ML20063M017

Annual 10CFR50.59 Rept 1993

ML20063M017
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	12/31/1993
From:	William Cahill, Woodlan D TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
TXX-94013, NUDOCS 9403080281
Download: ML20063M017 (105)

Text

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Log # TXX-94013

_-5 File # 10112 n

2 Ref. # 10CFR50.59(b)(2) r

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1UELECTRIC February 28, 1994 William J. Cahllt. Jr.

Group Vice President U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention:

Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT:

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES) - UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446 ANNUAL 10CFR50.59

SUMMARY

REPORT FOR 1993

.Gentiemen:

Attached is the CPSES Units 1 and 2 arnual report required by 10CFR50.59(b)(2) for 1993. This report contains a brief description of the changes, tests and/or experifimnts implemented er performed pursuant to 10CFR50.59(a), including a sunnary of each of the safety evaluations.

Items in this report are referenced by their 50.59 Safety Evaluation numbers.

This report includes'those activitfes which were completed in 1993 and were not reported to the' NRC in previons annual reports. This report covers the period from January 1, 1993 through December 31, 1993.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Jacob M. Kulangara at (214) 812-8818.

Sincerely, William J. Cahill, Jr.

h.

i D. R. Woodlan Cocket Licensing Manager JMK/jmk Attachment c-Mr. L. J. Callan, Region IV Resident Inspectors, CPSES (2)

Mr. T. A. Bergman, NRR Mr. A. B. Beach, Region IV 94030902B1 931231 PDR ADOCK 05000445 R

PDR

' 4m N. Olive Street LB. NI Dallas. Texas 75201 I

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Attachment to TXX-94013 COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION ANNUAL 10CFR50.59 REPORT 1993 TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC COMPANY

Attachment to TXX-94013 Page 2 of 104 COMANCHE PEAK UNITS 1 AND 2 ANNUAL 10CFR50.59 REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS This report contains a description and a summary of the following 10CFR50.59 Evaluations:

SE-91-062 Rev. 5 SE-93-021 Rev. C SE-93-083 Rev. O SE-91-149 Rev. O SE-93-022 Rev. O SE-93-084 Rev. 0 SE-92-055 Rev. O SE-93-023 Rev. O SE-93-085 Rev. O SE-92-061 Rev. O SE-93-027 Rev. C SE-93-086 Rev. O SE-92-085 Rev. O SE-93-028 Rev. O SE-93-087 Rev. O SE-92-108 Rev. O SE-93-029 Rev. O SE-93-089 Rev. O SE-92-117 Rev. O SE-93-030 Rev. O SE-93-090 Rev. O SE-92-123 Rev. 0-2 SE-93-033 Rev. O SE-93-091 Rev. O SE-92-153 Rev. O SE-93-034 Rev. O SE-93-092 Rev. O SE-92-165 Rev. O SE-93-035 Rev. O SE-93-095 Rev. O SE-92-173 Rev. O SE-93-038 Rev. 0-1 SE-93-096 Rev. O SE-92-175 Rev. 0 SE-93-039 Rev. 0-1 SE-93-097 Rev. O SE-92-178 Rev. O SE-93-041 Rev. O SE-93-098 Rev. O SE-92-187 Rev. O SE-93-045 Rev. O SE-93-099 Rev. O SE-92-188 Rev. O SE-93-047 Rev. O SE-93-100 Rev. O SE-92-189 Rev. O SE-93-048 Rev. 0-1 SE-93-102 Rev. 0-1 SE-92-190 Rev. O SE-93-049 Rev. O SE-93-106 Rev. O SE-92-203 Rev. O SE-93-050 Rev. O SE-93-110 Rev. O SE-92-204 Rev. O SE-93-051 Rev. O SE-93-111 Rev. O SE-92-205 Rev. O SE-93-052 Rev. 0-1 SE-93-112 Rev. O SE-92-207 Rev. O SE-93-054 Rev. 0 SE-93-113 Rev. O SE-92-210 Rev. O SE-93-056 Rev. O SE-93-114 Rev. O SE-93-001 Rev. O SE-93-058 Rev. O SE-93-115 Rev. O SE-93-002 Rev. O SE-93-059 Rev. O SE-93-116 Rev. O SE-93-003 Rev. O SE-93-060 Rev. O SE-93-117 Rev. O SE-93-004 Rev. O SE-93-062 Rev. O SE-93-120 Rev. O SE-93-005 Rev. O SE-93-063 Rev. O SE-93-007 Rev. O SE-93-064 Rev. O SE-93-008 Rev. O SE-93-067 Rev. O SE-93-009 Rev. O SE-93-068 Rev. O SE-93-010 Rev. O SE-93-071 Rev. 0-1 SE-93-011 Rev. O SE-93-0/2 Rev. O SE-93-015 Rev. O SE-93-073 Rev. 0-1 SE-93-016 Rev. O SE-93-075 Rev. O SE-93-017 Rev. O SE-93-076 Rev. O SE-93-018 Rev. O SE-93-077 Rev. O SE-93-019 Rev. 0-1 SE-93-078 Rev. 0-1 SE-93-020 Rev. O SE-93-080 Rev. O

Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 3 of 104 Unit: NXN Evaluation Number SE-91-062 Revision 5 Activity

Title:

Radioactive Material and Radioactive Waste Handling and Staging in Areas Outside of the Plant Description of Change (s) :

Due to insufficient space inside the plant, designated areas outside the plant are required for radioactive material handling and staging.

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The fenced area east of the Fuel Building and areas in and adjacent to Warehouse C will be used for radioactive material handling and staging. This activity involves the following:

t a.

Storage of radioactive materials (e.g.,

contaminated scaffolding and outage equipment, etc.);

b.

Staging of radioactive waste (e.g.,

resins, filters, shipment to an intermediate waste processor or waste disposal site; and Handling and sorting of Dry Active Waste (DAW).

c.

Summary of Evaluation:

It is concluded that this activity does not affect safety related structures, systems, components, and/or system parameters.

The radiological consequences of dropping a container loaded with high activity resins and a mishap involving Dry Active Waste were evaluated. The analysis determined that the offsite doses were well within the limits of 10 CFR 100 siting criteria. Additionally, the potential for creation of tornado generated missiles resulting from outdoor storage containers was evaluated.

The potential radiological consequences of damage due to a tornado are enveloped by the consequences of a resin handling accident.

The evaluation conc.ludes that there is no unreviewed safety question.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 4 of 104 Unit: 1X2 Evaluation Number SE-91-149 Activity

Title:

Revision 3 to the DR/QR report for the Transamerica Delaval Diesel Generators at CPSES.

Description of Change (s) :

This activity incorporates revisions to the Maintenance and Surveillance (M/S) program for certain components as described in Revision 3 of the Transamerica Delaval, Inc (TDI) Diesel Owners Group Design Review and Quality Revalidation (DR/QR) report. Most of the changes are minor and this evaluation provides the added clarifications pertaining to the applicability of these changes to the CPSES.

Summary of Evaluation:

1 1

Based on the significant operating experience on the nuclear service of the TDI engines, the TDI Owners Group issued Revision 3 of the DR/QR report.

CPSES will be implementing Revision 3 of the DR/QR report with plant specific clarifications as delineated in this evaluation. Revisions to the M/S program, which is discussed in Appendix II of the DR/QR Report, are intended to enhance the reliability and availability of the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG).

For certain components, detrimental inspections have been eliminated or their frequency reduced, new inspections added or the existing inspections increased and components which have shown no adverse trends have had their inspection frequency decreased or inspection requirements modified.

Implementation of this activity to the CPSES Units 1 and 2 does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, and does not increase the possibility of a new accident not previously evaluated.

It does not decrease the margin of safety defined by the bases of the Technical Specifications nor does it impact the radiological consequences of any radiological

accident, i

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I Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 5 of 104 Unit: INN Evaluation Number SE-92-055 Activity

Title:

DM 91-106 R1,LDCR SA-92-640; Replemnt.and Addtn.of Sodium Analzrs in the Secondary Samp1g.Pnl, Condenser Pit and Condensate Polisher Panel.

Description of Change (s) :

This activity performed the following:

1. Added two new sodium analyzers locally in the condenser pit to allow a quick and accurate determination of which waterbox to isolate and drain in the event of a condenser tube leak.

2. Replaced the existing secondary sampling recorders, analyzers and conductivity cells which were obsolete, difficult to maintain and which have proven to be highly unreliable with regard to information provided.

3. Added new sodium analyzer at condensate polisher panel to monitor the lead bed performance. Also provided input from the main generator primary water system conductivity and dissolved oxygen transmitters to the secondary sampling panel recorders.

Summary of Evaluation:

The modifications involved in this activity are non-safety related.

The modifications primarily provide measurement, analysis and recording features.

There are no control functions and there is no impact on the process parameters being measured.

Changes to electrical loads imposed by the addition of new devices have been analyzed and found not to cause source overload conditions. There are no accidents or malfunctions of equipment important to safety described in the Licensing Basis Documents which involve structures, systems, components or parameters that could be affected by implementation of this modification.

Technical Specifications for Secondary Water Chemistry, Records of Secondary Water Sampling and Water Quality and the ODCM apply to the systems, components and parameters affected by this activity.

However, there are no acceptance limits or failure values associated with these Technical Specifications, and implementation of this activity will not require any change to these Technical Specifications. Therefore, this modification will have no effect on any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 6 of 104 Unit: 1XN Evaluation Number SE-92-061 Activity

Title:

LDCR SA-92-592; Updated Description of Potable Water, Surface Water Pre-Treat and Condensate Clean-up to Current Plant Operations Description of Change (s) :

This activity revised FSAR Sections 9.2 and 10.4 to remove irrelevant and trivial information.

These sections were also updated with information concerning the physical changes to the sewage treatment system and the water treatment system (DM-89-406). The FSAR was updated with present operating practice, relevant information, and provided with clarification for the potable water, sewage treatment, fire protection, water treatment, low volume waste, and condensate polishing systems.

Summary of Evaluation:

DM 89-406 replaced and upgraded the pretreatment (clarification) portion of the Water Treatment system.

SE-90-085 was performed for DM 89-406.

These changes are additional information from that change.

The chlorination portion of the sewage treatment system was changed to a solid chlorinator which utilizes sewage treatment flow.

The sewage treatment system is not a part of the physical design of the plant.

These modifications present no new failure mode for these plant systems or the plant, and in addition, are not related to safety of the plant in any fashion.

Due to operational experience with equipment since the startup of the plant and comparison of operation with industry practice, some I

operational practices developed which improved performance, increased the corrosion protection of the plant, or were the result of the inoperability of components as originally intended / designed. This modification serves to update the FSAR with the present operating practices.

This modification therefore does not present any change or affect any structure, system, or components and/or system parameters as only information is changed.

Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 7 of 104 Unit: NXN Evaluation Number SE-92-085 Activity

Title:

DM 91-99, LDCR SA-92-687; Addition of Radiation Monitor in CCW Drain Tank Common Discharge Line Description of Change (s) :

This activity includes the installation of a radiation monitor in the common discharge line of the CCW Drain Tank, AB Sump 11 and the DG Sumps to allow continuous discharge to the LVW system. A high radiation signal would divert the discharge to the Cocurrent Waste system for batch processing. Additionally, the installation includes a bypass line around the CCWDT from AB Sump 3.

This line would tie into the common discharge line upstream of the new radiation monitor.

The systems which could be affected by implementation of this modification are as follows:

Process Radiation Monitoring System Component Cooling Water System Vents and Drains System Wastewater Management System Plant Non-lE Electrical Distribution System.

Summary of Evaluation:

There are no accidents or malfunctions or equipment important to safety described in license basis documents involving the structures, systems, components and systems parameters described above that could be affected by implementation of this modification.

Implementation of this modification has no potential for impacting the safety function of the CCW system during normal and accident conditions. The addition of the radiation monitor for the common discharge line only affects the NNS portion of the CCW System and cannot prevent the safety function from being performed. The bypass line for AB Sump 3 also only affects the NNS portion of the system with no potential for impacting the design safety functions.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 8 of 104 Unit: 1X2 Evaluation Number SE-92-108 Activity

Title:

DM 91-102,LDCR SA-92-706; Instal.of Silncr. on Aux. Boiler Stm.Supp.Lne Vent and Replce. Ball Chk.Vivs & Steam Traps on Atmizng. Air / Steam Line Description of Change (s) :

This activity installs a silencer on the Auxiliary Boiler steam supply vent to redace the excessive noise during venting.

Also, the ball-check bypass valves around the steam traps, as well as the steam traps, are being replaced with new equipment due to excessive failures of these components.

Summary of Evaluation:

All piping, valves, and equipment affected by this activity are non-safety related.

Implementation of this activity would have the same effect on structures, systems, components, and system parameters as the existing system. Thus the probability or consequences of accidents or malfunctions of equipment important to safety are unaffected by the implementation of this activity.

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l Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 9 of 104 Unit: INN Evaluation Number SE-92-ll7 Activity

Title:

Deferral of Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Inspection Activities Originally Scheduled For Unit 1RFO2 Description of ' Change (s) :

This activity defers specific inspection and maintenance items for nine DR/QR Phase II components of the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) for up to one refueling cycle. These items were originally scheduled for the upcoming CPSES Unit 1 refueling outage (lRF02).

Summary of Evaluation:

The goal of the EDG maintenance and surveillance program is to ensure that the EDGs are properly maintained and capable of reliably performing their safety function.

This evaluation reviewed specific inspection and maintenance recommendations for nine DR/QR Phase II components. All the recommendations were confirmatory in nature and were not the primary means of determining the condition of the EDG.

The existing monitoring and trending program provided adequate indication of an internal malfunction or impending malfunction and provided adequate assurance that the component will support the safety function of the EDG.

NUREG/CR-5057, " Aging Mitigation and Improved Programs for Nuclear Service Diesel Generators," concludes,

"....it is strongly recommended that an engine not be torn down solely for the purpose of inspection, unless the monitoring and trending program provides evidence of an internal malfunction or impending malfunction.

It was indicated earlier that such disassembly could actually detract i

from engine reliability." Implementation of the proposed activity' does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question based on: 1) the confirmatory nature of the inspection requirements, 2) no indications i

of abnormalities from the monitoring and trending programs, 3) positive inspection results from other utilities, and 4) the conclusions of NUREG/CR-5057.

In addition, this deferral minimizes the EDG outage time during 1RF02 while the NRC and the Cooper Enterprise Clearinghouse resolve the need for such inspections in light of the adverse impact of having an EDG inoperable during an outage and the reliability monitoring programs now in use.

These long tear down and inspection requirements impact emergency AC power availability during outages which has been shown to be important to shutdown risk.

Attachment to TXX-94r13 TU Electric Page 10 of 104 Unit: NXN Evaluation Number SE-92-123 Revision 2 Activity

Title:

LDCR SA-92-829; DM 90-494, R.2; DCN-4747; Surface Water Treatment i

System Upgrade Description of Change (s) :

DM 90-494 removes the existing "Reacta-Pak" units, associated sump pumps, conduit, water / air lines and relocates the water production lab's HVAC unit in order to prepare the building currently housing this system for installation of an upgraded Water Treatment System of greater production capacity.

System air and water lines, which will be incorporated for use in the new system, will be cut and capped at or near the building boundary, to be rerouted following preliminary equipment removal. Two of the existing sump pumps, their related components, and several other valves and lines will'be spared, but removed from the building to be later relocated and reinstalled.

The existing building will bn enlarged to accommodate the new Water Treatment System.

The existing system transformer will also be replaced with a larger unit.

The existing Water Treatment System has had a poor service record with respect to reliability, quality and quantity of water produced.

It is projected that the system will be unable to meet the support demands of two operating units in the long term.

The Reacta-Pak system is out-of-service.

Its removal has no impact upon on-line systems.

However, modifications which will be performed on the Demineralized Water Storage Tank, R.O.

Product Water Storage Tank, and Filtered Water Storage Tank will require the isolation of these tanks.

DM 90-494 initiates the installation of the new Water Treatment System by removal of the existing Reacta-Pak system and its components.

Building preparation for installation of the new Water Treatment System includes the installation of the supporting service lines above and below ground, and enlargement of the building structure. The new system equipment will be installed under Revision 2 of DM 90-494 Summary of Evaluation:

Implementation of Design Modification 90-494 Revision 2, does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question. The removal of the existing system, which is an out-of-service, non-safety related system, does not impact the safety of the plant.

The installation of non-safety related support piping and the new Water Treatment System (also NNS) also will not impact the safety of the plant. No new credible failure modes for any of the interfacing plant systems are introduced, and there is no potential for an Lmpact on the safety function of any plant structure, system or component.

Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 11 of 104 Unit: INN Evaluation Number SE-92-153 l

Activity

Title:

DM-91-148 R.0, LDCR SA 92-804; Replace Roots Blowers on Gaseous l

Radiation Monitors with Thomas Pumps l

l Description of Change (s) :

Replace Roots AF-22 blower with Thomas pumps on Radiation Monitors'l-RE-5502/66/03, X-RE-5568A/75A/67A, X-RE-5568B/75B/67B, X-RE-5895A, and i

X-RE-5896B.

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Summary of Evaluation.

f The design modification (DM 91-148 R.0) replaces existing blowers with new blowers.

The new equipment installed meets the same qualification and installation requirements as the existing equipment,

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and is powered from the same power source.

Operation of monitors remains t'ae sane and no new failure modes are introduced.

After l'aplementation of the activity, monitor malfunction would continue to result in equipment important to safety with which the monitor (s) interfaces, operating in the safe direction.

The activity does not change setpoints or operability requirements.

Testing is conducted to verify correct operation of monitors, and to determine that setpoints remain unchanged.

The Licensing Design Change Request (LDCR SA-92-804) updates the Final Safety Analysis Report Figures 8.3-9 Sheet 3 and 8.3-11 Sheets 2 and 3, to reflect the effects of the Radiation Monitor Skid design changes l

on their respective MCCs.

There is no Unreviewed Safety Question associated with this activity.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 12 of 104 Unit: 1XN Evaluation Number SE-92-165 Activity

Title:

MM 92-351 R0, LDCR SA-92-815; Removal of Abandoned Equalization Mixing Tank / Associated Equipment & Replacement with Corrosion Resistant Pipe Description of Change (s) :

This modification removes previously abandoned equipment that is no longer needed to process low volume wastes for discharge.

The equipment removed is the Equalization Mixing Tank (CPS-WMATEQ-01) and the Equalization Mixer (CPS-WMMEEQ-01).

Summary of Evaluation:

There are no potential accidents or malfunctions of equipment important to safety involving equipment and system parameters affected by the modification, since it involves the removal of equipment previously rendered ncnfunctional. The Waste Water Management System is not safety-related or considered part of the Radwaste Management System.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 13 of 104 Unit: INN Evaluation Number SE-92-173 Activity

Title:

DM 92-039 R.0; 30 Day Early Power Down of the Emergency Response Fac.

Computer Sys. and Subsequent Removal of ERFC Equipment During 1RF03 Description of Change (s) :

The existing Validyne multiplexor cabinets, located in the CPSES-Unit 1 Cable Spreading Room, will be reconfigured by removing existing internals in order to install new remote multiplexing hardware. This hardware includes Nuclear Safety Related Class lE isolation equipment to provide an electrical barrier between Class 1 E plant process instrumentation and non safety related Plant Computer System (PCS) hardware and circuits.

In preparation of this activity, the existing [ERF] cabinets will be powered down and the existing Class 1E instrumentation inputs to these cabinets will be disabled. This evaluating presents the justification for: (1) the power-down of the ERF Computer one month prior to the refueling outage by considering potential failure modes and effects this action might have on the Class lE process instrumentation, and (2) alternate means for complying with Post Accident Monitoring instrumentation requirements (R.G. 1.97 Category 1 Variables).

Summary of Evaluation:

The de-termination of Class lE cable at the existing ERF Multiplexor Cabinets will result in the loss of R.G.

1.97 Category 1 monitoring of select parameters. In order to comply with the. requirements of R.G.

l.97 during the power-down of the ERF, compensatory measures will be installed via temporary modification (TM 93-1-19) to assure that the plant operating configuration at no time is compromised with regard to R.G.

1.97 accident monitoring instrumentation.

The impact of this modification on the Class lE instrumentation loops has been reviewed with specific focus on signal characteristics, plant systems, and plant operating mode.

the proposed activity will not introduce or affect any systems, structures, or components which could create any unanalyzed safety concerns resulting in an unanticipated or credible potential failure or accident scenario. This is assured by maintaining electrical and physical separation and redundancy requirements in the Class 1E cabinets and by providing alternate means of interim protection for exposed Class lE signal wires due to the removal of the existing Class lE /non Class lE boundary.

Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 14 of 104 Unit: NXN Evaluation Number SE-92-175 Activity

Title:

LDCR SA-92-835; Enhancement of Auxiliary Operator and Radwaste Operator Training Program Description Description of Change (s) :

FSAR Chapter 13.2 change involves an enhancement of auxiliary operator and radwaste operator training program description. The current training program description for "nonlicensed operators" is augmented to differentiate between the training program description for

" auxiliary operators" and the training program description for l

"radwaste operators".

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The FSAR change adds the training program description for radwaste l

operators. Due to the specialization of radwaste operators in radwaste systems, the requirement to train auxiliary operators in radwaste systems is being deleted.

In addition, system observation-l training which consisted of self paced blocks is being deleted from the nonlicensed operator training program description and replaced with an enhanced on-the-job training program description designed for I

the auxiliary operators' specific tasks and an on-the-job training l

program description designed for the radwaste operators'-specific tasks.

This FSAR change updates commitment made in TXX-4097 dated January 17, 1984 submitted to support application for byproduct material license.

l The letter stated that "... personnel who are trained as Auxiliary Operators will be fully qualified to operate the systems at CPSES which generate and process radioactive waste...."

Based on this FSAR change, personnel trained as radwaste operators will be fully qualified to operate the systems at CPSES which generate and process radioactive waste in lieu of auxiliary operators.

i Summary of Evaluation:

1 This FSAR change enhances the training program description for l

auxiliary operators and radwaste operators.

The enhanced training l

program captures the same range of topics as before. Training i

auxiliary operators and radwaste operators is as effective if not better than training auxiliary operators to do both functions. There is no affect on any structures, systems, components, or system parameters affected by this FSAR change.

Therefore, accidents or malfunctions of equipment important to safety evaluated in the licensing basis documents are not affected, the potential for a new type of unanalyzed event is not created and the margin of safety for any Technical Specification basis is not reduced.

Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 15 of 104 Unit: 1X2 l

Evaluation Number SE-92-178 Activity

Title:

MM 92-424,-428,-431; LDCR SA-92-837; New Battery Pack Addition to Unit 2 Emergency Lights red from Unit 1 Emergency Lighting Panels Description of Change (s) :

Add new battery packs to the Unit 2 Omergency Lights fed from Unit 1 Emergency Lighting Panels EAB7 and EAB10 in Auxiliary Building and ECB1 and ECB2 in Control Building to meet the requirements of APCSB l

9.5-1 and DBD-EE-047 Revision 0.

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Summary of Evaluation:

l The Minor Modifications (M4 92-424; 428; 431) add battery packs to Unit 2 Emergency Lights which are required to illuminate Unit 2 areas locating fire safe shutdown equipment and access and egress routes between these areas.

These battery pack lights are fed from Unit 1 Emergency Lighting panels. Non-Class 1E branch lighting circuits are properly isolated from Class 1E power supply by the Class 1E circuit breakers located in the upstream Emergency Lighting panels.

These Emergency Lighting panels in the event of LOCA and/or LOOP, are fed from Unit 1 Diesel Generator through Class 1E MCCs.

The worst case (blackout condition) loading of Diesel Generator has increased from 6232.3 kw to 6232.5 kw due to additional battery pack loading of 0.216 kw.

The new loading of 6232.5 kw is less than the rated capacity of 7000 kw and is less than the Technical Specification l

limit of 6300 kw.

This modification presents no new failure modes for the plant or any plant systems.

l The Licensing Design Change Request (LDCR SA-92-837) revises Final l

Safety Analysis Report Tables 8.3-1A, 8.3-1B and 8.3-2.

The implementation of the above activities does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 16 of 104 Unit: NN2 Evaluation Number SE-92-187 Activity

Title:

TM 92-2-009 R0; Install Load Sensing Clevis Pins in the Feedwater System to Aid in Recording System Loads during Fower Ascension Testing Description of Change (s) :

This temporary modification affects portions of all four loops in the 18" diameter and 6" diameter main feedwater piping system in the Reactor Building of CPSES Unit 2.

Specifically, for eighteen (18) selected snubbers and six (6) selected struts, load sensing clevis pins are to be installed in place of the originally supplied load pins at the connection of the strut or snubber paddle to the rear bracket.

These load sensing clevis pins will be used during power ascension test, per ISU-212B, to detect actual system loadings throughout the Feedwater System during dynamic transient testing. Actual system loadings will be recorded and compared to predicted system loadings to assure the piping and support system is adequately designed for all design basis loading conditions.

Successful completion of this testing satisfies, in part, the requirements of FSAR Section 3.9B.2.1.2, Dynamic Transient Response Testing.

Summary of Evaluation:

The load sensing clevis pins are supplied by either Teledyne Engineering Services or Strainsert Company, both of which are on the CPSES AVL with established Quality Assurance programs.

The pins are manufactured from ASME Class 1 material; this requirement meets or exceeds the material requirement for the permanent load pins.

Additionally, these pins are designed to the maximum allowable load for the strut or snubber to which they attach.

Since they are also designed to be " drop-in" replacements, they will not restrict the Feeditater Piping System from its normal thermal displacement (it would possibly be restricted if the pins were a different size or shape).

Thus, since the load sensing clevis pins meet or exceed all specification requirements of the originally installed (pe rmanent) load pins, their presence in the system will in no way affect accidents, malfunctions, or margins of safety as defined in the Licensing Basis Documents.

Therefore, implementation of the temporary modification does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question.

Attachment to TXX-94013 TU E3actric Page 17 of 104 Unit: NN2 Evaluation Number SE-92-188 Activity

Title:

TM 92-2-010 R0; Install Lanyard Potentiometers and RTDs on Feedwater Piping to Assist in Measuring Piping Thermal Displacement Description of Change (s) :

This Temporary Modification affects portions of all four loops of the i

18" diameter and 6" diameter Main Feedwater Piping System, as well as some miscellaneous permanent plant structures, in the Reactor Building of CPSES Unit 2.

Specifically, eighty-four (84) lanyard potentio-meters and eight (8) resistance temperature detectors (RTDs) are to be installed at selected locations.on the Feedwater Piping system. This test equipment will be used during power ascension testing, per ISU-308B, to monitor actual system displacements during plant heat-up.

Actual system displacements will be recorded and compared to predicted system displacements to assure the piping is moving the direction, and of the magnitude desired.

Successful completion of this testing satisfies, in part, the requirements of FSAR Section 3.9B.,2.1.1, Thermal Expansion Test.

Summary of Evaluation:

Review of this Temporary Modification identified three potential impacts due to implementation of this activity. These potential impacts may summarized as follows:

1.

Additional mass on the piping due to the RTDs and stainless steel banding, and the strain transducer cables.

2 Additional mass on miscellaneous permanent plant structures due i

to attachment of temporary back-up structures for the lanyard potentiometers.

3.

Possible vertical missile hazards due to seismically induced dislodging of the temporary back-up structures from the permanent plant structures.

Each of these potential impacts was reviewed with respect to its potential effect on plant safety.

It was concluded that due to the relatively insignificant mass being added to systems, structures, and components (for items 1 and 2, above), and due to the redundant seismic protection being supplied as part of this Temporary Modification (for item 3, above), that no credible potential failure modes could be introduced.

Thus, implementation of this activity will in no way affect accidents, malfunctions, or margins of safety as defined in the licensing Basia Documents.

Therefore, implementation of this Temporary Modification does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 18 of 104 Unit: NN2 Evaluation Number SE-92-189 i

l Activity

Title:

TM 92-2-011 R0; Install Load Sensing Clevis Pins in the Main Steam System to Aid in Recording System Loads During Power Ascension Testing Description of Change (s) :

This Temporary Modification affects portions of all four loops of the 32" diameter Main Steam Piping System in the Reactor Building of CPSES Unit 2.

Specifically, for seventeen (17) selected snubbers, load sensing clevis pins are to be installed in place of the originally supplied load pins at the connection of the snubber paddle to the rear bracket. These load sensing clevis pins will be used during power ascension testing, per ISU-212B, to detect actual system loadings throughout the Main Steam Piping System during dynamic transient testing. Actual system loadings will be recorded and compared to predicted system loadings to assure the piping and support system is adequately designed for all design basis loading conditions.

Spacessful completion of this testing satisfies, in part, the req. rements of FSAR Section 3.9B.2.1.2, Dynamic Transient Response Testing.

Summary of Evaluation:

The load sensing clevis pins are supplied by either Teledyne i

Engineering Services or Strainsert Company, both of which are on the CPSES AVL with established Quality Assurance programs.

The pins are manufactured from ASME Class 1 material; this requirement meets or exceeds the material requirement for the permanent load pins.

Additionally, these pins are designed to the maximum allowable load for the snubber to which they attach.

Since they are also designed to be " drop-in" replacements, they will not restrict the Main Steam Piping System from its normal thermal displacement (it would possibly be restricted if the pins were a different size or shape).

thus, since the load sensing clevis pins meet or exceed all specification requirements or the originally installed (pe rmanent ) load pins, their presence in the system will in no way affect accidents, malfunction, or margins of safety as defined in the Licensing Basis Documents.

l Therefore, implementation of the Temporary Modification does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question.

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l Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 19 of 104 Unit: INN Evaluation Number SE-92-190 l

l Activity Title MM-92-429 R.0, LDCR SA-92-843; Change of Ground Fault Detection Circuit Resistor Values for DC Switchboards 1D1 & 1D2 Description of Change (s) :

The Minor Modification (ted 92-429, Rev. 0; DCN-5179) modifies the value of resistors in the ground fault detection circuit for Non Class 1E DC switchboards 1D1 and 1D2. The resist values in the ground fault detection circuit for DC switchboards 1D1 and 1D2 are too high to allow for the proper operation of the ground fault detection lights on panels. The new lower resistor values allow for the proper illumination of the ground fault detection lights when the ground detector switch is operated.

The Licensing Document Change Request (LDCR SA-92-843) updates the Final Safety Analysis Report Figure 8.3-14A sheets 1 and 2 to reflect the above described modifications.

Summary of Evaluation:

This activity does not increase the probability / possibility of malfunctions / accidents of the systems / equipment required for safety.

It reestablishes functionality to a ground fault detection circuit, thereby facilitating early detection and correction of ground conditions.There is no technical specification section associated with the 24/48vDC and 125VDC Non-Class 1E DC System.

Also, it does not involve unreviewed safety concern.

3 Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 20 of 104 Unit: IN2 Evaluation Number SE-92-203 Activity

Title:

PCN RWS-105-R2-9; Provide Valve Line-up and Instructions to Pump the Recycle Holdup Tanks (RHUTs) Inventory to riant Effluent Holdup Tanks Description of Change (s) :

In order to provide more efficient discharge of collected waste water from the Recycle Holdup Tanks, provide a faster rate of processing RHUT inventory, and allow greater Radwaste Operations flexibility, changes are made to current Radwaste Operations's procedures.

This change allows an alternate method of treating RHUT inventory other than processing through the Boron Recycle Evaporator.

RHUT discharge to be processed will be routed through a vendor supplied Filter /Demineralizer skid to the Plant Effluent Holdup and Monitor Tanks.

Summary of Evaluation:

Utilization of system components to provide an alternate path for treatment of RHUT inventory will introduce no credible system or component failure modes.

Utilization of system piping to allow flow in a direction other than the " normal" direction will not introduce conditions greater than the existing design capability of the components.

There are no check valves or other flow direction sensitive devices that will be adversely affected by implementation of the proposed activity.

Possible damage to a Floor Drain Tank Filter cartridge will be avoided as the filter cartridge will be removed prior to the transfer of RHUT inventory.

Existing accident analyses are not affected by the implementation of this activity.

It was also determined that this activity will not impact Technical Specifications.

Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 21 of 104 Unit: NN2 l

l Evaluation Number SE-92-204 l

Activity

Title:

I TM 92-1-102, R0; TM 92-2-016, R1; Temporary Installation of Piping Vibration Monitoring Equipment during Initial Startup Testing Description of Change (s) :

This activity involves temporary installation of piping vibration monitoring equipment in CPSES Unit 2 for use during initial startup testing.

A Data Acquisition System (DAS) located in the Unit 2 Control Room l

receives power from Non-Class 1E power supply panel XC2-1 via relay panel X-CV-01.

A multiplexer located in containment receives power from junction box JB-2S-3160 which is powered from Non-Class 15 power supply panel 2C3.

I This junction box is located in the safeguards building and power transferred to the multiplexer via electrical penetration E-55.

l Summary of Evaluation:

Eventhough this Temporary Modification is for Unit 2 and power sources used are Unit 2 and common, the evaluation is performed because it is l

anticipated that this installation will remain in place beyond Unit 2 l

fuel load (Unit 2 Operating License).

Justification used in evaluation 90-024, Rev. O is applicable to this installation also.

l This activity does not increase the probability / possibility of malfunction / accidents for safety related equipment / systems / structures nor does it involve an unreviewed safety question or change to the Technical Specifications.

The power to the system is Non Class 1E and is appropriately isolated from Class 1E power supplies.

The equipment is secured in such a manner so as to preclude adverse system interactions. All penetration barrier breaches have been sealed or l

otherwise evaluated / controlled to assure that the required barriers l

remain functional.

Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 22 of 104 Unit: NN2 Evaluation Number SE-92-205 Activity

Title:

TM 92-2-013 R0; Installation of Temporary cables from Data Acquisition System in Safeguards Bldg. via Penetration E-52 to Containment Sensors Description of Change (s) :

This activity involves determination of ILRT related cables to install and terminate temporary test cables from field sensors in Containment through penetration E-52 to the Data Acquisition system in the Safeguards Building.

Instead of using Unit 1 power source and junction boxes, in this modification, Unit 2 power source and Unit 2 junction boxes are used.

Summary of Evaluation:

Eventhough this Temporary Modification is for Unit 2 and the power source used is Unit 2, this Evaluation is performed because it is anticipated that this temporary installation will remain in place beyond the Unit 2 Fuel Load (Unit 2 Operating License).

Justification used in Evaluation 89-116, Rev. 0 (for Unit 1 testing) is also applicable for this Temporary Modification.

This activity does not increase the probability / possibility of malfunctions / accidents for the safety related equipment / systems

/ structures.

Further, it neither involves unreviewed safety questions nor involves changes to the Technical Specifications, l

i Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric l

Page 23 of 104 Unit: INN Evaluation Number SE-92-207 l

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Activity

Title:

LDCR SA-92-855; Permanent Use of Presently Installed DAS Soft Run l

Cable Inside the-Unit 1 Containment l

Description of Change (s) :

When CPSES Unit 1 integrates the Data Acquj.sition System (DAS) into the new Plant Process Computer, the DAS soft run cables outside the Containment will be removed.

However, those DAS cables inside the Containment will remain in place.

Summary of Evaluation:

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The Non-Class lE DAS instrumentation cables, which are soft run inside Unit 1 Contaimment, provide computer inputs from temperature and thermal movement sensors.

These cables which carry low level signals, are IEEE 383 qualified and installed to seismic Category II

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requirements, and meet the separation requirements of Regulatory Guide l.75.

The cables were installed for the temporary DAS and are being utilized by the Plant Process Computer System to minknize production of contaminated waste and to maintain personnel radiation exposure

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ALARA.

The potential failure modes are the same regardless of whether these cables are soft run or enclosed in raceway.

The cables are already installed, so permitting them to remain in place will not adversely impact reliability of the data, or operation of the plant.

l The implementation of the above activity does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 24 of 104 Unit: IN2 i

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Evaluation Number SE-92-210 Activity

Title:

l LDCR TR-93-004; Revision to TRM Tbl. 4.1.la & b to Add / Delete Loads and to Change Brkr. Cub. & Panel Board Tag Numbers and Breaker Type Description of Change (s) :

The Licensing Design Change Request (LDCR TR-93-004) adds / deletes loads for Unit 2 MCCs on Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Table 4.1.lb, pages 4-22, 4-23 and 4-24. This LDCR also changes panel board tag number on TRM Table 4.1.lb, page 4-30, and revises breaker types and deletes breaker catalog numbers on TRM Table 4.1.la, page 4-17 and Table 4.1.lb, page 4-30, and revises switchgear cubicle numbers on Table 4.1.lb, page 4-28.

Summary of Evaluation:

Deletion and addition of loads to non-Class 1E MCCs and other minor changes as described in the Licensing Design Change Request (LDCR) have no adverse effect on MCC loading, cable / breaker sizing, circuit I

protection, voltage drop and penetration conductor overload protection.

This activity does not involve any credible potential failures and will not create probability / possibility of new accident / malfunction of equipment important to safety and does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

Also, iL has no arrect on the margin of safety.

l The implementation of this activity does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

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l Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 25 of 104 Unit: NN2 Evaluation Number SE-93-001 Activity

Title:

LDCR TR-93-003; Revision to Define Initial Visual Inspection Interval for Unit 2 Snubbers Description of Change (s) :

Revises Technical Requirement 3.1.b of the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) to define the time period, after Power Operation, during which the " rst inservice visual inspection of each type (inaccessible or accessible) of snubber on any system shall be performed.

LDCR$ TR-91-003 modified the requirements for snubber inservice inspection based on Generic Letter 90-09; this LDCR was incorporated into the TRM as part of Revision 5.

Generic Letter 90-09 considered only operating nuclear power plants and therefore assumed that previous inspection intervals had taken place. The change covered by this safety evaluation reinstates some of the Standard Technical Specification requirements so that the TRM will more properly apply to both CPSES Units 1 and 2.

Summary of Evaluation:

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Snubber functional testing provides a 95 percent confidence level that 90 percent to 100 percent of the snubbers operate within specified acceptance limits. The change to the TRM being evaluated does not alter existing functional testing requirements; therefore, the 95 percent confidence level is not affected. Being that the confidence level for i

snubber operability remains unchanged, implementation of the proposed changes do not affect any structures, systems or components and/or system parameters; introduce any new credible failure modes; or, create the potential for a new type of unanalyzed event.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 26 of 104 Unit: NN2 f

Evaluation Number i

SE-93-002 l

Activity

Title:

LDCR SA-93-004; Identification of one additional Seismic Category II Pipe Segment being located in a Non-Category I Building (Turbine Bld.)

l Description of Change (s) :

I FSAR Sections 3.2, 3.7B, and Table 17A-1 are updated to identify an additional Unit 2 Seismic Category II Pipe (8-l HD-2-069-302-5) being located in Unit 2 Turbine Building.

This Unit 2 non-ASME HD line was previously a non-analyzed system and was recently seismically analyzed and qualified to satisfy CPSES licensing commitment and design basis.

Letter TXX-4092, dated January 5, 1984 requires that all non-ASME high energy pipe in Seismic Category I areas are designed to Seismic Category I.

This Unit 2 non-ASME Heater Drain line, being a high energy line and located in a Category I Building (Electrical Control (EC) Room 113),

is therefore required to be seismically analyzed and qualified.

The stress boundary of this seismic piping system runs from the Unit 2 Steam Generator Heat Exchanger in EC Room 113, through the EC Building west wall, and l

terminates at a seismic pipe interface anchor, thirteen inches inside the Turbine Building.

Summary of Evaluation:

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LDCR SA-93-004 supplements the affected FSAR Sections to l

add this thirteen inch long pipe segment as another i

condition to the same new Mixed Category description in the

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FSAR.

There is no credible potential failure mode introduced by this activity.

It has been demonstrated that unacceptable interactions between the Turbine Building /

l equipment and the Heater Drain Line up to and including the l

interface anchor, will not occur under a seismic event.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 Page 27 of 104 TU Electric

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Unit: NN2 Evaluation Number SE-93-003 Activity

Title:

PCN-STA-742-R4-1 "Snubbet Surveillance Program";

the initial snubber visual inspection interval for Unit 2 Change to establish Description of Change (s) :

Revises STA-742, " Snubber Surveillance Program," to define the time period, after Power Operation, during which the first inservice visual inspection of each type (inaccessible or accessible) of snubber on any system shall be performed.

LDCR4 TR-91-003 modified the requirements for snubber inservice inspection based on Generic Letter 90-09; this LDCR was incorporated into the TRM as part of Revision 5 nuclear power plants and therefore assumed that previousGeneric Letter 90-09 inspection intervals had taken place.

The change covered by the safety evaluation reinstates some of the Standard Technical Specification requirements so that STA-742 will more properly apply to both CPSES Units 1 and 2.

Summary of Evaluation:

Snubber functional testing provides a 95 percent level that confidence 90 percent to 100 percent of the snubbers operate within specified acceptance limits.

STA-742 being evaluated does not alter existing functionalThe change to testing requirements; therefore, the 95 percent confidence level is not affected.

snubber operability remains unchanged,Being that the confidence level for implementation of the proposed changes do not affect any structures, or components and/or system parameters; introduce any new systems credible failure modes; or, type of unanalyzed event, create the potential for a new l

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 28 of 104 Unit: NN2 Evaluation Number SE-93-004 Activity

Title:

Postpone Unit 2 Evacuation Alarm Audibility Test until after Fuel Load Description of Change (s) :

The evacuation alarm audibility test was to be performed during the Unit 2 Pre-Operational Test Program. This test was not performed.

The audibility test will be performed when plant conditions permit.

This evaluation reviews the requirements of the evacuation alarm to insure there is no unanalyzed event.

Summary of Evaluation:

This activity will not increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident previously evaluated in the licensing basis documents. The impact is considered a personnel safety concern.

The potential impact of postponing the evacuation alarm test was evaluated against the requirements of the CPSES Technical Specifications and FSAR.

There is no reference to the evacuation alarm audibility in the Technical Specifications.

The FSAR describes the alarm system, but there is no impact on plant safety if the alarm does not function or is not heard.

1 Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 29 of 104 Unit: NN2 Evaluation Number SE-93-005 Activity

Title:

j LDCR SA-93-003; Update 3 of the Unit 2 Brk. Point Location Drawings in FSAR Section 3.6B (Figures 3.6B-141, 142, and 184) l Description of Change (s) :

Figures 3.6B-142 and 142:

Pipe breaks were originally postulated at every fitting / weld for non-analyzed high energy lines 2-SB-2-072-1302-5, 8-SB-2-030-302-5 and 8-HD-2-069-302-5 in accordance with FSAR Section 3.6B and Standard Review Plan 3.6.2 requirements. These pipe segments were recently l

i seismically analyzed (stress problems SB-2-79H and SB-2-79G) with pipe 1

break locations postulated based on stress levels (only terminal breaks were postulated).

Several intermediate breaks which were l

previously postulated at every fitting / weld can therefore be l

eliminated. These intermediate break locations will be retained since

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no hardware protection is required and the engineering records for walkwdown results/ target evaluations of the effects of these can be retained.

Figure 3.6B-184:

A terminal break, break no. 006T was previously postulated

..t the boundary of stress problems 2-41A and 2-41L on Figure 3.68-184.

The effects of this break were determined to be undesirable due to potential damage to two CVCS isolation vcives.

A piping analysis has been performed combining these two stress problems, thereby elimination the need of postulating a terminal break at the boundary.

Summary of Evaluation:

i This change eliminates a postulated high energy line pipe break in a Chemical volume Control piping System (CVCS) (Figure 3.6B-184).

Based on piping analysis results this terminal break need not be postulated.

The postulated damage to the CVCS isolation valves is not credible.

This change also updates the stress problem boundary locations, and notes that several pipe breaks are conservative (Figures 3.6B-141 and 142).

Retaining these intermediate breaks is conservative. These changes do not affect any accidents or malfunctions of any equipment.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 30 of 104 Unit: 1X2 Evaluation Number SE-93-007 Activity

Title:

LDCR SA-93-023; Tech. Spec. Interpret. No. 023, Rev. O, TS 4.6.2.2.d; Five Year Surveillance Requirement and Revision to FSAR Sect. 6.5 Description of Change (s) :

i This activity, will provide an alternate method.to satisfy the OPERABILITY demonstration required by Specification 4.6.2.2.d.

The interpretation provides a clarification of the purpose'of the j

surveillance and describes how the results of future periodic tests will be compared to the baseline conditions derived from the I

preoperational test.

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In FSAR section 6.5.2.4 Tests and Inspections, the description of j

inservice testing of the Containment Spray Chemical Addition Subsystem l

(utilizing the test line from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST))

was changed to recognize flow throttling of the test line vice the use of a fixed orifice in the test line.

Summary of Evaluation:

l There are no new potential failure modes introduced by the implementation of this activity because preoperational testing j

demonstrated the technical capability of the Chemical Additive System to perform its safety function. There are no adverse effects on any structures, systems or components as a result of the implementation of this activity.

The basis for concluding that throttling of the RWST test line during inservice testing of the Chemical Addition Subsystem (vice use of a fixed orifice) does not constitute an unreviewed safety question is I

that technically the methods are equivalent and able to establish system performance with the same degree of accuracy.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 31 of 104 Unit: NN2 Evaluation Number SE-93-008 1

Activity

Title:

MM 93-53 R0; LDCRs SA-93-018,-114; Removal of Transformers T2C5-1 and T2C6-1 from the Unit 2 Cable Spreading Room Description of Change (s) :

This Minor Modification (ted 93-53) involves removal of Transformers j

T2C5-1 (CP2-ECTRNT-05) and T2C6-1 (CP2-ECTRJT-06) and associated

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cables and raceways from the Unit 2 Cable Spreading Room.

The j

Licensing Design Change Requests SA-93-018 and SA-93-114 update the Final Safety Analysis Report sections 8.3.1.4.1 and 1 A(B) j respectively to reflect the deletion of these transformers.

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Summary of Evaluation:

1 Transformers T2C5-1 (CP2-ECTRNT-05) and T2C6-1 (CP2-ECTRNT-0 6) were l

spared as a result of earlier modifications to the distribution system associated with the Plant Computer modification.

Commitment Data Form j

(CDF) No. 26361 requires that said transformers be removed from the Unit 2 Cable Spreading Room.

Although these transformers are not considered high energy equipment with respect to IEEE 384-1974 for separation purposes, they are removed from the plant and deleted from the Final Safety Analysis Report to satisfy the aforementioned CDF.

3 Since the transformers are presently spared and disconnected, and they l

were not associated with the Class 1E distribution system, their i

removal do not impact any plant system or function.

There is no unreviewed safety question associated with this activity.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 32 of 104 Unit: NN2 Evaluation Number

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SE-93-009 l

Activity

Title:

Preop. Test Procedure 2CP-PT-53-01; Evaluation of the Deferred Testing-after Unit 2 Fuel load for Plant Computer Software verification Description of Change (s) :

The SE evaluates the impact of deferring several sections of the Plant Computer Software Verification Preoperational Test until after fuel load on Unit 2 Summary of Evaluation:

The following sections of the Plant Computer Software Verification Preoperational Test 2CP-PT-53-01 for Unit 2 were deferred until after fuel load.

7.6 Printer Failover 7.14 Incore Movable Detectors 7.17 Reactor Protection System Monitoring 7.18 Primary Plant Performance 7.19 Delta I 7.23 Boron Flow 7.25 System Integrated Test l

7.28 Special Data Archive l

i In determining the impact of the deferral, the FSAR chapter 15 accident analysis was reviewed. Since, the plant computer provides l

indication only and is non-safety related,-the deferral affects only the displayed information and does not affect the plant parameters which the plant computer is monitoring. The untested status or possible failure of the plant computer system modules listed above were found to have no impact on the accident analysis. The probability occurance of the accidents reviewed in the accident analysis is unaffected. The radiological consequences of those accidents also remains unaffected.

Although the untested sections have the capability of displaying erroneous information the use of these software modules is administratively controlled. The primary source of information to the

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l operator when conducting plant evolutions are the panel mounted I

instrumentation. Because the operators do not rely on the modules for which testing has been deferred, there in no potential for creation of t

a new type or unanalyzed event.

The plant computer system is used as an alternate method of verify compliance with several technical specifications.

However as there l

are other methods of monitoring compliance the margin of safety is not a f f ect ed.

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Attachment to Txx-94013 TU Electric Page 33 of 104 Unit: NN2 1

Evaluation Number SE-93-010 Activity

Title:

1 2CP-PT-71-01/03/04; Justification for Post Fuel Load Completion of Post Test Calibration of Illumination Meters l

Description of Change (s) :

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CPSES FSAR Section 9.5.3 and Table 14.2-2 (Sheet 39) provide system operational requirements and test summary / acceptance criteria associated with lighting systems.

However, the test packages cannot be closed pending post test calibration of Illuminance Meters IC4148 and IC1199 used to complete the test procedures.

These meters have been sent off-site for the required calibration check as it cannot be performed on-site.

This Safety Evaluation serves to demonstrate that lack of the completed post test calibration of Illuminance Meters IC4148 and IC1199 will not impact Unit 2 safety.

Summary of Evaluation:

All lighting surveys performed via test procedures 2CP-PT-71-04 (Main Control Room Emergency DC Lighting), 2CP-PT-71-03 (Battery Panels Pre-Operational Test) and 2CP-PT-71-01 (AC Essential Lighting Test) yielded satisfactory results or additional lighting was installed and retested.

In addition, the Control Room and Hot Shutdown Panel area were evaluated for compliance with NUREG-0700 criteria and were found to be in compliance.

This testing consisted of illumination measurements as well as subjective evaluation by experienced l

professionals.

l DBD-EE-047 Revision 0 appendix A minimum illumination levels for AC l

essential and DC emergency lighting are conservative.

In the unlikely event that the subject illumination meters are found to be out of calibration, adequate illumination is present to navigate through plant areas and locate and operate necessary safe shutdown equipment as evidenced by actual field black-out testing and NUREG-0700 evaluations.

The implementation of the above activities does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 34 of 104 Unit: 1X2 Evaluation Number SE-93-Oll Act <ity

Title:

LDCR IT 93-Ol; Deletion of Closed Testing Regrmnt.from the IST Plan for Valves XCS-0037,-0039,-0041,-0044 and 1DO-0157,-0257 & 200-0157,-0257 Description of Change (s) :

This activity proposes to modify the CPSES Units 1& 2 Inservice Testing Plan for Pumps and Valves with regard to Units 1 & 2 Chemical

& Volume Control Systems (CVCS) and Units 1 & 2 Diesel Generator Systems (DG), as follows:

o CVCS: For the Boric Acid Transfer Pumps mini-flow recirculation check valves (XCS-0037/-0039/-0041/-0044), listed in Table 4 of the Combined Unit IST Plan, the " closed" position requirement was deleted from the Safety Function Position column and the Remarks Section was changed to replace "Boration Flowpath/Boration Flowpath Boundary" with " Pump Miniflow Path".

o DG:For the Diesel Generator Auxiliary Lube Oil Pumps suction check valves (1/2 D--0157/-0257), listed in Table 7 of the Combined Unit IST Plan, the " closed" position requirement was deleted from the Safety Function Position column and " Suction Line Keep Full" was deleted from the Remarks column.

Summary of Evaluation:

CVCS: This modification affects the Boric Acid Transfer Subsystem portion of the CVCS.

This subsystem is located within rooms 179 and 206 of the Auxiliary Building. This activity does not introduce a new failure mechanism and does not adversely affect the probability of system failure.

Also, this activity does not affect the acceptance limits and failure values identified. The failure of a check valve in the mini-flow recirculation line of a non-operating Boric Acid Transfer Pump while the opposite unit, same train pc.np is operating would divert the mini-flow recirculation flow of the operating pump to a different path back to its own suction line and/or the Beric Acid Storage Tank.

Loss of this flow is already accounted for in the Tech Spec requirements and its flow rate would not be affected due to the existing locked-in place throttle valves.

The required flow rate of borated water to the RCS would not be affected by diverting mini-flow recirculation flow to a different path back to the Boric Acid Storage Tank.

DG:

The emergency diesel generators are not impacted by deleting the

" closed" testing requirement.

The " closed" position does not perform a Safety function.

Also, there is no affect on any acceptance limit or failure value as there are no references in Tech Specs to this activity.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 35 of 104 Unit: NXN Evaluation Number SE-93-015 Activity

Title:

LDCR PC-93-001; Revisions to the CPSES Process Control Program Description of Change (s) :

This activity revises the CPSES Process Control Program (PCP) for radioactive waste processing to reflect changes in organizational responsibilities, add reference to vendor documents for a new vendor selected to provide waste processing services, and clarify selected waste processing requirements.

Summary of Evaluation:

This safety evaluation was based on information provided in the accident analysis performed by the vendor included in Westinghouse Hittman Topical Report STD-R-S-OllNP-A.

The evaluation included analysis of a resin spill which could result from various failures of the dewatering system and/or disposal container. Resultant offsite doses from the resin spill were determined to be within the offsite dose limits for normal operations given in 10 CTR 50, Appendix I.

No impact on safety related systems were identified. This activity does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 36 of 104 Unit: 1X2 Evaluation Number SE-93-016 i

Activity

Title:

LDCR SA-93-040;Revsion to Segnce of Steps / Addition of Note to FSAR Tb1 6.3-7, Sheets 4 & 5, Switchover from Cold Leg to Hot Leg Recirculation Description of Change (s) :

Table 6.3-7, Sheets 4 and 5 represent steps used to align ECCS equipment for hot leg recirculation of the RCS to prevent boron precipitation within the core during the recovery period following a Loss of Cooling Accident.

This change revises the sequence of steps within this Table that involve operation of the cold leg and hot leg header isolation valves and restart of the Safety Injection pump when switchover to hot leg recirculation is necessary.

It also adds a note to the effect that, if the alignment of a Residual Heat Removal (RHR) l or Safety Injection (SI) pump for hot leg recirculation is not successful, the affected pump is returned to delivering cold leg i

recirculation, plant staff is consulted, and applicable steps not yet l

performed are taken to align remaining pump (s) for hot leg recirculation.

Summary of Evaluation:

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The revised sequence and note added will bring the Table into agreement with the recently revised corresponding sequence and more detailed instructions of Site Emergency Response Guideline, EOS-1.4A, Transfer to Hc' veg Recirculation. These changes were made in response to concerns expressed in a Westinghouse Part 21 Notification.

It noted that the potential exists, given the Emergency Operating Procedures of some plants of Westinghouse design, that a single failure of a hot leg header injection isolation valve during the lineup for hot leg recirculation could result in the isolation of the RHR/LHSI pumps from the RCS.

Westinghouse further noted that the i

operator may aggravate this situation by leaving the pumps isolated from the RCS while attempting to diagnose and resolve the problem. The note added to the FSAR Table addresses the concern of leaving the subsystem isolated from the RCS.

The revised sequence will ensure that when switchover is performed, that flow can be verified from the SI pump to the hot leg header prior to isolating the cold leg header, l

and allows the operator to more easily return the affected pump to cold leg recirculation if the expected hot leg flow is not obtained.

This revision does not involve any changes to the Technical Specifications.

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l Page 37 of 104 Unit: 1X2 Evaluation Number SE-93-017 l

Activity

Title:

l LDCR IT-93-002; Revision 2 to Unit 1 & 2 IST Plan for Pumps & Valves 1

Description of Change (s) :

Revision 2 to the Unit 1 and 2 Inservice Testing Plan for Pumps & Valves is comprised of several changes which require evaluation.

In general, these changes result in an increase in valve testing frequency, deletion of previously required valve tests, addition of valves to the IST Program, addition of new test requirements for valves already in the IST Program, decrease in valve testing frequency, and change to a valve test method.

Some of these changes were previously evaluated is SE-92-102.

Summary of Evaluation:

The first change evaluated involved the revision of the test method for exercising the AFW valves in the AFW to SSW cross-tie line. Previously, a portion of the AFW system was drained prior to exercising the subject valves as a precaution against the introduction of contaminants into the AFW system and ultimately into the Main Steam and Feedwater systems.

Now, however, the test procedure has been revised to apply other precautions to prevent l

contamination which do not require AFW system draining prior to valve exercising. The other change evaluated l

changes the test frequency of certain va)>es in the Residual Heat Romoval Systen from quar'.erly to cold shutdown frequency. Neither of thera changes affect related structures and no failure modes are introduced.

Additionally, the probability of failures related to system i

chemistry or testing frequency are not affected.

4 The margins of safety provided by the secondary system inservice inspection program and the chemistry control program are not affected by the implementation of the first change evaluated, and it does nothing to change the effectiveness of these programs. With regard to the second change evaluated, the margins of safety associated with the ECCS performance are in part based on ECCS flowpath operability which assumes that certain critical valves are always in their correct positions such that two trains are never disabled simultaneously.

This change supports this assumption by requiring that 8716A and 8716B not be moved out of their standby-ready position (for testing or any other reason) when ECCS is required to be operable.

Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 38 of 104 Unit: 1X2 Evaluation Number SE-93-018 Activity

Title:

MM 92-389,93-008; LDCR SA-93-032; Update of Conductivity Rack in the Condensate Polishing System Description of Change (s) :

This activity involves upgrading the Condensate Polishing System Conductivity Rack.

Analyzers are to be replaced with more efficient and reliable equipment.

This will result in other equipment being removed either due to redundancy or because it is no longer needed.

Nitrogen gas supply to the Carbon Dioxide Scrubbing Column is no longer needed and results in abandoning in place the pressure reducing station and eliminating the need for nitrogen bottle supply.

Summary of Evaluation:

The systems affected by implementation of this activity includes the Condensate Polishing System and the Nitrogen Gas Supply System. The affected systems's function, operation, and response are not affected by this modification. There is no equipment important to safety described in the Licensing Basis Documents which involves these systems. There are no credible potential failure or malfunctions of equipment important to safety associated with this activity. There are no applicable Technical Specifications associated with the systems affected by this activity, i

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric l

Page 39 of 104 Unit: 1X2 Evaluation Number SE-93-019 Revision 1 Activity

Title:

i PCN SOP-507-R6-G; Chang.of Proc. to Utilz.the U1 Reactr Makup Wter Strg 4

Tank to Supply Water to Unit 1 and Unit 2 During Normal Operation i

Description of Change (s) :

The Unit taking the Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tank (RMUWST) outage will be isolated from its normal RMUWST for various reasons such as inspections, repairs and poor water quality.

The Unit taking the outage may be in any normal mode of operation and will continue to operate by utilizing water from the other Unit Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tank.

This cross connect will be performed by opening the j

cross connecting valves between the units on the suction side of the j

Reactor Makeup Water (RMUW) pumps and opening 0, 1 or 2 cross-connect j

valves on the discharge side of the RMUW pumps.

Water should be supplied by 2 of the 3 available RMUW pumps.

Summary of Evaluation:

No unreviewed safety question is involved since the Chapter 15 1

analysis does not take credit for water in the Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tank.

Water in the Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tanks is utilized for commercial reasons. Water sources that are credited in j

the analysis, the boric acid storage tank and the refueling water

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storage tank, are not affected by this changes.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 40 of 104 Unit: 1X2 Evaluation Number SE-93-020 Activity

Title:

MM 93-217 DCN 5968 (U1),-216 DCN 6020 (U2);LDCR SA-93-056; Add Nitrogen Purge Supply Capability to the Vent and Drain System Atmosperic Tanks Description of Change (s) :

During unit operations at power, the Heater Drain pumps are in operation with the pump shaft seal fluid being supplied by the condensate system.

Shaft seal discharge is directed to a drain tank which is vented to atmosphere.

Tank level control is provided by a level controller and level control valve which return condensate to the hotwell by vacuum drag.

Operation of the system, as currently designed, results in unacceptably high levels of dissolved oxygen in the Condensate system. A temporary modification previously installed in Unit 1 has shown that a continuous purge of approximately 1 sefm eliminates the dissolved oxygen problem introduced by this drain tank.

This modification will install a permanent regulator, flow indicator and tubing for this purge supply in both Units 1 & 2.

Summary of Evaluation:

The Nitrogen Supply system and the Vents and Drains system are non-nuclear safety class systems and are not required for safe shutdown or safety system operation.

Safety related components which are intermittently supplied by nitrogen do not require continuous supply during an accident condition.

Installation of this modification will not affect the probability of failure of the Nitrogen Supply system, or their components to perform their safety function as the Nitrogen Supply system and the Vents and Drains perform no safety function, i

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric 4

l Page 41 of 104 Unit: IN2 1

j Evaluation Number SE-93-021 9

i Activity

Title:

DM 93-007,LDCR SA-93-062; Design Modification to Provide a Bypass Around the Spent Resin Sluice Filter TBX-WPFLRS-01 Description of Change (s) :

This change installs a bypass line around the subject Spent Resin i

Sluice Filter. The bypass is for use during resin transfers to provide a flowpath around the filter.

The filter is required to be in place during flushing operations but may clog during sluicing. Due to crud bursts, the possibility exists that this filter will clog during j

transfer of resins from the CVCS mixed bed demineralizers to the Spent Resin Storage Tank.

When clogging occurs, the resultant stoppage of flow allows the resins in the slurry to fall out of suspension and deposit in the transfer piping.

It is then difficult to re-establish entrainment of the resin.

These resins have been surveyed at high radiation levels; continuing the sluicing process once begun will reduce hot spots and therefore produce an ALARA benefit.

1 In the past, Temporary Modifications have been implemented during resin transfers to remove the cartridge from the filter housing to l

prevent clogging of the filter. This results in the generation of j

radioactive waste and the exposure of personnel to radiation. With

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the bypass installed, it will be possible to bypass the Spent Resin Sluice Filter during resin transfer operations through manual i

manipulation of three valves.

ALARA benefits and reduced waste l

generation will be immediately realized.

Summary of Evaluation:

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The Liquid Waste Processing System is affected by this modification.

Though this modification allows the use of a bypass around the Spent Resin Sluice Filter during resin sluicing operations, there are no changes to system setpoints or safety parameters.

System operation will be revised to incorporate the use of the bypass when needed in the resin transfer process.

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All new piping and components are non-nuclear safety-related, but qualified to Category II over I requirements.

The piping has been analyzed for seismic and stress considerations. During use of the 4

filter, the system is alligned in a closed loop with the Spent Resin Storage Tank such that any potential leakage past the bypass valve will not have any adverse system impact. As a result, there are no credible potential failure modes for the listed systems or components that could be introduced by implementation of this activity, i

In addition, this activity has no potential for creating the j

possibility of an accident different from any accident already evaluated in the Licensing Basis Documents; and, there are no Technical Specifications associated with the systems, structures, components and/or parameters affected, which could be impacted by implementation of this modification.

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Attachment o TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 42 of JD4 Unit: NXN 4

Evaluation Number SE-93-022 Activity

Title:

LDCR EP-92-005; Revise Emergency Plan Section 7.2 to Change Description of Personal Computer (PC) Based Primary Dose Assessment System Description of Change (s) :

Section 7.2 of the CPSES Emergency Plan provides a general description of emergency offsite dose calculation methods. The primary means of assessing radiological conditions offsite has been by using the Emergency Dose Assessment Model (EDAM) software.

Emergency Planning has recently purchased a new dose assessment system to replace EDAM.

The new system includes a new personal computer (PC) system and software.

The new system is called the Offsite Release Consequence Assessment System (ORCAS) ; it has both a straight line gaussian plume model for dose projections and the MESOI puff model for real-time tracking plume location.

EDAM does not have the capability for real-time tracking. ORCAS will also reflect the new terminology to be 4

consistent with the revised 10CTR20 methods of dose calculations to whole body and organs.

ORCAS is theoretically a more accurate dose assessment system than EDAM.

ORCAS uses an iso <oic spectrum for eight different accident types.

ORCAS corrects '

decay, daughter ingrowth, deposition, plate-out and filtration of various groups or chemical species.

EDAM uses a gross correction for an effective Xe-133 Noble Gases Whole Body Dose and effective I-131 Iodine Child Thyroid Dose.

ORCAS also can handle wind shifts and provide current dose information.

Summary of Evaluation:

This change does not decrease the effectiveness of the CPSES Emergency Plan.

Since ORCAS has no direct effect on any plant structures, systems, or components and/or system parameters and is independent of any plant systems, there are no credible potential failure modes and there is no potential for creating an accident different from those already evaluated in Licensing Basis Documents.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 43 of 104 Unit: IN2 a

Evaluation Number SE-93-023 I

Activity

Title:

LDCR SA-93-65, Revise FSAR Section 7.1.2.11.1; Sensor Response Time Testing (SRTT) Using White Noise Analysis Methodology Description of Change (s) :

4 The change adds a description of performing time response testing of 3

pressure sensors using white noise analysis. The safety evaluation describes the methodology by which white system noise is used to determine the frequency response of various primary and steam flow pressure sensors.

Summary of Evaluation:

1 The safety evaluation describes time response testing using white noise analysis. The evaluation'looks at the point of connection a

between the test setup and the affected instrumentation as well as the I

isolation provided between the test setup ee.d the instrumentation.

The RC Flow, i

and S/G Level, S/G Pressure and Pressurizer Pressure Sensors are tested with the new test methodology.

The SE reviews the SAR sections j

7 and 15 for any possible credible failure modes that could be introduced and concludes there are none.

The SE also concludes that s

there is no effect on the types and propensity of accidents or malfunctions evaluated in the SAR.

The SE evaluates the test i

methodology for any new type of unanalyzed accident or the effects the

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testing has on the margin of safety and concludes there is no effect on the margin of safety and that there are no new unanalyzed types of j

accidents introduced.

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Attachment to TKX-94013 TU Electric Page 44 of 104 Unit: NN2 Evaluation Number SE-93-027 l

l Activity

Title:

EPT-303B R0; Condensate System Dissolved Oxygen Source Identification Test Description of Change (s) :

This activity provides a plant procedure to be used to identify sources of dissolved oxygen in the condensate system.

Summary of Evaluation:

The equipment affected by this procedure is not safety related and is located in non-safety areas.

The possible accidents related to the condensate system, Loss of Condensate Flow, and Loss of Condenser vacuum, are unaffected by the change and continue to be fully bounded by existing FSAR accident analyses.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric l

Page 45 of 104 Unit: 1x2 i

i Evaluation Number l

SE-93-028

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Activity

Title:

LDCR TR-93-10; Revision to Allow the First Inservice Visual Inspection of U/2 Snubbers to be Ferformed After Completing 2 Months of Power Ops Description of Change (s) :

Revises the first inservice visual inspection period of Unit 2 anubbers from 4 to 10 months after Power Operation to 2 to 10 months after Power Operation.

However, the Unit 2 visual inspections shall not begin until the Unit 2 Startup Testing has been completed.

The basis for requiring the initial inspection of snubbers after four months of commencing Power Operation is to provide the snubbers a sufficient opportunity to experience various modes of operation (i.e.,

startups, shutdowns, transients l

and steady-state).

Subjecting the snubbers to these j

various modes of operation establishes an operating history from which any major operational concerns can be identified. After CPSES Unit 2 completes its Startup Testing Program, the snubbers will have experienced these various modes of operation, established an operating history, and fulfilled the basis for performing the initial inspection. The Unit 2 visual inspections shall not begin until the Unit 2 Startup Testing Program has been completed.

Summary of Evaluation:

l The change does not affect the design or operation of equipment which is necessary to function to prevent an

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accident or mitigate the effects of an accident or to I

function following an accident. The snubbers in question will not be altered in any manner, nor will their required i

surveillance be changed. The snubbers will remain capable of performing their function and will be verified operable through performance of the visual inspection.

The initial visual inspection will be conducted in a timeframe consistent with the bases of the current surveillance requirement. Further, this change does not affect any plant hardware, plant design, safety limit settings, plant system operations or procedures.

Therefore, this change does not modify or add any initiating parameters that would create the potential for a new type of unanalyzed event; increase the probability of occurrence, or the consequences, of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in Licensing Basis Documents.

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1 Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 46 of 104 Unit: 1X2 Evaluation Number i

SE-93-029 Activity Title.

PCN-STA-742-R4-2; Allows the First Inservice Visual Inspection of U/2 Snubbers to be Performed After Completing 2 Months of Power Operation Description of Change (s) :

Revises the first inservice visual inspection period of Unit 2 snubbers from 4 to 10 months after Power Operation to 2 to 10 months after Power Operation (See also SE-93-028).

However, the Unit 2 visual inspections shall not begin until the Unit 2 Start-up Testing Program has l

been completed.

The basis for requiring the initial inspection of snubbers after 4 months of Power Operation is to provide the snubbers a sufficient opportunity to experience various modes of operation.

Subjecting the snubbers to these various modes of operation establishes an operating history from which any major operational concerns

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can be identified. After CPSES Unit 2 completes its Startup Testing Program, the snubbers will have experienced these various modes of operation, established an operating history, and fulfilled the basis for performing the initial inspection. The Unit 2 visual inspections shall not begin l

l until the Unit 2 Startup Testing Program has been completed.

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Summary of Evaluation:

The change does not affect the design or operation of equipment which is necessary to function to prevent an accident or mitigate the effects of an accident or to function following an accident. The snubbers in question will not be altered in any manner, nor will their required surveillance be changed. The snubbers will remain capable

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of performing their function and will be verified operable through performance of the visual inspection.

The initial visual inspection will be conducted in a timeframe consistent with the bases of the current surveillance requirement. Further, this change does not affect any plant hardware, plant design, safety limit settings, plant system operations or procedures.

Therefore, this change does not modify or add any initiating parameters that would create the potential for a new type of unanalyzed event; increase the probability of occurrence, or the consequences, of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in Licensing Basis Documents.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 47 of 104 Unit: NXN Evaluation Number SE-93-030 Activity

Title:

DM 93-017, LDCR SA-93-071; Waste Gas Analyzer Panel Upgrade Description of Change (s) :

l Remove old Bendix H2 and 02 Gas Analyzers and associated equipment.

l Replace old analyzers with new orbisphere Analyzers.[A Summary of Evaluation:

l The removal of the old Bendix Oxygen and Hydrogen Analyzers as well as associated equipment from the Gaseous Waste Processing System Control l

Panel, and the installation of new Orbisphere equipment is shown not to have any adverse effect on related Systems / Structures.

It will not initiate any unanticipated or credible potential failures nor will it initiate any accidents.

The proposed activity will not introduce new systems or structures that would create new type of unanalyzed events.

The impact on margin of safety, continued operation of the unit is enhanced by the proposed

activity, l

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r Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 48 of 104 Unit: INN Evaluation Number SE-93-033 Activity Tit]3:

DM-93-031 R0; Circuit Breaker Changeout in 118 VAC Panel IC3 CB#12 and 125 VDC Panel 1ED1-1 CB#14 - Increase Size of Two Circuit Breakers Description of Change (s) :

A.

This change affects the 118 Vac instrument power system and the 125 Vdc power system.

B.

Circuit breaker #12 in 118 Vac Panel 1C3 is being increased from 20 to 30 amperes.

Circuit breaker #14 in 125 Vdc Panel IED1-1 is being increased from 15 to 20 amperes. A 15 ampere fuse is being added to BOP Aux Relay Rack 3 1-CR-05.

C.

Cable NK105055A is being reterminated in BOP Aux Relay Rack 3 1-CR-05 to connect to the new 15 ampere fuse.

D.

This change implements the recommendations of the Multiple High Impedance Fault Calculation EE-CA-0008-715 Rev. 1.

Swmmary of Evaluation:

This change increased the size of 2 circuit breakers in low voltage systems so that the down stream fusea will isolate a fault before the-circuit breakers isolate the fault. The circuit breakers still will protect the feeder cable per requirements of DBD-EE-051.

The net effect 4.s an enhancement of the electrical protection system.

There are no new failure modes as a result of this change. Single failure analysis is unaffected by this change. There is no impact on existing design basis event analysis.

The implementation of the above activities does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 49 of 104 Unit: INN Evaluation Number SE-93-034 I

Activity

Title:

DM-92-41 R0; Remove Existing Computer Inverter and P-2500 Computer Internals in Computer Room; Install New Computer Cabinet Description of Change (s) :

CPSES is replacing the Unit 1 P2500 computer system with a DEC VAX 4000 computer. This SE addesses removal of the P-2500 processing hardware, as well as removal of the ll8vAC inverter IVlC1.

Summary of Evaluation:

The ll8VAC inverter does not supply any loads other than the P-2500 computer system. The removal of the processing internals or the inverter will neither initiate or affect the progression of any accident described in the FSAR chapters 6 or 15.

Removal of the processing equipment or inverter will not impact the radiological consequences of any accident previously analyzed. Since the P-2500 is l

used only for indication, removal of the processing equipment will not introduce any credible failure modes that may result in unanalyzed accidents or malfunctions. Removal of the inverter will not introduce any credible failure modes that vill have any effect on plant operating equipment.

Lastly, removal of the processing hardware and inverter will not have an impact on the margin of safety since the technical specifications do not apply to non IE equipment.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 50 of 104 Unit: 1X2 Evaluation Number SE-93-035

' Activity

Title:

DM 93-018; Adds instrumentation to monitor HP Turbine Stop and Control valve closing times.

Description of Change (s) :

This activity installs the necessary instrumentation and hardware to monitor the closing times-of the high pressure stop and control valves by plant computer for indications of closing time degradation. This modification permits the extension of required turbine valve testing from every two weeks to every six weeks.

The inclusion of this monitoring instrumentation was part of the basis under which the NRC approved the technical specification change in License Amendment 15 (Unit 1) and License Amendment 1 (Unit 2).

Summary of Evaluation:

The installation of the required instrumentation was evaluated for its impact on plant safety.

The monitoring instrumentation was found not to interfere with the proper operation of the turbine valves and did not impact other safety equipment. No credible potential failure modes are introduced by the installation of. this instrumentation.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 51 of 104 Unit: 1X2 Evaluation Number t

SE-93-038 Revision 1 Activity

Title:

LDCR FP-93-002; Update to the Fire Protection Report (FPR) to Incorporate NRC Generic Letter 89-14 Description of Change (s) :

The LDCR consists of the following changes:

1)

Delete the requirement in section IV-2.0 for combined interval for any three consecutive tests / inspections to not exceed 3.25 times the interval.

2)

Change 7 days to 92 days in section IV-2.1.b.3.a for testing the diesel fire pump (DFP) batteries.

3)

Add the following to section IV-2.1.b.3.a.2:

"...with the battery chargers OFF for at least 15 minutes."

4)

Change 31 days to 14 days in section IV-2.1.b.2.a for diesel fuel tank level and start and run for 30 minutes l

5)

Change the word " barriers" to " battery" in section IV-2.1.b.3.b.

6)

Delete the word " cell plates" from section IV-2.1.b.3.c.1.

Summary of Evaluation:

Change 1 above updates the Fire Protection Report (FPR) to incorporate l

NRC generic letter 89-14 Change 5 is to correct a typographical l

error.

Since the batteries are of black opaque vinyl plastic construction, cell plate inspection is not possible, and is deleted by change 6.

Changes 2, 3, and 4 affect the test method and frequency of testing the diesel fire pump batteries.

Change 4 requires the diesel fire pumps to be urn at least bi-weekly.

It was determined that a battery voltage check would not provide additional useful information, thus it was moved to a 92 day frequency and the test method was changed to more adequately determine the battery condition.

It is l

plant practice to start the diesel fire pumps on a weekly basis to comply with insurance company requirements, however no credit is taken i

for more frequent started of the diesel fire pumps for the purpose of justification for this change or for the plant licensing basis.

Each diesel fire pump contains two redundant battery systems, therefore start failure because of degradation or failure or both systems i

simultaneously is considered unlikely.

There is no affect on the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown due to a postulated fire in any ear.

The diesel fire pump rooms do not contain fire safe shutdown equipment. This evaluation meets the requirements contained in NRC Generic Letter 86-10.

The implementation of the above activities does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 52 of 104 Unit: 1X2 Evaluation Number i

SE-93-039 Revision 1 Activity

Title:

LDCR SA-93-079; Revision to Final Safety Analysis Report Sections 4

17.2.1.2, 17.2.1.4 and 17.2.7 1

Description of Change (s) :

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1 Significant improvements have occurred in the procurement document process during the past two years that greatly decreases the potential i

for inadequate technical and quality assurance requirements to be indicated in the procurement documents.

These improvements relate to the methods used to indicate technical and quality assurance I

requirements are continually evaluated by the responsible organization to ensure that are current and correct.

These improvements have resulted in an acceptance level of procurement document reviews in excess of 95%.

I Summary of Evaluation:

Currently the Nuclear Overview Department (NOD) conducts in-line

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reviews of procurement documents prior to initiation of the procurement action by the purchasing organization. This change addresses that NOD will assure through the overview process that the procurement process, including procurement document control, is in compliance with 10CFR50 Appendix B by conducting audits and surveillances of the procurement proces and review of procurement documents for safety related items and services for inclusion of i

adequate technical and quality assurance requirements prior to acceptance of the procured item or material, j

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 53 of 104 Unit: IN2 Evaluation Number SE-93-041 Activity

Title:

LDCR TR-93-008, Revises TRM Tables 4.1.la and 4.1.lb to Add Backup Penetration Protection Protective Relays & Make Editorial Changes.

Description of Change (s) :

LDCR# TR-93-008 revises Technical Requirements Manual, Tables 4.1.la and 4.1.lb to add backup protection relays on pages 4-18 and 4-19, panel board circuit designations on pages 4-16 and 4-29, and a note on page 4-29, and revises breaker types on pages 4-16 and 4-29.

This LDCR also revises valve tag numbers on pages 4-12 and 4-25, and makes editorial changes on pages 4-8 thru 4-11, 4-13, 4-21, 4-23, 4-24 and 4-26.

The changes per this LDCR are " Paper Change Only".

Summary of Evaluation:

Changes as described in the LDCR have no adverse effect on the performance of the equipment. This activity does not involve any credible potential failures, will not create probability / possibility of new accident / malfunction of equipment important to safety and does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

Also, it has no affect on the margin of safety.

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1 Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 54 of 104 Unit: INN j

Evaluation Humber SE-93-045 Activity

Title:

DM 92-040; Plant Computer System - Install New Multiplexing Equipment, Mounting Hardware, and Internal Wiring Description of Change (s) :

CPSES is replacing the Unit 1 Westinghouse P-2500 plant Computer with a new DEC VAX 4000 based Plant Computer System (PCS).

The attached safety evaluation addresses 10CFR50.59 implications of the removal of existing Va11 dyne components (no longer utilized) as part of the Unit l

1 PCS upgrade.

The existing Validyne multiplexor cabinets, located in the CPSES-Unit 1 Cable Spreading Room, will be reconfigured by removing existing internals in order to install new remove multiplexing hardware.

This hardware includes Nuclear Safety Related Class lE isolation equipment to provide an electrical barrier between Class lE plant process j

instrumentation and non safety related Plant Computer System (PCS) hardware and circuits. All equipment (e. g., power supplies) which is electrically interfaced with the Class lE circuits on the plant process side of the isolators are qualified for Class lE service; all other components installed in Class lE cabinets are seismically

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analyzed and mounted.

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Summary of Evaluation:

l The impact of this modification on Plant Licensing Basis Documentation is limited to editorial changes (Remote Multiplexor Cabinets designations to assure concurrence between the PCS, as designated and installed, and the TSAR.

The proposed activity will not introduce or affect any systems, l

structures, or components which could create any unanalyzed safety j

concerns resulting in an unanticipated or credible potential failure or accident scenario. This is assured by maintaining electrical and physical separation and redundancy requirements in the class lE cabinets, and by providing Class 15 isolation devices and internals.

l The possibility for impact on margin of safety, Plant Technical l

Specification implications (none identified), and the potential for CPSES Plant Licensing Basis impact (i.e.,

change to Section 8.3 of the FSAR) is addressed in the body of the evaluation.

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l Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 55 of 104 Unit INN l

l Evaluation Number SE-93-047 Activity Titlet l

MM 93-158; Addition of Manual Transfer Switch to Power Feed for l

Battery Room Exhaust Fan (CP* VAFNID-08) for Outage Use l

Description of Change (s) :

A manual transfer switch is added to allow continued use of the l

Battery Room Exhaust Fan (cpl-VAFNID-08) during Modes 5 and 6 when the original 480 volt power supply is out of service.

l Summary of Evaluation:

The Battery Room Exhaust Fan (CP1-VAFNID-08) is currently being fed from MCC 1EB3-1.

This Minor Modification will provide a Class 1E key-locked manual transfer switch and outage power supply from the Plant Support Power System to this exhaust fan.

The original power source is occasionally required to be out of service during Modes 5 and 6 for maintenance and testing.

During these outage periods the affected i

exhaust fan is needed to prevent-hydrogen buildup in the Train A battery room.

This change will provide a Non 1E outage power source to the Battery Room Exhaust Fan that will be available during the outages of the original power source. Operation of the transfer switch is limited to plant Modes 5 and 6.

Prior to operation of the transfer switch, the entire associated train must be declared inoperable and the circuit j

breakers for 1E power and Plant Support Power will both be OPEN. After the switch is aligned to the desired source, the appropriate circuit r

breaker is closed.

Thus, the affected train is not credited for being operable and the other train satisfies any minimum operability requirements. The use of the outage source will make equipment available above the minimum required even though no credit is taken l

for their availability.

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When aligned to Plant Support Power, adequate protection to the lE l

power cable and other cables which may share raceways is ensured j

through the use of a circuit breaker in series with a fuse.

Both of these protective devices are selected to prevent cable damage during l

fault conditions.

There is no Unreviewed Safety Question associated with this activity.

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Attachnent to Txx-94013 TU Electric Page 56 of 104 Unit: INN 1

I Evaluation Number

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SE-93-048

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Revision 1 Activity

Title:

j MM 93-179; Addition of Manual Transfer Switch to Power Feed for Bypass i

transformer TlEC4 (CP1-ECTRET-02) for Outage Use i

Description of Change (s) :

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A key-locked manual transfer switch is added to allow continued use of the Control Room Gas Monitors during _ Modes 5 and 6 when the original' 480 Volt MCC is out of service. These monitors are presently fed from Class lE power.

Summary of Evaluation:

1 This Minor Modification will provide a transfer switch and outage j

power supply from the Plant Support Power System to this transformer so power can be ensured for the Train B introl Room Radiation I

Monitors. The original power source is,c;asionally required to be out of service for maintenance and testing to support an outage of the normal MCC. During these outage periods, loss of the radiation monitors results in the Control Room Ventilation System going into Emergency Recirculation mode.

This MM will provide an optional highly 4

reliaDie Non IE outage power source to the Bypass Transformer (feeding i

the F diation Monitor) that will be available during the outages of the cstginal power source.

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Since the transfer to the outage power source will be administratively limited to Modes 5 and 6 when the normal MCC is out of service for ma ' atenance and testing, Train A will be available to meet the I

Technical Specification operability requirements for the lE power system. Therefore, no credit is being taken for the Train B electrical system affected by this proposed change and no impact is assumed. The loads connected to the Distribution Panelboards fed from the Bypass Transformer will be available through Plant Support Power

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and the transfer switch, but no credit will be taken for their operability as defined by Technical Specification. The only exception to this is the Train B Control Room Radiation Monitors. On loss of I

power, these monitors fail in a safe condition (recirculation of the

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Control Room Ventilation System) and should be considered functional regardless of power supply.

For these reasons, the monitors should be considered OPERABLE, even though they are not supplied with Class lE power.

This justification only halds true when the unit is in Modes 5 and 6.

Operation of the transfer switch is limited to plant Modes 5 and 6. Prior to operation of the transfer switch, the circuit breakers for lE power and Plant Support Power will both be OPEN.

After the a

switch is aligned to the desired source, the appropriate circuit breaker is closed. When aligned to Plant Support Power, a adequate protection to the lE power cable and other cables which may share receways is ensured through the use of a circuit breaker and a fuse in i

series.

Both of these protective devices are selected to prevent cable damage during fault conditions.

There is no Unreviewed Safety Question associated with this activity.

m 1

Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 57 of 104 Unit: INN Evaluation Number SE-93-049 Activity

Title:

MM 93-159; Addition of Manual Transfer Switch to Power Feed for Battery Room Exhaust Fan (CP1-VAFNID-10) for Outage Use Description of Change (s) :

A manual transfer switch is added to allow continued use of the i

Battery Room Exhaust Fan (CP1-VAFNID-10) during Modes 5 and 6 when the original 480 volt power supply is out of service.

Summary of Evaluation:

The Battery Room Exhaust Fan (cpl-VAFNID-10) is currently being fed from MCC 1EB4-1.

This Minor Modification will provide a Class 1E key-locked manual transfer switch and outage power supply from the Plant Support Power System to this exhaust fan..The original power source is occasionally required to be out of service during Modes 5 and 6 for maintenance and testing. During these outage periods the affected exhaust fan is needed to prevent hydrogen buildup in the Train B battery room.

This change will provide a Non IE outage power source to the Battery Room Exhaust Fan that will be available during the outages of the original power source. Operation of the transfer switch is limited to plant Modes 5 and 6.

Prior to operation of the transfer switch, the entire associated train must be declared inoperable and the circuit breakers for 1E power and Plant Support Power will both be OPEN. After the switch is aligned to the desired source, the appropriate circuit breaker is closed.

Thus, the affected train is not credited for being operable and the ciner train satisfies any minimum operability requirements. The use of the outage source will make equipment available above the minimum required even though no credit is taken for their availability.

When aligned to Plant Support Power, adequate protection to the 1E power cable and other cables which may share raceways is ensured through the use of a et.rcuit breaker in series with a fuse.

Both of these protective devices are selected to prevent cable damage during fault conditions.

There is no Unreviewed Safety Question associated with this activity.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric l

Page 58 of 104 Unit: INN I

Evaluation Number SE-93-050 Activity

Title:

MM 93-168; Addition of Manual Transfer Switch to Power Feed for Battery Charger BC1ED4-1 (cpl-EPBCED-0 6) for Outage Use Description of Change (s) :

A manual transfer switch is added to allow continued use of the Battery Charger BClED4-1 (cpl-EPBCED-06) during Modes 5 and 6 when the original 480 volt power supply is out of service.

Summary of Evaluation:

The Battery Charge BC1ED4-1 (cpl-EPBCED-06) is currently being fed from MCC lEB2-1.

This Minor Modification will provide a Class 1E key-locked manual transfer switch and outage power supply from the Plant Support Power System to this battery charger.

The original power source is occasionally required to be out of service during Modes 5 and 6 for maintenance and testing.

During these outage periods the affected battery charger is needed to maintain the batteries on a float charge, keep the batteries from discharging during the electrical outage, keep the DC bus energized during battery surveillance testing (batteries disconnected during testing) and recharge a discharged battery.

This change will provide a Non lE outage power source to the battery charger that will be available during the outages of the original l

power source. Operation of the transfer switch is limited to plant l

Modes 5 and 6.

Prior to operation of the transfer switch, the entire l

associated train must be declared inoperable and the circuit breakers j

for lE power and Plant Support Power will both be OPEN.

After the l

switch is aligned to the desired source, the appropriate circuit breaker is closed.

Thus, the affected train is not credited for being operable and the other train satisfies any minimum operability requirements. The use of ti.e outage source will make equipment available above the minimum required even though no credit is taken for their availability.

When aligned to Plant Support Power, adequate protection to the 1E power cable and other cables which may share raceways is ensured through the use of two circuit breakers in series.

Both of these protective devices are selected to prevent cable damage during fault conditions.

There is no Unreviewed Safety Question associated with this activity.

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4 Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 59 of 104 Unit: INN l

j Evaluation Number SE-93-051 Activity

Title:

MM 93-160; Addition of Manual Transfer Switch to Power Feed forn Non-Class 1E Battery Charger BC1D4 (cpl-EPBCND-04) for Outage Use f

Description of Change (s) :

l A manual transfer switch is added to allow continued use of Non Class 1E Battery Charger BC1D4 during Modes 5 and 6 when the original 480 Volt MCC is out of service.

Summary of Evaluation:

i The Non Class 1E Battery Charger B1D4 (cpl-ErBCND-04) is currently being fed from MCC 1EB4-1.

This Minor Modification will provide a Class 1E key-locked manual transfer switch and outage power supply from the Plant Support Power System to this battery charger. The j

original power source is occasionally required to be out of service during Modes 5 and 6 for maintenance and testing. During these outage periods it is desirable to maintain the batteries on a float charge, keep the batteries from discharging during the electrical outage, keep l

the DC bus energized during battery surveillance testing (batteries disconnected during testing) and recharge a discharged battery.

1 This change will provide a Non IE outage power source to the battery 4

charger that will be available during the outages of the original power source. Operation of the transfer switch is lbmited to plant Modes 5 and 6.

Prior to operation of the transfer switch, the entire associated train must be declared inoperable and the circuit breakers for IE power and Plant Support Power will both be OPEN.

After the switch is aligned to the desired source, the appropriate circuit breaker is closed.

Thus, the affected train is not credited for being operable and the other train satisfies any minimum operability requirements. The use of the outage source will make equipment available above this minimum required even though no credit is taken for their availability.

When aligned to P3 ant Support Power, adequate protection to the Associated Class 1E power cable and other Class 1E cables which may j

share raceways is ensured through the use of a circuit breaker and a j

fuse in series. These protective devices are selected to prevent i

cable damage during faults.

Battery Charge BClD4 is Non 1E and is thus not considered in the accidents and malfunctions discussed in the FSAR.

There is no Unreviewed Safety Question associated with this activity.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 60 of 104 Unit: INN Evaluation Number SE-93-052 Revision 1 Activity

Title:

MM 93-181; Addition of Manual Transfer Switch to Power Feed for Bypass Transformer TlEC3 (cpl-ECTRET-01) for Outage Use Description of Change (s) :

A key-locked manual transfer switch is added to allow continued use of the Control Room Gas Monitors during Modes 5 and 6 when the original 480 Volt MCC is out of service. These monitors are presently fed from Class lE power.

Summary of Evaluation:

This Minor Modification (F@i) will provide a transfer switch and outage power supply from the Plant Support Power System to this transformer so power can be ensured for the Train A Control Room Radiation Monitors. The original power source is occasionally required to be out of service for maintenance and testing to support an outage of the normal MCC.

During these outage periods, loss of the radiation i

monitors results in the Control Room Ventilation System going into Emergency Recirculation mode.

This MM will provide an optional highly reliable Non IE outage power source to the Bypass Transformer (feeding the Radiation Monitor) that will be available during the outages of the original power source.

Since the transfer to the outage power source will be administratively limited to Modes 5 and 6 when the normal MCC is out of service for maintenance and testing, Train B will be available to meet the Technical Specification operability requirements for the 1E power system.

Therefore, no credit is being taken for the ' train A electrical system affected by this proposed change a d no impact is assumed. The loads connected to the Distribution Pstelboards fed from the Bypass Transformer will be available through 21 ant Support Power and the transfer switch, but no credit will be taken for their operability as defined by Technical Specifications. The only exception to this is the Train A Control Room Radiation Monitors. On loss of power, these monitors fail in a safe condition (recirculation i

of the Control Room Ventilation System) and should be considered j

functional regardless of power supply.

For these reasons, the monitors should be considered OPERABLE, even though they are not supplied with Class 1E power.

This justification only hold true when i

the unit is in Modes 5 and 6.

Operation of the transfer switch is l

limited to plant Modes 5 and 6. Prior to operation of the transfer switch, the circuit breakers for lE power and Plant Support Power will both be OPEN.

After the switch is aligned to the desired source, the appropriate circuit breaker ir closed. When aligned to Plant Support Power, adequate protection to the 1E power cable and other cables which may share raceways is ensured through the use of a circuit breaker and a fuse in series. Both of these protective devices are selected to prevent cable damage during fault coeditions.

There is no Unreviewed Safety Question associated with this activity.

i Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 61 of 104 Unit: INN Evaluation Number SE-93-054 Activity

Title:

MM 93-169,LDCR TR-93-011; Relocation of Power Feed for Containment El-evator from Normal Non Class lE Power to Non lE Plant Support Power Description of Change (s):

The power source for the Containment Elevator (cpl-MEELRB-01) is being changed from normal Non lE to non lE Plant Support Power.

The new power source is considered more reliable in outage situations, and is 4

not susceptible to being shut down for maintenance. This change will help prevent loss of the containment elevator during outages.

[

Summary of Evaluation:

l The Containment Elevator (cpl-MEELRB-01) is currently being fed from normal non Class lE power.

This Minor Modification will relocate the power feed to the Plant Support Power System.

The original power source is occasionally required to be out of service during Modes 5 and 6 for maintenance and testing. During these outage periods the elevator is required for outage activities. This evaluation is required since MM 93-169 replaces the protective devices for the containment penetration assembly with dual circuit breakere ahich have similar trip characteristics to the circuit breakers which irrently i

exist.

The Containment Elevator is non-safety seismic category N and does not perform any safety function nor does the loss of power affect its seismic category.

Thus, the proposed activity could not create the possibility of an accident different from any accident evaluated in the Licensing Basis Documents. The use of dual circuit breakers to protect the containment penetration assembly maint ains required protection and precludes the possibility of damag Me to electrical faults.

1

(

The Licensing Document Change Request (LDCR SA-93-011) revises the Technical Requirements Manual to show the new protective devices for the containment penetration assembly. There is no Unreviewed Safety l

Question associated with this activity.

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l Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 62 of 104 Unit: INN Evaluation Number SE-93-056 i

Activity

Title:

MM 93-164; Addition of Manual Transfer Switch to Power Feed for Battery Charger BClED3-1 (cpl-EPBCED-05) for Outage Use Description of Change (s) :

A manual transfer switch is added to allow continued use of the Battery Charger BClED3-1 (cpl-EPBCED-05) during Modes 5 and 6 when the original 480 Volt power supply is out of service.

Summary of Evaluation:

l The Battery Charge BClED3-1 (cpl-EPBCED-05) is currently being fed from MCC lEB1-1.

This Minor Modification will provide a Class lE key-locked manual transfer switch and outage power supply from the Plant l

Support Power System to this battery charger.

The original power l

source is occasionally required to be out of service during Modes 5 l

and 6 for maintenance and testing.

During these outage periods the l

affected battery charger is needed to maintain the batteries on a i

float charge, keep the batteries from discharging during the electrical outage, keep the DC bus energized during battery l

surveillance testing (batteries disconnected during testing) and j

recharge a discharged battery.

This change will provide a Non lE outage power source to the battery charger that will be available during the outages of the original power source. Operation of the transfer switch is limited to plant Modes 5 and 6.

Prior to operation of the transfer switch, the entire associated train must be declared inoperable and the circuit breakers l

for lE power and Plant Support Power will both be OPEN.

After the switch is aligned to the desired source, the appropriate circuit l

breaker is closed.

Thus, the affected train is not credited for being l

cperable and the other train satisfies any minimum operability i

requirements. The use of the outage source will make equipment available above the minimum required even though no credit is taken for their availability, l

l When aligned to Plant Support Power, adequate protection to the lE power cable and other cables which may share raceways is ensured

)

through the use of two circuit breakers in series.

Both of these protective devices are selected to prevent cable dmmage during fault conditions.

l There is no Unreviewed Safety Question associated with this activity.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 63 of 104 Unit: INN Evaluation Number r

SE-93-058 Activity

Title:

MM 93-170; Addition of Transfer Switches to Power for Security Light-ing Transformers cpl-ELTRNT-26,27,30 & 31 for Outage Use Description of Change (s) :

A manual transfer switch is added to allow continued use of the Security Lighting System during Modes 5 and 6 when the original 480 Volt MCC is out ci service.

Summary of Evaluation:

Security Lighting Transformers cpl-ELTRNT-31, cpl-ELTRNT-26, cpl-

[

ELTRNT-27, and cpl-ELTRNT-30 are currently being fed from Switchgear I

lEB3, MCCs lEB1-1, lEB2-1 and lEB4-2, respectively..MM 93-170 will provide a Class lE key-locked manual transfer switch and outage power supply from the Plant Support Power System to these transformers.

The original power source is occasionally requfred to be out of service during Modes 5 and 6 for maintenance and testing. During these outage periods the Security Lighting Transformera are required to provide power for the plant Non IE Security Light ing System.

I The Security Lighting System is not sofety related and serves no safety function associated with safe shatdown or the mitigation of consequences associated with any design basis accident.

This change l

will not degrade the performance of any equipment and therefore l

security is not downgraded.

Operation of the transfer is limited to plant Modes 5 and 6.

Prior to operation of the transfer switch, the entire associated train must be declared inoperable and the breakers for lE power and Plant Support Power will both be OPEN.

After the switch is aligned to the desired source, the appropriate circuit breaker is closed.

Thus, the affected train is not credited for being operable and the other train satisfies any minimum operability requirements.

The use of the outage source will make equipment available above the minimum required even though no credit is taken for availability.

1 When aligned to Plant Support Power, adequate protection to the lE power cable and other cables which may share raceways is ensured l

through the us of two circuit breakers in series. Both of these l

protective devices are selected to prevent cable damage during fault conditions.

I l

There is no Unreviewed Safety Question associated with this activity.

Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 64 of 104 Unit: INN Evaluation Number SE-93-059 Activity

Title:

MM 93-165 R0; Addition of Manual Transfer Switch to Power Feed for Battery Charger BClEDl-2 (cpl-EPBCED-03) for outage Use Description of Change (s) :

A manual transfer switch is added to allow continued use of the Battery Charger BClEDl-2 (CP1-EPBCED-03) during Modes 5 and 6 when the original 480 Volt power supply is out of service.

Summary of Evaluation:

Battery Charger BClEDl-2 (cpl-EPBCED-03) is currently being fed frcs MCC lEB3-1.

This Minor Modification will provide a Class 1E key-locked manual transfer switch and outage-power supply from the Plant i

Support Power System to this battery charger.

The original power l

source is occasionally required to be out of service during Modes 5 j

and 6 for maintenance and testing. During these outage periods the affected battery charger is needed to maintain the batteries on a float charge, keep the batteries from discharging during the electrical outage, keep the DC bus energized during battery surveillance testing (batteries disconnected during testing) and recharge a discharged battery.

This change will provide a Non IE outage power source to the battery charger that will be available during the outage of the original power source. Operation of the transfer switch is limited to plant Modes 5 and 6.

Prior to operation of the transfer switch, the entire associated train must be declared inoperable and the circuit breakers for lE power and Plant Support Power will both be OkEN.

After the switch is aligned to the desired source, the appropriate circuit breaker is closed.

Thus, the affected train is not credited for being operable and the other train satisfies any minimum operability requirements. The use of the outage source will make equipment available above the m3aimum required even though no credit is taken for their availability.

When aligned to Plant Support Power, a iequate protection to the lE power cable and other cables may share raceways is ensured through the use of two circuit breakers in series.

Both of these protective devices are selected to prevent cable damage during fault conditions.

There is no Unreviewed Safety Question associated with this activity.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 65 of 104 Unit: INN Evaluation Number SE-93-060 Activity

Title:

MM 93-185; Addition of Manual Transfer Switch to Power Feed for Safe-guard Building Lighting Transformer cpl-ELTRET-01 for outage Use Description of Change (s) :

A manual transfer switch is added to allow continued use of the Safeguard Building Lighting Transformer CP1-ELTRET-01 during Modes 5 and 6 when the original 480 Volt power supply is out of service.

Summary of Evaluation:

The safeguard Building Lighting Transformer CP1-ELTRET-01 is currently being fed from MCC 1EB1-1.

This Minor Modification will provide a Class lE key-locked manual transfer switch and outage power supply from the Plant Support Power System to this transformer. The original power source is occasionally required to be out of service during Modes 5 and 6 for maintenance and testing. During these outage periods, the affected transformer is required so lighting can be ensured for Diesel Generator Room 1-084.

The lighting in the Diesel Ge"eratar Room is needed to support outage activities.

This change will provide a Non lE outage power source to the transformer that will be available during the outages of the original power source. Operation of the transfer switch is limited to plant Modes 5 and 6.

Prior to operation of the transfer switch, the entire associated train must be declared inoperable and the circuit breakers for lE power and Plant Support Power will both be OPEN.

After the switch is aligned to the desired source, the appropriate circuit breaker is closed.

Thus, the affected train is not credited for being operable and the other train satisfies any minimum operability requirements. The use of the outage source will make equipment available above the minimum required even though no credit is taken for their availability.

When aligned to Plant Support Power, adequate protection to the lE power cable and other cables which may share raceways is ensured through the use a circuit breaker and a fuse in series.

Both of these protective devices are selected to prevent cable damage during fault conditions.

There is no Unreviewed Safety Question associated with this activity.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 66 of 104 Unit: INN Evaluation Number SE-93-062 Activity

Title:

MM 93-171,LDCR TR-93-011; Relocation of Power Feed for the Containment Polar Crane from Class 1E Power to Non Class 1E Plant Support Power Description of Change (s) :

The power source for the Containment Polar Crane (CP1-MESCCP-01) is being changed from Class 1E power to non Class 1E Plant Support Power.

The new power source is considered more reliable in outage situations, and is not susceptible to being shut down for maintenance.

This change will help prevent loss of the crane during outages.

Summary of Evaluation:

The Containment Polar Crane (CP1-MESCCP-01) is currently being fed from 480 volt Class 1E switchgear.

This Minor Modification will relocate the power feed to the Plant Support Power System.

The original power source is occasionally required to be out of service during Modes 5 and 6 for maintenance and testing. During these outage periods the crane is required for outage activities. This evaluation is required since MM 93-171 replaces the protective devices for the containment penetration assembly with dual circuit breakers which have similar trip characteristics to the circuit breakers which currently exist.

The crane is non-safety seismic category 1 and does not perform any safety function nor does the loss of power affect its seismic category.

Thus, the proposed activity could not create the possibility of an accident different from any accident evaluated in the Licensing Basis Documents. The use of dual circuit breakers to protect the containment penetration assembly maintains required protection and precludes the possibility of damage due to electrical faults.

The Licensing Documents Change Request (LDCR SA-93-011) revises the Technical Requirements Manual to show the new protective devices for the containment penetration assembly. There is no Unreviewed Safety Question associated with this activity.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 67 of 104 Unit: INN l

Evaluation Number SE-93-063 i

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Activity

Title:

l MM 93-166; Addition of Manual Transfer Switch to Power Feed for Battery Charger BClED2-2 (CP1-EPBCED-04) for Outage Use Description of Change (s) :

j A manual transfer switch is added to allow continued use of the j

Battery Charger BC1ED2-2 (CP1-EPBCED-04) during Modes 5 and 6 when the l

original 480 volt power supply is out of service.

l f

1 Summary of Evaluation:

The Battery Charger BC1ED2-2 (cpl-EPBCED-04) is currently being fed from MCC lEB4-1.

This Minor Modification will provide a Class lE key-locked manual transfer switch and outage power supply from the Plant Support Power System to this battery charger.

The original power source is occasionally required to be out of service during Modes 5 l

and 6 for maintenance and testing. During these outage periods the affected battery charger is needed to maintain the batteries on a float charge, keep the batteries from discharging during the i

electrical outage, keep the DC bus energized during battery surveillance testing (batteries disconnected during testing) and recharge a discharged battery.

This change will provide a Non IE outage power source to the battery charger that will be available during the outages of the original power source. Operation of the transfer switch is limited to plant Modes 5 and 6.

Prior to operation of the transfer switch, the entire associated train must be declared inoperable and the circuit breakers for 1E power and Plant Support Power will both be OPEN.

After the switch is aligned to the desired source, the appropriate circuit breaker is closed.

Thus, the affected train is not credited for being operable and the other train satisfies any minimum operability requirements. The use of the outage source will make equipment available above the minimum required even though no credit is taken for their availability.

l When aligned to Plant Support Power, adequate protection to the lE power cable and other cables which may share raceways is ensured through the use of two circuit breakers in series.

Both of these protective devices are selected to prevent cable damage during fault conditions.

There is no Unreviewed Safety Question associated with this activity.

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l Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 68 of 104 Unit: 1X2 Evaluation Number SE-93-064 Activity

Title:

MM 93-172, LDCR TR-93-011; Relocation of Power Feed for Fuel Manipu-lator Machine from Normal Non 1E Power to Non 1E Plant Support Power Description of Change (s) :

The power source for the Fuel Manipulator Machine (TBX-THSCMC-01) is being changed from normal Non IE power to non 1E Plant Support Power.

The new power source is considered more reliable in outage situations, and is not susceptible to being shut down for maintenance. This change will help prevent loss of the manipulator machine during outages.

Summary of Evaluation:

The Fuel Manipulator Machine (TBX-FHSCMC-01) is currently being fed from normal non Class 1E power.

This Minor Modification will relocate the power feed to the Plant Support Power System. The original power source is occasionally required to be out of service during Modes 5 and 6 for maintenance and testing.

During these outage periods the elevator is required for outage activities.

This evaluation is required since MM 93-172 replaces the protective devices for the l

containment penetration assembly with dual circuit breakers which have similar trip characteristics to the circuit breakers which currently exist.

l l

The Yuel Manipulator Machine is non-safety seismic category II and does not perform any safety function nor does the loss of power affect its seismic category.

Thus, the proposed activity could not create the possibility of an accident different from any accident evaluated in the Licensing Basis Documents. The use of dual circuit breakers to protect the containment penetration assembly maintains required protection and precludes the possibility of damage due to electrical faults.

l The Licensing Document Change Request (LDCR TR-93-011) revises the Technical Requirements Manual to show the new protective devices for the containments penetration assembly.

There is no Unreviewed Safety Question associated with this activity.

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I Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 69 of 104 Unit: INN l

Evaluation Number SE-93-067 Activity

Title:

j MM 93-174, LDCR TR-93-011; Relocation of Power Feed for the Contain-i ment Lighting Transformer and Fuel Transfer System Control Panel Description of Change (s) :

The power sources for two loads (TBX-FHSTTS-02 and CP1-ELTRNT-14) are being changed from normal Non IE power to non IE Plant Support Power.

The new power source is considered more reliable in outage situations, and is not susceptible to being shut down for maintenance. This change will help prevent loss of containment lighting and refueling j

system control during outages.

Summary of Evaluation:

The Containment Lighting Transformer (CP1-ELTRNT-14 ) and Fuel Transfer System Reactor Side Containment Panel Control Panel 1-02 (TBX-FHSTTS-

02) are both currently being fed from normal non Class 1E power.

This Minor Modification will relocate the power feed to the Plant Support Power System. The original power source is occasionally required to be out of service during Modes 5 and 6 for maintenance and testing.

During these outage periods the Fuel Transfer Control Panel is required for refueling activities and the Contaimment Lighting Transformer provides lighting inside Unit One Containment. This evaluation is required since MM 93-174 replaces the protective devices for the containment penetration assembly with dual circuit breakers which have similar trip characteristics to the circuit breakers which currently exist.

Both pieces of equipment are non-safety seismic category N and perform no safety function.

Implementation of this Minor Modification will l

not affect the seismic category and thus could not create the i

possibility of an accident different from any accident evaluated in l

the Licensing Basis Documents. The use of dual circuit breakers to l

protect the containment penetration assembly maintains required protection and precludes the possibility of damage due to electrical faults.

The Licensing Document Change Request (LDCR TR-93-011) revises the Technical Requirements Manual to show the new protective devices for the containment penetration assembly.

There is no Unreviewed Safety Question associated with this activity.

Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 70 of 104 Unit: 1XN Evaluation Number SE-93-068 Activity

Title:

MM 93-187; Addition of Manual Transfer Switch to Power Feed for Safe-guard Building Lighting Transformer cpl-ELTRET-03 for Outage Use Description of Change (s) :

A manual transfer switch is added to allow continued use of the Safeguard Building Lighting Transformer cpl-ELTRET-03 during Modes 5 and 6 when the original 480 volt power supply is out of service.

Summary of Evaluation:

The Safeguard Building Lighting Transformer cpl-ELTRET-03 is currently being fed from MCC lEB2-1.

This Minor Modification will provide a Class lE key-locked manual transfer switch and outage power supply l

from the Plant Support Power System to this transformer.

The original l

power source is occasionally required to be out of service during i

Modes 5 and 6 for maintenance and testing. During these outage periods, the affected transformer is required so lighting can be ensured for Diesel Generator Room 1-085.

The lighting in the Diesel Generator Room is needed to support outage activities.

This change will provide a Non lE outage power source to the Safeguard Building Lighting Transformer that will be available during the outages of the original power source. Operation of the transfer switch is limited to plant Modes 5 and 6.

Prior to operation of the transfer switch, the entire associated train must be declared inoperable and the circuit breakers for lE power and Plant Support Power will both be OPEN.

After the switch is aligned to the desired source, the appropriate circuit breaker is closed.

Thus, the affected train is not credited for being operable and the other train satisfies any minimum operability requirements.

The use of the outage source l

will make equipment available above the minLmum required even though no credit is taken for their availability.

i When aligned to Plant Support Power, adequate protection to the lE l

power cable and other cables which may share raceways is ensured i

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through the use a circuit breaker and a fuse in series.

Both of these protective devices are selected to prevent cable damage during fault conditions.

There is no Unreviewed Safety Question associated with this activity.

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i Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 71 of 104 Unit: 1X2 Evaluation Number SE-93-071 Revision 1 Activity

Title:

MM 93-176 R1; Addition of Manual Transfer Switch to Power Feed for Control Room Gas Monitors CPX-VAAPRE-10 and TXEC1 for Outage Use Description of Change (s) :

Two manual transfer switches are added to allow continued use of the Control Room Gas Monitors during Modes 5 and 6 when the original 480 Volt power supply is out of service.

These monitors are presently fed from Class lE power.

Summary of Evaluation:

The Control Room Gas Monitors are safety related monitors that are required during ALL modes of plant operations, per Technical Specification 3.3.3.1.

For a selected HVAC intake, both (Train A and the Train B) monitors should be operable, otherwise Action Statement 128 requires that the fresh air supply fans be secured and the Control Room be maintained in Emergency Recirculation for an extended period of time.

This is not desirable during a routine plant outage (a normal plant condition) in an area which is occupied all the time and where smoking is permitted.

Hence, it is essential to provide alternate power to these Class 1E radiation monitors during outages of the normal power source.

There are no Regulatory Guides or other regulatory requirements which dictate that lE power must be supplied to these monitors. During one Unit Modes 5 and 6 (where the other Unit may be in Modes 1-4),

operation of the manual transfer switch will provide highly reliable, Non lE Plant Support Power to these monitors to ensure functionality.

Loss of power to the monitors will automatically initiate Control Room ventilation Emergency Recirculation, which is a safe condition. For these reasons, the monitors should be considered OPERABLE, even though they are not supplied with Class lE power. Active components required to put the Control Room Ventilation into Recirculation are powered I

from the available Train and are still operable.

This Minor Modification will provide a Non IE outage power source to the rad monitors that will be available during the outages of the original power source. Operation of the transfer switch is limited to plant Modes 5 and 6. Prior to operation of the transfer switch, the circuit breakers for lE power and Plant Support Power will both be OPEN.

After the switch is aligned to the desired source, the appropriate circuit breakar is closed.

When aligned to Plant Support Power, adequate protection to the lE power cable and other cables which may share raceways is ensured through the use of a circuit breaker and a fuse in series. Both of these protective devices are selected to prevent cable damage during fault conditions.

There is no Unreviewed Safety Question associated with this activity.

i Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric 1

y Page 72 of 104 Unit: INN

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Evaluation Number l

SE-93-072

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1 Activity

Title:

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MM 93-317, LDCR TR-93-Oll; Relocation of Power Feed for Containment j

Welding Receptacles from normal Non IE Power to Non IE Pint.Supprt.Pwr 1

Description of Change (s) :

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The power source for the Containment We.1 ding Receptacles is being changed from normal Non IE power to non IE Plant Support Power.

The new power source is considered more reliable in outage situations, and I

is not susceptible to being shut down for maintenance.

This change will help prevent loss of power to the receptacles during outages.

Summary of Evaluation:

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The Containment Welding Receptacles are currently being fed from normal non Class lE power.

This Minor Modification will relocate the power feed to the Plant Support Power System. The original power l

source is occasionally required te be out of service during Modes 5 a

and 6 for maintenance and testing. During these outage periods the I

receptacles are required for outage activities.

This evaluation is j

required since MM 93-317 replaces the protective devices for the containment penetration assembly with dual circuit breakers which have d

I similar trip characteristics to the circuit breakers which currently exist.

The receptacles perform no safety function nor will this Minor Modification affect the seismic category.

Thus, the proposed activity 4

l could not create the possibility of an accident different from any i

accident evaluated in the Licensing Basis Documents.

The use of dual I

circuit breakers to protect the containment penetration assembly maintains required protection and precludes the possibility of damage due to electrical faults.

The Licensing Document Change Request (LDCR TR-93-Oll) revises the Technical Requirements Manual to show the new protective devices for the containment penetration assembly.

There is no Unreviewed Safety Questions associated with this activity.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 73 of 104 Unit: 1X2 Evaluation Number SE-93-073 Revision 1 1

Activity

Title:

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MM 93-178 Rl; Addit.of Mnual Transfer Sw. to Pwr Feed for CR Gas Mntra CPX-VAAPRE-10,U1 Cntnmnt. Air Mntra.1RE-5502/03/66 and AB Isl Tr TXEC2 Description of Change (s) :

Three manual transfer switches are added to allow continued use of the Control Room Gas Monitors and Unit One Containment Air Monitors during Modes 5 and 6 when the original 480 Volt power supply is out of service. These monitors are presently fed from Class lE power.

Summary of Evaluation:

The Control Room Gas Monitors are safety related monitors that are i

required during ALL modes of plant operations, per Technical Specification 3.3.3.1.

For a selected HVAC intake, both (Train A and j

the Train B) monitors should be operable, otherwise Action Statement i

1. 28 requires that the fresh air supply fans be secured and the Control Room be maintained in Emergency Recirculation for an extended period of time.

This is not desirable during a routine plant outage (a 1

normal plant condition) in an area which is occupied all the time and where smoking is permitted.

Hence, it is essential to provide l

alternate power to these Class lE radiation monitors during outages of the normal power source.

i There are no Regulatory Guides or other regulatory requirements which dictate that 1E power must be supplied to these monitors. During one Unit Modes 5 and 6 (where the other Unit may be in Modes 1-4),

operation of the manual transfer switch will provide highly reliable, Non IE Plant Support Power to these monitors to ensure functionality.

Loss of power to the monitors will automatically initiate Control Room Ventilation Emergency Recirculation, which is a safe condition.

For these reasons, the monitors should be considered OPERABLE, even though they are not cupplied with Class 1E power.

Active components required to put the Control Room Ventilation into Recirculation are powered 3

j from the available Train and are still operable.

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This Minor Modification will provide a NON 1E outage power source to the rad monitors that will be available during the outages of the original power source. Operation of the transfer switch 1: limited to plant Modes 5 and 6.

Prior to operation of the transfer switch, the circuit breakers for lE power and Plant Support Power will both be OPEN. After the switch is aligned to the desired source, the appropriate circuit breaker is closed.

l When aligned to Plant Support Power, adequate protection to the 1E power cable and other cables which may share raceways is ensured through the use of a circuit breaker and a fuse in series.

Both of j

these protective devices are selected to prevent cable damage during fault conditions.

There is no Unreviewed Safety Question associated with this activity.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 74 of 104 Unit: INN Evaluation Number SE-93-075 l

Activity

Title:

DM 92-042; Install New Computer Components in Cabinets TBX-PCCOCP-00,

-01, -02, -03 and CP1-PCCOCP-10 and Modify Control Board CP1-ECPRCB-07 Description of Change (s) :

CPSES is replacing the Westinghouse P-2500 computer system with a DEC VAX 4000 computer system.

The SE addresses installing new processing hardware into existing cabinets.

The hardware consists of CPU's, I/O cards, and associated processing hardware such as ethernet bridges and data links.

Summary of Evaluation:

The modification includes the installation of computer equipment and the powering of the equipment from a 118 VAC source. The distribution panels which supply the new computer equipment are non class IE.

The Plant computer system is used for monitoring only and will not affect any structures systems or components which could create any unanalyzed safety concern or result in any credible failure or malfunction or accident scenario. This activity will neither affect the initiation or progression of any accident analyzed in the FSAR chapters 6 or 15.

The activity will also not result in any failure or malfunction of equipment important to safety which will result in any new type of-unanalyzed accident. The installation and powering of the hardware, since it is non IE, will not affect the margin of safety as no technical specification limits or failure values are applicable to the l

power distribution panels or processing hardware.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 75 of 104 Unit: IN2 Evaluation Number SE-93-076 Activity

Title:

EPP-314, Revision 4," Evacuation and Accountability"; Delete Early Dismissal of Non-emergency Personnel at Alert Description of Change (s) :

The proposed activity is to revise the subject. procedure and delete the commitment to dismiss (at Alert) all non-emergency personnel at the site under declared emergency conditions. This activity is proposed-in order to:

a.

minimize operating / manpower' costs, and b.

minimize risks associated with increased personnel.

movement.

Evacuation of all non-emergency personnel from CPSES is required upon declaration of a Site Area or General Emergency. During the construction phase at CPSES, a large number of non-emergency engineering and construction personnel, in addition to regular TU non-emergency personnel, populated the site.

If a site evacuation were to have become necessary, the site populatica may have been.too large to evacuate as a whole in a safe and efficient manner.

TU Electric

)

therefore committed to dismiss early all non-TU Electric engineering and construction personnel upon declaration of an Alert emergency classification, thus reducing the number of onsite personnel if site evacuation became necessary at Site Area or General Emergency.

Construction activities are now complete at CPSES and the site population has reduced greatly from an average of 8300 in 1989 to an average of 2700 in 1993 Early dismissal of non-emergency personnel, J

and a full site evacuation upon declaration of any emergency classification during routine and outage operations, is and always has been an option available to the Emergency Coordinator; however, dismissal at Alert is no longer required due to a smaller total site population.

Summary of Evaluation:

This activity involves the decision as to when to perform (movement) evacuation of non-emergency site personnel under emergency conditions.

The activity does not affect any required plant operations (including minimum staf fing requirements), and does not affect safety related structures, systems or components. The activity is not related to, and does not impact, accident analyses described in the licensing basis.

Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 76 of 104 Unit: IN2 Evaluation Number SE-93-077 Activity

Title:

LDCR SA-93-66; Alternate Amine Demonstration Project i

Description of Change (s) :

Diethylhydroxylamine (DEHA) will be injected into the Unit 2 secondary side as a Hydrazine replacement.

Concentration will be optimized to minimize condensate oxygen concentration, feedwater iron transport, and feedwater electrochemical potential. The goal is to reduce steam generator tube corrosion and failure.

Dimethylandne (DMA) is a naturally occurring DEHA daughter product.

DMA will be injected into the Unit 1 secondary side as a Morpholine additive. DMA will reduce piping corrosion and deposition of sludge on the steam generator tubing. DMA concentration will be optimized.

The goal is to reduce feedwater iron transport, sludge deposition, tube fouling, and steam generator failure.

Once successfully added to each Unit, it is the goal to place both units on DERA/DMA/ Morpholine chemistry.

Summary of Evaluation:

This safety evaluation separately examined the effect of each chemical.

Since DMA is a DEHA daughter product, no deleterious effect from their combination is expected.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 77 of 104 Unit: INN Evaluation Number 1

SE-93-078

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Revision 1 Activity

Title:

DM 92-03.7; LDCR SA-93-009,-156; Plant Computer System Upgrade, Field Terminations and Final Tie-ins l

Description of Change (s) :

CPSES is replacing the existing Unit 1 Westinghouse P-2500, ERF and Data Acquisition Computer Systems with a new DEC VAX 4000 Based Plant Computer System during 1RF03. DM 92-017 provides the final field terminations and tie-ins to activate the system.

It also addresses the overall PCS hardware and software installation as well as testing for proper system operation. Ancillary Design Modifications (DM 92-036 through -043) issued previously, provided the required information for removal of old equipment and installation of new components.

Each Design Modification dealt with particular aspects of the overall installation and 10CFR50.59 Screens or Evaluations, as required, were part of each of the Modifications. The Licensing Design Change Requests are issued to revise the FSAR figures to reflect this Design Modification.

Summary of Evaluation:

The CPSES Unit 1 plant licensing basis documentation has been reviewed to assure that the implementation of the Plant Computer System upgrade i

satisfies the requirements of both the plant licensing basis and the j

Plant Technical Specifications.

Plant Technical Specifications 1

operational and surveillance requirements are satisfied with the l

implementation of this modification. Additionally, CPSES Safety Evaluation Report (SER), NUREG 0797 and it's supplements have been l

reviewed to assure that the CPSES Unit 1 PCS upgrade complies with the licensing commitments and requirements in the SER.

l The proposed activity does not introduce or affect any systems, structures, or components which could create any unanalyzed safety concerns resulting in an unanticipated or credible potential failure or accident scenario.

Internal modifications to the Westinghouse 7300 Process Racks may be performed on both Train A and Train B equipment simultaneously since the Emergency Response Facility Computer System is out of service during this phase of the project and no train restrictions apply. The requirements of Electrical Installation Procedure 2323-ES-100 have been satisfied with the new PCS design. The physical plant is naintained within the limits of the FSAR, Plant Technical Specifications, and CPSES Safety Evaluation Report NUREG l

0797, without introducing any limiting conditions for operation.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 78 of 104 Unit: 1X2 1

Evaluation Number SE-93-080 Activity

Title:

MM-93-390,-391;LDCR SA-93-093: Change Normal Operating Position of PDP Suction Stabilizer Isolations & Gas Vent Isolations from Open to Close Description of Change (s) :

Recent operational problems with the Unit 2 Positive Displacement Pump (PDP) Suction Stabilizer level control switch (2-LS-018 9) caused the Unit 2 CVCS charging pump gas binding events that occurred on 2/25-26/93 during Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) suction switch overs between the Volume Control Tank (VCT) and the Reactor Water Storage Tank (RWST).

Level switch floats of the PDP suction stabilizer level switch (2-LS-0189) failing to move because of binding on the level switch probe caused the gas supply valve 2-8204 to remain open.

This allowed higher pressure gas from the suction stabilizer to be injected into the lower pressure suction of the PDP during the first event and into the charging pump suction header during the second event causing a centrifugal charging pump to become gas bound.

Summary of Evaluation:

The proposed activity will maintain closed the PDP suction stabilizer gas supply and vent isolations (1- & 2-8210A & B and 1- & 2-8202A &B) whenever the PDPs are not operating. This will protect the CCPs against a single failure to the PDP suction stabilizer leval switches (1/2-LS-0189) causing the gas supply control valves (1/2-8204) to remain open and potentially injecting gas into the charging pump suction header. The safety function performed by these valves will not be affected by implementation of this proposed activities.

In addition, maintaining the Valcor SOV gas supply isolations (1/2-8210A/B) and vent isolations (1/2-8202A/B) closed (and de-energized) whenever the PDPs are not operating should reduce potential thermal degradation of the solenoid operator limit switches and contribute to maintaining calibration.

Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 79 of 104 Unit: INN Evaluation Number SE-93-083 1

Activity

Title:

TM 93-1-19 R0; Provide Compensatory Actions to Assure R.G.

1.97 Historical Trending / Recording During Early Power-Down of ERT Description of Change (s) :

Temporary modification TM-93-01-019 provides for temporary recording trending of Unit 1 process monitoring / recording instrumentation which will be disabled during the early power-down of the Unit 1 Emergency Response Facility (ERF) computer system.

These process variables will be maintained via plant systems / equipment'which will not be affected by the ERF early power-down.

This includes signal cable and/or data links between the Unit 1 equipment and Unit 1 ERT Development System in the CPE building, between the Unit 1 equipment and Unit 1 Temporary Data Acquisition System (TDAS), Unit 1 equipment and Unit 2 Plant Computer System (PCS), and between Unit 1 TDAS and temporary recording instrumentation.

Summary of Evaluation:

The utilization of Unit 1 TDAS for N-16 and ex-core neutron flux monitoring is acceptable since these variables are required only during reactor modes 1 and 2 (power operations and startup). The dismantling of TDAS during 1 REC 3 will have no bearing on N-16 or ex-core neutron flux monitoring since the Unit will be in reactor mode 5 or 6 (cold shutdown or refueling) at t his time.

Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 80 of 104 Unit: NXN Evaluation Number SE-93-084 l

Activity

Title:

TM 93-1-020 R0; Fuel Building Crane - Sypass the Main Holst Load Cell Trip & Permissive Contacts Description of Change (s) :

l The Temporary Modification (IM) to the fuel building overhead crane bypasses the trip and permissive contacts from the 130 ton main hoist load cell instrument.

The load cell trip function provides a hoist trip at 137 tons, which locks out all hoist movement.

The load cell was inoperable and therefore the hoists, including the 17 and 5 ton auxiliary hoists, could not be used.

The load cell trip function is a backup to the X-SAM system for main hoist load only.

All X-SAM functions, including overload protection, the load cells associated with the 17 and 5 ton hoists, and all trolley interlocks will remain operable during the duration of the TM.

Summary of Evaluation:

There are no licensing basis accidents or malfunctions important to safety associated with the Unit 1 or 2 reactors or with reactor operation. The probability of an accident associated with a load drop into the Unit 1 spent fuel pool is not considered credible due to the relatively light loading of the main hook during the duration of the l

TM and the lack of proximity to the spent fuel pool no. 1

[

(pool no. 2 contains no spent fuel).

The potential for l

snagging a structure during a lift exists for any lift and l

the probability will not be increase with the IM installed.

The X-SAM system can handle any overload that could occur l

by snagging, however since the load cell is bypassed, there

(

will be no backup system to prevent overload in the unlikely case the X-SAM system were to fail. Caution tags will be placed in the crane operating cab to alert personnel of the TM installation. The area of greatest l

risk, i.e.,

the 860' elevation, is relatively clear and free of snag points, so the probability of a snag occurring in this area is low.

The fuel building crane has a dual cable reeving arrangement that gives added assurance of reliability in overload conditions, particularly since the probable loads weigh much less the crane capacity.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 81 of 104 Unit: 1XH l

Evaluation Number SE-93-085 Activity

Title:

Review the Cancellation of DM 90-478 " Reduce Gear Operator Ratio for Valves lAF-066 and 1AF-054" Description of Change (s) :

The of this Safety Evaluation is to review the decision to. cancel DM 90-478, " reduce gear operator ratio for valves lAF-066 and 1AF-054".

The time required to manually operate 1AF-054 was considered to be associated with the auxiliary feedwater backflow events of 1989. CDF 24860 stated that the valves would be reworked and DM 90-478 was initiated to implement that commitment; however, other corrective actions have been implemented which directly address the root causes of these events and the modification is not considered necessary.

Swnmary of Evaluation:

l The cancellation of the mod leaves the valves in their current configuration and does not represent a change to the plant design, j

procedures or licensing.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 82 of 104 Unit: 1XN i

Evaluation Number SE-93-086 4

1 Activity

Title:

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Deferral of Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Inspection Activities i

Originally Scheduled for Unit 1RTO3 Description of Change (s) :

The purpose of this activity is to evaluate the deferral of specific EDG inspection recommendations for thirteen components originally l

scheduled for the upcoming CPSES Unit 1 refueling outage (1RF03).

NUREG/CR-5057, " Aging Mitigation and Improved Programs for Nuclear Service Diesel Generators," concludes,

"...it is strongly recommended that an engine not be torn down solely for the purpose of inspection, unless the monitoring and trending program provides evidence of an internal malfunction or impending malfunction.

It was indicated i

i earlier that such disassembly could actually detract from engine reliability."

1 Summary of Evaluation:

1 Implementation of the proposed activity does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question based on:

1) the confirmatory nature of the inspection requirements, 2) no indications of abnormalities from the 4

monitoring and trending programs, 3) positive inspection results from previous inspections and from other utilities, and 4) the conclusions of NUREG/CR-5057 In addition, this deferral will minimize the EDG d

I outage time during 1RF03 while the NRC and the Cooper Enterprise Clearinghouse resolve the need for such inspections in light of the adverse impact of having and EDG inoperable during an outage in light of the adverse impact of having an EDG inoperable during an outage and the reliability monitoring programs now in use.

These long tear down and inspection requirements impact emergency AC power availability j

during outages which has been shown to be important to shutdown risk.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric l

Page 83 of 104 Unit: IN2 l

Evaluation Number j

SE-93-087 i

I Activity

Title:

l MM 93-228, LDCR SA-93-108; Remove Locked Valve Requirements for Liquid l

Waste Processing Valves & Revise Normal Position of Valve in FSAR Fig.

Description of Change (s) :

Minor Modification (ted 93-228) removed locked valve requirements for Liquid Waste Processing System valves XWP-7416B, XWP-0215, and XWP-0305 to bring normal valve lineup and locking criteria into compliance l

with preferred radioactive waste system operating practices while reducing the number of unnecessarily locked valves. Also, revised normal postion of valve XWP-7421B on FSAR Figure 11.4-2 Sh. 1 to t

normally closed to reflect actual plant conditions.

Summary of Evaluation:

The changes involved with the subject minor modification reduce operator radiation exposure during normal work activities and during system suveillances, reduce the number of unnecessarily locked valves, and allow operations flexibility. The changes do not adversely affect the system design basis or the margin of safety within the Radioactive Waste Management System (RNMS) or other systems described in the Licensing Basis Documents or Technical Specifications. Also, the updated position of valve XWP-7421B in FSAR figure 11.4-2 Sh 1 is an administrative correction to reflect the actual and normal closed condition, i

There are no structures, system set points, or safety parameters that are affected by this activity. The system operation was revised to incorporate the changes necessary to reflect the implementation of this activity, j

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l Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 84 of 104 Unit: IN2 Evaluation Number SE-93-089 Activity

Title:

LDCR SA-93-103; Revision to FSAR Section 13.2 " Training" to reflect NRC rulemaking to 10 CFR parts 50 and 55 Description of Change (s) :

FSAR Section 13.2 is being revised to reflect the 3/25/87 revision to part 55 and the 4/26/93 issuance of 50.120. The NRC (as stated in 58 FR 21904) finds that an accredited systems approach to training program is an acceptable alternative to the prescriptive requirements of part 55. Regulatory Guide 1.8 rev. 2 states its prescriptive training requirements no longer apply after a training program is accredited. As a result, commitments are being updated to comply with current regulations, and/or commitments which are re dant to the regulations are being deleted.

Summary of Evaluation:

Since these changes do not change the " scope" of the training program, all critical operator tasks considered in the accident analysis remain intact in the training program content. As no existing critical operator tasks are being eliminated, nor are any previously unidentified critical operator tasks being introduced, no unanalysed condition nor unreviewed safety question exists. By the application of SAT-based training and plant configuration management processes to non-licensed personnel, performance is enhanced, thereby imposing no adverse impact on plant safety.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 85 of 104 Unit: NX2 Evaluation Number SE-93-090 Activity

Title:

PPT-TP-92B-1 R0; Public Address and Emergency Evacuation Alaom System Test Loscription of Chat ye (s) :

l The objective of the test is to demonstrate the capability of the intraplant and plant-to-offsite communication systems to provide adequate communication coverage and audibility.

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The acceptance criteria is "that the communication system functions in accordance with design requirements.

The public address and emergency evaluation alarm systems are audible during the highest expected ambient noise levels.

Intraplant communications channels function properly and communications to offsite can be established by the public telephone, two way radio and direct telephone line to the system dispatcher."

During the performance of PPT-TP-92B-1, it was discovered that voice l

paging and emergency evacuation alarm signals were not audible for the l

Train A and B RHR and SI Pump rooms, room 285 and the pipe chase at l

the north end of the Safege rds hallway elevation 790.

This does not meet the acceptance crite as specified in the FSAR Table 14.2-2, Sheet 40, " Communication S.tems Test Summary".

As a compensatory measure, scurity officers will be dispatched to these areas to provide emergency notification when required.

Summary of Evaluation:

The activity does not affect any systems, structures, or components important to safety and therefore does not affect any accidents or malfunctions as described in the Licensing Basis Documents. There are l

no Technical Specifications associated with this activity.

The evaluation concludes that there is no unreviewed safety question.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 86 of 104 Unit: 1XN-Evaluation Number SE-93-091 Activity

Title:

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l LDCR SA-93-104;DCN-6642; Revision of Valve 1Ar-0236 to Normally Open to Allow Continuous Sampling of Inventory in the Condensate Storage Tank Description of Change (s):

A 3/4" connection is provided on the Condensate Storage Tank level instrumentation line to allow sampling of the tank inventory.

The sampling equipment requires continuous flow, but the isolation valve for the sampling line is positioned as normally closed. This requires the isolation valve to be opened by operations or chemistry when a sample is to be taken.

Sampling is done on a frequent basis and requires manual operation of the valve for sample system lineup.

Summary of Evaluation:

The DCN revises the position of the isolation valve to normally open.

Calculation ME-CA-0000-3326 has determined that the maximum flow rate i

from the 3/4" piping is such that this configuration will not l

compromise the ability of the ATW System to perform its safety functions. That is, failure of the lower class components will not i

result in loss of safety function of the higher class components.

The l

effect on the level instrumentation has been evaluated, and it has l

been determined that this effect will not compromise the ability of I

the ATW system to perform its safety function.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 87 of 104 Unit: 1X2 Evaluation Number SE-93-092 Activity

Title:

DM 93-038 R0, LDCR SA-93-099; Change the Power Source to the PPV ESF Htrs. X-15 & -16 from Class lE Unit 1 MCCs to.the Class lE Common MCCs Description of Change (s) :

This activity aligns the power source of the Primary Plant Ventilation (PPV) ESF heaters CPX-VAFUPK-15 & 16 to their associated fans CPX-VAFNCB-21 & 22, rerpectively. This activity will allow these ESF. fans and heaters to be available to auto-start in the event of a LOCA on either unit with the other unit in an outage condition, This activity spares in place the existing power cables and install new cables from the new MCCs to the heaters.

The power source for the non-IE Lighting Transformer CPX-ELTRET-08 is displaced and moved to 6" MCC bucket to accommodate the 12" MCC bucket needed for heater X-15.

Revision to the one-line diagrams and consequently, the FSAR figures and table on Section 8.3 are made (Ref. LDCR SA-93-099). The Diesel Generator loading calculations are updated with no net effect on the l

results.

Summary of Evaluation:

l The ESF heaters are required to start with their associated filtration I

unit following a LOCA to maintain negative pressure in the Auxiliary, safeguards and Fuel buildings.

These equipment are loads included in the Diesel Generator loading analyses shown on FSAR Tables 8.3-1A, 8.3-1B and 8.3-2.

The implementation of this activity will provide the required availability of redundant ESF fan / heater to maintain negative pressure in the Auxiliary, Safeguards and Fuel buildings (common to both units) even during an event where one unit is in either an outage or loss of power condition and a LOCA event occur in the other unit.

The implementation of this activity does not have any net impact on the Diesel Generator loading as these loads have already been accounted for in calculations EE (B)-095 (Unit 1) and 2-EE-014 (Unit

2). Changes made to the calculations only moved the load from the Unit 1 MCC to the common MCC thus retaining the total connected load.

The load sequence time block at which this loads start have not been changed.

The implementation of the above activities does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

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i Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 88 of 104 Unit: 1XN l

I Evaluation Number SE-93-095 Activity

Title:

DM 93-045, R.0; LDCR SA-93-124; Design Changes to Implement Reanalysis of Inadvertent Boron Dilution Event Description of Change (s):

This activity implements design changes required to support the revised safety analysis for the inadvertent boron dilution event in Modes 3, 4 and 5.

The modifications listed below were previously 4

3 described in a License Amendment Request (TXX-93098 dated April 30, 1993) which was subsequently approved in License Amendment 20 for Unit i

1 and License Amendment 6 for Unit 2.

These modifications are i

complete for Unit 1 and are scheduled for the next outage for Unit 2.

The modifications include:

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1.

An alarm added to the Volume Control Tank (VCT) to alarm at 70%

span.

I 2.

An alarm added to annunciate when the VCT divert valve is not in the "VCT" position.

3.

An alarm added to annunciate when the VCT divert valve is diverting flow to the Hold-up Tank.

i In addition to the above, the nuclear feed forward signal circuit card was removed from the feedwater bypass control channel to make room for the VCT alarms. The output gain on this card had previously been set i

to zero, to improve the control of the steam generator water level at low power levels.

Summary of Evaluation:

The safety impact of the installed boron dilution alarms was discussed in the license amendment submittal in which it was concluded that j

there was no adverse safety impact.

Installation of the equipment was also found not to have safety impact.

Deletion of the forward gain signal from the feedwater regulating 4

bypass valve was recommended by the Westinghouse Owners Group trip assessment committee due to control instabilities it caused at low power levels.

The forward gain feature is generic to Westinghouse S/G control systems. The change was reviewed for its impact on the ability to control steam generator water level and found not to have any 4

adverse impact.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 89 of 104 Unit: 1X2 Evaluation Number SE-93-096 Activity

Title:

MM 93-528,-529,-530,-533,-534,-535,-536,-537,-539,-540;LDCR SA-93-128; Rplemnt of GEAR Raultng in Incra in the Mx Strk Tme for 10 MOV in ECCS Description of Change (s) :

This activity consisted of minor modifications that resulted in the increase in the closure time of several motor operated valves (MOVs) in the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) for each unit as part of the Generic Letter 89-10 MOV Testing and Maintenance Program.

(The affected valves are the four accumulator discharge isolation valves, and six other valves required to change position to facilitate ECCS hot leg recirculation.)

The internal gears on these valves were being replaced to improve their actuator capability. This gear change out has resulted in the stroke times of these valve to increase slightly.

Since the stroke times were very close to the maximum stroke times specified in FSAR Table 6.3-1, a safety evaluation was conducted to determine the acceptability of this modifications.

Summary of Evaluation:

Increasing the stroke time requirements for the referenced accumulator motor operated isolation valves and the ECCS motor operated valves does not affect the integrity of the ECCS or accumulators such that their functions in the control of radiologi' cal consequences are affected.

In addition, this change does not change, degrade, or prevent the response of the ECCS or accumulators to accident scenarios, as described in Chapter 15 of the FSAR since the hot leg switchover time is not changed.

In addition, the increasing of the stroke time for these valves does not alter any assumption previously made in the radiological consequences of an accident described in the FSAR since the isolation time of 30 minutes is not changed.

Hence, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased.

The increasing of the isolation valve's maximum stroke time does not cause the initiation of any accident nor create any new credible limiting single failure. As such, it does not create the possibility of an accident different than any evaluated in the FSAR.

Increasing the MOVs maximum stroke time allowable will have no ef fect on the availability, operability, or safety function performance of the ECCS.

Therefore, this activity will not reduce a margin of safety.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 90 of 104 Unit: INN l

Evaluation Number SE-93-097 Activity

Title:

MM-93-496 RO, LDCR SA-93-129; Remove Internals of Two (2) Unit 1 Station Service Water System Check valves 1SW-0388 and 1SW-0389 Description of Change (s) :

A mechanical engineering evaluation has identified and eliminated those check valves which duplicate a function already being performed by other valves in the system or do not require a closed safety or l

non-safety function.

l This modification removes the internals of two Unit 1 Station Service l

Water System (SW) check valves ISW-0388 and 1SW-0389.

l Summary of Evaluation:

l There are no credible operating scenarios under which these valves are l

required to perform a " closed " safety function. There are no l

designed functions or parameters associated with the auxiliary feedwater and service water systems which are affected by this modification. The implementation of this modification teill not increase the probability of occurrence of a TSAR Chapter 15 accident.

l The possibility of creating a malfunction of equipment important to l

safety different from any evaluated in the Licensing Basis Docunents does not exist.

This modification does affect the Technical l

Specifications for the SW systems.

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i Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 91 of 104 Unit: NN2 Evaluation Number SE-93-098 Activity

Title:

MM-93-497 R0, LDCR SA-93-133; Remove Internals of Two (2) Unit 2 Station Service Water System Check Valves 2SW-0388 and 2SW-0389 Description of Change (s) :

A mechanical engineering evaluation has identified and e10minated those check valves which duplicate a function already being performed by other valves in the system or do not require a closed safety or non-safety function.

This modification removes the internals of two Unit 2 Station Service Water System (SW) check valves 2SW-0388 and 2SW-0389.

Summary of Evaluation:

There are no credible operating scenarios under which these valves are required to perform a " closed " safety function.

There are no designed functions or parameters associated with the auxiliary feedwater and service water systems which are affected by this modification. The implementation of this modification will not increase the probability of occurrence of a FSAR Chapter 15 accident.

The possibility of creating a malfunction of equipment important to safety different from any evaluated in the Licensing Basis Documents does not exist. This modification does affect the Technical Specifications for the SW systems.

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Page 92 of 104 Unit: 1X2 Evaluation Number

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SE-93-099

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Title:

STA-716, R10; " Site Modification Process" as it Relates to SORC Review of Design Changes j

Description of Change (s) :

i The procedure governing station modifications is being revised to require SORC review of minor modifications only if the minor modifications involve an Unreviewed Safety Question or change to a radwaste treatment system.

The requirement to review safety evaluations or ndnor modifications is preserved Summary of Evaluation:

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As the proposed changes are consistent with the existing Technical Specifications and current Licensing Basis, they do not represent i

either an unreviewed safety question or reduction in commitment to quality and prior NRC approval is not required.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 93 of 104 Unit: 1XN Evaluation Number SE-93-100 Activity

Title:

F MM 93-455/DCN 6889,LDCR SA-93-135; Cont. Iso. Penet.MIII-17 Modfication to Allow Its Use for Depressurization of Cont'nt During ILRT Description of Change (s) :

Containment Isolation Penetration MIII-17 is modified to allow its use for depressurization of Containment during Integrated Leak Rate Test (ILRT) and for cable feed through during normal outage activities.

Prior to the change, the configuration consisted of a welded cap inside Containment. This cap will be removed to allow modification of l

the penetration. The permanent installation will consist of a flange and blind flange inside containment and a flange, blind flange, and test connection outside Containment, l

Summary of Evaluation:

An evaluation has determined that the final penetration configuration is acceptable under accident and seismic conditions.

In addition, the penetration configuration during the testing and depressurization stages of the ILRT was evaluated for stress and deadweight loadings, j

and was found to be acceptable. The depressurization rate will be controlled and will have negligible effect on equipment and the Containment building.

In addition, an evaluation was conducted to evaluate the effects of the depressurization of Containment via this penetration on the ILRT duration and also the effect of the discharge of the Containment atmosphere into the Safeguards Building. As the ability of this penetration to maintain Containment Integrity during normal operation and accident conditions has not been impeded, and that the use of this penetration during outage activities is acceptable, this modification neither represents an unreviewed safety question nor requires a change to the Technical Specifications.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 94 of 104 Unit: INN Evaluation Number SE-93-102 Revision 1 Activity

Title:

CPSES Unit 1, Cycle 4 Core Configuration Description of Change (s) :

For the CPSES-1 Cycle 4 core configuration, 88 fuel assemblies manufactured by Siemens Power Corporation (SPC) will be co-resident with 105 partially burned fuel assemblies manufactured by Westinghouse. This mixed core configuration has been evaluated for mechanical and thermal-hydraulic compatibility between the SPC and W fuel assemblies. All applicable design criteria were determined to be satisfied. The neutronic characteristics of the Cycle 4 core configuration have been evaluated for effect on the accident analyses.

In all cases, it was determined that the applicable event acceptance criteria were satisfied.

Swamary of Evaluation:

1 Because all mechanical design criteria continue to be satisfied, there is no reduction in any failure point introduced by the Cycle 4 core l

I configuration. All acceptance criteria of the accident analyses continue to be satisfied; therefore, there is no increase in the consequences of any accident previously analyzed.

Based on the foregoing, it is concluded that the Cycle 4 core configuration does not reduce any margin of safety as defined by the plant Technical Specifications; therefore, the proposed change does not involve an unreviewed safety question, l

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Page 95 of 104 Unit: 1X2 l

Evaluation Number i

SE-93-106 i

Activity

Title:

j TM 93-1-027, R0; Bypass the Load Limit Device on the Fuel Building i

Fuel Handling Bridge Crane Description of Change (s) :

The Temporary Modification TM-93-1-027 bypasses the Load j

Limit Device of the Fuel Build *ng Fuel Handling Bridge Crane.

This Load Limit Device was damaged due to incorrect 1

wiring which moved Bridge Crane power to the 25 KV loop.

4 The Load Limit Device is designed to trip power to the f

hoist motor when a load of 3200 lbs. is lifted. Due to the i

damage, the device trips power at 1500 lbs.

Fuel movements cannot be performed with the damaged Load limit Device.

This temporary modification will be removed when a replacement Load Limit Device is purchased and installed.

The Fuel Building Fuel Handling Bridge Crane is a Non-Q piece of plant equipment, but is seismic Category II.

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Summary of Evaluation:

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Potential damage to a fuel assembly and/or the spent fuel pool racks may occur with the Load Limit Device bypassed.

An excessive uplift force could damage a single fuel assembly and physically distort a spent fuel storage rack.

The worst condition that could occur is the failure of all s

4 the rodlets in a single assembly. This malfunction is considered to be enveloped by the Chapter 15 accident of a j

dropped fuel assembly outside contaimment. This accident assumes that the fuel assembly is inadvertently dropped i

j during fuel movements and all rodlets fail.

The TM will not affect the probability of failure of a fuel assembly while utilizing the hoist. Administrative controls will require the use of a 3000 lb. dynamometer whenever a fuel assembly is withdrawn and lifting will immediately stop if the load increases above 2000 lbs.

The combined weight of the fuel assembly and long handling tool is approximately 2000 lbs. The administrative controls will also assure the 4000 lb. capacity of the hoist is not affected.

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Page 96 of 104 Unit: 1XN l

Evaluation Number SE-93-110 Activity

Title:

TM 93-1-06, R1; Provide Temporary Power for Instrument Air Compressor l

1-02 (CP1-CICACO-02) from MCC XBl-6 During 1Rr03 Description of Change (s) :

The Temporary Modification involves installation to power instrument l

air compressor 1-02 (CP1-CICACO-02) from "C" train motor control I

center, (MCC) XB1-6 during Unit i refueling outage 3 (1Rr03), as the l

bus 1EB4-1 is taken out of service for maintenance.

l Summary of Evaluation:

MCC XBl-6 load is increased due to the temporary power to the instrument air compressor CP1-CICACO-02. The instrument air system is not required for the safe operation of the plant in modes 5 and 6. The instrument air supplies air to components important to safety, however, all control and actuation devices associated with safeguards are elactrically operated, have a fail safe position, or addressed by l

administrative controls.

By implementation of the Temporary Modification, the instrument air compressor CP1-CICACO-02 would be powered off of the non-safety train l

after a Station Blackout, while the air compressor CP1-CICACO-01 would I

be loaded on the diesel. Only one compressor is required for 100 j

percent air supply capacity.

If CP1-CICACO-01 should also fail to start, then there would be a loss of instrument air, which has already been evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report and is not required

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for the safe shutdown of the plant, j

There are no additional failure modes introduced for the affected structures and systems by the implementation of this temporary modification and there is no unreviewed safety question associated with this activity.

Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 97 of 104 Unit: INN Evaluation Number SE-93-111 Activity

Title:

MM 93-504; Closure Bolt Reduction For Blind Flange On Fuel Trnsfr. Tube Description of Change (s) :

In order to reduce the time required to remove and reinstall the blind flange on the fuel transfer tube during refueling outages, and in order to reduce the personnel radiation exposure incurred, it is proposed that the number of bolts utilized to attach the containment end blind flange to the fuel transfer tube be reduced.

Locator pine will also be installed and will function as an aid in aligning the blind flange to the fuel transfer tube.

Summary of Evaluation:

These changes are evaluated and are deemed acceptable.

It is determined that blind flange installation with a reduced number of closure bolts maintains its leak-tight sealing capability.

Bolt stresses are evaluated and it is determined that they remain within allowable limits.

It is determined that the containment isolation function of the fuel transfer tube blind flange is not compromised in any way.

No failure modes will be introduced by the activity and it is determined that an Unreviewed Safety Question is not involved.

Additionally, it is determined that Technical Specifications are not impacted.

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Page 98 of 104 Unit: IN2 Evaluation Number i

SE-93-112 l

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Activity

Title:

1 Replacement of PDQ Based Methodolgy with SIMULATE-3 Methodolgy to i

Produce Theoretic Constants for Use in Incore Power Distr. Monitoring Description of Change (s) :

This evaluation discusses the replacement of PDQ based methodology with SIMULATE-3 based methodology to produce theoretical constants for use in in-core power distribution monitoring.

Current and proposed a

replacement methodologies are described.

Validation data for the q

proposed SIMULATE-3 methodology is presented, and the effect of this j

change on measurement uncertainties is discussed.

Summary of Evaluation:

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I The evaluation concludes that the replacement methodology will allow j

accurate monitoring of core power distribution and that the current measurement uncertainties remain valid for use with the replacement d

methodology.

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l Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 99 of 104 Unit: 1x2 Evaluation Number SE-93-ll3 1

Activity

Title:

LDCR SA-93-137,-138,TR-93-014; Clarification of Containment Isolation Test, Vent and Drain Capping Requirements Description of Change (s) :

l The criteria for containment isolation valve TVDs is clarified to:

1.

Better define which TVDs are containment isolation valves, 2.

Clarify the capping and the leak rate testing requirements of TVDs consistent with NRC SSER 22.

The previous discussion of TVDs was confusing, resulting in unecessary administrative burdens on the plant operators.

Summary of Evaluation:

This change is a clarification of a previous TSAR commitment and is entirely consistent with the existing licensing basis and NRC review of that licensing basis.

Therefore there is no unreviewed safety question involved in the implementaion of this activity.

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Page 100 of 104 Unit: 1X2 Evaluation Number SE-93-114 l

l Activity

Title:

i TM 93-1-0028 R0; Temporary Barrier at Containment Air Lock l

Description of Change (s) :

During the third refueling outage conducted for Unit 1, with fuel removed from the reactor vessel, a temporary wooden door was erected at the Containment Air Lock.

This was done to allow both hatches to remain open while maintaining an envelope capable of maintaining negative pressure in the Unit 1 Safeguard Building to support Unit 2 l

operational requirements.

l Summary of Evaluation:

The temporary wooden door was erected inside the Unit 1 Containment Air Lock to maintain the Safeguards Building negative pressure envelope, yet allow free access to the Unit 1 Containment Building during outage activities. An evaluation was conducted that demonstrated that the temporary wooden door was capable of remaining intact during the anticipated pressure transients associated with a Unit 2 EST filtration activation, while remaining in place, the door frame provided a barrier sufficient to allow a sufficient negative pressure to be achieved. This change was deemed acceptable, representing neither an unreviewed safety question nor requiring a l

change to the plant technical specifications.

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l Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 101 of 104 Unit: IN2 Evaluation Number SE-93-115 l

Activity Title Filling of Spent Fuel Pool No. 2 with Demineralized Water Utilizing Operations Procedure SOP-TP-93-5 i

Description of Change (s) :

The Spent Fuel Pool No. 2 will be filled with Demineralized Water as a precautionary measure in order to ensure that if leakage occurs past the gate seals in the Fuel TransfeA Canal gate or the Spent Fuel Fool No. 2 swing gate, that water level in the Spent Fuel Fool No. I will not drain down to an unacceptably low level.

Summary of Evaluation:

j This activity has been evaluated and deemed acceptable.

Interfacing valves with other system piping and components will remain positioned and tagged as required by the procedure. The transfer tube connecting the fuel transfer canal with the containment for both Unit 1 and 2 is closed during the filling process. The filling process will be closely monitored. Any rupture of the transfer hose will have no effect on the inventory within the spent fuel pools and flow can be brought under control from the isolation valve used to initiate the flow.

Demineralized water will not enter other system piping. Dilution of the boron concentration of spent fuel pool No. 1 is not a credible j

failure since the water in the spent fuel pool No. 2 will I

be below the level of the spent fuel pool cooling water pump suction piping.

None of the systems (Spent Fuel Pool l

No. 1& 2, Fuel Transfer Canal, Demineralized Water System, Spent Fuel Pool Cooling & Cleanup System) affect the accidents described in the licensing basis documents. No credible failure modes will result.

It is determined that an Unreviewed Safety Question is not involved and Technical Specifications are not impacted.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric l

Page 102 of 104 Unit: IN2 Evaluation Number 35-93-116 l

l Activity

Title:

TM 93-1-029; Temporary Barrier At Containment Air Lock Description of Change (s) :

i During 1Rr03, with fuel removed from vessel, a temporary wooden shall be erected at the containment air lock. This is done to allow both hatches to remain open while maintaining an envelope capable of maintaining negative pressure in the Unit 1 safeguard building to support Unit 2 operational requirements.

Summary of Evaluation:

This Safety Evaluation considers all aspects previously considered by SE 93-114 in addition to the affects of continued usage of tr5e door during Unit 1 Mode 5 and 6, except during periods of core al:eration or irradiated fuel movement in the containment.

The continued use of this door in Modes 5 and 6 was deemed to neither represent an unreviewed safety question, nor require a change to the plant-l technical specifications.

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Page 103 of 104 Unit: IN2 l

l Evaluation Number SE-93-117 Activity

Title:

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l Evaluate Impact Of Failure Of Fuel Building Lift Gate And Spent Fuel Pool #2 Swing Gate While Fuel Movament In Progress Description of Change (s) :

i The proposed activity involves filling spent fuel pool # 2 with demineralized water and the drained portion of the transfer canal with borated water to support 1RF03 insert changeouts and core reload. The impact of the potential failure of the Fuel Building lift gate and spent fuel pool

1. 2 swing gate and subsequent decrease in water elevations was performed.

Summary of Evaluation:

It was determined that if these gates were to fail during 1RF03 core reload or insert changeouts, the resultant spent fuel pool #1 and reactor cavity levels would still be bounded by analyses presented in the current Licensing Basis Documents.

The postulated fuel handling accident outside of containment and inside of containment is bounded by the existing analysis. Also the spent fuel pool cooling system capability is enveloped by existing analysis and limits.

The valves of the spent fuel cooling system are tagged out to prevent mixing of spent fuel poo.1 #1 and #2.

If lift gate and swing gate failure were to occur, the flow would be from the more highly borated water source to the lower c'ncentration source. Flooding spent fuel pool #2 and the transfer ca nal to 852'-6" does not create but rather mitigates the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety different from any already evaluated in the Licensing Basis Documents.

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Attachment to TXX-94013 TU Electric Page 104 of 104 Unit: IN2 l

Evaluation Number SE-93-120 Activity

Title:

TM 93-1-30 R0; Temporary Barrier At Containment Air Lock l

Description of Change (s) :

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During 1RF03, with fuel removed from vessel, a temporary wooden door l

shall be erected at the containment air lock.

This is done to allow both hatches to remain open while maintaining an envelope capable of maintaining negative pressure in the Unit 1 safeguard building to l

support Unit 2 operational requirements.

Summary of Evaluation:

This Safety Evaluation considero all aspects previously considered by SE 93-114 in addition to the affects of continued usage of this door during Unit 1 Mode 5 and 6, except during periods of core alteration or irradiated fuel movement in the containment.

I Based upon this results of this evaluation, implementation of the l

proposed activity neither represents and unreviewed safety question, nor requires a change to the plant technical specifications.

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