ML20062F853
| ML20062F853 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 12/19/1978 |
| From: | Gilleland J TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7812210248 | |
| Download: ML20062F853 (104) | |
Text
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CH ATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 374ol 500C Chestnut Street Tower II DEC 101978 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:
Mr. S. A. Varga, Chief Light Water Reactors Branch No. 4 Division of Project Management U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Dear Mr. Varga:
A In the Matter of the Application of the
)
Docket Nos./'50-327 Ieanessee Valley Authority
)
f50-328,,/
LJ Enclosed are TVA's responses to the Auxiliary Systems Branch (ASB) and Quality Assurance Branch (QAB) fire protection review questions 1, 12, and 13 for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. These questions were forwarded by your September 1, 1978, letter to N. B. hughes. A revised definition of the implementation schedule for additional modifications is enclosed.
Also enclosed are minor editorial revisions to the TVA responses to ASB fire protection review questions 2 through 11 and 14 through 27, and QAB questions F421.1 and 1 through 4 submitted by my letter dated November 9, 1978.
We have identified a design deficiency in that the issued design drawings do not conform to the intent of the criteria relative to placement of fire dampers and fire doors.
Eight additional fire dampers and six additional fire doors are required in the control and auxiliary buildings.
These will be installed before unit 1 fuel loading. TVA nonconformance report NCR SNP 78-S-2 has been issued and is being evaluated for report-
.ahd.lity to 0I&E Region II.
This deficiency will require a revision to edr response to ASB question 3.b(ii). We will submit a revised response s
along with a schedule for installation of any additional modifications that might result frem our evaluation of the deficiency before January 19, 1978.
Very truly vour,
f Lt sq -
J. E. Gilleland Assistant Manager of Power Enclosure (10) 781221CO45 An Equal Opport.nity Employer
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f 11/9/73 R1 12/1S/78 i
J AUXILIARY SYSTEMS BRANCH FIRE PROTECTION REVIEW SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT - Ui1ITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NUMBERS 50-327/328 1.
Your submittal provides only part of the information requested in to our letter dated September 30, 1976. A fire hazards analysis should be conducted for each plant fire area, and the effects of postulated fire involving permanent and/or transient combustibles on systems, circuits, or equipment required for safe plant cold shutdown should be evaluated.
The fire detection and primary and secondary fire suppression systems for each area should also be indicated.
In the fire hazards analysis you should identify all the redundant mechanical and electrical systems necessary for safe cold shutdown which are separated only by distance (no fire barriers).
The fire hazards analysis should demonstrate that, assuming failure of the primary suppression system, a fire in installed or transient combustibles will not damage redundant trains or divisions of systems required for safe plant cold shutdown. Where this cannot be demonstrated, an alternate means of assuring safe plant shutdown (cold shutdown) should be provided.
TVA Resconse Sequoyah Nuclear Plant's fire protection system design was based on the results of a fire hazards analysis covering those areas where an unmitigated fire could affect a unit's ability to reach and maintain a safe cold shutdown.
The analysis involved a detailed review of the plant design and an evaluation of the effects of postulated fires.
The results of the analysis are provided in part in the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Program Reevaluation forwarded to the NRC by letter from J. E. Gilleland to R. S. Boyd dated January 24, 1977. The l
following discussion supplements the original documentation.
Based upon the fuel loading and compartmentation of fire cells, fire suppression and detection systems have been provided in the various plant areas as identified in Table 1-1.
When fixed suppression systems are provided in an area, they are considered the primary systems. Backup protection is provided by standpipe systems or yard hydrants. When manual systems are used exclusively in an area, they are considered the primary systems and are backed up by manual systems in adjacent areas.
Figure 1.1 is a safe shutdown logic diagram for a fire at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.
This figure, together with its comment sheet, identifies those plant features necessary to achieve and maintain a safe plant shutdown in the event of a fire.
TVA has conducted an analysis of the plant based upon this diagram and a postulated exposure fire with a zone l
of influence requiring a minimum 20-foot spatial separation of redundant equipment, circuits, or components in all plant areas outside of containment.
This analysis has identified where additional protection l
_ ___ _ _ _ 825340/2_._ _
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and[for separation is required to assurdly reach the hot shutdown condition during a fire using only existing hardware and no extraordinary operating action (i.e., the operator's response will not be required in less than 15 minutes and will consist of plant manipulations typical of those required for normal operation). The analysis does not consider inside primary containment because transient fire loads in this area, when the plant is at power, are not credible, and fixed hazards which pose an exposure threat to equipment components or circuits required for safe shutdown (i.e., reactor coolant pumps) are provided with fixed automatic water suppression systems, automatic detection capability, and an oil t
collection pan with drains to prevent spilled oil from contacting hot piping.
Note that terms such as inadequate separation and unacceptable interaction when used in this discussion refer to the inability to achieve 20-foot spatial separation within a fire cell. These terms do not imply violation of separation as specified in the plant design criteria.
Throughout this discussion an asterisk (*) will be used to identify the title of a function block on the shutdown logic diagram (Figure 1.1).
(.
This diagram and its keyed comments are germane and are an integral part of the following discussion.
Hot Shutdown i
Each of the six conditions necessary to achieve hot shutdown will be discussed separately.
Refer to the six conditions which provide input I
into the AND block that leads to the hot shutdown condition on-the shutdown logic diagram.
Secondary Side Pressure Control - The secondary safety valves
- and the secondary relief valves
- can satisfy this plant condition. The spring-loaded secondary safety valves used for short-term control are considered immune to fire damage. The secondary relief valves used for long-term control are adequately separated so that access to the required two valves for manual actuation can be assured during a fire.
The redundant circuits for the steam generator pressure instrumentation
(
were found to be inadaquately separated. TVA will provide the required instrumentation integrity in accordance with Table 1.3.
In that this satisfies the required condition, TVA has not evaluated control via the main steam system
- nor remote electrical control of the power-operated secondary relief valves.
Steam Generator Inventory Control - This plant condition requires an auxiliary feedwater pump capable of feeding any two steam generators, level control for these steam generators, and suction to the pump.
This analysis has identified areas where the postulated exposure fire described above would affect both the A and B train sections of the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump
- function. Other areas were identified where a separate postulated exposure fire would affect both trains of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump
- function. However, no single postulated 8
fire exists which would affect both of these functions.
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Interactions also exist for the automatic control of the steam generator j
level control
- function.
These interactions have been deemed acceptable i
because the control valves themselves are adequately separated and manual control is achievable. Unacceptable interactions were found to exist for the steam generator level signal which is necessary for both manual or automatic level control. TVA will provide the necessary protection of s
this function in accordance with Table 1.3.
Suction from the ERCW*
(essential raw cooling water system) was not evaluated because suction from the condensate storage tank
- is assured due to the tank being immune to fire damage.
Reactor Coolant System Inventory Control - This condition requires that RCS letdown be controlled, that RCS makeup be provided, and that reactor coolant pump seal integrity be assured. These three cor.ditions are discussed separately RCS Letdown Control - This condition can be satisfied by closure of any one of a number of letdown isolation valves
- in each of f
two series strings of valves. Since all of the valves involved are air-operated valves which would fail in the desired position should their control cable be damaged, these control circuits were not evaluated for separation.
RCS Makeup - This condition requires the availability of a charging pump, pump suction, and a flow path into the RCS. Of these, water, 1
via volume control tank suction
- and refueling water storage tank suction *, is assured since the tanks themselves pe-form only a passive' function wnich would not be jeopardized by a fire, and manual handwheel operation of the RWST suction valves is acceptable.
3 The analysis noted that the single postulated exposure fire described above could cause the loss of both trains of the CVCS centrifugal charging pump
- and the positive displacement charging pump *.
TVA will correct this unacceptable condition by rerouting the wiring for the positive displacement charging pump in i
accordance with Table 1.2.
1 This pump was chosen for rerouting because it is the pump used in normal operation; hence, its flow path is already properly aligned. The ECCS flow path
- associated with the centrifugal pumps contains interactions which can affect both A and B train sections. These interactions are acceptable because they do not affect the positive displacement charging pump; hence, either the positive displacement pump via the normal charging path or the centrifugal charging pump (s) via the ECCS path (s) are 6
available during any postulated fire.
Control of RCS makeup via either the ECCS (centrifugal) pumps or the normally operating (positive displacement) pumps requires a pressurizer level signal. Unacceptable interactions were found to exist between conduits associated with the required instrumentation wiring. TVA will correct this condition in accordance with Table 1.3.
The component cooling water and t
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. /N essential raw cooling water systems are identified in the keyed comments as being required for RCS makeup. Unacceptable interactions do exist in both of these systems. The CCS mechanical system inter-actions and how they are resolved are discussed in the response F
to question 13. The CCS and ERCW electrical system interactions will be protected in accordance with Table 1.4.
RCP Seal Integrity - Seal integrity for the reactor coolant pumps can be assured if either the positive displacement charging pump i
or the centrifugal charging pump and the associated charging flow control valve, FCV62-93*, is available to provide injection water j
to the seals. The modifications proposed to upgrade the system i
in the preceding paragraph will assure RCP seal integrity.
RCP thermal barrier cooling
- also would assure this required condition.
This path does contain interactions which would affect both its A and B train sections. These interactions are deemed acceptable because RCP seal injection is assured.
Secondary Side Isolation - The main steam isolation valves
- are stored-energy, fail-closed valves which require both A and B control signals to remain in the open position. A postulated fire which would affect the control cables would cause the valves to shut, assuring this function.
Hence, these control cables and those for the parallel path, steam load isolation *, were not evaluated.
Analysis of the main feedwater isolation valves
- indicated that at least one of the two valves in each feedwater line could be shut for the postulated fire. Hence, the main feedwater pump
- function, a parallel path to feedwater isolation, was not evaluated.
Each steam generator blowdown line contains an A and B train isolation valve in series. Both valves would fail in the desired, closed position if there was fire damage to the control cables; hence, this feature is considered to be assured and was not evaluated.
?
RCS Pressure Control - Trained power cables outside primary containment for the pressurizer heaters
- were found to interact within 20 feet in two locations. Within the reactor building annulus, the two trains are separated by 19 feet for most of their routing, but approach 13 i
feet at the' primary containment penetration. This interaction has been deemed acceptable because of the low probability for transient fire loads within the annulus area and because all exposed surfaces of cable within this area have been provided with a flame-retardant mastic coating.
The second interaction involves opposite trains approaching to within I
three feet at an orthoganal crossing on elevation 759 of the auxiliary building near the pressurizer transformers and switchgear. This interaction is considered acceptable because it occurs in a location with a low, fixed fire load and where a significant transient fireload is not credible.
Instrumentation conduits which contain the pressure signals necessary for control interact within the auxiliary building. TVA will correct l
this condition in accordance with table 1.3.
36740
Initial Reactivity Control - The trained reactor trip system
- which provides this condition is a fail-safe system which will respond to.
the postulated fire by causing the control rods to be inserted.
Thus, no evaluation was considered necessary.
Cold Shutdown The shutdown logic diagram also identifies those features necessary to reach the cold shutdown condition. This section of the diagram is presently being analyzed to assure that the cold shutdown condition can be reached assuming a postulated fire with a zone of influence requiring a minimum 20-foot separation. The analysis for cold shutdown will differ from the hot shutdown condition in that TVA will take credit as necessary for temporary damage control measures and extraordinary operator actions necessary to achieve this condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> (e.g., temporary power cables may have to be connected to a pump).
As a result of the preceding analysis and the identification of areas where 20-foot spatial separation of redundant circuits required for safe shutdown within a fire cell has not been achieved, protective measures described in Tables 1.2,1.3, and 1.4 shall be implemented.
These modifications will assure the ability to achieve the hot shutdown condition as discussed previously in this res,sonse. The cold shutdown condition can be achieved within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> through the implementation of temporary damage control measures and extraordinary operator actions.
Strict administrative procedures have been established to control transient combustibles and are included in the Sequoyah Physical Instruction, PHYSI-13.
The procedure requires identification of the routes for transient ccmbustibles and the procedure takes no credit for the fixed suppression system in regard to its extinguishing capability for transient fire loads. The procedure requires provisions for additional fire protection that is capable of suppressing the transient fire load.
With the defense-in-depth as described above, protection to redundant
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divisions of systems from installed or transient combustibles has been provided to ensure capability of safe shutdown of the plant.
36739 m
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CONDITIO NOTES:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _f - - - - - - _Z ZZ Z _~ _ _2 _12.{ J l.
IN GENERALONCE A PARTICULAR S ATETY TRAIN HAS BEENINVOKETHISTRAIN RHR KEY FLOW PATH KEY CVCS KEY MUST BE USED THROUGHOUT THE LOGIC. EXCEPTIONS MUST BE EVALUATED ON ACASE BASIS.
SHUTDOWN 31 THROUGH 32 30 PUMPS 2.
SOLID LINES ARE USED FOR PATHS LE ADlNG TO THE HOT SHUTDOWN FLD TH A
IB B
A !B CONDITION. THIS SECTION OF THELOGlC DI AGRAM HAS BEEN ANALYZEDTO ASSURE THAT ALL REQUIRED CONDITIONS CAN BE REALIZED DURING A FIRE.
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THE CRITERIA FOR ACCEPTABILITY IS AS FOLLOWS:
AND AND GIVEN A FIREWHICH EFFECTS ANY FUCTION ON THE DIAGRAM,THE REQUIRED CONDITlON MUST BE CAPABLE OF BEING REACHED EITHER VIA A PARALLEL REDUNDENT OR CIVERSE PATH WHICH IS PHYSICALLY SEPARATED OR PROTECTFD FROM THE FIRE OR BY VIRTUE OF THE FACT LONG LONGTER THAT THE FUNCTION MAY BE CONSIDERED IMMUNE TO FIRE DAMAGE HEAT REACTIVITY (E.G. THE REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK)
REMOVAL CONTROL u_
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3.
DASH LINES AREUSEDTODEPICT PATHS LEADING BEYOND HOT SHUTDOWN TO THECOLD SHUTDOWN CONDITION. THESE PATHS CAN BE AND ASSURED UNDER POST-FIRE CONDITIONS EITHER BY ADEQUATE PHYSICAL SEPARATION OR BY TEMPORARY MEASURES DEFINED IN CASUALTY PROCEDLRES Figure 1.1 4.
BLOCKSWHICH CONTAIN AN A AND B SUB BLOCK DENOTE TRAINIZED FEATURES.
PLANT T TAL RE UNMN Y IS PROWDED mR THIS BLOCK SHS?'
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT 5.
KEYED COMMENTS ARE LOCATED ON SEPARATE COMMENT SHEET.
CONDITION SHUTDOWN LOGIC-FIRE
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l FIGURE 1.1 SEQUOYAH IiUCLEAR PLAtlT SHUTDOWil LOGIC - FIRE l
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KEYED COMMENTS l
1.
Requires auxiliary lube oil pump AND power to pump room cooler AND ERCW to pump oil cooler AND ERCW to pump room cooler AND CCS water to ERCW heat exchangers.
2.
Requires appropriate section of pressurizer level control system AND EITHER B auxiliary air compressor Og station air compressor.
L 3.
Requires ERCW to pump room cooler AND power to pump room cooler AND CCS water to pump oil cooler AND CCS water to pump speed control AND ERCW to CCS exchanger AND EITHER automatic speed control from appropriate section of pressurizer level control system Og manual speed control using pressurizer level instrumentation.
4.
Short-term make up source, normally aligned, no action required.
I 5.
Long-term make up source requires opening of FCV62-135 OR FCV62-136, i
hand wheel operation acceptable.
i 6.
Flow path requires opening an inlet valve (EITHER FCV63-25 OR FCV63-26) AND an outlet valve (EITEER FCV63-39 OR FCV63-40) for the boron injection tank.
l 7.
Termination of normal letdown requires closure of FCV62-77 OR l
FCV62-70 OR FCV62-69 OR all three valves FCV62-72, FCV62-73 and FCV62-74.
t S.
Termination of excess letdown requires closure of FCV62-54 OR FCV62-55 jd3 FCV62-56.
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9.
Requires CCS water to thermal barrier booster p' ump AND ERCW to CCS heat exchangers.
10.
IF B train is selected, an additional requirement is opening
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capability for FCV70-9, FCV70-10, FCV70-195 and FCV70-196.
11.
Requires automatic control AND hydraulic motor for back pressure regulating valve (A train PCV3-122, B train PCV3-132).
12.
Requires automatic control signal to level control valves (A train LCV3-156 AND LCV3-164, B train LCV3-148 AND LCV3-171) OR steam generator level instrumentation for manual control (A train steam generator 1 AND 2, B train steam generator 3 AND 4).
Manual control consists of on/off operation of the pump.
l 13.
IF automatic control is selected, an additional requirement is the appropriate train of auxiliary air compressor OR service air compressor.
14.
Not a true A and B train system--the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater subsystem may be considered to be a separate single train, which can be supplied with control and power from either of the traditional A and B trains.
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15.
Requires turbine trip and throttle valves (FCVI-51) AND governor valve (FCV1-52).
16.
Requires automatic signal to any two level control valves (LCV3-172, LCV3-173, LCV3-174, LCV3-175) Og steam generator level instrumentation for manual control of any two steam generators. Manual operation consists of handwheel operation of the level control valves.
17.
Normally aligned, no action required.
18.
IF automatic speed control is selected, an additional requirement is B train auxiliary air compressor Og service air compressor.
19.
Requires suction valves to open AND ERCW system availability.
20.
Requires closure of all main steam isolation AND isolation bypass valves (FCV1-4, FCV1-11, FCV1-22, FCV1-29, FCV1-147, FCVI-148, FCV1-149, FCV1-150).
21.
Requires closure of main steam dump valves AND main turbine trip and throttle valve AND main feedwater pump turbine trip and throttle valves.
22.
Requires closure of a feedwater isolation valve (FCV3-33, FCV3-47, FCV3-87, FCV3-100) OR closure of a feedwater control and bypass valve pair in each feed line (FCV3-35 AND FCV3-35A, FCV3-48 AND FCV3-48A, FCV3-90 AND FCV3-90A, FCV3-103 AND FCV3-103A).
23.
Requires trip of main feedwater pump turbine.
24.
Requires cloaure of one valve in each blowdown line (FCV1-7 OR 2
FCV1-181) AND (FCVI-14 OR FCV1-182) AND (FCV1-25 OR FCV1-183) AND (FCV1-32 Og FCV1-184). ~~
~~
f 25.
Self actuating, short-term control.
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26.
Long-term control, requires operability of any two relief valves (PCV1-5, PCV1-12, PCV1-23, PCV1-30 manual control acceptable) AND pressure instrumentation for same two steam generators.
27.
Requires opening of two main steam isolation og isolation bypass valves AND control of main steam dump valves AND condenser circulating water.
28.
Manual control requires RCS wide range temperature and pressure instrumentation.
29.
Requires reactor shutdown by driving in control rods OR manual scram signal OR manual opening of scram breakers Og de-energizing of rod drive motor generator.
30.
Requires opening FCV74-1 AND FCV74-2. Handwheel operation is acceptable.
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31.
Requires RHR pump operability (temporary cables are acceptable) AND CCS water to RHR heat exchanger (handwheel operation of A train valve FCV70-156 or B train valve FCV70-153 is acceptable) AND CCS water to RHR pump seal cooler AND RHR pump room cooling (portable blower is acceptable).
32.
Flow path requires opening an inlet valve (EITHER FCV63-25 OR FCV63-26) AND an outlet valve (EITHER FCV63-39 OR FCV63-40) for the boron injection tank. Handwheel operation is acceptable.
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TABLE l-1 i
The following table summarizes the fire protection systems provided in the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. The table covers only those areas 1
where an unmitigated fire could affect a unit's ability to reach and maintain a safe cold shutdown condition.
Notes:
(1) Refer to the SK-1000 series of compartmentation drawings in the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Reevaluation for location of the tabulated areas.
i (2) The compartmentation fire rating column identifies the rating of the most limiting component in the compart-j' mentation boundary. Refer to the response to question 3 for additional compartmentation information.
I (3) Refer to the response to question 12 for a discussion of the fire retardant coating of exposed cable trays.
j (4) Legend:
I - Ionization smoke detector IR - Infrared flame detector LT - Lir. ear thermistor PE - Photoelectric smoke detector RC - Rate compensated thermal detector 1
T - Fixed temperature thermal detector j
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l 85414 83-hour srparatton maYtained between' fire area containing chart storage and spreading room and other plant areas.
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X X
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X X
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X X
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X X
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X X
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X X
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X X.
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X X
X X
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X X
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I A6 480V SHUTDOWN BD. ROOM 101 1-1/2 HR.
X X
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X X
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X X
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X X
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X X
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X X
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X X
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X X
X X
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X X
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1 TABLE 1.2 CIRCUITS TO IIE RELOCATED i
Cable or j
Conduit No.
Function Resolution IPL4742B CCS Pump IB-B Supply Relocate conduit to provide minir.um 1PL4743B 20' separation from train A i
i 2PL4742B CCS Pump 2B-B Supply Relocate conduit to provide minimum 2PL4743B 20' separation from train A 1PL4748B CCS Pump 18-B Control Route in conduit from 480V S/0 Brds. to 2PL47488 CCS Pump 2B-B Control pumps with 20' minimum separation from redundant train A circuits 1PL5025 Reciprocal Charging Route in conduit from 480V S/D Brd. 18-B Pump Supply to pump with 20' minimum separation from train A j
1PL5026 Reciprocal Charging Route in conduit from 480V S/D Brd. 18-B J
Pump Control to pump with 20' minimum separation from train A i
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TABLE 1.3
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CIRCUITS TO BE PROTECTED BY A 1/P. HOUR FIRE RATED BARRIER The following conduits shall be provided with a 1-h:ch thick mineral wool or equivalent wrap in the auxiliary building, from the reactor building containment penetrations at auxiliary building EL 734.0 to the control building Q-line wall penetrations at auxiliary building EL 714.0.
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Conduit No.
Function a
1PM100ll Pressurizer level and pressure indication, loops 2 and 3 IPM1002II steam generator instrumentation IPM1003III 1PM1004IV 1PM10681 1PM850II IPM1066III 1PM1065III IPM2142III 1PM10671 1PM2128I
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1PM2111II IPM851II 1PM21451V 1PM2080I 1PM2084I
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CIRCUITS TO BE RELOCATED, PROVIDED WITil 1/2 Il00R FIRE RATED BARRIER, OR,P,ROVjnfn,yITHFIXEDWATERSPRAYEXPOSUREPROTECTIONORCOMBINATIONTHERE0F The above protection shall be provided for the following cable and conduit combinations from the junction box at UA1, auxiliary building EL 690.0 to UA6, auxiliary building EL 734.0, or to the point where the l
conduit transitions to a cable tray where 20-foot minimum separation between trains is achieved.
Conduit No.
Functior-r IPP780A 6900V Power Feed to ERCW 480V XFMR lA-A 1PP785B 6900V Power Feed to ERCW 480V XFMR 18-B 2PP780A 69C0V Power Feed to ERCW 480V XFMR 2A-A 2PP7858 6900V Power Feed to ERCW 480V XFMR 28-B IPP712B ERCW Pump N-B Supply IPP700B ERCW Pump C-B Supply 2PP7000 ERCW Pump H-B Supply 2PP712B ERCW Pump F-B Supply IPP675A ERCW Pump A-A Supply 1PP687A ERCW Pump ()-A Supply 2PP675A ERCW K-A Supply i
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2.
Item B - Administrative Procedures, Controls _, and Fire Bricade -
You plan to use administrative procedures, controls, and fire brigade programs previously accepted by the staff for the return to service of Browns Ferry, Units Nos. 1 and 2.
We request that j
you review these procedures against the staff supplemental guidance contained in " Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Function Responsibilities, Administrative controls, and Ouality Assurance," dated June 14, 1977.
It is our position that you either (1) confirm that your existing administrative procedures and fire brigade progran meet the staff supplement guidelines, or (2) provide a commitment that they will be revised accordingly.
a TVA Response Me are presently reviewing our administrative crocedures, controls, and fire brigade programs against the staff supplemental guidance contained in " Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Function Responsibilities, Administrative Controls, and Ouality Assurance," dated June 14, 1977. We plan to revise these procedures accordingly.
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Item D, General Guidelines for Plant Protection j
A.
You state that the majority of the materials used will conform to NFPA definitions of noncombustible or limited combustible material.
During our site visit, we noted that some materials such as ventilatio; duct insulation were not UL listed or FM approved. Therefore, modify your fire hazard analysis to include the limited combustibles or show that these materials will meet the criteria of Section C.4.a(4), BTP ASB 9.5-1, Revision 1.
B.
For the following listed items substantiate their fire resis-tance capabilities as they pertain to safety-related areas or high hazard areas by verifying that their construction will be in accordance with a particular fire tested design.
Identify l
the design, test method, and acceptance criteria.
(i) Rated fire barriers including floor, ceiling, wall systems, structural members and doors.
Indicate the type of protective material used and the design number in reference to ASTM E-119.
[
i (ii) Fire dampers and fire doors, including the installation
)
of the same in ventilating ducts penetrating fire barriers of safety related areas; fire door dampers are required in a 3 br. rated fire barrier penetration.
(iii) Fire carrier penetration seals around ducts, pipes, cables, cable trays, and conduit or any other openings. Verify that the seals will meet the 3 hr. requirements for ASTM E-119. Verify that the inplant cable tray supports are similar to the ones used in the fire tests and that, in case of collapse of the trays, the resultant unsupported load and torque on the penetration seal will not affect the integrity of the seal.
4 I
C.
It is our position that where the fire loadings exceed a i
l-1/2 hr. duration (see Table 6-8A, Fire Protection Handbook) and thus, exposes safety related conduit-cables or equipment that such barriers be upgraded to a 3 hr. fire resistance.
Confirm that your design will meet this position.
r D.
You have not responded to the Appendix A guidelines concerning I
fire doors being locked and alarmed. Confirm that you will meet this position.
In particular, all fire doors used to
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protect openings in the wall separating the control building i
from the turbine building be alarmed and annunciated in the control room. These circuits should be electrically supervised.
t TVA Response A.
The duct insulation installed in safety-related plant areas has been tested by Underwriters Laboratories and has a flame l
spread rating of 25 and smoke developed rating of 50. TVA did not require the manufacturer to label the duct insulation.
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e B.
(i) Compartmentation has been provided in accordance with the SK-1000 series compartmentation drawings submitted in the Sequoyah fluclear Plant Fire Protection Program Reevaluation.
These drawings indicate the boundaries where fire-resistive construction and assemblies will be utilized to maintain the integrity of fire areas and fire cells. Additional information is provided in Table 1-1 showing the minimum fire resistive rating of the most limiting structural components in each area or cell.
A minimum three-hour fire resistive rating has been assigned to the construction between the following buildings:
Reactor Building and Auxiliary Building Control Building and Auxiliary Building Service Building and Auxiliary Building Control Building and Turbine Building The 3-hour and 1-1/2-hour fire rated wall and floor /
ceiling construction consists of reinforced concrete or reinforced concrete block. These ratings are assigned based on the equivalency to similarly rated construction denoted by Figure 6-7H of the NFPA Fire Protection Handbook and Data Sheet 1-21, Table 2, of Factory Mutual Loss Prevention Data.
A minimum three-hour fire rated coating, Pyrocrete 102, is applied to all exposed structural steel within the cable spreading room. Applications are in accordance with UL Design lio. X-716 and Code approved design based on Design D-717 (B0CA R.R. 73-42-I-C-1-b).
Fire-rated door assemblies are provided for most fire cell and fire area boundaries. These doors have a fire resistance rating at least equivalent to that designated for the wall.
The remaining fire cells and fire areas are located in the Auxiliary Building and are provided with nonfire-rated, special purpose pressure or flood doors. These doors are identified in the SK-1000 series compartmentation drawings and are listed in Table 3.B.(i)-1.
TABLE 3.B.(i)-1 Door No.
Door Type Elevation Column A55 Flood door 690.0 s-t,Al A57 Flood-pressure door 690.0 r-q,A!
A60 Pressure door 690.0 r-s, Al -A2 A64 Pressure door 690.0 u-v,A15-Cl3 A65 Flood door 690.0 v-w,Al-S1 A77 Pressure door 690.0 u-v,Al-S1 A78 Flood door 690.0 v-w,A15-Cl3 l
577044
4 i
TABLE 3.B.(i)-1 (Continued)
Door flo. Door Type Elevation Column A101 Pressure door 706.0 u-v,A2-A3 A105 Pressure door 706.0 u-v,A13-A14 A112 Flood door 706.0 x-y,A5 All5 Pressure door 706.0 w-x,A6-A8 A123 Pressure door 714.0 t-u,A3 A132 Pressure door 714.0 t-u,A13 A153 Pressure door 734.0 t-u,A8 A154 Pressure door 734.0 u-w,A8-A10 A173 Pressure door 734.0 u-x,A5-A6 A184 Pressure door 749.0 r-s,A3-A4 A191 Pressure door 749.0 r-s,A12-A13 A214 Pressure door 714.0 w-x,A12-A13 A215 Pressure door 714.0 w-x,A3-A4 These doors are designed to ASME Standards and are of heavy welded steel construction. They have multiple side hinges and multiple latch points on the sides, top, and 2
bottom. TVA has evaluated these doors and determined that they will provide an equivalent fire rating commen-l surate to the fuel loading in the areas or cells that they sc.arate.
Doors C44, CEO, CSS, and C56 are nonlabeled security doors (refer to drawing SK-1037). These doors are made of bullet resistant heavy gauge steel and have not been tested by UL.
However, the manufacturer has certified that the doors are equivalent to UL tested fire doors rated for three hours.
B.
(ii) Fire dampers and fire doors are provided in ventilation ducts when the ducts penetrate fire barriers. The dampers and doors have a fire resistant rating equivalent to the designated rating of the barrier. They are UL i
listed and tested in accordance with UL standards 10B and i
555.
B.
(iii) The design of the Sequoyah electrical penetration fire stops (EPFS) for cables and cable trays and their installa-tion are based on TVA tests of full-scale mockups that must seal against air pressure. The tested design was modified to provide a greater depth of sealant material to give protection equivalent to a 3-hour fire resistance ra ting. The modification was based on a similar design, using the same type of cables and sealant material, and tests conducted by others to the standard time-temperature curve of ASTM E-119.
1 The design of the wall and floor electrical penetration fire stops through a fire barrier utilize a separate cable sleeve or slot for each cable tray. The design and installation of these penetration fire stops employ Dow Corning 3-6548 577045
9 i
silicone RTV (room temperature vulcanizing) foam as the sealant material and inorganic fire barrier materials.
From each side of the wall or floor opening, the cables are separated within the cable sleeve or slot using an inorganic fiber. The sealant material is then installed within the cable sleeve or slot. The cable sleeve opening i
is covered with a fire barrier board that is cut to fit around the cables and cable tray configuration.
In addition, the exposed surfaces of cables are coated from the fire barrier board for a minimum distance of five feet or to the nearest electrical panel or enclousre i
with material similar to Flamemastic 77 that is approved by Factory Mutual Research Corporation. Typical electrical penetration firestops through walls and floors are shown in Figures 3.B.(iii)-1 and 3.B.(iii)-2, respectively.
Conduit penetrations, containing cables, through designated fire barriers, utilize RTV silicone rubber as the sealant material. This material is installed around the cables in either the end of the conduit termination or in the nearest available conduit box on each side of the barrier.
Inorganic fiber is used on each side of the sealant material.
l Spare conduits are plugged or capped until used, t
The sealant material used in cable tray penetration fire stops is Dow Corning's 3-6548 silicone RTV foam (com-ponents A and B). This material in its cured foam state is noncorrosive and fire resistant. A sample of this material has been tested by an independent laboratory according to ASTM E84, standard method of testing of " Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials." The result of the test was that the material has a flame spread rating of i
20.
The fire barrier materials used in the design and instal-lation of the penetration fire stops employ a combination of inorganic fiber and fiber board similar to Johns-Manville Cerafiber and Cera Form Board. These materials are made from exceptionally high purity alumina and silica constituents and are capable of withstagding conginuous exposure to a temperature range of 2000 to 2300 F.
TVA has conducted fire tests on full-scale assemblies of l
electrical penetration fire stops that must seal against air pressure. The required differential air pressure across the penetration under test was maintained by adjusting a normal damper together with an exhaust fan in the exhaust i
duct. An external gas burner was located under the. cables outside the area of coated cables. The burner was ignited on the fire side of test facility and allowed to burn for 30 minutes before shutoff. The fire was allowed to self-extinguish; therefore, no water spray test was conducted.
i 577046
The results of the tests were that no fire burred through the penetration onto the cold side of the test facility and pressure seal maintained its integrity. The results from the tests demonstrate that the design provides an effective fire stop and pressure seal under simulated conditions when tested as a completed system.
In addition, fire tests on similar designs using the same type of cables and sealant material have been conducted by others. The mockup was for a floor penetration arrange-ment and was tested to the time-temperature curve of ASTM E-il9. Test results are recorded in report serial No. 26543 dated October 28. 1975, of Factory Mutual Research Corporation.
The innalled cable tray supports are similar to those used in the fire tests.
From a review of the design of the cable trays supports together with post-test observations of the TVA mockup, we have determined that in case of collapse of trays on the fire side of the barrier, no loss of seal integrity will occur.
The design of the inplant cable tray supports are typically shown in Figures 3.B.(iii)-1 and 3.B.(iii)-2 for wall and floor penetrations with cable trays, respectively. During the tests conducted by TVA, warpage of the cable trays and supports was observed to occur outside tha cable coated area. No visual distortion of the cable trays or their supports was observed at the wall opening following the test.
The design of the mechanical wall and floor penetration fire stops through fire barriers are based on similar designs, using the same type of sealant and damming materials, and tests conducted by others to the standard time-temperature curve of ASTM E-119.
The design of the mechanical fire stops utilize mechanical duct and pipe sleeves for each penetration.
Fire barrier penetration fire stops for pipe and duct penetrations consist of Foamed-in-place Dow Corning 3-6548 silicone RTV foam installed to a depth of 12 inches or the thickness of the wall (minimum 8 inches). Typcial mechanical duct and pipe penetration fire stops of this type are shown in i
Figures 3.B.(iii)-3 and 3.B.(iii)-4, respectively.
In those pipe penetrations where pipe movements are present, a fire stop assembly consisting of a rolled silicone foam coated ceramic fiber blanket is wrapped around the pipe and stuffed into the sleeve on each side of the penetration.
Airtight bellows seals are then installed over these fire stops. A typical fire stop of this type is shown in Figure 3.B.(iii)-5.
Fire tests on similar penetration fire stop designs have been conducted by Factory Mutual Research Corporation.
577047
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i The results are recorded in Factory Mutual Report Serial No. 26543 dated October 28, 1975. The tests were performed following the procedures for evaluating floor-ceiling assemblies as defined under the Standard for Fire Testing of Building Construction and Materials ASTM E-119 (NFPA 251).
C.
The following safety-related fire cells have been identified from the fire zards analysis as having a fire loading greater than 120,000 Btu /ft (1) Auxiliary Instrument Rooms (unit 1, 685.0-Cl; and unit 2, 685.0-C4).
(2) Cable Spreading Room (706.0-C2).
(3) Diesel Generator Rocas (l A-A, 2A-A,18-B, 28-B).
(4) Diesel Generator Lube Oil Storage Room.
(5) 480V Electrical Board Rooms (l A-A, 2A-A,1B-8, 2B-8)
(6)
Intake Pump Station (El. 705.0 Upper Deck-ERCW Pump Trains)
(7) Additional Equipment Buildings TVA has provided equivalent three-hour fire rated compartmentation for these fire cells with the exception of the Auxiliary Instrument Rooms.
The diesel generator rooms and board rooms of each diesel unit are separated from other units by three-hour barriers.
The unit I and unit 2 auxiliary instrument rooms (685.0-Cl and C4) are separated from the Turbine Building and Auxiliary Building by minimum three-hour fire resistant barriers. The Auxiliary Instrument Rooms are separated from each other by two 1-1/2-hour fire resistant barriers and the nonsafety-related computer room and a corridor.
(Refer to drawing SK-1006 in the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Program Reevaluation.)
Although the fire loading of each Auxiliary Instrument Room exceeds a 1-1/2-hour duration, the fire loading consists mainly of exposed cable insulation in trays and all exposed cabling within l
the rooms is coated with a fire retardant material similar to Flamemastic 77.
In addition, each Auxiliary Instrument Room is provided with an early warning fire detection system that actuates an automatic total flooding CO, system. This is supplemented by a fire hose
, station located ih each stairwell.
As indicated in the response to question 21, loss of either Auxiliary Instrument Room does not prevent the ability to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition.
TVA feels that with these measures implemented, the two as-built 1-1/2-hour fire barriers that separate the safety-related Auxiliary Instrument Rooms are adequate.
.i i
i D.
The fire doors listed in Table 3.0-1 are alarmed in the gatehouse and secondary alarm system room in the control building through the security system.
P,efer to the SK-1000 series of compartmentation drawings for details showing door numbers and column lines. TVA does not propose to supervise the operation of other fire doors.
I TABLE 3.D-1 Door flo.
Building Elevation Column i
A3 Auxiliary 653.0 t-u,A6-A7 A4 Auxiliary 653.0 t-u,A6-A7 A5 Auxiliary 653.0 u-v,A6-A7 A6 Auxiliary 653.0 v-w,A50A7 A8 Auxiliary 653.0 v-w,A9-A10 A9 Auxiliary 653.0 u-v,A9-A10 A10 Auxiliary 653.0 t-u,A9-A10 All Auxiliary 653.0 t-u,A9-A10 A25 Auxiliary 669.0 t-u,A2 A46 Auxiliary 669.0 t-u,A14 All7 Auxiliary 706.0 w-x,A3-A4 l
All8 Auxiliary 706.0 x-y,A12-A13 A125 Auxiliary 714.0 u-v,A2-A3 A130 Auxiliary 714.0 u-v,A13-A14 A169 Auxiliary 734.0 q-r,All-Al2 A170 Auxiliary 734.0 q-r,All-Al2 A172 Auxiliary 734.0 q-r,A8-A10 A181 Auxiliary 749.0 q-r,A6 A182 Auxiliary 749.0 q-r,A4 A194 Auxiliary 749.0 q-r,A12 l
A195 Auxiliary 749.0 q-r,A10 A203 Auxiliary 759.0 w-x,A4-A5 A204 Auxiliary 759.0 w-x,All-A12 A207 Auxiliary 763.0 s-t,A6-A8 C1 Control 669.0 n-p,C3-C4 C10 Control 669.0 n-p,C9-C10 C12 Control 669.0 n-p,C10-Cll C21 Control 685.0 n-p,C3-C4 C22 Control 685.0 n-p,C6-C7 C23 Control 685.0 n-p,C6-C7 C24 Control 685.0 n-p,C7-C8 C25 Control 685.0 n-p,C10-C11 C30 Control 706.0 n-p,C3-C4 C33 Control 706.0 n-p,C10-C11 C49 Control 732.0 q,C4-C5 C50 Control 732.0 q,C9-C10 C51 Control 732.0 n-p,C12-Cl3 C52 Control 732.0 n-p,C10 C55 Control 732.0 n-p,C9-C10 C56 Control 732.0 n-p,C4-C5 m-'
Doors separating the control building from the turbine building are normally closed, heavy equipment doors which are locked and operated by card readers.
Operation of these doors (except for flood-pressure door C27) is alarmed in the main control room.
All of the heavy equipment doors separating the control and turbine buildings are augmented by 3-hour rated sliding fire doors which are held open by fusible links.
There is no alarm capability associated with the sliding fire doors.
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4.
Item 3.e. - It is our position that fire stops be installed every 20 ft. along horizontal uncoated cable routings in areas not protected by automatic water systems. Between levels or in vertical uncoated cable chases, fire stops should be installed at the mid-height if the vertical run is 20 ft. or more, but less than 30 ft.
or at 15-foot intervals in vertical runs of 30 f t. or more unless such vertical cable routings are protected by automatic water systems directed on.the cable trays.
Individual fire stop designs should prevent the p'ropagation of a fire for a minimum period of 30 minutes when tested for the largest number of cable routings i
and maximum cable density.
Confirm th t your design will meet p
this position.
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TVA Response In areas outside primary containment containir:9 redundant divisions of systems, ali exposed surfaces cf cables in torizontal or vertical routings will 3;e coated with a flame-ret.ardant aaterial such as
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Thus, the design meets the stated NRC position and no
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5.
Item D.4, Ventilation - Describe the procedure employed for heat and smoke removal using fixed or portable equipment in areas that house systems or components necessary for cold shutdown of the plant.
Describe how these areas can be ventilated for manual firefighting purposes.
Include a discussion regarding control accesses to ventilation equipment (including fire dampers) as well as tne ability to handle high temperature gases and particulates.
TVA Response In general, heat and smoke removal capability is provided in areas that house systems or components necessary for cold plant shutdown by the normal ventilation systems discussed in FSAR Section 9.4.
A developing fire will cause the isolation of these ventilation systems in the immediate vicinity of the fire through the closing of fusible link or fire detector actuated dampers.
Smoke venting at this point will be accomplished by the use of portable smoke ejectors.
Two ejectors are provided for the use of the fire brigade and each is rated at 7200 cfm. Smoke will be vented from a fire area to adjacent areas, where it will be removea by the normal ventilation systems.
Those areas of the plant utilizing recirculating ventilation systems will rely upon portable smoke ejectors exclusivel.
f Due to containment requirements, smoke removal in the reactor building will be provided by the containment purge air system.
Should the smoke and fire gas temperautres exceed the capability of the containment purge air system, it will be isolated and smoke removal will be accomplished by the redundant trains of g
the standy gas treatment systems.
6.
Item D.5, Lighting and Communication A.
Item (a).
You state that adequate emergency lighting system is provided in safety-related areas of the plant.
Power supply for the system is from the plant emergency diesel generator.
Your proposed emergency lighting system is unacceptable.
It is our position that fixed self-contained lighting consisting of fluorescent or sealed beam units with an individual 8 hr. minimum battery power supply be provided in areas that must be manned for safe cold shutdown and for access and egress routes to and from all fire areas.
B.
Item (d). You indicate that fixed repeaters are being installed in the Sequoyah plant to facilitate the use of portable radio equipment.
It is our position, however, that the fixed repeaters should be protected against exposure fire damage using 1/2 hour fire rated barriers such as 1" mineral 4
wool.
In addition, verify that the portable radio communica-tion system will be tested to demonstrate that its frequencies will not interfere with the actuation of protective relays.
d TVA Response A.
Item (a).
Fixed self-contained lighting consisting of fluorescent or sealed beam units with an individual 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> minimum battery power supply will be provided in areas that must be manned for safe j
cold shutdown and for access and egress routes to and from all fire areas.
B.
Item (d). The protection of fixed radio repeaters by 1/2 hour fire rated barriers such as mineral wool is not feasible since the i
repeater would be damaged by overheating.
It is TVA's position that such protection.is not necessary due to the redundancy i
and physical separation of the repeaters.
4 There are three independent intraplant radio repeater systems at m
Sequoyah. Two of these systems known as the inplant repeaters,.
operate with 26 two-channel portable radios (this group includes the six fire brigade portables). One of these repeaters is located in the turbine building and one is located in the auxiliary i
building, providing multiple fire barriers between systems. The associated protables can address either of these repeaters.
The third intraplant repeater system (the public safety service repeater system) consists of one repeater located in the turbine i
building and 18 portable radios. These portable radios have three channels capable of addressing all three intraplant repeater systems. The public safety service repeater is located on a different turbine building elevation from one inplant repeater and in a different building from the other.
The portable radio communication system will be tested during i
the preoperational test program to demonstrate that its l
frequencies will not interfere with other plant systems.
I l
117112
1 7.
Item E.1, Fire Detection - Your description of the fire detection system is incomplete. Describe the type of detector provided for each room or area containing safety related equipment or systems.
A1:o, provide a detailed description of the fire detection system, supported where necessary, by diagrams or appropriate prints (in-clude a single line draiwng from the detection circuits, waterflow I
alarms, through the subpanels and into the control room).
r It is our position that prinary and secondary power be supplied as follows:
(
A.
Using normal offsiste power as the primary supply with a 4 hr. battery supply as secondary supply; and l
B.
Having capability for manual connection to the Class lE emergency power, but within 4 hrs. of loss of offsite power. Such connection should follow the applicable i
guidelines in Regulatory Guides 1.6,1.32, and 1.75.
Confirm that your design will meet this position.
i TVA Response r
t The fire detection system is designed in accordance with flFPA 720 and 72E. The system censists of initiating de. vices, local control panels, remote transmitter-receivers providing remote multiplex (MUX) l functions, and computerized multiplex central control equipment.
~
Refer to Figure 7-1 for a block diagram of the system.
The system's initiating devices consist of fire detectors which are identified as to type and location in Table 1-1 and flow alarm pressure switches which are provided for each fixed suppression system.
3 A central processor unit (CPU) communicates with the local control panels via the remote MUX units over looped circuits. The MUX equip-ment allows the processor to interrogate each local control panel in turn and to receive data from the panels. When an initiating device changes from normal to a trouble or alarm status, it is detected at the remote MUX transmitter-receiver and when next interrogated by the central processor will transmit this status change. The change is evaluated by the processor and visual and audible indications provided.
t An alarm condition results in the following system responses:
t (1) Sounding of audible devices locally and in the main control 4
room.
(2)
Illumination of indicating lamps on the local control panel indicating the location of the alarming device.
(3) Actuation of local control panel circuits for the control of automatic suppression systems, fire pumps, fire dampers, fire doors, and ventilation equipment.
i 577311
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(4)
Identification of the location and time of receipt of the
)
alarm condition on a cathode ray tube (CRT) display in the main control room and on a line printer in the unit 2 auxiliary instrument room.
The system is electrically supervised for ground and open wiring faults in the detection, power supply, alarm, and MUX data transmission circuits. Supervision is Class A in the detection and data transmission circuits and Class B in local audible alarm circuits. A wiring fault in the above circuits results in an audible and visual trouble indication at both the local and control locations. The system is capable of processing and displaying multiple a' arm and trouble conditions.
A second CPU is provided in the main control room as an installed spare. Upon failure of the primary processor, the spare can be connected to the system by jumper cables in less than 30 minutes.
The fire detection system is powered from a single 120V ac distribution panel as shown in Figure 7-2.
The panel is provided with a manual transfer switch to allow normal or alternate power feed from 480V ac control and auxiliary building ventilation boards lAl-A and 2Al-A, respectively. Both ventilation boards are auto-matically connected after 10 seconds to the emergency diesel generators on loss of offsite power. The system's power supply complies with the applicable guidelines in Regulatory Guides 1.6 and 1.32 and partially complies with Regulatory Guide 1.75 as discussed in FSAR section 8.3.
The momentary loss of power to the CPU resulting from the transfer to the diesel generators will cause a loss of the CRT display in the main control room. However, when power is restored, all persisting alarm and trouble conditions will be redisplayed.
Fire detection system components are located as identified in Table 7-1.
Refer to compartmentation drawing SK-1004 in the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Program Reevaluation for definition of the column lines.
i 577312
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TABLE 7-1 Component Building Elevation Column Room Name Central processor unit Control 732.0 p,C7 Main control room and CRT display Line printer Control 685.0 p,C10 U2 aux. inst. room Local control panels
Located throughout plant -----------
Power distribution Auxiliary 734.0 t,A8 6.9 kV shutdown panel board room B 480V cont, and aux.
Auxiliary 734.0 t,A3 480V shutdown bldg. vent board 1Al-A board room 1A2-A Transformer 1 Auxiliary 734.0 u,A2 480V shutdown
<f' board room 1Al-A 4l cont. and aux.
Auxiliary 734.0 r,A13 480V shutdown b1dg. vent board 2Al-A board room 2A2-A Transformer 2 Auxiliary 734.0 r,A15 480V shutdown board room 2Al-A C
1 8.
Item E.2.c., Fire Protection Water Supply System - In Section E.2.c you state that the fire pumps at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant are electric motor driven and are connectable to the emergency diesel genera tors.
Ccnfirra that these pump motors will be connected automatically to the lE bus, upon loss of offsite rower. The required alarms and status are annunciated in the main control room.
It is not clear that the pump monitoring system meets the guidelines of BTP 9.5-1, Appendix A.
Therefore, verify that the fire pumps are individually monitored and the monitoring circuits are electrically supervised. Alarms indicating pump running, driver availability, or failure to start, should be provided in the control room.
TVA Response The electric motor-driven fire pump motors are powered by the 480V shutdown boards. Upon loss of offsite power, these boards are auto-matically loaded on the diesels. Two minutes after the power loss, the fire pumps are in turn loaded on the 480V shutdown boards. Alarms indicating that the fire pump switchgear has operated into a motor running condition and alarms indicating loss of line power on the line side of the switchgear are provided in the main control room. Neither BTP 9.5-1, Appendix A, or NFPA 20 require electric supervision of these monitoring circuits, and none has been provided.
l
9.
Item E.3, Water Sprinklers and Hose Standpipe Systems A.
Item (a).
You state that the fire protection system or plant equipment will be so designed such that a pipe break or a single inadvertent actuation of the fire protection will not prevent the functioning of both trains of the safety-related system. This design arrangement is unacceptable.
It is our position that the safety related systems or equipment should be protected against moderate energy line cracks in accordance with BTP APCSB 3-1, by water shields or baffles.
B.
Item (d). Verify that the hose station will be able to reach any locations that contain or present a fire hazard to safety related equipment with at least one hose not over 100' long.
C.
Your submittal does not indicate the hourly fire rating of the protected openings in the stairwell.
Indicate their hourly fire ratings.
D.
Throughout your fire hazards analysis, you state that sprinkler systems will be installed in various areas of the plant. We observed during our site visit that the sprinkler systems were installed at the ceiling level. However, no provisions were made to locate sprinkler heads clear of overhead obstructions, especially in areas housing the auxiliary feed-water pumps and the component cooling water pumps.
It is our position that where such systems are to be installed that additional sprinkler heads be provided below any obstructions to obtain minimum interference to dishcarge patterns of the sprinkler heads on the floor below.
TVA Respense I
(
A.
The Sequoyah fire protection system in safety-related areas is a seismically qualified, preaction sprinkler system. This system is j
charged with water only when a cross-zoned detector system enters the alarm state.
To provide the operator continuous assurance of the integrity of the system in areas which are sensitive to water damage, low-pressure air supervision which alarms in the control room is provided.
In addition, water shields are provided in areas l
where actuation of the fire protection system would unacceptably impair safety-related equipment. This design philosophy complies fully with BTP APCSB 3-1, Sections B.1 and B.3a which requires protection of essential systems and components against postualted piping failures in high or moderate energey fluid systems that operate during normal plant conditions.
B.
All areas of safety-related structures are within reach of fire hose stations equipped with 100' of hose.
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C.
The protected stairwells in the control building have equivalent 1-1/2 hour rated reinforced concrete and concrete block construction.
The plaster partition assemblies above the fire doors have a fire resistive rating at least equivalent to that assigned the wall construction.
Fire barrier seals around pipe penetrations in the stairwells are in accordance with the designs discussed in 3.B.
There are no cable tray or ducts penetrating the stairwells.
D.
Additional sprinkler heads shall be provided or existing heads 4
relocated in order to clear overhead obstructions and obtain minimum interference patterns where possible.
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- 10. Safety related pumps of both trains for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 are contained in the Auxiliary Building elevation 653' and 660' i
area. Each train is in its own room; however, no fire rated door i
separates the room from the corridor and adjacent pump rooms.
[
It is our position that each room be provided with a 3-hr. fire i
rated door, mounted in an approved fire rated frame to properly l
i protect the room.
In lieu of fire rated doors, provide a wet pipe sprinkler system to completely cover the corridor separating L
i Unit No.1 from Unit No. 2.
The sprinkler system should alarm and l
annunciate in the control room.
i i
TVA Response
[
Three-hour fire doors are provided for each of the eight openings from j
safety-related pump rooms. At the time of the NRC site visit, these doors had not been installed.
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- 11. On elevation 690' of the auxiliary building at Al and U, all four power cables (both trains of both units) of the ERCW pump from the yard pump house come into a metal enclosure mounted on the concrete wall approximately 10 ft. above the floor.
Each cable within the junction box is separated by a metal baffle. From the enclosure, the cables are run in conduits and go up the wall and through the ceiling. We were informed that at the ceiling, all the conduits are supposed to be buried in concrete back to the switchgear room of the various trains and units.
It is our position that:
~
A.
Verify that these conduits are actually buried back to their I
switchgear rooms from the ceiling level above the junction box.
8.
A 3-hr. fire rated barrier be installed around the metal enclosure as well as around the conduits located on the wall above the enclosure and terminating at the ceiling to protect against potential exposure fires.
In addition, we are concerned that the metal enclosure and metal baffles are inadequate to prevent an electrically initiated fire that may damage all power cablings in the enclosure. Revise your design of the metal enclosure and metal baffles to protect the cables such that an electrically initiated fire will cause damage to no more than one power train.
TVA Resconse A.
The conduits are not buried back to their switchgear rooms from the ceiling level above the junction box.
The conduits ascend from the junction box to elevation 734.0 embedded only as they penetrate floor slabs. On elevation 734.0 the conduits terminate in cable trays that extend to the switchgear.
B.
A 3-hour fire rated barrier around the junction box and conduits would cause an unacceptable derating of the installed ERCW pump power cables.
In lieu of the 3-hour fire rated barriers, TVA will provide a 1" mineral wool barrier between the redundant power cables in the junction box as protection against an electrically initiated fire. A fixed water spray system will also be provided to protect the junction box and conduits on elevation 690' from installed and transient exposure hazards.
1 Protection of the ERCW pump power cables on elevation 714' and above will be handled as discussed.in the response to question 12.
577315
- 12. During our site visit we noticed numerous places where redundant safety related cable trays as well as conduits were in close proximity to each other. This was noticed on almost all elevations.
Some of these locations are to have flamemastic and preaction sprinkler j
systems installed at the interaction. At the time of the site visit the function of these various cables-conduit could not be determined at these interactions.
It is our positon that:
A.
Identify all such interactions in the areas of both Units 1 and 2 where the redundant safety related trains are within 20 ft. of each other. Also, the consequence of electrically initiated or exposure fires should be evaluated with regard to plant shutdown capability (see item 1).
B.
For those areas indicated in item (A) above, where a fire can affect the plant shutdown capability, an area automatic sprinkler system should be provided to afford protection against
(
exposure fires. Also, a 1/2-hr. fire rated barrier such as i
1" of mineral wool should be provided to separate one i
safety related train from the other or from a common exposure fire source. The sprinkler system should alarm and annunciate l
4 in the contrcl room.
TVA Resocnse A.
The criteria for the separation of Class lE equipment and circuits basically meet RG 1.75, revision 0, although it was issued after the Sequoyah design was complete. The criteria used in the design for the separation of redundant cable trays at Sequoyah in general plant areas are as follows. Redundant cable trsys are separated a minimum l
of 3 feet horizontally, and a minimum of 5 feet vertically, except where trays containing cables of different divisions of separation r
cross. Where redundant cable trays cross, there is a minimum vertical separation of 12 inches (tray top of lower tray to tray bottom of upper tray) with the bottom tray covered with a solid steel cover and the top tray provided with a solid steel bottom for minimum distance of 3 feet on each side of the tray crossing.
In the auxiliary building, each cable tray tier may contain a combination of nondivisional trays together with trays of only one division. As a result of the reevaluation of the Sequoyah fire 4
protection program, it was determined that in most fire cells, containing redundant division of systems, the installed combustibles consisted of cable insulation and jacket materials. New criteria were developed to identify and protect redundant circuits, whether l
installed in conduits and/or cable trays within a 5-foot radius of the point of interaction. This distance was established as the most l
credible zone of influence for an electrically initiated fire.
4 6
D 117116.
Following this 5-foot criterion, approximately 50 percent of the cable trays in the auxiliary building were identified as needing protection. The areas of divisional interactions are shown as hatched cable trays in figures 12-1 through 12-5.
The hatched trays represent both tray-to-tray and tray-to-conduit divisional interactions.
In each reactor building annulus there are 15 divisional interactions, in the cable spreading room there are 44 divisional interactions, and in each auxiliary instrument room there are 4 divisional interactions.
Following a 20-foot criterion, between 75 and 80 percent of the trays will be involved in divisional interactions within the reactor building annulus, the auxiliary building, the cable spreading room, and the auxiliary instrument room.
For example, in units 1 and 2 areas of the auxiliary building, the divisional interactions of redundant safety-related trains that are within 20 feet of each other are shown shaded in figures 12-6 through 12-10.
The present design requires that the exposed surfaces of cables in the identified trays (both divisional and nondivisional) be coated I
with a flame-retardant material such as Flamemastic 77 for a 5-foot radius from the point of interaction (or to the nearest wall, floor, or ceiling).
In addition, fixed suppression systems are provided l
for these interactions.
TVA has evaluated the consequences of fires with regard to plant shutdown capability.
Electrically initiated fires are judged to be acceptable cased on the results of tests conducted at
)
s Sandia Laboratories and the commitment to add a fire-retardant coating to cables as discussed in the response to question 4.
The tests demonstrate that a fire initiated in a shorted cable will not propagate to cables in adjacent trays and that cable coatings are effective in restricting fire propagation. The consequences of exposure fires are discussed in the response to question 1.
B.
TV/. has provided automatic sprinkler systems for the protection of
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redundant circuits N interaction points based on the 5-foot criterion. Automatic sprinkler coverage is also provided for areas containing fixed combustibles which could impose an exposure fire threat to equiprient, components, or circuits necessary to achieve safe plant shutdown. As indicated in the response to question 9.D, additional sprinkler heads shall be provided or existing heads relocated in order to clear overhead obstructions and obtain minimum interference patterns where possible, and additional suppression systems will be provided as described in the responses to questions 1 and 13.
TVA's present design philosophy provides for the alarm and annunciation in the main control room of the operation of all fixed suppression systems.
See the response to question 1 for a discussion of the measures proposed for protection of redundant safety-related circuits required l
for safe shutdown.
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4
- 13. On elevation 690' of the auxiliary building at coordinate A-3 and T, all five (two from each unit and one swing) component cooling water pumps are lccated together. Adjacent to these safety related pumps are the two motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps (both trains), of Unit 1, which are also safety related.
Both Unit No. 2 auxiliary feedwater pumps are located approximately 125' away down the corridor at coordinates A-12 and S. Power operated control valves for the component cooling water (CCW) pumps are located immediately above the CCW pumps on an open grating mezzanine. Various safety related cable trays are also located in the area. A preaction sprinkler system is proposed for the ceiling level only and would offer very little protection against an exposure fire due to the many obstructions between the ceiling level sprinkler and the floor below. It is our position that: A. A half hour fire rated barrier be provided between the redundant auxiliary feedwater pumps and extend up to the mezzanine above these pumps. At present, a metal decking barrier is used to partially separate each auxiliary feedwater pumps. This applies to both Unit 1 and 2 pumps. B. Provide autcmatic sprinkler protection under the partition above the auxiliary feedwater cumps of both Unit I and 2. Activation of the system should alarm and annunciate in the control room. C. Provide automatic sprinklers a fer all five component cooling water pumps under the mezzanine above them. D. Provide a 1/2-hr. fire rated barrier separating each component cooling watar pump from each other. Ine barrier should extend to the underside of the mezzanine above. Also provide a 1/2-hr fire rated barrier fo> the mezzanine floor above these pumps. The 1/2-hr. fire ratin; should orotect against a fire from either side of the barrier. E. Provide a 1/2-hr. fire rated barrier protection (l" mineral wool or equivalent) for the control and power supplies to the various valves on the mezzanine level above the component cooling water pumps. F. Provide additional smoke detection throughout the area for early detection. Detection should be tied into the existing fire alarm system and alarm and annunciate in the control room. G. Verify that the existing hose station location will be sufficient with the above fire rated barriers in place for protection of all pumps and valves.
\\ J TVA Response A. The auxiliary feedwater system contains two motor-driven pumps [ (those described in the above question) and a steam turbine-driven pump-(located on elevation 669). Since any one of these pumps has ( sufficient capacity to establish and maintain a safe shutdown, the loss of both motor-driven pumps to a fire is an acceptable i event. Hence, fire rated barriers between pumps are not required. See discussion of steam generator inventory control in response to question 1. B. Automatic sprinkler protection will be provided.under the pipe break barrier for the units 1 and 2 motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. C. Automatic sprinkler coverage will be provided under the mezzanine for all five component. cooling water pumps. D. A single fire barrier will be p'rovided between train A and train B component cooling water pumps. The fire barrier will be five feet in height and have a minimum 1/2-hour fire resistance rating. E. Control and power supply cables that are required for safe shutdown and that are located on the mezzanine level above the component cooling water pumcs will be protected as discussed in the response to question 1. F. Additional smoke detection will be provided to actuate the proposed sprinkler systems and to ensure early warning of a fire. G. Existing fire hose capability is sufficient to reach all equipment within the area of the component cooling water pumps and motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps with no more than 100 feet of hose. A a O M - - - - - - ~,, - - w w ,-m=--
s
v v
14 The emergency raw cooling water pump house is separated into three compartments with train A of both units located on either end and trair B of both units located together in the middle compartment. It is our position that the following be provided for the ERCW pump house. A. Provide a 3 hr. fire rated door to separate the center compart-ment from the south compartment. The door should be alarmed and annunciated in the control room. B. Provide a 1/2-hr. fire rated partial barrier to separate the two B trains in the center compartment. Barriers should be at least 6" high. TVA Response A. A 3-hour rated fire door is provided between the center and south compartments of the intake pumping station containing the ERCW pumps. At the time of the NRC site visit, the door had not been installed. The door shall be locked in its normally closed position with the keys administratively controlled. Therefore, alarm and annunciation of the door is not necessary. B. Separation within the B train is not required. The ERCW system is not designed as a separated system beyond that which is required for the two train assignments (train A plus train B); i.e., there are not two B trains. All four B train ERCW pumps supply tie same B train ERCW header. Train A of the ERCW system provides cor.:plete and fully qualified redundancy to the train B pumps. A more complete description of the ERCW system is provided in FSAR section 9.2.2. ( \\ t I i l 117121
- 15. All four wood and PVC cooling towers for the Auxiliary Essential Raw Cooling Water System are located within 50 ft. of the emergency diesel generator building and approximately within 50 ft. from the two large diesel fuel oil storage tanks (also located approximately within 50 ft. from the emergency diesel generator building and approximately 50 ft. from the AERCW pumps).
These cooling towers are not protected by a deluge system. We are concerned that a fire in the cooling towers can threaten the diesel generator building, the diesel storage tanks, and the auxiliary essential raw cooling water pumps. It is our position that the cooling towers be protected in accordance with Section 0.18 of Appendix A, i.e., providing deluge system, hydrants, and hose stations. TVA Response TVA is not providing a deluge system or hose stations for the four auxiliary essential raw cooling water (AERCW) cooling towers for the following reasons: A. The AERCW system (pumps and cooling towers) is required to shut down the plant only upon loss of Chicamauga Dam (the downstream dam). The safety feature will be transferred to the new ERCW station when it is completed (prior to unit 2 operation). B. The diesel genrator building is about 50 feet from the closest tower (the dis ances of the other towers are 120, 200, and 280 feet). This distance is great enough so that an AERCW cooling tower fire would not constitute a hazard to this structure. The diesel generator building is a seismic 1A structure, designed to be tornado and missile resistant and its exterior walls are equivalent to at least a 3-hour rated fire barrier. C. The yard storage fuel oil tanks are 70 feet away from the closest cooling tower (distances to remaining towers are 75,120, and 180 feet). This separation distance is sufficient such that an AERCW cooling tower fire would not constitute an exposure hazard to these tanks (see table 4-4, NFPA 30). The fuel oil tanks are diked and yard hydrant and hose / equipment capabilities are provided for tne entire area. Further, the yard fuel oil tanks serve no safety function. The safety-related diesel seven-day tanks are embedded in concrete under the diesel generator building. D. Salient features of the cooling tower design are as follows: a. The use of fire retardant, corrugated fiberglass casing and louvers. b. Fire retardant glass reinforced polyester fan cylinder. c. PVC fill and eliminators with a flame spread rating of 25 or less. n e nn
l 16. It is our position that when the C0 total flooding system is locked 2 out locall, in any emergency diesel generator room that the operator in the control room receives an alarm and annunciator indicating that the system is inoperative. TVA Response The system will be under administrative control wi en locked out in accordance with Physical Security Instruction PHYSI-13 section 4.4. Therefore, alarm and annunciation in the control room is not necessary. ( [ 3 l 117123
17. A. The corridor outside each diesel generator room of the emergency diesel generator building has a preaction sprinkler system. Power conduits from each diesel run up the west wall of the corridor. A concrete barrier extending out approxi-mately 3 f t. from the west wall separates the redundant power trains. Unit flo.1 power conduit is located at one end of the corridor and Unit ilo. 2 at the opposite end. It is our position that a 1-1/2 hr. fire rated barrier separate each redundant train of each unit from each other in the corridor for protection against an exposure fire in the event of failure of the sprinkler system. It is also our position that the doors leading to each emergency diesel generator from the corridor be kept in the closed positon (at all times) and alarmed and annunciated in the control room. B. Also verify that a fire in any one of the four switchgear rooms above the corridor of the diesel generator building, elevation 740 ft., will not involve cables and/or conduit for any other safety related train or unit. TVA Response A. The !!RC understandinc of the conduit assignment is in error. Unit I and unit 2 train A power conduits are located on the north end of the corridor, and unit 1 and unit 2 train B conduits are located on the south en: of the corridor. There is approximately 50 feet separation between train A and train B conduits. TVA considers the spacial separation to be adequate and does not propose to add a fire rated barrier, iiormally open, 3-hour rated sliding fire doors are provided for the opening leading to each emergency diesel generator room from the corridor. The doors are provided with electromagnetic door holders. The doors are actuated either by detection systems located on each side of the door, by thermally actuated links or by a diesel generator room CO system release. 2 The detection systems that actuate the fire doors annunciate a fire signal in the control room. Likewise, a C0 initiation in any 7 one of the diesel generator rooms is annuncTated in the main control room. We conclude that the door release system, as designed, provides sufficient redundancy and alarm features to assure door closure in the event of a fire. B. There are no cable trays and/or conduit that penetrate switchgear rooms of opposite divisions. GG OO
= l l
- 18. We were informed at the time of the site visit that an alternative means of achieving cold shutdown if both redundant trains of conduit-cable trays (of both units) are lost due to a fire in the control room, or cable spreading room or remote shutdown panel room.
In order to evaluate this alternative, we require a description of how the alternate shutdown method for each area will be carried out, system modifications associated with the shutdown method, and confirmation that written procedures have been established for immediate use by responsible individuals. The staff position with respect to providing alternate or dedicated shutdown methods for fire protection is stated in Enclosure 1. Provide information that demonstrates that the requirements of Enclosure 1 will be satisfied. TVA Response Emergency Operating Instruction E01-7, Control Room Inaccessibility, provides for safe plant shutdown from the auxiliary control room should the main control room become inaccessible due to a fire (or for other reasons such as toxic gas, etc.) in either it or the spreading room. This instruction provides a discussion of symptoms, automatic actions, immediate operator action, subsequent operator action, and recovery for: (a) control room inaccessibility at power or hot standby; (b) control room inaccessibility at not shutdown, cold shutdown, or refueling shutdown; (c) hot standby to cold shutdown in the auxiliary control node; and (d) return to r.ain control room operation from test of E01-7. E0I-7 and all EDI's nave been submitted to NRC Region 2 Office of Inspection and Enforcement for review. The auxiliary control room has been divided into five independent compartments (a central control area and four transfer switch rooms) which are separated from each other by 1-1/2 hour fire rated barriers. The central control area is the only room where a fire could affect both safety trains. Panels and cables in the central area are 1 normally inactive and their loss would have no effect upon plant control. A fire in one of the other four rooms could affect only a single train and would not prevent safe shutdown from the main control room. 4 t 1162ni -
i 19. It is our position that the ventilation system of each safety-related battery room be alarmed and annunciated in the control room upon failure of such systems. Confirm that you will meet this position. TVA Response Redundant ventilation systems are provided for each safety-related battery room. Failure of one system results in an alarm and annunciation in the main control room and the automatic starting of the second system. l MN
4
- 20. Control Room Comolex A.
Provide the flamespread, smoke developed, and fuel contributed test results as per E-84 of the dropped plastic ceiling in the l control room. We were informed at the time of the site visit that this ceiling was a UL-approved dropout ceiling. Verify that the ceiling material meets the guidelines of Section C.4.a(4) l of Revision 1 to BTP 9.5-1 or replace it with a ceiling material i that does. l B. It is our position that you provide a 3-hour fire rated barrier at T5 and T12 on the ends of the control room. Present doors t are not labeled as well as openings are above the suspended ceiling into the corridor. Verify that the doors are of 3-hour t fire rated construction and that 3-hour fire doors / dampers are used in all ventilation duct penetrations where they penetrate the 3-hour barrier. l C. The main safety-related consoles actually extend through the i floor three to four feet into the cable spreading room. These are completely enclosed with metal walls and floor. A 3-hour I fire rated coating is to be applied to the sides and bottom of l these consoles from the cable spreading room side only. There i is no fire rating from the control room side. The consoles are [ congested with cables (all non-IEEE-383 rated) and would make i manual firefighting difficult. [ It is our position that taking the above factors into consider-ation and providing a defense-in-depth protection that an auto-matic or local manual operated gas suppression system (either high or low pressure CO r halon) be provided for protection of these [ 2 consoles. D. Verify that the sprinkler system for protection in the records storage area conforms to NFPA 13. It was noted that the riser nipples appear to be 1/2-inch pipe, which is not pemitted by F NFPA 13. Also, verify that the wall separating the records storage room from the relay room is of 3-hour fire rated con-struction, including protection of all duct penetrations. TVA Response 4 A. The translucent panels in the main control room ceiling are not UL listed. They will be' replaced with material that meets the guidelines of section C.4.a(4) of Revision 1 to BTP 9.5-1. l B. The control room complex is separated from other plant areas by minimum 3-hour fire rated contruction. Within the complex, the peripheral rooms are generally separated from the main control room by 1-1/2-hour fire rated construction. One-and-one-half i hour fire separation between the main control room and the i remainder of the control room complex satisfies the requirements of section C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.120, Revision 1. j i i 561981 l
Refer to control building elevation 732.0 on compartmentation drawing SK-1007 in the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Program reevaluation for the layout of the control room complex. The mechanical equipment room on elevation 732.0 contains venti-lation equipment that is essential for continued operation of the main control room. Therefore, the equipment room is considered an extension of the main control room fire cell. The two rooms are connected by ventilation ducts located above the suspended ceiling for the housekeeping area between columns C2 and C4. These ducts do not penetrate a fire barrier and are not provided with fire dampers. The housekeeping area is separated from the main control room, the mechanical equipment room, and the essential ventilation ducts for the main control room by 1-1/2-hour rated suspended ceilings and fire walls. The ventilation supply ducts penetrating the ceiling of the housekeeping area consisting of the shift engineer's office, instrument calibration shop, toilet and locker area, and the kitchen area are not provided with fire dampers at the ceiling penetration. Smoke dampers actuated by ionization smoke detectors are provided in the main supply trunk above the 1-1/2-hour fire rated ceiling for each of these areas. These dampers are UL listed and have a 1-1/2-hour fire rating. Upon detection of smokt in any of the housekeeping area rooms, the dampers in the main supply trunk to the affected room or rooms will be isolated thereby closing off supply air to the room or rooms without interrupting essential ventilation supply to the main control room. Return air ducts from the chart storage room and instrument calibration room are also provided with a rated smoke detector actuated damper in the main return trunk above the suspended ceiling. Isolation of this damper will prevent smoke in these rooms from returning to the control room complex air-handling units thereby preventing contamination of the main control room. P.eturn ventilation from the shift engineer's office is through a louver in the wall to the corridor and back to the mechanical equipment room. The louver in the wall between the shift engineer's office and the corridor is provided with a 1-1/2-hour fire rated damper. Exhaust ventilation for the kitchen area and the toilet and locker rooms is thrcagh an exhaust fan located in the mechanical equipment room exhausting to the outside through the control building roof. No fire dampers are provided for these ducts. Additional detector-actuated rated fire dampers are provided between the corridor and the mechanical equipment room to prevent smoke present in the corridor from entering the mechanical equipment room, and in the return air duct within the mechanical equipment room supplying 5200 cfm makeup air to the main control room air-handling units to prevent smoke present in the mechanical equiptrent room from entering the main control room. The relay room is separated from the main control room by 1-1/2-hour rated fire wall that extends through the suspended ceilings. Refer to part D. of this response for a discussion of the separation between the relay ro.om and the record storage room. MMBRMdLAW76/
= All fire barrier openings are provided with appropriately rated, UL-labeled assemblies except the previously mentioned housekeeping area ventilation supply ducts and door openings C55 and C56 (refer to drawing SK-1007) which contain special purpose security doors. These doors are made of bullet-resistant, heavy gauge steel and have not been tested by UL. However, the manu-facturer has certified that the two doors are equivalent to UL-tested fire doors rated for three hours. The above-described fire rated separation and smoke control provide adequate protection of the main control room from a fire originating in the peripherial areas of the control room complex. As described in the response to question 20.C, loss of the main control room is an acceptable event since reactor shutdown can be acccnplished from the backup control room located in the auxiliary building. C. Automatic smoke detection is provided within the control room consoles to provide the earliest possible indication of a fire. Hand portable fire extinguishers are provided within the main control room and manual fire hose backup capability is provided immediately outside the room. The control room consoles contain only low-voltage cable, which minimizes the possibility of internally generated fires. The consoles are proviced with full access doors on the rear of the panels which afford access to the lower recessed portions of the consoles with an extinguisher or fire hose nozzle. With early detection capability in the control room consoles, a fire can be detected and extinguished in the incipient stage with minimal effect on equipment and electrical circuits. Should a fire occur that develops beyond the capability of the extinguishing equipment, the main control room can be abandoned and reactor shutdown accomplished from the backup control room located in the auxiliary building. It is TVA's position that a gaseous suppression system is not necessary for the main control room consoles. D. The 1/2-inch riser nipples will be replaced with 1-inch nipples to conform to NFPA 13 in'the records storage area. The wall separating the records storage room from the relay room is of 1-1/2-hour fire rated construction including 1-1/2-hour rated fire dampers in duct penetrations. C77AA9
21. In the control building on elevation 685 ft. in both Units 1 and 2, auxiliary instrument rooms, both safety related divisions of one unit are located in each room. The consequence of electrically initiated or exposure fires should be evaluated with regard to plant shutdown capability. In the event that the plant shutdown capability cannot be maintained, an alternate shutdown method should be provided. TVA Response The auxiliary instrument room (s) located on elevation 685.0 of the control building are considered an extension of the main control room for the sake of the design of the backup control system. Hence, Sequoyah can establish and maintain a safe shutdown with a total loss of an auxiliary instrument room. See response to question 18. i l l 117103
22. In the cable spreading room of the control building, a preaction sprinkler system is used for protection with one layer of sprinklers located at the ceiling and an intermediate level located approximately half way between the floor and the ceiling. Provide heat collectors for the lower sprinkler heads to prevent ceiling level sprinklers from cold soldering the lower layer of sprinklers. TVA Response Heat collectors are provided for lower level sprinkler heads in the spreading room. At the time of the NRC site visit the heat collectors had not been installed. h 117104
- 23. Verify that the controllers of the four fire pumps are separated such that an exposure fire will not jeopardize more than one controller. List the location of each such controller.
TVA Response The four fire pumps are controlled by switchgear located in separate 480V shutdown board rooms. Refer to compartmentation drawing SK-1004 in the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Program Reevaluation and Table 23-1 for the switchgear locations. Table 23-1 Fire Pump 480V Shutdown Board Room Number lA-A 1A2-A 734.0-A8 1B-B 1B2-0 734.0-A5 2A-A 2A2-B 734.0-A21 2B-B 282-8 734.0-A18 J l 4 117105 .~ m
- 24. Verify that the main control valve of the C0 system used for 2
prctection of safety related equipment in various rooms is supervised and alarmed and annunciated in the control room. TVA Response The C0 system is provided with all alarm and annunciation functions 7 required by tiFPA 12, 1973. It is TVA's position that the supervision of the master control valve is not necessary. l 577415
- 25. The information obtained as the result of the site visit was that the cable used at the Sequoyah fluclear Plant will not pass the flame test in the current IEEE Standard 383. We were informed that some testing had been performed on this cable.
Provide the information on the test used as well as the necessary data and criteria. TVA Response Table 25.1 contains the requested data for the purchased electrical cable. A description of the various flame tests is given in table 25.2. 197h0(
d
- ~
TAEE 29.1 1 I i . T7A l Cabl'e Decerietion l Cable Tvoe Flcr.e Test ..t 17CEA S-19-81 Single conductor, stranded, nylon. I 173, UC ~ jachet, polyethylene inculation 1 ) W, W IEEE 383-1974. Multi-conductor, twisted, stranded,. IPCEA S-19-81 chicided, chloroculfonated polyethylene j IFCEA S-61 h02 jecket, cro: linked, polyethylene MIL'tT-P_2'(59/16 inculation 8- .I uL-w 2 IPCEA G-19-81 Single conductor, PVC jacket, cros: linked ~* U, WD N .IEEE 333-1974 pclyethylene insuletion I Telephone and coaxial cable .T I.. IPCEA S-61402 A 1 ~ croselinked IPCEA S-19-81 Multi-conductor, single 1.7,, FM ), ~ polyethylene PVC jacket, PVC overall jacket ~ t TTP IPCEA S-19-81 ~ Single conductor, asbestos braid dacket, ~ 3 cilicone rubber i'n::ulation VTFT W, WG, WK i. IPCEA S-19-81'* Multi-conductor, single: polyethylene 'IPCEA S-61-bO2 PVC jacket, overall PVC jacket I YTFT .. Multi-conductor, singles cilicone rubbe-Siith WR C a::s braid, ove'rall jecket asbesto: l j braid L 'W IPCEA S-19-81 Thermocouple cable I MILW29.759/16 ~ 1 The TVA cable type is actually'a threc* letter designation. The' third 1 fetter was 'diopped for table brevity as the cable description. remains unchanged.. E Single conductors : aller than No. 8;AWG are installed in conduits ~._. 3 iTA Vertical Tray Flame Test. .) : s g 0
i ~- TADi3 25.2 IEEE 333-197$ An ci ht foot cable tray van crected vertically and loaded with multiple length 1. 6 of cabics arranged in a cinsic layer. 2. The flame cource uns a ribbon gas burner placed very near the bottom of the vertical tray. 3 The criteria for fcilure was a propagating fire in the troy above the flame source for the total length,of the tray. ~ UIr IsI6 A three sided metal enclosure was erected vert 5cally and loaded with l. a singic conductor.
- 2. ' The flame source was a Turrill gas burner placed approximately near the center of the cable specimen.
3 The following is the criteria for failure: A sin 5 e conductor vire that flamed l'onger than 1 minute following 1 A. any of the, five 15-second applications of the fla.c, i B. The uire igniting any combustibic material in its vicinity during, betueen, or after the various applications of the flame. C. A damage cf more than 25 percent of the indicator material during, betueen, or after the various applications of the flame. TVA Vertical Tray Flame Test 4 .l. An eight foot ladder type metal cable tray was crected vertically ruid
- loaded with several conductors from end to end on a singic 1 cycl.
s A 120/2f 0-volt oc test circuit was used to monitor circuit integrity
- 2..
t during the test. 3 The flame source va:: cre pled burlap soaked uith tran::fomer insulatin5 oil and placed several inches above the lower cable end. l 1 The follouing van the criteria for failure: 1 A. Propagating fire results. B. ' Circuit integrity loss $n less than 15 seconds after ignition. C. ' Decessive smoke appearing from cabic. D. Ect drippings from cable that may ignite fire in lower areas. I l b s.
_=. t ) TAliLE 25.2 (Continued) ' p, l l o-l ^ IKEA S-19-81/INEA S-61 !:02 (Flame Resisting Test) I 1, Th'c finne resisting t'ests of the above are dxactly the same as the prcviously described test of UL 11 (1976) except part B of the ~ 46 failure criteria thich is not adhered to. j MIDI-22759/16 1. A 'titree-sided metal enclosurc was crected vertically and loaded with j ~ 2 a c.ingic vire,. 2. The flame source vas a Bunsen burner applied approximately near the t center of the cabic specirsen. 3 The following is the criteria for failure: ? A. A single conductor that floned longer than five seconds after the fle.e is withdraun. i B. A flame travel of more than 0.25 inch fror. flame mark on cable after the flar.c is removed. i g l I j i o i y ( a 1: II*. II i I I! i ? i I O t ',4 J'
- 4-f (5
-F b'-if l 6 I' i .c.' . Lao
- 26. Verify that hose houses equipped with hose and combination nozzle and other auxiliary equipment recommended in NFPA 24, "Outside Protection," is spaced not more than 1000 ft. apart.
_TVA Response Hose houses are spaced less than 1000 feet apart. However, they are not completely furnished with the equipment listed in NFPA 24. The following will be provided: 250 ft 1/2" hose (on wheeled cart) 150 ft 1/2" hose 2 1/2" variable fog nozzles 2 1/2" variable fog nozzles 1 - Fire axe 1 - Crow bar 2 - Hydrant wrenches 4 - Coupling spanners 2 - Hose and ladder straps 1 1/2" by 2-1/2" by 2-1/2" gated wye 1 1/2" by 1-1/2" by 1-1/2" gated wye 2 1/2" by 1-1/2" reducers 2 1/2" adapters (female to male) 2 1/2" adapters (female to male) 2 1/2" adapters (double male) 2 1/2" adapters (double male) 2 .- 2-1/2" adapters (double female) 2 1/2" adapters (double female) 1 - Wheeled fire extinguisher (rated 320 B:C) 1 - Tee handle wrench 1 - Portable hand lantern (battery operated) 577416
4 f 27. Provide a description on the operation and sequencing of the station fire pumps including isolation of the RWST valves, pushbutton stations located next to fire hose stations including i supervision of the circuits and how they are connected to the fire alarm control panel as well as the fire pump controllers. Consideration should be given to failure of any 'of the above circuits and its affect on the fire protection system. TVA Response The four station fire pumps are capable of three modes of operation-- automatic, manual, and standby. In normal operation, two pumps are placed in automatic mode and two in standby. Upon receipt of an auto-matic start signal, one automatic pump starts immediately and the second starts three seconds later. If the fire protection system pressure cannot be maintained above 130 psig because of high system demand, the two standby pumps start ten seconds after the receipt of the initial signal. Manual operation of the pumps is also provided from the main control room and the individual pump switchgear. The automatic start signals are originated in the circuits shown in block diagram form in Figure 27-1. Local control panels are provided for each fixed suppression system to actuate the system and to transmit a signal to start the fire pumps. These panels receive initiation inputs frein the fire detection system and/or from hand-switches located in the protected areas. Additional fire pump start signals are generated by pushbuttons near fire hose stations located tnroughout the plant. All the start signals are processed through the centralized automatic stret logic located in three panels in the unit 1 and 2 auxiliary instrument rooms. From this logic, the start signals are transmitted simultaneously through separation relays to the individual pump switchgear. The pump sequencing is controlled by the switchgear as determined by the position of the handswitches located in the main control room. Refer to Table 27-1 for the location of the major system components. Upon starting a fire pump in any mode, its switchgar provides an output to close the raw service water head tank isosation valves. The pushbutton stations located next to the fire hose stations are provided to start the fire pumps only. They are not connected to the fire detection system and they are not supervised. No single failure in the circuits shown in Figure 27-1 or their power supplies will result in an unacceptable loss of firefighting 4 capability. A failure in a local control panel could prevent the automatic initiation of the associated suppression system and the fire pumps during a fire. However, the failure would not affect the detection system's annunciation capability so the unit operator can manually start one or more fire pumps and can dispatch the fire brigade to manually initiate the suppression system. Automatic start logic failures can prevent the automatic actuation of all fire 572824
pumps. This would not affect the suppression system operation, but would require manual starting of pumps from the main control room upon receipt of a detection system annunciation. A failure in the separation relays, 480V switchgear, or fire pumps would affect one pump only. The remaining three pumps would be operable in any mode. Failures in the handswitches, pilot valves, pushbuttons, and the system's con-necting circuits are no more restrictive than those failures discussed above. The fire pumps are assigned trained designations with two pumps in train A and two in train B. The manual control circuits (aain control room switch, 480V switchgear, power supply, and connecting circuits) for the pumps are separated per the requirements for Class lE electrical com-ponents. e h I I W.
ItiPUT FROM FIRE DETECTI0ri SYSTEM LOCAL MULTIPLE IllPUTS CONTROL FROM LOCAL PANEL CONTROL PANELS C HANDSWITCH O PUSHBUTT0?1 b t d 3 MULTIFLE INPUTS FROM %( AUTOMATIC -4 PUSH 8UTTONS LOCATED PILOT VALVE FOP, FIRE PUMP J NEAR FIRE HOSE STATIO iS SUPPRESSION SYSTEM START LOGIC SEPARATION SEPARATION SEPARATION SEPAPATION . RELAYS RELAYS RELAYS RELAYS HANDSWITCH .Ahct b C b I "., [ HANDSWITCH hat:DSWITCH HANDSWITCH .fH CONTROL MCR MCR MCR ROOM (MCR) 480-V 480-V 480-V 480-V SWITCHGEAR SWITCHGEAR SWITCHGEAR SWITCHGEAR l(lA-A 18-B 2A-A 28-8 ) FIRE PUMPS l FIGURE 27-1
E TABLE 27-1 Component Building Elevation Column Room flame local control
Located Throughou t the Pl an t-------------
panels Automatic fire Control 685.0 p,CS Units 1&2 pump start logic
- p,C9 Aux. Instr.
Fire pump 1A-A Intake 705.0 Pumping Station lA-A separation Control 685.0 p,C5 Unit I relays ** Aux. Instr. lA-A 480V switch-Auxiliary 734.0 t,A2 480V Shutdown gear Bd. Rm. lA2 Fire Pump 1B-B Intake 705.0 Pumping Station 1B-8 separation Control 685.0 p,C5 Unit 1 relays"-* Aux. Instr. 1B-5 t,80V switcn-Auxiliary 734.0 r,A3 480V Shutdown gear Bd. Rm.182 Fire pump 2A-A Intake 705.0 Pumping Station 2A-A separation Control 685.0 p,CS Unit I relays ** Aux. Instr. 2A-A 480V switch-Auxiliary 734.0 r,A13 480V Shutdown gear Bd. Rm. 2A2 Fire Pump 28-B Intake 705.0 Pumping Station 28-B separation Control 685.0 p,C5 Unit I relays *** Aux. Instr. 2B-B 480V switch-Auxiliary 734.0 t,A14 480V Shutdown gear Bd. Rm. 2B2
- Located in panels R-71, R-72, and R-79.
- Located in panel 1-R-73.
- Located in panel 1-R-78.
- Located in panel 1-R-73.
576967
Quality Assurance Branch Request for Additional Information Your description in Sections A.1 and B.5 of your submittals relative to your compliance with the " Guidelines in Appendix A of BTP 9.5-1" does not provide adequate information on your fire protection organization for us to complete our review. Therefore, please provide the following information: i j 1. Describe the upper level management position that has the overall responsibility for the formulation, iaalementation, and assessment j of the effectiveness of the fire protection program. J 2. Describe the offsite position (s) that has direct responsibility for formulating, implementing, and periodically assessing the i effectiveness of the fire protection program for the nuclear plant, including fire drills and fire protection training. i 3. While the Plant Superintendent is generally responsible for all activities at the facility, describe any further delegation of these responsibilities for the fire protection program such as training, maintenance of fire protection systens, testing of fire protection equipment, fire safety inspections, fire fighting procedures, and fire drills. 4. Describe the authority of your fire brigade leader relative to that of your Snift Engineer. TVA Response ~ 1. In the TVA organization structure, the General Manager has overall responsibility for the formulation, implementation, and assess-e ment of the effectiveness of the fire protection program. In accordance with the TVA policy of management accountability, the General Manager has delegated these fire protection program responsibilities through the respective managers of offices. to the Director of Engineering Design, the Director of Construction, and the Director of Power Production within their respective areas. To fulfill these responsibilities, these directors maintain qualified -taffs to ensure that all aspects of the fire protection program are, at a minimum, consistent with applicable regulatory requirements. To ensure that an integrated program is maintained, TVA has established a fire protection panel composed of key management representatives from each of these three divisions for review and coordination of program policies and application in interface areas. 1 577300
2. The offsite position (s) that has direct responsibility for formulating implementing, and periodically assessing the effectiveness of the fire protection program for the nuclear plant, including fire drills and fire protection training is the Fire Protection Section of Safety Engineering Services. The program is fornulated and implemented through Division Procedures ?tanual M78S2. Section F8 of this nanual establishes lhe requirement for an annual fire audit of each nuclear facility. 3. Delegation of responsibilities for the fire protection program such as training, maintenance.of fire protection systems, testing of fire l protection equipment, fire inspections, firefighting procedures, and L fire drills is contained in Division Procedures Manual N78S2. 4. The authority of the fire brigade leader relative to that of the shift engineer is contained in Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Physical Security Instruction Physi-13, Section 1.0. This instruction states in part that the duty assistant shift engineer, unit 1, shall be the fire brigade leader. Ne shall remain the leader unless relieved by his inline supervisor (the shift engineer). It further states that he shall keep the control room informed as to the fire conditions. l t l' i ~ i
e REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION QA FOR FIRE PROTECTION FOR SEQU0YAH (AND WATTS BAR) NUCLEAR PLANTS i F421.1 TVA's letter of January 24, 1977, to NRC regarding fire protection for Sequoyah (and Watts Bar) does not indicate whether the QA program for fire protection during design and construction is under the management control of the QA organization. This control consists of (1) formulating and/or verifying that the fire protection QA program incor-porates suitable requirements and is acceptable to the management responsible for fire protection and (2) verifying the effectiveness of the QA program for fire protection through review, surveillance, and audits. Performance of other QA program functions for meeting the fire protection program requirements may be performed by personnel outside of the QA organization. The QA program for fire protection should be part of the overall plant QA program. These QA criteria apply to those items within the scope of the fire protection program, such as fire protection systems, emer-gency lighting, communciation, and emergency breathing apparatus as well as the fire protection requirements of applicable safety-related equipment. We find that the letter does not describe sufficient detail to address the ten specific quality assurance criteria in Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1 during design and construciton. In order for the QAB to fully evaluate your plan to ceet these criteria, additional detailed description is necessary. Examples of the detail we would expect TVA to provide are given in Attachment 6 to Mr. D. B. Vassallo's letter of August 29, 1977. If, however, you choose not to provide this detail, you may apply the same controls to each criterion that are commensurate with the controls described ( in your QA program description, Section 17.lA. These controls would apply to the remaining design and construction activities of Unit Nos.1 and 2. If you select this method, a statement to this effect would be adequate for our review of the QA program for fire protection. TVA Response The QA program fire protection has been reviewed by appropriate TVA management including the QA organization to verify that the program incorporates suitable requirements and is acceptable. The appropriate QA personnel are responsible for verifying the effectiveness of the program through periodic audits. The QA criteria apply to all fire protection related systems equipment and components within the scope of the fire protection program including fire protection systems, emergency lighting, communication, and emer-gency breathing apparatus, to the extent that they may affect the fire ~
i protection for nuclear safety-related plant features. Our i submittal of January 24, 1977, to the NRC will be revised as follows to reflect a more detailed discussion of the existing procedures and i p-ograms within the Office of Enginering Design and Construction (OEDC) that are required for fire protection related systems: C. Quality Assurance _ TVA Compliance As indicated in the response to item A.1, Personnel, and as amplified in our response to Quality Assurance Branch question 1, TVA has delegated the responsibilities' associated with the various aspects of fire prevention and protection to or-ganizations which have personnel qualified to handle those i functions. The responsibility for the operational aspects of fire pro-tection has been delegated to the Division of Power Production in TVA's Office of Power. The Office of Power utilizes TVA's established QA program designed to meet the requirements of Appendix B to 10CFR Part 50.,.This program applies, for the operational phase of TVA's nuclear power plants, to the activities affecting the quality of those critical structures, systems, and components (CSSC) whose satisfactory performance is required for safe plant operations; to prevent accidents that could cause undue risk to the health and safety of the public; and to mitigate the consequences of such m idents in the unlikely event that they should occur. inose fire protection features protecting critical structures or areas will be included in the CSSC list and as such will fall under TVA's operational QA program. The operational QA program is described in the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Chapter '.7. Responsibility for the design and construction aspects of fire protection has y been delegated to the Office of Engineering Design and Construction (0EDC). OEDC has documented procedures and specifications which govern its activities and which apply to all systems for which OEDC has responsibility. These procedures are aimed at ensuring that the design and construction of TVA facilities result in a reliable and quality product. As applied to fire protection, these documents will require, in part, that the actions required in C.1 through C.10 below be accomplished. C.1 Design Control and Procurement Document Control TVA Compliance All fire protection related design criteria and procurement documents be reviewed by appropriate qualified indi-viduals to ensure that applicable regulatory and design requirements are properly and adequately specified and, as appropriate, quality standards such as fire MEP2
protection codes and independent laboratory testing are included. All changes to these documents and deviations therefrom, including requests for field changes, are reviewed in a similar manner. The above includes appropriate design reviews to verify separation and isolation requirements as they relate to fire protection. C.2 Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings TVA Compliance The design, installation, and tests associated with fire prot ction related systems be accomplished in accordance with written and approved instructions, procedures, and drawings. These documents must be reviewed by qualified personnel to ensure that applicable regulatory and design requirements are properly and adequately specified. This documentation includes any specialized training requirements for installation. C.3 Control of Purchased Material and Equipment TVA Compliance The procurement of fire protection related material and equipment require either an inspecticn at the manufacturer's facility or a receiving inspection to verify conformance to procurement requirements. C.4 Inspection TVA Compliance The installation of fire protection related systems be verified by independent inspection to ensure that it meets i the specified requirements and conforms to installation drawings and procedures. The inspection must be conducted in accordance with documented procedures. The procedures controlling inspection activity require that the inspection procedures or instructions shall be available with necessary drawings and specifications to use prior to performing inspection operations. Further, the procedures, instructions, and/or drawings, including revisions, supporting the inspection activities shall be documented. The results of these inspections shall be recorded. C.5 Test and Test Control TVA Compliance Fire protection systems be tested under TVA's preoperational test program. This program requires that tests be conducted in accordance with written test instructions which are reviewed to ensure that applicable regulatory and design requirements are properly and adequately specified. The acceptance criteria shall be evaluated and documented and all exceptions documented and controlled. WD6(@
t.- s - ~ 4 j N s / C.6 Inspection, Test, and Operating Status i TVA Compliance i Items that have satisfactorily completed tests or inspections be identi'ied by appropriate means. C.7 Nonconforming Items i 4 TVA Compliance Nonconforming items be identified and controlled to prevent inadvertent use or installation. This includes documentation of the disposition of the nonconformance. The Thermal Power i Engineering (TPE) Design Project shall review all noncon-formance reports and may request review by other branches l within EN DES as appropriate. shall approve the disposition of the nonconformance,The TPE Des i C.8 Corrective Action TVA Comoliance 3 Significant and repetitive conditions adverse to fire protection i such as nonconformances with installation drawings and deviatic1s from specifications be controlled and appropriate corrective action taken and documented. fire incidents and the corrective actions taken shall beConditions involv promptly reported to a cognizant level of management for i review and assess' ment. 1 C.9 Records _TVA Compliance t u Records be maintained for fire protection systems to t document conformance to the prescribed criteria. These records must include review of criteria, procurement documents and drawings, inspections test results, non-l conformances, and modification recor,ds. C.10 Audits TVA Compliance Independent audits by QA personnel be conducted annually in accordance with written procedures to ensure conformance to procedural requirements applicable to fire protection related systems. The audits must be documented along with the corregtive action taken and reviewed by the. appropriate level of management to ensure that the program is effective. t i i l r j C99snn
m COMMITMENTS TVA proposes to implement additional modifications resulting from commit-ments made in our responses to the following questions as soon after initial fuel loading for unit I as is practical, but prior to return to power after the first refueling outage for the first unit: Response to ASB question 1 - Relocation, protection by 1/2-hour fire rated barrier, and protection by fixed water spray systems of circuits identified as required for hot shutdown condition. Response to ASB quastion 4 - Additional fire retardant cable c= ting Response to ASB question 6A - Self contained 8-hour battery pack emergency lighting. Response to ASB question 90 - Additional and/or relocation of sprinklers. Response to ASB question llB - 1" mineral wool blanket between trains in ERCW junction box and additional suppression for junction box and conduit. Response to ASB question 13B - Automatic sprinkler protection for auxiliary feedwater pumps; 13C - Automatic sprinkler protection for component cooling xater pumps; 130 - Fire barrier between train A and train B comparent cooling water pumps; 13E - Modifications to control and power supply cabling at mezzanine level above the component cooling water pumps; 13F - Additional smoke detection. Response to ASB question 26 - These equipment houses presently contain 250 feet of 2-1/2-inch hose on a wheeled cart,1 to 2-1/2-inch variable fog nozzle, I hydrant wrench, 2-coupling spanners, and 1-wheeled fire extinguisher rated 320 B:C. Additional equipment listed in our response will be installed according to the above schedule. All modifications resulting from comnitments made in our submittal of January 24, 1977, shall be implemented prior to the initial fuel loading of each respective unit. All temporary hardware necessary to effect cold shutdown and casuality procedures directing their use will be available prior to return to power after the first refueling outage for the first unit. .}}