ML20059H328
| ML20059H328 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 10/29/1993 |
| From: | COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059H318 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9311100049 | |
| Download: ML20059H328 (11) | |
Text
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t ATTACHMENT C PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS l
(Marked-Up Pages) l NPF-11 NPF-18 1
l 3/4 6-34 3/4 6-37 INSERT A INSERT B
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TABLE 3.6.3-1 (Continued)
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES E
VALVE FUNCTION AND NUMBER Other Isolation Valves (Continued) 4 xZ 7.
w 1HG001A, B 1HG002A, B 1HG005A, B 1HG006A, B 8.
Standby Liquid Control System 1C41-F004A, B IC41-F007 5
9.
Reactor Recirculation Seal Injection cn U.)
O 1833-F013A, BU)
IB33-F017A, B 10.
Drywell Pneumatic System 11N018 1
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INSERT A 11.
Reference Leg Backfill 1C11-F422B 1C11-F422D 1C11-F422F 1 C11-F422G 1 C11-F423B 1C11-F423D 1C11-F423F 1 C11-F423G k:\\nlailasalle\\rvlis999.wpfi16
TABLE 3.6.3-1 (Continued) 9 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES g
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VALVE FUNCTION AND NUMBER OtherIsolationValves(Continued)
E 7.
Post LOCA Hydrogen Control 2HG001A, B rw 2HG002A, B 2HG005A, B.
2HG006A, B 8.
Standby Liquid Control System 2C41-F004A, B 2C41-F007 9.
Reactor Recirculation Seal Injection 2B33-F013A,B((3) d)
w 2833-F017A, B
- 10. Drywell Pneumatic Valves 2IN018' l
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l INSERT B 11.
Reference Leg Backfill 2C11-F4228 l
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2C11-F422G 2C11-F423B 2C11-F423D 2C11-F423F 2C11-F423G k:\\nla'dasalleirvlis999.wpf\\17
ATTACHMENT D SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION Commonwealth Edison has evaluated the proposed License Amendment and determined that it does not represent a significant hazards consideration. Based on the criteria for defining a significant hazards consideration established in 10 CFR 50.92, operation of LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the proposed amendment will not:
Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because:
The proposed change to Technical Specification Table 3.6.3-1 is administrative in nature. Adding components to Table 3.6.3-1 does not change the probability nor does it change the consequences of any previously evaluated accident for LaSalle County Station.
The proposed modifications for the reference leg backfill instrument lines do not increase the probability of any previously evaluated accidents for LaSalle County Station. For the indication only reference legs, the inadvertent closure of a root valve does not significantly increase the consequence of any previously evaluated accident as a result of the proposed plant modifications.
The proposed plant modifications for the reference leg backfill check valves will not increase the radiological consequences of any previously evaluated accident.
The radiological impact from a reference leg backfill instrument line break is bounded by LaSalle's Instrument Line Break analysis (UFSAR Section 15.6.2).
Therefore, the proposed plant changes will not increase the consequences of any previously evaluated accident.
Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because:
The proposed modification connects the non-safety-related CRD system to each safety-related division of RPV instrumentation. The failure of the CRD piping may result in instrument line leakage. However, this event is mitigated by the isolation action of the reference leg backfill check valves. These check valves are classified as safety-related and will be maintained and controlled such that overall plant safety is maintained. The addition of the reference leg backfill valves to the Technical Specifications is administrative in nature and does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident for LaSalle Station..
Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety because:
The proposed change to Technical Specification Table 3.6.3-1 to include the reference leg backfill valves is administrative in nature. Primary containment k:\\nlailasalleirvlis999.wpf t18
l integrity is not compromised by the addition of a pair of check valves that i
provide isolation for the reference leg backfill lines. These valves have been demonstrated to meet the criteria specified in General Design Criterion (GDC)
- 55. The maintenance and control applied toward all the reference leg backfill check valves ensures that overall plant safety is maintained. It can therefore be concluded that the addition of the reference leg backfill valves to Technical Specification Table 3.6.3-1 does not reduce the margin of safety for LaSalle l
County Station.
Guidance has been provided in " Final Procedures and Standards on No Significant l
Hazards Considerations," Final Rule, 51 FR 7744, for the application of standards to license change requests for determination of the existence of significant hazards consideration. This document provides examples of amendments which are not i
considered likely to involve significant hazards consideration. These proposed i
amendments most closely fit the example of an administrative change to the Technical I
Specifications. New primary containment isolation valves are being added to Table 3.6.3-1, Primary Containment Isolation Valves, to ensure proper maintenance and i
testing of the new valves, thus ensuring primary containment integrity is maintained.
The proposed modification design most closely fits an example of a change which may l
either result in some increase in the probability or consequences of a previously evaluated accident or may reduce in some way a safety margin, but where the results l
of the change are clearly within all acceptable criteria with respect to the system or component specified in Standard Review Plan Section 6.2.4.
d This proposed amendment does not involve a significant relaxation of the criteria used to establish safety ilmits, a significant relaxation of the bases for the limiting safety system settings, or a significant relaxation of the bases for the limiting conditions for j
operations. Therefore, based on the guidance provided in the Federal Register and the criteria established in 10 CFR 50.92(c), the proposed change does not constitute a l
significant hazards consideration.
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ATTACHMENT E i
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT STATEMENT APPLICABILITY REVIEW f
i Commonwealth Edison has evaluated the proposed amendment against the criteria for the identification of licensing and regulatory actions requiring environmental j
assessment in accordance with 10 CFR 51.21. It has been determined that the i
proposed changes meet the criteria for categorical exclusion as provided for under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). This conclusion has been determined because the changes required do not pose a significant hazards consideration or do not involve a significant increase in the amounts, and no significant changes in the types, of any effluents that may be released off-site. Additionally, this request does not involve a significant increase in s
individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
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ATTACHMENT F_
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Conseauences of Root Valve Closure - Trio Actuation Reference Leo "3 I
RVLIS Iniection at Rack j
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EVENT / ACTUATION i
Root valve 1(2)B21-F377 Closes Reference Leg F.essurizes to Approximately 1300 psi 1/2 scram on Reactor Low Level 3 and Reactor High Pressure 18 Safety Relief Valves open in Relief Mode Actual Reactor Water Level Swell to Level 8 Setpoint Main Turbine and all Feedwater Pumps Trip on Level 8 Main Turbine Trip Causes Reactor Full Scram Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Initiation RCIC High Reactor Water Level Shutoff Disabled l
Start "A" Low Pressure Coolant injection (LPCI), Low Pressure Core l
Spray (LPCS) and the O Diesel Generator Full Main Steam isolation Valve Closure when Reactor Pressure Reaches 854 psi Defeat LPCl/LPCS Injection Valve Opening i
initiate Automatic Depressurization System 9 Minute Timer l
e 1/2 Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) Alternate Rod Insertion j
Signal 1/2 ATWS Reactor Recirculation Pump Trip Signal i
l 1/2 Primary Containment Isolation System Signal for Groups I through Vll, and X This is for Division I rack H22-P026. The Division 11 rack has similar results, except 9 SRV's open versus 18. The other two racks also cause actuations of a lesser consequence. These results are listed for. reference only, because the backfill design resolved these potential effects.
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ATTACHMENT G i
Conseauences of Root Valve Closure -Indication Oniv Reference Lea l
i EVENT / ACTUATION Root Valve B21-F569 Closes Reference Leg for Post-Accident / Fuel Zone Instruments Pressurizes to Approximately 1300 psi l
l Low Level Alarm from Recorder 821-R884A Annunciates i
i The Following Level Instruments indicate Downscale:
B21-R604 at Panel H13-P603 l
B21-R884A, Reactor Level Pen at H13-P601 l
B21-R615, Fuel Zone Indicator at H13-P601 l
No Equipment Trips or Actuations Result j
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FIGURE 1
LASALLE COUNTY STATION UNITS 1
& 2 BACKFILL MODIFICATION CRD DRIVE g
ROUT ALVE 563 RACK N
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i BACKMLL LOCAL FLOW STATE 30 RACK G W 4) 3 LS LS PS PS i
M4 SIMPLIFIED FOR REFERENCE ONLY i
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