ML20059F373

Amends 19 & 9 to Licenses NPF-76 & NPF-80,respectively, Changing App a Tech Specs by Adding Specific Tech Spec for Main Feedwater Isolation Valves

ML20059F373
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	08/31/1990
From:	Charemagne Grimes Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20059F377	List: ML20059F373
References
NUDOCS 9009110192
Download: ML20059F373 (10)

Text

......

S

[

UNITED STATES

.[

yp NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM!SSION L

f s

,e waswiwoTow, p. c.nosos

)

HOUSTON LIGHTING & P0 ster COMPANY CITY PUBLIC SERVICE BOARD OF SAN ANf0N!0 CENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY CITY OF AUSTIN. TEXAS DOCKET NO. 50-498 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT. UNIT 1 AMEN 0 MENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.19 License No. NPF-76 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Ccamission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Houston Lighting & Power Companya (HL&P) acting on behalf of itself and for the City Public Service Board of San Antonio (CPS), Central Power and Light Corpany (CPL), and City of Austin, Texas (C0A) (the licensees) dated May 11, 1990, complie7 Vith the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy

" '*E4,-.as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules una... u ions set forth in 10 CFR Chapter ~!;

B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance:

(1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering'the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Cummission's regulations; 0.

The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the publici.

and E,

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulatinns and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

" Houston Lighting & Power Company is authorized to act for the City Public Service Board of San Antonio, Central Power and Light Company and City of-Austin, Texas and has exclusive responsibility and c.ontrol over the physical construction, operation and maintenance of the facility.

g9110192900P'1 ADOCK 050(

og 1

p

,.4~-

rd.

4

}..

t

.g.

- N w

d.:, '

'2.

Accordingly, the license is~ amended by changes to.the Technical Specifi-cations as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-76 is hereby.

amended to read as follows:-

4 2.

Technical Specifications i

n The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised-

.through Amendment No. 19, and the Environmental-Protection' Plan ll 1

contained in Appendix B, are hereb; incorporated in the license..

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the'.

Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

'l 3.

The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

.)

FOR T5!E NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO> MISSION M

t.AAA.

U -@

j Christopher I. Grimes, Director i

Project Directorate IV-2 R

Divisio'n of-Reactor' Projects

III, IV, V and.Speciel Projects-1 1

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation'-

.l A' ttachment:

Changes.to the: Technical

)

' Specifications

'l ogy

'Date of Issuance:- August 31,7.990 I

-b.

g i..

f3

.h 4

-i n

/

h 0)

'f n:

a l-

. :=

---

- - --- L-

-c'

~ - - - '

~

5

%q fi.

+

x i

<h

.*" ;f [

p.

. UNITED STATES.

9

. n' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINoToN, o, C. 20566

,5

't k...

I HOUSTON LIGHTING &-POWER COMPANY' i.

CITY PUBLIC SERVICE BOARD OF SAN ANTONIO

^

lk CENTRAL-POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

+4 h

CITY OF AUSTIN. TEXAS-j DOCKET NO. 50-499

'I j

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT.' UNIT 2-AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE t'

Amendment' No. 9 License Ho, NPF-80 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The: application-for amendment by Houston Lighting & Power Company *-(HL&P) acting lon behalf of itself and for-thel City Public Service Board of. San Antonio (CPS). Central-Power and

i Light Company (CPL), and City of Austin, Texas-(COA) (the-licensees)-dated May-11, 1990, complies with the standards and requirements of the-Atomic Energy-Act of 1954, as amended (the?

Act), and the. Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFr. Chapter I; B.

Thelfacility will operate-in conformity withithe application, asi amended' the provisions of th'e Act, and the rules ~and' reg..ations 7

' of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance:

(1) that the activitie authorized by this amendmant can be conducted without endangering the health' and safety of-the public, and (ii).that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; 0; * ' The issuance of this liranse amendment'will not be inimical to the c

common' defense and security or to the health and safety of the public;-

0 Qs

-and h

E.

.The issuance of this amendment is in accoroance with.10 CFR Part 51 L

.of the Commi=sion's regulations and all applicable requirements huve W

been satisfied.

.gn,

,, e k

u l:

" Houston Lighting & Power Company is authorized to act for the City Public Service. Board of San Antonio, Central ~ Power and Light Company and City of pl Austin, Texas ar.d has exclusive responsibility and control over the physical l

p

-7 construction, operation and maintenance of the facility.

U i

tI '

)

I

..p 4

Y L:fi.

./-

s i

2-a 2..

Accordingly, the license is' amended by changes to.the Technical Specifi-cations as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-80.is hereby amended to read as follows:

2.

Technical Specifications

.4 The Technical Specifications' contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.

9, and the Environmental Protection Plan-contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

.i 3.

The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION k.n)w W.

pp WJ :

Christopher.I. Grimes, Director' Project Directorate-IV-2 Division of Reactor Projects - III, a

IV, V'and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

= Attt:chment:

Chaw]es to the Technical

. Specifications-3;

2. '

Date-of Issuance:

August 31, 1990 tu y

V

~

p li

\\ :,

D i

[ -L' i

h I,,

L r.

1-h) -

+=yM" ATTACNMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NOS. 19-AND 9 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. - NPF-76 AND NPF-80 DOCKET NOS. 50-498 AND 50-499-Replace-the following pages of the Appedix A Technical Specifications with'-

the attached pages.

The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and' contain vertical lines indicating the areas o~ C.s.v.

The corresponding e

. overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.-

REMOVE

-INSERT 3/4 7-10s 8 3/4 7-3 83/47-3 B 3/4 7-4 8 3/4 7-4 8 3/4 7-5 8 3/4 7-5 8 3/4 7-6 8 3/4 7-6 i

I l

i f..

\\_;

i b

.x.

• f PLANT SYSTEMS MAIN FEE 0 WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDIT1e. FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.7 Each main' feedwater isolation valve (MFIV) shall be OPERABLE.'

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

MODES 1 and 2: With one MFIV inoperable but open, operation may continue provided the inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />; otherwise be in HOT STANDBY withia the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

MODE 3:

With one MFly inoperable, subsequent operation-in MODE 3 may proceed provided the isolation valve is maintained closed.

Otherwise, be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.7 Each MFIV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying full closure within 10 seconds-when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

The provisions of specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3.

' SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 7-10a Unit 1 - Amendment No. 19-Unit 2 - Amendment No. 9 l

a

.i m

~

a PLANT SYSTEMS-BASES 3/4.7.1.6 ATMOSPHERIC STEAM RELIEF VALVES The atmospheric steam relief valves are required for decay heat removal' and safe cooldown in accordance with Branch Technical Position RSB 5-1.

In the safety analyses, operation of the atmospheric steam relief valves is assumed in accident analyses for mitigation of small break LOCA,-feedwater line break, loss of normal feedwater and loss-of-offsite power.

3/4.7.1.7 FEE 0 WATER ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the feedwater isolation valves ensures that no more than one steam generator will: blow down in the event of a staam line.or feed-water line rupture.

The operability of the Feedwater Isolatun valves will-minimize the positive reactivity effects of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown associated with the blowdown, and limit the pressure rise within containment.

The OPERABI!!TY-of the feedwater isolation valves within the closure ;imes.of the' Surveillance Requirements are consistent with the assumptions'used in'the safety analysis.

-3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PREffURE/ TEMPERATURE LIMITATION t

(ht limitation co steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the VMsure-indw.ed stresses in the steam generators do not exceea the maximum L'

allowable fracture toughness stress limits.

The limitations of 70*F and 200 psig are based on a steam generator RT f 10 F and are sufficient NDT to prevent brittle fracture.

3/4.7.3: COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM i

The OPERABILITY of the Component Cooling Water System ensures that suf-j ficient cooling' capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment'during. normal and accident conditions.

The redundant cooling capacity of:this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptiws used in the safety analyses.

[

3/4.7.4 --ESSENTIAL COOLING WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Essential Cooling Water System _ ensures that suffi-l cient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions.

The redundant cooling capac-ity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assump-L tions used in the safety analyses.

Li 3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK

- The limitations on the ultimate heat sink level and temperature ensure L..

-that sufficient cooling capacity is available either:

(1) provide normal l-cooldown of the facility or (2) n.itigate the effects of accident conditions j-within acceptable limi.

l.

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 7-3 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 19 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 9 I

I

/

t PLANT SYSTEMS ft BASES The limitations _ on minimum water level and maximum temperature are based -

on providing a 30-day cooling water supply to safety-related eonioment without exceeding its design basis temperature and is consistent w Gn the recommend-ations of. Regulatory Guide 1.27, " Ultimate Heat Sink for. Nuclear Plants,"

March 1974.

3/4.7.6~ (Not used) 3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM MAKEUP AND CLEANUP FILTRATION SYSTEM g

The OPERABILITY of the Control Room Makeup and Cleanup Filtration System ensures that: (1) the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature for continuous-duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation-cooled-by this system, and (2) the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all credible accident conditions.

Operation of the system with the heaters operating for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is P cient to re'uce the bui1 Wp of moisturezon the adsorbers and HEPA filters.

OPERABILITY of this system in conjunction with-control room design'provisicM N based on limiting the radiatiot exposure to personnel occupying the contrr oom to 5 rems or less whole body, or its-equivalent.

This limitation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criterion _19 of Appendix A, 10 CFR Part 50.

ANSI N510-1980 will be used as a procedural. guide for-surveillance testing.

4 3/4.7.8 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING EXHAUST AIR SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Air System ensures that radioactive materials leaking from the ECCS equipment within-the FHB fol-lowing a LOCA.are filtered prior to reaching the environment. Operation of the system with the heaters operating for at least.10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA' filters. 'The operation of this system and the resultant effect on offsite dosage calculations was assumed in the safety analyses.

ANSI N510-1980 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing.

3/4.7.9 SNUBBERS All snubbers are required OPERABLE to ensure that the ' structural integrity -

of the. Reactor Coolant System and all other safety-related systems is main-tained during and following a seismic-or other event initir'ing dynamic loads.

Snubbers are classified and grouped by design and manufacturer but not by size.

For example, mechanical snubbers utilizing the same design features of the 2-kip,10-kip and 100-kip capacity manufactured by Company "A" are of the same type.

The same design mechanical snubbers ; manufactured by Company "B" for the-purposes of this Technical Specification would be of a different type, as would hydraulle snubbers from either manufacturer.

A list of individual snubbers with deMlled information of snubber-location and size and of system affected shall be available et the plant in accordance

?

' SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 8 3/4 7-4 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 19 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 9

! \\

J.

s PLANT SYSTEMS BASES SNUBBERS (Continued) with Section 50.71(c) of 10 CFR Part 50.

The accessibility of each snubber-i shall be determined and_ approved by the Plant Operations Review Committee.

The Utermination shall be based upon the existing radiation levels and the expected.

time to perform a visual inspection in each snubber location as well as other

factors associated with accessibility during plant operations (e.g., temperature, atmosphere, location, etc.), and the recommerdations of Regulatory Guides 8.8' and 8.10. _The addition or deletion of any-hydraulic or mechanical snubber shall be made in accordance with Section 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50.

The visual inspection frequency is based upon maintaining a constant level of snubber protection to each safety-related system during an earthquake j

or severe transient.

Therefore, the required inspection interval varies 1

inversely with the observed snubber failures on a given system and is determined i

by'the number of inoperable snubbers found during an inspection of each system.

i In order to establish the inspection frequency for each-type of snubber on a-

-safety-related system,-it was assumed that the frequency of snubber failures j

and initiating events is constant with time and that the failure of any. snubber _

l on that system could cause the system to be unprotected and to result-in failure during an assumed initiating event. _ Inspections _ performed before:that interval has elapsed may_be used as a new reference point to determine the next~ inspection.

However, the results of such ea.ly inspections performed before the original required time interval has elapsed (nominal time less 25%) may not-be used to lengthen the required inspection interval.

Any inspection whose results require j

a shorter inspection interval will override the previous schedule.

The acceptance criteria are to be used in the visual inspection to determine I

OPERABILITY.of._the snubbers..For example, if a fluid port of a hydraulic.

E snubber is found to be uncovered, the snubber shall be declared inoperable and

.i shall not be determined OPERABLE via functional testing.

To provide assurance of snubber functional reliability, one of three i

functional testing methods is used with the stated acceptance criteria *

'l i

1.

Functionally test 10% of a type of snubber with an additional 10% tested for each functional testing failure, or I

2'.

Functionally test a sample size and determine sample acceptance or_

l' rejcction using Figure-4.7-1, or i

3.

Functionally test a representative sample size and detenh sample j

acceptance or rejection using the stated equation.

Figure 4.7-1 was Avelop ed using "Wald's Sequential Probability Ratio j

Plan" as described in " Quality' Control and Industrial Statistics" by Acheson J. Duncan.

Permanent or other exemptions from the surveillance program for individual

. snubbers. may be granted ' y the Commission if a justifiable basis for exemption o

. SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 7-5 Unit 1 - Amendment No.19 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 9 3

PLANT SYSTEMS ed testing was perf orm com-at either theexempted r life destructiveconditions

$A" so SNUBBERS (Continued)f aplicable, snubbe Snubbers extent applicable designsubsequent date. indicating the is presented and. isnubbers for the individual snubbers manufacturer input an at a d

or of their f abricationin the list of established viaservice to qualify the and al conditions installed snubbers, se pletion shall be listedexemptions.

snubber is

area, temperatureluded to snubber records (newly of the of the area, in highservir.e lif e is incevalua f

of a view nsiderationand maintenanceiation service life information through coinstallation The placed, in high radmonitor the undergo records snuhber a performancewill provide associatedreplaced, spring re l

requirement tosnubbers periodical y These tions.

service life, and operating condiof snubber The etc.).

the t

leak ansure tha consideration requiring for age of their CFR 70.39(a)(3) limits INATION bases for futureSEALE0 SOURCE CONTAM contamination for sources

Source, t

leakage from Byproduc,ble intake values.

10 emitters, is based onwill not excee removable 3/4.7.10 will ensure that on

use, The limitationsalpha a

f damage torequired testing, includingThis limitationMaterial sourcesinto three gr plutonium.and Special Nuclear classifiedcommensuratewhich are frequent y with l

with n i

Sealed sources stored (i.e., sealed sources are Sealed sourcesRequirementssources not.

considered to beshiel which are Those with Surveillancesource in that group.often than those shielded mechanism re measuring devices) aremoved from the a

d within to be tested morecontinuously enclosemonitoring or bor radiationand need not be teste Used lated equipment will Not 3/4.7.11 tal qualification Used MONITORINGensure that safety-reof their env Not equipment and can 3/4.7.12 TEMPERATURE degrade an AREA itationsexcess es may include 3/4.7.13 area temperature lim excessive temperaturThe temperature limi tures in subjected to tempera The Exposure to temperatures. of its OPERABILITV.F maximum.

not be i

ensures that suff 3

of saf ety-relatedpac a loss of i WATER SYSTEM r System cause instrument error CHILLED ESSENTIAL Essential Chilled Watecontinued operat The the

/

3/4.7.14 available forident conditions. consiste h

The OPERABILITY of t e

/

is cient cooling capacduring normal and accsingle f ailure, i ity Unit 1 - Ame system, assuming asaf ety analyses.

B 3/4 7-6 equipment of this

'

• in the

'N

L

PLANT - SYSTEMS 4

BASES

' SNUBBERS (Continued) with Section 50.71(c) of 10 CFR Part 50.

The accessibility of each snubber i

shall be determined and approved by the Plant Operations-Review Committee.

The determination shall be based upon the existing radiation levels and the expected

. time to perform a visual. inspection in each snubber location as well as other factors associated with accessibility during plant operations (e.g., temperature, atmosphere, location, etc.), and the recommendations of Recu5atory Guides 8.8 and 8.10..The addition or deletion of any hydraulic or mechanC.aT snubber shall be'made in accordance with Section 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50

-The visual inspection frequency is based upon maintaining a constant level of snubber protection to each safety-related system during an earthquake or severe transient.

Therefore, the required inspection interval varies inversely with the observed snubber failures en a given system and is determined-by the number of inoperable snubbers found during an inspection of each system.

In order to establish the inspection frequency for each type of snubber on a

-safety-related system, it was assumed that the frequency of snubber failures-L and initiating events is constant with time and that the failure of any snubber L

Lon that system could cause the system to be unprotected and to result in failure L

during an assumed initiating event.

Inspections performed before that interval E

_has elapsed may be used as a new reference point to. determine the next inspection.

However, the results of such early inspections performed before the original required time interval-has elapsed (nominal time ~1ess 25%) may not be used to L,

' lengthen the required inspection interval.

Any inspection whose results require a~ shorter inspection interval will override the previous schedule.

l The acceptance criteria are to be. used in the visual inspection to determine p

OPERABILITY of.the snubbers.

For example, if a fluid port of a hydraulic l

. snubber is found to be uncovered, the snubber shall be declared-inoperable and shall-not.be determined OPERABLE-via functional testing.

_ To provide assurance of snubber functional reliability, one of three 4

= functional testing methods is used with the stated acceptance criteria:

h 1.

Functionally test 10% of a type of snubber with an additional 10% tested.for each functional testing failure, or 2.

Functionally test a. sample size and determine sample acceptance or l-rejection using Figure 4.7-1, or L,

3.

Functionally test a representative sample size and determine sample acceptance or rejection using the stated equation.

Figure 4 7-1 was-developed-using "Wald's Sequential Probability Ratio Plan" as described in " Quality Control ard Industrial Statistics" by Acheson J. Duncan.

Permanent or other exemptions from the surveillance program for individual snubbers may be granted.by the Commission if a justifiable basis for exemption

. SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 8 3/4 7-5 Unit 1 - Amendment No.19 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 9 r

A w

n' B

~ PLANT SYSTEMS

+

BASES SNUBBERS (Continued) with Section 50.71(c) of 10 CFR Part 50.

The accessibility offeach snubber shall be determined and approved by the Plant Operations Review Committee.

The determination shall be based upon the existing radiation levels and the expected

-time to perform a visual inspection in.each snubber location as well as.other factors associated with accessibility during plant operations (e.g., temperature,

-?p j!

_ atmosphere, location, etc.), and the racommendations of: Regulatory Guides 8.8 and 8.10.

The addition or deletion ofiany hydraulic or mechanical' snubber shall be made in accordance with Section 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50.

1 The visual inspection frequency is based upon maintaining a constant

-level of snubber protection to each safety-related system during an earthquake or severe transient.

Therefore, the required inspection interval varies j

inversely with the observed snubber failures on a given system and is determined by the number of inoperable snubbers found during an inspection of each system.

i

~In order to establish the inspection frequency for each type of snubber on a safety-related system, it was assumed that the frequency of snubber failures 1

and initiating events is constant with time and that the failure of any snubber on-that system could cause the system to be unprotected and to result in failure

.during an assumed initiating event.

Inspections performed before that interval u

has elapsed may be used as a new reference point _to determine the next inspection.

However, the results of such early inspections performed before the original

-required time interval has elapsed (nominal time less 25%) may not.be used to j

lengthen the required inspection interval.

Any inspection whose results require i

a shorter inspection interval will override the previous schedule.

The acceptance criteria are to be: Used in the visual inspection to determine i

OPERABILITY of_the snubbers.

For example, if a fluiu port of a hydraulic snubber is found to be uncovered, the snubber shall be declared inoperable and shall not be determined OPERABLE via functional testing.

To' provide assurance of snubber' functional reliability, one of three functional testing methods is used with the stated acceptance criteria:

1 1.

Functionally test 10% of a type of snubber with an additional 10% tested for each functional testing failure,_or j

2.

Functionally test a sample size and determine sample acceptance or rejection-using Figure 4.7-1, or j

3.

Functionally test a representative sample size.and determine sample acceptance or rejection using the stated equation.

t Figure 4.7-1 was developed using "Wald's Sequential Probability Ratio Plan" as described in " Quality Control and Industrial Statistics" by Acheson J. Duncan.

' Permanent or other exemptions-frcm the surveillance program for individual snubbers may be granted by the Commission if a justifiable basis for exemption l

I.

~ SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 7-5 Unit 1 - Amendment No.19 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 9 y

e d

^

~

q

' PLANT SYSTEMS' BASES SNUBBERS (Continued) is presented and, if applicable,' snubber life destructive testing was per#ormed

.to qualify-the snubbers for the applicable design conditions at either the com-

. pletion of their fabrication or at a subsequent date.

Snubbers so exempted shall be listed in the list of' individual snubbers indicating the extent.

of the exemptions.

The service life of a snubber is estat Mshed via manufacturer input and information -through consideration of the snubber service conditio'ns and i

associated installation and maintenance records (newly installed snubbers, seal replaced, spring replaced, in high radiation area, in high temperature area, etc.).

The requirement to monitor the snubber service life is included to ensure that the snubbert periodically undergo a performance evaluation in view j

~

of their age and'operat'.ng conditions.

These records will provide statistical.

bases for future consideration of snubber service -life.

3/4.7.10-SEALED'SOURCECONTAMINATION The limitations on removable contamination for sources requiring leak testing, including alpha emitters,'is based on 10 CFR 70.39(a)(3) limits for plutonium.

This Cimitation will ensure that leakage from Byproduct, Source, and Special Nuclear Material sourcu will not exceed allowable _ intake values.

Sealed sources are classified into three groups according to their use, with Surveillance Requirements commensurate with the probability of damage to a.

source in that group.

Those sources which are frequently handled are required R

to.be tested more often than those which are not.

Sealed sources which=are continuously enclosed within a shielded mechanism (i.e., sealed sources within radiation monitoring or boron measuring devices) are considered to be stored and need not-be tested'unless they are removed from the shielded mechanism.

3/4.7.11' (Not Used) 3/4.7.12 (Not used) 4 3/4.7.13 AREA TEMPERATURE MONITORING 1

The~ area. temperature limitations ensure that safety-related equipment will not be' subjected to temperatures in excess of their environmental qualification temperatures.

Exposure to excessive temperatures may. degrade equipment and can cause a loss of its OPERABILITY. The temperature limits include an allowance.for

' instrument error of i'3 F maximum.

3/4.7.14 ESSENTIAL CHILLED WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of tha Essential Chilled Water System ensures that suffi-cient cooling' capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment'during normal and accident conditions.

The redundant cooling capacity

= of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety: analyses.

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 8 3/4 7-6 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 19 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 9 e

v m

---