ML20058N138
ML20058N138 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | 05200001 |
Issue date: | 10/04/1993 |
From: | GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML20058N136 | List: |
References | |
NUDOCS 9310080074 | |
Download: ML20058N138 (58) | |
Text
i
}]/0 0H /tM O d / Fr $C r e I LLO Y. Y l l ACTIONS l
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i A. One of two offsite AC A.1 Verify affected ESF 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> power sources to one bus is powered from .
ESF bus inoperable. the other operable AND offsite AC circuit.
once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter AND A.2 Verify the CTG is 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> functional by verifying the CTG AND '
starts and achieves steady state voltage once per 7 days i and frequency within thereafter ,
10 minutes.
AND i A.3 Verify the CTG 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> !
circuit breakers are capable of being MQ aligned to the '
affected ESF bus. once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> -
thereafter ,
MQ ,
A.4 Restore inoperable 30 days offsite AC power to affected ESF bus.
- i ABWR TS 3.2-1 10/01/93 draft .
9310000074 931004 3 PDR ADOCK 05200001 f4 A PDR [d i
Bases for new Condition:
if Condition A is entered, Required Action A.4 allows 30 days to restore the inoperable offsite power source to one ESF bus to OPERABLE status provided:
- a. The ESF bus with its associated unit auxiliary transformer inoperable is verified to be energized from the offsite transmission network through the reserve auxiliary transformer initially within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, and once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter,
- b. The CTG is verified functional through testing within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and once per 7 days thereafter,
- c. The CTG is verified to be aligned with the ESF bus that has its associated unit auxiliarv transformer inoperable within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, and once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter.
The 30 day Completion Time is reasonable because it accounts for the reliability and convenience of the CTG. Since the CTG can be aligned as a temporary backup offsite source, there are sufficient offsite sources available if Required Actions A.2 and A.3 are completed. The LCO is satisfied at this point. However, given the primary function of the CTG as the alternate AC power source during the station blackout event and a a standby non-safety related power source located onsite to energize non-safety related plant investment protection loads, the Completion Time has been limited to 30 days.
If the CTG cannot be made available to function as a temporary backup offsite circuit within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, the configuration of the AC sources is described in Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), which states that operation in the applicable modes may continue as described by Condition A for a period that should not exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Therefore, if Required Actions A.2 and A.3 cannot be completed within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of entering Condition A, then Required Actions F.1 and F.2 must be followed. Upon restoring the offsite circuit to OPERABLE status, the LC0 is met, Conditions A and F are exited, and operation may continue.
Should the CTG no longer be functional or capable of being aligned to the ESF bus subsequent to the 72-hour period following initial entry into Condition A, Condition F again applies and Required Actions F.1 and F.2 must be followed.
Anytime the 8-hours Completion Time of Required Action A.3 is not met during this extension period, Condition F must be entered. Condition F can then only be exited by restoring the offsite circuit to OPERABLE status.
AC Sources-Operating 3.8.1 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.1 AC Sources-Operating LCO 3.8.1 The following AC electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE: !
- a. Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission ,
network and the onsite Class 1E AC Electric Power '
Distribution System; and
- b. Three diesel generators (DGs).
i APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3. _
ACTIONS !
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i
A. One required offsite A.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> ,
circuit inoperable. for OPERABLE required offsite circuit. AND ;
Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> ,
thereafter i AND l
A.2 Declare required 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> from feature (s) with no discovery of no power available from power available an OPERABLE offsite from an circuit inoperable OPERABLE when the redundant offsite circuit required feature (s) to one division are inoperable. concurrent with inoperability of redundant required feature (s)
AND (con _tinued).
i 1
ABWR TS 3.8-1 9/30/93 ,
l l
9 AC Sources-0perating
-3.8.1 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.3 Verify the combustion 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> turbine generator (CTG) is functional by verifying the CTG ,
starts and achieves steady state voltage and frequency within 10 minutes.
- AND A.4 Verify the CTG 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> circuit breakers are ;
capable of being AND aligned to each of three 6.9 kV- once per 8 essential AC buses, hours thereafter
~
AND A.5 Restore required 7 days offsite circuit to OPERABLE status. AND I day from ,
discovery.of two divisions with no power ,
available from an OPERABLE i offsite circuit i
AND t 8 days from i discovery of :
failure to meet the LC0 (continued)
ABWR TS 3.8-2 9/30/93 :
AC Sources-Operating 3.8.1 -
1 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME ,
B. ---------NOTE--------- B.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Required Action B.3.1 for OPERABLE required or B.3.2 shall be offsite circuit (s). AND ,
completed if this Condition is entered. Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter One required DG inoperable. AND B.2 Declare required 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> from feature (s), supported discovery of by the inoperable DG, Condition B inoperable when the concurrent with redundant required inoperability feature (s) are of redundant inoperable. required feature (s)
AND B.3.1 Determine OPERABLE 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> DG(s) are not inoperable due to common cause failure. ,
OB B.3.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />s-for OPERABLE DG(s).
AND B.4 Verify the combustion 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> turbine generator (CTG) is functional by verifying the CTG starts and achieves :
steady state voltage .
and frequency within l 10 minutes.
~
AND (continued)
ABWR TS 3.8-3 9/30/93 1
I l
AC Sources--Operating 3.8.1 -
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. (continued) B.5 Verify the CTG 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> .
circuit breakers are aligned to the 6.9 kV AND essential AC bus associated with the once per 8 '
inoperable'DG. hours thereafter AND B.6 Restore required DG 7 days to OPERABLE status.
AND 8 days from discovery of failure to meet the LC0 C. Two required offsite C.1 Declare required 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> from circuits inoperable. feature (s) inoperable discovery of when the redundant Condition C required foature(s) concurrent with are inoperable. inoperability of redundant required feature (s) :
A!!D C.2 Restore one required 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> offsite circuit to OPERABLE status. t (continued) ,
1 i
1 ABWR TS 3.8-4 9/30/93 )
i
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- l l
l AC Sources-Operating l 3.8.1
]
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i
D. One. required offsite ------------NOTE-------------
circuit inoperable. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of AND LC0 3.8.9, " Distribution Systems-Operating," when One required DG Condition D is entered with inoperable. no required AC power source to one division.
4 D.1 Verify the combustion 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> turbine generator (CTG) is functional by verifying the CTG starts and achieves steady state voltage and frequency within '
10 minutes. ,
AND D.2 Verify the CTG 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> circuit breakers are '
capable of being AND '
aligned to each of three 6.9 kV once per 8 essential AC buses. hours thereafter AJLD i
D.3.1 Restore required 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> >
offsite circuit to OPERABLE status. .
08 D.3.2 Restore required DG 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> .
to OPERABLE status. .
ABWR TS 3.8-5 9/30/93 I
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'I 1
AC Sources-Operating 'l 3.8.1 !
l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. Two required DGs E.1 Verify the combustion 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> inoperable. turbine generator .
(CTG) is functional by verifying the CTG starts and achieves steady state voltage and frequency within ;
10 minutes. .
I AND j i
E.2 Verify the CTG 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> circuit breakers are capable of being AND aligned'to each of the 6.9 kV essential once per 8 AC buses associated hours with the inoperable thereafter DGs. l MQ E.3 Restore one required 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> DG to OPERABLE status. ,
F. Required Action and F.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Associated Completion Time of Condition A, AND B, C, D, or E not met.
F.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> G. Three or more required G.1 Enter LC0 3.0.3. Immediately )
AC sources inoperable. ,
t
)
1 J
'l ABWR TS 3.8-6 9/30/93
AC Sources-0perating.
3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.1 Verify correct breaker alignment and 7 days indicated power availability for each required offsite circuit.
SR 3.8.1.2 -------------------NOTES-------------------
- 1. Performance of SR 3.8.1.7 satisfies this SR.
- 2. All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period and followed by a warmup period prior to loading.
- 3. A modified DG start involving idling and gradual acceleration to synchronous speed may be used for this SR as recommended by the manufacturer.
When modified start procedures are not used, the time, voltage, and frequency tolerances of SR 3.8.1.7 must be met.
Verify each DG starts from standby conditions and achieves steady state As specified in voltage 2 6210 V and 5 7590 V and frequency Table 3.8.1-1 1 2 58.8 Hz and s 61.2 Hz.
(continued) h-d j l
4
'# l',.
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ABWR TS 3.8-7 9/30/93 ;
1 AC. Sources -Operating l 3.8.1 l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) ,
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.3 -------------------NOTES-------------------
- 1. DG loadings may include gradual loading as recommended by the manufacturer.
- 2. Momentary transients outside the load :
range do not invalidate this test.
- 3. This Surveillance shall be conducted on cuiy one DG at a time.
- 4. This SR shall be preceded by, and :
immediately follow, without shutdown, :
a successful performance of SR 3.8.1.2 or SR 3.8.1.7.
Verify each DG is synchronized and loaded As specified in ;
and operates for 2 60 minutes at a load Table 3.8.1-1 2 5000 kW and s [ ] kW. .
SR 3.8.1.4 Verify each day tank contains 2 [ ] liters 31 days of fuel oil. i i
SR 3.8.1.5 Check for and remove accumulated water from 31 days each day tank. ;
SR 3.8.1.6 Verify the fuel oil transfer system 92 days l operates to automatically transfer fuel oil
- from the storage tank to the day tank.
5 (continued)-
r W
ABWR TS 3.8-8 9/30/93
AC Sources -0perating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY j SR 3.8.1.7 -------------------NOTE--------------------
All DG starts may be preceded by an engine -
prelube period.
Verify each DG starts from standby 184 days condition and achieves, in s 20 seconds, >
voltage 2 6210 V and s 7590 V and frequency 2 58.8 Hz and s 61.2 Hz. ;
SR 3.8.1.8 -------------------NOTES------------------
- 1. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or i'.
- 2. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.
i Verify manual transfer of the [18 months]
[ unit power supply] from the normal offsite circuit to each required alternate offsite circuit.
(continued) .
1 s
t ABWR TS 3.8-9 9/30/93 I
AC Sources-Operating
- 3. 8.1 '
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.9 -----------------NOTES--------------------
- 1. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2.
- 2. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.
Verify each DG operating at a power factor [18 months]
s[ ] rejects a load 2 540 kW for Division 1 and 2 1400 kW for Divisions 2 and 3, and:
- a. Following load rejection, the frequency is s [ ] Hz;
- b. Within 3 seconds following load rejection, the voltage is 2 6210 V and s 7590 V; and
- c. Within 3 seconds following load rejection, the frequency is 2 58.8 Hz and s 61.2 Hz.
SR 3.8.1.10 -----------------NOTES--------------------
- 1. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2.
- 2. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.
Verify each DG operating at a power factor '[18 months]
s 0.9 does not trip and voltage is maintcined s [ ] V during and following a load rejection of a load 2 [5000] V and
- [ ] kW.
(continued)
ABWR TS 3.8-10 9/30/93
AC Sources-Operating [
-3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) ;
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.11 ------------
NOTES-------------------
- l. All DG starts may be preceded by an ,
engine prelube period.
- 2. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3.
- 3. Credit may be taken for unplanned >
events that satisfy this SR. .
Verify on an actual or simulated loss of I
[18 months]
offsite power signal: '
- a. De-energization of emergency buses;
- b. Load shedding from emergency buses; and f
- c. DG auto-starts from standby condition and: ;
- 1. energizes permanently connected loads in s 20 seconds, -
- 2. sequentially energizes auto-connected shutdown loads, -
- 3. maintains steady state voltage 2 6210 V and s 7590 V, ;
- 4. maintains steady state frequency [
2 58.8 Hz and s 61.2 Hz, and
- 5. supplies permanently connected and auto-connected shutdown loads for ;
2 5 minutes.
j (continued) r
+
ABWR TS 3.8-11 9/30/93 ;
AC Sources-Operating 3.8.1 .
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS- (continued) !
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.12 -------------------NOTES-------------------
- 1. All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period. ;
- 2. This Surveillance shall not be !
performed in MODE 1 or 2. ~
- 5. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.
Verify on an actual or simulated Eme.gency [18 months]
Core Cooling System (ECCS) initiation signal each DG auto-starts from standby i condition and: '
- a. In 5 20 seconds after auto-start and during tests, achieves voltage i 2 6210 V and s 7590 V;
- b. In s 20 seconds after auto-start and ,
during tests, achieves frequency ?
2 58.8 Hz and s 61.2 Hz;
- c. Operates for 2 5 minutes; ,
- d. Permanently connected loads remain energized from the offsite power system; and i
- e. Emergency loads are sequentially ,
energized from the offsite power l system.
(continued)
,i I
ABWR TS 3.8-12 9/30/93
AC Sources-Operating
'3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.13 ------------------NOTES-------------------
- 1. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3.
- 2. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.
Verify each DG's automatic trips are [18 months]
bypassed on actual or simulated loss of voltage signal on the emergency bus concurrent with an actual or simulated ECCS initiation signal except:
- a. Engine overspeed; and
- b. Generator differential current.
SR 3.8.1.14 -------------------NOTES-------------------
- 1. Momentary transients outside the load and power factor ranges do not invalidate this test.
- 2. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2.
- 3. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.
Verify each DG operating at a power factor [18 months]
s 0.9, operates for 2 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />s:
- a. For 2 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> loaded, 2 5225 kW and s 5500 kW; and
- b. For the remaining hours of the test loaded 2 5000 kW and 5 [ ].
(continued) y i
ABWR TS 3.8-13 9/30/93
1 AC Sources--Operating j
.3.8.1 l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l SR 3.8.1.15 -------------------NOTES-------------------
- 1. This Surveillance shall be performed within 5 minutes of shutting down the DG after the DG has operated 2 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 1 loaded 2 5225 kW and s 5500 kW.
Momentary transients outside of load range do not invalidate this test.
- 2. All DG starts may be preceded by an i engine prelube period.
Verify each DG starts and achieves, in [18 months]
s 20 seconds, voltage 2 6210 V and s 7590 V and frequency 2 58.8 Hz and s 61.2 Hz.
SR 3.8.1.16 -------------------NOTES-------------------
- 1. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3.
- 2. Credit may be taken for unplanned ;
events that satisfy this SR.
Verify each DG: [18 months]
- a. Synchronizes with offsite power source -
while loaded with emergency loads upon a simulated restoration of offsite power;
- b. Transfers loads to offsite power source; and
- c. Returns to ready-to-load operation.
(continued) i ABWR TS 3.8-14 9/30/93 !
j
AC Sources-0perating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) l SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.17 -------------------NOTES------------------- !
- 1. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3. :
- 2. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. .
Verify, with a DG operating in test mode [18 months]
and connected to its bus, an actual or simulated ECCS initiation signal overrides t the test mode by:
- a. Returning DG to ready-to-load operation; and i
- b. Automatically energizing the
- emergency load from offsite power.
SR 3.8.1.18 ------------------NOTES-------------------
- 1. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3. i
- 2. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.
Verify interval between each sequenced load [18 months]
block is within i 10% of design interval for each load sequencer timer.
(continued)
ABWR TS 3.8-15 9/30/93
4 i
i
- AC Sources-Operating !
3.8.1 i
i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY j SR 3.8.1.19 -------------------NOTES------------------- ,
- 1. All DG starts may be preceded by an
, engine prelube period. l
- 2. This Surveillance shall not be '
performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3.
- 3. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.
Verify, on an actual or simulated loss of [18 months]
offsite power signal in conjunction with an actual or simulated ECCS initiation signal:
- a. De-energization of emergency buses;
- b. Load shedding from emergency buses; and
- c. DG auto-starts from standby condition '
and:
- l. energizes permanently connected loads in s 20 seconds,
- 2. sequentially energizes auto-connected emergency loads,
- 3. achiaves steady state voltage 2 6210 V and s 7590 V,
- 4. achieves steady state frequency 2 58.8 Hz and s 61.2 Hz, and
- 5. supplies permanently connected and auto-connected emergency loads for 2 5 minutes.
(continued)
ABWR TS 3.8-16 9/30/93 ,
AC Sources --Operating ,
3.8.1 i SURVEILLANCE-REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.20 -------------------NOTE----------------'---- f All DG starts may be preceded by an engine e prelube period. :
i Verify, when started simultaneously from 10 years during standby condition, each Division 1, 2, shutdown and 3 DG achieves, in s 20 seconds, voltage 2 6210 V and s 7590 V and frequency 2 58.8 Hz and 5 61.2 Hz. ,
1 I
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ABWR TS 3.8-17 9/30/93 i
l
AC Sources-Operating 3.8.1 Table 3.8.1-1 (page 1 of 1)
Diesel Generator Test Schedule NUMBER OF F ILURES '
INLAST25VAlf0 TESTS (a) FREQUENCY s3 31 days '
24 7 days (b) (but 2 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />)
(a) Criteria for determining number of failures and valid tests shall be in accordance with Regulatory Position C.2.1 of Regulatory Guide 1.9, Revision 3, where the number of tests and failures is determined on a per DG basis.
(b) This test frequency shall be maintained until seven consecutive failure free starts from standby conditions and load and run tests have been performed. This is consistent with Regulatory Position [ ], of Regulatory Guide 1.9, Revision 3. If, subsequent to the 7 failure free i tests, 1 or more additional failures occur such that there are again 4 or more failures in the last 25 tests, the testing interval shall again be reduced ai noted above and maintained until 7 consecutive failure free tests have been performed.
ABWR TS 3.8-18 9/30/93 l
l l
i i
i ACTIONS ,
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i
A. One of two offsite AC A.1 Verify affected ESF 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> power sources to one bus is powered from ESF bus inoperable. the other operable AND ,
offsite AC circuit.
Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter i AND ,
A.2 Verify the CTG is 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> ,
functional by verifying the CTG AND starts and achieves steady state voltage once per 7 days and frequency within thereafter 10 minutes.
AND A.3 Verify the CTG 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> circuit breakers are 1 capable of being AND ,
aligned to the affected ESF bus. once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter AND A.4 Restore inoperable 30 days i offsite AC power to t affected ESF bus.
t ABWR TS 3.2-1 10/01/93 draft i
e Bases for new Condition:
If Condition A is entered, Required Action A.4 allows 30 days to restore the inoperable offsite power source to one ESF bus to OPERABLE status provided: i
- a. The ESF bus with its associated unit auxiliary transformer inoperable is verified to be energized from the offsite transmission network through '
the reserve auxiliary transformer initially within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, and once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter, ;
- b. The CTG is verified functional through testing within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and once per 7 days thereafter, ,
- c. The CTG is verified to be aligned with the ESF bus that has its associated unit auxiliary transformer inoperable within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, and ,
once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter. '
The 30 day Completion Time is reasonable because it accounts for the reliability and convenience of the CTG. Since the CTG can be aligned as a temporary backup offsite source, there are sufficient offsite sources available if Required Actions A.2 and A.3 are completed. The LC0 is satisfied at this point. However, given the primary function of the CTG as the alternate AC power source during the station blackout event and a a standby non-safety related power source located onsite to energize non-safety related l plant investment protection loads, the Completion Time has been limited to 30 days.
l If the CTG cannot be made available to function as a temporary backup offsite circuit within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, the configuration of the AC sources is described in Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), which states that operation in the applicable ;
modes may continue as described by Condition A for a period that should not 1 exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Therefore, if Required Actions A.2 and A.3 cannot be completed within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of entering Condition A, then Required Actions F.1 and F.2 must be followed. Upon restoring the offsite circuit to OPERABLE status, the LCO is met, Conditions A and F are exited, and operation may continue.
Should the CTG no longer be functional or capable of being aligned to the ESF bus subsequent to the 72-hour period following initial entry into Condition A, Condition F again applies and Required Actions F.1 and F.2 must be' followed.
Anytime the 8-hours Completion Time of Required Action A.3 is not met during this extension period, Condition F must be entered. Condition F can then only i be exited by restoring the offsite circuit to OPERABLE status. !
l AC Sources-0perating B 3.8.1 l
B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.1 AC Sources-Operating BASES !
BACKGROUND The unit Class IE AC Electrical Power Distribution System AC sources consist of the offsite power sources (normal preferred and alternate preferred) and the onsite standby power sources (Division I diesel generator (DG), Division II i DG, and Division III DG). As required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17 (Ref.1), the design of the AC electrical power system provides independence and redundancy to ensure an available source of power to the Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems.
The Class lE AC distribution system supplies electrical power to three divisional load groups, with each division powered by an independent Class 1E 6.9 kV ESF bus (refer to ;
LC0 3.8.9, " Distribution Systems-0perating"). Each ESF bus '
has two separate and independent preferred (offsite) sources of power and a dedicated onsite DG. Each ESF bus is also connectable to a combustion turbine generator (CTG). The ESF systems of any two of the three divisions provide for the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the unit and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.
Offsite power is supplied to each of the 6.9 kV ESF buses from the transmission network via two electrically. and_ _
physically separated circuits. In?addihonpoffsite! power i may3sT5'applieditoEahy[I6ns}ESFibuffrom};theiCTG7(forja"lim reserveisuxiliary transformsr5:whilestherunithauxiliary transformer!a's'sociated%ithithe!ESE biissisT6ilt?offsebviEs?
~~ '
Th'ss E"o f fs i t e AC el ect'r i c al ~jiowsr~ c i rEu i t s" ire"dds iinsh 'shd !
located so as to minimize to the extent practicable the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under operating and postulated accident and environmental conditions. A '
detailed description of the offsite power system and circuits to the onsite Class lE ESF buses is found in SSAR, Chapter 8 (Ref. 2).
i An offsite circuit consists of all breakers, transformers, switches, interrupting devices, cabling, controls, and :
control power supplies required to transmit power from the offsite transmission network to the onsite Class 1E ESF bus (es). Certain required plant loads are returned to (continued)
ABWR TS B 3.8-1 10/1/93
l l
AC Sources-Operating 8 3.8.1 BASES service in a predetermined sequence in order to prevent overloading the transformer supplying offsite power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. Initiating. signals (i.e., load shedding and buses-ready-to-load) for returning certain plant loads to service are generated by the control system for the electrical power distribution system.
Individual timers for each major load are reset and started by their electrical power distribution system signals EEd LO'CAtili6als. After the initiating signals are receivid^,/"6h sll"Eulositic and permanently connected loads needed to recover the unit or maintain it in a safe condition are returned to service in a preset sequence via timer delays on each load.
The onsite standby power source for each 6.9 kV ESF bus is a dedicated DG. A DG starts automatically on loss of coolant accident (LOCA) signal (i.e., signal generated from low reactor water level and high drywell pressure that are ,
arranged in two-out-of four logic combinations or on an ESF bus undprvoltage signal (refer to LCO 3Mgi4)));ESE AetBation Instrumentation"). In addition, the CTC prov4 des 5'63thE?~ independent cource of AC power that can bc =nually cligned to cny ESF bus. The CTC provides an extra level af redundancy that een be utilized under certain conditions.
T hf addi tLiosHp6seWEanibe7supplJed ff6fihy!bhEESEff6diTtfii CTG ((f6d M lfimitedidufat.ioph whe nalD MisMnolerp g ~
In the event of a loss of preferred power, the ESF electrical loads are automatically connected to the DGs in sufficient time to provide for safe reactor shutdown and to mitigate the consequences of a Design Basis Accident (DBA)-
such as a LOCA.
Ratings for DGs satisfy the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3). The continuous service rating for each DG is 5000 kW, with 10% overload permissible for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period.
APPLICABLE The initial conditions of DBA and transient analyses in the SAFETY ANALYSES SSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 4) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 5), assume ESF systems are OPERABLE. The AC electrical power sources are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of ,
necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor (continued)
ABWR TS B 3.8-2 10/1/93
, ' AC Sources-Operating i B 3.8.1 ;
BASES l Coolant System (RCS), and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail- in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reacto, Coolant System (RCS); and Section 3.6, Containment Systems.
The OPERABILITY of the AC electrical power sources (not ,
including the CTG) is consistent with the initial '
assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon ;
meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes ;
maintaining the onsite or offsite AC sources OPERABLE during accident conditions-in the event of: i
- a. An assumed loss of all offsite power or all onsite AC 7 power; and
- b. A worst case single failure.
AC sources satisfy the requirements of Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.
In iddition,1the' CTG 'may'Wsubstituted for' the second
~
[
(delay access) offsite source to any one ESF bus, when the first (immediate access) offsite, source is from the reserve
~
auxiliary transformer while the, unit auxiliary transformer '
associated with the,ESF bus is out of service. The CTG may also be used to substitute (for a limited time) for an ^ t inoperable DG. With this substitution, the AC electrical '
power sources are designed to provide sufficient capacity;' ,
capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the "
availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that;th's l fuel, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and containment design limits are not exceeded.j LC0 Two qualified offsite circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class IE Distribution '
System that consists of three separate and independent i divisions (Divisions I, II, and III) each backed by its own ;
dedicated and independent DG, ensure availability of the ;
required power to shut down the reactor.and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (A00) or a postulated DBA. In addition, the CTC may be utilized ;; a temporary replacement for the required cffsite er ensite source to an/ cnc ESF bu: under certain (continued) ;
ABWR TS B 3.8-3 10/1/93 r
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES
~
eendM4onw In addition,: the. CTG 'mayl be utilized . 'as a temporary substitution forsthe'second (delayed access) qualified offsite circuit when the- first- (immediate:Jaccess)
. qualified ~offsite circuit to_ any one ;ESF;;busL (immediate ~
access):offsite sourceLis from~ the jreservelauxiliary .
transformer while the uni ~t auxiliary trnsformer: associated with the ESF'buso.isLoutfof; service. 'With this; temporary substitution, the two. qualified'offsiteLcircuitstbetw'een~the offsite transmission' networkland' theTo'nsitel Class 11E~
Distribution System that consistsfof tthree4 separate:and _ .
independent. divisions:(Divisions ~:;I,ill,(andElll) Leach backed by.its own-dedicated!andlindependent'DGb also_. ensure availability of. the; the requi. red ' power to Lshutdown;the reactor-and maintain it-in a safe condition:after an anticipated operational' occurrence (A00) or _a postulated
~
DBA.
Qualified offsite circuits are the normal and alternate preferred power circuits that are described in the SSAR and are part of the licensing basis for the unit. In addition, the; temporary' substitution of the CTG is-described in the SSAR and is' part of.the licensing basisTfor theLun_it.
Each offsite circuit must be capable of maintaining rated frequency and voltage, and accepting required loads within the assumed load sequence intervals during an accident, while connected to the ESF buses. The normal preferred circuit consists of the switching station breaker to the main transformer, the generator breaker, the disconnect links to the unit auxiliary transformers, and the circuit path from the offsite transmission network to all of the 6.9 kV ESF buses including feeder breakers at the 6.9 kV ESF buses. The alternate preferred circuit consists of the switching station breaker to the reserve auxiliary transformer and the circuit path from the offsite transmission network to all of the 6.9 kV ESF buses including feeder breakers at the 6.9 kV ESF buses.
Each DG must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and voltage, and connecting to its respective ESF bus on detection of bus undervoltage. This sequence must be accomplished within 20 seconds. Each DG must also be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed !
loading sequence intervals, and must continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the ESF buses. These capabilities are required to be met from a variety of (continued) l l
ABWR TS B 3.8-4 10/1/93
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES initial conditions such as DG in standby with engine hot, DG in standby with engine at ambient conditions, and DG operating in parallel test mode.
T6[CTLGjj@fssi{ss;idlfaiEijtiiiipWiffy0EsMijfs7f5$WEis{d@
offsitelsourceloriforJan;inoperablefDG;tolanyXonetESFibusy sed %53 inusts bsscapabl e L[b fiistarti ng Maccsl epat i hp?to tratedisp$6 VoltageMandfofCbsing?~msnuallsesnfi tosthelESF6buif iThisVseqbsscelinust?g'Uredst6fproVidsbeiabdom 105 min Utes? inhs? CTG:i iiu's tfal sM bsinpibis3f fshsgitin redu i redD nidsR$b sQbei c$$b@o f{sai ntsi_h i nb spa.te[j~~
frequen cyfand W01 t agek andsacceptihggequ ifed116ad sMh e_n connectedito;the4SF(busy Proper sequencing of loads is a required function for both DG and offsite circuit OPERABILITY.
The AC sources are separate and independent. For the DG AC sources, the separation and independence are complete. For the offsite AC sources (including the CTG as an offsite source), the separation and independence are to the extent practicable. For the offsite (including the CTG) to DG AC sources, the separation and independence are to the extent practicable.
Offsite circuit OPERABILITY includes the normal offsite source supplying two of three AC divisions and the alternate offsite source supplying the third AC division. Other configurations make an offsite circuit inoperable.
lhe AC sources are required to be OPERABLE in MODES I, 2, and 3 to ensure that:
- a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of A00s or abnormal transients; and
- b. Adequate core cooling is provided and containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.
AC power requirements for MODES 4 and 5 are covered in LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources -Shutdown." l (continued)
ABWR TS B 3.8-5 10/1/93
AC Sources-0perating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS A1 1
To ensure a highly reliable power source remains, it is necessary to verify the availability of the remaining .
required offsite circuits on a more frequent basis. Since the Required Action only specifies " perform," a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 acceptance criteria does not result in the-Required Action not met. However, if a second required circuit fails SR 3.8.1.1, the second offsite circuit is inoperable, and Condition [C], for two offsite circuits inoperable, is entered.
4 I
i t
(continued)
ABWR TS B 3.8-6 10/1/93
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS A.2 (continued)
Required Action A.2, which only applies if the division cannot be powered from an offsite source, is intended to provide assurance that an event with a coinc_ident single failure of the associated DG does not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical systems. These features are designed with redundant safety related divisions.
Redundant required features failures consist of inoperable features associated with a division redundant to the division that has no offsite power.
The Completion Time for Required Action A.2 is intended to allow time for the operator to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal " time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock." In this Required Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:
- a. The division has no offsite power supplying its loads; and
- b. A required feature on the other division is inoperable.
If, at any time during the existence of this Condition (one '
offsite circuit inoperable), a required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked.
Discovering no offsite power to one division of the onsite Class IE Power Distribution System coincident with one or more inoperable required support or supported features, or both, that are associated with the other division that has offsite power, results in starting the Completion Times for the Required Action. Twenty-four hours is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before the unit is subjected to transients associated with shutdown.
The remaining OPERABLE offsite circuit and DGs are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class IE Distribution System. Thus, on a component basis, single failure protection may have been lost for the required feature's function; however, function is not lost. The (continued)
ABWR TS B 3.8-7 10/1/93
AC Sources-Operating-B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS A.2 (continued) 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account the component OPERABILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable required feature. Additionally, the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Completion Time -
takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.
A.3. A.4. and A.5 If Condition A is entered, Required Action A.5 allows 7 days to restore the inoperable offsite circuit to GPERABLE status, provided the combustion turbine generator (CTG) is .
verified functional through testing within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and its !
capability of being aligned to shif 6fsthe three 6.9 kV essential AC buses is verified, ~initiilly within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, and once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter. This 7-day Completion Time '
is reasonable because it accounts for the reliability and convenience of the CTG. Since the CTG can be aligned as a temporary backup offsite source, there are sufficient ,
offsite sources available if Required Actions A.3 and A.4 -
are completed. The LC0 is not completely satisfied at this point, but the AC electrical power system is verified to be sufficiently reliable to allow for the 7-day Completion Time of Required Action A.S. The 7-day Completion Time is also reasonable because the capabilities of the remaining AC sources are adequate for this time period, and because of ,
the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time !
period. See the discussion for Required Action B.6 for additional justification of this Completion Time. i If the CTG cannot be made available to function as a
- temporary backup offsite circuit within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, the !
configuration of the AC sources is as described in Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref.' 6), which states that operation in the applicable modes may continue as described by -
Condition A for a period that should not exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. '
Therefore, if Required Actions A.3 and A.4 cannot be ;
completed within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of entering Condition A, then ?
Required Actions F.1 and F.2 must be followed. Upon restoring the offsite circuit to OPERABLE status, the LC0 is met, Conditions A and F are exited, and operation may continue.
(continued)
ABWR TS B 3.8-8 10/1/93 1 i
1 AC Sources-Operating i B 3.8.1 i BASES ACTIONS A 3. A.4. and A.5 (continued) ,
i Should the CTG no longer be functional or capable of being i aligned to a 6.9 kV AC ESF bus subsequent to the 72-hour period following initial entry into Condition A, Condition F ;
again applies and Required Actions F.1 and F.2 must be :
followed. Anytime the 8-hour Completion Time of Required !
Action A.4 is not met during this extension period, Condition F must be entered. Condition F can then only be ;
exited by restoring the offsite circuit to OPERABLE status. ;
The CTG is considered functional when the requirements of !
Section 9.5.13.19 of the SSAR are satisfied and the CTG is verified to start frcm standby-eenditic= and achieves steady state voltage 2 6210 V and s 7590 V, and frequency i 2 58.8 Hz and s 61.2 Hz within 2 minutes.
The 7-day Completion Time of Required Action A.5 assumes ,
sufficient offsite power remains to power the minimum loads needed to respond to analyzed events. It also assumes that ;
the CTG may be utilized if needed. Should two divisions be affected, the 1-day Completion Time of Required Action A.5 is conservative with respect to the Regulatory Guide e assumptions supporting a 1 day Completion Time for both :
offsite circuits inoperable (addressed by .
Condition C). With only one offsite circuit, the reliability of the offsite system is degraded, and the potential for a loss of offsite power is increased, with '
attendant potential for a challenge to the plant safety systems. In Condition A, however, the remaining OPERABLE offsite circuit, DGs, and the CTG are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E distribution system. t The 7-day Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.
The third Completion Time for Required Action A.5 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required AC power sources to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO. If Condition A is entered while, for instance, a DG is inoperable and that DG is subsequently returned to OPERABLE status, the LC0 may already have been not met for up to 7 days. This situation could lead to a total of (continued)
ABWR TS B 3.8-9 10/1/93
AC Sources-Operating '
B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS A.3. A.4. and A.5 (continued) ;
14 days, since initial failure to meet the LCO, to restore ,
the offsite circuit. At this time, a DG could again become i inoperable, the circuit restored to OPERABLE status, and an additional 7 days (for a total of 21 days) allowed prior to .
complete restoration of the LCO. The 8-day Completion Time provides a limit on the time allowed in a specified Condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO.
This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which r Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. The "AND" '
connector between the 7-day and 8-day Completion Times means l that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive must be met.
As in Required Action A.2, the Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal " time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock." This exception results in t
establishing the " time zero" at the time the LC0 was initially not met, instead of at the time that Condition A was entered.
B.1 ;
To ensure a highly reliable power source remains, it is !
necessary to verify the availability of the remaining i required offsite circuit on a more frequent basis. Since i the Required Action only specifies " perform," a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 acceptance criteria does not result in a Required Action being not met. However, if a circuit fails to pass SR 3.8.1.1, it is inoperable. Upon offsite circuit inoperability, additional Conditions must then be entered. ;
B.2 Required Action B.2 is intended to provide assurance that a loss of offsite power, during the period that a DG is inoperable, does not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical systems. These features are designed with redundant safety related divisions (i.e., single division systems are not included). Redundant required :
7 (continued)
ABWR TS B 3.8-10 10/1/93
I i
AC Sources'-Operating ;
B 3.8.1 ;
BASES i
-l ACTIONS fL2 (continued) .I features failures consist of inoperable features associated .
with a division redundant to the division that has an I inoperable DG. l The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal :
" time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock."
In this Required Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:
- a. An inoperable DG exists; and
- b. A required feature on the other division is l inoperable.
If, at any time during the existence of this Condition (one DG inoperable), a required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked.
Discovering one required DG inoperable coincident with one or more required support or supported features, or both, that are associated with the OPERABLE DGs, results in ,
starting the Completion Time for the Required Action. Four hours.from the discovery of these events existing concurrently is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the unit to transients associated with shutdown.
The remaining 0PERABLE DGs and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class lE Distribution System. Thus, on a component basis, single failure protection for the required feature's function may have been lost; however, function has not been lost. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account the component OPERABILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable required feature. Additionally, the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, reasonable time for repairs, and low :
probability of a DBA occurring during this period. 1 1
(continued) l ABWR TS B 3.8-11 10/1/93
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS B.3.1 and B.3.2 (continued)
The Note in Condition B requires that Required Action B.3.1 or B.3.2 must be completed if Condition B is entered. The ,
intent is that all DG inoperabilities must be investigated for common cause failures regardless of how long the DG inoperability persists.
Required Action B.3.1 provides an allowance to avoid unnecessary testing of OPERABLE DGs. If it can be determined that the cause of the inoperable DG does not exist on the OPERABLE DG, SR 3.8.1.2 does not have to be performed. If_the cause of inoperability exists on other DGs, the other DGs are declared inoperable upon discovery, and Condition E of LCO 3.8.1 is entered. Once the failure ;
is repaired, and the common cause failure no longer exists, Required Action B.3.1 is satisfied. If the cause of the ,
initial inoperable DG cannot be confirmed not to exist on '
the remaining DG(s), performance of SR 3.8.1.2 suffices to provide assurance of continued OPERABILITY of those DGs.
According to Generic Letter 84-15 (Ref. 7), 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is t reasonable time to confirm that the OPERABLE DGs are not affected by the same problem as the inoperable DG.
B.4. B.S. and B.6 If Condition B is entered, Required Action B.6 allows 7 days to restore the inoperable DG to OPERABLE status provided the CTG is verified functional through testing within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, ,
and its circuit breakers are verified to be aligned to the -
affected 6.9 kV essential AC bus initially within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter. This 7-day Completion Time is reasonable because of the reliability and convenience of the CTG, the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period.
The CTG is considered functional when the requirements of Section 9.5.13.19 of the SSAR are satisfied and the CTG is ,
verified to start from standby conditions and achieves steady state voltage 2 6210 V and s 7590 V, and frequency 2 58.8 Hz and s 61.2 liz within 2 minutes.
(continued)
ABWR TS B 3.8-12 10/1/93 l
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 I
BASES ACTIONS B.4. B.5. and B.6 (continued)
If the CTG can not be made available to function as a '
temporary onsite divisional backup to preferred offsite power, the configuration of the AC sources is as described in Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), which states that operation may continue as described in Condition B for a period that should not exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Therefore, if Required Actions B.4 and B.5 cannot be completed within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of entering Condition A, then Required Actions F.1 and F.2 must be followed. Upon restoring the inoperable DG to OPERABLE status, the LCO is met, Conditions B and F are exited, and operation may continue.
In Condition B, if the CTG is not functional, the remaining ,
OPERABLE DGs and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E distribution system for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC i sources, reasonable time for repairs, and low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. ,
Should the CTG no longer be functional or capable of being aligned to a 6.9 kV essential AC bus subsequent to the 72-hour period following initial entry into Condition B, Condition F again applies and Required Actions F.1 and F.2 must be followed. Anytime the 8-hour Completion Time of :
Required Action B.5 is not met during this extension period, l Condition F must be entered. Condition F can then only be ;
exited by restoring the DG to OPERABLE status. ,
The once-per-8-hour Completion Time of Required Action B.5 is necessary to keep a check on the proper alignment of the CTG's circuit breakers and thus the capability of supplying power from the CTG to the 6.9 kV essential AC bus associated with the inoperable DG.
The second Completion Time for Required Action B.6 ,
establishes a 8-day limit on the maximum time allowed for '
any combination of required AC power sources to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO. If Condition B is entered while, for instance, an offsite circuit is inoperable and that circuit is subsequently restored OPERABLE, the LC0 may already have been not met for up to 7 days. This situation (continued)
ABWR TS B 3.8-13 10/1/93
4 AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS B.4. B.5, and B 6 (continued) could lead to a total of 14 days, since initial failure to :
meet the LCO, to restore the DG. At this time, an offsite !
circuit could again become inoperable, the DG restored OPERABLE, and an additional 7 days (for a total of 21 days) would be allowed prior to complete restoration of the LCO.
The 8-day Completion Time provides a limit on the time allowed in a specified condition after discovery of failure. ,
to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. The "AND" connector between the 7-day and 8-day Completion Times means that both Completion Times apply-simultaneously, and the more restrictive must be met.
As in Required Action B.2, the 8-day Completion Time of -
Required Action B.5 allows for an exception to the normal
" time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock."
This exception results in establishing the " time zero" at the time the LC0 was initially not met, instead of the time Condition B was entered.
C.1 and C.2 Required Action C.1 addresses actions to be taken.in the I event of concurrent failure of redundant required features.
Required Action C.1 reduces the vulnerability to a loss of 3 function. The Completion Time for taking these actions is reduced to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> from that allowed with only one division without offsite power (Required Action A.2). The rationale for the reduction to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is that Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6) allows a Completion Time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for two .
required offsite circuits inoperable, based upon the assumption that all three safety divisions are OPERABLE.
When a concurrent redundant required feature failure exists, ;
this assumption is not the case, and a shorter Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is appropriate. These features are designed with redundant safety related divisions (i.e., ;
single division systems are not included in the list). i Redundant required features failures consist of any of these features that are inoperable, because any inoperability is on a division redundant to a division with inoperable offsite circuits.
(continued)
ABWR TS B 3.8-14 10/1/93 I h
AC Sources-0perating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS C.) and C.2 (continued)
The Completion Time for Required Action C.1 is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal " time zero" for .
beginning the allowed outage time " clock." In this Required Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:
- a. All required offsite circuits are inoperable; and
- b. A required feature is inoperable.
If, at any time during the existence of this Condition (two offsite circuits inoperable), a required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked.
According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue in Condition C for a period that should not exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. This level of degradation means that the offsite electrical power system does not have the capability to ,
effect a safe shutdown and to mitigate the effects of an accident; however, the onsite AC sources have not been
- degraded. This level of degradation generally corresponds .
to a total loss of the immediately accessible offsite power '
sources. >
Because of the normally high availability of the offsite '
sources, this level of degradation may appear to be more severe than other combinations of two AC sources inoperable that involve one or more DGs inoperable. However, two factors tend to decrease the severity of this degradation level: '
- a. The configuration of the redundant AC electrical power system that remains available is not susceptible to a single bus or switching failure; and
- b. The time required to detect and restore an unavailable offsite power source is generally much less than that required to detect and restore an unavailable onsite AC source.
(continued)
ABWR TS B 3.8-15 10/1/93
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES i
ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued)
With both of the required offsite circuits inoperable, sufficient onsite AC sources are available to maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a DBA or transient. In fact, a simultaneous loss of offsite AC -
sources, a LOCA, and a worst case single failure were postulated as a part of the design basis in the safety analysis. Thus, the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Completion Time provides a period of time to effect restoration of one of the offsite circuits commensurate with the importance of maintaining an AC electrical power system capable of meeting its design criteria.
According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), with the available offsite AC sources two less than required by the LCO, operation may continue for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. If two offsite sources are restored within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, unrestricted operation may continue. If only one offsite source is restored within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, power operation continues in accordance with Condition A.
The status of the CTG was not a consideration in establishing the appropriate Completion Times for Required Actions C.1 AND C.2.
D.1 and D.2 Pursuant to LC0 3.0.6, the Distribution System ACTIONS would not be entered even if all AC sources to it were inoperable, resulting in de-energization. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition D are modified by a Note to indicate '
that when Condition D is entered with no required AC source to one division, Actions for LC0 3.8.9, " Distribution Systems-0perating," must be immediately entered. This allows Condition D to provide requirements for the loss of ,
the offsite circuit and one DG without regard to whether a division is de-energized. LCO 3.8.9 provides the appropriate restrictions for a de-energized division.
According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue in Condition D for a period that should not exceed' 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. In Condition D, individual redundancy is lost in both the offsite electrical power system and the onsite AC electrical power system. Since power system redundancy is (continued)
ABWR TS B 3.8-16 10/1/93 !
l l
I J
AC Sources-0perating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS D.1 and 0.2 (continued) provided by two diverse sources of power, however, the reliability of the power systems in this Condition may appear higher than that in Condition C (loss of both required offsite circuits). This difference in reliability is offset by the susceptibility of this power system configuration to a single bus or switching failure. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC. sources, reasonable time for repairs, and low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.
The status of the CTG was not a consideration in establishing the appropriate Completion Times for Required .
Actions D.1 and D.2.
E.1 With two DGs inoperable, there is one remaining standby AC source. Thus, with an assumed loss of offsite electrical power, insufficient standby AC sources are available to power the minimum required ESF functions. Since the offsite electrical power system is the only source of AC power for the majority of ESF equipment at this level of degradation, the risk associated with continued operation for a very short time could be less than that associated with an immediate controlled shutdewn (the immediate shutdown could cause grid instability, which could result in a total loss of AC power). Since Ony incdvertent gencrctor trip could 01:0 result in c totcl los: Of offsite fI power, howcVer, the time ellowed for centinued operctien-4s-severely eestricted. The intent here is to avoid the risk associated with an immediate controlled shutdown and to minimize the risk associated with this level of degradation.
According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), with both DGs inoperable, operation may continue for a period that should not exceed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. This Completion Time assumes complete loss of onsite (DG) AC capability to power the minimum loads needed to respond to analyzed events. -
l 1
(continued)
ABWR TS B 3.8-17 10/1/93 l
)
t t
AC Sources-0perating B 3.8.1 BASES I ACTIONS L.1 (continued) 1 The status of the CTG was not a consideration in !
establishing the appropriate Completion Time for Required +
Action E.1. ;
F.1 and M If the inoperable AC electrical power sources cannot be I restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be brought.to a MODE in which the LCO ;
does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 4 within j
36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, :
based on operating experience, to reach the required plant ;
conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner ;
and without challenging plant systems. ;
,- G.1 o
Condition G corresponds to a level of degradation in which all redundancy in the .AC electrical power supplies has been :
lost. At this severely degraded level, any further losses in the AC electrical power system will cause a loss of ;
function. Therefore, no additional time is justified for -
continued operation. The unit is required by LC0 3.0.3 to !
commence a controlled shutdown. l 4
SURVEILLANCE The AC sources are designed to permit inspection and REQUIREMENTS testing of all important areas and features, especially those that have a standby function, in accordance with 10 CFR 50, GDC 18 (Ref. 8). Periodic component tests are ,
supplemented by extensive functional tests during refueling l outages under simulated accident conditions. The SRs for !
demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the DGs are in accordance j with the recommendations of Reguhtory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), i Regulat_ory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), and Regulatory Guide 1.137
~ ~
(Ref. 9).
1 (continued) j ABWR TS B 3.8-18 10/1/93
f I
AC Sources-0perating B 3.8.1 ,
BASES :
i SURVEILLANCE Where the SRs discussed herein specify voltage and frequency REQUIREMEETS tolerances, the following summary is applicable. The (continued) minimum steady state output voltage of 6210 V is 95% of the '
nominal 6.9 kV output voltage. This value, which is specified in ANSI C84.1 (Ref.10), allows for voltage drop t to the terminals of 6600 V motbFs whose minimum operating voltage is specified as 90%, or 5980 V. It also allows for ,
voltage drops to motors and other equipment down through the 200 V level where minimum operating voltage is also usually specified as 90% of name plate rating. The specified ,
maximum steady state output voltage of 6674 V is equal to the maximum operating voltage specified for 6600 V motors.
It ensures that for a lightly loaded distribution system, the voltage at the terminals of 6600 V motors is no more than the maximum rated operating voltages. The specified minimum and maximum frequencies of the DG are 58.8 Hz and 61.2 Hz, respectively. These values are equal to i 2% of '
the 60 Hz nominal frequency and are derived from the recommendations given in Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3).
l l
This SR ensures proper circuit continuity for the offsite AC electrical power supply to the onsite distribution network and availability of offsite AC electrical power. The breaker alignment verifies that each breaker is in its correct :
position to ensure that distribution buses and loads are i connected to their preferred power source and that appropriate independence of offsite circuits is maintained.
The 7 day Frequency is adequate since breaker position is not likely to change without the operator being aware of it and because its status is displayed in the control room. ,
l SR 3.8.1.2 and SR 3.8.1.7 ,
These SRs help to ensure the availability of the standby '
electrical power supply to mitigate DBAs and transients and .
maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition. !
To minimize the wear on moving parts that do not get lubricated when the engine is not running, these SRs have t been modified by Notes (Note I for SR 3.8.1.7 and Note 2 for !
SR 3.8.1.2) to i ,dicate that all DG starts for these (continued)
ABWR TS B 3.8-19 10/1/93 ,
, - +
AC Sources-0perating i B 3.8.1 l
BASES ,
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.2 and SR 3.8.1.7 (continued) :
REQUIREMENTS Surveillances may be preceded by an engine prelube period and followed by a warmup period prior to loading.
1 For the purposes of this testing, the DGs are started from standby conditions. Standby conditions for a DG mean that the diesel engine coolant and oil are being continuously circulated and temperature is being maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.
In order to reduce stress and wear on diesel engines, some i manufacturers recommend that the starting speed of DGs be limited, that warmup be limited to this lower speed, and '
that DGs be gradually accelerated to synchronous speed prior to loading. These start procedures are the intent of Note 3, which is only applicable when such procedures are -
recommended by the manufacturer.
SR 3.8.1.7 requires that, at a 184 day Frequency, the DG !
starts from standby conditions and achieves required voltage l and frequency within 20 seconds. The 20 second start '
requirement supports the requirements set forth in the SSAR !
Chapter 8 (Ref. 2). The 20 second start requirement may not '
be applicable to SR 3.8.1.2 (see Note 3 of SR 3.8.1.2), when .
a modified start procedure as described above is used. If a i modified start is not used, the 20 second start requirement of SR 3.8.1.7 applies. Since SR 3.8.1.7 does require a i 20 second sttrt, it is more restrictive than SR 3.8.1.2, and :
it may be performed in lieu of SR 3.8.1.2. This procedure ;
is the intent of Note 1 of SR 3.8.1.2. ,
The normal 31 day Frequency for SR 3.8.1.2 (see Table 3.8.1-1, " Diesel Generator Test Schedule") is consistent with Regulatory Guide 179 (Ref. 9). The 184 day Frequency for SR 3.8.1.7 is a reddifion in cold testing consistent with Generic Letter 84-15 (Ref. 7). These !
Frequencies provide adequate assurance of DG OPERABILITY, !
while minimizing degradation resulting from testing. i i
i SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.3 (continued)
ABWR TS B 3.8-20 10/1/93 l
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES REQUIREMENTS (continued) This Surveillance demonstrates that the DGs are capable of i synchronizing and accepting greater than or equal to the equivalent of the maximum expected accident loads. A minimum run time of 60 minutes is required to stabilize engine temperatures, while minimizing the time that the DG is connected to the offsite source.
In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design basis conditions as i possible, testing shall be performed using a power factor less than or equal to 0.9. This power factor is chosen to be representative of the actual design basis inductive loading that the DG would experience. The load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the DG. Routine overloading may result in more frequent tear down inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY.
The normal 31 day frequency for this Surveillance (see
- Table 3.8.1-1) is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1l9 (Ref. 9).
Note 1 modifies this Surveillance to indicate that diesel engine runs for this Surveillance may include gradual loading, as recommended by the manufacturer, so that !
mechanical stress and wear on the diesel engine are .
minimized. ,
Note 2 modifies this Surveillance by stating that momentary transients because of changing bus loads do not invalidate this test.
Note 3 indicates that this Surveillance should be conducted ,
on only one DG at a time in order to avoid. common cause failures that might result from offsite circuit or grid perturbations. Similarly, momentary power factor transients above the limit do not invalidate the test.
%te 4 stipulates a prerequisite requirement'for performance cd this SR. A successful DG start must precede this test to :
credit satisfactory performance. i (continued)
ABWR TS B 3.8-21 10/1/93 :
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.4 REQUIREMENTS (continued) This SR provides verification that the level of fuel oil in the day tank is at or above the level at which fuel oil is automatically added. The level is expressed as an equivalent volume in liters, and is selected to ensure adequate fuel oil for a minimum of I hour of DG operation at full load plus 10%. l The 31 day Frequency is adequate to assure that a sufficient supply of fuel oil is available, since low level alarms are provided and facility operators would be aware of any large '
uses of fuel oil during this period.
SR 3.8.1.5 Microbiological fouling is a major cause of fuel oil degradation. There are numerous bacteria that can grow in fuel oil and cause fouling, but all must have a water environment in order to survive. Removal of water from the fuel oil day tanks once every 31 days eliminates the necessary environment for bacterial survival. This is most effective means in controlling microbiological fouling. In addition, it eliminates the potential for water entrainment in the fuel oil during DG operation. Water may come from any of several sources, including condensation, ground water, rain water, contaminated fuel oil, and breakdown of the fuel oil by bacteria. Frequent checking for and removal of accumulated water minimizes fouling and provides data .
regarding the watertight integrity of the fuel oil system. ,
The Surveillance Frequencies are established by Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 9). This SR is for preventive maintenance. The presence of water does not necessarily represent a failure of this SR provided that accumulated water is removed during performance of this Surveillance.
This Surveillance demonstrates that each required fuel oil transfer pump operates and transfers fuel oil from its associated storage tank to its associated day tank. It is required to support the continuous operation of standby power sources. This Surveillance provides assurance that i the fuel oil transfer pump is OPERABLE, the fuel oil piping i (continued)
ABWR TS B 3.8-22 10/1/93 I I
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.6 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS system is intact, the fuel delivery piping is not obstructed, and the controls and control systems for automaticfueltransfersystemsareOPERAC'_E.ThTsYfbsf?Wf be7peFf6FmsW6Miislmulstedl6EEtiii1Hst'osiU@nitjitici! '
signap The Frequency for this SR is variable, depending on individual system design, with up to a 92 day interval. The 92 day Frequency corresponds to the testing requirements for pumps as contained in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI (Ref.11); however, the design of fuel transfer systems is such~that pumps operate automatically or must be started manually in order to maintain an adequate volume of fuel oil in the day tanks duriag or following DG testing. In such a case, a 31 day Frequency is appropriate.
Since proper operation of fuel transfer systems is an inherent part of DG OPERABILITY, the Frequency of this SR should be modified to reflect individual designs.
SR 3.8.1.7 See SR 3.8.1.2.
SR 3.8.1.8 Manual transfer of each 6.9 kV ESF bus power supply from the normal offsite circuit to the alternate offsite circuit demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the alternate circuit distribut%n network to power the shutdown loads. ThE '
sanu'all tFinif fe$shoul d i be3sf f6Fmed fusi ndH6ej DGMsiffi thej]oadsi(f^the Surveillance is base'd on engineeringlieMnotsalde Frequency o ;
judgment taking into consideration the plant conditions !
required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. Operating ,
experience has shown that these components usually pass the ,
SR when performed on the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability :
standpoint.
This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is ,
that, during operation with the reactor critical, (continued)
ABWR TS B 3.8-23 10/1/93 l
L AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES performance of this SR could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge entwined steady state operation and, as a result, plant SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.8 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS safety systems. Note 2 acknowledges.that credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.
SR 3.8.1.9 Each DG is provided with an engine overspeed trip to prevent damage to the engine. Recovery from the transient caused by '
the loss of a large load could cause. diesel engine overspeed, which, if excessive, might result in a trip of the engine. This Surveillance demonstrates the DG load-response characteristics and capability to reject the-largest single load without exceeding predetermined voltage and frequency and while maintaining a specified margin to the overspeed trip. The load referenced for Division 2 and Division 3 DGs is the 1400 kW high pressure core flooder (HPCF) pump; for the Division 1 DG, the 540 kW residual heat removal (RHR) pump. The Reactor Building Cooling Water (RCW) system load.was not used. Even though the load to DG 1 is 640 kW, that value consists of 2.RCW pumps of 320 kW each. As required by IEEE-308-(Ref.12 , the load rejection test is acceptable if the increase in"d)iesel speed does not exceed 75% of the difference between synchronous speed and the overspeed trip setpoint, or 15% above synchronous speed, whichever is lower.
The time, voltage, and frequency tolerances specified in this SR are derived from Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3) recommendations for response during 1oad sequence intervals.
The 3 seconds specified is equal to 60% of the 5 second load sequence-interval associated with sequencing of this largest load. The voltage and frequency specified are consistent with the design range of the equipment powered by the DG.
SR 3.8.1.9.a corresponds to the maximum frequency excursion, while SR 3.8.1.9.b and SR 3.8.1.9.c'are steady state voltage and frequency values to which the system'must recover-following load rejection. The [18 month] Frequency is consistent with the recommendation of Regulatory Guide 139
-(Ref. 3) .
(continued)
ABWR TS B 3.8-24 10/1/93
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design basis conditions as possible, testing must be performed using a power factor s[ ]. This power factor is chosen to be representative of the actual design basis inductive loading that the DG could experience.
This SR has been modified _by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is that during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this SR could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems. Note 2 acknowledges that credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.
Reviewer's Note: The above MODE restrictions may be deleted if it can be demonstrated to the staff, on a plant specific basis, that performing the SR with the reactor in any of the restricted MODES can satisfy the following criteria, as applicable:
- a. Performance of the SR will not render any safety system or component inoperable;
- b. Performance of the SR will not cause perturbations to any of the electrical distribution systems that could result in a challenge to steady state operation or to plant safety systems; and
- c. Performance of the SR, or failure of the SR, will not cause, or result in, an A00 with attendant challenge to plant safety systems. _
SR 3.8.1.10 This Surveillance demonstrates the DG capability to reject a full load without overspeed tripping or exceed!7 the predetermined voltage limits. The DG full load rejection may occur because of a system fault or inadvertent breaker tripping. This Surveillance ensures proper engine generator load response under the simulated test conditions. This test simulates the loss of the total connected load that the DG experiences following a full load rejection and verifies that the DG does not trip upon loss of the load. These acceptance criteria provide DG damage protection. While the (continued)
ABWR TS B 3.8-25 10/1/93
AC Sources-Operating I B 3.8.1 ;
BASES DG is not expected to experience this transient during an event, and continues to be available, this response ensures that the DG is not degraded for future application, including reconnection to the bus if the trip initiator can be corrected or isolated. ,
t In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load i conditions that are as close to design basis conditions as possible, testing must be performed using a power factor s 0.9. This power factor is chosen to be representative of the actual design basis inductive loading that the DG would experience.
- The [18 month] Frequency is consistent with the recommendation of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9) and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. .
This SR has been modified by two Notes. The reason for ~
Note 1 is that during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this SR could cause perturbation to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems. Note 2 acknowledges that credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. '
Reviewer's Note: The above MODE restrictions may be deleted if it can be demonstrated to the staff, on a plant specific basis, that performing the SR with the reactor in any of the restricted MODES can satisfy the following criteria, as applicable: ,
- a. Performance of the SR will not render any safety system or component inoperable;
- b. Performance of the SR will not cause perturbations to [
any of the electrical distribution systems that could result in a challenge to steady state operation or to '
plant safety systems; and
- c. Performance of the SR, or failure of the SR, will not cause, or result in, an A00 with attendant challenge to plant safety systems. _
(continued)
ABWR TS B 3.8-26 10/1/93 ;
i
AC Sources-0perating B 3.8.1 ,
BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.11 REQUIREMENTS (continued) As required by Regulatory Guide M (Ref. 3),
paragraph 2]23, this SurveillanEi~demonstFates the as designed operafion of the standby power sources during loss of the offsite source. This test verifies all actions '
encountered from the loss of offsite power, including energization of the emergency buses and respective loads from the DG. It further demonstrates the capability of the DG to automatically achieve the required voltage and i frequency within the specified time.
The DG auto-start time of 20 seconds is derived from requirements stated in the SSAR Chapter 8 (Ref. 2). The frequency should be restored to within 2% of nominal i following a load sequence step. The Surveillance should be -
continued for a minimum of 5 minutes in order to demonstrate that all starting transients have decayed and stability has '
been achieved.
The requirement to verify the connection and power supply of permanent and auto-connected loads is intended to satisfactorily show the relationship of these loads to the DG loading logic. In certain circumstances, many of these loads cannot actually be connected or loaded without undue hardship or potential for undesired operation. For instance, ECCS injection valves are not desired to be stroked open, high pressure injection systems are not I capable of being operated at full flow, or RHR systems performing a decay heat removal function are not desired to be realigned to the ECCS mode of operation. In lieu of actual demonstration of the connection and loading of these loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable. This r testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading ,
sequence is verified.
The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 119 ,
paragraph 21274, takes into consideration (Ref.
unit
~
3),
conditions required 16~pcFform the Surveillance, and is intended to be '
consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.
(continued) ;
I ABWR TS 8 3.8-27 10/1/93 i
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.11 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS This SR is modified by three Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil being continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations. The reason for Note 2 is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge plant safety systems.
Note 3 acknowledges that credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.
SR 3.8.1.12 This Surveillance demonstrates that the DG automatically starts and achieves the required voltage and frequency within the specified time (20 seconds) from the design basis actuation signal (LOCA signal) and operates for 2 5 minutes.
The 5 minute period provides sufficient time to demonstrate stability. SR 3.8.1.12.d and SR 3.8.1.12.e ensure that permanently connected loads and emergency loads are energized from the offsite electrical power system on an ECCS signal without loss of offsite power.
The requirement to verify the connection and power supply of permanent and autoconnected loads is intended to satisfactorily show the relationship of these loads to the loading logic for loading onto offsite power. In certain circumstances, many of these loads cannot actually be connected or loaded without undue hardship or potential for undesired operation. For instance, ECCS injection valves are not desired to be stroked open, high pressure injection systems are not capable of being operated at full flow, or RHR systems performing a decay heat removal function are not desired to be realigned to the ECCS mode of operation. In lieu of actual demonstration of the connection and loading of these loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable.
This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.
(continued)
ABWR TS B 3.8-28 10/1/93 e
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.12 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS The Frequency of [18 months] takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance and is intended to be consistent with the expected fuel cycle '
lengths. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the
[18 month] Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was '
concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.
This SR is modified by three Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil being continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations. The reason for Note 2 is that during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this SR could cause perturbations to the electrical distributica systems that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems. Note 3 acknowledges that credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.
SR 3.8.1.13 !
This Surveillance demonstrates that DG non-critical protective functions (e.g., high jacket water temperature) are bypassed on a loss of voltage signal concurrent with an ECCS initiation test signal and critical protective functions (engine overspeed and generator differential '
current) trip the DG to avert substantial damage to the DG unit. The non-critical trips are bypassed during DBAs and provide an alarm on an abnormal engine condition. This alarm provides the operator with sufficient time to react appropriately. The DG availability to mitigate the DBA is more critical than protecting the engine against minor problems that are not immediately detrimental to emergency operation of the DG.
The [18 month] Frequency is based on engineering judgment, taking into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. Operating experience has-shown that these components usually pass the SR when ,
performed at the [18 month] Frequency. Therefore, the '
(continued)
ABWR TS B 3.8-29 10/1/93 i i
AC Sources-Operating- )
B 3.8.1
~
BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.13 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.
The SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is that performing the Surveillance removes a required DG from service. Note 2 acknowledges that credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.
Reviewer's Note: The above MODE restrictions may be deleted if it can be demonstrated to the staff, on a plant specific basis, that performing the SR with the reactor in any of the restricted MODES can satisfy the following criteria, as applicable:
- a. Performance of the SR will not render any safety system or component inoperable;
- b. Performance of the SR will not cause perturbations to -
any of the electrical distribution systems that could result in a challenge to steady state operation or to plant safety systems; and >
- c. Performance of the SR, or failure of the SR, will not cause, or result in, an A00 with attendant challenge !
to plant safety systems. _
SR 3.8.1.14 Regulatory Guide E9' demonstration onci^jier(Ref.
18 mbnths3),that paragraph M2l9, the"DGs can requires start and t run continuously at full load capability for an interval of not less than 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />s-22 hours of which is at a load equivalent to 90R oE100 F 6fEthe continuous rating of the DG, and 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of Mi'ch~1s it~i load equivalent to 1051fd 110%
of the continuous duty-rating of the DG, The DG~itIFfs for this Surveillance can be performed either from standby or hot conditions. The provisions for prelube and warmup, discussed in SR 3.8.1.2, and for gradual loading, discussed
- in SR 3.8.1.3, are applicable to this SR. i In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design conditions as possible, testing must be performed using a power factor (continued)
ABWR TS B 3.8-30 10/1/93 '
i
.I
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES 1
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.14 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS 5 0.9. This power factor is chosen to be representative of the actual design basis inductive loading that the DG could experience.
The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendat_ ions of Regulatory Guide $91(RefM3),
- takes into consideration plant conditions paragraph required to 212[@formtheSurveillance;andisintendedtobe per
- consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. ,
This Surveillance is modified by three Notes. Note I states that momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. The load band is provided to avoid '
routine overloading of the DG. Routine overloading may result in more frequent tear down inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY.. Similarly, momentary power factor transients above the limit do not invalidate the test. The reason for Note 2 is that during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this SR could cause perturbations to the l electrical distribution systems that would challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems. Note ? acknowledges that credit may be ;
taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.
SR 3.8.1.15 This Surveillance demonstrates that the diesel engine can restart from a hot condition, such as subsequent to shutdown from normal Surveillances, and achieve the required voltage and frequency within 20 seconds. The 20-second time is derived from the requirements set forth in the SSAR Chapter ;
8 (Ref. 2).
The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 139["(Rsffi3{,
paragraph 2)2110.
~ ~
"r
- This SR has been modified by two Notes. Note 1 ensures that the test is performed with the diesel sufficiently hot. The requirement that the diesel has operated for at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> at full load conditions prior to performance of this Surveillance is based on manufacturer recommendations for I (continued) r ABWR TS B 3.8-31 10/1/93 i
\ \
AC Sources-Operating l B 3.8.1 '
BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.15 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS achieving hot conditions. The load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the DG. Routine overloads may result in more frequent tear down inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY. Momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Note 2 allows all DG starts to be preceded by an engine prelube period to minimize wear and tear on the diesel during testing.
SR 3.8.1.16 As required by Regulatory Guide 1!97(Riff 31, paragraph 2!2ill, this Surveillahes^ ens 0Fsi that the manual synchronizafien~and automatic load transfer from the DG to the offsite source can be made and that the DG can be returned to ready-to-load status when offsite power is restored. It also ensures that the auto-start logic is reset to allow the DG to reload if a subsequent loss of offsite power occurs. The DG is considered to be in ready-to-load status when the DG is at rated speed and voltage, the output breaker is open and can receive an auto-close signal on bus undervoltage, and the load timers are reset.
The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory RefR3 Guide UK(itish"J, paragraph 2:2111, and takes into consider plant conditions 7equired to perform the Surveillance.
1 This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required '
offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Note 2 acknowledges that credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.
SR 3.8.1 11 Demonstration of the test mode override ensures that the DG availability under accident conditions is not compromised as the result of testing. Interlocks to the LOCA sensing circuits cause the DG to automatically reset to (continued)
ABWR TS B 3.8-32 10/1/93
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.17 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS ready-to-load operation Bf?an ECCS initiation signal is
. received during operatiofi"In the test mode. Ready-to-load operation is defined as the DG running at rated speed and voltage with the DG output breaker open. These provisions ,
for automatic switchover are required by IEEE-308 (Ref. 12),
paragraph 6.2.6(2).
The requirement to automatically energize the emergency loads with offsite power is essentially identical to that of SR 3.8.1.12. The intent in the requirement associated with SR 3.8.1.17.b is to show that the emergency loading is not affected by the DG operation in test mode. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the emergency loads to perform these functions is acceptable.
This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.
The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide M9 paragraph 2!2!13;takesintoconside' Fit (io(RsfR3),d^ plant conditi required to" perform the Surveillance; and is intended to.be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.
This SR has been modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Note 2 acknowledges that credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.
SR 3.8.1.18 As required by Regulatory Guide 1?97(RefCI3},
paragraph 272L6, each DG is requiFed to dsmonstrate proper operation f6f^the DBA loading sequence to ensure that ,
voltage and frequency are maintained within the required limits. Under accident conditions, prior to connecting the i DGs to their respective bus, all loads are shed except load I center feeders and those motor control centers that power ,
Class IE loads (referred to as " permanently connected" i loads). Upon reaching 90% rated voltage and frequency, the (continued)
ABWR TS B 3.8-33 10/1/93 1
l
AC Sources-;p< ating
< 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.18 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS DGs are then connected to their respective bus. Load shedding and buses-ready-to-load signals are generated by the control systems for the electrical power distribution system. Individual timers for each major load are reset and started by their electrical power distribution systems signals (Ref. 2). The 10% load sequence time interval tolerance ensures that sufficient time exists for the DG to restore frequency and voltage prior to applying the next load and that safety analysis assumptions regarding ESF equipment time delays are not violated. Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3) provides a summary of the automatic loading of ESF buses.
The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide }I9f(~Refp3)L, paragraph 212jj;takesintoconsiderit~i6npla6f' conditions required to perform the Surveillance; and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.
This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is that performing the Surveillance during these MODES would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge plant safety systems. Note 2 acknowledges that credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.
Reviewer's Note: The above MODE restrictions may be deleted if it can be demonstrated to the staff, on a plant specific basis, that performing the SR with the reactor in any of the restricted MODES can satisfy the following criteria, as 3 applicable:
- a. Performance of the SR will not render any safety ,
system or component inoperable; '
- b. Performance of the SR will not cause perturbations to any of the electrical distribution systems that could !
result in a challenge to steady state operation or to plant safety systems; and
- c. Performance of the SR, or failure of the SR, will not cause, or result in, an A00 with attendant challenge to plant safety systems. _
(continued)
ABWR TS B 3.8-34 10/1/93 l l
l
AC Sources-0perating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.19 REQUIREMENTS (continued) In the event of a DBA coincident with a loss of offsite power, the DGs are required to supply the necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, RCS, and containment design limits are not exceeded.
This Surveillance demonstrates the DG operation, as discussed in the Bases for SR 3.8.1.11, during a loss of offsite power actuation test signal in conjunction with an ECCS initiation signal. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.
The Frequency of 18 months takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance and is intended to be consistent with an expected fuel cycle length of 18 months.
This SR is modified by three Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil being continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations. The reason for Note 2 is that performing the Surveillance would remove ,
a required offsite circuit from . service, pgurb the electrical distribution system, and challenge ~ plant safety systems. Note 3 acknowledges that credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.
SR 3.8.1.20 This Surveillance demonstrates that the DG starting independence has not been compromised. Also, this Surveillance demonstrates that each engine can achieve ,
proper speed within the specified time when the DGs are !
started simultaneously.
(continued) ,
1 ABWR TS B 3.8-35 10/1/93
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES is consistent with the recommendations The 10 year Guide of Regulatory Frequency!9f(Ref53),
I paragraph 222I14, and Regulatory Guide 1.137~(Ref ~9), paragraph C'.'2.f 7 r This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to minimize wear on the DG during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.
Diesel Generator Test Schedule j The DG test schedule (Table 3.8.1-1) implements the i recommendations of Revision 3 to Regulatory Guide 1.9 ;
(Ref. 3). The purpose of this test schedule is to provide timely test data to establish a confidence level associated ,
with the goal to maintain DG reliability at > 0.95 per test. '
F According to Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), Revision 3, each [
DG unit should be tested at least once every 31 days.
Whenever a DG has experienced 4 or more valid failures in j the last 25 valid tests, the maximum time between tests is !
reduced to 7 days. Four failures in 25 valid tests is a ;
failure rate of 0.16, or the threshold of acceptable DG l performance, and hence may be an early indication of the !
degradation of DG reliability. When considered in the light l of a long history of tests, however, 4 failures in the last -
25 valid tests may only be a statistically probable ,
distribution of random events. Increasing the test ,
Frequency allows a more timely accumulation of additional i test data upon which to base judgment of the reliability of- ,
the DG. The increased test Frequency must be maintained t until seven consecutive failure free tests have been performed. '
The Frequency for accelerated testing is 7 days, but no less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Therefore, the interval between tests should !
be no less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and no more than 7 days. A
- successful test at an interval of less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> should i be considered an invalid test and not count towards the i seven consecutive failure free starts. A test interval in f excess of 7 days constitutes.a failure to meet SRs.
v
[
(continued) !
ABWR TS B 3.8-36 10/1/93 4
n AC Sources-0perating .
B 3.8.1 1 BASES i
REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17.
- 3. Regulatory Guide 1.9, R6?Jij65]!3]
- 7. Generic Letter 84-15, July 2, 1984. !
- 8. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18. ;
- 9. Regulatory Guide 1.137. l l
- 10. ANSI C84.1, 1982.
- 11. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI. ;
- 12. IEEE Standard 308.
i t
i b
ABWR TS B 3.8-37 ~10/1/93 l