ML20045H498
| ML20045H498 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200001 |
| Issue date: | 07/15/1993 |
| From: | GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20045H496 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9307200288 | |
| Download: ML20045H498 (25) | |
Text
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i RCW/RSW System and UHS-Shutdown j
B 3.7.2 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS i
B 3.7.2 Reactor Building Cooling Water.(RCW) System, Reactor Service Water (RSW) System and Ultimate 1
Heat Sink (UHS) - Shutdown
+
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'I BASES.
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i BACKGROUND A description of the RCW and RSW Systems and 4
the UHS are provided in the Bases for LCO 3.7.1,
" Reactor Building Cooling Water (RCW)
System, Reactor Service Water (RSW) System and Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) - Operating."
j l
APPLICABLE The volume of water incorporated in the UHS SAFETY is sized so that sufficient water inventory ANALYSES is available for all RCW/RSW System post LOCA cooling requirements for a 30 day period with.
no additional makeup water source available (Ref. 1). The ability of the RCW/RSW System i
to support long term cooling of the reactor or containment is assumed in evaluations'of' the equipment required for safe reactor shutdown presented in the SSAR, Sections j
9.2.11, 6.2.1.1.3.3.1.4, and Chapter 15, (Refs.
2, 3 and 4, respectively)..The long term cooling analyses following a design j
basis LOCA demonstrates that only one 1
division of the RCW/RSW system is required, post LOCA, to support long term cooling of the reactor or containment. To provide redundancy, a minimum of two RCW/RSW divisions are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 except with the reactor cavity to dryer / separator storage pool gate
]
removed and water le- _ > 7.0 m (23 f t) over j
the top of the react : pressure vessel flange.
The combined RCW/RSW System, together with the UHS, satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.
(continued)
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RCW/RSW System and UHS-- Shutdown B 3.7.2 BASES LCO Two' divisions of the RCW/RSW System and the 2
UHS are required to be OPERABLE to ensure the' effective operation of the-RHR System'in.
removing heat from the reactor,-and the effective operation of other safety related equipment-during a DBA or transient.
Requiring two divisions to be OPERABlv.
ensures that one division will be ava?'..able to provide adequate capability to meet cooling requirements of the equipment required for safe shutdown in the event of a single failure. Operability of the UHS and the RCW/RSW' System is defined in the' Basis for LCO 3.7.1.
APPLICABILITY In MODES 4 and 5 except with the reactor cavity to dryer / separator storage pool gate removed and water level > 7.0 m_(23 ft) over the top of the reactor pressure' vessel flange, two divisions of the RCW/RSW System
}
and the UHS are required to be OPERABLE to-support OPERABILITY of the equipment serviced l
by the RCW/RSW System and-UHS, and are required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.
In MODES 1, 2,
and 3, the OPERABILITY requirements of the RCW/RSW System and UHS are specified in'LCO 3.7.1.
I In MODE 5 with the reactor cavity to dryer / separator storage pool gate removed and water level 2 7.0 m (23 ft) over the top of the reactor pressure vessel flange, the OPERABILITY requirements of the RCW/RSW System and UHS are specified in LCO 3.7.3, "RCW/RSW System and UHS - Refueling".
(continued) h
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RCW/RSW System and UHS - Shutdown B 3.7.2 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 If one or more required RCW/RSW division (s) or the UHS is inoperable,-then, immediately, those required feature (s) supported by the inoperable RCW/RSW division (s) Lor UHS must Isa declared inoperable (i.e.,
Emergency Diesel
~i Generator, RHR heat exchanger) ~and the applicable Conditions and; Required Actions lof the appropriate LCOs for.the inoperable required feature (s) must be entered. For the applicable shutdown MODES, an inoperable-RCW/RSW division or UHS requires entering the Conditions of LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources-l Shutdown," for a diesel generator made inoperable and either LCO 3.4.8~,
" Residual i
Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System-.
Cold Shutdown," or LCO 3.9.8,
" Residual-Heat-Removal (RHR) Low Water Level" for RHR shutdown cooling made inoperable. This is in accordance with LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for these components.
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.2.1 REQUIREMENTS l
This SR ensures adequate long term (30 days) cooling can be maintained. With the UHS. water source below the minimum. level, the affected RCW/RSW division must be declared inoperable.
The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Frequency is based on operating experience related to trending of the parameter variations during the applicable MODES.
t SR 3.7.2.2 This SR verifies the' water level in each RSW pump well of the intake structure to be sufficient for the proper operation of the RSW pumps (net positive suction head and pump vortexing are considered in determining this limit). The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Frequency is based on operating experience related to trending of the parameter variations during the
.)
applicable MODES.
(continued)
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.i 1
RCW/RSW. System and UHS - Shutdown i
B.'3.7.2 BASES U
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Verification of'the WIS temperature ensures that the heat removal capability of the RCW/RSW System is within the assumptions of-
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the DBA analysis. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Frequency is based on operating experience related toi trending of the parameter variations during the applicable MODES.
f SR 3.7.2.4 Verifying'the correct alignment for each-manual, power operated, and automatic valve in each RCW/RSW~ division flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will.
exist for RCW/RSW operation. This SR does not' apply to valves that are locked,1 sealed,-or otherwise secured in position, since these l
valves were verified to be in the correct position ~ prior to' locking, sealing, or securing..A valve is also allowed to be'in the nonaccident position and.yet considered in the correct position, provided it can be automatically-realigned to its accident-i position. This SR does'not require any testing or valve manipulation;- rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as' check valves.
t This SR is modified by a Note indicating that isolation of the RCW/RSW System to components i
or systems may render those components or systems inoperable, but does not affect the OPERABILITY of the RCW/RSW System ~. As such, when all RCW/RSW pumps, valves, and piping are OPERABLE, but a branch connection off the
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main header is isolated, the RCW/RSW System is still OPERABLE.
The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgement, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct valve positions.
(continued).
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4 RCW/RSW System and UHS'- Shutdown' B 3.7.2 j
BASES s
SR 3.7.2.5 This SR" verifies that the automatic isolation valves of the RCW/RSW System will
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automatically switch to the safety or emergency position to provide cooling water exclusively to the safety related equipment, t
and limited non-safety related equipment, during an accident event. This is demonstrated by use of an actual or simulated-initiation signal. This SR also verifies the automatic start capability of the RCW/RSW pumps that are in standby and automatic valving in each of the standby RCW/RSW heat l
exchangers in each division. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.5.1.4 overlaps this SR to provide complete = testing of the safety function.
Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed.
on the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, this Frequency is concluded to be. acceptable from
[
a reliability standpoint.
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REFERENCES 1.
Regulatory Guide 1.27, Revision 2, January 1976.
a 2.
ABWR SSAR, Sections 9.2.11 and 9.2.15.
3.
ABWR SSAR, Section 6.2.1.1.3.3.1.4.
4.
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I
t RCW/RSW System and UHS-Refueling B 3.7.3.
B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.3 Reactor Building Cooling Water (RCW). System, Reactor Service Water (RSW) System and Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) - Refueling l
BASES c
BACKGROUND A description of the RCW and RSW Systems and the UHS are provided in the Bases for LCO 3.7.1,
" Reactor Building Cooling Water (RCW)
System, Reactor Service Water (RSW) System and Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS).- Operating". In MODE 5 with the reactor vessel water level 2 7.0 m (23 ft) over the vessel flange the unit components to which the RCW/RSW System is required to supply cooling. water is greatly reduced from normal operation. For example, j
LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources-Shutdown" and LCO 3.9.7, "RHR-High Water Level" require one DG-and one RHR subsystem to be. OPERABLE, respectively, and LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS-Shutdown" does not require any ECCS components to be OPERABLE for this condition.
c APPLICABLE The volume of water incorporated in the UHS SAFETY is sized so that sufficient water inventory i
ANALYSES is available for all RCW/RSW System post LOCA cooling requirements for a 30 day period with
-i no additional makeup water source available (Ref. 1). The ability of the RCW/RSW System to support long term cooling of the reactor or containment is assumed in evaluations of the equipment required for safe reactor shutdown presented in the SSAR, Sections t
9.2.11, 6.2.1.1.3.3.1.4, and Chapter 15, (Refs.
2, 3 and 4, respectively). With the unit in MODE 5 and with the reactor cavity to dryer / separator storage gate removed and water level 2 7.0 m (23 f t) over the top of the reactor pressure vessel flange, the volume of water in the reactor vessel provides a heat sink for decay heat removal.
However, to provide redundancy, a minimum of I
one RCW/RSW division is required to be OPERABLE.
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t RCW/RSW System and UHS.- Refueling B 3.7.3 j
BASES APPLICABLE The combined RCW/RSW System, together.with SAFETY
-the UHS, satisfy Criterion 3_of.the NRC-l ANALYSIS Policy Statement.
(continued) i LCO One division of the RCW/RSW System and the UHS are' required to be OPERABLE to ensure the j
effective operation of'the RHR-System in l
removing heat from the reactor. LCO 3.9.7, i
"RHR-High Water Level" requires that one RHR subsystem be OPERABLE and in. operation in 4
MODE 5 with the water level 2 7.0 m (23 ft) above the RPV flange. Only one subsystem is required because the volume of water above l
the RPV flange provides backup decay heat i
removal capability. Operability of the UHS.
and the RCW/RSW System is defined in the Basis for LCO 3.7.1.
i APPLICABILITY In MODE 5 with the reactor cavity to dryer / separator storage pool gate removed and' water level 2 7.0 m (23 ft) over the top of the reactor pressure vessel flange, one division of the RCW/RSW System and the UHS l
are required to be OPERABLE to support OPERABILITY of the equipment. serviced by the RCW/RSW System and UHS, and are required to be OPERABLE in this MODE.
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In MODES 1, 2,
and 3, the OPERABILITY requirements of the RCW/RSW System and UHS are specified in LCO 3.7.1.
In MODES 4 and 5 except with the reactor cavity to dryer / separator storage pool gate j
removed and water level 2 7.0 m (23 f t) over the top of the reactor pressure vessel flange, the OPERABILITY requirements of the RCW/RSW System and UHS are specified in.LCO i
3.7.2, "RCW/RSW System and UHS - Shutdown".
(continued)
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RCW/RSW System and UHS - Refueling B 3.7.3
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BASES ACTIONS
-A.1 and A.2 If no RCW/RSW division lis operable or.the UHS is inoperable, then, immediately, those l
required feature (s) supported by the inoperable required RCW/RSW division'or UHS must be declared inoperable (i.e.,. Emergency Diesel Generator, RHR heat exchanger) and'the-applicable Conditions and Required-Actions of l
the appropriate LCOs'for the inoperable required feature (s) must be entered. Jul inoperable RCW/RSW division or UHS requires l
entering the Conditions of LCO 3.8.2, "AC-Sources-Shutdown," for a diesel generator-l made inoperable and LCO.3.9.7,
" Residual' Heat.
Removal (RHR)-High Water Level" for RHR' shutdown cooling made inoperable. This is in accordance with LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for these components.
b SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.3.1 REQUIREMENTS r
This SR ensures adequate long term ( 3 0 ' days )'
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cooling can be maintained. With the UHS water-j source below the minimum level, the affected
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RCW/RSW division must be declared inoperable.
The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Frequency is based on operating experience related to trending of the parameter variations during the applicable
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MODES.
This SR verifies the water level in each RSW pump well of the intake structure to be sufficient for the proper operation of the RSW pumps (net positive suction head and pump vortexing are considered in determining this limit). The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Frequency is based on operating experience related to trending of I
the parameter variations during the applicable MODES (continued)
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c-l 4
RCW/RSW System and UHS - Refueling B 3.7.3-BASES 1
i Verification of the UHS temperature ensures-that the heat removal capability of the RCW/RSW System is within the assumptions'of the DBA' analysis. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Frequency is' based on operating experience related to trending of the parameter variations during-the applicable MODES.
}
SR 3.7.3.4 Verifying the correct alignment'for each manual, power operated, and automatic valve in each RCW/RSW division flow' path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for RCW/RSW operation. This SR does not-apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these valves were verified to be.in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident positio'n and yet considered in the; correct position, provided:it-can be automatically realigned to its accident position..This SR'does not require any-testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not-apply to valves that cannot be, inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.
'I This SR is modified by a Note indicating that.
isolation of the RCW/RSW. System to components-or systems may render those components or.
systems inoperable, but does not affect the OPERABILITY of the RCW/RSW System. As such, when all RCW/RSW pumps, valves,. and piping-are OPERABLE, but a branch connection ~off the main header is isolated, the RCW/RSW System t
is still OPERABLE.
The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgement, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct valve positions.
(continued)
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9
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RCW/RSW System.and UHS -. Refueling-B=3.7'.3 BASES SR 3.7.3.5 This SR verifies that the automatic isolation valves of the RCW/RSW System will automatically switch to the safety or I
emergency position to provide cooling water exclusively to the safety related equipment,:
i and limited.non-safety related equipment, during an accident event. This is demonstrated by use of an actual or simulated initiation signal. This SR.also verifies,the automatic start capability of the RCW/RSW pumps that are in standby and automatic valving in each of the standby RCW/RSW heat exchangers in each division. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.5.1.4. overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function.
Operating experience has'shown that these components usually pass the SR.when performed on the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, this Frequency is concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.
REFERENCES 1.
Regulatory Guide.l.27,. Revision 2, January 1976.
2.
ABWR SSAR, Sections 9.2.11 and 9.2.15.
3.
ABWR SSAR, Section 6.2.1.1.3.3.1.4.
4.
s e
e 5
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AC Wl$ 5td l
(5816SysteaanDUHS
-l 3.7.1
.I gg f,c Build %
2 e a &f * '
i lSI,"$$rcAss)
- 1 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS C**9 Ack/
sre a 3.7.1
!!::dt; S:rei;c Water (
)
ystem[and [ Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) j f
Divisiod1:-d2[SSM]ni;,ati...,anh(UHShall be b%
LC0 3.7.1 J
, 6 y) )J p Acu su Syrtero APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, and 3.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME.
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A. One or more cooling ore c n14=; te.u
/ days l
towers with one BLE cooling tow status.
ino e.
- b. CAe 8C A> pu~r A.I Rea-/ o r4 pu-act)
-(continued) an)lor on e psu uj j or k ca:t 30 A61' I
fu MP asAlcr osr Uckanger
+o Rc w/Rsw hea t OfCAA 4 La
?YCh^^3er
.s+.+ m s.
t^operab4 in a
1 sing Le );vistop, i
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ABWRASTS 3.7-1 itev.
G, 09/Z8/92
ACIJfASw r
[364dl.SystemanhUHSh 3.7.1 y
Of4rafiq ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME RcL>j A s w );yiston c
- 8. One M ' d rytt r
.1
.... NOTES----
y m m eS ia Te,t y.
inoperab1?Tfor 1.
Enter applica le reasons other than Conditions a d Condition A 7 Required Ac ons of LCO 3.8.,
"AC Source -
Operating for diesel ge erator
(
D made ino erable f 6.l.DecLaM oS30cl*M by [SSW.
S uppo r nd rep air <d f e.fu re c.5) inopera 6k 2.
nter pplicable a^d es ur aPpticaLLt nd' ions and ConAi+'cu a^)
R nd Actions 8efuitth (5C+io^'
a g
af d e L C Ds [or R me 1 (RHR)
H e ino,44r*6Lt hutd wn Cooling reg u ;e d [edu rold, f
System Hot Shutdo
" for AND
[RHRsh down cooling]
de B.1 Sol +hir P GU *" "
inoperab1 by Emw Oldel y reste rt. RCu/As u
[SSW].
g;
,,;w
/
Restore [SSW)
-72 heurs f
subsystem to OPERA LE status.
C. Con);fico A cri.rn C.)
destor< one (continued) m oP C re" b L< Acwloesu 7 cl a y,5 i
- , 4u, op g o(4 cli v i3 s on +o AC Wl ASlJ c$ivisio A3 O p c R A 4 L E s ts t u.s.
AMD C,1.
f esrore 4Wo jy j onopera bLe Ravla.sv cliv ision +o OP&Rh6L E stufus.
[BWRMSTS 3.7-2
- Ro.
O, 09/28/02
RGWlRW l
Systemand)UHShr 3.7.1 i
ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D
p
~
[. Required Action and f.1 Be in MODE 3.
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time of Condition A; O AND or A not met.
p C
I.2 Be in MODE 4..
36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />
- r M* g OR pu 1 g s W's;oo>
Tw o j:0 g
Seth [S5"] d for inoperabig. :2:y:t:::::
reasons other than Condition {C DE 30HShnoperable.
f0r r:::;n: Oth:r the C:nditice 8 h
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Verify the water level of each\\] UHS [
SR 3.7.1.1 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> C
cre!in; t: :r h:iry s a [ M 8 ft.
i y
[Spr'ypoaA]
8 Verify the water level in each ISW um 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> SR 3.7.1.2 well of the intake structureys a [p] p ft.
SR 3.7.1.3 Verify the average water temperature of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> f
juMS is s ~ C>}:Q.
nr U
5 *c. ( 4 5
- 0 3
(continued)
ABWD4STS 3.7-3 Re.
O, CS/23/92
)
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AcwlRsw
{36ttlSystemandk 3.7.1 Ofe r -lj,d i
s SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) i SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY-h l.:
Operata aach i(9:!] ceclius tower fan for 31 days
-ftfl~iiiinutes.
4 B &w}RS W SR 3.7.1.5
NOT Isolation of flow t ndividual components does not render System inoperable.
...y...h".~o~n~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
f Verify each 450R] :d:ytter manual, power 31 days operated, and automatic valve in the flow path servicing safety related systems or components, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.
3 f\\c.u j ks u of.'v isten SR 3.7.1.k Verify each [000] 02:y: tee actuates on an 718[ months actual or simulated initiation signal.
SBWRhi STS 3.7-4
-ne.
O, 09/44492
ACW}/S W m
g~
System and1 UHS [-Oper,try B 3.7.1 feactor Aeactor 6uiLA ^j Jervice B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS Cool!^3 gc,p f g Asw)
B3.7.1)StendbySer"iceWater(
)]Syste3and)UltimateHeatSink(VHS)]
BASES Nt.ap,s Operet,3 r
/ u O
(
gCWa+bASW cr c '
Ac ul pus u BACKGROUND The [NQ System 4 signe to provide cooling water for m
i the removal of heat from it auxiliaries, such as Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Syst heat exchangers, standby diesel
^ r sent L
g auch ar co4cret c, f
generators (DGs), and oom coolers for Emergency Core 6af Jrsve ca o) pw.p et Cooling System equip.ent required for a safe reactor y,[t LL c o o t e e(s, i n.5 t e m e j
shutdown following Design Basis Accident (DB
^^d s*r m e dir transient. The System also provide oling to unit
$7c# Ur Ya r[r t
components, as required, during norm utdown and reactor cL - p Cgwcu isolation modes. During a DBA, the equipment required fors ACWfU#
p u,w p coct e ry cud normal operation only is isolated from the [35WJ System, and rea c t o r ;4 te c^a t cooling is directed ay? to safety related equipmenty M
p sy' C MP) p cf Se.r cocters SSW] System consists of the [ UHS], two inde ent a
cooling
+ r headers (subsystems A and 8 their associated pu iping, valves, an strumentation. The pe,L u non-se.se A-Da t )
core [SSW] pumps, or two SW) and the high pressure gg(
hLL c element can b e.
spray service water e sized to provide 7 ;.s,La rd sufficient cooling c ity to supp he required safety M58#
fon u a tt if ref ur e e J. Durt related systems ing safe shutdown of nit following a M
a tt p Lwr ope rg$
loss of co t accident (LOCA).
Subsystems B are me,fe3lj;ottAcq reduja and service equipment in [SSW) Divisions nd 2/
p3 w v tsic as kas re@ectively.
s t-Lus-r o n e p u"P opere c43 e A; ThelVHS consists of twe mu eic m Lup wctcr Los;ns, each
+heccface,if A en._.n;ng one ccoling t wcr with twc fcn ecll: per bas 4a L oc. A c>c.c u rS th 4.
The cerbincd b::in volu; eris sized such that sufficientj.sef 3 i
Acw / Rs w s ys +em water inventory is available for all [3WLlystem post LOCA o/ecHce ^.h bc ;n cooling requirements for a 30 day period with no externaT-Afggy r.tt < t rec makeup water source available (Regulatory Guide 1.27 q 2g3 y Re f. 1). Normal makeup for ::ch basin'is provided
~c h
automatically by the {fnt Service '.l& tar Sy ten:.
r[IS la S t r* f Aod sua e on c a nweens Lm 9 rg[#
Cooling [ water is pumped from the dy keur s a y
e19 N bcsins by the hbetea Ly / /in3,}
main redundant supply headers ':ui:,;t:ntwo [3N] pumpis) to the a:c Acv)Asu'.
i surc4/ d A
,_m).
After hen +
abaue
-rhe posA 3.uc h ts j reaving heet frc: the cerpene
.the ":ter is discherged to the cccling t wcrs here the hEb
"" '.'(P on rec d erced cotue2]o[ direct = tact "ith :,mbient ir-.J (i; rejected through 1Ac j
coaccett
( d i v i.s o ^o A, a 4 ^/
l c;\\
Llsy;(en2cm3 A,oand K s.upply cooling water to redundant Q V C2 C
r i rn a s epa roic
.cLosea Loof m 'iM equipment required for a safe reactor shutdown. Additional
' a a e r. s c3 M L* +* e by i h 8- / u ^/ f d I
fr
[ *fh.t (continued) ea f
9 ea 6<
c oo t e d a ~d bock "compo^e^+e
- k t.
+ k e s uf +A e n t A BWR76. STS gcufaso 43.N-M.
O, 03/M/9A s
e tc. Aa aj e c>. Thu5i+Ae A ed re aove/
f r* ^ + h 4 COM#*OS**J
- 1+htACW j.$
tra ^S Rfft) fu +- k x A.3 W CAAA t' kk ^
u n man i rep ete s ro + u,u ts s.
[A
);gis t*0^
3 ;c ^)
/
The combined PCd/?S4 system includes #three seperate
\\ ? rfr rs (A, B and C). Each cdcj::c;n consists of the Multimate heat sink (LHS)Can independent cooling water header, an independent service water loop, and the associated pu@s, heat exchangers, piping, valves and instrunentation.
Each W y e includes two PCd pumps, two PSd pums and three R to PSd heat exchangers.
Each
_/rt e is sized to prov de sufficient cooling capacity to support the required fety-related systems in its respective division dur' g safe shutdown of the unit j,pIs,a+follcwing a loss-of-coo ant accident (LOCA).
o
);vis *i s^
i 1
6 3, 7 -1 A.
Ac.wlksu Systemand[UHSk B3.7.1)
O
\\5 ka+;n4 BASES
) 9-Il S
Hc
,RCuMw BACKGROUND information on he design and operation of the 1sS#1 System (continued) and9 UHS]Tlo with the pecific equip nt for which t h od"A gc gfgS y % System upplies co ling water is p vided in the* USAR,g SectioF"19.2. J'iind the SAR, Table 39.2-]#(Refs.2and3, 4
respectively). The F85Q System is designed to withstand a
[p e j +hree single active or passive failure, coincident with a loss of fC offsite power, without losing the capability to supply 3 7 A g 3g adequate cooling water to equipment required for safe reactor shutdown.
4cw/h W 7
Following a DBA or transient, the {$rAQ System will operate automatically without operator action. Manual initiation of supported systems (-e.g., suppressien peel coeling) is, however, performed for ier.g term cooling operationr g
y Ce h Sh7[,.c" s o m e.
RCufRsW
,pr u M APPLICABLE The volume of eaeh water nurce incorporated in 4 [U"S-]
SAFETY ANALYSES cc= plex is sized so tha sufficient water inventory is available for all System post LOCA cooling requirements for a 30 day period with no additional makeup gcg/,g3g, water source available (Ref.1). Theabilityofthe[$A(T I
System to support long term cooling of the reactor or 6, 2, f, f, 3,3,f,)
containment is assumed in evaluations of the eouloment /
ll _ reouired for safe reactor shutdown resented in the QAR, Sectionsj 9.2 M [E 2 1 -1. t._ _ and Chapter *'{15&, S (Refs. 2, 4, and 5, respectively). These analyses include
[ the evaluation of the long term primary containment resoonse
- 7. L N after a design basis LOCA. The N System provides
~ M hAso cooling water for the RHR suppression pool cooling mode to limit suppression pool temperature and primary containment pressure following a LOCA. This ensures that the primary containment can perform its intended function of limiting the release of radioactive materials to the environment M 5"
following a LOCA. The CH43 System also provides cooling to otter components assumed to function during a LOCA (e.g.,
t o ;350 c Core Spr:y cytte s). Also, the ability RHR).W I e r
to provide onsite emergency AC power is dependent on the ability of the System to cool the DGs.
Rc ulRsw S
The safety analyses for long te containment cooling were performed, as discussed in the AR, Sections i
g 6.2.1.1.3.3.1. J'and 46.2.2.3 Refs. 4 and 6, respectively),
or a LOCA, concurrent with a loss of offsite power, and min mum available DG power. The worst case single failur affecting the performance of the System AGU f6SW y
(continued)
ABWRX STS B 3.7-2 fu: v.
O, 09/28/92
l N
Acwlfsw tS6MJ System anhUHSk g
~ B 3.7.I.
ok
'W a4 A ca u t O
C a L uc-c o+
A-Nd fies 0 ;p ;of 4
j' BASES A n A h eu+ m* ^ 9' r 8
as aumed in +4 ssM c.sa 12h f one of the k+.4cie APPLICABLE is the failure standby DGs, which would in SAFETY ANALYSES turn affect one [S';W) 2 b:y:t-The [SS'.l] flew is;;;;d in (continued) the en: lyres 4r [7900] ;;r p;r p ;p tv ih h..t en han;;r (fSAR, Table [S.2
), Ref. 7).
Reference 2 discusses System performance during these conditions.
, cos;nd Aculasu ACWl$SW TheC36M] System,togetherwiththdVHS[ satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.
D w s ; onn A, 6 ub e The OPERABILITY of (sub5jit. A (Din 3ien 1) :nd : i:y;t:: B LCO
'0-;.i;i;; 2' of the $995} System is required to ensure the bg' p,5g r
errecu ve operation of the RHR System in removing heat from the reactor, and the effective operation of other safety related equipment during a DBA or transient. Requiring be4h a t t M" subsjet;;; to be OPERABLE ensures that either : t:y:t: A JM S'
- will be available to provide adequate capability to meet cooling requirements of the equipment required for safe
+po shutdown in the event of a single failure.
y,gisi
^3 Jivision A cubsystee is considered OPERABLE when:
pcynso act
$LL go ufGThe associated pumsf f(OPERABLE; i,,
Au. thret Acg f-exc Annee rs a c<.
D Ad d hol'5;.
c.K Theassociatedy0HSysOPERABLE;and-
- d. O The associated piping, valves, instrumentation, and t.ontrols required to perform the safety related function are OPERABLE.
OPERABILITY thehUHS[isbasedonamaximumwater 35 *C temperature o
]lf)with OPERABILITY of each ::t:y;t;; divWm requiring a mi mum bu4n water level at or above elevation
[100 ft ; indn] mean sea level (equivalent to an indicated level of ;t [7 Tt 3 inch::)) and four OPERABLE,C3 cecling to. r a
San +.
g The isolation of the [ddQ System to components or systems may render those components or systems inoperable, but does not affect the OPERABILITY of the @'d(] System.
" Ac w jdS HJ Rou)M W APPL ABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the Systemand)UHShre required to be OPERABLE to support OPERABILITY of the (continued)
SBWR/tSTS B 3.7-3 Rev.
Gr09/?9/9B-1
( fQCWlASW
[391Q System andhUHS[
B 3.7.1 '
BASES ACHldsv APPLICABILITY equipment serviced by the
.SystemandiUHS[andare (continued) required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.
ACW/MU 7
In MODES 4 and 5, the OPERABILITY requirements of the.599EQ System and} UHS {are de,t g ije{ b g 5 2j.; t) g gp:g+
y 4
u ns-n om %e 1.u %pw a,J u t+s -
fe h ey,"
y ACTIONS
&,1 (N or more cooling towers have one fan inoperable (i l
up to on per cooling tower inoperable), acti st be N) Q4 taken to resto he inoperable cooling to an(s) to f
OPERABLE status wit -
days.
wi+k pr e4 I The 7 day Completion T s rea ble, based on the low g
probability of cident occurring ing the 7 days that one cooli wer fan is inoperable in o more cooling tow
, the number of available systems, and ime required to complete the Required Action.
f
' ~ l';w ); a ; M I
fplpez n.
y y
y i+k I one ($EIG :;&y;teT. is inoperable [for reasons othe an 7
Con tion A 7 1t must be restored to OPERABLE statu ithin yMSW 72 hou With the unit in this condition, the aining OPERABLE SW) subsystem is adequate to perfo the heat f f-removal fun ion. However, the overall rel' bility is reduced becaus a single failure in the RABLE[SSW) subsystem could uit in' loss of [SS function. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion was develo taking into account the redundant capabili
The Required Action modified by wo Notes indicating that the applicabla Co tions of LCO 3.8.
"AC Sources-Operating," and 0 3.4.9, " Residual He Removal (RHR)
Shutdown Coo g System-Hot Shutdown," be ntered and the Required ions taken if the inoperable [SS subsystem results n an inoperable DG or RHR shutdown coo g,
res ively. This is in accordance with LCO 3.0.
nd ures the proper actions are taken for these compon ts.
(continued)
BWR/6 STS B 3.7-4 Rev. O,09/28/92
H I
k 4
A.
p,l
- 8
);visW s
7 If one RCW pump and/or one PSd pump d/or one RCW/PSd heat exchanger in the same e r/st. n is inoperable (i e.,
if '
_ _a minimum complemnt of one RCW pump, one PSd pump and two RCW/PSd heat exchangers are OPEPABLE) in h g ;sioo N i ;j:t r, action must be taken to restore cfioiS
- inoperable component (s), and thus the cd ej :
- m. affected, to OPEFABLE status within 30 days.
In this condition sufficient redundant equip ent is still available to provide cooling water to the required safety related components and sufficient heat removal capacity is still available to adequately cool safety related loads, even assuming the worst case single failure. However, in the
.M degraded mode of this condition, overall reliability is e
g;O
' recuced ano a7_j t= mry not be capable of removing heat frcan the respective RHR heat exchanger at a rate consistent with design basis assumptions and nodeling in the analy's for long tenn containment cooling (depending on other factors such, actual UHS temperature).
s as
}i0esi**
With a minimum complement of one RCW pump, one PSd pump and two RCW/PS4 heat exchangers, a c d jc a is capable of performing its safety related cooling function, consistent with design basis assumptions, for all required modes with the exception of containment cooling.
However, beyond design basis calculations performed to __ g d 7 support PPA success criteria (Ref. 250 cemonstrate that successful operation of only one of three PSR i ctra-Miv I1Ic^ 3 f
(in the suppression pool cooling mode) is needed to i
prevent conditions inside the containment from exceeding its ultimate capacity (see B 3.6.2.3). Thus, should a DBA occur while in this slightly degraded Condition, even considering a coincident worst case single failure, the cambined RCW/PSW and RHR system would retain the capability to ultimately protect containment integrity.
The 30-day Completion Time is reasonable, based on the low probability of an accident occurring during the 30 days that a component is inoperable in one or more divisio^J cpgas t.a s efr/rt^~c, the number of available redundant c$ rict-. Ef the substantial cooling capability still remaining in a J; gly /on(s)2 jst='c) in this Condition, and the expected high j ;v po^ cd j:t= availability afforded by a system where most of the equipwnt, including the minimum required for most i
functions, is normally operating.
Chc n;q.u.:el Action in r~iified bj u aue.umt.. 3 1t thO p O'iriC T Of T 3.0.I.r 0 ";CE T i'"ble.
Thic ic--
2(
f et2' gin.n ;h; si;t=tial tgee of _ cd ricry a
03'7%
p c.idcd b., llc nC'. TS' =d s w ;-l m uum aa.1-d:a ai 4
T 9 crt c;~ a;iem l m...rj
~ '
^
d d3 -.rgi".Ollj" I 7 0$C$ COnditiC"
i f
7f B.1 and B.2 If one RCW/RSW division is inoperable for' reasons other than Condition A, then, immediately, those required feature (s) supported by the inoperable RCW/RSW division must be declared inoperable (e.g., Emergency Diesel Generator, RHR heat exchanger, drywell coolers, RIP coolers,_etc.) and the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of the appropriate LCOs for the inoperable required feature (s) must be entered. For example, applicable Conditions of LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating," LCO 3.4.7, " Residual Heat Removal-(RHR) Shutdown Cooling System-Hot Shutdown," LCO 3.4.1,
" Reactor Internal Pumps (RIP) Operating," and LCO 3.6.1.5, "Drywell Air Temperature" be entered and the Required Actions taken if the inoperable RCW/RSW division results in an inoperable DG, RHR shutdown cooling, RIPS or drywell coolers, respectively. This is in accordance with LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for these components.
Additionally, immediate action must-be taken to restore the inoperable RCW/RSW division to OPERABLE status. This is consistent with the Required Actions of the applicable LCOs for those support feature (s) declared inoperable as a result of the inoperable RCW/RSW division.
i
MCWh5W g
g3 My
{39t] System an U
0 0P%+,,J.
I BASES l--+
eoM or W
ACTIONS CM D. I, D. g_, D. 3 a n ) D. y pcp ou (continued) f A
If the C360 : b:y n w. cannot be restored to OPERABLE status withintheassociatedComk[etionTime,orbe-l.[5 l
1/Q
[4C y/ g& v cubry:t=~ are inoperable for reasons other than s
'I' 8 (ConditionAT,'ortheQ:
UHS Ts determined inoperable f e j
/
ra:-;=FeU= r dc :
St4a
^], the unit must be placed in C
a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.
g C W h id SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.1.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR ensures a equate long term (30 days) cooling can be maintained. With heMUHST5Tatersourcebelowtheminimum
--i level, the affected rf:y:t+m must be declared inoperable. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Frequency is based on operating experience related to trending of the parameter variations during the applicable MODES.
SR 3.7.1.2 f?S W This SR verifies the water leve in each pump well of the intake structurel5To be sufficient for the proper f
operation of the pumps (net positive suction head and g
pump vortexing are c nsidered in determining this limit).
The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Frequen is based on operating experience related to trending of the parameter variations during the
- applicable MODES.
ASU
[(AJ f dIW
~
SR 3.7.1.3 Verification of the UHS e erature ensures that the heat g
removal capability of the System is within the r6 assumptions of the DBA analysis. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Frequency is based on operating experience related to trending of the
_ parameter variations during the applicable MODES.
(continued)
SBWR/tSTS B 3.7-5
- b..O,09/25792
L 4
cw) tkr o ACW}AJu div13fons m u s + be 1
l I'eStored Fo OA"4A 6Le QSta+us m hys.
- n V { #~
C.1 an d C.').
O(
s tod S(on If one Pcd 7 and/or one RS4 pump and/or one RCV/PSd heat exchan er in the same c i si; L is inoperabl in
" TE two se(4 rate h:itm, one PCd/PSd 32: St ;; diV'3 EC^
must be restored to OPEP M LE status within 7 daysk
- In this condition sufficient redundant equipnent is still available to provide cooling water to the required safety related components and sufficient heat removal capacity is still available to adequately cool safety related loads. However, a si sf a f may not be capable ot j'.Y ' 8 '."^
removing heat from the respective RHR heat exchanger at a rate consistent with design basis assumptions and modeling in the analyis for long term containment cooling. Nonetheless, with a minmum complement of one i
RCW pump, one PSd pump and two RCW/FS4 heat exchangers, a Jivision edristcm is still capable of perfoming its safety related cooling function, consistent with design basis i
assunptions, for all other modes.
Furthermore, beyond g7 design basis calculations perfomed to support PRA M M185 pf success criteria (Ref. du cemonstrate that only one of
_ g three nhx siu,nas (in the suppression pool' cooling i
mode) is needed to ultimately protect containment integrity (see B 3.6.2.3). Therefore, continued operation for a limited time is justified. However, in the degraded mode of this condition, overall reliability and heat removal capability is reduced from that of Condition A, and thus a more restrictive Completion Time is inposed.
.ob W
); Vi 3 ^7 4
The 7 day Ccmpleti Tim #id nable, based on the low probability of an ccident occurring during the 't::shes AsN=d that one or nore edundant components are Inoperable in one o r '"c r (
=> 21 := cir,ct=c, the number of available redundant divi 3 ^ ) sic /ctas, the substantial cooling capability still M g.4.
' re aining in h in this Condieion, and the M *,V ' J '.* ^
s expected high ofzjatarava11 ability :_4crded he a system where most of the equignent, including the minmum required for most functions, is non ally operating.
% e m lieu e n i: ~~a 4 # i u "1 e
- i ndi m i ng tP;t -
the applicilc Canditi;= cf LT 3. t.( f "rzsidal' =
2 r.cc=1 'F2"" $2t% Cccli.;;
1cd..J Le c.4Lc. &l And DWNirAd MtiO= tdr if the in;p il; P.C ?D'
[ " ^ s M __ -.r05210C 4" n" 4 "AN'*10 r;4 ml FH.-1&dev. ?
-COOlins a idy:=Lt5n.
L.13 i: ;#. =C Op5i;- 2: !_T 3 C. $ ; id' erho Je y.cper actic= acc tah. 6 LL 2 g
CO."pOnr_itw.
6 3/P M gsv, d w LA-
~w er
,_4
Acu)ASW r
[tSWfSystemandh0HS[opeMyl B 3.7.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE
%.7.1.4
~
/
REQUIREMENTS (continued)
Operating ea oling tower fan for 2 15 minute res that all fans are and that all ated controls e
are functioning properly.
o res that fan or motor failure, or excessive vibrat a
detected for-corrective action.
Th day Frequency
- ased on operating exper
, the known reliability o fan
- units, undancy available, and the low proba t of sj icant degradation of the cooling tower fans occur
/ between Surveillances.
/200 Verifying the correct alignment for each,fmanu
);gisi**
operated, and automatic valve in each [5H() May5 tem flow path provide assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for 154t[] operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, 7
since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position and yet considered in the correct position, provided it can be automatically realigned to its accident position. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position.
This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.
This SR is modified by a Note indicating that isolation of kg SSW 6 System to components or systems may render those components or systems inoperable, but does not affect the OPERABILITY of the [3$ liq System. Assuch,whenall[.W4]~A6"/h pumps, valves,andpipingareOPERABLE,butabranch connection off the mqin header is isolated, the yACv/R System is still OPERABLE.
4 AC u /AS,W The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct valve positions.
(continued)
[)BWRM STS B 3.7-6 te. O,09/28/92
Aca]Asw p%CJ System an[{ UHS [
B 3.7.1 BASES i
n) L i m t r l non
.sa fe4 Y.
3 e
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.1.4 r e latd eg u e'A * * ^$
REQUIREMENTS (continued)
This SR verifies that the aut matic isolation valves of the W System will automatical y switch to the safety or
$CU N emergency position to provid cooling water exclusively to the safety related equipment during an accident event.
This is demonstrated by use of an actual or simulated initiation signal.
This SR also verifies the automatic start fibility of th M pump
- ad ::, cling tetter fens in each 8CW g g g;ssb::::y:ter. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.5.1.I' y
/gg, g f d function.
omplete testing of the safety-overlaps this SR to provide s+ wlby gsA
% erating experience has shown that th se components usually j3 ;I ed passtheSRwhenperformedonthe318hnthFrequency.
A
{j g p p Therefore, this Frequency is concluded to be acceptable from y
gg geg a reliability standpoint.
I
- e. vcAans 4 N REFERENCES 1.
Regulatory Guide 1.27, Revision 2, January 1976.-
s II
~~)
- /SAR,Sectioh9.2.ff
/SAR, TablPI9.2-1[
S g 6 W A ^.L
/4
/SAR,SectionD6.2.1.1.3.3.1.4{.
4.
5.
/SAR,ChapterhlS[
s 6.
/SAR,SectioD6.2.2.3[
f"9, LLb [0.2 2}, C L & T IS (
7.
i l
i SBWR M STS B 3.7-7
-Rev.
G,03/20/42 J