ML20058H764
| ML20058H764 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 10/31/1990 |
| From: | Breeding R, Helton J, Murfin W, Laura Smith SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES) |
| References | |
| CON-FIN-A-1322 NUREG-CR-4551, NUREG-CR-4551-V3R1P2, NUREG-CR-4551P2, SAND86-1309, NUDOCS 9011260020 | |
| Download: ML20058H764 (386) | |
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NUREG/CR-4551 SAND 86-1309 Vol. 3, Rev.1, Part 2
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Evaluation of l Severe Accident Risks: )
Surry Unit 1 Appendices -
Prepared by i
R. J. Breeding, J. C. Helton, W.11. Murfin, L N. Smith 1^
Sandia National Laboratories Operated by- ,
! Sandia Corporation Prepared for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission k
9011260020 DR 901031 ADOCK 05000280 PDR
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- DISCLAIMER NOTICE l
This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agercy of the United States Govemment.
Neither the Unitod States Govemment nor any agency thereof, or any of their employees, makes any warranty, exprosed or impiled, or assumos any legal liability of responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of such use, of any information, apparatus, product or process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by such third party would not infringo privately owned rights.
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E NUREG/CR--4551 SAND 86-1309 Vol. 3, Rev.1, Part 2 Evaluation of Severe Accident Risks:
Surry Unit 1 Appendices Manuscript Completed: July 1990 Date Published: October 1990 Prepared by R. J. Breeding, J. C. licitoni, W.11. Murfin*, L N. Smith 3 Sandia National Laboratories Albuquerque, NM 87185 Prepared for Division of Systems Research Omce of Nuclear Regulatory Research U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- Washington, DC 20555 NRC FIN A1322
. ' Arizona State University,Tempe, AZ trechnadyne Engineering Consultants,Inc., Albuquerque, NM 3 Science Applications International Corporation. Albuquerque, NM
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APPENDIX A i SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR THE i ACCIDENT PROGRESSION ANALYSIS l t
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CONTENTS INTRODUCTION....................................................... A.1 A.1 ACCIDENT PROGRESSION EVENT TREE........................... A.1 A.1.1 Detailed Description of the Surry APET............. A.1 A.1.2 Listing of the Accident Progression Event Tree.. ... ................................. A.1.2-1 A.1.3 Description of the Surry Binner.................... A.1.3-1 A.1.4 Lis ting o f the Surry Binne r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A.1.4 1 A.1.5 Description of the Surry Rebinner.................. A.1.5 1 A.1.6 Listing of the Surry Rebinner...................... A.1.6 1 A. 2 DESCRIPTION AND LISTING OF THE USER FUNCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . , A.2.1.1 A.2.1 Description of the User Function for the Surry APET............................... A.2.1-1 A.2.2 Listing of the Surry APET' User Function............ A.2.2-6 A.3 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING THE ACCIDENT PROGRESSION ANALYSIS..................................... A.3,1-1 A.3.1 Basic Information About the Plant.................. A.3.1-1 A.3.2 Initialization Quastinns......................... . A.3.2-1 A 3.2.1 APET Initialization for Internally-Initiated Accidents.......................... A.3.2-1 A.3.2.2 APET Initialization for Fire-Initiated Accidents.......................... A.3.2-5 A.3.2.3 APET Initialization for Seismically-Initiated A:cidents.......................... A.3.2-6
- j. A.3.2.4 Listing of the First 13 APET Questions for Each PDS Group.................A.3.2-11 A.3.3 Additional Discussions of Selected Questions....... A.3.3 1 o
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CONTENTS (continued)
FIGURES A.2 1 Process Used to Determine the Mode of Containment Failure for Fast Pressure Rise........................A.2.1 3 A.3-1 Mean and 90% Bounds of the Offsite Power Recovery Distributions for Surry...............................A.3.3 4 TABLES A.3 1 Timing Information for Surry Blackout PDSs.............A 3.3 6 A.3-2 Timing in STCP PWR Blackout Sequences..................A.3.3 7 1 A.3 3 Timing in STCP PWR LOCA Sequences......................A.3.3 7
'A. 3 Electric Power Recovery Times for Surry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. 3. 3 8 A.3-5. Electric Power Recovery Times for Surry................A.3.3-9 T
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APPENDIX A SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR THE ACCIDENT PROGRESSION ANALYSIS INTRODUCTION Appendix-A contains information and details about the accident progression analysis. Appendix A,1 contains a detailed description and listing of the Accident Progression Event Tree (APET) and the binner that groups the outcomes of evaluating the APET. Appendix A.2 contains a description and listing of the user function. The user function is a FORTRAN function subprogram which is called by EVNTRE when instructed to do so by the event tree. Appendix A.3 contains additional information about the accident progression analysis: basic information about the plant, and a discussion of how the initialization questions (1 through 13) of the APET were quantified.
l A.1 ACCIDENT PROGRESSION EVENT TREE A brief description of the Surry APET is given in Section 2.3, and the binner is treated in Section 2.4 The material in these sections is not repeated here. The 71 questions in the Surry APET are listed concisely in Table 2.3 1. This appendix consists of four subsections. Subsection A l.1 contains a discussion of each question in the Surry APET. The event tree itself is too large to be depicted graphically and exists only in computer input; format , which appears in Subsection A.l.2. Subsection A.l.3 is a detailed discussion of the binner, and Subsection A,1.4 contains a listing of the binner, which, like the APET itself, exists only in computer input format.
A l.1 Detailed Description of the Surry APE"'
This Subsection contains a description of the surry APET. It is meant to be used with Subsection A.1.2 to explain the computer imput. The meaning of types of questions and the uses of branches and cases is explained in Referenco A-1.
A-1 J. M. Griesmeyer and L. N. Smith, "A Reference Manual for the Event Progression Analysis Code (EVNTRE)", Sandia National Laboratories, NUREG/CR-5174, SAND 88-1607, September 1989.
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Question 1. Size and Location of the RCS Break when the Core Uncovers?
6 Branches, Type 1 The branches for this question are:
- 1. Brk A A large break in the RCS, equivalent to the break of a pipe greater than 2 in. in diameter,
- 2. Brk 52 A small break in the RCS, equivalent to the break of a pipe between 0.5 and 2 in, in diameter. _
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- 3. Brk S3 A very'small break in the RCS, equivalent to the break of a l pipe less than 0.5 in. in diameter.
i 4 Brk-V A break in an interfacing system has opened a path from <
inside the RCS to outside the containment. The size is l equivalent to an A break. l
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5, B SGTR 'An SGTR has occurred. The size is equivalent to an S3 break.
- 6. B PORV There is no break in the RCS; any loss of coolant will be through the cycling PORV or SRV. '
The branch taken in this question depends solely on the first PDS ,
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-there is no break in the RCS pressure boundary, the RCS pressure will be j maintained near the PORV setpoint, around-2500 psia. B-PORV is v.ed to )'
represent this situation. A stuck open PORV or SRV is consida d to be an S2 break. Note that this question determines the condition of the RCS pressure boundary at the time,the water level had decreased to the. top of active fuel (TAF). This~is taken to be the' onset of core damage and marks the transition ; from ' the a'ccident frequency analysis to the accident ]
progression analysis. If an accident initiated by a transient event bs ,
had a reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal failure before the uncovering of TAF (UTAF), the first characteristic of the PDS is "S", 3 and the third branch ;
is taken. Similarly, a transient event in which the PORV(s) stick open before ' the UTAF is designated an "S" 2 PDS and the second branch is !
indicated . at this question of the APET. Thus the branch taken in this ;
question may not reflect the original accident initiator. :
For some PDS groups, all the probability is assigned to one branch is an j obvious manner, e.g., Branch 6 (B-PORV, no break) for Groups 3 (Fast SBO) t and 5 (Transients) and Branch 4 (Brk-V) for Group 4 (Event V), Other-groups contain several PDSs that have different size breaks or no break at all. For example, PDS Group 1, Slow SBO, contains "T", "S",
3 and "S 2" PDSs. For groups like this, the probability is divided among the branches accordin5 to the frequency of the relevant PDSs relative to-the total group frequency. For example, PDS Group 1, Slow SBO, contains two "T" PDSs. If the frequency of these two PDSs together is 0.567 of the total frequercy of Group 1, then 0.567 is the probability of Branch 6, B PORV. When the APET i A.l.1 1
k is evaluated in the sampling mode, the division of the probability between the branches varies from observation-to-observation and is determined for each observation by TDiAC4. For PDS Group 3, the quantification of this question is:
Branch 1: Brk-A - 0.0 Branch 2: Brk-S2 - 0.0 Branch 3: Brk-S3 - 0.0 Branch 4: Brk-V - 0.0 Branch 5: B-SGTR - 0.0 Branch 6: B-PORV - 1.0 Question 2. Has the Reaction been Brought under Control?
2 Branches, Type 1 The branches for this question are:
- 1. Scram The nuclear reaction in the core has been brought under control by insertion of the control rods or boron injection.
- 2. no-Scram The nuclear reaction in the core has not been brought under control.
The branch taken in this question depends upon the PDS group being analyzed. No PDS characteristic was defined for scram - no scram.
Branch 1 is taken for all PDS groups except Group 6. PDS Group 6 consists of accidents initiated by anticipated transient without scram (ATWS);
Branch 2 is taken for this group.
This question is used with the previous question to determine the RCS pressure at UTAF. For example, if the PORVs are stuck open in the absence of steam generator (SG) cooling, the RCS pressure will be much lower at UTAF if scram occurred than if scram did not occur. If scram occurred, the boiling rate in the core would be relatively low, and the RCS pressure with the PORVs stuck open is expected to be around 500 psia or lower. If the control rods cannot be inserted, boiling would occur at a rate high enough to keep the PORVs open all the time, so the RCS would be at the PORV setpoint pressure, around 2500 psia. Whether scram occurred is not very impertant for determining the RCS pressure at VB. to the water level decreases below TAF, more and more of the core will lose the neutron-moderating effect of the liquid water, and the nuclear reaction will decrease. For PDS Group 3, the quantification of this question is:
Branch 1: Scram - 1.0 Branch 2: no-Scram - 0.0 Question 3. For SGTR, are the Secondary System SRVs Stuck Open?
2 Branches, Type 1 The branches for this question are:
- 1. SSRV-St0 One or more safety / relief valves on the secondary system are stuck in the open position.
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- 2. SSRVnSto No safety / relief valves on the secondary system are stuck in the open position.
The branch taken in this question depends solely on the first PDS characteristic.
This question is of f.nterest only for the seventh internal initiator PDS group, SGTR. It is used to discriminate between those PDSs which have "11" for the first characteristic (SGTR with the SRVs on the secondary system stuck open) and those which have "G" for the first characteristic (" normal" SGTR). k'hether the secondary SRVs are stuck open is important in determin-
[-- ing the source term. For all PDS groups except Group 7, the second branch is indicated. The quantification for Group 7 is a function of the relative frequency of the "C" and " 11 " PDSs. k' hen the APET is evaluated in the sampling mode, this changes from observation to observation. For each observation, the quantification is determined by TEMAC4. For PDS Group 3, the quantification of this question is:
, Branch 1: SSRV-St0 - 0.0 J Branch 2: SSRVnSt0 1.0 Status of ECCS?
Question 4.
4 Branches, Type 2, 4 Cases The branches for this question are:
- 2. BaECCS The ECCS are available and can operate when electric power is restored.
- 3. BfECCS The ECCS is failed, end is not recoverable.
- 4. B LPIS The LPIS is operating (but not necessarily injecting water into the RCS); the HPIS is failed.
The branch taken depends upon the second PDS characteristic and upon the branch taken at Questions 1 and 3.
The first branch is chosen for those PDSs where both HPIS and LPIS are
. operating at the UTAF. However, water may not be entering the vessel because the RCS pressure is too high. Indeed, the fact that the TAF is uncovered indicates that sufficient injection is not taking place. Branch 1 is taken, for example, when all AFW has failed, the RCS is intact, and
_ bleed and feed has failed because the PORVs cannot be opened, but all ECCS are operable.
The second branch is used in blackout situations with no ECCS failures; if
_ or when power is recovered, the ECCS will function. The third branch is selected when the failures are in the ECCS themselves, and there is no recovery within the timeframe of this analysis. Since the period in which the ECCS operate in the injection mode occurs before the uncovering of the A.1.1-3
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i core, the third branch is chosen for those PDS's in which the ECCS never operate as well as those PDS's in which the ECCS operate in the inj ection mode and fail in the recirculation mode. The fourth branch indicates that HPIS is failed, but that LPIS is operating. As in the situations for which Branch 1 applies, core damage occurs because the RCS pressure is so high that no injection results. The third branch is chosen for Eevent V since much of the water injected by the LPIS goes out the break and a sufficient amount does not reach the core. +
Case 1: There was a large break in the RCS when the core uncovered.
This case is used to select the A and S PDSs t in PDS Group 2, loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs) and EQ 3, Seismic LOCAs, so that the status of the ECCS can be assigned correctly. In . the sampling mode, the quantification of this case for these two groups depends upon the ;
frequency of the A and S3 PDSs relative to the total group frequency.
This varies from observation to observation, and is determined by TEMAC4. For PDS Group 3 Fast SBO, this case does not apply.
Case 2: There was a small or very small break in the RCS when the core uncovered. This case selects the S2 and S 3 PDSs in several PDS groups so that the status of the ECCS can be assigned correctly. For PDS Group 2, LOCAs, all the probability is assigned to Branch 4, B LPIS, as both the PDSs for which this case applies, SaLYY YYN and S LYY 2 Y W .
have the LPIS operating. For PDS Group 6, all the probability is assigned to Branch 3, BfECCS, since no ECCS is available in S NYY 3 YXN.
Some portion of PDS Groups 1 (SBO) and EQ 2 (seismic SBO) also satisfy the requirement for this case; Branch 2, BaECCS, is appropriate as in all SB0 accidents. For the Fire PDS Group, Branch 3, BfECCS, is specified as the fire has failed all ECCS capability in every PDS. For seismic group EQ 1, loss of offsite power (LOSP), Branch 3 is also chosen as the only PDS for which this case applies has no ECCS available. For seismic group Eq 3, LOCAs, two of the "S" 2 PDS have LPIS available and one does not. The probability is split between Branches 3 and 4. When the APET is evaluated in the sampling mode, the quantification of this case for EQ 3 depends upon the relative frequency of the three "S 2" PDSs. This case does not apply to internal PDS Group 3, Fast SBO.
Case 3: The initiating event was an SGTR and the SRVs on the main steam line from the affected SG did not reclose. This is indicated by an "H" for the first PDS characteristic. This case separates the "H" SGTRs from the "G" SGTRs in PDS Group 7. The "G" SGTRs have the IPIS operating at UTAF; the "H" SGTRs do not. Branch 3 BfECCS, is specified for the "H" PDSs in this case. The ECCS are failed because the contents of the RWST have escaped out the break and the sump is dry.
Case 4: This' case applies if the RCS is intact when the top of active i fuel uncovers, or if the initiator is Event V or an SGTR with the secondary system SRVs reclosing ("G" SGTRs). The quantification foc each PDS group depends upon the second PDS characteristic in a straightforward manner except for PDS Group 5, Transients, and Group EQ 1, Seismic LOSP (No SBO). For the Transient Group, the probability is A.1.1 4
split between Branches 1 and 4 according tbt the second PDS charac-teristic, and for the Seismic LOSP Group, the probability is split between Branches 1, 3, and 4 similarly. When the APET is evaluated in the sampling mode, the quantification of this case for these two PDS Groups depends upon the relative frequency of the PDSs in each observation as determined by TEMAC4 Thus the quantification changes from observation to observation. For PDS Group 3, Fast SBO, the quantification is:
Branch 1: B ECCS 0.0 Branch 2: BaECCS 1.0 Branch 3: BfECCS - 0.0 Branch 4: B LPIS 0.0 Question 5. RCS Depressurization by the Operators?
3 Branches, Type 2, 3 Cases The branches for this question are:
- 2. OpmDePr The operators did not open the PORVs to depressurize the RCS before UTAF, but they may do so after UTAF.
- 3. OpnDePr The operators did not open the PORVs to depressurize the RCS before UTAF when they should have, so no credit can be given for their openin6 the PORVs after UTAF.
The branch taken depends upon the PDS group and upon the branch taken at Questions 1 and 3.
For use in Question 18, it is necessary to know if the operators can be given credit for opening the PORVs after UTAF. The Surry emergency procedures direct the operators to open the PORVs when the core' exit thermocouples reach _1200F if ac power is available. 'If the PORVs were not opened before UTAF when they should have been, due to either human error or hardware failures,- no credit is given for deliberate opening of the PORVs after UTAF.
For the internal and seismic SBO.PDS groupe, the operators are prohibited from opening the PORVs by the lack of ac power, to Branch 3 is specified.
For the A, S, t and S 2 breaks, opening the - PORVs will have a negligi'Ae effect and the question is moot. .For the Transient PDS Group and tF.e S3 PDS in the internally initiated LOCA group, the operators have failed to open the PORVs before UTAF or the PORVs are stuck closed. In either case no credit is given for 'delibefate opening of the-. PORVs in the accident progression analysis and Branch 3-is chosen. For the ATWS initiators, it was estimated that the operators would be too busy attempting to shut down the reaction before UTAF to open the PORVs, and the PORVs would be kept continuously open by escaping steam in any event. Thus operators may open the PORVs after UTAF and Branch 2 is taken. For the SGTR initiators if the operators failed to follow procedures and did not depressurize the RCS by normal means, no credit is given for their opening the PORVs after UTAF.
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In the Fire PDS Group, the operators may open the PORVs if the control and power wiring to the PORVs has not been disabled by the fire. For the seismic initiators, it was estimated that the operators would be too busy coping with the effects of the earthquake to open the PORVs before UTAF.
Thus the operators may open the PORVs after UD.F (Branch 2) in all the seismic PDSs with ac power, unless hardware or power failures make it impossible.
Case 1: There was a very small break in the RCS when the core uncovered. This case is used to separate out the S3 PDSs in Fire and Seismic LOSP (No SBO) PDS Groups. In the PDS due to fire in the emergency switchgear room, S3 NNN NDN, the power to operate the PORVs is lost and Branch 3 is chosen. In the other two S3 Fire PDSs, Branch 2 is chosen, in PDS uroup EQ 1, the operators may depressurize (Branch
- 2) i the only PDS (S3 NNY NYN) that goes to this case. When the APET is e. ;uated in the sampling mode, the quantification of this case for the Fire PDS Group depends upon the relative frequency of the "S "3 PDSs in each observation as determined by TEMAC4. This case does not apply to the Fast SB0 PDS Group.
Case 2: This case applies only to the "ll" SGTRs in PDS Group 7. In HINY NXY, the operators failed to follow procedures and did not depressurize the RCS by normal means; no credit is given for their opening the PORVs af ter UTAF (Branch 3) . In llINY YXY, the PORVs are stuck open and Branch 1 is specified. When the APET is evaluated in the sampling mode, the quantification of this case depends upon the relative frequency of the two "H" PDSs.
Case 3: This case includes all the initial conditions not covered in the first two cases: RCS intact, or any break except an S 3 , or a "G" SG1R. For internal PDS Groups 1 and 3, and Seismic Group EQ 2, there is no electrical power and the procedures prohibit depressurization, so Branch 3 is specified. For PDS Group 2, LOCAs, Branch 3 is chosen. In the only PDS where opening the PORVs will have a significant effect, SaLYY-YYN , the operators have failed to open the PORVs before UTAF to allow the LPIS to inject. In the other PDSs, the break is more effective in depressurizing the RCS'the open PORVs would be, so whether the PORVs are. opened is irrelevant. For PDS Group 4, Event V, the break is large and opening the PORVs will have no effect on the RCS pressure. For PDS Group 5, Transients, Branch 3 is specified since the PORVs cannot be opened from the control room due to hardware failures (TBYY-YNY) or the operators failed to open the PORVs before UTAF (TLYY-YNY). For the ATWS Group, Branch 2 is taken as discussed above. In the - SGTR Group, GLYY-YNY has the PORVs are open (Branch 1) since the operators are attempting to cool the core by bleed and feed. In GLYY-YXY, the operators failed to open the PORVs when they should have, so Branch 3 is indicated. In the Fire PDS Group, the operators may deliberately depressurize the RCS (Branch 2) for the only fire PDS (S3 NNY-NXY) for which case 3 applies. In Seismic PDS Group EQ 1, LOSP (no SBO), the operators may open the PORVs (Branch 2) for all PDSs except TBYP-YNY where the PORVs can not be opened because of hardware or electrical failures. In Group EQ 3, Seismic LOCAs, Branch 2 is also specified for all PDSs although the opening of the PORVs will have no A.1.1-6
l discernible effect in the APET. For all PDS Groups except SGTR and Seismic LOSP (No SBO),_all the probability is assigned to one branch as discussed above. When the APET is evaluated the sampling mode, the quantification of this case for SGTR and Seismic LOSP varies with the observation. For the SCTR F7S Group, it depends upon the relative frequencies of GLYY YNY and GLYY YXY. For the Seismic LOSP Group, it depends upon the frequency of TBYP YNY relative to the total frequency of the group. This case applies to PDS Group 3, Fast SBO, and the quantification for this PDS group is:
Branch 1: Op-DePr - 0.0 Branch 2: OpmDePr - 0,0 Branch 3: OpnDePr - 1.0 Question 6. Status of Sprays?
4 Branches, Type 2, 4 Gases The branches for this question are:
- 1. B Sp The containment sprays are operating or are operable in the recirculation mode.
- 2. BaSp. The containment sprays are available and can operate when electric power is restored.
- 3. BfSp The containment sprays are failed in the recirculation mode and are not recoverable.
4 nob SWHX The sprays themselves are operable, but heat removal from the spray heat exchangers by the service water system is failed and cannot be restored.
The branch taken depends upon the third PDS characteristic, and upon the branches taken at Questions 1 and 3.
This question concerns the sprays during the period of core degradation, so only the recirculation' mode'of the containment sprays-is of interest. The branch BfSp does not mean that the sprays did not operate in the injection mode. ' The spray injection pumps are high capacity pumps (3000 gpm) and the entire contents of the RWST can be injected into the containment in about 35 minutes if both spray injection pumps _ and all high-pressure inj ection (HPI) pumps are operating at capacity. If little HPI is required, then it may take about an hour for the spray pumps alone to empty the RWST. Thus the injection mode of containment spray is over before the core uncovers or shortly after it uncovers. Whether or not the water from che RWST has been transferred to.the containment and is in the cavity is covered in Question
- 7. There are no significant PDSs for Surry in which the sprays operate only in the recirculation mode. High pressures do not occur in the containment for Event V or SGTR due to the break location, so the sprays are not initiated. Both recirculation sprays and heat removal' from the heat exchangers by service water are required for containment heat removal.
For branch BaSp, service water flow to the heat exchangers will be restored when _the containment sprays are restored to operation following power A.1.1-7
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recovery. The fourth branch is chosen for the service water failure sequences which lead to containment failure before core melt - (the " Core
-Vulnerable" sequences). No significant core vulnerable sequences were identified for Surry, so this branch is not used, i
Case 1: There was a small break in the RCS when the core uncovered. l This case is used to select the S PDSs 2 in the Fire and Seismic LOCA PDS Groups. In the sampling mode, the quantification of this case for ,
Seismic LOCAs depends upon the frequency of the S2 PDSs with a "Y" for l the third PDS characteristic relative to the total frequency for all (
the S2 PDSs in the group. This varies from observation to-observation, and is determined by TDIAC4. For PDS Group 3, Fast SBO, this case does not apply.
Case 2: There was a very small bresk in the RCS.when the core uncovered. This case selects the S PDSs 3 in the Fire and Seismic LOSP (No SBO) PDS groups so that the status of the sprays can be assigned correctly. In the sampling mode, the quantification of this case for the Fire PDS Group depends upon the frequency of the S3 PDSs with a "Y" for the third PDS characteristic relative to the total frequency for all the S 3 PDSs in the group. This varies from observation to-observation, and is determined by TDiAC4. This case does not apply to PDS Group 3, Fast SBO. l Case 3: The initiating event was an SCTR and the SRVs on the main steam line from the affected SG did not reclose. This is indicated by an "H" for the first PDS characteristic. This case separates the "H" SGTRs from the "G" SGTRs in PDS Group 7. _In the "H" SGTRs, the water from the RCS and that injected by the HPIS escapes -into the secondary system through the break, and then out through the stuck-open SRV(s) on the main steam line. In HINY-NXY, there is no release of primary !
coolant into the containment, there is no need for containment sprays prior to vessel failure, and at that time the. RWST is empty and the sump is dry. In HINY-YXY, the PORVs are stuck open, there is a release j of - primary coolant into the containment, and the containment sprays l operate before vessel failure. The HPIS and the sprays recirculate the water from the sump, but some is always being lost out the ruptured tube, and eventually the sump runs dry. The reactor cavity is full at j this time, but there is no way for the pumps to take suction from the cavity. Branch 3, BfSp, is indicated for this case for both "H" PDSs.
Case 4: This case applies if the RCS is intact at UTAF, or if there is a large break-in the RCS, or if the initiator is Event V or an SGTR with the secondary system SRVs reclosing ("G" SGTRs). The quantifica-tion for each PDS group depends upon the third PDS characteristic. In the sampling mode, the quantification of this case for Seismic LOSP (No -j SBO) and for Seismic LOCAs depends upon the frequency of the PDSs with a "Y" for the third PDS characteristic relative to the total frequency for all the PDSs in the group. This varies from observation to-observation, and is determined by TEMAC4. For PDS Group 3, Fast SBO, the quantification is: }
l A.1.1-8
Branch 1: B-Sp 0.0 Branch 2: BaSp - 1.0 Branch 3: BfSp - 0.0 Branch 4: nob SWHX - 0.0 Question 7. Status of Fan Coolers?
3 Branches, Type 1 The branches for this question are:
- 1. B FC The fan coolers are initially operating or operable.
- 2. BaFC The fan coolers are available and can operate when electric power is restored.
- 3. BfFC The fan coolers are initially failed and are not recoverable.
The third branch is always chosen for Surry since the fan coolers at Surry were not designed for operation during severe accidents. Cooling of the containment with the fan coolers during the -initial stages of severe accidents at Surry is considered in the accident frequency analysis.
However, service water to the fan coolers is isolated upon containment isolation, and injection of the contents of the RWST into the containment will place the . fan coolers partially under water. Thus, operation of the fan coolers at Surry after the onset of core damage is not considered in the accident progression analysis. Thus, for all PDS Croups at Surry, the quantification is:
Branch 1: B FC - 0.0 Branch 2: BaFC 0.0 Branch 3: BfFC - 1.0 Question 8. Status of AC Power?
3 Branches, Type 1 The branches for this question are:
- 1. B ACP AC electrical power is available from offsite or from the diesel generators (DGs) throughout the accident.
- 2. BaACP AC electrical power is not available, but may be recovered.
- 3. BfACP .AC electrical power is not available, and cannot be recovered.
The branch taken depends upon the fourth pdc characteristic.
For internal initiators, LOSP and failure of the'DGs to start (SBO) leads to the second branch since offsite power may always be restored. For seismic initiators, SB0 leads to the third branch since LOSP due to an-earthquake will not be restored within the time of interest for this analysis. PDSs that have power available at some locations in the plant but which have switchgear, bus, or motor control center failures that l t
1 A.1.1 9 '
i l
prevent power from reaching the pumps and valves of the ECCS or spray systems are denoted by the letter "P" in this characteristic (for Partially available). These occur only in the EQ 1 PDS Group, Seismic LOSP (No SBO).
The third branch of this question is specified for this group since the ECCS and spray failures are indicated separately by the second and third PDS characteristics. The effect of having ac power available when the ECCS and sprays are failed is only to indicate that an ignition source is likely to be present in the containment when a significant amount of hydrogen has accumulated after VB. For PDS Group 3 Fast SBO, the quantification is:
Branch 1: B ACP 0.0 Branch 2: BaACP 1.0 Branch 3: BfACP 0.0 t
Question 9. RWST Injected into Containment? !
3 Branches. Type 2, 4 Cases The branches for this question are:
- 2. RWSTaln The contents of the RWST have not been injected into the containment, but can be injected if ac power is recovered.
- 3. RWSTfIn The contents of the RWST have aot been inj ected into the containment, and cannot be inj ec ted even if power is recovered.
The branch taken depends upon the fif th PDS characteristic and upon the branch taken at Questions 1 and 3.
The branch taken .'n this question is used to determine whether the reactor cavity is full of water. At Surry, there is. no - connection between the cavity and the sumps at or near the floor (basemat) level. A hatch in the in core instrumentation room, which is open to the reactor cavity, provides the connection between the cavity and the rest of the containment. This hatch is 23.5 ft above the cavity floor. Even if the entire primary coolant inventory and the contents of the RWST are transferred to the sump, the sump and the floor outside the shield wall are not filled to the point where any water will spill over into the cavity. Thus the only way to fill the cavity (capacity 12,000 ft,3 including the in core instrumentation room) is for the sprays to operate. The spray water falling instde the shield wall and inside the refueling area will drain into the "eactor cavity.
In the PDS groups except V and SGTR (discussed in Cases 3 and 4 below), if the water in the RWST is pumped out, it will be transferred to the contain-ment. If the water is not injected directly into the containment by the spray injection system, it is injected into the RCS by the HPIS or LPIS and escapes into the containment through the initiating break, or through the PORVs or SRVs if there is no break in the RCS, If the water from the RWST escapes from the RCS through a break, it will flow to the containment sump.
A.1.1 10
)
1
The escape of a large amount of RCS inventory into the containment will increase the radiation levels in the containment. For this analysis, the sprays are-always initiated in response to these high radiation levels.
Based on the opinion of plant personnel that all the spray . water falling inside the refueling cavity (area - 750 f t ) 2 will drain into the reactor ,
cavity, the time necessary for the sprays to fill up the reactor cavity may be estimated. The capacity of each recirculation spray pump is 3500 gpm, and assuming that the spray water is evenly distributed over the contain. l ment floor, it takes about I h to fill the reactor cavity if all four pumps '
are running, and about 4 h if only one pump is running. These times are short enough that the cavity may be considered filled to capacity before vessel failure for all cases of interest.
Thus, at.Surry, except for bypass accidents, if the water in the RWST is injected at all, the containment sprays operate, and the cavity is full at VB, The branch RWST In is used to indicate this situation. In SB0 accidents, the water in the RUST is not inj ec ted into the vessel or the containment as there is no pump power. In Event V, the water from the RWST is pumped out the break into the auxiliary building. In the "11" SCTRs, the water from the RWST is pumped throught the SGTR into the secondary system and escapes out the stuck open SRVs to the environment, In the "G" SGTRs, the water from the RWST not injected as the llPIS is failed and the RCS is at too high a pressure for the LPIS to inj ec t . If the sprays do not operate, there will be little or no water in the cavity before VB. (If the break is inside the shield wall, the leakage frc.a the RCS will drain into the cavity; but the combination of the sprays not operating and the break being inside the shield wall is so unlikely that it is not considered here.)
Case 1: There-was a small break in the RCS when the core uncovered.
This case is used to select the S PDSs2 in the Fire and Seismic LOCA PDS Groups. In the sampling mode, the quantification of this case for Seismic-LOCAs depends upon the frequency of the S 2 PDSs with a "Y" for the fif th PDS characteristic relative to the total frequency ~ for all the S2 PDSs in the group. This varies from observation-to observation, and is determined by TEMAC4. This case does not apply to PDS Group 3, Fast SBO.
Case 2: There was - a very small break .in the RCS when the core uncovered. This case selects the S PDSs 3 in the Fire and Seismic LOSP (No SBO) PDS groups so that the disposition of the contents of the RWST can be assigned correctly. In the sampling mode, the quantification of this case for the Fire PDS Group depends upon the frequency of the S3 NYY YYN relative to the total frequency for all the S 3PDSs in the group. This varies from observation-to observation, and is determined by TEMAC4 For PDS Group 3, Fast SBO, this case does not apply.
Case 3: The initiating event was an SGTR and the SRVs on the main steam line from the affected SC did not reclose. This is indicated by an "11" for the first PDS characteristic. This case separates the "11" SGTRs from the "G" SGTRs in PDS Group 7. In llINY-NXY, there is no release of primary coolant into the containment, there is no need for l
l A.1.1-11 l-l
J containment spre.ys prior to vessel failure. At VB the RWST is empty and the reactor cavity is dry, so Branch 3, RWSTfIn, is appropriate for HINY NXY. In HINY YXY, the PORQ are stuck open, there is a release of prinary coolant into the containment, and the containment sprays operate before vessel failure. Thus the reactor cavity is full at VB, so Branch 1, RWST In, is appropriate for HINY-YXY. In the sampling mode ,- the quantification of this case depends upon the frequency of HINY-NXY relative to the frequency of both the "H" PDSs. This varies from observation-to observation, and is determined by TEMAC4
-Case 4: ~This case applies if the RCS is intact at UTAF, or if there is a large break in the RCS, or if the initiator is Event V or a "G" SGTR.
For LOCAs, or accidents where the primary coolant escapes from the RCS through the PORVs, the high radiation alarms in the containment will cause the sprays to operate and the cavity will-be full at VB. Branch 1, RWST In, is specified for these accidents. For the V breaks, the water in the RUST will pass through the LPIS pumps, but will escape through the break into the suxiliary building; thus it will not end up in the containment and the third branch, RWSTfIn, is chosen for Event V. For the "G" SGTRs, enough of the primary coolant will escape through the PORVs ~ to generate high radiation conditions in containment and initiate the _ sprays . Spray operation will transfer the RWST contents to.the containment and fill the reactor cavity.- Thus, Branch 1, RWST In, is specified for the "G" SGTRs. In the sampling mode, the quantification of this case for the: Seismic LOSP (No SBO) and Seismic.
LOCA PDS' Groups depends. upon the frequency of the PDSs with a "Y" for !
the 'fifth PDS characteristic - relative to the total frequency for all the PDSs in the group.. This is determined for each observation by TEMAC4. The quantification for the other PDS groups depends upon the fifth PDS characteristic, but all the probability is assigned to only one branch. For PDS Group 3, Fast SBO, the contents of'the RWST can be injected into the containment if offsite' electrical power is recovered, so the quantification is:
-Branch 1: RWST-In - 0.0
. Branch 2: .RWSTaIn - 1.0 Branch 3: RWSTfIn - 0.0
. Question 10 Heat Removal from the Steam Generators?
4 Branches, Type 2, 4 Cases The branches for this question are:
- 1. SG HR Heat is removed from the secondary side of the steam generators throughout the accident.
I-
- 2. SGaHR There was no heat removal from the secondary side of the steam generators at the start of the accident, but it'may be l- recovered if. electrical power is recovered.
l 3. SGfHR Heat removal from the secondary side of the steam generators
' was failed at the start of the accident, and it cannot be recovered.
A.1.1-12
- 4. SGdilR - .There is no heat removal from the secondary side oi the steam generators at UTAF, but the steam turbine driven AW operated until battery depletion. The electric motor driven AW pumps could be started when power is recovered.
The branch taken depends on the sixth PDS characteristic and upon the branch ta ken at Questions l' and 3. Whether the operators depressurize the I secondary system by blowing down the steam generators is determined in the next question.
In blackout situations, the sole means of heat removal from the SGs is the steam . turbine driven AW (STD AW) pump, which is not dependent on ac
-power. The " fast" and " slow" blackout cases are distinguished by the second and fourth brnnches of this question. If the STD.AW is failed at the start of the accident, core melt ensues rapidly; in this case Branch 2 of this question O, chosen. If the STD AW operates for several hours,
-until battery 'epletion, the onset of core degradation will be considerably ;
delayed; in this case Branch 4 of this question is chosen.
For the canes with an S 3 break,-the secondary system may be used initially
'to reduce the pressure in the primary system. This action is effective if- ,
the. pressure in the secondary system is reduced.to nearly atmospheric or to i just enough to run the STD-AW. By this means, the RCS may be brought down to a few hundred pais.; ,the reduced pressure will reduce the flow out the break, llowever, if there .is no water injection to the prime.ry, eventually enough-inventory is lost from the RCS so that the presence of steam in the primary side of the steam generators will _ limit heat - removal by this method. . The RCS pressure. may then increase to a value limited by the S 3 ,
break. !
f Case 1: There was a small break in the RCS when the core uncovered.
This case is used'to select the S2 PDSs in the Fire and Seismic SB0 PDS Groups so that the status of the AWS can be assigned correctly. This
( case does not apply to PDS Group 3, Fast SBO. l.
l Case.2: There was a very small break in the RCS . when the core uncovered. This case selects-the S3 PDSs-in the Fire, Seismic LOSP (No -
l - SBO)', and Seismic SB0 PDS. groups so that the status of. the AWS can be -
-assigned correctly. When the APET is evaluated in the sampling mode, the quantification of this case for the Fire PDS Group depends upon the !
frequency. of SaNYY-YYN and3 S NNY-NYN relative to the total frequency:
for all three S 3PDSs . in the group. This varies from observation-to- ;
, _ observation, and is determined by TEMAC4. For PDS Group '3, Fast SBO, i this case does not apply.
l Case 3: The initiating event was an SCTR and the SRVs on -the main L
steam line from the affected SG reclosed. This is indicated by an "G" for the first PDS characteristic. This case separates. the "11" SGTRs from the "G" SGTRs in PDS Group 7. In . GLYY-YXY, at least one ' AWS-train operates-_successfully. .In CLYY-YNY, the AWS fails at the start of the accident. In the sampling mode, the quantification of this case depends upon the frequency of CLYY-YXY relative to the frequency of both the "C" PDSs. This is determined for each observation by TEMAC4.
A.l.1-13
i Cssa 4: This case applies if the RCS is intact when the TAF uncovers, 9: if there is a large break in the RCS, or if the initiator is Event V or an SGTR with the secondary system SRVs not reclosing ("H" SGTRs). '
Except for PDS Group EQ 2, Seismic - SBO, the branch taken follows directly from the sixth characteristic of the PDS. When the APET is . j evaluated in the sampling mode, the quantification of this case for the Seismic SB0 PDS Group depends upon the frequency of the PDSs with a "N" i for the sixth PDS characteristic relative to the total frequency for j all the PDSs in the group. This varies from observation to observa.
tion, and is determined by TEMAC4. For PDS Group 3, Fast SBO, the STD-AFWS fails at the start of the accident, but the EMD AFWS may be recovered if offsite electrical power is recovered, so the .
quantification is: I i .
. Branch 2: ScaHR - 1.0 Branch 3: SGfHR - 0.0 Branch 4: SGdHR - 0.0 Question 11. Did the Operators Depressurize the Secondary before the Core Uncovers?
2 Branches, Type 2, 4 Cases The branches for this question are: j i
- 1. SecDePr1 The secondary system has been depreasurized beforo UTAF.
- 1
- 2. noScDePr- The secondary system has not been d0 pressurized before UTAF.
The branching at this question depends the branch taken at Questions 1 and 10-and upon the sixth letter of the PDS characteristic. If two PDSs which differ only'in'whether the operators depressurize the secondary. system are in the same PDS group, then the split between the branches will depend upon lt the relative frequencies of these PDSs in the group. ;
i The procedures direct the operators to depressurize the secondary system in-
- many situations es long as auxiliary feedwater'is available. Reducing the pressure in the secondary system will reduce the pressure and temperature i of 'the water in the primary system as well in most . cases. It would,. for example, reduce the flow rate out a break in the RCS. Whether the opera-tors will depressurize. the secondary system is also important in the long-term blackout. scenario in which there are no temperature-induced breaks in the RCS. In this sequence the steam turbine-driven AFW system fails after !
battery depletion. Although the RCS will repressurize to the setpoint level before core degradation commences, blowdown of the secondary before ATM failure ' determines whether the accumulators discharge before the core uncovers or at VB. ;
Case 1: .Depressurizing the secondary system is prohibited by the plant procedures unless an AFWS is operating. Thus if the AFWS failed at the start of the accident, this case applies. In Internal PDS Group 3, Past SBO, this is the situation, so the quantification is:
A.1.1-14
Branch 1: SecDePr 0.0 Branch 2: NoScDePr 1.0 Case 2: There is an very small break in the RCS; this case separates the S 3 break PDSs in the Slow SBO, Fire, and Seismic IASP . groups.
Except for the Slow SB0 group, the quantification follows directly from the sixth characteristic of the PDS. When the APET is evaluated in the sampling mode for PDS Group 1, the quantification of this case depends upon the relative frequencies of S RRR 3 RCR and S RRR 3
RDR, as determined by TEMAC4 This case does not apply to PDS Group 3, Fast SBO.
Case 3: There is an small break in the RCS; this case separates the Sg break PDSs in the Slow SB0 and Fire groups. Except for the Slow SB0 group, the quantification follows directly from the sixth characteris- l tic of the PDS. When the APET is evaluated in the sampling mode for l PDS Group 1, the quantification of this case depends upon the relative l frequencies of S RRR 2 RCR and S RRR 2 RDR, as determined by TEMAC4 This l case doos not ' apply to PDS Group 3, Fast. SBO.
Case 4: All situations except those for cases 1, 2, and 3 come to this case. The quantification depends upon the sixth PDS characteristic.
This case does not apply to PDS Group 3, Fast SBO.
Question 12. Cooling for the RCP Seals?
3 Branches, Type 2, 2 Cases The branches for this question are:
- 1. B-PSC Cooling water is delivered to the ~ seals of the reactor coolant pumps throughout the accident.
- 2. BaPSC Cooling water is not being delivered to the seals of he reactor coolant pumps when the core uncovers, but cooling can be recovered if power is recovered.
- 3. BfPSC Cooling for the seals of the reactor coolant pumps is failed and cannot be recovered.
The branch taken depends upon the seventh letter of the PDS and upon the branch taken at questions 1 and 10.
Water to cool the RCP seals normally comes from the charging pumps. If these pumps fail. and the alternate means of cooling' the seals is not activated, or if all electrical power is lost, there is a good probability that the seals will fail, resulting in an S size3 break in the RCS.
Case 1: There is ' no break in the RCS and STD AFWS operated until battery depletion, This case selects the PDSs in PDS Group 1, Slow SBO, where the RCS pressure boundary is intact at UTAF, i.e., the "T" PDSs. In the sampling mode, the quantification of this case depends upon the relative frequencies of TRRR RDY and TRRR RDR in Group 1 as determined by TEMAC4. This case does not apply to PDS Group 3.
A.1.1-15
4 i
Case 2: All situations except those for which _ Case 1 applies are treated in this case. The quantification for each PDS group depends
-directly on the seventh PDS characterictic. For PDS Croup 3. Fast SBO, the seventh characteristic is "R", the SB0 has failed all RCP seal cooling, but it may be recovered when offsite power is recovered.
Thus, for Fast SBO, the quantification for this case is: p i
Branch 1: B-PSC - 0.0 Branch 2: BaPSC 1.0 Branch 3: BfPSC 0.0 Question 13. Initial Containment Leak or Isolation Failure? i 3 Branches Type 2, 2 Cases j
f The branches for this questions are:
- 1. B Rupt At UTAF, the cc.aainment pressure boundary has a significant break in it. If at elevated pressure, the containment would j depressurize in less than 2 h. The nominal hole size is 7.0 2
ft, 1
- 1. B Leak At UTAF, the containment leaks at a rate significantly above 3 the design leak rate; the rate is large enough to preclude i further - failure by gradual overpressurization but too small, to depressurize the containment rapidly. The nominal hole size is 0.1 ftz,
- 2. nob CF The containment is intact and leaks at the design leak rate, !
or at some slightly greater rate : which is insufficient to i preclude. gradual overpressurization failure.
The leak branch is used for both isolation-failures and pre-existing leaks, and is equivalent . to a hole between _ 4 in2 .and 1 ft2 in size. A hole smaller than 4 inz is not of interest because it is too small to arrest a 3
- slow pressure buildup.
The Surry containment is maintained below ambient atmospheric pressure-(at The capacity of the vacuum pumps limits
[
about 10 psia) during operation.
any pre-existing leak to about 0.07 in2 Leaks larger than this would be i
-immediately obvious to the operators. Thus the probability of a pre-i existing leak large enough to be of concern is negligible. 4
'l Because the Surry containment is maintained below ambient atmospheric '
i- pressure, the only pbssibilities for isolation failure come from noraally -
open lines. There are only two such lines, both 2 in, in diameter: the - ;'
suction line to the vacuum pumps and the suction line to the Instrument Air System. Each line is isolated by two air-operated valves which fail closed. The failure of either line to isolate was calculated to be 0.0002 per event ' in the- systems analysis. This is discussed in Section 4.11 of NUREC/CR-4550, Volume 3.
1 Case 1: There is a large break in the RCS at UTAF. This case is used
, to select the large breaks in the Seismic SBO and Seismic LOCA PDS A.1.1-16
l:
l Groups. The' ' "A" breaks in the Surry seismic accident frequency analysis were all due to failures of the RCP or SG supports. It was judged that these support failures would put such a stress on the main steam lines (MSLs) that it was possible that the containment pressure boundary could fail where the MSL penetration stiffener plates were welded to the steel shell. For seismic initiators, the APET was evaluated with and without these initial containment failures. If the failure occurs, it was estimated that there was a 0.10 probability that the break would be of the " Rupture" size, and a 0.90 probability that t the break would be of the " Leak" size. In the Seismic SB0 PDS Group, there are no S i initiating breaks, st all the "A" PDS are treated in this case in the manner indicated. . the Seismic LOCA PDS Group, there are both St and A initiating LOCA=. The "S3 " breaks are not SG or RCP support failures, and have no associated initial containment failures. When the APET is evaluated in the sampling mode, the quantification of this caso depends upon the relative frequency of- the l "A" and "S i " PDSs. The "Sg" PDS have only the 0.0002 probability of isolation failure. The "A" PDSs are treated as described above. This case does not apply to the PDS Group 3, Fast SBO.
Case 2: All the accidents which do not have large initiating breaks are treated in this case. Only isolation failures are possible at Surry due to the containment design. Thus, the quantification is:
Branch 1: B-Rupt e 0.0 Branch 2: B Leak - 0.0002 Branch 3:- nob CF - 0.9998 Question 14. Event.V - Break Location under Water?
2 Branches, Type 1 The branches for this question are:
' 1. V Wot The break location outside containment is located so that it will be underwator by the time the radioactive releases commence.
- 2. V Dry The break location outside containment is located so that it will-not be underwater by the time the radioactive releases Commence.
'The split between the two branches is sampled from a distribution provided ~
~
by a group of experts that considered only this question.
=If the break - in the interfacing system is located low in the safeguards building, the original water in the RCS and the RWST water injected into the RCS, escapes through the break, it will form a pool which covers . the break location. In Draft NUREG-1150, this was Containment Issue 8. Four experts considered this problem in some detail. Their consensus was that the probability that the break location would be submerged was reasonably high. Some of the experts gave specific numerical ranges cnd others gave their results in more general terms. The distribution used here is a uniform distribution from 0.70 to 1.00. The mean of this distribution is A.1.1-17
1 0.85. This agrees with a general conclusion from all experts considered together that the center of the distribution would be between 80% and 90%
submerged. More detail is contained in Appendix A.3.3. This question is not relevant to PDS Group 3 as it applies only to PDS Group 4 (Event V).
Question 15. RCS Pressure at the Start of Core Degradation?
4 Branches, Type 2, 4 Cases The branches for this question are: ;
- 1. E-SSPr The vessel is at the system safety setpoint pressure, approximately 2500 psia.
- 2. E-HiPr The vessel is at high pressure, about 1000 to 1400 psia.
- 3. E-ImPr The vessel is at intermediate pressure, about 200 to 600 psia.
'4. E-LoPr The vessel is at low pressure before breach, below 200 psia.
This question is not sampled. The branch taken at this question depends upon the branches previously taken at Questions 1, 2, and 11 The pressure in the vessel at the start of core degradation is a largelv a function of the size break that has occurred, whether~an AFWS is operating, and whether the secondary system has been depressurized. Once core melt is well underway, whether the AFW is operating and whether the secondary system is depressurized are less important since a gas bubble will form in i the steam generators , rendering this means of cooling ineffective. Thus :
the system may eventually repressurize to a pressure determined solely by the break size. The relationship between break size, AFWS' state, and RCS pressure was primarily determined from the results of many source term code '
package (STCP) runs, although other code results were consulted as well.
The high pressure range is meant to cover all pressures between 600 and 2000 psia. The code results indicate that the majority accidents with an '
Sa or an S 2break where the secondary system has- not been depressurized will have the RCS in the 1000 to 1400 psia range at UTAF, but the pressure at UTAF is a function of the accident timing and - the exact size of the break.
If the RCS pressure boundary remains intact and the RCS has been depres-surized by operation of the AFWS, repressurization of the primary system is required before the onset of core damage. Coro degradation will not begin until a substantial portion of_the primary system water inventory has been lost. _ With no break in the RCS, the only ' way for water to escape is through the PORVs or SRVs, and the system must be fully repressurized to force open the PORVs or SRVs.
Case 1: There:was an initiating large break (A) or Event V occurred.
In either case the RCS pressure is low (below 200 psia). The quantification for this case is:
A.1.1-18
Branch 1: E SSPr 0.0 Branch 2: E HiPr 0.0 Branch 3: E ImPr 0.0 Branch 4: E.LoPr - 1.0 Case 2: There is no break in the RCS at the time the core uncovers, so I the only escape path for the water is through the PORVs or the SRVs.
This case also applies of there is no scram (ATWS initiator) since the rate of steam generation in the core will keep the reactor fully pres-surized event if both PORVs are fully open. The RCS is at the system j setpcint pressure (around 2500 psia). The quantification for this case i is*
i Branch 1: E SSPr 1.0 Branch 2: E HiPr - 0.0 1 Branch 3: E ImPr 0.0 Branch 4: E LoPr 0.0 Case 3: The AFWS is either operating or has been operating, the secon-secondary system is depressurized, and there is either an S 3 or an S 3 break. SCTR is included here since it is S3 insize. The RCS pressure is intermediate (200 to 600 psia). The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: E SSPr - 0.0 Branch 2: E HiPr - 0.0 i Branch 3: E ImPr - 1.0 Branch 4: E LoPr - 0.0
- Case 4
- Whether or not the AFWS !.s or has been operating, the i
secondary system is not depressurized when the core uncovers and there is an S2- or S 3size break. The RCS pressure is high (nominally 1000 to 1400 psia). The quantification for this case is:.
i i Branch 1: E SSPr 0.0 Branch'2: E HiPr - 1.0 L ' Branch 3: E-ImPr - 0.0 Branch 4: E LoPr - 0.0 L! Question 16. -Do the PORVs or SRVs Stick Open?
2 Branches, Type 2, 2 Cases The branches for this question are:
- 1. PORV-St0, At least one pressurizer PORV or RCS SRV is stuck open, resulting in an "S 2 "-size leak.
2; PORVnsto There'aro no PORVs or SRVs stuck open.
L This question is sampled; the distribution was determined internally. The I branch taken at this question depends upon the branch taken at Question 15.
l' A.1.1-19
I.I pl I.N----
With no breaks in the RCS ptessure boundary, the only route by which water can escape from the RCS is through the PORVs or SRVs, If the PORVs can not be opened from the control room (as in PDS Croup 5), they may still func.
tion in their relief mode. If they do not open in this mode, the SRVs will open at a slightly higher pressure. (The following discussion is in terms of PORVs only, but it applies equally to the SRVs.) After the water level has decreased below the TAF and core degradation has commenced, the PORVs or SRVs will be passing superheated steam and hydrogen at temperatures well in excess of the temperatures for which they were designed. Furthermore, they will open and close many times as they cycle about their setpoint.
Thus the probability that the PORVs will stick open during the core melt period may be fairly high. If one or more PORVs stick open, the break is of S2 8120.
Case 1: The RCS was at system setpoint pressure (about 2500 psia) at the start of core degradation, PORVs stick open occasionally in normal se rvice . After core melt begins, the PORVs will be operating at tem-peratures much higher those they encounter in normal service, so the single-cycle failure to reclose probability is higher than the proba-bility for failure to reclose at normal operating conditions. Further-more, the PORVs are expected to cycle many times during core melt. The distribution for the PORVs sticking open during core melt was determined internally, Plausible rates of failure for a single cycle were estimated by increasing the normal failure rate to account for degraded performance at above design temperatures. The number of cycles was estimated from code simulations. The probability estimates for the PORVs sticking open during core melt obtained in this manner ranged from 0,1 to 1,0, In the absence of any data on the operation of these valves at the temperatures in question, a uniform distribution for 0,0 to 1,0 was used for this caso, Based on the mean value, the quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: PORV St0 - 0,50 Branch 2: PORVnsto 0.50 Case 2: The RCS was not at system setpoint pressure at the start of core degradation, so the PORVs or SRVs will not be cycling. Thus they will not stick open, The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: PORV St0 - 0.0 Branch 2: PORVnSt0 - 1.0 Question 17. Temperature-Induced RCP Seal Failure?
2 Branches, Type 2, 4 Cases The branches for this question are:
1, EB-PSS3 Due to lack of cooling, the seals of the RCPs fail, resulting in an "S3 " size leak.
- 2. noEB PSF The seals of the RCPs do not fail.
A.1.1-20
J Cases 2, 3, and 4 of this question are sampled; the sampling is based on the conclusions of a special ASEP expert panel that considered only the question of RCP seal failures. This question is sampled zero one; that is, all the probability in an observetion is placed in only one branch. Ite branching at this question depends upon the branches previously taken at Questions 12, 15, and 16.
The accident frequency analysis considered the failure of the RCP seals before the onset of core degradation. The accident progression analysis considers the failure of the RCP seals after the onset of core degradation.
The accident frequency analysis considered different modes of failure, each of which resulted in a different flow rate. In the APET, only failure or no failure is considered. Selection of the no failure branch in cases 2, 3, and 4 is rank correlated with the success state (design leakage only) in TEHAC. All RCP seal failures in this analysis are considered to be S3 breaks.
Case.1: Either seal cooling was available all along, or it was lost but re-established when power was recovered before the uncovering of the core. In either case, pump seal failures do not occur. The quantification for this case is: c Branch 1: EB PSS3 - 0.0 ,
Branch 2: noEB PSF - 1.0 Case 2: There is no break in the RCS, so the RCS will be at the setpoint pres:ure determined by the PORVs, about 2500 psia. There is no cooling for the RCP seals by Case 1. The expert panel concluded that seal failure was more likely than not. Based on their aggregate results, the mean probability of seal failure (all the leakage levels above design) for this case is 0.71. As this question is sampled zero-one, that means that 71% of the observations had 1.0 for Branch 1 and 0.0 for Branch 2, and 29% of the observations had 0.0 for Branch 1 and 1.0 for Branch 2, More detail on RCP seal failures can be found in NUREG/CR-4550, Volume 3 Appendix D.5 and ~ NUREC/CR-4550, Volume 2, Appendix C.4. Based on the the mean value of the distribution, the quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: EB-PSS3 - 0.71 Branch 2: noEB PSF - 0.29 Case 3: The RCS is at high pressure, about 1000 to 1400 psia. The experts considering this matter concluded that the degradation of the RCP seals is largely a matter of temperature, and that the reals would degrade at any temperatures considerably in excess of their normal op-erating temperatures. Thus, the lower temperatures that accompany the L lower RCS pressure (compared to Case 2) do not appreciably decrease the
! probability of seal failure. The mean failure value from Case 2 was reduced slightly to obtain a mean failure value of 0.65. As in Case 2, the sampling is zero one. Based on the the mean value, the quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: EB-PSS3 - 0.65 l Branch 2: noEB-PSF - 0.35 l A.1.1 21
Case 4: The RCS is at intermediate or low pressure, below 600 psia.
The reasoning for this case follows that for the previous case. The mean tailure value from case 3 was reduced slightly to obtain a mean f ailure value of 0.60. The sampling is zero one. Based on the the mean value, the quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: EB PSS3 0.60 Branch 2: noEB PSF 0.40 Question 18. Is the RCS Depressurised before Breach by Opening the Pressuriser PORVs?
2 Branches, Type 2, 3 Cases Tho branches for this question are:
- 1. PrmDePr The operators open the pressurizer PORVs and depressurite the RCS successfully before VB.
1
- 2. noPrik 'r The operators either do not open the pressurizer PORVs or they open the pressurizer PORVs so late that there is not enough time to depressurire the RCS before VB.
This question was quantified internally. The branch taken at this question depends upon the branch previously taken at Question 5.
The pressure in the RCS may be reduced directly if the operators reach the point in the procedures where they are directed to open the FORVs on the pressurizer, and if there is suf ficient time to blow down the RCS through the PORVs before core melt. If the accumulators have not been discharged before, reducing the RCS pressure will allow the accumulators to discharge at this time. As opening the PORVs is a last resort action, it is not
-clear that the operators will reach this step bafore core melt is well ad-vanced. Even if they do reach this step and open the PORVt., it is not clear that depressurization of the RCS will have been accomplished before VB.
The procedures at Surry direct the operators to open the PORVs when the core exit thermocouples reach 1200'F if ac power is available. Thus deliberate depressurization is not credible in blackout situations.
(Standard human reliability analyses do not consider actions that may be beneficial if they are in in contradiction to procedures.) Furthermore, operator d4 ressurization is not allowed here if the operators have already failed to open the PORVs. The reasoning is that if the operators have already failed to follow procedures, they can not now be given credit for returning to, and following, those procedures.
As an example, consider PDS TIXY Wt in PDS Croup 5. Transients. All AFW is failed and Bleed and Feed- fai? a because the HP7.5 fails. 1.PIS is operating but cannot inj ect be tuso the, PCS pressure is too high. The reason this is a core damage situation is that the operators failed to ,
depressurize the RCS and obtain low pressure injection. As the operators failed to open the PORVs before the onset of core damage, they are given no credit for deliberate de;ressurization of the RCS in this question. i A.1.1 22
l l
l Although theoretically a viable means of reducing the pressure in the RCS, deliberate d< pressurization by the operators has little effect on the internally W.ciated accidents at Surry. For example, of the six T" (RCS intact at core uncovering) PDSs, deliberate depressurization is prohibited l
in three of them because no AC power is available, and deliberate depres.
surization is not credited in the other three because hardware faults make !
it impossible to open the PORVs or because the operators had failed to depressurize (and avoid core damage) before the core was uncovered, j Branch 1 applies in a few cases where the operators had opened the PORVs before the onset of core damage but this is not reflected in the PDS indicator. This is discussed in Question 5.
Case 1: The operators opened the PORVs before the onset of core i 1
degradation. As this was part of their attempt to inject water into l
the vessel, there is no reason to think they will close the PORVs later. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: PrmDePr 1.0 Branch 2: noPrDePr - 0.0 Case 2: There is ac power available, the PORVs are capable of being opened from the control room (there are no hardware PORV faults), and the operators hve not previously failad to depressurize the RCS. (
Opening the PORVs is directed by procedures in these situations, and i the operators should follow the procedures with high reliability. The core exit thermocouples should indicate 1200'F well before core slump, and recent code calculations have shown that opening the PORVs depressurizes the RCS . fairly quickly. There are, however, maj or
' uncertainties. as to when the operators will reach this step in the
-procedures, and how much time will be available for depressurization before VB.- Therefore, the depressurization probability is not unity.
The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: PrmDePr - 0.90 Branch 2: noPrDePr 0.10 l
l Case 3: ac power is not available, or the operators have already failed to depressurize the RCS by opening the PORVs. In the absence of AC power, opening the PORVs is prohibited by procedures at Surry. If the operators are in a core damage situation because they failed to open the PORVs earlier, no credit is given for them opening the PORVs now.- The.quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: PrmDePr 0.0 Branch 2: norrDePr 1.0 l
A.1.1 23
I i
Question 19. Temperature Induced SGTRf 2 Branches, Type 2, 2 Cases i i
The branches for this question are: {
- 1. E SGTRS3 One or two SGTRs, resulting in an "$3"-size leak. ;
Case 1 of this question is sampled; the distribution was provided by the :
In Vessel Expert Panel (see Volume 2 Part 1, of this report). The branch ;
taken at this question depends upon the branches taken at the preceding four questions.
-Steam generator tube ruptures are possible only if the steam generators have dried out and very hot gas is circulating into the intake plenum from the vessel. The probability of the temperature induced rupture of a nondefective tube before the hot leg or surge line fails is quite small.
However, defects appear regularly in SG tubes, and there are so many tubes in a PWR that there are certain to be some defective tubes at any time '
except just af ter an inspection of all the tubes.
Case 1: There is no break in the RCS, so the RCS will be at the setpoint pressure determined by the p0RVs, about 2500 psia. Thermal- i hydraulic calculations show that the temperatures to be expected in the SG plenum and in the tube ends near the tube sheet can be quite high, but that they lag behind the temperatures in the hot leg and the surge line by a significant margin. If all the tubes were free of defects, r temperature induced SGTR would be highly unlikely. Taking defects into account, however, increases the probability of an SGTR. The mean value ;
of the distribution provided by'the Experts for this case is:
Branch 1: E SGTRS3 0.018 Branch 2: noE SGTR - 0.982 .
Case 2: There is a break of some size in the RCS, so the RCS will not be at the setpoint pressure. Compared to the setpoint pressure case. '
the reduced pressure reduces the hoop stress on the tubes as well as the temperatures in the RCS. A' temperature induced SGTR was not '
. considered credihie by the Experts, The quantification of this case.
is:
s Branch 1: E SGTRS3 - 0.0 Branch 2: noE SGTR 1.0 >
l Question 20. Temperature Induced Hot Leg or Surge Line Break? ,
l 2 Branches, Type 2, 4 Cases The branches for this question are:
- 1. EB HLA An "A" size break occurs in the hot leg or surge line. ;
- 2. noEB HLA There is no failure of a hot leg or surge line, t
A.1.1 24 ,
Cases 1 and 2 of this question are sampled; the distributions were provided by the In Vessel Expert Panel (ree Volume 2, Part 1, of this report). The branch taken at this question depends upon the branches taken at Questions 1, 10, and the previous five questions.
Af ter much of the core is uncovered, the upper portion of the vessel and the piping connected to it will be subjected to temperatures well above the design temperature. The core will be above 2000'F, so temperatures higher than 1000'r are possible in the vicinity of the hot leg nozzles and the surge line. If the RCS remains at high pressure during degradation, the hoop stress nn the hot leg and the surge line will be high, and the elevat-ed temperatures will weaken the metal considerably. It is possible that the piping may fail before VB. Both the hot leg and the surge line are large pipes, so that all failures are of "A" size.
Case 1: There is no break in the RCS, and the AW is not operating; the RCS will be at the setpoint pressure determined by the PORVs, about 2500 psia. Some calculations show that temperatures high enough to cause creep rupture failure may occur in the hot leg and the surge line (the pipe connecting the hot leg to the pressurizer). Although the surge line is further from the upper plenum than the hot leg, the surge line has thinner walls than the hot leg, so it may fail before the hot leg. For the accident progression it is immaterial which fails. The mean value of the Experts' distribution for this case is:
Branch 1: EB lllA - 0.72 Branch 2: noEB lilA - 0.28 Case 2: There is an S3 break in the RCS and the AWS is not operating.
In these conditions, some code simulations show the RCS reaching pressures over 2000 psia late in the core melt scenario. There is less stress on the hot leg and surge line than in Case 1, and the natural circulation will not be a vigorous as in Case 1, but creep rupture of the piping is still credible. The mean value of the Experts' distri-bution for this case is:
Branch 1: EB ll1A -
0.034 Branch 2: noEB lllA -
0.966 Case 3: The only break in the RCS is a temperature induced SGTR. The pressure will decrease from the PORV setpoint value after the SCTR occurs, but perhaps not very quickly. This situation is similar enough to the situation in Case 2 that the same distribution is deemed applicable. The mean value of the distribution is:
Branch 1: EB lilA - 0.034 Branch 2: noEB lilA -
0.966 Case 4: The RCS pressure is below 2000 psia. A temperature induced break of the hot leg or surge line was not considered credible by the Experts. The quantification of this case is:
Branch 1: EB-lilA -
0.0 Branch 2: toEB lilA - 1.0 A.1.1 25 l
Question 21. Is AC Power Available Earlyt 3 Branches, Type 2, 7 Cases The branches for this question are.
- 1. E ACP ac power is available in this time period.
1
- 2. EaACP ac power is not available in this time period, but it may )
be recovered in the future. )
- 3. EfACP ac power is not available in this time period, and cannot be recovered.
Cases 3 through 7 of this questic are sampled; the distributions were obtained from an analysis of offsite ,)ower recovery for the Surry plant. A plot of the power recovery distributions for Surry is contained in Subsection A . 3. 3. _ The methods used for offsite power recovery are explained in more detail in Volume 1 of this report and in NUREC/CR 5032.
The branching at this question depends upon the branches taken at Questions ,
1, 8, 10, and 11.
As used here, . probability of power recovery means the probability that offsite electrical power is recovered in the period in question given that j power was not rscovered before the start of the period. The derivation of the time periods used in Cases 3 through 7 is presented in Appendix A.3.3.
The period of interest for the injection of water into the RCS is from UTAF to VB. However, the service water delivery system at Surry is such that ,
the period of interest for power recovery is from roughly 30 minutes before ;
UTAF to 30 minutes before VB. Service water for pump cooling is provided '
from an elevated canal at Surry. ~Following a loss of power, this canal will drain, and it takes about 30 minutes to refill the canal. Thus power must be recovered 30 minutes beforo injection starts. Because the end of the electric power recovery period in the accident frequency analysis and the start of the power recovery period in this analysis, the start of the power recovery period here cannot be determined by UTAF. Instead it must be the time at which the accident frequency analysis terminated their consideration of power recovery. This is roughly 30 minutes before UTAF for some PDSs, but is much earlier-for other PDSs. The UTAF and the onset of core degradation.
l
[ The power recovery periods are based on the condition of the RCS at UTAF.
Of course, temperature induced failures or deliberate depressurization may change the rate of the accident progression, and thus the timo between UTAF l and VB, during the core degradation. Some of these occurrences may hasten the time to vessel failure (by allowing the RCS inventory to escape more quickly, for example) while others may delay it (by allowing tho l
accumulators to discharge, for example). There are so many combinations of original RCS condition, AFWS and secondary system status, RCS failure during core melt, and time of this failure in the pressure boundary, that it was not possible to treat them all. Even if all of these combinations could have been considered, the supporting database from which to obtain i
A.1.1 26
l i
I the required timing information is lacking. Thus, power recovery was l considered for only five time periods, based on the RCS condition at j uncovering as explained in the discussion of Cases 3 through 7. ;
i Case 1: Power was available at the start of the accident and remains ;
available. The quantification for this case is: ,
i Branch 1: E.ACP 1.0 Branch 2: EaACP 0.0 '
Branch 3: EfACP 0.0 ,
Case 2: Power was failed at the start of the accident and is not t
recoverable. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: E ACP 0.0 Branch 2: EaACP - 0.0 Branch 3: [
EfACP 1.0 l
Case 3: By the preceding two cases, this case and all the following cases have electric power not initially available, but recovery
- possible. In this case, the AFWS failed at the start of the accident.
The only PDS group that meets.this condition la Fast SBO, so this case applies to PDS TRRR RSR and the RCS is intact at UTAF. The recovery period for this case is 0.5 to 2.0 h. The mean value for power '
recovery in this period gives the following quantification: r Branch 1: E ACP 0.56 Branch 2: EaACP 0.44 #
Branch 3: EfACP 0.0 Case 4: By the preceding case, the AFWS was operating at the start of the accident but failed after 4 h upon battery depletion. This case applies to the S RRR RDR and S RRR*RCR PDSs (slow blackout with stuck- !
open PORVs). With this large a break in the RCS, whether the operators depressurized the secondary system while the the AFWS was operating is not very important. The recovery period for this case is 1.0 to 4.0 h. ,
The mean value for power recovery in this period gives the following quantification:
Branch 1: E ACP - 0.74 Branch 2: EaACP 0.26
! Branch 3: EfACP 0.0 l Case 5: In this case there is an S break 3 and the operators did not depressurize the secondary system while the the AFWS was operating. . so l- the PDS to which this case applies is S RRR 3 RCR. The recovery period L for this case in 4.0 to 5.5 h. The mean value for power recovery in I
this period gives the following quantification:
Branch 1: E.ACP - 0.39 Branch 2: EaACP 0.61 Branch 3: EfACP - 0,0 l
l- A.1.1 27 l
l
I Case 6: In this case here is an Si break and the operators did ,
depressurize the secor dry system while the the AFW was ope r.ating.
This case applies to the $ RRR3 RDR. The recovery period for this case is 4.0 to 10.0 h. The mean value for power recovery in this period gives the following quantification:
Branch 1: E ACP - 0.80 Branch 2: EaACP 0.20 Branch 3: EfACP 0.0 Case 7: In this case the operators depressurized the secondary system while the the APWS was operating and the RCS was intact at UTAF, so the applicable PDSs are TRRR RDR and TRR RDY. The recovery period for this case is 7.0 to 12 . 0 h . The mean value for power recovery in this period gives the following quantification:
Branch 1:- E ACP 0.68 Branch 2:' EaACP - 0.32 Branch 3:' EfACP 0.0 ,
Question 22. Rate of Blowdown to Containment?
4 Branches, Type 2, 4 Cases The branches for this question are:
'1. EBD A The blowdown is equivalent to an "A" break,
- 2. EBD S2 The blowdown is equivalent to an "S2" break
- 3. EBD S3 The blowdown is equivalent to an "S3" break.
- 4. noEBDL There is no blowdown to containment before VB.
This question is not sampled; the blowdown to containment depends directly upon the size and location of the break in the RCS pressure boundary. The branching at this question depends upon the branches taken at-Questions 1, 16, 18, and 20.
Note that this question specifically concerns blowdown to containment. If the' blowdown is to some location outside containment, as in Event V, then tho' fourth branch is chosen. There must, of course, be blowdown to somewhere or the core would not become uncovered. Blowdown due to both initiating and induced failures is considered. The blowdown from a cycling PORV is equivalent to the blowdown from an S3 break. The blowdown from'a stuck-open PORV is equivalent to the blowdown from an S2 break.
Case 1: There is a large break inside containment. The quantification for this case is: !
Branch 1: EBD A - 1.0 Branch 2: EBD S2 - 0.0 Branch 3: EBD S3 - 0.0 Branch 4: noEBD -
0.0 1
1 A.1.1 28 J
i L i-i i
f Case 2: Event V has occurred. The break is of large size (A size), )
but the blowdown is to the auxiliary building. The SGTRs are not !
included in this case. It was the opinion of the accident frequency ;
analysts that in an accident initiated by an SGTR, the operators would j attempt to reduce the pressure in the RCS to reduce the flow out the ruptured tube. Thus, some of the RCS invontory will escape through the ;
PORVs into the containment. As the main use of this question is in !
determining the baseline pressure inside the containment just before i vessel breach, it was concluded that the SGTRs fit better in Case 4 of this question even though more water may escape through the ruptured tube than through the PORVs. Thus, only for event V is there }
considered to be no blowdown to the containment. The quantification !
for this case is: ,
Branch 1: EBD A 0.0 Branch 't: EBD.S2 0.0 i Branch 3: EBD S3 0.0 Branch 4: noEBD 1.0 t
Case 3: There is an Sa break inside containment. This case includes a -[
t stuck open PORV. The quantification for this> case is: ;
Branch 1: EBD A 0.0 ,
-Branch 2: EBD S2 - 1.0 j
Branch 3: EBD S3 0.0 Branch 4:. noEBD 0.0 Case 4: There is an S3 break inside contr anment. This case includes a
. cycling PORV and SGTRs as explained in 'ne discussion of. Case 2 above. ;
The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: .EbD A 0.0 Branch 2: EBD S2 0.0 Branch 3: EBD S3 -1.0 *
-Branch 4: noEBD 0.0 Question 23. . Vessel Pressure just be' ore Breach? '
4 Brans.hes Type 2, 4 Ctses The branches forfthis question are: -
- 1. I-SSPr The - vessel is- at the system safety setpoint pressure. >
approximately 2500 psia.
' 2. I liiPr The vessel is at high pressure just before breach. The 3 pressure is certainly above 600 psia and, may be as high as '[
2000 psia is some cases, o >
- 3. I-ImPr The vessel-is at intermediate pressure before breach, about 200 to 600 psia.- ,
4 _I-LoPr The vessel is at low pressure before breach, about 200 psia: l or less.
A.1.1 29 i i
_ __ _ ~ - - _ ,
m , . . . . . . . .
Cases 2 and 3 of this question are sampled zero one; the distributions for these cases were determined internally. For a large break, and for no break in the RCS, the pressure just befr re breach follows directly from the size of the break. The branch taken at this question depends upon the branches previously taken at Questions 1, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 22.
The pressure rise in the containment due to RCS depressurization at VB is dependent on the pressure in the RCS at the time the vessel fails. The pressure in the vessel just before breach may be considerably higher than the pressure during most of the core degradation process. Many descript-ions of the core melt process have a significant repressurization occurring shortly before breach when the core slumps into the bottom head and boils off the water remslaing there. This pressure decreases at a rate primarily dependent upon the size of the hole (s) in the RCS pressure boundary.
Therefore, the RCS pressure at breach may depend strongly upon the time between slump and breach as the length of this period determines where on the decreasing pressure curve the breach occurs. Recent code calculations have shown the pressure spike due to steam generation at core slump may be lower than that calculated by the STCP, and the rate of pressure decay may be faster than that calculated by the STCP. Thus there is considerable uncertainty in the RCS presnure at VB for situations with Sa or S2 breaks.
Case 1: There was an initiating or induced large break which resulted in blowdown to the containment or Event V occurred, which resulted in blowdown at a similar rate outside the containment. In either case the RCS pressure is low (200 psia or less) at VB. Cases with both an S 2 break before UTAF and open PORVs also result in low pressure in the RCS at VB. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: SSPr - 0.0 Branch 2: HiPr - 0.0 Branch 3: ImPr . 0.0 Branch 4: LoPr -
1.0 Case 2: There was an initiating or induced S2 break, Cases v.ith both an S2 break and open PORVs were considered in Case 1. With an S -size hole in the RCS, the pressure due to the core slurp dies away fairly quickly. The RCS pressure at VB could be in the low or intermediate ranges. The internal analysis, similar to the documented analysis for S3 breaka considered in the next case, concluded that low pressure was much more likely than intermediate pressure at VB. The sampling was zero one, so each observation had all the probabilit; assigned to one of these two branches. Taking the average over all the observations, the quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: SSPr 0.3 Branch 2: HiPr - 0.0 Branch 3: ImPr 0.20 Braich 4: LoPr - 0.80 Case 3: There was an initiating or induced S3 break. The increased pressure due to core slump dies away fairly slowly. The RCS pressure at the time of vess el breach coald be in the low, intermediate, or high A.1.1 30
pressure ranges. The internal analysis, described in Volume 2, Part 6, of this report, concluded that these three pressure ranges were equally L likely. The sampling was zero one, so each observation had all the
. probability assigned to one of these three branches. Taking the average over all the observations, the quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: SSPr - 0.0 Branch 2: HiPr - 0.33 Branch 3: ImPr - 0.34 Branch 4: 1.oPr 0.33 Case 4: There was no initiating break, and no induced break has occurred, so the RCS is near the PORV setpoint pressure (2500 psia).
_ The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: SSPr - 1.0 Branch 2: HiPr 0.0 Branch 3: ImPr 0.0 Branch 4: LoPr - 0.0 Question 24. Is Core Damsgo Arrested? No Vessel Breach?
2 Branches, Type 2, 9 Cases The branches for this question are:
1.
noVB The process of core degradation is arrested and a safe stable state is reached with the vessel intact.
_ 2. VB Core degradation continues, resulting in core melt and VB.
Cases 5 through 9 of this question are sampled from distributions determined internally. The branching at this question depends upon the branches previously taken at Questions 1, 4, 10, 11, 21, and 23.
The question is: given that electric power is restored, is core damage arrested and vessel breach prevented? It was judged that, if power was restored to the plant, water injection to-the RCS would be promptly started (after pump cooling from the service water canal was obtained) with a high probability. Compared to the uncertainty in the core condition when power is recovered, the uncertainty in the operators timely action to restore inj ection is small, and it was not explicitly considered. If injection from the ECCS is recovered before core degradation has progressed too far, there is certainly some chance that a safe stable state can be reached.
The restoration of injection eventually terminated the core damage progression'at Three Mile Island (TMI). There is also some chance that the addition of water does not arrest the melting of the core and that it proceeds on t) vessel breach. While there was. no vessel breach at THI, some analysts have concluded that THI came very close to vessel failure.
Note that the threat to the TMI bottom head, which occurred when about 15 to 20 tons of molten material relocated from the " crucible" in the center of.the core to the botto:n head, occurred after core cooling had been re-established for some time.
A.1.1-31
i The injection of cold water could cause vessel failure due to pressurized thermal shock (PTS) . If RCS failure due to PTS occurs, it is likely to occur in the hot leg or near the hot leg. Failure of the bottom head by PTS is negligible. If the RCS does f ail by PTS, it is likely to be a failure equivalent to a temperature induced hot leg or surge line failure, i.e., it will be a large break which depressurizes the RCS rapidly. While this has some negative impacts on the accident progression (e.g.,
accelerating the rate of water loss from the vessel), it also has some ameliorativo effects (e.g., containment failure is less likely at vessel breach if the RCS is at low pressure). In view of the low probability of the large break due to PTS, and the uncertain effects of such a break, PTS was not explicitly considered in this analysis.
The probability of recovering electric power and inj ection in time to arrest core degradation, establish a safe, stabic state, and prevent vessel failure was estimated internally based on the probability of gettin6 power back, the TMI 2 accident, and MELCOR analyses to determine the rate of ,
accident progression for Surry. The electric power recovery periods used l were those of Question 21. More detail may be found in Appendix A.3.3.3.
The distributions determined for Surry took into account the time required to refill the service water canal before injection could start because of the need for service water for pump cooling. In the analysis done for this question, power recovery was considered in different time periods for each PDS or group of PDSs. The start of the time period must be the end of the power recovery period used in the accident frequency analysis to avoid gaps or overlap. The end of the time period was determined by taking the VB time from appropriate STCP analyses and subtracting the time (30 minutes) needed to refill the service water canal.
Case 1: Core cooling has not been restored, either because power was not recovered, or because the ECCS systems are failed. Continued core degradation and eventual vessel failure is assured. The quantification for this case is:
t Branch 1: noVB 0.0 Branch 2: VB - 1.0 Case 2: At UTAF, there was a large initial break in the RCS, and the LPIS was operating. The large break (A- or S 3 size) will effectively depressurice the - RCS , allowing successful low pressure inj e c tion.
These PDSs are core damage accidents because the FSAR response criteria require the successful operation of other systems to prevent any core damage. For an "A" initiator, the accumulators and the LPIS must i function; the "A" PDSs have the accumulators failed. Tor an "Sg" initiator, both HPIS and LPIS must operate successfully; the "S 3" PDSs have the HPIS failed. With the LPIS functioning successfully through- )
out the accident, and a break large enough to rapidly depressurize the RCS below the LPIS shutoff head, extensive core damage seems unlikely.
However, there were no code simulations to indicate just how much or how little damage could be expected. It was estimated that the probability of this type of accident progressing to vessel failure was small. The quantification for this case is:
A.1.1 32 l
Branch 1: noVB 0.95 Branch 2: VB 0.05 Case 3: This case is similar to Case 2, except that the depres-surization either occurs later in the accident or the depressurization is slower. In this case are included situations where LPIS has been operating since the start of the accident, but the pressure remained at the PORV setpoint until well after UTAF when an RCP seal failed or the PORVs stuck open. If the RCS pressure decreases below 200 psia, as ,
determined in Question 23, then low pressure injection is possible. i llowever, as this injection starts later than in Case 2, the probability of avoiding VB are less. Also included in this case are the accidents where both HPIS and LPIS are operating at the start of the accident, i but the RCS pressure is too high to allow sufficient injection (e.g. , l TBYY YNY). Any f ailure of the RCS pressure boundary will allow l inj ection, but whether sufficient injection will occur in time to prevent VB depends on the size of the break and the time it occurs. .
Thus, halting the core damage process is probable, but not as likely as ;
in the previous case. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: noVB 0.90 i Branch 2: VB 0.10 Case 4: The ECCS are not recoverable when offsite electrical power is ,
recovered. This case includes all the situations in which some ECCS ;
are operating but the RCS pressure is not low enough for sufficient injection to Mccur. Case 1 accounted for th; situations where power i was not recovered or the ECCS are failed, and tses 2 and 3 accounted for the situations in which an ECCS is operating, and the pressure is ;
In Case 4, the situations in which low enough for injection to occur.
some ECCS a.re operating but the pressure is not low enough to permit ,
sufficient injection are assigned to Branch 4. VB. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: noVB - 0.0 Branch 2: VB 1.0 Case 5: This case, and all the following cases, by Cases 1 and 4, are cases in which the ECCS were ' recoverable and electric power has been restored. In this case, heat removal from the SCs was not initially ,
operating, so Case 5 applies to TRRR RSR, PDS Croup 3 Fast SBO. The i period during which power must be recovered to ensure injection before '!
l VB is 0.5 to. 2.0 h. For this case, the internal analysis concluded !
that the probability of getting power back in time to prevent vessel failure was fairly high; the distribution for avoiding VB was uniform-from 0.8 to 1.0.- In the mean, the quantification for this case is:
l Branch 1: noVB 0.90 Branch 2: VB - 0.10 Case 6: By the preceding case, this case and the three following cases '
all apply to accidents in which the AWS operated for some hours until the batteries . depleted. Case 6 applies to SgRRR RCR and S RRR2 RDR.
The PORVs stuck open before UTAF, so the accident goes - to UTAF more ;
A.1.1 33 I
rapidly than the other cases in which the AWS operates for several hours. The electric power recovery period is 1.0 to 4.0 h. For this case, the internal analysis concluded that the probability of getting !
power back before about half the core was molten was reasonably good, '
although not as good as for the previous case. The probability distribution for avoiding VB for Case 6 was quadratic from 0.0 to 1.0; ;
the median is about 0.70 and the mean is about 0.66. Considering the '
entire distribution, the quantification for this case is:
i Branch 1: noVB 0.70 Branch 2: VB 0.30 ,
Case 7: This case is similar to Case 6 (AWS operates for several hours af ter UTAF), but the break is of size S 3 (RCp seal failure) ;
instead of size S. 3 For Sa breaks, whether the secondary system was depressurized while the AWS was operating is important in determining the timing. In Case 7, the SCs are not depressurized and the applic-able PDS is $ RRR 3 RCR. The electric power recovery period is 4.0 to 5.5 h. For this case, the internal analysis concluded that the probability of getting power back after it was too late to prevent VB was about the same as that of getting. it back in time to prevent VB.
The distribution for avoiding VB for Case 7 was uniform from 0.0 to 1.0. The quantification for this case, based on the average of the distribution, is:
\
Branch 1: noVB 0.50 Branch 2: VB 0.50 ,
Case-8: This case is similar to Case 7 except that in case 8 the SCs [
are depressurized. The applicable pDS is S RRR3 RDR. The electric i power recovery period is 4 to 10 h. The internal analysis concluded -
that the probability. of getting power back before about half the core !
was molten was quite good. The distribution for Case 5 was used for this case: uniform from 0.8 to 1.0. In the mean, the quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: noVB 0.90 Branch 2:. VB - 0.10 Case 9: This case has no break in the RCS before UTAF. The electric
- l power recovery period is 7 to 12 h. The internal analysis concluded
! that the probability of getting power back before about half the core ,
- was molten was quite good. The distribution for case 5 was used for t this case also; the quantification for this case is
L Branch 1: noVB 0.90 Branch 2: VB 0.10 A.1.1-34 i
Question 25. Early Sprays?
3 Branches, Type 2, 4 Casse The branches for this question are:
- 1. E Sp The containment sprays are operating.
- 2. EaSp The containment sprays are available to operate if power is recovered.
- 3. EfSp The containment sprays are failed and cannot be recovered.
This question is not sampled; the branch chosen depends directly upon the branches taken at previous questions. The branch chosen for this question depends upon the branches taken at Questions 6 and 21.
If power has been recovered, and the sprays were initially in the "available" state, the sprays will operate in this period. If the blowdown has raised the containment pressure to the high high setpoint (26 psig),
the sprays will come on automatically when power is restored. If the sprays are not not actuated by existing high pressure when power is restored, they will be actuated by a hydrogen burn (if any) or by VB.
There is a good chance that the operators will turn on the sprays before VB even if coricainment pressure is not high eine the sprays are the only way to cool the water in the sumps, and this water is or may be used for recirculation cooling of the core. If power is recovered and the sprays operate, the contents of the RWST will be transferred to the containment and the cavity will fill up with water.
Case 1: The sprays were operating at or shortly after the start of the accident and they continue to operate. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: E.Sp 1.0 Branch 2: EaSp 0.0 Branch 3: EfSp 0.0 case 2: The sprays were failed at the start of the accident, and no recovery is possible, so the sprays remain failed. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: E Sp 0.0 Branch 2: EaSp 0.0 Branch 3: EfSp 1.0 Case 3:
4 The spreys were available to operate at the start of the accident, and pcVer has been recovered so the sprays now operate. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1. E-Sp 1.0 ,
Branch 2: EaSp 0.0 Branch 3: EfSp - 0.0 A.1.1 35 I
i l
l 1
Case 4:- The sprays were available to operate at the start of the accident, but power has not been recovered so the sprays remain available to operate in the future when power is recovered. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: E Sp 0.0 l Branch 2: Easp 1.0 l Branch 3: EfSp 0.0 ;
Question 26. Early Fan Coolers? .
i 3-Branches, Type 2, 4 Cases i The branches.for this question are: ;
- 1. E FC The containment fan coolers are operating. .
i
- 2. EaFC ' The containment- fan coolers are available to operate if power is recovered. {
- 3. EfFC The containment fan coolers are failed and cannot be ,
recovered.
This= question is not sampled;,the branch chosen depends directly upon the branches taken at previous questions. The branch chosen for this question depends upon the branchesitaken at Questions ~7 and 21. <
Although Surry does not have safety grade fan coolers, this question is :
included to make the containment event - tree applicable ' to large, dry .
containments that do have fan coolers ' that are qualified for operation in severa accident conditions.- ,
Case 1: The fan coolers were operating at or shortly after the start ;
of the accident and they continue to operate. The quantification for:
this case is:
Branch 1: E FC :1.0 Branch 2: EaFC 0.0 f Branch.3: EfFC 0.0 .
Case 2: . The . fan coolers were failed ' at ' the ' start of' the accident, and no recovery is possible, so: the fan coolers remain failed. The .;
quantification for this case is: i Branch 1: E PC 0.0 Branch'2: EaFC 0.0 '
Branch 3: EfFC 1.0 Case 3: The : fan coolers were available to operate at the ' start of the !
accident, and power has been recovered, so the fan coolers now operate. l l The quantification for this case is: !
l 4 l Branch 1: E FC - 1.0 Branch 2: EaFC - 0.0 Branch 3: EfFC - 0.0 R 1
A.1.1 36 1
i l Case 4: The fan coolers were available to operate at the start of the ,
accident, but power has not been recovered so the fan coolere remain i l available to operate in the future when power is recovered. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: E.FC 0.0 Branch 2: EaFC 1.0 Branch 3: EfFC 0.0 i Question 27. Early Containment Heat Removal? 1 2 Branthes Type 2, 2 Cases j l
The branches for this question are:
- 1. E.CHR Containment heat removal (CHR) is available in this period. i
- 2. EfCHR CHR is not available in this period.
i This question is not sampled; the branch chosen depends directly upon the !
branches taken at the two previous questions. !
If' either the sprays or the fan coolers are operating or operable, CHR is available. !
Case 1: The sprays or the fan coolers, or both, are available, so CHR '
is available. The quantification for this case is: ,
Branch 1: E.CHR 1.0. '
Branch 2: EfCHR 0.0 l Case 2: Neither the sprays nor.the fan coolers are available, so CHR is not available. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: E.CHR 0.0 Branch 2: EfCHR 1.0 Question 28. Baseline Containment Pressure just before Vessel Breach?
1 Branch. Type 4, 4 Cases
'The single branch has the same name as the parameter read in at this p question:
- P1 IPBase The baseline pressure in the containment is read in as Parameter 1.
This question is not sampled; the baseline pressure before VB is a direct function of whether there is blowdown to the containment and whether there is CHR. The available codes are in reasonable agreement about the value of
'the pressure in the containment before VB. The cases for this question depend upon the branches taken at Questions 6, 13, 22, 24, and 27.
i l A.1.1 37 l
1
Case 1: If there is no blowdown to containment, or if the core damage has been arrested, the containment is near normal operating pressure.
The value of IPBase is 12 psia - 2 psia above normal operating pressure.
Case 2: The sprays are operating (with heat removal from the spray heat exchangers) or the containment has ruptured already. In either case, the containment will be near ambient atmospheric pressure. The S D STCP results in BMI 2104 and BMI 2139 indicate that a containment pressure around 16 psia is to be expected.
Case 3: There is no containment heat removal and there is blowdown to the containment from a large break. The STCP results for AB in BMI-2104 show containment pressures between 32 and 42 psia. A value of 37 psia is used for IPBase.
Case 4: The sprays are not operating, and there is blowdown to the containment from a break smaller than a large break. The STCP results for TMLB' in BMI 2104 and BMI 2139 and for S,B in BMI 2160 show that a containment pressure around 26 psia is appropriate for this case.
Question 29. Time of Accumulator Discharge?
3 Branches, Type 2, 3 Cases The branches for this question are:
- 1. AcDbCM The accumulators discharge before core degradation starts.
- 2. AcDdCM The accumulators dischargo during core degradation.
- 3. AcDaVB The accumulators discharge at VB.
This question is not sampled; the time of accumulator discharge may be reliably deduced from the values of the RCS pressure at UTAF and just before VB. The branch taken at this question depends upon the branches previously taken at Questions 10, 11, 15, and 23.
The accumulators discharge at 650 psig.- Whether they have discharged by the onset of core degradation or before VB is strictly a function of the pressure history of the RCS, Cenerally, any small (S 2) or large (A) break will depressurize the RCS enough that accumulator discharge before the onset of degradation is ensured. If AWS is available and the operators depressurize the secondary system, the RCS pressure should get low enough to result in accumulator discharge even if there is no break in the RCS, or a very small (S 3) break.
Whether the operators will reduce the pressure in the primary system by blowing down the secondary system is particularly important in the long-term blackout scenario if there are no temperature induced breaks in the RCS, In this sequence, the steam turbine driven AW system falls after battery depletion and the RCS repressurizes to the setpoint level before core degradation commences. Blowdown of the secondary before AW failure determines whether the accumulators. discharge before core degradation commences or when the lower head of the vessel fails.
A.1.1-38
Case 1: The RCS pressure was intermediate or low at the onset of core degradation, or the secondary was depressurized while the ATW was operating. Accumulator discharge takes place before the core has started to degrade. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: AcDbCM - 1.0 Branch 2: AcDdCM - 0.0 Branch 3: AcDaVB - 0.0 Case 2: The RCS pressure was intermediate or low just before VB. By Case 1 the pressure was not in this range at the start of core melt.
Thus accumulator discharge takes place during core degrodation. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: AcDbCM - 0.0 Branch 2: AcDdCM - 1.0 Branch 3: AcDaVB - 0.0 Case 3: If the accumulators did not discharge before or during core degradation, they must discharge at VB. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: AcDbCM - 0.0 Branch 2: AcDdCM - 0.0 Branch 3: AcDaVB - 1.0 Question 30. Fraction of Zr Oxidized In-Vesuel During Core Degradation?
1 Branch, Type 4, 7 Cases The single branch has the same name as the parameter read in at this question:
P2. ZrOx-Inv The amount of equivalent zirconium oxidized in the vessel during core degradation is read in as Parameter 2.
All cases of this question are sampled. The distributions for this parameter were provided by the In-Vessel Expert Panel. The conclusions of the experts and their aggregate distributions are presented in Volume 2, Part 1, of this report. The applicable case for this question depends upon the branches taken at Questions 15 and 29.
This question concerns the amount of hydrogen produced during core melt.
For convenience, hydrogen production is measured as the equivalent fraction of the core zirconium which is oxidized. Because steel may be oxidized also, it is possible to have over 100% equivalent zirconium oxidation.
Oxidation of all the zirconium in the core at Surry produces 360 kg-moles or 720 kg of hydrogen.
During core degradation, the presence of unoxidized metal in the very hot steam atmosphere leads to a metal-water reaction that produces hydrogen.
Zirconium is the primary metal oxidized, but some oxidation of steel and stainless steel may occur as well. The amount of metal oxidized depends upon the temperatures present and the availability of steam. Some experts A.1.1-39
expect a blockage to form in the lower portion of the core which would severely limit the steam available for oxidation in much of the core volume. Other experts expect either no blockaSe to form, the blockage is ineffective in limiting steam availability, or the zirconium is effectively l oxidized in other locations before or after the blockage limits steam flow. '
Case 1: The RCS is at system setpoint pressure and the accumulators discharge before or af ter core melt. This is Case 1A/1C of In vessel Issue 5. The mean value of the aggregate distribution is 0.44 1
Case 2: The RCS is at system setpoint assure and the accumulators discharge during core melt. This is case 9 of In vessel Issue 5. The >
mean value of the aggregate distribution u 0.50. .t t
The RCS is at high pressure and the accumulators discharge Case 3:
before or after core melt. This is Case 2A/2C/5 of In vessel Issue 5.
The mean value of the aggregate distribution is 0.32.
Case 4: The RCS is at high pressure and the accumulators discharge-during core melt. This is case 2B of In vessel Issue 5. The mean value of the aggregate distribution is 0.38. <
Case 5: The RCS - is at intermediate pressure and the accumulators .
discharge before or af ter core melt. This is Case 3A of In vessel ,
Issue 5. The mean value of the aggregate distribution is 0.48.
t Case 6: The RCS is at intermediate pressure and the accumulators discharge during core melt. -This is Case 3B of In vessel Issue 5. The !
mean value of the aggregate distribution is 0.52.
Case 7: The RCS is at low pressure. This is Case 4 of In vessel Issue
- 5. The mean value of the aggregate distribution is 0.45.
Question 31. Amount of Zr oxidised In Vessel During Core Degradation?
2 Branches, Type 5' The branches.for this question are:
.This question is not sampled; the branch chosen depends directly upon the values of the parameter defined in the previous question. This question divides the fraction of equivalent zirconium oxidized in vessel into two groups, i
A.1.1 40 i
Question 32. Amount of Water in the Reactor Cavity at Vessel Breach?
2 Branches, Type 2, 2 Cases The branches for this question are:
- 1. RC Wet The reactor cavity is full or nearly full of water.
- 2. RC-Dry The reac. tor cavity contains little or no water.
This question is not sampled; the amount of water in the reactor cavity may be reltably deduced f rom the information available about the inj ec t t on of
! the RWST water into the containment and the operation of the sprays. The branch ' mken at this question depends upon the branches previously taken at Questions 9 and 25.
As used here, the cavity includes not only the annular space directly under the vessel, b t. c the In Core Instrumentation Room (ICIR) adj ac ent to it.
The ICIR is completely open on one end to the annular cavity proper. A hatch in the ceiling of the ICIR (nt elevation -6') provides an overflow path which prohibits water f r om at taining a depth of more than 23.5 ft in the cavity. The ceiling of the ICIR keeps the water from getting more than 14.5 ft deep in the ICIR. The floor area of the annular region is about 380 it2 and the floor area of the ICIR is about 240 fta, so the maximum amount of water that can he contained in the cavity (and ICIR) is about 12,400 ft3 The cavity at Surry has no direct connection at or near the basemat elevation with the containment sumps. Thus the only water that will collect in the cavity is the spray water that falls within the shield wall or in the refueling cavity. If the containment sprays do not operate, the cavity will contain little or no water at VB. If both spray i nj ec t i on pumps operate f rom shortly af ter the start of the accident, the cavity will be full before core degradation starts.
If the only water in the cavity is that due to recumulator dump at VB, the water depth will be about 4.5 ft. tioweve r , there is no branch in this question for a partially full cavity. What is of interest here is the presence of water for the direct containment heating ( DCil) and ex-vessel steam explosion (EVSE) events. The magnitude of the pressure rise due to DCH depends upon whether there is water in the cavity. Whether an EVSE occurs also depends upon whether there is water in the cavity. If the accumulators discharge at VB, the accumulator water will enter the cavity only after the the molten core ent e rs the cavity and after DCH occurs.
Thus whether the accumulators discharge at VB is irrelevant for these two events.
Case 1: The RWST was not inj ec t ed int o the containment before breach, and the sprays never operate before breach; the ranctor cavity contains little or no water at breach. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: RC Wet 0.0 Branch 2: RC-Dry 1.0 A.1.1-41
Case 2: The RWST was injected into the containment before breach or the sprays operated before breach; the reactor cavity is full of water at breach. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: RC Wet 1.0 Branch 2: RC Dry 0.0 Question 33. Fraction of the Core Raleased from the Vessel at Breach?
1 Branch, Type 3 The single branch has the same name as the parameter read in at this question:
P3 FCorRe1 The fraction of the core released from the vessel at breach is read in as Parameter 3.
This question is sampled; the distribution was provided by the In Vessel Expert Panel as part of Issue 6. The conclusions of e.he Experts and their aggregate distributions are presented in Volume 2, Part 1, of this report.
The median value of the distribution is 0.28. At Surry, this paramiter is primarily used to determine *.he amount of the core that participates in DCil as a result of itPME.
Question 34. Amount of the Core Role From the Vessel at Breach?
3 Branches, Type 5 r The branches for this question are:
- 1. Ili FCoR More than 40% of the core is released promptly from the vessel at breach.
- 2. Md FCoR 1.ess than 406 but more than 20% of the core is released ,
promptly from the vessel at breach.
- 3. Lo FCoR Less than 204 of the core is released promptly from the vessel at breach.
This question puts the fraction of the core participating in llPME, which was read in the previous question, into one of three groups.
Question 35. Does an Alpha Mode Event Fail Both the Vessel
- and the Containment?
l 2 Branches. Type 2, 3 Cases The branches for this question are:
- 1. Alpha A very energetic molten fuel coolant interaction (steam explosion) in the vessel fails the vessel and generates a missile which fails the containment as well.
- 2. noAlpha The vesse'. does not fail in this manner.
A.1.1 42 :
This question is sampled; the distribution used was developed internally from the opinions expressed by the Steam Explosion Review Group (NUREG.
1116). The experts' individual distributions and the aS6tegation of them are presented in Volume 2, Part 6, of this report. The branch taken at this question depends upon the branches previously taken at Questions 23 and 24 Case 1: There is VB and the RCS was at low pressure. Steam extlosions are more likely when the RCS is at low pressure than when the RCS is at some higher pressure. The aggregate distribution developed from distribution in the SERG was used for thia case.
- This distribution covers many orders of magnitude. .n the mean value of the distribution, the quantification for th :e is:
Branch 1: Alpha 0.008 Branch 2: noAlpha - 0.992 Case 2: There is VB and the RCS was not at low pressure. Steam explosions are less likely when the RCS is not at low pressure. The aggregate distribution utilized in the preceding case was decreased by an order of magnitude for use in this case. Based on the mean value of the distribution, the quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: Alpha 0.0008 Branch 2: noAlpha 0.9992 Case 3: The core degradation process has been arrested and there is no VB. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: Alpha 0.0 Branch 2: noAlpha 1.0 Question 36. Type of Vessel Brescht 4 Branches Type 2, 5 Cases The branches for this question are:
- 1. PrEj The molten core material is ej ec ted under considerable pressure from a hole in the bottom of the vessel.
- 2. Pour The molten core material pours slowly from the vessel, primarily driven by gravity.
- 3. BtmHd A large portion of the bottom head fails, perhaps due to a circumferential failure.
- 4. noVBoA There is no failure of the reactor pressure vessel, or an alpha mode failure has occurred.
Cases 2, 3, and 4 are sampled. The type of VB was determined by the In-Vessel Expert Panel. The conclusions of the Experts and their aggregate distributions are presented in Volume 2, Part 1, of this report. The branch taken at this question depends upon the branches previously taken at Questions 23, 24, and 35.
A.1.1-43 i
The pressurized ejection failure mode requires that the RCS be at high i pressure (greater than 200 psia) when the vessel fails. The experts generally has the failure of one or a few penetrations in the bottom head in mind when discussing this failure mode. Although the pour failure mode is often considered to occur only with the RCS at low pressure (less than 200 psia), at least one expert concluded that the probability of the failure mode with the RCS at high pressure at VB was nonzero. The scenario envisaged is that the RCS first fails somewhere above the level of the core debris in the bottom head. This failure could be near the junction of the vessel cylindrical section and the dome section that forms the bottom head, or it could take place anywhere in the RCS, such as in the surge line or '
the hot leg. No matter where this first failure occurs, the RCS blows down through this break, but no core debris is expelled. After the blowdown, the lower head fails and the core debris pours out into the cavity.
Although there could be a small driving force due to the gas pressure in the RCS, the Pour failure mode is distinguished by the fact that gravity is the primary force causing the molten core debris to leave the vessel.
The bottom head failure mode can occur at any RCS pressure; the failure could be a circumferential failure in which the whole bottom head falls into the cavity or some other failure in which a substantial portion of the bottom head fails. Bottom head failure at high pressure has effects similar to HPME; bottom head failure at low pressure has effects similar to '
a pour failure. The fourth branch is used to indicate that none of the three preceding branches applies. It is specified when there is no VB or when the vessel failed in the Alpha mode.
Case 1: The core degradation process has been arrested and there is no VB, or an Alpha modo failure of both the vessel and the containment has occurred. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: PrEj 0.0 Branch 2: Pour 0.0 Branch 3: BtmHd 0.0 Branch 4: noVBoA 1.0 Case 2: The vessel fails when the RCS is at system setpoint pressure.
The most likely failure mode is failure of a penetration, leading to HPME. This is caso 1 of In Vessel Issue 6. Based on'the mean value of the distribution provided by the Experts for this case, the quantifi-cation is:
Branch 1: PrEj - 0.79 Branch 2: Pour 0.08 Branch 3: BtmHd 0.13 Branch 4: noVBoA 0.0 Case 3: The vessel fails when the RCS is at high pressure. The most l likely failure mode is penetration failure leading to HPME. This is i Case 2 of In Vessel Issue 6. Based on the mean value of the distrib-l ution provided by the experts for this case, the quantification is:
i A.1.1 44 ,
Branch 1: PrEj 0.60 Branch 2: Pour - 0.27 Branch 3: Btmild - 0.13 Branch 4: noVBoA 0.0 Case 4: The vessel fails when the RCS is at intermediate pressure.
The most likely failure mode is penetration failure leading to llPME.
This is Ct.se 3 of In Vessel Issue 6. Based on the mean value of the distribution provided by the experts, the quantification is:
Branch 1: PrEj 0.60 Branch 2: Pour 0.27 Branch 3: StmHd 0.13 Branch 4: noVBoA - 0.0 Case 5: The' vessel fails when the RCS is at low pressure. The failure mode is gravity pour. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: PrEj 0.0 Branch 2: Pour 1.0 Branch 3: Btmild - 0.0 Branch 4: noVBoA - 0.0 Question 37. Does the Vessel Become a " Rocket" and Fail the Containment?
2 Branches, Type 2, 2 Cases The branches for this question are:
- 1. Rocket When the vessel fails it is accelerated upward at high speed and fails the containment.
- 2. noRocket When the vessel fails it is not accelerated upward at high speed and does not fail the containment.
This question was not sampled and was quantified internally. The branch taken at this question depends upon the branches taken at Questions 23 and 36.
The " Rocket" problem has not been well studied. A possible scenario is:
there is gross failure of the bottom head of the vessel at high pressure.
The gas inside she vessel is at about 2500 psia and its escape from the bottom of thr vessel accelerates the vessel upwards. The bolts holding down the versel fail, the hot legs and cold legs are sheared off, and the vessel atta4ns enough momentum rise clear of the shield wall. Striking the containmere wall, the vessel f ails the pressure boundary. Before striking the con'.ainment wall or dome, the vessel must dislodge the missile shield and t}ia manipulator crane, and avoid or dislodge the polar crane.
Case 1: There is gross failure of the bottom head of the vessel at system setpoint pressure. The rocket type of event may be credible.
The Surry cavity is much larger than those in German PWRs, so the rocket failure mode is considered to be much less likely than estimated A.I.1 45
for German reactors. The rocket failure mode ir generally believed to be less probable than the Alpha failure mode. As the mean of the Aalpha mode distribution is 0.008, the value selected for the Rocket mode should be less than this. On the other hand, a rocket probability of 0.0001 essentially means that the event is not credible. Thus, a value of 0.001 is used for a Rocket mode failure in this case and the the quantification is:
Branch 1: Rocket 0.001 i Branch 2: noRocket 0.999 ;
Case 2: There is no gross failure of the bottom head of the vessel at !
system setpoint pressure: the rocket failure mode is not credible. The ;
quantification for this case is: l Branch 1: Rocket 0.0 Branch 2: noRocket 1.0 Question 38, 81:e of the Hole in the Vessel (After Ablatiod)?
2 Branches Type 2, 2 Cases The branches for this question are:
- 1. LrgHole The hole size, after ablation, exceeds 0.4 m2 The nominal large hole size is 2.0 m2 2 Sm1 Hole The hole size, after ablation, does not exceed 0.4 m2 The nominal small hole size is 0.1 m2 i Case 1 is sampled zero one; this question was quantified internally. The branch taken at this question depends upon the branch previously.taken at -
Question 36.
In situatiens with HPHE, the pressure rise at VB depends upon the size of the hole in the vessel. Note that this is the hele size after ablation, that is, the hole size after any enlargement during the expulsion of the molten core debris and at the beginning of the gas blowdown. It is the high speed jet of gas impinging on the toolten corium in the cavity, entraining it, and dispersing it throughout the containment, that is responsible for DCH pressure rise. The experts who determined the distributions for pressure rise at VB concluded that the pressure rise depended on hole size.
~
Computer simulations for melt masses varying from 25 metric tons to 75 metric tons and for pressures ranging from 100 psia to 2500 psia have shown that the failure of one PWR bottom head penetration will result in a hole, after ablation, that has an area on the order of 0.1 to 0.2 m2, or smaller.
Holes sizes on the order of 0.4 ma are be observed in computer simulations !
only if a number of penetrations fail simultaneously. At 2500 psia, the time required for melt ejection is about 3 to 4 s, and at 500 psia, the time required for melt ejection is about 6 to 8 s. For the multiple ,
penetration failures to be considered simultaneous, they must occur within a fraction of the melt ejection time. Thus to be effective, the multiple A.1.1 46
penetration failures must occur within a fraction of a second of each other. Tc's appears to be very unlikely. More information on the analysis used to determine hole size distribution may be found in Volume 2, Part 6, of this report.
Case 1: The failure of the vessel is accompanied by HPME. The hole size is important in determining the pressure rise in the containment.
It was concluded that the probability of a small hole in the vessel when it fails in the llPME mode is 0.90. As this question was sampled zero one, 90% of the observations had 1.0 for the probability of the small hole branch and 10% of the observations had 1.0 for the probability of the large hole branch. In the average, the quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: trgilole 0.10 Branch 2: Sm11 tole 0.90 case 2: The failure of the vessel is not accompanied by llPME. The hole size is irrelevant. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: 1.rgilote 1.0 Branch 2: Smllloie - 0.0 Question 39. Pressure Rise at Vessel Breach? Large llole Cases 1 B:anch. Type 4, 13 Cases A parameter is read in at this question:
P4. dpl VB The total containvent pressure rise due to all the events that occur at VB for the low pressure and large hole cases is read in as Parameter 4.
Cases 3 and 5 through 13 are sampled. Distributions for the pressure rise at VB were provided by the Containment Loads Expert Panel. The branch taken at this question depends upon the branches previously taken at Questions 23, 24, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, and 38.
The Experts provided distributions for pressure rise at VB that included the effects of all the events that accompany vessel failure. These include EVSE, vessel bics'down, hydrogen combustion, and DCll. The effects of the various events are not separable, so there is no way to extract, for example, the contribution of DCll or hydrogen combustion to the total pressure rise. Because of the number of cases defined by the experts, two questions are used to determine pressure rise at VB. This question considers Alpha and Rocket mode failures, the low pressure case, and the large hole cases. The next question considers the pressure rise for the small hole cases. As the values of parameters dpl VB and dp2 VB are added together to obtain the pressure rise in the portion of the user function evaluated at Question 43, the value of at least one of these parameters is always zero.
Statistical tests on the aggregate distributions provided by the experts showed that their distributions for several cases are not distinguishable A.1.1-47
_ _ . _ . _ . . . . . - ~
from their distributions for other cases. Thus, Cases 1, lA, and 3B are grouped together; Cases IB and 1C are grouped together; and Cases 3 and 3A are grouped together. More information on the determination of the aggregate distributions for pressure rise at VB by the Containment Loads Expert Panel may be found in Volume 2, Part 2, of this report.
Case l' The core degradation process has been arrested and there is no i VB. The pressure rise is zero. {
Case 2: There.is an Alpha mode or Rocket mode failure of the vessel l and the containment. The pressure rise at VB is set to an arbitrary high value.to ensure that containment failure occurs in Question 43.
t Case 3: At breach, the RCS is at low pressure (less than 200 psia), or :
the molten core debris pours out of the vessel under the influence primarily of gravity alone. This is Case 4 of Containment Loads issue !
- 9. The mean value of the aggregate distribution of the pressure rise for this case is 19 pai. [
Case 4: The small hole cases are treated in the next question. As the value of dp2 VB will be set to some nonzero value in the next question, dpl VB is~ set to zero in this case.
Case 5: The' vessel . fails with intermediate pressure in the RCS and there is water in the reactor cavity. This case applies to Cases 3 and 3A of. Containment Loads Issue 9. The fraction of the core ejected is high'and the hole size after ablation is large. The mean value of the !
aggregate distribution of the pressure rise for this case is 67 psi.
Case- 6: The vessel fails with intermediate pressure in. the RCS and ,
there is water in'the reactor cavity. This case applies to cases 3 and ;
3A of Containment' Loads Issue 9.- The fraction of the core ejected is . ,
medium and. the hole size af ter. ablation is large. The mean value of the aggregate distribution of the pressure rise for this case 4 is 58 :
psi.
Case 7: The vessel fails with intermediate pressure in the RCS and i there is water in the reactor cavity. This case applies to Cases 3 and 3A of Containment Loads Issue 9, The fraction of the core ejected is' ;
,- small and the hole size after ablation is large. The mean value of the t aggregato distribution of the pressure rise for this case is 38 psi. ;
Case 8: The vessel fails with system setpoint or high pressure in the l i RCS and there is'little or no water:in the cavity. This caso applies [
l1 to' Cases'1B and 10.of Containment Loads' Issue 9. The fraction of the.
core ejected is high and the. hole size after ablation is large. The 7
.mean-value of the aggregate distribution of the pressure-rise for this ,
case is 90 psi. ;
case 9: The vessel fails with system setpoint or high pressure-in the j
. RCS and there is little or no water in the cavity. This case applies .:
to Cases 18 and 10 of Containment Loads Issue 9. The fraction of the I core ejected is medium and the hole size after ablation is large. The -
A.1.1-48 i
s mean value of the aggregate distribution of the pressure rise for this case is 75 psi.
Case 10: The vessel fails with system setpoint or .iigh pressure in the RCS and there is little or no water in the cavity. This case applies to Cases IB and 10 of Containment Loads Issue 9. The fraction of the core ejected is small and the hole size af ter ablation is large. The mean value of the aggregate distribution of the pressure rise for this case is 47 psi.
Case 11: The vessel fails with system setpoint or high pressure in the RCS and there is water in the cavity, or the vessel fails with inter-mediate pressure in the RCS and there is little or no water in the cavity. This case applies to Cases 1, 1A, and 3B of Containment Loads issue 9. The fraction of the core ejected is high and the hole size after ablation is large. The mean value of the aggregate distribution of the pressure rise for this case is 77 psi.
Case 12: The vessel fails with system setpoint or high pressure in the RCS and there is water in the cavity, or the vessel fails with inter-mediate pressure in the RCS and there is little or no water in the
- cavity. This case applies to Cases 1, 1A, and 3B of Containment Loads
- Issue 9. The fraction of the core ejected is medium and *he hole size after ablation is large. The mean value of the aggregate distribution of the pressure rise for this case is 65 psi.
Case 13: The vessel fails with system setpoint or high pressure in the RCS and there is water in the cavity, or the vessel fails with inter-mediate pressure in the RCS and there is little or no water in the i cavity. This case applies to Cases 1, 1A, and 3B of Containment Loads i Issue 9. The fraction of the core ejected is smaF and the hole site after ablation is large. The mean value of the aggre64te distribution of the pressure rise for this case is 42 psi.
Questien 40. Pressure Rise at Vessel Breach? Small lloie Cases 1 Branch, Type 4, 10 cases A parameter is read in at this question:
P5. dp2 VB The total containment pressure rise due to all the events that occur at VB for the small hole cases is read in as j Parameter 5. j Cases 2 through 10 are sampled. Distributions for the pressure rise at VB was provided by rte containment loads review group. The branch taken at this question dapends upon the branches previously taken at Questions 23, 24, 32, 34, 35, 37, and 38.
Because of the number of cases for pressure rise at VB, two questions are used. The previous question considered Alpha and Rocket mode failures, the low pressure case, and the large hole cases. This question considers the pressure rise for the small hole cases, h.1,1-49
Case.1: There is no VB, or alpha mode or Rocket mode failure of the containment, or low pressure in the RCS, gravity pour, or HPME with a smal1~ hole. These cases were treated in the previous question. The value of Parameter 5, dp2 VB, is set to zero.
Case 2: The vessel fails with intermediate pressure in the RCS and there is water in the reactor cavity. This case applies to Cases 3 and 3A of Containment Loads Issue 9 The fraction of the core ejected is high and the hole size after ablation is small. The mean value of the aggregate distribution of the pressure rise for this case is 60 psi.
Case 3: The vessel fails with intermediate pressure in the RCS and there is water in the reactor cavity. This case applies to Cases 3 and 3A of Containment Leads Issue 9. The fraction of the core ejected is medium and the hole size after ablation is small. The mean value of the aggregate distribution of the pressure rise for this case is 49 psi.
Case'4: The vessel failo with intermediate pressure in the RCS and there is water in the reactor cavity. This case applies to Cases 3 and 3A of Containment Loads Issue 9. The fraction of the core ejected is small and the hole size after ablation is small. The mean value of tha i aggregate distribution of the pressure rise for this case is 34 psi. ~
Case-5: The vessel fails with system setpoint or high pressure in the RCS and there is little or no water in the cavity. This case applies to Cases 1B~and 10,of Containment Loads Issue 9. The fraction of the core ejected is high and the- hole size af ter ablation is small. The mean value of the aggregate distribution of the pressure rise for this caso.is-75 psi. i Case 6: The vessel fails with system setpoint or high pressure in the
- RCS and there is little . or no water in the cavity. This case-applies to Cases'1B and 1C of Containment = Loads Issue 9. The fraction of the core ejected'is -medium and the hole size after ablation-is small. The mean-value of-the' aggregate distribution of the pressure rise'for.this 1
case is 61 pai. !
Cese 7: The vessel fails with system setpoint or high pressure in the 4 RCS and there is little or no water in the . cavity. This case applies-to Cases .1B and 1C of Containment Loads Issue 9. The fraction of the' core ejected -is small and the hole size af ter > ablation is small. The '
mean value of the- aggregate distribution of the pressure rise for this -
case is 40 psi.
Case 8: The vessel fails with system setpoint or high pressure in the RCS and- there 'is water in the cavity, or the _ vessel fails with inter.
mediate pressure in the RCS and there is little or no water in the
. cavity. This case applies to Cases 1, 1A, and 3B of Containment Loads Issue 9. The fraction- of _the core ejected is high and the hole size ;
after ablation is small. The mean vclue of the aggregate distribution '
of the pressure rise for this case is 67 psi.
A.1.1-50
Case 9: The vessel fails with system setpoint or high pressure 13. the RCS and there is water in the cavity, or the vessel fails with inter <
mediate pressure in the RCS and there is little or no water in the cavity. This case applies to Cases 1, 1A, and 3B of Containment Loads Issue 9. The fraction of the core ejected is medium and the hole size after ablation is small. The mean value of the aggregate distribution of the pressure rise for this case is 55 psi.
Case 10: The vessel fails with system setpoint or high pressure in the RCS and there is water in the cavity, or the vessel fails with inter-mediate pressure in the RCS and there is little or no water in the cavity. . This case applies to Cases 1, 1A, and 3B of Containment Loads issue 9. The fraction of the core ejected is small and the hole size after ablation is small. The mean value of the aggregate distribution of the pressure rise for this case is 37 psi.
Question 41. Does a Significant Ex-Vessel Steam Explosion Occur?
2 Branches, Type 2, 2 Cases The branches for this question are:
- 1. EVSE An energetic molten fuel coolant interaction occurs in the reactor cavity upon vessel breach.
- 2. noEVSE No energetic molten fuel coolant interaction occurs in the reactor cavity upon vessel breach.
This question is not sampled and was quantified internally. The branch taken at this question depends upon the branches previously taken at Questions 32 and 36.
The dropping of hot metal into water has been observed to cause energetic and . violent reactions which are commonly known as steam explosions. They appear to _ be more likely when the water is considerably below the satur-ation temperature. At Sandia National Laboratories, steam explosions were observed in 86% of the tests where hot metal was dropped into water. Some of these explosions were extremely energetic, others were not very energe-tic. In a severe reactor accident, a . steam explosion may occur when the core slumps into the lower head of the vessel, known as an in vessel steam explosion (IVSE),, or when the lower- head of the vessel fails and the core falls or is expelled into water . in the reactor cavity beneath the vessel.
This latter event is known as an ex-vessel steam explosion (EVSE). While IVSEs . were explicitly considered for the BWR APETs, the probability of a PWR vessel failure by an IVSE was not judged to be negligible. Thus IVSEs are not considered in this analysis for Surry.
The Surry containment - is not considered vulnerable to failure due to an EV3E alone. There is no path by which the impulse from an EVSE may be transmitted directly to the containment wall either in air or water. -The static pressure rise due to only an EVSE is not large enough to fail the Surry containment.
The effects of EVSEs are considered in two places in this APET. If the RCS is at high pressure (greater than 200 psia) at VB, the effects of an EVSE l A.1.1-51
T at VB are considered in Questions 39 and 40. The experts who considered pressure rise at VB included the - nressure rise due to EVSEs in their distributions for total pressure rise, The other effects of an EVSE are considered to be small compared with the effects of HPME. This question
- considers the effects of EVSEs when the vessel fails at low pressure or the molten debris pours from the vessel due to gravity alone, As an EVSE is not deemed capable of failing the containment, whether an
' EVSE occurs following a low pressure VB determinos: 1. whether the-debris bed in the reactor cavity af ter VB is in a coolable configuration; 2. if l the pressure rise for a low prescure VB is fast or slow; and, 3. the amount ;
of core involved in CCI. A small steam explosion that involves only a very small fraction of the core will not have any- discernible effect on this
- analysis. A "significant" EVSE in one that involves a considerable portion of the released core material and affects at least one of the three aspects of the analysis listed above.
Case 1: The vessel failure resulted in the melt pouring out, driven ,
primarily by . gravity, and there was water in the cavity when this occurred.. This is the only situation in which an EVSE is of . interest.
Not. all steam explosions are "significant" in context used here. The fraction of. the time that a pour c! hot metal into water results in a significant EVSE is thought to be between 0.1 and 0,9, The state-of -
knowledge in this aren'is such that,_ at this time, it is not possible to do a great deal better than assigning a probability of 0.50 to the probability for a significant EVSE. Thus, the quantification for this case is: .
Branch 1: EVSE. - 0,50 Br,snch 2: noEVSE - 0,50 case There was no VB, or the cavity was dry at breach, or the vessel'
.faile: a an alpha mode event or_ by _ pressurized ejection of the melt.
An -ex-vossel' steam explosion is not of interest or is not credible.
The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: . lEVSE - 0,0 Branch 2: noEVSE - 1.0 Question 42. Containment Failure Pressure?-
1 Branch, Type 3 Two parameters are read in at this question: i P6,-CF-Pr The containment failure pressure is read in as Parameter 6.
~ P7. RndNum A random _ number between 0.0 and 1.0 is read in as Parameter
- 7. This number is used to determine the mode of containment failure.
This question reads in the failure pressure of the containment and a random number used to determine the mode of containment failure. The comparison of the failure pressure with the load pressure, and the determination of A.1,1-52
the mode of failure. take place in the user function, a portion of which is evaluated at the next question in the event tree. The distribution for the containment static failure pressure was provided by the Structural Expert Panel. A detailed description of the conclusions of the structural experts whc considered the strength of the Surry containment, and the formation of the aggregate distribution, is contained in Volume 2, Part 3, of this report. The mean value of the experts' aggregate distribution for the failure pressure for the Surry containment is 126 psig.
Question 43. Containment Failure and Type of Containment Failure?
4 Branches. Type 6, 4 Cases The branches for this question are:
- 1. ICF.CtRp The containment fails by catastrophic rupture; the area of the hole is at least 1.0 f ta (and may be considerably larger) and there is extensive structural damage.
- 2. ICF-Rupt The containment fails by rupture; the nominal hole area is 7.0 ft 2,
- 3. ICF-Leak The containment fails in the leak mode; the nominal hole area is 0.1 fta,
- 4. no-ICF The containment does not fail at VB.
In Cases 3 and 4 of this question, a portion of the user function is evaluated to determine whether the containment fails, and, if it fails, the mode of failure, The case selected in this question depends upon the
-branches previously taken at Questions 13, 23, 35, 36, 37, and 41.
The user function is a small FORTRAN subprogram that is complied with EVNTRE, the computer code that evaluates the APET. The part of the user function evaluated at this question adds the pressure rise at VB
'(Parameters 4, dpl-VB, and 5, dp2-VB) to the base pressure in the containment before breach (Parameter 1, IPBase) to obtain the load pressure. This is then compared to the containment failure pressure (Parameter 6, CF-Pr) plus 14.7 (to put the failure pressure in psia). If the load pressure exceeds the failure pressure, the containment fails. The pressure rise is determined by sampling one of the Loads Experts' aggregate distributions in Question 39 or Question 40. The failure pressure is determined by sampling the Structural Experts' aggregato distribution in the previous question.
The way in which the random number, Parameter 7 (also read in the previous question), is used to determine the mode of containment failure differs depending on whether the rate of pressure rise is fast or slow relative to the rate at which a leak depressurizes the containment. For slow pressure rise, the experts provided an aggregate conditional probability for each failure mode as a function of failure pressure, and a table containing this information is contained in the user function. The random number is used to select the modo based on these conditional probabilities. For fast pressure rise, the conditional probability for each failure mode depends on A.1.1 53
both the failure pressure and the load pressure since the development of a leak at the failure pressure will not arrest the pressure rise. The method of determining the mode of containment failure is described briefly in Appendix /.2. (See also Issue 2 in Volume 2, Part 3.)
The parameter values passed to the user function at this ques. ion (and the question in which they are defined) are:
Pl. IPBase - Base pressure in the containment just before VB (Question 28);
P4. dpl-VB Pressure rise at VB due to low pressure and large hole cases (Question 39);
PS. dp2-VB - Pressure rise at VB due to small hole cases (Question 40);
P6, CF-Pr Containment failure pressure (Question 42);
P7. RndNum Random number used to determine the mode of containment failure (Question 42);
The user function (see Appendix A.2) determines the branch taken at this question.
Case 1: The containment was failed by rupture at the 9 tart of the accident due to an earthquake. Further failures are irrelevant. Dummy values are used with the comparison capability of EVN'.RE 'so that the no failure branch, no ICF, is selected.
Case 2: The containment is failed by an Alpha mode event or a rocket event. Dummy values are used with the comparison capability of EVNTRE I so.that rupture, Branch 2, is selected.
Case 3: The pressure rise is rapid compared to the leak depressuri- '
zation rate, that is, development of a leak does not arrest the-pressure rise in this cace. The portion of. the user function denoted ICFFst determines if failure occurs and the mode of failure.
Case 4: The containment fails at VB due, to a pressure rise that is comparable to the leak depressurization rate, that is, development of a leak arrests the pressure rise. .The portion of the user function denoted ICFS1w determines if failure occurs and the mode of failere. '
l l
Question 44. Sprays after Vessel Breach?
3 Branches, Type 2, 5 Cases The branches for this question are:
1.. 12-Sp The sprays operate after VB.
- 2. I2a3p The containment sprays are available to operate if power is recovered..
- 3. 12fSp. The containment sprays are failed and cannot be recovered.
This question is not. sampled; it was quantified internally. The branch taken at 'this question depends upon the branches previously taken at Questions 25, 35, 37, and 43.
A.1.1-54 i
This question is placed here because the operation of the sprays for 5 to 30 minutes after VB can considerably reduce the amount of fission products released to the environment for the scenarios in which the RCS is at high or - setpoint pressure just before breach. In these scenarios, a large fraction of the fission products released from the fuel is still within the vessel at the time of breach, so their first exposure to the decontaminat-ing effects of the sprays is immediately after vessel failure.
If the sprays were not manually or automatically actuated before VB, they will almost certainly be actuated by VB, There is the possibility that VB or containment failure may fail the sprays. The most likely mechanisms appear to be direct damage to the piping or clogging of the sumps by debris. Since the sprays survived the hydrogen burns at TMI, spray failure is not considered credible unless the containment fails. Structural engineers at Sandia who are familiar with reactor containments were consulted about the probability of spray failure upon containment failure at Surry. They agreed that the probability of spray failure for failure modes other than catastrophic rupture was negligible. Even for catastro-phic rupture it was their opinion that the probability of spray failure would be only about 0.10. As the Surry containment is of reinforced concrete construction, they concluded that even a: catastrophic rupture failure would be unlikely to involve such a large portion of the contain-ment structure that all four of the independent recirculation spray trains would be severely damaged. The sump screens at Surry are very large, so that a blockage of the sumps severe enough to fail the pumps was deemed negligible for. containment failures other than catastrophic rupture. Even for catastrophic rupture, complete sump blockage is considered imprebable.
The 0.10 spray failure probability for catastrophic rupture therefore is defined to include failures due to sump blockage as well as piping damage.
Case 1: The sprays were failed at the start of the accident and remain failed, or an Alpha or rocket event failed both the vessel and the containment. _An Alpha or rocket event is estimated to always fail the sprays. The quantification for this case is:
Branch.1: 12 Sp - 0.0 Branch 2: 12 asp - 0.0 Branch 3: I2fSp 1.0 Case 2: The sprays were available to operate before, and the contain-ment did not fail by catastrophic rupture, so the sprays remain available. Whether or not ac power has been recovered since the last spray question is not asked because the time period is short. Thus sprays which were only available to operate when power is recovered in the previous period do not operate in this period. The quantification for this case-is:
Branch 1: I2-Sp - 0.0 Branch 2: 12 asp - 1.0 Branch 3: 12fSp 0.0 Case 3: The sprays were operating before, and the containment did not fail by catastrophic rupture, so the sprays continue to operate. The quantification for this case is:
A.1.1-55
Branch 1: 12 Sp - 1.0 Branch 2: 12 asp 0.0 Branch 3: 12fSp - 0.0 Case 4: The sprays were operating before, and the contatament has failed by catastrophic rupture. As Surry is a steel-lined, reinforced concrete structure and has four independent spray recirculation trains, the structural engineers consulted concluded that it is unlikely that the sprays will be failed by catastrophic rupture of the containment.
The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: 12 Sp --0.90- !
Branch 2: 12 asp- --0.0 Branch 3: 12fSp 'O.10 Case.5: The sprays were available to operate before, and the contain-ment has failed by catastrophic rupture. The quantification is similar to the preceding case:
Branch 1: 12-Sp - 0.0 Branch 2: 12 asp - 0.90 j Branch 3: 12fsp 0.10 Question 45. -Is'AC Power Available Late ?
3 Branches, Type 2, 7 Cases.
The branches for this question are:
1.- L-ACP ac power is available during.the initial portion of CCI.
- 2. LaACP . ac - power is not available for this time period, but may be recovered in the future.
~3. LfACP ac . power ' is , not available for this time period,. and cannot be. recovered.
Cases - 3 through 7 of this question are sampled; the distributions were obtained from an analysis of the recovery of . offsite power for Surry as
- discussed above - for Question 21. The branching at this . question depends upon the branches taken at Questions 1, 10, 11, and 21.
The time period of interest here is between 30 minutes before VB and the-end of the initial portion of CCI. As CCI tapers off .very gradually, the end of- this time period is somewhat arbitrary, but it is intended to be after the bulk. of the hydrogen and radionuclides have been released. To simplify the number of cases in the next question about power recovery, the end of. this period of CCI has been taken to be 9 h for. cases 3, 4, and 5, and 17 h for cases 6 and'7. In general, then, the initial period of CCI was taken to be between 4 and 7 h.
The probability of power recovery is the probability that offsite electrical power is recovered in the period in question given that power was not recovered before the period.
A.1.1 56
Case 1: Power was available at the start of the accident and remains ,
available. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: L ACP- 1.0 Branch 2: LaACP - 0.0 l Branch 3: LfACP 0.0 Case 2:' Power was not available at the start of the accidrat and is not recoverable. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: L ACP 0.0 Branch 2: LaACP - 0.0 Branch 3: LfACP 1.0 +
Case 3: By cases 1 and 2, this case and all the following cases have electrical power not -initially available, but recoverable. The AFWS was failed at the start of the accident, and the RCS was intact when the water level dropped below the TAF. This case applies to PDS TRRR-RSR (fast blackout). The recovery period for this case is 2.0 to 9.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />. The_ mean value for power recovery in this period (0.89) gives the following quantification:
Branch 1: L-ACP - 0.89 Branch 2: LaACP - 0.11
. Branch 3: LfACP 0.0 L (Case 4: The AFWS was -operating at the start of the accident but falled after several hours upon battery depletion and there is an Sa break 'in
,the RCS at'UTAF. . This case applien to the S RRR RDR and SaRRR RCR PDSs (slow l blackout with stuck open PORVs). With this large; a break in tius !
RCS, whether the operators depressurized the secondary system while the-t the AFVS was operating is not very important. The recovery period for this> case is 4.0 to 9.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />. . The mean value for power recovery in this period (0.75) gives the following quantification for this case:
F Branch 1: 'L ACP - 0,75 4
Branch 2: LaACP - 0.25 Branch 3: LfACP - 0.0 case _5:. Power was not initiall'y available.-but recovery was possible.
The ' AFWS ' was operating at the start'of the accident but - failed af ter J several hours upon battery' depletion. The ' operators did not ~ depres.
surize the' secondary system while the the AFWS was operating. There is
'an S 3 break in the RCS at UTAF. This case applies to the SaRRR-RCR' PDS : i (slow blackout with RCP seal failure and the secondary not depressu-rized). The recovery period for this case is 5.5 to 9.0 h,' The mean
-value for power recovery in this period (0.60) gives the _ following quantification:
1 Branch li L-ACP - 0.60 Branch 2: LaACP 0.40 Branch 3: LfACP
- 0.0 A.1.1 57
Case 6: Power was not initially available, but recovery wau possible.
The AWS was operating at the start of the accident but failed after ,
4 h upon battery depletion. The oporators did depressurize the i secondary system while the the AFWS was operating. There is an S 3
-break in the RCS at UTAF. This case applies to the S RRR 3 RDR PDS (slow -
blackout with RCP seal failure and the secondary depressurized) . The recovery period for this case is 10 to 17 h. The mean value for power recovery in this period (0.73) gives the following quantification: ;
i Branch 1: L-ACP - 0.73 i' Branch 2: LaACP - 0.27 Branch 3: LfACP - 0.0 l
Case 7: Power was not initially available, but recovery was possible.
The AFWS was operating at the start of the accident but failed after 4 h upon battery depletion. The operators did depressurize the second-ary system while the the AFWS was operating. The RCS was intact when the core uncovered. This case applies to the TRRR RDR and TRR-RDY PDSs (slow blackout). The recovery period for this case is 12 to 17 h. The mean value for power recovery in this period (0.60) gives the following ,
quantification: :
Branch 1: O.60 L ACP Branch 2: LaACP 0.40 l Branch 3: LfACP 0.0 ,
l Question 46. Late Sprays?
3 Branches, Type 2, 3 Cases The-branches for this question are:
- 1. L Sp The containment sprays are operating during the initial portion of CCI. ;
-2. LaSp The containment sprays are available and will. operate when j' electric power is restored.
- 3. LfSp The contsinment sprays are failed and cannot be recovered.
This question is not sampled; if power has been recovered, and the sprays were "available" before, _ the sprays will operate in this period. The branch taken at this question depends upon the branches taken at the two previous questions.
The time period of interest is the same as in the preceding question. If sprays are recovered during this . period, the release from CCI will _ be considerably-reduced. If the debris bed is coolable and water was present but was not being replenished, spray recovery will prevent dryout and the start of CCI. Water is present in the cavity af ter VB but is not replenished in only two situations at Surry; 1. the accumulators discharge at VB and the sprays are not operating, and 2. an Alpha, rocket, or catastrophic rupture failure of the containment has failed the sprays, which were operating before VB. j i
A.1.1-58 l
Case 1:. The sprays were operating shortly after VB, or the sprays were available to operate and power has been recovered. In either situation the sprays now operate. The quantification is:
- Branch 1
- L Sp - 1.0 Branch 2: LaSp 0.0 Branch 3: LfSp - 0.0 Cass 2: The sprays were failed in the previous time period, so the sprays remain failed. The quantification for this case is:
i Branch 1: L.Sp - 0.0 Branch 2: LaSp 0.0 Branch 3: LfSp 1.0 Case 3: The sprays were available to operate, but power has not been recovered so the sprays remain available. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: L Sp - 0.0 Branch 2: LaSp - 1.0 Branch 3: LfSp 0.0 Question 47. Late Fan Coolers?
3 Branches, Type 2, 4 Cases The branches for.this question are:
- 1. L FC The containment fan coolers are operating in this period.
- 2. LaFC. The containment fan coolers are available to operate if pow r -
is recovered.
- 3. LfFC The containment fan _ coolers are ' failed ' and cannot be-recovered.
.This question.is not sampled. The branch chosen for this question depends upon the branches taken at Questions 26 and 45.
Although Surry does not have safety grade fan coolers, this question is included to make the containment event tree applicable to large, dry containments that do; have fan coolers qualified to operate in severe accident conditions.
Case.1: The fan coolers were. operating at.or_ shortly after the start-of the accident and they operate during this period. -The quantifica-tion for this case is:
Branch 1: L-FC - 1.0 Branch 2:
LaFC - 0.0 Branch 3: LfFC - 0.0 A.1.1-59
Case 2: The fan coolers were failtd at the start of the accident, and no recovery is possible, so the fan coolers remain failed. The quantification for this case is.
Branch 1: L-FC - 0.0 Branch 2: LaFC - 0.0 Branch 3: LfFC 1.0 Case 3: The fan coolers were available to operate at the start of the accident, and power has been recovered so the fan coolers now operate.
The quantiffcation for this case is: !
Branch >1: L FC - 1.0
" Branch 2: LaFC - 0.0 Branch'3: LfFC - 0.0 Case 4: The fan coolers were available to operate at the start of the accident, but power has not been recovered so the fan coolers remain available to operate in the future when power is recovered. The quantification for this case is: ,
b Branch 1: L-FC - 0.0 P
Branch 2: LaFC - 1.0 Branch 3: LfFC - 0.0 Question 48. Late Containment Heat Removai?
L 2 Branches, Type 2, 2 Cases l
l- The branches-for this question are:
- 1. L CHR-. Containment heat removal is operating during the - initial !
portion of-CCI.
L 2. LfCHR Containment heat removal is not operating in this period.
-r This question is not sampled; the branch: chosen depends.directly upon the branches taken at the two previous questions.
The time period in question is the same as in the preceding three questions. If'either=the sprays or the' fan coolers are operating, CHR.is operating.
Case 1: The sprays or:the fan coolers, or both, are operating, so CHR is operating. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: -L-CHR - 1.0 i'
Branch 2: LfCHR - 0.0 Case 2: Neither the sprays nor the fan coolers are available, so CHR is not available. The quantification for this case is:
Branch.1: L CHR - 0.0 Branch 2: LfCHR - 1.0 A.1.1-60 l
Question 49. How much Hydrogen Burns at Vessel Breach?
1 Branch, Type 4, 4 Cases The single branch has the same name as the parameter read at this question:
P8. Fril2-Brn The fraction of the hydrogen produced before or at VB that is burned at vessel failure is read in as Parameter 8.
The values for this parameter were determined internally. The applicable case for this question depends upon the branches previously taken at Questions 1, 13, 19, 23, 25, 36, and 43.
Whether hydrogen combustion is possible af ter CCI depends in part on the fate of the hydrogen produced before or at VB. If this hydrogen is either burned at VB or' escapes from the containment, it will not be available for combustion after CCI. Ilow much hydrogen burns during the events associated with VB depends on the inode of vessel f ailure and whether the containment is steam-inert at VB.
Case 1: The containment is already failed or bypassed (by Event V or SGTR). If the containment is already failed, further failure is irrelevant. If the containment is bypassed, most of the hydrogen produced in vessel will have passed out of the containment. The fraction turned at VB is set to 1.0. Since the containment is already failed of bypassed, the amount of hydrogen available for a burn after VB is o2 little importance.
Case ': The containment is intact, itPME occurred at VB, and the con-tairus.ent was not inerted by steam. The sprays were operating before VB so the steam concentration would have been low at VB. The dispersal of-high temperature melt partLcles throughout the containment is an excellent ignition source. However, the hydrogen that leaves the vessel late in the gas blowdown may not burn in the cavity since it may encounter an local _ atmosphern depleted of oxygen. The Containment Loads Expert' Panel gave distributions for the total pressure rise at VB, but did not specify the amount of hydrogen consumed. The combin-ation of gross bottom head failure at any RCS pressure except low pres-sure is also considered here since the events associated with grcss -
bottom head failure at pressure are- expected to ignite any available hydrogen. The fraction of the hydrogen produced before or at VB which is burned at VB is estimated to be 95% for this case. The presence of sprays ensures that the containment will be - well mixed, with a low steam concentration, in the minutes af ter VB. Electrical power means that ignition sources will be present. Any hydrogen that escapes the vcasc1 late in the blowdown and does not burn in the cavity due to lack of oxygen, should mix into the containment in the following few minutes and burn there if local concentrations above the flammable limit can be established.
Case 3: The containment is intact, and llPME occurred at VB, but the sprays were not operating and the contaitunent was likely to have been inerted by steam. The fraction of the hydrogen burned at VB can only be roughly estimated. The dispersal of high temperature melt particles l l
A.1.1-60a l
l throughout the containment might cause local combustion where the !
containment atmosphere was heated enough to reduce the steam concen- 1 tration significantly. The fraction of the hydrogen produced before or at VB that burns at VB is estimated to be 30% for this case. The lack of sprays means that the bulk of the containment atmosphere will be steam inert. With no electrical power, there will be no ignition sources. Any hydrogen that escapes the vessel late in the blowdown is unlikely to burn.
Case 4:- The containment is intact and the debris poured out of the vessel at breach. There may be some local burns in the cavity but a general deflagration is not expected. It is estimated that none of the 4 hydrogen produced before or at VB burns at VB. '
Question 50. Does. Late Ignition Occur? Conversion Ratio? Scale Factor?
2 Branches, Type 4, 3 Cases ;
The brancher for this question are:
t 1._ L Ign Ignition of the hydrogen in the containment will occur-during '
the initial part of CCI if the concentration is flammable.
- 2. noL-Ign Ignition of the hydrogen in the containment will not occur during the initial part of CCI even if the concentration is l
flammable. '
L Two parameters are read in at this question:
P9. IIB ConvR The conversion ratio, which determines the fraction of hydrogen consumed in a burn, is read in as Parameter 9, ,
P10. dp-Scale The scale factor applied to the adiabatic pressure rise for a late burn is read in as Parameter 10.
'Ihis question is not sampled and was quantified internally. The applicable case depends upon.the branches taken at Questions 1, 13,- 19, 21,-43, 45, and 48 This-question concerns ignition during the initial part of CCI; it deter- '
mines if ignition takes places when the atmosphere is flammable. 'Whether
- the atmosphere is flammable is determined in the portion of the user function _ evaluated at the next question. In the late period, the hydrogen available is;that produced in-vessel or at VB which is not burned at VB, and .the. hydrogen- produced by oxidizing all- the remaining unoxidized Zr.
flydrogen produced in CCI in addition- to that from oxidizing the rest of the zirconium is not available until the very late period (see Questions 61, 62, and 63).
The conditions that make hydrogen combustion capable of failing the Surry containment in the late period are no prior failure or bypass of the t containment little or no combust: ion at VB, and the absence of continuous electrical power and sprays. If the sprays do not operate in this period, the containment will be steam inert through this period and combustion is l
A.1.1-61 I
not possible. If the sprays have operated continuously since the start of the accident, then ignition is expected whenever a flammable concentration is reached. Burns at the lower flammable limit are no threat to the Surry containment. The only burns that appear capable of challenging the Surry containment are those that occur when the power is recovered after the onset-of CCI. When power is recovered after a period of hydrogen accumu-lation, the sprays begin to operate, which condenses the steam and de-inerts the containment, thus making large hydrogen deflagrations possible.
As the steam condenses, the containment atmosphere will pass from inert to flammable. At the higher steam concentrations in the flammable region, deflagrations are possible, but detonations are not. With electric power available in the containment, it was estimated by the Experts considering hydrogen combustion at Grand Gulf that ignition would occur quickly if the atmosphere is flammable. For Surry, even though the sprays reduce the steam concentration fairly quickly, it was concluded that ignition would occur while the containment atmosphere was in the deflagrable region and before it reached a detonable concentration. Therefore, only deflagrations are considered.
The conversion ratio is the ratio of the amount of hydrogen consumed in a deflagration to the amount in the atmosphere. The Surry containment is fairly open and the condensation of the steam by the sprays will cause considerable turbulence in the atmosphere, so the atmosphere is expected to-be well mixed. The conversion ratio, HB.ConvR, used for the Surry APET is 95%. That is, it is_ estimated that only 5% of the hydrogen is located in a poorly mixed area, such as the reactor cavity, where there is insufficient oxygen for combustion.
While the adiabatic pressure rise from a deflagration is easily calculated, the pressure rises observed in experimental burns are usually less than the adiabatic pressure rise. This difference is accounted for by a scale factor. It is the ratio of the expected pressure rise to the adiabatic pressure rise. That is, the pressure rise used to determine the contain-ment load from a late burn is the adiabatic pressure rise multiplied by the late burn scale factor, dp-Scale. The distribution for the. scale factor for rapid de-inerting of the containment due to the recovery of sprays was obtained from an ad hoc panel that considered only distributions for scale factors for late hydrogen burns. This panel was composed ~of K. D. Bergeron and D. C. Williams of Sandia National Laboratories, and they concluded that there was a great deal of uncertainty in the pressure rise due to hydrogen burns under these conditions. Their aggregate distribution for the scale factor for rapid de inerting has a cumulative probability of 0.0 for a scale factor of 0.20, a cumulative probability of 0.5 for a scale factor of 0.75, and a cumulative probability of 1.0 for a scale factor of 1.20. They made the distribution broad to account for the uncertainty-in mfxing, local turbulence, combustion efficiency in an atmosphere with a high steam concentration,.and possible flame acceleration due to obstacles. Values of the scale factor greater than 1.0 account for the possibility that local acceleration of the flame front will occur.
A.1.1-62 I
1
Case 1: .The containment is already failed or is bypassed. Ignition and burn at th*s time are irrelevant. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: L Ign 0.0 Branch 2: noL Ign - 1.0 Case 2: Electrical power and spray operation were recovered during this period. -The experts from the Containment Loads Panel that consi-dered hydrogen combustion events at Crand Culf concluded that when electrical power is available, ignition is all but 1.0 if the atmo-spheric is flammable due to presence of minute sparks from electrically operated equipment in the containment (e.g., valve motors). The conversion ratio is set to 0.95 as discussed above. The distribution for the scale factor for rapid de inerting of the containment due'to the recovery of sprays is nearly uniform from 0.20 to 1.20; the mean value is 0.72. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: L-Ign - 0.99 Branch 2: noL-Ign - 0.01 Case 3; Electric power was not recovered during this period. If power was available continuously, many- small burns are expected to occur.
These burns will not threaten the integrity of'the Surry containment; a large . burn ' at this time is not possible. If electric power is not recovered during this - period, the containment steam concentration remains high and the containment is effectively inert. In either '
situation, the probability of a significant hydrogen deflagration at this time is negligible. The quantification for this case is: -
Branch 1: L-Ign - 0.0 Branch.?: noL-Ign - 1.0 a
Question 51. Late Burn? Resulting Pressure in Containment? ,
2 Branches, Type 6, 2 Cases
- The branches for this question are:
- 2. LnH2Brn liydrogen combustion does not occur during the initial part of CCI.
'A parameter is computed in the user function at this question:
)
Pil, p-L2HB The containment pressure due to a very late hydrogen burn is
- computed in.the user. function and returned as Parameter 11.
This question is not sampled. The applicable case at this question depends i upon the branch taken at the previous question. l l
l The portion of the user function ovaluated at this. question computes amount ;
of hydrogen consumed in a deflagration and the resulting pressure in the containment. The amount of hydrogen consumed is limited by the amount of A.1.1-63
oxygen available and depends upon the conversion ratio defined in the preceding question. Since ignition occurs shortly after the sprays have reduced the steam concentration to the point where the atmosphere is flammable, the steam concentration is estimated to be 50% at the time of ignition. The adiabatic pressure rise, computed in the user function, is multiplied by the scale factor (also defined in the previous question) to obtain a realistic estimate of the pressure rise. Information is passed to the user function by means of parameters defined in previous questions.
The parameter values passed to the user function at this question (and the question in which they are defined) are:
P2. Zr0x-InV - Fraction of Zr oxidized in-vessel (Question 30);
P8. Fril2-Brn - Fraction of hydrogen generated at or before VB that burns at VB (Question 49);
P9. I!B ConvR - Conversion ratio for hydrogen deflagration (Question 50);
P10 dp Scale - Scale factor for the pressure rise due to deflagrations due to rapid de-inerting (Question 50).
The user function returns the total pressure in containment as the value of Parameter 11, p-LHB (in psia). More detail on the user function may be found in Appendix A,2 of this volume.
Case 1: There is no ignition; no hydrogen is consumed. The contain-ment pressure is set to 15 psia. The user function and the test value are set so that the quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: L H2Brn - 0.0 Brm.ch 2: Lnh2Brn - 1.0 Case 2: There is ignition if the atmosphere in the containment is flammable. The user function determines if - there is sufficient hydrogen and oxygen present to have a flammable concentration. If so, the amount . of hydrogen consumed in - the deflagration and the total pressure are calculated by the user function. The test value is set to 1,0, so if more than 1,0 - kg-mole of hydrogen is consumed in the deflagration, i.e., if the containment atmosphere is flammable, the quantification is:
Branch 1: L2-H2Brn - 1.0 Branch 2: L2nh2Brn - 0.0 Question 52. Containment Failure and Type of Containment Failure? .
4 Branches, Type 6,'2 Cases The branches for this question are:
- 1. LCF-CtRp The containment fails by catastrophic rupture; the_ hole is a-substantial portion of the containment surface area and there is extensive damage to the structure.
- 2. LCF-Rupt The containment fails by rupture; the nominal hole area is 7.0 ft 2, A.1.1-64
- 3. LCF Leak The containment fails in the leak mode; the nominal hole area is 0.1 ft 2.
This question is not sampled. The applicable case at this question depends upon the branch taken at the previous question. In Case 2 of this ques-tion, a portion of the the user function is evaluated to determine whether the containment fails, and the mode of failure. This question is similar to Question 43 except that the load pressure results from a hydrogen deflagration and the pressure rise is always fast with respect to the depressurization rate due to a leak mode failure. As in Question 43, the user function compares the load pressure to the failure pressure to determine if the containment fails. The mode of failure is determined as described in Question 43.
The parameter values passed to the user function at this question (and the ;
question in which they are defined) are: '
-P6. CF-Pr - Containment failure pressure (Question 42);
P7. RndNum - Random number used to determine the mode of containment failure (Question 42);
Pll. p-LHB Total pressure in the containment due to a deflagration during the initial part of CCI (Question 51);
The user function determines the branch taken at this question. The method embodied in the user function to determine the mode of containment failure is discussed in Appendix A.2.
Case 1: There is no burn during this period, so containment failure is not possible. Dummy values are used to ensure that the fourth branch is chosen, i
Case 2: There is a burn during this perind. The pressure rise is rapid compared to the leak depressurization race, that is, development of a leak does not arrest the pressure rise. The portion of the user function denoted LCFFst determines if failure occurs and the mode of failure.
Question 53. Amount of the Core Available for CCI?
3 Branches, Type 2, 6 Cases
.The branches for this question are:
- 1. Lrg-CCI Over 60% of the core is available for CCI.
- 3. Sml-CCI Less than 30% of the core is available for CCI.
This question is not sampled; it was quantified internally. The branch taken at this question depends upon the branch's previously taken at Questions 23, 34, 35, 36, 37, and 41.
A.1.1-65
How much of the molten corium is available to interact with the concrete !'
depends upon the mode of VB and the events that accompany VB. A high energy event may distribute the corium widely throughout the containment.
A significant CCI will not take place if the corium is spread out in a thin uniform sheet throughout the containment. It is estimated that almost all of the core eventually leaves the reactor vessel. Most of the core not involved in the events that accompany vessel failure will melt and flow out of the vessel in the next few hours. This material is considered to be available for CCI.
Although SURSOR subtracts out the fraction of the core material that par-ticipates in HPME, there is no double subtraction of this fraction as the HPME case is explicitly considered in the binner. See the discussion of binning Characteristic 10 in section 2.4.1 and later in this appendix.
Case 1: An Alpha or rocket mode failure of the vessel and containment has taken place. At least a substantial portion of the core debris is likely to be widely distributed throughout the containment. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: Lrg-CCI - 0.0 t Branch 2: Med-CCI - 1.0 Branch 3: Sml-CCI -G0 Case 2: The degradation of the core was arrested and there was no VB.
CCI does not take place. As the "small" category includes zero, the quantification for this case is:
-Branch 1: trg-CCI - 0.0 Branch 2: Med CCI 0.0 Branch 3: Sml-CCI - 1.0 Case 3: The vessel failure resulted in HPME or gross bottom head ,
failure at high pressure. ("At high pressure" means any pressure above !
200 psia.) The fraction of the core ejected at VB is either large or medium. Most of this material is expected to be involved in HPME and widely distributed throughout the containment, so.it is-not available-for CCI. The core debris that is available for CCI is the material that leaves the vessel after the HPME event, and the material that was expelled from the vessel in the HPME but was not entrained and ejected from the cavity by the ensuing gas blowdown. While the fraction of the core debris that does not leave the cavity that is involved in CCI is expected to be quite high, so much material was involved in HPME that the fraction of the core available to participate in CCI is in the medium range. Thus, the quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: Lrg CCI - 0.0 Branch 2: 'Med CCI - 1.0 Branch 3: Sml CCI - 0.0 Case 4: The vessel failure resulted in HPME or gross bottom head failure at pressure. The fraction of the core ejected at VB is small.
A.1,1-66
Although most of this material is involved in HPME and is not available for CCI, the fraction of the core debris that leaves tho vessel after HPME is large. Almost all of this material is available to participate in CCI. Thus, the quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: Lrg CCI - 1.0 Branch 2: Med CCI 0.0 Bianch 3: Sml-CCI - 0.0 Case 5: The vessel failed at low pressure or otherwise resulted in a gravity pour. There was an EVSE when the hot metal poured into the water in the cavity. Whether the EVSE will distribute a significant fraction of' the core outside the cavity is not known with any 1.0ty.
However, considering _ the cavity design at Surry, it does not seem credible that an EVSE would eject a large portion of the core from the cavity. It is expected that a large fraction of the core debris that does not leave the cavity will be involved in CCI. The quantification
.for this case is:
Branch 1: Lrg CCI - 0.50 Branch 2: Med CCI - 0.50 Branch 3: Sml CCI 0.0 Case 6: The vessel. failed at low pressure or otherwise resulted in a gravity pour. There was no EVSE. Almost all of the core debris will remain in the cavity and will be available for CCI. The quantification
.for this case is:
Branch 1: Lrg-CCI - 1.0 Branch 2: Med-CCI - 0.0 Branch 3: Sml-CCI - 0.0 Question 54. Is the Debris Bed in a Coolable Configuration?
2 Branches Type 2,-5 Cases The branches for this question are:
- 1. CDB: The debris bed is coolable; no CCI takes place as long as the debris remains covered with water.
- 2. noCDB The debris bed is not coolable. CCI'will begin as soon as the melt reheats whether water is present or not.
This question is not sampled and was quantified internally. The branch taken .at this. question depends upon the branches previously taken at Questions 23,-35, 36, 37, and 41.
'CCI will'not occur if.the debris bed in inherently coolable. and if there is water present to cool it. This question determines whether the debris bed is coolable assuming that water is present when the-core debris enters the cavity and is continuously . replenished thereafter. Whether water is present is determined in the next question. The portion of the molten core
-that participates in DCH is unavailable for CCI. Thus the core debris j l
A.1.1-67
considered in this question is the debris expelled at VB that remains in the cavity and the debris that leaves the vessel some time after VB. More discussion of debris coolability topic may be found in Volume 2, Part 6, of this report.
An Alpha or rocket event is likely to scatter at least some corium around i the concainment. If this corium comes to rest in a thin uniform layer, air {
cooling will suffice. However, it is possible that drifts of corium particles might accumulate in corners, in the wall-floor angle, and so on, thac would be large enough to reheat and start CCI. Debris coolability is very uncertain in scenarios such as these.
Case 1: The vessel has failed by an Alpha or rocket mode event which also fails the containnent. These events are so energetic that a substantial portion of the core debris is likely to be widely scattered throughout the containment. However, very little is known about these events or the expected corium distribution. Since both Alpha and rocket mode failure of the containment also fail the sprays, there is no supply of water to the cavity and CCI will occur eventually even if the debris bed is initially coolable and some water is present, Thus the quantification for this case is largely irrelevant. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: CDB - 0.85 Branch 2: noCDB - 0.15 Case 2: There was no vessel failure; CCI does not occur. The quantification of this case is:
Branch 1: CDB 1.0 Branch 2: noCDB - 0.0 i
Case 3: The vessel failure resulted in HPME or gross bottom head failure at ' high pressure (greater 'than 200 psia) . The core debris-involved in HPME but which does not participate in DCH is likely to be widely distributed throughout the containment. The state of the debris.
ej ec ted at vessel failure which remains in the cavity is not well known. The debris that pours out of the vessel some r.ime after vessel blowdown may assume a coolable form if it fragments into pieces that are neither too small nor too large. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: CDB - 0.80 Branch 2: noCDB - 0.20 Case 4: A gravity pour of the core debris resulted at VB, and an EVSE occurred. The EVSE may spread a portion of the debris throughout the containment where it would be coolable. On the other hand, the EVSE may create fine particles that remain in the cavity and make the bulk of the core debris in the cavity noncoolable. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: CDB - 0.80 Branch 2: noCDB - 0.20 A.1.1-68
Case 5: The vessel has failed with a gravity pour resulting. No EVSE F occurred. All of the core which exits the vessel should remain on the cavity floor. To form a coolable debris bed, the debris must fragment when it hits the water, the resulting particles must quench whi'4e falling through the water, and the size of the bulk of the parti.les 1 must fall within a 1.0 size range. Further, if a portion of the oebris bed is noncoolable, the available evidence is that this portion of the bed will grow in size until essentially the entire bed has become noncoolable. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: CDB 0.35 i Branch 2: noCDB 0.65 <
Question 55. Does Prompt CCI Occur?
2 Branches, Type 2, 2 Cases The branches for this question are:
f
- 2. noPrmCCI- CGI does not occur promptly after vessel breach. !
This question is not sampled; whether prompt CCI occurs follows logically from the information available about the coolability of the core debris and l the presence of water! in the reactor cavity. The . branch taken at this question depends upon the branches previously taken at Questions 24, 29, 32, and 54.
Case 1: .The debris is coolable and there is water in the cavity, or there has ' been no VB. In either case, CCI does not begin promptly.
The situation where the containment sprays operate only in the late
=
period is not considered a' sufficient water supply .to prevent CCI from starting. Electrical power may be recovered any time in the period, so the sprays may not. start until several hours- after VB. Water must be L continuously present from VB to prevent prompt CCI. The quantification for this case is: ,
Branch 1: PrmptCCI --0.0 Branch 2: noPrmCCI 1.0 i Case 2: There is no water in the cavity, or the debris is not coolable. In either case, CCI begins promptly, either at once, if the.
debris is hot when it leaves the vessel, or as soon as the debris-has reheated. The quantification for-this case is:
Branch 1: PrmptCCI - 1.0 Branch 2: noPrmCCI 0.0 A.1.1-69
Question 56. Is AC Power Recovered Very Late?
3 Branches, Type 2, 4 Cases The branches for this question are:
1, L2 ACP ac power is available after the initial portion of CCI,
- 2. L2aACP ac power is not available, but may be recovered in the future.
ac power is not available for this time period, and cannot be
~
- 3. L2fACP recovered.
Cases 3 and 4 are sampled. The distributions are based on the power recovery analysis for Surry discussed in Question 21. The branch taken at this question depends upon the branches previously taken at Questions 1, 10, 11, and 45.
The time period of interest is from the end of the period considered in Question 45 to 24 h. The start of this period is generally af ter almost all the fission products - have been released from the CCI, If power is restored during this period, sprays and containment heat removal will become available.
Case 1: Power was available at the start of the accident and remains available. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: L2-ACP - 1.0 Branch 2: L2aACP - 0.0-Branch 3: L2fACP - 0,0 Case 2: Power was not available at the start of the. accident and is not recoverable. The quantification-for this case is:
Branch 1: L2 ACP - 0.0 Branch.2: L2aACP - 0,0 Branch 3: L2fACP - 1.0 Case. 3: By. Cases 1 and 2, this case and the following case have electrical power not initially available, but recoverable. The AFWS was operating Cc the start of the accident but failed a few hours later after battery depletion; the operators depressurized the secondary system while the the AFWS was operating. Either there was no failure of the RCS pressure boundary before the TAF was uncovered or an S3 size pump seal failure occurred. .This case applies to PDSs TRRR RDR, TRRR-RDY, and S RRR-RDR, 3 The recovery period for this case is 17 to 24 h.
The mean value for power recovery in this period gives the following quantification:
Branch 1: L2 ACP - 0.68 Branch 2: L2aACP - 0.32 Branch 3: L2fACP - 0,0 A,1,1 70 i
Case 4: This case ' includes the blackout PDSs not included in the previous case: TRRR RSR, S2RRR RDR, S2 RRR RCR, and S RRR 3 RCR. The t recovery period for this case is 9 to 24 h. This case applies to PDSs.
The mean value for power recovery in this period gives the following quantification:
Branch 1: L2-ACP 0.92 Branch 2: L2aACP - 0.08 Branch 3: L2fACP 0.0 Question-57. Very Late Sprays?
3 Branches, Type 2, 5 Cases The branches for this question are:
1; L2 Sp The containment sprays- are operating after the initial portion of CCI.
- 2. 'L2 asp The containment sprays are available and will operate when electric power is restored.
- 3. L2fSp The containment sprays are failed and cannot be recovered.
1This. question-is not sampled; if ac power is recovered, the sprays operate :
if they are_not failed. The branch taken at this question depends upon the i branches previously taken at Questions 46, 52, and 56.
The period of interest here is the same as in the previous question. If l power has been recovered, and the sprays were "available" before, the sprays operate in this period. . If sprays are recovered during this time period, steam condensation will de-inert the containment, making a hydrogen burn possible. If the debris bed is coolable, spray operation during this period is required to prevent'dryout'and concrete attack.
Case 1: The sprays were operating in the. previous period or power has been recovered and the containment did.not fail by catastrophic rup- .
ture. The sprays operate during this period. The quantification for this case is:
Branch'1: L2-Sp - 1.0 Branch 2: L2 asp - 0.0 Branch 3: 'L2fsp - 0.0
- Case 2
- The sprays were failed earlier and _ they cannot be recovered in !
the timeframe of this analysis. The sprays remain failed. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: L2 Sp 0.0 Branch 2: L2 asp - 0.0 Branch 3: L2fsp - 1.0 l
l^
n.1.1-71 1
l
Case 3: The - sprays were operating in the previous period, or were available to operate when power was recovered, and power has been recovered. The containment failed by catastrophic rupture. The quantification is the same as Case 4 of Question 44:
Branch 1: L2 Sp - 0.90 Branch 2: L2 asp - 0.0 Branch 3: L2fsp - 0.10 Case 4: The sprays were available to operate when power was recovered, power has not been recovered and the containment failed by catastrophic rupture. The quantification is the same as Case 5 of Question 44:
Branch 1: L2 Sp - 0.0 Branch 2: L2 asp - 0.90 Branch 3: L2fSp 0.10 Case 5: The sprays were available to operate, but power has not been recovered, so the sprays remain available. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: L2 Sp - 0.0 Branch 2: L2 asp 1.0
. Branch 3: L2fsp 0.0 Question 58. Very Late Fan Coolers?
3 Branches, Type 2, 4 Cases The branches for this question are:
- 1. :L2-FC The containment fan coolers are operating 'n this period.
2.- L2aFC 'The containment fan coolers are available to operate if power.
is recovered.
- 3. L2fFC The. containment fan coolers are f ailed and cannot be recovered.
This question is not sampled; the branch chosen depends directly upon the branches taken at previous questions. The branch chosen for this question depends upon the branches taken at questions 47 and 56.
Although Surry does not have safety-grade fan coolers, this question is included to make. the containment event tree - applicable to large, dry containments that do have fan coolers qualified to operate in severe accident conditions.
Case 1: The fan coolers were operating at or shortly after the start of the accident and they continue to operate. The quantification for
.this case is:
Branch 1: L2-FC - 1.0 Branch 2: L2aFC - 0.0 Branch 3: L2fFC - 0.0 A.1.1-72
Case 2: The fan coolers were failed at the start of the accident, and no recovery is possible,_ so the fan coolers remain failed. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: L2-FC 0.0 Branch 2: L2aFC 0.0 Branch 3: L2fFC - 1.0
. Case 3: The fan coolers were available to operats at the start of the accident, and power has been recovered, so the fan coolers now operate.
The quantification for this case is:
L Branch 1: L2-FC - 1.0
- Branch 2: L2aFC - 0.0 L Branch 3: L2fFC - 0.0 h _ Case 4: The fan coolers were available to operate at the start of the accident, but power has not been recovered so the fan coolers remain available to - operate in the future when power is recovered, The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: L2-FC - 0.0 Branch 2: L2aFC - 1,0 Branch 3: L2fFC - 0.0 question 59. Very late CHR?
2 Branches, Type 2, 2 Cases The branches for this question are: !
- 1. L2 CHR CHR is operating after the initial portion of CCI.
- 2. . L2 fCHR CHR is not operating.in this period.
This question is not . sampled: the branch chosen depends directly upon the branches-taken at the two previous questions.
The time period of interest is the same as in the preceding three ques-tions. If either the sprays or the fan coolers are operating, CHR is operating.
Case 1: The sprays or the fan coolers, or both, are operating, so CHR is operating. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: L2-CHR - 1.0 Branch 2: L2fCHR - 0.0 1
L Case 2: Neither the sprays nor the fan coolers are operating, so CHR is not operating.' The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: L2-CHR - 0.0 Branch 2: L2fCHR
- 1.0 ,
A.1.1-73
I 1.
l'
-Question 60. Does Delayed CCI Occur?
2 Branches, Type 2, 2 Cases l The branches for this question are: i i
- 1. DelydCCI CCI occurs after a delay to boil off the water in the cavity.
- 2. nod 1dCCI CCI does not occur after a delay to boil off the water in the cavity. _;
I This question is not sampled; whether delayed CCI occurs follows logically from the information available about the coolability of the core debris, ;
whether prompt CCI has occurred, and whether the sprays are operating. The l branch taken at this question depends upon the branches previously taken at Questions 24, 55, and 57. l Case 1: Prompt CCI did not occur and the sprays are now operating, or prompt . CCI occurred, or there was no VB. If prompt CCI occurred, delayed CCI is not possible, If prompt CCI did not occur, the debris bed must have been coolable with water available. Since the sprays are now operating, the water cooling the debris bed is being replenished and delayed CCI will not take place. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: DelydCCI - 0.0 Branch 2: nod 1dCCI 1.0 Case 2: Prompt CCI did not occur, and the sprays are not operating, s; The debris bed must have been coolable, and there must have been some water present,-or prompt CCI would have resulted. As the water being ,
boiled off is'not being replenished, delayed CCI will begin when the !
, water is all boiled off. The quantification for this case is: ,
Branch 1: DelydCCI 1.0 'I Branch 2: noDidCCI - 0.0 i
A.1.1-74
P l
J i
Question 61.: How much H 2 is produced during CCI? -- i 2 Branches, Type 4, 4 Cases j
-The branches for this question are:
]
One parameter is road in at this question: ,
P12. H2 CCI The amount of' hydrogen produced during CCI in addition to the hydrogen produced by oxidizing the Zr-not oxidized in vessel .
L is read in'at this question as Parameter 12. Carbon monoxide l is treated'at hydrogen.
~
g This question is tot sampled; the ' values of Parameter 9 was determined internally. The branch taken at this question depends upon the = branches
- previously taken at Questions 53, 55, and 60.
- It was< concluded that during the initial part of CCI, all of the zirconium:
.not oxidized in the= vessel before breach will be oxidized. Paramotor 9 is
. the amount (kg moles) of hydrogen produced during CCI in addition to the l
. hydrogen produced by oxidizing the1 rest of the ' zirconium. This hydrogen 2
-l comes . from .-the" reaction of water . (steam) with iron and chromium -in the M -melt, t
i ~
- Carbon dioxide, carbon. monoxide, and other inert gases are also. produced by the; decomposition of the. concrete. At - Surry , the - concrete . is siliceous c that' is , = it was ' made with - basalt : coarse aggregate: and common: sand fine . , .,
,+
(aggregate, ,-As al result, when decomposed, the= concrete at?Surry gives off much less Coa 'and C0 than it would 'if -it: had been ;made using limestone } -
coarse e aggregate . The amount . of CO given off during CCI at Surry is
> Lnegligible comparedcto the hydrogen produced.. Another factor.particular to Surry -is: the fact ;that the = containment pressure is- maintained below ambient - '
atmospherict pressure' during operation Thus; the atmo' sphere initially in M~
- tho
- Surry containment;contains only-284 kg-moles ofeoxygen, so the maximum ,
1 e amount,of hydrogen that can bo; burned, nocmatter how much.is' produced,!is .[
L l568 kg moles.
5
- f' The method used to determine the amount of bydrogen produced.during'CCIin- ,
addition to the hydrogen produced by_ oxidizing ithe rest of. the zirconium is ,
based :on CORCON computations performed as part of some Battelle:'STCP calcu-'-
d lations' performed for: NUREC-1150. ;(i.etter Report, ; 29 April = 1988. ; contained'. '
>in Volume-2, Part 6, of this report.) The calculations indicate that about' }
1201kg moles of hydrogen .are produced in the firstl 5 h of' CCI af ter the.
rapid: production' of ' hydrogen due to zirconium oxidation ceases. . This;is considered to be typical when a medium fraction of the core is' involved,in.-
CCI and is the value used for Case 3. This 120 kg moles'is in addition to' !
, the 360 kg-moles of hydrogen produced by oxidizing of all the zirconium in the Surry-core. Note that, since there is only enough oxygen to burn 568 kg moles of hydrogen, and s'ince oxidation of all the zirconium in the core produces 360 kg moles of hydrogen, only about 200 kg-moles of hydrogen .;
produced by the oxidation-of steel during CCI can be burned in any event. ;
A.1.1-75
Case 1: CCI does not occur. No hydrogen is produced. The quantification for this asse is:
Branch 1: CCI - 0.0 Branch 2: noCCI 1.0 Case 2: A large fraction (70 to 1004) of the core is involved in CCI.
The center of this range is 85% of the core involved in CCI. The ratio of 85 to 50% (the center of the medium range) ir 1.70, so the medium amount produced, 120 kg moles, is scaled up by this factor to obtain 200 kg moles of 11. 2 Thus, Parameter 12, H2 CCI, set set to 200 for this case. This is about the maximum amount of hydrogen that can be t>urned in any event. The branch quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: CCI - 1.0 Branch 2: noCCI - 0.0 Case 3: A medium fraction (30 to 70%) of the core is involved in CCI.
As discussed above, CORCON results were used to estimate that 120 kg-moles of hydrogen are produced by oxidizing steel during CCI after the rapid production of hydrogen due to zirconium oxidation ceases. For this case, then, Parameter 12, ll2 CCI, is set to 120. .The branch quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: CC ' - 1.0 Branch 2: nouCI 0.0 Case 4: A small fraction (0 to 30%) of the core is involved in CCI.
The center of this range is 15% of the core involved in CCI. The ratio of 15 to 50%'(the center of the medium range) is 0.30, so the amounts used -in Case 3 are scaled down accordingly to obtain 36 kg moles of hydrogen. -Parameter 12 is set to this value for this case. The branch quantification is:
Branch 1: CCI - 1.0=
Branch 2: noCCI
~
- 0,0
' Question 62. Does Very Late Ignition Occur? Scale Factors?
2 Branches, Type 4, 4 Cases The branches for this questier are:
.1 '. L2-Ign Ignition of the hydrogen in the_ containment will occur during the latter part of CCI if the concentration is flammable.
'2. noL2-Ign Ignition of the hydrogen in the containment will not occur during the latter part of CCI even if the concentration is flammable.
Two parameters are read in at this question:
P13 dpScalel The scale factor applied to the adiabatic pressure rise for a very late burn in which the sorays rapidly de-inert the containment is read in as Parameter 13.
A.1.1-76
P14. dp$cale2 The scale fac*ir applied t.o the adiabatic pressure rise for a very late burn in which the sprays never come on and the de.
i inerting is very slow is read in as Parameter 14.
This question is not sampled and was quantified internally. The applicable ca3e depends upon the branches taken at Questions 1, 13, 19, 21, 43, 45, 51, 52, 56, and 59.
This question concerns ignition during the latter part of CCI. This e question determines if ignition tskes places when the atmosphere is flammable. Whether the atmosphere is flammable is determined in the portion of the user function evaluated at the next question. In the very late period, if no burns, containment failures, or bypasses have occurred, the hydrogen available is that produced in vessel or at VB, the hydrogen produced by oxidizing all the remaining unoxidized zirconium during the initial part of CCI, and the hydrogen produced in CCI in addition to that from oxidizing the rest of the zirconium. The amount of this additional nydrogen produced during CCI was determiner' in the previous question.
Significant combustion events during this period are negligible if electric power e.nd containment sprays have been continuously available since the i start of the accident as discussed in Question 50. As in the late period, only deflagrations are considered. They may occur in this period when electric power and the sprays are recovered, or thy may occur when the containment eventually cools off without mechanical neat removal. With no sprays operating, the condensation of steam will be very slow, and the containment atmosphere may be poorly mixed; " mushy" burns at marginally flammable concentrations are much more likely than when tecovery of the sprays cause rapid steam condensation and considerable turbulence. There.
fore, separate scale factors are defined for deflagrations that accompany rapid de iurting and for deflagrations that accompany very slow de-inerting.
The scale factor used for hydrogen deflagrations following the rapid de-inerting that follows spray recovery is the same as that used in Question
- 50. The same ad hoc panel that determined the distribution for the scale factor for rapid do inerting also provided a distribution for the scale factor for gradual de inerting when sprays are not recovered. This panel, Williams of Sandia National composed of K. D. Bergeron and D. C.
Laboratories, concluded that there was a great deal of tncertainty in the pressure rise for slow de inerting as well. Without the rapid condenantieu i and ensuing turbulence that accompanies initial spray operetion, the containment atmosphere is expected to be quiescent and may be stratified.
There may be a long period during which the atmosphere is just barely flammable. Experts in hydrogen combustion describe de flagrations that
, occur in mixtures with high steam concentrations as " mushy." By this they mean that the flame front travels slowly and the pressure rise is much less than adiabatic. The aggregate distribution for the scale factor for slow de inerting has a cumulative probability of G.D for a scale factor of 0.10, a cumulative probability of 0.5 for a scale factor of 0. 50, and a cumulative probability of 1.0 for a scale factor of 1,0.
A.1.1-77
l Case 1: The containment is already failed, or is bypassed. Ignition and burn at this time is irrelevant. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: L2 1&n 0.0 Branch 2: noL2 Ign 1.0 Case 2: Electrical power and spray operation were recovered during this period. This case is identical to case 2 for Question 50.
dpScalel is set to the same value used there; dpScale2 is set to zero.
The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: L2 Ign .
0.99 Branch 2: noL2 Ign 0.01 Case 3: Electric power was available continuously i.ince the start of the accident, or a burn occurred in the late period. If power was available continuously, many small burns are expected to occur. These burns will not threaten the integrity of the Surry containment. If a burn occurred in the previous time period, there will not be enough hydrogen available in this time period to cause a deflagration that could threaten the Surry containment. In either situation, ignition and burns in the very late period are not of interest. The ,
i quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: L2 Ign 0.0 Branch 2: noL2 Ign 11 0 Case 4: Electric power is not recovered during the time frame of interest for this analysis. The sprays do not operate, so the con-tainment will remain inerted by the high steam concentration for some time. Eventually the steam concentration in the containmunt may drop t c, about 55%, and then ignition is possible if enough hydrogen is present. The aggregate distribution for dpScale2 is nearly linear ft'um '
0.10 to 1.00; the mean value is 0.52, dpScalet is set to zero. When no electrical power is available, ignition appears to be a stochastic phenomenon. A similar case was considered by the experts considering ,l hydrogen combustion events at Crand Culf. They gave distributions for 1 ignition probability which depended on the hydrogen concentration. !
This issue is summarized in Volume 2, Part 2, of this report. The mean values of their ignition probability distributions for concentrations of interest are about 0.30. This value (0.30) for the ignition probability also includes implicitly the probability that heat loss l through the containment wall alone eventually causes enough wall condensation to reduce the steam concentration to about $5%. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: L2 Ign 0.30 !
Branch 2: noL2 Ign 0.70 .
I A.1.1 78
Question 63. Very Late Burn? Resulting Pressure in Containment?
2 Branches. Type 6, 2 Cases The branches for this question are:
A parameter is computed in the user function at this question:
P15, p L2HB The containment pressure due to a very late hydrogen burn is computed in the user function and returned as Parameter 15.
This question is not sampled. The branch taken at this question depends upon the branch taken at the previous question.
The portion of the user function evaluated at this question computes amount of hydrogen consumed in a deflagration and the resulting pressure in the containment. This portion of the user function is similar to the portion of the user function evaluated at Question 51. The amount of hydrogen consumed is limited by the amount of oxygen availabic and the conversion ratio. As in Question 51, ignition occurs shortly after the steam concen-tration has decreased enough to make the atmosphere flammabic and ignition occurs at 50% steam concentration. Different scale factors, defined in the previous question, are used for deflagrations resulting from rapid de.
inerting due to sprays and deflagrations resulting from very slow de-inerting when the sprays do not operate. Information is passed to the user function by means of parameters defined in previous questions. The parameter values passed to the user function at this question (and the question in which they are defined) are:
P9. HB.ConvR Conversion ratio for hydrogen deflagration (Question 50);
P12.112 C01 Amount of hydrogen produced in CCI in addi o n to that produced by oxidizing the remaining Zr (Quescion 61);
P13. dpScalel Scale factor for the pressure rise due to deflagrations due to rapid de inerting (Question 62);
P14. dpScale2 Scale factor for the pressure rise due to deflagrations due to slow de inerting (Question 62).
The user function returns the total pressure in containment as the value of P15, p L2HB (it psia). More detail on the user function may be found in Appendix A.2 of this volume.
Case 1: There is no ignition; no hydrogen is consumed. The contain-ment pressure is set to 15 psia. The quantification for this case is:
Braneb 1: L H2Brn 0.0 Branch 2: Lnh2Brn 1.0 A.1.1-79
Case 2: There is ignition if the atmosphere in the containment is flammable. The user function determines if there is sufficient hydrogen and oxygen present to have a flammable concentration. If so, the amount of hydrogen consumed in the deflagration and the total pressure in containment are calculated by the user function. If the containment atmosphere is flammable, the quantification is:
Branch 1: L2 H2Brn 1.0 Branch 2: L2nh2Brn 0.0 Question 64. Containment Failure and Type of Containment Failure?
4 Branches. Type 6, 2 Cases j The branches for this question are:
- 1. L2CF CRp The containment fails by catastrophic rupture; the hole is a j substantial portion of the containment surface area and there i is extensive damage to the structure.
- 2. L2CF Rp The containment fails by rupture; the nominal hole area is 7.0 ft 2.
- 3. L2CF Lk The containment fails in the leak mode; the nominal hole area is 0.1 ft 2.
- 4. no L2CF The containment does not fail after the initial part of CCI.
This question is not sampled. The applicable case at this question depends ;
upon the branch taken at the previous question. In Case 2 of this ques- ;
tion, the same portion of the user function used in Question $2 is .
evaluated to - determine whether the containment fails, and the mode of '
failure. .
l The parameter values passed to the user function at this question (and the ;
question in which they are defined) are: ,
i P6. CF+Pr Containment failure pressure (Question 42);
P7. RndNum Random number used' to determine the mode of containment failure (Question 42); j Pl$. p L711B - Total pressure in the containment due to a defla& ration !
during the latter part of CCI (Question $1). r The user function determines the branch taken at this question. The method.
. programmed to . determine containment failure mode in the user function is discussed in Appendix A.2. ,
Case 1: There is no burn during this period, so containment failure is
.not possible. Dummy values are used to ensure that the fourth branch is chosen.
t A.1.1 80
Case 2: There is a burn during this period. The pressure rise is rapid compared to the leak depressurization rate, that is, development of a leak does not arrest the pressure rise. The portion of the user function denoted LCFFst determines if failure occurs and the mode of failure.
Question 65. Sprays after Very Late Containment Failure?
2 Branches, Type 2, 3 Cases The branches for this question are:
- 1. F Sp The containment sprays operate in the final period.
- 2. noF Sp The containment sprays are failed and do not operate.
This question is not sampled; if ac power is recovered, the sprays operate if they are not failed. The branch taken at this question depends upon the branches previously taken at Questions $6, 57, and 64.
If the containment is still intact and is not bypassed, operation of the sprays in the final time period will prevent eventual overpressure failure of the containment. Operation of the sprays is also required to keep coolable debris beds from dryin6 out. The time period of interest here is af ter the bulk of the CCI has taken place and af ter a very late hydrogen burn (if any); this may be 24 h or more af ter the start of the accident.
The probability that offsite power will not be recovered by this time for internal initiators is estincted to be negligible, so if the sprays were available in the previous period, and they are not failed by containment failure, they will operate in this period. Recovery of failed sprays is not considered.
The treatment of the possibility that catastrophic rupture of the containment may fail the sprays is the same as that in Question 44.
Case 1: The sprays were failed earlier, or the LOSp was due to an earthquake. If the sprays were failed earlier, they remain failed as recovery is not considered credible in the timeframe of interest. If the LOSp was due to a seism, it is also non recoverable in the timeframe of interest. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: F Sp 0.0 Branch 2: noF-Sp 1.0 case 2: Catastrophic rupture of containment has occurred; spray failure is judged to be unlikely. The sprays are not failed by Case 1.
Offsite power is always recovered by this time unless the LOSp was due to an earthquake. If power was initially recoverable or the sprays were operating in the previous period, and if the catastrophic rupture did not fail the sprays, the sprays operate now. The quantification is the same as in Question 44, Case 4:
Branch 1: F-Sp 0.90 Branch 2: noF Sp 0.10 A.1.1-81
. - - _ - - - - - - - - - . . . . . . . . . . . . .i .i
t Case 3: The LDSp was not due to a seism, so offsite power is always a recovered by this time. There was no catastrophic rupture of the containment, and the sprays were not failed initially: in this situa-tion the sprays always operate in this period. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1:. F Sp - 1.0 Branch 2: noF Sp 0.0 Question 66. Fan Cociers after Very Late Containment Failure? '
2 Branches Type 2, 2 Cases
.The branches for this question are: i
- 1. F FC The containment fan coolers operate in the final period.
- 2. noF PC The containment fan coolers are failed and do not operate.
This question is not sampled; the branch chocen dependa directly upon the ;
branches taken at previous questions. The branch chosen for.this question. '
depends upon the branches taken at Questions 56 and $8. l Although Surry does not have saft / grade fan coolers, this question is ,
included to ' make the containmer, event tree applicable to large, dry containments that do have fan coolers qualified to operate during severe .i accidents. I Case 1: The fan. coolers were failed or the offsite power is failed.
In either case, no recovery is possible, so the fan coolers remain failed. The quantification for this case is: -
Branch 1: F FC 0.0 '
Branch 2: noF FC - 1.0 Case 2: The. fan coolers were available to operate at the start of the accident, and, unless the LOSp was due to an earthquake, electric is always recovered by this time, so the fan coolers now operate. The- +
quantification for this case is: i Branch 1: F FC 1.0 i Branch'2: noF FC 0.0 j
-Question 67. Containment.lleat Removal after Very Late Containment Failure?
2 Branches, Type 2, 2 Cases ,
-The' branches for this question are: !
l i
- 1. F.CllR .CllR is available in this period.
'2. noF.CllR - CllR is not available in this period.
[
This question is not sampled; the branch chosen depends directly upon the branch taken at the two previous questions.
{
A.1.1 82 .j
E If either the sprays or the fan coolers are operating, CHR is operating.
Case 1: The sprays or the fan coolers, or both, are operating, so CHR is operating. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: F CHR - 1.0 Branch 2: noF-CHR 0.0 Case 2: Neither the sprays nor the fan coolers are operating, so CHR is not operating. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: F CHR 0.0 Branch 2: noF-CHR - 1.0 Question 68. Eventual Basemat Melt-throught 2 Branches, Type 2, 7 Cases The branches for this question are:
- 1. BMT The CCI eventually penetrates the basemat in the reactor cavity.
- 2. noBMT The basemat does not melt through, or the melt-through is irrelevant.
This question is not campled; it was quantified internally. The branch taken at this question depends upon the branches previously taken at Questions 13, 24, 43, $2, 53, 55, 60, 64, and 65.
The question of eventual BMT is considered here without respect to whether eventual overpressure failure of the containment occurs. From a risk perspective, if ( rerpressure failure (OP) occurs, whether BMT occurs is irrelevant since most of the fission products released will be released through the above-ground failure. If the debris bed is coolable and there is CHR, BMT is not credible. The basemat at Surry consists of 10 ft of siliceous concrete. Thus, even with a large fraction of the core involved in CCI and no water available, eventual penetration of the basemat by the core debris is not assured. This question was quantified by the analysts involved; advice was solicited from D. R. Bradley and D. C. Williams of Sandia National L.aboratories. Because of the thickness (10 ft) of the Surry basemat, and its composition (siliceous), BMT is not considered assured even for the worst case- a large fraction of the core involved in a dry cavity. Inseed, for this case it was estimated that the probability of BMT is somewhat less than 0. 50. For a small amount of core involved in CCI, the chances of BMT were so low that no distinction was made for whether water was present.
Case 1: The containment is failed already, or there is no VB. In the first case, basemat melt through is irrelevant, and in the second case, it is 0 0. The quantification is:
Branch 1: BMT - 0.0 Branch 2: noBMT - 1.0 A.I.1-83
Case 2: The debris bed is coolable and CHR is operating; BMT is not credible. In nost PWRs. the condensate from the fan coolers would drain to the cavity, so it does not matter whether the fan coolers or the sprays are operating. At Surry, the condensate from the fan coolers does not drain to the reactor cavity, so this case specifically requires the sprays to be operating. The quantification for is:
Branch 1: BMT 0.0 Branch 2: noBMT - 1.0 Case 3: For this case and the following cases, CCI occurs and is o'.
interest by cases 1 and 2. For Case 3, a large fraction of the core is involved in CCI and the sprays are operating so there is a pool of water over the core debris in the cavity. (The debris bed is not l coolable by case 2.) There will be more heat loss upward into the ;
water covering the debris than if the cavity were dry. Whether the '
concrete attack will penetrate the basemat is not known with any certainty but no melt through is esd:-sted to be more likely than melt. ,
through. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: BMT 0.25 Branch 2: noBMT 0.75 Case 4: A large fraction of the core is involved in CCI and the cavity is dry _ More of the decay heat will be directed downward into the concrete than in Case 3, so BMT is more likely than in Case 3. The quantification for this casa is:
Branch 1: BMT 0.40 Branch 2: noBMT 0.60 Case 5: An intermediata fraction of the core is involved in CCI and the sprays are operating so there is a pool of water over the core i debris in the cavity. BMT is less likely than if a large portion of the core were involved in CCI. Considering the thickness of the Surry ;
basemat, BMT is unlikely. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: BMT - 0.05 Branch 2: noBMT 0.95 Case 6: An intermediate fraction of the core is involved in CCI and the cavity is dry. BMT is less likely than if a large portion of the core were involved in CCI in a dry cavity (Case 4), _but more likely than if an intermediate fraction of the core is involved and the sprays are operating (Case 5). The quantification is:
Branch 1: BMT 0.20 Branch 2: noBMT 0.80 Case 7: Only a small fraction of the core is involved in CCI. LMT is less likely than if a larger fraction of the core is involved, and does not depend strongly on whether the sprays are operating. The quantification for this case is:
l A.1.1-84 i
1 branch 1: BMT 0.02 Branch 2: noSMT 0.98 Question 69. Eventual Overpressure Failure of Containment?
2 Branches. Type 2, 2 Cases The branches for this question are:
- 1. F CF.0P The containment eventually fails due to a slow increase in internal pressure.
- 2. noFCFOP The containment pressure rise is insufficient to eventually cause failure.
This question is sampled; it was quantified internally. The branch taken at this question depends upon the branches previously taken at Questions 13, 24, 43, 52, 64, and 67.
The question of eventual OP failure of the containment occurs is considered here without respect to whether or not BMT occurs. Eventual OP of the Surry containnient due only to the noncondensible gases generated by CCI is not credible. The concrete forming the Surry containment is siliceous (the coarse aggregate is basalt), so the amount of noncondensible gases produced by CCI will be much smaller than if it were composed of limestone concrete.
The amount of concrete that would have to be decomposed to overpressure the Surry containment is such that the CCI would penetrate the basemat before enough gas was generated.
If the sprays are not operating, eventual overpressure is possible. 1,ong-term analyses indicate that the heat losses through the containment wall are so small that after several days the inner surface of the containment wall will become so hot that condensation will become negligible. The fission products in the sump and cavity water will continue to generate heat and steam. Failure of the containment due to steam pressure may occur on the order of a week af ter the accident. More detail on how the time required for the eventual overpressure mode of containment failure may be found in Volume 2, Part 6.
Since times on the order of a week are involved, the probability of even-tual overpressure depends primarily on the recovery of containment heat removal in the days following the accident. With this much time available, there are many means of obtaining containment heat removal. Restoring one of the four independent recirculation spray trains to operation and providing service water to its heat exchanger would suffice. If this cannot be accomplished, or if the sumps contain very little water, the RWST could be refilled and the spray injection pumps used to inject more water into the containment. Many other options are also available to the plant operators.
Case 1: The containment is already failed, CHR is available, or there was no VB. Overpressure failure of the containment at this time is either irrelevant or not credible. This is the only case that will be selected for internal initiators at Surry. For internal events, A.1.1 85
electric power is always recovered in a day or so. Thus, the only way there can be no C}lR at this time is for the sprays to be failed. None of the internal PDSs at Surry have recirculation sprays failed since there are four independent spray trains. The only way to fail the sprays in this analysis is by catastrophic rupture of the containment, an Alpha mode event, or a Rocket event. Therefore, for internal initiators at Surry, there is always no VB, containment failure, or containment heat removal, and this case is selected. The quantification is:
Branch 1: F CF OP 0.0 Branch 2: noFCFOP 1.0 i Case 2: CllR was not operating in the final period and the containment is not already failed (by case 1) . This situation is realizable at Surry only for external initiators. Eventual overpressure failure may occur after about a week if CilR is not recovered. Even following a bad fire in the emergency switchgear room or the cable vault, or following ,
a severe earthquake, the probability is high that some means of cooling the containment will be devised in several days. The quantificatioa for this case is:
Branch 1: F CF OP 0.05 Branch 2: noFCFOP 0.45 ,
Question 70. Basemat Melt through before Overpressure Failure?
3 Branches, Type 2, 5 Cases The branches for this quertion are:
- 1. F BMT The basemat melts through, and this is the only failurt of !
the containment.
- 2. FCF Leak Slowly increasing pressure - eventually leads to containment failure above ground. BMT may or may not occur.
i
- 3. Neither Neither BMT nor OP failure eventually occurs.
This question in not sampled; it was quantified intertw11y. The branching at this question depends upon the branches taken at Question $3 and the two ,
previous questions.
If both final failure modes, BMT and containment (OP) failure, are predicted to eventually occur in the absence of the other, the situation after a few days may be seen as a race between the two failure modes. The overpressure failure is always considered to be a leak as the rate of pressurization will be very slow and- the Surry containtnent is constructed i of reinforced concrete with a steel liner forming the pres sure boundary.
If BMT occurs first, it will provide enough pressure relief that the OP failure will not occur. If OP occurs first, it will not pre vent BMT, but the bulk of the fission products released will be released through the aboveground failure, so whether BMT occurs is not of interest. Thus, the failure that occurs first is the only one of interest. The third branch 18 A.1.1 86
chosen if the containment has already failed as sell as when the contain-ment never fails. Bypass is not considered to be containment failure in this question.
Case 1: The conditions in the containment will l e ait to eventual BMT, but not to OP. The quantification of this case is:
Branch 1: F-BMT - 1.0 Branch 2: FCF Leak 0.0 Branch 3: Neither 0.0 Case 2: The conditions in the containment will lead to eventual OP, but not to BMT. The quantification of this case is:
Branch 1: F BMT 0.0 Branch 2: FCT Leak - 1.0 Branch 3: Neither 0.0 Case 3: The conditions in the contaitunent will lead to eventual OP and to BMT. A lacge fraction of the core is involved in CCI. The time estimated for bo h failures to occur is on the order of five days. OP failure is estinated to be slightly more likely than BMT. The quantification of this case is:
Branch 1: F-BMT - 0.40 Branch 2: FCF Leak - 0.60 Branch 3: Neither - 0.0 Case 4: The conditions in the containment will lead to eventual OP and to BMT. Only a small or intermediate fraction of the core is involved in CCI. The time estimated for -he OP failure to occur is on the order of five days as in the previous esse, but the BMT will take consider-ably longer. Thus the probability of the BMT preceding the development of a leak are very small. The quantification of this case is:
bcanch 1: F-BMT - 0.01 Branch 2: FCF Leak 0.99 Branch 3: Neither - 0.0 Case 5: The conditions in the -ontsinment will lead neither to eventual OP nor to eventual BMT; or the containment has failed already.
The quantification of this case is:
Branch 1: F BMT - 0.0 Branch 2: FCF-Leak - 0.0 Branch 3: Neither - 1.0 Question 71. Final Containment Condition?
5 Branches, Type 2, 6 Cases The branches for this question are:
- 1. F-Ruptr The contaltunent failed by rupture
- 2. F Leak The containment failed by the development of a leak.
A.1.1-87
- 4. Bypass The containment is bypassed; Event V or SGTR has occurred.
- 5. noCF There is no containment failure or bypass.
This question is not sampled. It summarizes information developed in previous questions about the modo of of containment failure or bypass. The branching at this question depends upon the branches previously taken av Questions 1, 13, 19, 43, $2. 64, and 70.
This question uses the results of many previous questions to summarize the state of the containment at the end of this event tree analysis. Only the most important condition in determining the releases -is considered. For example, if a leak, a rupture, and BMT all occurred for a pathway through the event tree, the final containment condition is considered to be a rupture since that failure mode is the most severe and determines the offsite consequences. This question primarily concerns the containment condition, not the escape path that is most important for determining offsite risk. In this question, the containment condition is considered to be a bypass only if no other failure mode of the containment occurred. In the binning of the results, the concern is with the most important path for the release of fission products, and the consideration is different.
Case 1: The contair. ment failed by catastrophic rupture. The releases are the similar to those resulting from a rupture. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: F Ruptr - 1.0 Branch 2: F Leak 0.0 Branch 3: F MT 0.0 Branch 4: Bypass 0.0 Branch 5: noF CF 0.0 case 2:- The - containment failed by rupture. The quantification for this caso is:
Branch 1: F Ruptr 1.0 Branch 2: F Leak 0.0 Branch 3:- F MT 0.0
- Branch 4: Bypass 0.0 Branch 5: noF CF -
0.0 Case 3:- A containment leak developed. This case includes isolation failures, whether or not core damage was arrested before VB. The
_quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: F Ruptr 0.0 Branch 2: F Leak 1.0 1 Branch 3: F MT 0.0 Branch 4: Bypass 0.0 Branch 5: noF CF 0.0 A.1.1 88
Case 4: No aboveground failure occurred, and the CCI penetrated the basemat. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: F Ruptr 0.0 Branch 2: F Leak 0.0 Branch 3: F.MT 1.0 Branch 4: Bypass 0.0 Branch 5: noF.CF 0.0 Case 5: The containment was bypassed by Event V or an SGTR and there was no direct failure of the containment. Temperature induced SGTRs l that are followed by the arrest of core damage are included in this case. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: F Ruptr 0.0 Branch 2: F Leak 0.0 Branch 3: F MT 0.0 Branch 4: Bypass 1.0 i Branch 5: noF CF 0.0 Case 6: The containment did nct fail and was not bypassed. The quantification for this case is:
Branch 1: F.Ruptr 0.0 Branch 2: F Leak 0.0 Branch 3: F MT 0.0 Branch 4: Bypass 0.0 Branch 5: noF CF 1.0 A.1.1 89
q l ]
A.1.2 Listing of the Accident Progression Event Tree This subsection of Appendix A lists the Surry APET. The 71 questions in the Surry APET are listed concisely in Table 2.3 1. The event tree itself i is too large to be depicted graphically and exists only as the computer !'
input, which is given here.
The Surry APET used in the accident progression analyses for NUREG 1150 consists of 1285 lines that form a computer input file. This file is .
designed to be easily understood, with mnemonic abbreviations for each branch of every question. The structure of the input file is defined in ;
the EVNTRE Reference Manual.M ;
r The APET was developed on a PC spreadsheet program, which greatly facili. !
tates keeping track of the references to previous questions when questions '
are added or subtracted, or when the order of the questions is changed in the course of the development of the tree. The APET appears as developed !
on the spreadsheet program.~ The numbers at the right side of the page are i line numbers that are deleted when passed to 'the mainframe computer for !
evaluation. They are ~ useful for development and discussion of the tree.
Comments in the APET appear to the right of $s and are ignored by EVNTRE, ,
Mc 3 *: of the _ ' questions refer to previous questions in defining the case structure, The - previous ~ questions referenced are obv!ous from the case l definition, as explained in the EVNTRE reference manual. The succeeding questions,.which rely on the branch taken at this question, are indicated >
to the right of the question following the abbreviation "RIQ". RIQ stands 6 for. Referenced in Question. - Consider Question 5 in the Surry APET. The case definitions _show that it depends'on Questions 1 and 3, while "RIQ 18" '
indicates that Question 5 is referenced'in Question 18 .
Following i the 71 questions . that constitute the Surry APET are three [
additional pages generated on the. spreadsheet program that,may be helpful l
,in understanding the tree. The - first two pages comprise a list of- the questions in the tree, givin 6 the number of branches, the type of-question, and the number of cases. . If the branch taken at a ' question. is used in i binning the outcomes of the tree evaluation, the binner characteristics in which the question .is referenced are listed to the right of the_ question ;
statement. The final page is a list of the parameters utilized in the ,
Surry APET. The question in which the parameter is defined is listed, as are the questions in which the parameter is used-or referenced.
i I
i-i ..
A.1.2 1
Questions in t_he Surry APtf 1468 1469 Question Type Used in Binner 1470 Branches Cases Characteristic 1471 1472 1 6 1 Site and Location of RCS Break when the Core Uncovers? 1 6 1473 2 2 1 Han the Reaction been Brought under Control? 1474 3 2 1 For $ Git, are the secondary System StVs Stuck open? 6 1475 l
( 4 2 4 status of ICC$? 1476 1 5 3 2 3 2C$ Depressuritation by the Operators? 1477 J
1478 6 4 2 4 Status of Sprays? 1479 [
l 7 3 1- . Status of Fan Coolers? 1480 8 3 1 Status of AC Power? 1481 9' .3 2 4 RW$f injected into Contaltnent? 1482 l
' 10 4- 2 4- Heat Removal from the Steam Generators? 1483 ,.
1484 11 2 2 4 Did the Operators Depressuri te the $ccondary before the Core Uncovers? 1485 ,
12 3 2 2 Cooling for RCP seats? 1486
,13 3 2 2- .Initlet Contaltnent Condition) 1 10 1487 >
14 2 1 Event V Break Location under Water? 1 1488 j 15 42 4 RCS Pressure at the Start of Ctre Degradation? 1489 l l
1490 161 .2 2 2. Do the PORVs or $RVs stick Opent 1491 -[
17 - 2 2 4 1eeperaturealnduced RCP Seat Falture? 1492
, .18 2 2 <3 la the RC$ Depressurlied before Breach by Opening the P2R PORVs? 1493
[
19 - , 2 :2 2. Tegeraturealtduced SGTR? ..
1 6 1494 : :?
,, 20 '2 2. 4 Tenperature Induced Hot leg or surge Line Break? :1495 ,
1496
' 21 3' 21 :7- la AC Power Available Early? 1497 22 e 4 .2 4 Rate of Blowdown to Contaltnent? ,
11 -1498 ,-
23 = 4 2' 4 Vessel Pressure just before Breach? '4 7 9 1499 j E 24 2. 2 .9 : Is Core Damage Arrested? No Vessel Breach? .5 1500 1 o ' 25 .- 3'2 4 ta' ty sprays? 2 150) :
1502. ;
1 26 3 2 4 Earty Fan Coolers? - 1503 l 27 ' 2. 2 2~ :Early containment Heat Removat?' 1504 j
' 28 1. 4 ~4' Baseline Containment Pressure just before VB?: 1505
< ?9; 3- 2 3- time of Accumulator Olscharge? 3- -1506
-30t ~1~T4 7 , Fraction of Zr oxidized In vesset during Core Degradation? 1507 !
1508-- ,
- 31- ' 2; 5 Amount of Ir oxidited in Vesset.during Core Degradation? -8 1509 :i*
32" -2. 2 2 : Amount of Water in'the Reactor Cavity at Vessel Breach?. 3 1510 ';
33 1 3 ~ f ra: titin of Core Released f rom Vesset at Breach?' -1511' -
34L 3 5 -Amount of Core Released from Vesset at Breach? ' ..
9_ 1512-- ,;
g 35= '2 2- :3, ' 0)es an Alpha Mode Event. Fall. both Vessel and Contalnment? 5' 11 . 1513 1 1514 36' & '2 '5 Type of Vessel Breac'h? $ 7 9 .1515 ,
4 37' 2-~2 '
2 Does the Vessen become a " Rocket" and Fall the Containment? $ 11 1516
, 38 2-2 2'- $lte of Hole in Vesset taf ter Ablation)? .1517 ,
39 - i - .1 4'. ' 13 Pressure Rise at Vessel Breach? Large Hole Cases 1518
-40 ' .1 - 4 ' 10 - ' Pressure Rise'at vesset Breach? 'Smal! Hole Cases 1519 4
f
'11 Oct 89 Surry APET Rev.11 Pnge1l A.1.2-2
,-i
l 1
.l l
1520 I 1521 l 1522 -l Questions in the surry apt? ( Continued ) 1523 1524 Bucetion type Used in Binner 1525 ,
Branches Cases Characteristic 1526 !
1527 =j
-41 5 2- 2 Does a $lenificant ta Vesset steam tsplosion occur? 1528
-42 1 3 Containment Falture Pressure? 1529 j 63 '4 6 4 Contairvnent Falture, and Type of Containment Fatture? 1 10 1530 .l 44' - 3 2 5 sprays after Vesset Breach? 2 1531 ;
45 - 3 2 7 la AC Power Avaltable Lats 1532 ]
1533 j d6 3 2 3 tate sprays? '2 .1534 j 47 3 2 4 Late Fan Cooters? 1535 :
- 48 2 2 2 tate Contaltvoent Heat Removat? 1536 49 1 4 4 .Now much Hydrogen Burns at Vesset Breach? 1537
' 50 2 3 Does 1 ate Ignition Occur? 1538
- 1539
- 51. 2 ~6 2 ,Resulting Pressure in Containment? 1540 1 52 4 6~ 2 Containment f ailure, and type of Containmerit Falture? 1 10 1541 53 3 2 6 . Amount of Core Avaltable for CCl? -7 1542 54 2 2. 5 'Is the Debria Bed in a Cootable Configuratto,i? 1543
$$ 2 2 2 Does Prcapt CCI occur? 3 7 1544 1545 56- 3 2 4 :la AC Power Available Very late? 1546' ,
'57. -3' 2 5 ; very Late sprays? 2 '1547 i
'$8 3 2. 4' Very late Fan Coolers? 1548 ,,
i- 59: 2- 2 2 Very Late Containment Heat Removat? 1549 60 2 2 2 Does Delayed CCI occur? 3 7 1550
~
1551 ,.
'61r 2 4 '4
'How much H2 la Produced during CCl? '
1552 p f 62 '2-4 4 . Does very late ignition occur? 1553 63- :2 i 6 'Reautting Pressure in Containment? 1554 ;
64 f4 6- 2 Containment falture, and type of Containment falture? I 10 - 1555
- 65-2 2 .3'
- Sprays after very Late CF? =2 1556 ,
,N '
1557
- q. 66 2 2' 2 Fan Coolers after very late CF7 1558
/[ 67 '2 2 .2 Contalfinent Heat Removat af ter very late CF? 1559 68 2 2' ; 7- ! Eventual Basemat Mett through? 1560 l 69 - 2- 2 2' . Eventval-Overpressure Falture of Contaltinent? - 1561' f F0 3: 2 5. Basemat Mett through before overpressure Falture?
1562
- I' 1563' I
- F1 - 5 - : 2. 6 Final containment condition? 1 10 1564i 1565' .,
1566 [
1567' !
1568 1569 1570 [
1571 -L
>:l t 11 Oct 89 Surry apt 1 Rev. 11 Page ?
A.1.2-3
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SURRY Art 1, Rev 11.07,15 f eb 89 71 osestions Fast $80 1 71 2 houest 3 1 1.000 4 Cente Pinit 5 1 $lse ord Location of RCS Break when the Core uncovers? 5 PDS 1st Letter ( f a PORY ) 6 6 Brk A Brk*$2 Brk 53 Stk V B 5GTR B PORY l Question 1 is ref erenced in too 7 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 % many questions to itst here. B 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 9 2 Has the Reactlon beer, brought under Control? $ Rio 15 10 2 Scram no $ cram 11 1 1 2 12 1.000 0.000 il 3 f or $GTR, are the tecondary System $RVs $ tuck Open? 5 POS 1st Letter 14 2 S$RV*St0 $$RVnSto 1 Rio 4 5 6 15 1 1 2 5 9 10 16 0.000 1.000 17 4 Status of (CCS7 $ PD$ 2nd tetter 18 4 0 tCC$ BalCCS BfECCS B LPIS $ Rio 24 19 2 1 2 3 4 20 4 Caser 21 1 1 1 Case 1: Large Break in the kt$ ??
1 23 Brk A 24 I 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 25 2 1 1 $ Case 2: $ mall or Very Smnll Break in the RCS 26 2 e 3 27 Brk 52 or Brk 53 28 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 ??
? 1 3 S Case 3: SG1Rs with Secondary System SRVs Stuck Open 30 5
- 1 S ( *H" SGIRs ) 31 B 5GIR & $$RV St0 32 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 33 Otherwise $ Case 4: V, ho Break, or $GTRs with $RVs ReclestnD 34 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 ( "G" SG1Rs ) 35 5 RC$ tepressuritation by the Operators? 36 )
3 Op DePr OrroePr Opr1bePr $ Rio 18 37 2 1 2 3 3B 3 Cases 39 1 1 S Case 1: Very small Breaks 40 3 41 Brk.$3 42 0.000 0.000 1.000 43 2 1 3 $ Case 2: SGTRn with the $RVs stuck Open 44 5
- 1 ( "H" SGTRs ) 45 B SG1R & $$RV sto 46 0.000 0.000 1.000 47 Otherwise 5 Case 3: A, 62, V, ho Break, or SG1Rs with the SRys Rectosing 48 0.000 0.000 1.000 ( "G" $GTRs ) 49 6 $tatus of sprays? $ PD$ - 5td Letter 50 4 B Sp BaSp Bf5p nob SWHX $ RIO 25 28 51 2 1 2 3 4 5?
12 Oct 89 Surry APti Rev. 11 Page 1 A.1.2-5
j ...
4 Cases ~ 53 1 1 S Case 1: $nell treaks 54 2 55
'ttk.$2 56 0.000 1.000. 0.000 0.000 57
- 1. 1 S Case 2: Very small Breaks 58 !
-3 59 I trk.$3 60 )
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 61 ;
2 1 3 5 Case 3: $G1Rs with the $RVs stuck open 62 i 5
- 1 $ ( "N" $GIRS ) 63 1 0+$CTR- A $$RV St0 64 'l 0.000' 1.000 0.000 0.000 65 Otherwise S Case 4: A, Y, No Break, $GTRs with the SRVs 'tectosing '
66
'O.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 ( "C" $Gits ) 67 i
'? $tatus of fan Coolers? $ PDS
- Not used for Surry 68 3 8 fC BefC BffC $ the fan Coolers are not 8 RIO 26 69 j 1 1 2 3 S tafety Grade at Surry 70 0.000 0.000 1.000 71 8 Status of AC Powett & PD$
- 4th Letter 72 3- .B ACP BaACP BfACP S R10 21 73' 4
1 ' ., g-1- 3 74 0.000. 1.000 0.000 75
. 9 kW51 injected into Containment? 8 PD$
- 5th Letter 76
- 3. RW$1ain RW$1ain tv$1 fin S Used to Indicate a full cavity at Surry $ RIO 32 . 77' 3 2, 1 2 3' S $1nce the sums and cavity do not connect at Surry, 78
~
Ti. 4 Cases S a fut( c6vity inctles containment spray operation. 79 1 1 S Case 1: $ matt Breaks 80 -
- 2. 81 M brk $2 ~ 82 -
0.000 0.000 1.000 83 l! -
1' 1 $ Case 2: Very $ mall Breaks 84 3 85' 4 ,
I Btk $3 86 0.000 0.000 1.000 87 2- ,1 3 S Case 3: $CTRs with Secondary SRVs Stuck open 88
$
- 1 $: .( "H" $GTRs ) 89 -
B+$GiR & $$RV St0 90 i 0.000 0.000- 1.000- 1 91
, Otherwise 5 Case 4: A, V No Break, $GTRs With the SRVs Rectosing ("G" $GIRs), 92 f =0.000- 1.000 0.000 93 -
10 Heat Removal from the Steam Generators? .
S PO$ 6th Letter S Rio 11' 94-e 4 i $C kt :$GaHR SGfMR $( %R S $GdHR e operated unt{l batteries 12 20 95-
., ,. q f2j 1 -2 :
3 '5-depleted but not operating when 21 24 96
. -! ? . 4 Cases t core uncovers, 29 97 -
. 1, 1 i tase 1 Smali Breaks- 45 - 56 98 2- 99
,i ,trk $2 $ No case for Large Breaks as $C HR is irrelevant, 100 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 101
> '1 1 S Case 2: Very $ mall Breaks 102' 3 103 trk $3 104 17Oct89L Surry apt 1 Rev.11 Page 2
.A.I.2-6
_ f ..
b 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 105 2 1 3 $ Case 3: $GTR with Secondary $RVs Rectosing 106
$
- 2 5 ( "G" $GTRs ) 107 B $GTR & $$Rvnst0 108 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 109 Otherwise $ Case 4: A, V, No $reak, or $GTR with SRVs Stuck Open 110 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 ( am" $GTRs ) 111 11010 the Operators Depressurl e the Secondary bef ore the Core Uncovers? 8 PDS 6th Letter 112 2 sec0ePr noscDePr 5 Rio 15 21 24 113 2 1 2 S 29 45 $6 114 4 Cases 115 2 10 10 $ Case 1: Depressurising the Secondarv system is Prohibited 116 2 + 3 S by Procedures when an AFWS is not Operating. 117
$Gaht or $GfMR 118 0.000 1.000 119 1 1 S Case 2: $3 Break 120 3 121 Erl.$3 122 0.966 0.034 123 1 1 S Case 3: $2 Break 124 2 125 l Brk.$2 126 O.441 0.559 127 Otherwise 1 Case 4: A. V, No Break, or SGTR 128 0.000 1.000 129 12 Cooting for ktP Seatst S PD$ 7th Letter 130 3 B PSC BacSC Bfr$C S Rio 17 131 2 1 2 3 132 2 Cases 133 2 1 10 $ Case 1: Slow Blackouts with RC$ Intact 134 6
- 4 $ in PDS Group 1 135 B PORY & $GdHR 136 0.909 0.091 0.000 137 l Otherwise $ Case 2: Slow Blackouts with RCS Not Intact 138 0.000 1.000 0.000 $ and PO$s not in Group 1 139 13 Initial Containment Condition? 140 3 B Rupt B teak nob CF S teak . 0.1 sq.ft. S Rio 28 43 49 141 2 1 2 3 $ Rupture
- 7.0 sq. ft. 5 50 62 142 2 Cases $ Nominal hole wtaes. 5 68 69 71 143 1 1 $ Case 1: Large Initiating Break 144 3
1 $ teak may be either Isolation failure or leismic at surry. 14%
Brk A 5 Rupture is always seismic at Surry. No Pre exisiting teaks 146 0.0000 0.0002 0.9998 $ at Surry since the conteirunent is sub atmospheric. 147 Otherwise $ Case 2: No targe Initiating Break 148 I 0.0000 0.0052 0.9998 149 14 Event V Break tocacion under Water? 150 ;
2 V Wet V Dr) 151 i 1 1 2 152 1.000 0.000 153 15 RCS Pressure at the Start of Core Degradation? $ Rio 16 17 20 154 4 E $$Pr E HiPr E Intr E toPr $ 19 29 30 155 2 1 2 3 4 156 12 Oct 89 Surry Arff Rev. 11 Page 3 k
A.1.2-7 )
3 9
4 Cases- 157 2 1- 1- S Case 1: Large Break 158 1 + 4 5 Low Pressure 200 pela or less, 159 trk A or trk V 6 I Followin0 cases cannot have A sfie breaks 3 -160 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 161
.1 2 l Case 2 ho treak in the RCS or No $ CRAM 162 64 2 S
- System Setpoint Pressure around 2500 psia. 163 i 8 PORV or re Scram S ( Following cases must have $2 or $3 or $G1R 3 164 i 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 i 11- S Case 3: Sec. DePr. & ( $3 or $2 or SC1R )
165 166
- -g 1 5 ~
- IM Pressure
- 200 to 600 pala. 167 l
SecDePr- 168 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 169 f'
Otherwise S Case 4: $2 or 53 with AFW but noDePr or with no AFW ~ 170 O.000 1.000- 0.000 0.000 ) $ =High Pressure 1000 to 1400 pelo. 171 'l 16 Do the PORVs or, SRys Stick Open? . .172 Ll 2 PoeV*sto PORVnsto 8 klo 17 20 19 1 73 ,
2 1- 2: S 22 23 174 'f
'2 Cases. 175 1 1 15 S Case 1: RC$ at setpoint pressure, no breaks
- 176> !
1 S All the water loss 16 thru the PORVs.- 177 I t*$$Pr 178- .(
0.500- 1 0.500 179 I
-Otherwlae S Case la RC$ not at setpoint pressure -
Water loss la not thru PORys.
180 ]
0.000 .i.000' S > 181 <t
- 171eaperaturea lnduced RCP test f alture? (After core uncovering) 182 ' d 2.(B Pl$3 - notB+ PSF .
S R10 20 19 183
};
2' 21' 2 -S Att RCP leal Faltures treated S. 23 184> d 4 Cases S- .as $3 sire.- 185- ,
-1.- 112' 'S Case 1: Have seat cootIng. 186 h, 1 187 !
B PSC; , _
-188 l-0.000 : '1.000 189
.15, 16' $ Case 2: RC$ at Setpoint Pressure. :100 , 1
' 1: * - .?. ;191j ~!
S- E*S5Pr .8'PORvnSto. ' S Distribution f roin A$tP speclat panet. 192 j.
10.707' - 0.293- 193-1; .15 3 .S Case 3: RCS at High Pressure. _19t. ?
n >
- 195. 1f EkHIPt . 196
[ 0.650 : 0.350 ,
-- 197 -; g
'Otherwise $ Case 4: RCS at'IM or low pressure.- ,19873 (0.600- 0.400 >
5199 ;;g f 18 !s she.RC$ Depressurlied before Breach by Opening the PZR PORys? _ 200,: r
'q 2 PincePr . 'noPrDePr' S. RIO : 20 J 19 ' 201'-- * ^O
- e. =y x s1- : 2- l' 22 ~ , 23 ' "202 yi y 3 Cases 203M (
- 1.; S Case 1: The operators have opened the '
204} j
, ]I? S' ' PORys before the core uncovereo. 205.' ]j ~-
'.Op4DePr '
206 :
-1.000 2 0.000 207^' +
II , 5' S Case 2: the operators are directed ta- 208) )
I 12:0ct 89 surry Arti Rev. 11 Page.4L !
F A.1.2-8 i a *
,,_ . -mn
2 $ open the PORVs by Procedures. 209 OpncePr 210 0.900 0.100 gli Otherwise $ Case 3: Opening the PORVs to prohibited by Procedures or the 212 0.000 1.000 $ operators f atted to follow Procedures before uncovering. 213
! 19 Temperature lrdJCed $$IRI 214 2 E $Gtk$3 root $G1R S Distribution from S Rio 20 23 215 2 1 2 S In Vessel issue 2. S 49 50 216 2 Cases S 62 71 217 4 15 16 if 18 5 Case 1: No breaks & no AFW - 218 1
- 2
- 2
- 2 S RC$ at setpoint pressure. 219 E S$Pr & PORVnst0 & notB P$F & noP @ePr S $GTR very unlikely. 220 0.018 0.982 221 Otherwise no$$Pr S Case 2: RCS not at letpoint Pressure 222 0.000 1.000 $ SGTR not credible 223 20 ferperature ltduced Hot leg or Surge Line Break? 224 2 [B MLA notB MLA S Dittrlbution from S RIO 22 225 2 1 2 S In Vessel lasue 1. 226 4 Cases 227 5 15 16 17. 18 19 S Case 1: No breaks & no AFW 228 1 8 2 2
- 2
- 2S RCS around 2500 psia. 229 E $$Pr & PORVn$to & notB Psf & noprDePr & not $G1R S Hot leg break likely. 230 0.722 0.278 231 6 1 1 10 10 18 16 S Case 2: $3 break & no AFW 232
( 3 + 5 ? *( 2 + 4)* 2
- 2 5 RCS around 2000 psia. 233
( Brk 53 or B $01R ) &( ScnHR or $GdHR ) & noPrDePr & PORVn$to S Hot leg break unlikely. 2.'.4 0.0345 0.9655 235 1 19 $ Cese 3: The 1 1 $cTR reduces the pressure somewhat, 236 1 S Use the values for case 2 f or 6 ot Leg Failure. 237 E $GTR$3 238 120,2,1 120,2,2 239 Otherwise nc$tPr S Case 4: RCS not at 2000 2500 psia. 240 0.000 1,r,00 $ No Hot Leg Breaks. 241 21 1s AC Power Availab e torty? (Between uncovering 30 min & VB 30 min) 242 3 L 4CE taACP [fACP $ R10 24 25 243 2 1 2 3 5 26 45 244 7 Cases S 50 62 245 1 8 $ Case 1: Had power initially 246 1 5 have tower now. 247 8 ACP $ If have 50 HR, must have B ACP (for indefinite operatlon). 248 1.000 0.000 0.000 249 1 8 $ Case 2: Power fatted initially 250 3 $ . not recoverable. 251 BfACP S Remaining cases have recoverable power. 252 0.000 0.000 1.000 .253 2 10 10 $ Case 3 No initial AFW TRRR R$R. 254 2 + 3 $ Recovery period a 0.5 to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. 255
$GaHR or $GfMR S Remaining cases have $GdHR AFW initially available. 256 0.565 0.435 0.000 257 1 1 S Case 4: Inittat AFW & $2 Break $2RRR RDR & $2RRR RCR. 258 2 S Recovery Period a 1 to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. 259 Brk $2 S BaACP & $GdHR inplied by previous questions. 260 12 Oct 89 Surry Arti Rev. 11 Page 5 A.1.2-9
1:
0.736 0.264 0.000 261 i 2 1 11 S Case la initial AFW & $3 Break . $3RRR.RCR. 262 ll 3 + 2 S No Depressurlistion of the secondary. 263
- j. Ork $3 & nosc0ePr S Recovery Period a 4 to 5.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. 264 1 0.394 0.606 0.000 265 l 2 1 11 S Case 6: Initlet AfW & $3 Break . $3RRR.RDR. 266 3
- 1 S Secondary Depressurlied. 267 ,
Brk 53 & Sec0ePr S Recovery Period
- 4 to 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />. 268 )
0.801 0.199 0.000 269 ,
' $ Case 7: Initial AFW & no break, Sec0ePr . TRRR kOR & 1RRR Rot. 270 i Otherwise
- 0 PORV 0.676 0.324 0.000 $ Recovery Period a 7 to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. 271 22 Rate of Stowdown to Cimtaltnent? [ This is blowdown before vesset breach. 1 272 l 4- ISO A fBD $2 IBD 53 nott0 $ Rio 23 28 2 73 4 274 t f 2 1 2 3 4 Cases 2 75 2 1 20 S Case 1: Large break
- 276 1 + 1 $ initial or induced. 277 B.*k A or IB*HLA 278
^
4 1.000' O.000 0.Or0 0.000 279 1 1 S Case 2: Event V
- No blowdown 280 -!
4 5 to contalement. 281 l Brk.V 282 ;
~0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 283 [
3 1 16 18 $ Case 3 $2 break Inittet. 284 2+ 1 + 1 $ trduced, or deliberste. 285 ,
Brk $2 or PORV+$t0 or PrnoePr S Includes stuck open PORV. 286
O.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 287 i Otherwise
- Effective $3 $ Case 4: $3 break
- Initial. Induced or cyclin 0 PORV. 288 0.000- S Includes SGTR since some inventory goes out PORV. 289 I
, .., 0.000 0.000- 1.000 F" '23 Vessel Pressure just before Brench? S Rio 24 29 - 35 290 4 l*$$Pr l HIPr 1*1mPr- 1 LoPr S 36 37 39 40 291 j; 2 1- 2 3- 4 S 43 49 53 54 292 ;
4 Cases 293 l*
-5. 22 1 1 18 16 - S Case 1: Large Break or 294
.1 + 4 +( 2*(- 1 + 1))~ S $2 with PORVs open: 295' U ERD A or Brk V or ( Brk 52 8 ( PrnoePr or PORV St0) ) S_ Low Pressure * < 200 pala. 296 ,
F l- 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000- .
297 f
1- 22 S Case 2: $2 Break: Low Pressure (<200 pala) or 298 -
2 S Intermediate Pressure (200 600 pala). 299 -
100 52 S [ No A breaks by Case 1 1 300--
0.000 0.000- 0.200 0.800 $ ( Open PORVs included in (B0 $2 1 301 4- 17 19 1 - 1: $ Case 3: $3 Breakt Lowi Intermediate._or ;302 ;
g 1 + 1 + 3' + .5 $ High Pressure (1000 2000 psla). 303 q to PS$3 ort $GTR$3 or Brk $3 or B.$GTR S ( E80+$3 includes B PORV
- can't use here ) '304- a b 0.000 0.333 0.334 0.333- S ( No A or $2 breaks by cases 1 & 2 1 305-Otherwise 5 PORV $ Case 4: RC$ Pressure Boundary intact * .306 h ,
1.000- 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 $ $ystem Setpoint Pressure 2300 to 2500 psia. 307
. 24 la Core Damage Arrested? No Vesset Breach? - S RIO- 28 35 36 308 h 2 novs VB $ 39- 40 55 309 2' 1. 2 S- 60 68 69- 310' !
Y 9 Cases 311 2- 21 4 - S Case 1: No power or no injection 312 x
i' 112Oct89 Surry apt 1 Rev.11 Page 6 A.1.2-10 L 1 lI v
1 + 3 $ assures vesset breach. 313 not ACP or BffCCS S Rest of cases have electric power tefore VB. 314 0.000 1.000 315 2 1 4 S Case 2: LarBe initial Break with LPit evaltable all along. 316 1
- 4 S RCS will depressucite before core damaBe 317 Brk A & B LPIS S has Bone very far. 318 0.950 0.050 319 4 23 4 23 4 S Case 3: Depressurlastion was either later or 320 4
- 4 )* ( *
( 1 1)$ stower than in Case 2. Chances of 321
( l LoPr & B LPit )or(nol SSPr & B fCCS ) $ avoidinB VB are less than in Case 2, 322 0.900 0.100 323 1 4 S Case 4 the remaining cases nust have recoverable ICCS. 324 2 1.000 $ they have electric power by case 1 325 roBatCCS S e.B., B LPit & Hi Pr goes to VB at this case. 326 0.000 1.000 327 2 10 10 $ Case 5: No initial AFW 1RRR RSR. 328 2 + 3 S Recovery period a 0.5 to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. 329 SGaHR or SCfMR S Remaining cases have SGdHR Af W initially evaltable. 330 0.900 0.100 331 1 1 $ Case 6: Initial AfW & $2 Break $2RRR RDR 4 52RRR RCR. 332 2 S Recovery Period a 1 to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. 333 Brk 52 S BaACP & SGdHR trot ted by previous questions. 334 0.700 0.300 335 2 1 11 1 Case 7: Initial AfW & $3 Break $3RRR RCR. 336 3
- 2 $ No Dapressuritation of the Secondary. 337 Brk 53 & noscDePr S Recovery Period a 4 to 5.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. 338 0.500 0.500 339 2 1 11 S Case 8: Initial AFW & $3 Break $3RRR RDR. 340 3
- 1 $ Secondery Depressurized. 341 Brk 53 & SecDePr & Recovery Period a 4 to 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />. 342 124,5,1 124,5,2 343 Otherwise B PORV $ Case 9: Initial AFW & no Break, SecDePr 1RRR RDR S 1RRR RDY. 344 (24,5,1 124,5,2 S Recovery Period a 7 to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. 345 25 Early Sprays? 346 3 t Sp fasp tilp $ Rio 27 32 347 2 1 2 3 $ 44 49 348 4 Cases 349 1 6 $ Case 1: Mad sprays at start 3'.0 1 S have sprays now. 351 B Sp 352 1.000 0.000 0.000 353 1 6 S Case 2: Sprays were fatted 354 3 $ stay failed. 355 Bfsp 356 0.000 0.000 1.000 357 2 6 21 $ Case 3: Sprays were available and have power now 358 2 1 S sprays operate, tven if containment pressure 359 Balp & t ACP S never gets high enough for auto actuation, assume 360 1.000 0.000 0.000 $ operator will turn on sprays to cool som water. 361 Otherwise S Case 4: No power 362 0.000 1.000 0.000 $ sprays remain avaltable. 363 26 tarly fan Cooterst 364 12 Oct 89 Surry APti Rev. 11 page 7 A.1.2-11
p
- i. l r ,
3 t FC teFC EffC S Rio 27 47 365 I
- - 2 1 2 3 366 l I '4 Cases 367 l 1 7 $ Case 1
- Had f an cooters at stat ; 368 l
1 S have fan cocters now. 369 _j B FC 370 1.000 0.000 0.000 371 1 7 $ Case 2: Fan cooters were f ailed 372 {
3 $ stay failed. 3 73 l BffC 374 F.
0.000 0.000 1.000 3 75 e p 2 7 21 S Case 3: Fan Coolers were avaltable and have power now 376 ,
2
- 1 S f an coolers operate. Even if contalrvnent 377 l BeFC & E ACP_ $ pressure never gets high enough for auto 376 1.000 0.000 0.000 $ actuation, assume operator will turn on. 379. .
n Otherwise S Case 4: No power f an 380 I
f 0.000 1.000 0.000 =$ coolers remain avallobte. 381 27 Early Contaltunent Heat Removett ' 382 j, 2 E CHR EfCHR $ RIO - 28 383
'2 1 2' 384 ;
385 !
2 Cases _ _
b 2 25 26 S Case 1: Have Sprays or Fan Cooters 386 1 + 1 S Have CHR 387 L t Sp or t FC: 388 1.000 0.000- . _
389 !
Otherwise $ Case 2: No Sprays, No Fan Coolers 300
, 0.000- 1.000 $
- No CHR 391' I
28BaselineContainmentPressurejustbeforeV81 392 :
1 IPBase '
$ PUl0 43 393
- k 4 '1 S lPBase Parameter 1 394
. 4 Ca.es v5 I 2 22 ' 24 S Case 1: No blowdown to contairvnent, or ' 396-4 + 1' L$ no vesset breach. Containment wilt be 397. i notBD or noV8 $ near normat operating pressure. 398. .
1.000'- ' 399 1 -S pressure in psla 400-1 12.00 .
401 4
3 27 6~: 13 .$ Case 2: Have Sprays or Fan Cooters and Service Water. -402
['- ( 1
- 4)+
( t CHR & B $WHX ) or; ~B4CF 3- $1
. or Containment is Falled.- Containment will be near Ambient Pressure.-
- 403
' 404 6
1.000 8, . See $20 runs in BMI 2104, BMI 2139 ' 405
' R 406 -
1 1 16.00 ' 407 2 ; 27 ' 22- S Case 3: No CHR and blowdown to 408 L 2 * '1' $ containment from a large break. 409-
," 'EfCHR -& E BD . A S' Pressure between 32 and 42 psia see AB in BMI 2104- 410) ,.
1.000 411 l 1 412 1= 37.00$ 413 >
Otherwise- S Case 4: No sprays and no large break.. 414 ;
1.000 $ Pressure around 24 26 pela, 1 415 L .1 S See tMLB' in BMI 2104 and $3B in BMI 2160. 416 12 Oct 89 Surry APit Rev. 11 Page 8 A.1.2-12
]
E.
1 26.00 417 29 time of Accunststor Discharge? 418 3 AcDbCM AcDdCM AcDav8 $ Rio 30 55 419 2 1 2 3 420 D
- 3 Cases 421 4 15 15 10 11 S Case 1: Accuwtators Discharge 422 L 3 + 4*( 4
- 1 ) i before core Degradation starts 423
(*1mPr or (*toPr or( SGdHR & SecDePr ) 424 1.000 0.000 0.000 425 2 23 23 S Case 2: Accumtators Discharge 426 3 + 4 S during Core Degradation 427 l Intr or latoPr 428
. 0.000 1.000 0.000 429 Otherwise S Case 3: Accu wtators Discharge 430 j 0.000 0.000 1.000 $ at Vesset Breach 431 j 30 f raction of Ir Omidlaed in Vessel during Core Degradation? Alt i tr0x*Inv $ Pulo 31 51 433 4 1 S trDa inV' Parameter 2 434 7 Cases 435 2 15 29 $ Case 1: RCS at system setpoint Pressure (2500 pale) 436 1
- 2 $ Accm. dsg tef ore or af ter core pelt 437 w E'$$Pa & AcDnCM & In vesset #5
- Case la/1c 438 1.000 439 1 440 2 0.44 441 2 15 29 $ Case 2: RCS at System letpoint Pressure (2500 pain) 442 1~* 2 S Accumulater dump during core melt 443 I tat $Pr & AcDdCM S in Vessel #5 Case Ib 444 1.000 445 1 446 2 0.50 447 2 15 29 $ Case 3: RCS at High Pressure (1000 1400 pela) 448 i l
2 * *2 l Accm. dtg tefore or af ter core melt 449 E HIPr & AcDnCM l In Vesset #5 - Case Pa/2c/5 450 1.000- 451 1 452 7 2 0.32 453 2 15 29 $ Case 4: RCs at High Pressure (1000 1400 psla) 454
_ 2
- 2 5 Accumulator dump during core sett 455 E HIPr & AcDdCM $ In Vessel #5 Case 2b 456 1.000 457 1 458
- 2- 0.38 459 2 15 29 8 Case 5: Intermediate Pressure (200 600 psla) 460 3
- 2 S Accm, cksop twfore or af ter core melt 461 ;
talmer & AconcM $ in vessel W5 Case 3a 462 l 1.000 463 1 4 64 2 0.48 465 2 15 29 $ Case 6: Intermediate Pressure (200 600 pela 466 3
- 2 $ Accumulator dum during core melt 467 E tmPr & AcDdCM $ in Vessel #5 Case 3b 468 i
12 Oct 89 Surry Atti Rey, 11 Page 9
{
A .1. 2-13 )
l-i l'
1.000 469
.1 470 l 2 0.52 471 f Otherwise t Lotr S Case 7: Low RCS Pressure O 200 pala) 472 1.000 S In vessel #5 Case 4 4 73 1 474 2 0.45' 4 75 31 Amount of 2r Dal Haed In vessel during Core Degradation? 476 2 Mi 2 rom to Irom 477 5 1 2 S Put fraction 2r oxidited 478 1 2 S Into 2 categories ** need 479 Irox+1nV S this information for SUR$0R 480 A40 481 Gt1HRtSH 1 0.4 482 fraction of Ir Caldited in vesset 483 32 Amount of Water in the Reactor Cavity at vesset Breach? 484 4
2 NC Wet RC Dry S Rio 39 40 41 485 2 1 '2 S 55 486 2 Cases 487 2 9 25 $ Case 1: RWSt not injected & no sprays - 488
+1 * *1 S cavity dry. 489 RWSinin & not Sp S fime of Accm. Dump irrelevant for DCH & EVSE, 490 0.000 1.000 S If Dump at vt, it will be after DCH or [vst. - 491 Otherwise- S Case 21 RW$t injected er sprays operating
- 492 1.000 0.000 S the Cavity is Futt (12,000 ft3 a 340 m3). 493 33 Fri.ction of Core Released free vessel at Breach? 494 g 1 FCorRel S Pulo 34 495 3' .i 6 FCornet. Parameter 3 496 1.000 $ Fraction Released or Expelled Promptly at Breach 497' 1 S Distribution from In vesset issue 6 498 3 0.30 $ Median value e 28% 499 34 Amount of Core keteased from Vesset at Breach? 500 3 Hi FCoR Md FCot Lo FCot S This question puts the fractions S Rio 39 501 5- '1. 2 3 S obtained in the previous question 40 $3 502 1 3 $ into a small ruter of categories. 503.
FCorRet 504 AND - 505 GE7HRE$N 2 0.4 0.2 506 Fraction of Core Participating in HPME 507 35 Does an Alpha Mode Event Fall both vessel and Containment? $08 2 A L Fhe noAlpha S RIO 36 39 40 509 2 1 2 S 43 44 53 54 510-3 Cases =511 2' 24 23 $ Case 1: Core Damage Not Arrested and 512 r 2
- 4 $ Low Pressure in the RCS $13' v3 & l*LoPr $14 0.0080 0.9920 515 K 2 24 23 - S Case 2: Core Damage Not Arrested and $16 2~* 4: S IM, High, or $$ Pressure in the RCS 517 VB & nol LoPr $18 0.0006 0.9992 $19 Otherwise $ Case 3: Core Damage Arrested, no VB 520 12*0ct 89 Surry APti Rev. 11 Page 10 l A.I.2-14
'l
1
\'
0.0000 1.0000 521 j 36 Type of Wesset treech? $ RIO 37 38 39 522 4 Prtj Pour stand noveon S 41 43 49 523 {
- 1 2 3 4 5 53 54 526
{
$ Cases $25 1 2 24 35 S Case 1: No Vessel Breach 526 j 1 + 1 8 or Alphs fatture $27 !
novt or A1pha $28 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 529 l i 23 8 Case 2: RCS at Systee letpoint Pressure. 530 i 1 6 In Vesset issue 6 $31 i l+$$Pr S Case 1 532 0.7900 0.0800 0.1300 0.0000 533 1 23 8 Case 3 kCS at High Pressure. 534
.2
- In V 86 Cese 2 535 )
l*HIPr 536 0.6000 0.2700 0.1300 0.0000 537 1 ~23 $ Case 4: RCS et internedtate Pressure. $38 3 1 In V #6
- Case 3 539 l
- laer 540 136,3,1 136,3,2 136,3,3 0.0000 541 l Otherwise
- l LoPr S Case 5: RC$ at Low Pressure. 542 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 543 37 Does the vesset tecome a "Rocketa and f all the Contaltnent? 544 ,
2 Rocket notocket $ RIQ 39 40 43 545 2- 1 2 S 44 53 54 546-2 Cases . 547 j 2 36 23 $ Case 1: Gross Bottce Head f ailure
- Rocket .548 3-
- 1 8 la possible only for this mode of VB 549 BtmNd & l*$$Pr ' $ and at maximum pressure tr the vesset.- $50 [
0.001- 0.999 ;
$$1 otherwise S Case 2: Not 6tmNd & $$Pr
- Rocket Not Credible. 552 O.000' 1.000 f 553
. 38 $1 e of Hole in vessel (af ter Ablation)? 554-2 trgHole- SmtNote 8 RIO 39 40 555 !
2 1 2 5 Large Hole is nominalty 2.0 sq. meters after ablation. 556 2 Cases S $ malt Hole is nominally 0.1 sq. meters after ablation. 557 1- 36 S Case 1: HPME e'Distributton for Hole $1re - 558 .;
1 559 -l' Pr() 560-O.100 0.900 561 Otherwise. $ Case 2: Not HPME
- Large Hole or irrett 562 1.000 0.000 563
[
'39 Pressure Rise at vesset Breach? taroe Hole Cases $64 ;
i OP*VB $ Pul0 43 .565 ,
4 1 S dp1*VS
- Parameter 4 566 . }
!13 Cases 567l s 1 24 S Case 1: No Vesset Breach 568' !
1 '569-noVB $70 1.000 571 1 S Pressure rise in pst 572.. ,
'12 Oct 89 Surry APET Rev. 11 Page 11 ;
A.1.2-15 l
4 0.00 $P3 2 35' 37 $ Case 2: Alpha Mode or Rocket * $74 1 + _1 $ very Large Dummy value used to 575 Alpha or Rocket S Assure Containment Falture. 576 1.000 577 1
578 4 777.00 579 2 21 36 $ Case 3: Low Pressure in RCS, or Pour. 580 4 + 2 $ Loads issue 9, Case 4 581 1 LoPr or Pour 582 1.000 $ The value entered for each case is the 583 1 $ mean of the distribution. 5 84 4 19.20 585 1 38 $ Case 4: Small Hole Cases a 5 86 2 $ treated in next question $87 Sm' Hole $88 1.000 $ the following questions are 589
_1 $ thus all targe hole cases. 590 4 0.00 591-3 '23 32 34 $ Case 5: IM Pressure in RCS. 592 3
- 1
- 1 $ Cavity Full or Part Full. 593 l'ImPr & RC Wet' & Hi FCoR $ High Fraction Ejected 594 1.000 $ Loads issue 9, Case 3/3A 595-1 596 4 67.20 597 3 23 32 34 $ Case 6: IM Pressure in RCS. 598 3
- 1
- 2 $ Cavity Full or Part Full. 599
.I.imPr & RC+ Wet .& Md FCoR $ Medium Fraction Ejected 600 1.000 $ Loads issue 9, Case 3/3A 601 1
602 4 57.70 603 3 23 32 34 $ Case 7: IM Pressure in RCS. 604 3
- 1
- 3 $ Cavity Full or Part Full.
~
605
" Low Fraction Ejected 606 I*lmer & RC Wet. & Lo FCoR $
1.000 $- Loads issue 9, Case 3/3A 607 1
< 608 4- 38.50 609 4 23 23 32 - 34 $ Case 8: SS or Hi Pressure in RCS.- 610
( 1+ 2 )* 2
- 1 $ Cavity Dry. 611 t 1 SSPr or 1 HIPr ) & RC. Dry. & Hi FCoR $ High Fraction Ejected 612 1.000 $ Loads issue 9, Case 18/1C 613 1 614 4 89.80 ~ 615 4 23 23 32 34 $ Case 9: SS or Hi Pressure in RCS. 616
( 1 + 2 )* 2
- 2 $ Cavity Dry. 617-( l+$SPr or l*HiPr ) & RC Dry & Md FCoR $ Medium Fraction Ejected 618
.1.000 $ Loads issue 9, Case 18/1C 619 1
620 4 75.20 621 4 23 23 32 34 $ Case 10: SS or Hi Pressure in RCS. 622
( 1 + 2 )* 2
- 3 $ Cavity Dry. 623
( 1+SSPr or l*HIPr ) & RC Dry & Lo FCoR $ Low Fraction Ejected 624 Surry APET Rev. 11 Page 12' 12 Oct*89 A.1.2-16
1.000 $ Loads issue 9, Case 1B/1C 625 1 626 4 47.20 627 1 34 $ Case 11: $$ or Hi Pr & Cavity Wet 628 1 $ Plus IM Pressure & Cavity Dry. 629 Hi FCoR $ High Traction Ejected 630 1.000 $ Loads issue 9, Cases 1/1A/3B 631 1 632 4 76.80 633 1 34 $ Case 12: $$ or Hi Pr & Cavity Wet 634 2 $ Plus IM Pressure 3 Cavity Dry. 635 Md FCoR $ Medium Fraction Ejected 636 1.000 $ toads issue 9, Cases 1/1A/3B 637 1 638 4 64.70 639 Otherwise Lo HPME $ Case 13: SS or Hi Pressure & Cavity Wet 640 1.000 $ Plus IM Pressure & Cavity Dry. 641 1 $ Low Fract ton E jected 642 4 41.90 $ toads lasue 9, Cases 1/1A/38 643 40 Pressure Rise at Vessel Dreach? Small Hole Cases 644 1 DP VB $ Pul0 43 645 4 1 $ dp2 VB Parameter 5 646 10 cases. 647 5 38 24 35 23 37 $ Case 1: Large Hote, or no VB, or Alpha, 648 1 + 1 + 1 + 4 + 1 $ or Rocket, or Low Pressure - 649 Lrghole or noVB or . Alpha or 1 LoPr or Rocket $ frented in previous question. 650-1.000 $ lie following questions are 651 1 $ thus att snell hole cases. 652 5 0.00 653 3 23 32 34 $ Case 2: IM Pressure in RCS. 654 3
- 1'* 1 $ Cavity Full or Part Full, 655' l lwr & RC Wet & Hi-FCoR $ High Fraction Ejected 656 1.000 $ Loads lasue 9, Case-3/3A. 657 1 658 5' 59.80 659 3 23 32 34 $ Case 3: IM Pressure in RCS. 660 3
- 1
- 2 $ Cavity Full or Part Full. 661 l-ImPr & RC Wet & Md FCoR $ Medium Fraction Ejected 662 1.000 $ Loads Iscue 9, Case 3/3A -663 1 664 5 49.20 665 3 23 - 32 34 $ Case 4: IM Pressure in RCS. 666' 3
- 1
- 3 $ Cavity Full or Part Fult. 667
, 1 lwr & RC Wet & Lo FCoR $ Low Fraction Ejected 668 1.000 $ Loads In ue 9, Case 3/3A 669 1 670 5 34.20 671 4 23 23 32 34 $ Case 5: SS or Hi Pressure in RCS. 672
( 1 + 2 )* 2
- 1 $ Cavity Dry. 673
( l=$$Pr or 1 HiPr ) & RC Dry & Hi FCoR $ High Fraction Ejected 674 1.000 $ Loads issue 9, Case 10/1C 675 1 676 12 Oct 89 Surry APET Rev. 11 Page 13 A.1.2-17
C 5 74.60 677
=
4 23 23 32 34 S Case 6: SS or Hi Pressure in RCS. 678
( 1 + 2.)* 2
- 2 S Cavity Dry. 679
( l SSPr or 1 HIPr ) & RC Dry & Md FCoR S MediumFractionEjected 680 1.000 $ Loads issue 9 Case 1B/1C 681 1 682 5 61.30 683 4 23 23 32 34 S Case 7: SS or Hi Pressure in RCS. 684
(. 1+ 2 )* 2
- 3 5 Cavity Dry. 685
[
E ( l SSPr or I HiPr ) & RC Dry & Lo FCoR S Low Fraction Ejected 686 1.000 $ Loads Issue 9, Case 1B/1C 687 1 688 5 40.20 689 1 34 S Case 8: $$ or Hi Pr & Cavity Wet 690 1 S Plus IM Pressure & Cavity Dry. 691 Hi FCoR S High Fraction Ejected 692 1.000 S Loads issue 9, Case 1/1A/38. 693 1 694 5 66.60 695 t 1 34 S Case 9 SS or Hi Pr & Cavity Wet 696 2 S Plus IM Pressure & Cavity Dry. 697 Md FCoR S Medium Fraction Ejected 698 1.000- S Loads issue 9, Case 1/1A/38. 699 1 700 5 $ 5.00 , 701
. Otherwise Lo HPME $ Case 10: $$ or Hi Pressure & Cavity Wet 702 l 1.000 S Plus IM Pressure & Cavity Dry. 703 1 S Low Fraction Ejected 704 5 37.10 $ Loads issue 9, Case 1/1A/38. 705 i 41 Does a Significant Ex Vessel Steam Explosion Occur? 706 2 EVSE noEVSE S Rio 43 53 707
-2 1 2 54 708 2 Cases 709 2- ' 32 36 $ Case 1: Gravity Pour into Pool in Cavity 710
'1
- 2 S la the only case where EVSE is possible. 711 RC Wet A Pour 712 0.500 0.500 713
- OtherWisc
- No EVSE S Case 2: Alpha Mode, or Rocket, or 714 0.000 1.000 $ no VB, or HPME, or cavity dry. 715 42 Containment Falture Pressure? 716 s 1 CF Pr S Read Failure Pressure and Random Number for failure Mode 717 3 1
- CF Pr Parameter 6 $ PUl0 43 52 64 718 ;
1.000 S RndNum Parameter 7 719 E 3 2 S Failure Pressure in psig 720 ;
6 125.70 $ CF Pr Distribution from Structural issue 2 (mean value at left) 721 7- 0.50 722 43 containment-Falture, and type of Containment Failure? 723 4 ICF CtRp 1CF Rupt ICF Leak no ICF $ RIO 44 49 724 6 1 -2 3 4 5 50 62 68 725 I 4 Cases S 69 71 726 1 13 5 Case 1: Containment Ruptured at Start of Accident - 727 1 S Further Falture now is Irrelevant. 728 12 Oct*89 Surry APET Rev. 11 Page 14 '
A.1.2-18
't ,
i B Rupt 729 1 1 730 IPtase 731 AND 732 GETHRESH 3 999 888 777 733 Dunny values to Assure ho f atture 734 2 35 37 S Case 2: Alpha or Rocket - 735 1 + 1 S Rupture Assured 736 ALpFe or Rocket 737
'2 1 4 S Leak is nominally 0.1 sq. ft. In area. 738 IPtase dp1 VB $ Rupture is nominally 7.0 sq. f t. In area. 739 AND $ Catastrophic Rupture is greater than 7.0 sq. ft. 74 0 GETHRESH 3 999 2 1 S and implies severe structural damage as wett. 741 b Dumy Values to Assure Rupture 742 4 36 23 36 41 S Case 3: Rapid Pressure Rise 743 1+( 4
- 3)+ 1 744 PrEj or( nottoPr & BtmHd ) or EVSE 745 5 1 4 5 6 7 746 IPBase dpi VB dp2 VB CF Pr RndNLp 747 FUN ICFFat 74 8 GETHRESH 3 3 2 1 749 User Function for Fast Pressure Rise 750 Otherwise Pour or ( BtmHd & LOPr ) $ Case 4: Slow Pressure Rise 751 5 1 4 5 6 7 752 IPBase- dp1 VB dp2 VB Cr Pr RndNum 753 FUN ICFStw 754 GETHRESH 3 3 2 1 755 User Function for Slow Pressure Rise 756 44 Spreys after vesset Breach? S ( The 5 to 30 minutes after VB are crucial 757
'3 12 Sp 12 asp 12fSp S for spray removal of the RCS releases 758
-2 1 2 3 $ for SSPr and HIPr cases, ) 759 5 Cases _ .
S RIQ 46 760 3 25 35 37 $ Case 1: Sprnys falLed remain falLed. 761 3 + 1 + 1 S Alpha or Rocket always f ait sprays. 762 Efsp or Alpha or Rocket 763 0.000 0.000 1.000 764 2 ' 25 43 $ Case 2: Sprays avaltable & no Cat. Rupture - 765 2
- 1 $ Sprays stay available. ( Have not asked 766 Easp & notCFCRp S power recovery since test spray question. ) 767 0.000 1.000 0.000 768 2 25 43 $ Case 3: Sprays operating & no Cat. Rupture 769 1
1 S Sprays stay operating. 770 E Sp & notCFCRp 771 1.000 0.000 0.000 772 2' 25 43 $ Case 4: Cat. Rupture at Vesset Dreach - 773 1
- 1 S Sprays operating 774 E Sp & ICF.CtRo 775 0.900 0.000 0.100 776 Otherwise EaSp & lCF CtRp S Case 5: CR at VB, sprays only avaltable. 777 0.000 144,4,1 144,4,3 778 45 la AC Power Avaltable Late? ( During the initial part of Prompt CCI ) 779 ~
3 L-ACP LaACP LfACP S RIQ 46 47 780 12 Oct 89 Surry APET Rev. 11 Page 15
=
A.1.2-19 1
s_
r 2 3 $ 50 56 781 2 1 S 62 782 7 Cases 1 21 S Case 1: Had power initially or 783 1 S recovered it already have power now. 784 785 E ACP 0.000 0.000 786 1.000 21 S Case 2: Power falted initially 787 1
3 $ not recoverable. 788 ffACP $ Remaining cases have recoverable portr. 789 0.000 1.000 790 0.000 10 10 $ Case 3: No inittet AFW TRRR RSR. 791 2
2 + 3 $ Urcov. at 100; VB at 160 min. 792 SG6HR or SGfMR S Recovery period a 2 to 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br />. 793 0.888 0.112 0.000 $ Remaining cases have SGdHR AFW initially available. 794 1 1 S Case 4: Initial AFW & $2 Break- $2RRR RDR & $2RRR RCR. 795 2 S Recovery Period
- 4 to 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br />. 796 Brk $2 S BaACP & SGdHR implied by previous questions, 797 0.246 0.000 798 0.754 11 S Case 51 Initial AFW & $3 Break $3RRR RCR. 799 2 1 3
- 2 S Wo Depressurtration of the Secondary. 800 Brk $3 & noScDePr S Recovery Period a 5.5 to 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br />. 801 0.602 0.398 0.000 802 2 1 11 S Case 6: Initial AFW & $3 Break $3RRR RDR. 803 3 *- 1 S Secondary Depressurized. 804
- Brk 43 4 Sec0ePr S Recovery Period = 10 to 17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br />. 805 0.731 0.269 0.000 806 Otherwise + B PORV $ Case 7: Initial AFW & no Break, SecDePr TRRR RDR & TRRR RDY. 807 0.604' O.396 0.000 $ Recovery Period = 12 to 17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br />, 808 46 Late Sprays? 809 3 L Sp LaSp LfSp S RIQ 48 57 810-2 1 2 3 811 3 Cases 812 3 44 44 45 S Case 1: Had sprays before, or have 813 1+ '( 2 <
- _1 ) $ recovered power sprays operate. 814 12 Sp or ( 12 asp & L ACP ) 815 1.000 0.000 0.000 816 1 44 S Case 2: Sprays fatted earlier
- stay failed. 817 3 818 12fsp 819 0.000 0.000 1.000 820 Otherwise $ Case 3: AC power not recovered, so 821 0.000' 1.000 0.000 $ sprnys remain available, 822 47 Late Fan Cooters? 823
- 3. L-FC LaFC LfFC 5 Rio 48 58 824 '
2 1 2L 3- 825 4 Cases 826 1 26 S Case 1: Had fan coolers before 827 1 5 have fan cooters now. 828 E FC 829-1.000 0.000 0.000 830 1 26 $ Case 2: Fan cooters were failed 831 3 $ stay failed. 832 12 Oct.89 surry APET Rev. 11 Page 16 A.1.2-20
prrt 7 ,J p,
.a
.i r.
-u
- a Efic 833
'O.000 ~ 0.000 - 1.000 834 2 26 45 : $ Case 3: Fan cooters were.svaltable and have power now 835- ;!
2-
- 1 $ fan cooters operate. 836 EaFC . & -L ACP 837 j 1.000- ~0.000 0.000 838 4 -Otherwise 1 $ Case 41 No power _* f an 839 ,
0.000 - 1.000 0.000 $ cooters remain avaltable. 840 ;
I N.1 -
48 Late containment Heat Removat?'
2 L CHR LfCHR $ RIQ 50 842 2 1 2, 843.
'r 2 Cases 844 -
2- 46 47 $ Case it Have Sprays or Fan Coolers 84$' t 1 + 1 $ = Have CHR 846'- -f L Sp - or L TC 847 [
1.000- 0.000~ 848 {
R Otherwise $ Case 2: No sprays, No Fan Coolers 849 ~ !
0.000. 1.000 $ No CHR 850 g
49 How much Hydrogen Burns at Vessel Breach? $ PU10 51 851- 'k 0
-1 FrH2 Brn $ FrH2 Brn Parameter 8 852 j
'4' ' 1' S FrH2 Brn 6 Fraction of H2 from before VB burned at VB.' 853 ,
~854- I
'4 Cases '
L5- 13 . .43 1 1. 19.$ Case 1: Containment Faited or bypassed:- :BS5-1-$
3 + 4 + 4 + 5+ How much Burned is irrelevant. 856
' B CF or : ' l CF - or Brk V or B $GTR or .E SGTRS3 857- ,
Y .1.000: 358 -;
~
1' ; 859 - [
J8- 1.00t 860 . _;-
14: 36' 36 23 1 25 - $ Case 2: HPME occured at VB, and the containment was 861 : l
- (1 1 +( .3'
- 4 ))
- 1 .S. not steam inert. Most of the hydrogen from before 862 3( _ PrEj or-( StmHd 8': nottoPr )) & E Sp $> .VB burned. 863
' 1.000 1 864 y 1- 865 !
8 0.95 .
866 , -
4: 36 iex -36 23 125' $ Case 3: HPME ;occured at VB, and the cont. .could have - 867- 'i-.
_(1 -1 ' +: (
- 3 * ' -4 ' ))
'I
' (: > PrEJ orJ(lBtmHd :& ' nottoPr H- A noE Sp $ could have burned.' =869:
, 1.000' 870-1 ;.
871 yl s .
8' .'O.30 872- :l
$ Case 4s ' intact Containment and Pour et -VB
- Assume No Burn 4 873; Otherwise a NoCF & Pour 1.000. $. -Att the Hydrogen generated Remains in Containment. J874-1-
1 875:
N o8' O.00 .
876 ]
- 50.Does Late Ignition Occur? . Conversion Ratto? Scale factor? $ RIO 51 .877;
'2' lL-Ign< tnoL Ign ' $ HB ConvR Parameter. 9 $ PUlo- 51' 63 ' -- 878 '-
4- 1 2- $ dp Scale a-Parameter 10 879-880 ,
-3 Cases
~$. 13 - 43 1 1' 19 $ Case 1: Contairvnent Failed'or Bypassed - 881 -
3 -.+ 4 + 4+ 5+ 1-S Ignition and Burn now is trrelevant. =882' .. ;
B CF or . I CF - or Brk V or B SGTR'or t *41RS3 .883 884 0.000 1.000 i
Surry APET Rev. 11 Page~17{
{12Oct89; A.1.2 ,
-l
2 $ HB ConvR = Conversion Ratto = Combustion Ef ficiency 885 9 0.95 0.95 5 dp Scale = Scate factor on pressure rise 886 10 -0.00 0.00- 887 3 21 45 48 888
- 1
- 1
- 1 S Case 2: Electrical Power and CHR Recovered during this 889 noE ACP & L ACP & L CHR S period Ignition is Very Likely if there is enough H2. 890 0.990 0.010 891 2 892 9 150,1,1,1 150,1,1,1 893 10 0.72 0.00 894 otherwise $ Case 3: AC Power not recovered during this period: 895 0.000 1.000 $ If had power att along many smatt burns; 896 2 S If no power
- steam inert. 897 9 150,1,1,1 150,1,1,1 $ Either way No Significant Burn now. 898 10 0.00 0.00 899 51 Late Burn? Resulting Pressure in Containment? $ PU!Q 52 62 900 2 L H2Brn LnH2Brn S p LHB
- Farameter 11 S RIO 52 901 6 1 2 S This parameter defined here in the User Function 902 2 Cases- 903 1 50 $ Case 1: No Ignition 904 2 905 noL-Ign 906 1 11 907 p LHB 908 FUN NOBURN 909
' THRESH' 1 999.000 910 Set P LHB to 15 psia. 911 Otherwise S Case 2: Ignition ( if enough H2 is present ) 912 5 2 8 9 10 11 913' 2rox InV FrH2 Brn HB ConvR dp Scale p-LHB 914 FUN LBURN 915-
' THRESH' 1 1.000 916 Calculate pressure resulting from combustion 917 52 Containment Failure, and Type of Containment Failure? 5 R10 57 62 918 4 LCF CtRp LCF Rupt LCF Leak no LCF *$ 68 69 919 6 1 2 3 4 5 71 920 2 Cases 921 1 51 S Case in No Burn Contalrnent Failure 922
-2 % 'now is not Possible 923 LnH2Brn 924 1 11 925 p LHB 926 AND 927 GETHRESH 3 999 888 777 928 Dunny Values to Assure No f ailure 929 Otherwise Burn S Case 2: Late Burn Fast Pressure Rise 930 3 11 6 7 931 p LHB CF Pr_ RndNum 932 FUN LCFFst 933 GETHRESH 3 3 2 1 934 User Function for Fast Pressure Rise- 935 53 Amount of Core Avaltable for CCl? 936 12 Oct 89 Surry APET Rev. 11 Page 18 A.1.2-22
3 tro CCI - Mod CCI Smt CCI & Large means > 70% $ Rio 61 68 937 2 1 2 3 $ Medlun means > 30% and < 70% 938 6 Cases S Small means < 30% 939 2 35 37 $ Case 1: Alpha Mode or Rocket At least Some of the 940 1 + 1 $ Debris is spread around through the Containment 941 ;
Alpha or Rocket 942 0,000 1.000 0.000 943 1 36 S Case 2: No Vessel Breach 944 4 $ The Small Range includes Zero. 945 noveoA 946 0.000 0.000 1.000- 947 4 36 36 23 34 S Case 3: HPME and fr. Ejected Not Small - 948
( 1+ ( 3
- 4 ))
- 3 5 Enough Core is involved in HPME that only 949
( PrEj or ( BtmHd & nol*LoPr)) &nolofCoR S a Medium Anomt is lef t in the cavity for CCI. 950 O.000 1.000 0.000 951 4 36 36 23 34 $ Case 4: HPME and Fr. Ejected Small - 952 L ( 1+ ( 3 * -4 ))
- 3 $ Most of the Core Remains in the Cavity 953
( PrEj or ( BtmHd & nol LoPr)) & Lo FCoR $ and is Available for CCI. 954 l
1.000 0.000 0.000 955 4 36 36 23 41 $ Case 5: Gravity Pour and EVSE The EVSE could 956
( 2+ ( 3
- 4
- 1 $ distribute some Debris outside the Cavity 957
( Pour or ( BtmHd & l LoPr )) & EVSE 958 0.500 0.500 0.000 959 Otherwise Pour & noEVSE $ Case 6: Gravity Pour and No EVSE
- All the 960 1.000 0.000 0.000 $ Debris will remain in the cavity 961 54 le the Debris Bed in a Cootable Configuration? 962 2 CDB notDB $ Rio ~ 55 963 2 1 2 964-5 Cases 965 i 2 35 37 $ Case 1: Alpha or Rocket - Some Debris will be widely Scattered. 966 1 + 1 S As Alpha or Rocket falls the sprays, CDB or nocDB is 967 Alpha or Rocket $ largely irrelevant and CCI is assured. 968 0.850 0.150 969 1 36 5 Case 2: No VB. 970 ,
4 971 noV50A 972 1.000 0.000 9 73 < i 3 36 36 23 S Case 3: High Pressure Melt Ejection. 974 1+ ( 3
- 4)1 At least some of the core Debris wilt 975 pre) o ( BtmHd & nol LoPr) $ be widely scattered throughout containment. 976
! 0.800 0.200 97, 1 41 $ Case 4: Cravity Pour with EVSE. V78 3 1 $ EVSE likely to distribute some debris outside containment. 979 , EVSE S . But fine particles may make debris in the cavity.noncoo'able. 980 0.800 0.200 . 981 Otherwise - Pour & noEVSE $ Case 5: Gravity Pour with no EVSE. 982. 0.350 0.650 $ Debris bed is more likely to be noncootable than coolable. 983 - 55 Does Prompt CCI Occur? 984 2 PrnptCCI noPrmCCl S Rio 60- 6' 985 2 1 2 5 68 986 2 Cases 987 4 54 32 29 24 $ Case 1: Cootable Debris with Water, or no "B no 988 12 Oct 89 Surry APET Rev. 11 Page 19 l l
- l. A.1.2-23 1
i ( 1*( 1 + 3 ))+ 1 $ promt CCl. Late sprays are not considered 989 ( CDB & ( RC Wet or AcDaVB ))or noVB $ because they may start at any time during CCI 990 7 0.000 1.000 $ and water is needed from the start. 991 Otherwise Not cootable or no water $ Case 2: No water in the Reactor Cavity 992 i 1.000 0.000 S. or debris not cootable prompt CCI. 993 1 56 is AC Power Avellable Very late? 994 4
$ Rio 58 995 !
3 L2 ACP L2aACP L2fACP' 57 2 1 2 3 $ 62 65 66 996 4 Cases 997 1 45 $ Case 1: Had power initietty or 998 1 $ recovered it already have power now. 999 L ACP 1000 . 1.000 - 0.000 0.000 1001 1 45 $ Case 2: Power falted initially 1002 3 $ not recoverable. 1003 LfACP $ Remaining case have power recoverabte. 1004 0.000 0.000 1.000 1005 4 10 1 1 11 $ Case 3: Inittet AFW & ( no Break or S3 with SecDePr ). 1006 4 *( 6+ ( 3
- 1 )) $ - 1RRR RDR, TRRR RDY, & $3RRR ROR. 1007
$GdHR & ( B PORV or ( Brk 53 & SecDePr )) $ Recovery Period = 17 to 24 hours. 1008 0.679 0.321 0.000 1009 Otherwise $ Case 4: Other blackout cases TRRR RSR, $3RRR-RCR, 52RRR RCR, 1010 1 0.916 0.084 0.000 $' & S2RRR RDR. Recovery Period = 9 to 24 hours. 1011 57 very late Sprays? 1012 3 L2 Sp L2 asp L2fsp $ RIO 59 60 (5 1013 2 1 2 3 1014 i 5 Cases 1015 i 4 46 46 56 52 $ Case 1: Had sprays before, or power has been 1016
( 1+ ( 2
- 1 )) * -1 $ recovered, and there was no Catastrophic 1017
( L Sp or ( LaSp & L2 ACP )) & LCFnCRp $ Rupture of Containment. 1018
.f '
1.000- 0.000 0.000 1019 1 46 $ Case 2: Sprays falted earlier - stay fatted. 1020 3 1021 Lfsp 1022 0.000 0.000 1.000 1023 ; 4 46 46 56 52 $ Case 3: Had sprays before, or power has been 1024 ( 1+ ( 2
- 1 ))
- 1 $ recovered, and there was Catastrophic 1025.
( L*Sp or ( LaSp & L2 ACP )) &LCF CtRp $ Rupture of Containment. 1026 ' 144,4,1 0.000 144,4,3 1027 , 3 46 56 52 .$ Case 4: Electricat power has not been 1028 ;
* * $ recovered, and there was Catastrophic 1029 -!
2 1 1 LaSp & noL2 ACP &LCF CtRp $ Rupture of Containment. 1030 0.000 144,4,1 144,4,3 1031 Otherwise LaSp & noL2 ACP & LCFnCRp $ Case 5: AC power not recovered, & no Cat. Rupt. 1032 0.000 1.000 0.000 1033 58 very Late Fan Cooters? 1034 l 3 L2 FC L2aFC L2fFC $ RIO 59 66 1035 2 1 2 3 1036 4 Cases 1037 1 47 $ Case 1: Had fen cooters before ~1038 1 $ have fan cooters now. 1039
<L FC 1040 zl2 Oct 89 Surry APET Rev. 11 Page 20 A.1.2-24
i 1.000 0.000 0.000 1D41 1 47 $ Case 2: Fan cooters were fatted 1042 3 $- stay failed. 1043 LffC 1044 0.000 0.000 1.000 1045 2 47 56 5 Case 3: Fan cooters were avaltable 1046 2 i 1 '5 and have power now 1047 LaFC & L2 ACP S fan cooters operate. 1048 1.000 0.000 0.000 1049 otherwise S Case 4: No power fan 1050 0.000 1.000 0.000 $ cooters remain available. 1051 -; 59 very Late Contaltwnent Heat Removat? 1052-2 L2 CHR L2fCHR $ RIQ 62 1053 2 1 2 1054 2 Cases 1055 , 2 57 58 s Case 1: Have sprays or Fan Cooters 1056 1 + 1 $ Have CHR 1057 L2* Sp .. or L2*FC 1058 1.000 0.000 1059-Otherwise $ Case 21 No Sprays, No Fan Cooters 1060 O.000 1.000 $
- No CHR 1061-60 Does Delayed CCI Occur?. 1062-2 DelydCCI 5 RIO 68 I nouldCcl- 61 1063 2 1 2 1064 -l 2 Cases-- 1065 4 55- 57 55 24 $ Case 1: Olt not have CCI promptly (so debris 1066
( 2
- 1)+ 1 + 1 $ is cratable), and have water now, or-had 1067 (noPrmCCI & L2 Sp ) orPrmptCCI or noVB $ per.npt CCl, or no VB + can't have CCI now. 1068 0.000- 1.000 1069 Otherwise S Case 2: Water boiled off and there are no 1070 1.000 0.000 5- sprays.now
- delayed CCI occurs. 1071' 61 How much H2 la Produced during CCl? 1072 3 2 CCI noCCI S H2*CCI - Parameter 12 S Pul0 63 1073 4 1- 2' 1074 - >
4 Cases -1075. '! 2 55 . 60 $ Case 1: No CCI. 1076 7 2
- 2 .
1077-noPrmCCI & no0LdCCI $ H2 CCI = Hydrogen produced by CCI (Kg moles) in additon to 1078
$ that produced by oxidizing the rest of the Zr. 1079
'I 0.000 1.000 1 5 It includes any C0 produced. 1080 12 0.00 0.00 1081 l 1 53 $ Case 2: A large amount (> 70%) of 1082-
- 1. $ the core is involved in CCI. '1083 '[
.Lrg CCl 1084 1.000 0.000 1085 I 1 1086 12 200.00 -0.00 1087 i 1, 53 $ Case 3: A medium amount (30 70%) of 1088' ;'
2 $ the core is involved in CCI. -1089 Med CCI 1090 1.000 0.000 1091
'1 1092 12 Oct 89 Surry APET Rev. 11 Page 2' A.1.2-25
l i 12 120.00 0.00 1093 Otherwise Set CCI S Case 4: A smatt amount (< 30%) of 1094 1.000 0.000 $ the core is involved in CCI. 1095 1 1096 12 36.00 0.00 1097 62 Does very Late ignition Occur? Scale Factors? $ Pulo 63 1095 2' -L2 Ign =noL2 Ign $ dpScatel Parameter 13 S Rio 63 1099 4 1 2 $ dpscate2 Parameter 14 1100 4 Cases 1101 6 13 43 52 1 1 19 $ Case 1: Contalrnent Failed 1102 3 + 4 + 4+ 4 + 5+ 1 S or Bypassed - 1103 B CF or I CF or L CF or Brk V or B SGTR or E SGTRS3 $ lenition and Burn now 1104 j 0.000 1.000 $ is Irrelevant. 1105 2 1106 13 0.00 0.00 1107 14 0.00 0.00 1106 3 45 56 59 $ Case 2: Electrical Power and CHR Recovered duri g 1109 1
- 1
- 1 S this period Ignition is Very Likely if there 1110 noL ACP & L2 ACP & L2 CHR S is enough Hydrogen. 1111 0.990 0.010 $ noL ACP means Late Burns are not in this case. 1112 2 1113 13 150,1,2,1 0.00 1114 14 0.00 0.00 1115 4 21 45 51 56 S Case 3: Electrical Power Available all along, or 1116
(( 1
- 1) + 1 )* 1 5 bed a late Burn In either case, will have 1117~
-( ( E ACP & L ACP ) or L H2Brn ) & L2 ACP $ many smalt burns as the H2 is generated in 1118 0.000 1.000 $ this period: no threat to the Surry Containment. 1119 2 1120 I 13 0.00 0.00 1121
- 11. 0.00 0.00 1122 Otherwise $ Case 41 No Power Recovery - the Steam Concentration 1121 ,
0,300 0.700 $ may drop below 55% and ignition may occur. 1124 2 -S- Need a different Scale Factor for these burns 1125 13 0.00 0.00 $ as the distribution is different. 1126 14 0.52 0.00 1127 63 Very late Burn? Resulting Pressure in Contalrnent? $ Rio 64 1128 2 L2 H2Brn L2nH2Brn S p L2HB Parameter 15 $ Pulo 64 1129 6 1 2 S This Parameter Defined Here in the User Functicn 1130 2 Cases 1131 1- 62 $ Case 1: No Ignition 1132 , 2 1133 noL2 Ign 1134 1 15 1135 j p L2HB 1136 FUN NOBURN 1137
' THRESH' 1 999.000 1138 Set P L2HB to 15 psia. 1139 Otherwise S Case 2: Ignition ( if there is enough Hydrogen ) 1140 5 9 13 14 12 15 1141 ;
HB Convt opScatel dpScate2 H2 CCI 9 L2HB 1142 FUN L28 URN 1143
. 'THRESH' 1 1.000 1144 12 Oct 89 Surry APET Rev. 11 Page 22 A.1.2-26
Calculate pressure resulting from combustion 1145 64 Containment Failure, and Type of Catairment Failure? 1146 4 L2CF CRp L2CF Rp L2CF Lk no L2CF S Rio 65 68 1147 6 1 2 3 4 S 69 71 1148 2 Cases 1149 1 63 $ Cese 1: No Burn
- Contaltnent Failure 1150 2 $ now is not Possible 1151 L2nH2Brn 1152 1 15 1153 p L2MB 1154 AND 1155 CETHRESH 3 999 888 777 1156 Dunny Values to Assure No Failure 1157 i Otherwise L2 H28rn $ Case 2: Very late Burn Fast Pressure Rise 1158 3 15 6 7 1159 p L2MB CF Pr RndNun 1160 FUN LCFFst 1161 GETHRESH 3 3 ? 1 1162 ,
User Function for Fast Pressure Rise 1163 65 Sprays after Very Late CF7 1164 2 F Sp noF $p $ RIQ 67 68 1165 2 1 2 1166 3 Cases 1167 2 56 s Case 1: Sprays failed or power not recoverable. 1168 3 + 3 $ If LOSP is not Seismic, Assune AC power always recovered by 1169 L2fSp or_ L2fACP $ this time. Thus, eprays operate unless damaged by CF 1170- . 0.000 1.000 $ in the remaining cases. 1171 ! 1 64 $ Case 2: Catastrophic rupture of containment - 1172 1 $ spray failure unlikely. 1173 L2CF CRp $ Use the same values as in previous spray questions. 1174 144,4,1 _144,4,3 1175 Otherwise- S Case 3: No catastrophic rupture - 1176 1.000 0.000 $ sprays operate. 1177 66 Fan Coolers after Very late CF7 '1178 2 F FC 'FfFC' $ Rio 67 - 1179 - 2 1 2 1180
'2 Cases 1181 3 2 58 56 $ Case 1: Fan coolers f ailed or power not recoverable. 1182 3 + 3 5 Fan coolers do not operate. 1183' I L2ffC or L2fACP 1184 - !
0.000 1.000 S Case 2: Fan coolers either were operating, or 1185 Otherwise + were available and we assume that we 1186 1.000 0.000: $- have power now
- fan coolers operate.
. 1187 67 C'ontainment Heat Remova! after Very late CF? 1188 2 F CHR FfCHR $ RIQ 69 1189 2 1 2 1190' 2 Cases 1191-~
2- 65 66 5 :ese 1: Have Sprays or Fan 1192-1 + 1 S Coolers Have CHR 1193 F Sp or F FC 1194 1.000 0.000 1195 Otherwise $ Case 2: No Sprays and No 1196 1 12 0ct 89 Surry APET Rev. 11 Page 23 A.I.2-27
~
l l 0.000 1.000 $ Fan Cooters ko CHR 1197 68 Eventual Basemat Mett through? 1108 2 BMT noBMT $ R10 70 1199 l 2 1 2 1200 7 Cases 1201 ; 5 13 24 43 52 64 $ Case 1: Conteiraent f ailed alreacty, 1202 3 + 1 + 4 + 4 + 4 $ or no VB BMT is not of interest 1203 ! B CF or novB or I CF or L CF or L2 CF $ or is not possible. 1204 1 0.000 1.000 1205 ! 3 55 60 65 $ Case 2: Cootable debris bed and sprays operating 1206 2
- 2
- 1 $ no basemat melt thru, if FCs drained to the 1207 noPrmCCI & nootdCCI & F Sp $ cavity, could use F CHR instead of F Sp. 1208 0.000 1.000- 1209 l 2 53 65 $ Case 3: Large fraction of core in CCI, futt cavity, 1210' j 1
- 1 $ sprays and CHR c,wrating. 1211 j Cases 3 thru 7 ha n CCI.by case 2.
~
Lrg CCI & F*$p $ 1212 0.250 0.750 1213 2 53 65 $ Case 4: Large f raction c' core in CCI, 1214 1
- 2 $ no sprays, dry cavity 1215 Lrg CCI & noF Sp 1216 0.400 0.600 1217 j 2 53 65 $ Case 5: Medium fraction of core in CCI, futt cavity, ~ 12181 l' 2
- 1- $ sprays and CHR operating, 1219 Med CCI & F Sp 1220 0.050 0.950 1221 2- 53 65 $ Case 6: Medium fraction of core in CCl, 1222 2
- 2 $ no sprays, dry cavity. 1223 Med CCI' & noF Sp 1224 0.200 0.800 1225 ,
Otherwise Sn.i CCI -$ Case 7: smalt fraction of core in CCI, wet or dry. 1226
)
0.020 0.980 1227
.l 69 Eventual overpressure Failure of Containment? 1228 '
2 F CF OP noFCF0P $ Rio . 70 1229 2 1- 2~ 1230 l 2 Cases _
,1231 ;
6 13 24 '43 52 64 67 $ Case 1: Containment is already 1232 3+ 1 + 4.+ -4 + 4 + 1 S' fatted, or have CHR, or have 1233 i B Cf or noVB or 1 CF or L CF or ' L2 CF or F CHR $ no VB - OP now not credible. 1234 .l 0.000 1.000 $ Att Bypass accidents have F CHR. 1235 Otherwise noCF & noCHR $ Case 2 OP may occur in several days if ChR riot restored; 1236 O.050 0,05n $ probability of CHR restoration in a few days is quite high. 1237 ; 70 Basemat Melt th~sugh before Overpressure Failure? 1238 { 3 F BMT FCF-Leak Neither $ The Surcy Basemat is.10 feet Thick. $ RIO 71 1239 l 2 1 2 3 $ ' inst OP Falture is always Leak. 1240 { 5 Cases 1241 i 1 2 68 69 $ Case 1: Have eventual BMi, but 1242- [' 1'
- 2 $ do not have ever.tuat OP. 1243'
*BMT & noFCFOP 1244 1.000- 0.000 0.000 1245 2 68 69 $ Case 2: Have eventuat 09, but 1246 i
2
- 1 $ do not have eventual BMI. 1247 no8MT & F CF OP 1248 12 Oct 89 Surry APET Rev. 11 Page 24 A.1.2-28 8
H
r ry - - - - . r v p 1 , ou
- 4 e .
4
# I h r
n . ; y 0.000 1.000 0.000- 1249 l p . 3- 68- ' 69 - "53 $ Case 3: Have OP and BMT, Large fraction of Core in CCI - 1250 '{
- * -1,
- S- BMT and OP timing is similar (median around 5 days).
- 1. - 1 1251? .'j BMT . & F CF 0P & trg CCI 1252 {
0.400 0.600- 0.000 1253' f 2' 68 . 69- .S Case 4: Have OP and BMT, Medium or Smatt-fraction of Core in CCI 1254 1* 1 S- OP is very likely to occur first. 125$ BMT & : F
- CF 0P '256 >
0.010 ~ =d.990 0.000 -1257 I otherwise S Case 5: Have neither BMT nor 1258 0.000- . 0.000 : 1.000 $ OP, or already have CF. -1259-71 Final, Containment Condition? -1260 5; F Ruptr~ F Leak F M1 Bypass noCF '1261 j
'2- 1 2 3- 4 5 _-1262. -lj @'r'\ (6' Cases , .
1263 - $ 4- 'J .' 3 ! - 43 52 - n 64 S Case 1: Catastrophic Rupture i- 1264 ! e 1 +c 1"+: 1 S Releases are the same as Rutpure.-' ;1265 I
- lCF CtRp or LCF CtRp or L2CF*CRp 1266 ,h 1.000 0.000 0:000 0.000 0.000- 1267 g1 4' : 13 ~- 431 52 - 64 S Case 2: Containment Ruptured. 1268 f . -f .
. 1+
. 2,+ 2-+: --2 1269' ,
-j
; ':B Rupt; or ICF Rupt-or;LCF Rupt or L2CF*Rp 1270'
-1.000i 0.000-' i0.000 so.000 0.000 1271; .; *
- 5'- .
13- 43 '. 52' 64. 70 $ Case 31. Containment. Leaks. 1272: .,
.2s +. :3 ; +
l( .4 3 .+ 1 3 + 2 1273' ; [' . ,8LeakuorICFLeak}orLCFLeak-orL2CFLk or'FCF Leak ;1274 p{ ~ L,. .0iOOO L1.000- 0.000 0.000 'O.000 1275 m s .o" ' i
.1 ' ? 70.-' > S Case 4: Basemat Melt Thru. 1276-4-
Jp 3; 3777 'g
- 7p F BMT 3- .
, 1273,
'O.000 ' O.000 .- 1. 000, =0.000 - 0.000 L1279 '
' ^
Ti +
-3 1; 1 19 S Case 5: Containment' Bypassed.' -1280 14!+- , : .5 : .+ _ 1- 12812 .
2 '1282
+
, iBE V 'or? ' B SGTR or' I SGTRS3 5 S E .p <
6@ '
'O.000 2 0.000 '
0.000. ; 1.000 ' - 0.000 - .1283
,1 ..0therwlbe: 'S Case' 6: No ' Containment Failure. .1280
' i0;000, 0.000- 0.0'00 L 0.000 -1.000 ~
, -12 6
,, m; -
i 1 e r; i , c ' s
.!v ',
q_ n l } l' k I, t ir , y
-t 9~
, j 2 .s, ,
l
.f.
.}L i s i
+
D or - 5 i
~e A.1.2-29 oma
'1= -
i s
. -,. l
t L A.1.3 Descriotion of the Surry Binner The binner is ' the computer input that instructs EVNTRE how to group the outcomes from evaluating the APET. There are too many outcomes for them all to be saved for analysis afterwards, so as each unique path through the ; event tree is evaluated, the probability of that path is added to the probability for the appropriate accident progression bin. The term "binner" refers to the set of computer input that defines these bins. Section 2.4 of this volume gives a general description of the accident progression bins and defines each attribute of each characteristic. That material is not repeated here. The binner itself, a computer input file read by EVNTRE, defines the accident progression bins and is listed in Subsection A.1.4. This subsection contains a case by-case description of the binner. 1 i Characteristic 1. CF-Time (Time of Containment Failure) 8 Attributes, 8 Cases The attributes for this characteristic are: 1 i A. V-Dry Check valve failures resulted in a pipe break in an inter-facing low pressure system. The break location was not underwater at the start of core degradation. B. V Vet Check valve failures resulted in a pipe break in an inter-facing low pressure system. The break location was under- 4 water at the start of core degradation, C. Early-CF The containment failed b'efore vessel breach (VB). At Surry, these are all isolation failures. D. CF-at-VB' The containment failed at the time of VB. E. Late-CF The containment failed in the very late period, during the initial part of CCI. F. VLate CP The containment failed in the very late period, during the latter part of CCI. G. Final-CF The containment failed during the final period in this analysis, at least 24 h after the start of the accident.
- 11. No CF The containment did not fail.
This characteristic primarily concerns the time of containment failure. In q addition to five time periods in which the containment may fall, there is an attribute for no containment failure and two attributes concerning Event V, which initiates the accident and provides a large bypass of the , containment at the same time. 1 A.1.3 1 L
Case 1: This case defines the conditions for Attribute H. No-CF. For this characteristic, no containment failure is interpreted to mean no failure of the containment pressure boundary itself and no bypass by Event V. If an steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) occurred, and there was no other f ailure or bypass of the containment, it is included in this case. SGTRs are considered separately in Characteristic 6, as they can occur in addition to failures of the containment itself. The size or type of containment failure is treated in Characteristic 10, and bypass of the containment is specifically identified there. Case 2: This case defines the conditions for Attribute A, V Dry. The conditions for this case are . an Event V - initiator and that the break location in the auxiliary building is not underwater at uncovering of the top of active fuel (UTAF). Case 3: This case l defines the conditions for Attribute B, V Wet. The conditions for this case are an Event V initiator and that the break location in the auxiliary building is underwater at UTAF. Case 4: This case defines the conditions for Attribute C, Early-CF. Early containment failure here means - failure before VB. Containment failures due to hydrogen combustion'before VB at Surry are negligible, and..are not treated in this. analysis. The existence of a leak at the time of-.the accident -(from failure to properly secure an airlock, for ; example) are also = negligible at Surry because the containment is maintained at 10 psia during operation. Thus, all early containment failures for accidents initiated by internal events and fires at Surry i are isolati failure's,-which are of " Leak" size. These leaks are'not counted if , more . severe failure of the containment occurs at vessel [ breach. For - seismic initiators, rupture failures of the containment are possible. - Case 5: This case defines the conditions for Attribute' D, CF-at-VB. This is containment failure within a - few minutes of - VB due to the events accompanying vessel failure, i Case-6: This case defines the ' conditions for Attribute E, Late-CF. ! This is _ containment failure which occurs during. the initial part of-CCI. ;It could occur anywhere from' a few tens' of minutes after VB to > several ' hours af ter - VB. Failure in this time period is due to a l hydrogen deflagration that occurs when the sprays are recovered. Case-7: This case defines the conditions for Attribute F, VLate-CF. This is containment failure which occurs during the latter part of CCI. ; L .This could be from several hours af ter VB ~ to about 24 h after UTAF.
-Failure in this time period is due to a hydrogen deflagration that occurs when the sprays are> recovered or when the containment cools down
-enough without .wray operation to permit some - steam condensation to l- occur.
Case 8: This case defines the conditions for Attribute G, Final-CF. This is containment failure which occurs during the final period in i this analysis--at least 24 h af ter the start of the accident. The possible failure mechanisms are basemat meltthrough (BMT) or eventual A.1.3-2
i overpressurization of the containment due to the failure to restore ;
-containment heat removal in the few days following the accident. '
characteristic 2.- Sprays (Operation of Containment Sprays) 9 Attributes, 9 Cases
, The attributes for this characteristic are: .
A. Sp-Early The sprays operate only in the Early period, that is, before [ VB.
'B. Sp E+I The sprays operate only in the Early and Intermediate periods, that is, before VB and immediately after VB. ;
C. Sp E+I+L The. sprays operate only in the Early,' Intermediate, _and' Late periods, that is, from UTAF through the initial part of CCI.. D. .SpAlways The sprays Always operate during-the periods'of interest for [ fission product removal, that is, for at-least 24 h starting at UTAF. ,
.t E. Sp-Late 4 The sprays operate only in the Late period, that is. during i theiinitial part of CCI. l t
JF. -Sp L+VL :The sprays operate . only in the Late and Very Late periods, that is, from the start of CCI through the. release of;almost , all the fission-products from CCI. e
'G. Sp VL. The sprays operate only in- the Very Late period,' that is, during the latteripart of CCI.
H. Sp Never The. sprays Never operate during the accident. I. . Sp Final The sprays operate only'during the Final period,.which is not of --interest for fission- product removal since almost all of
- the fission products will have' b6en released from CCI before
- this period starts.
- This characteristic concernstthe operation of - the containment sprays. As the fan coolers ~at Surry are not qualified for operation-is-severe' accident- -(
conditions, ' and ' are -partially. submerged -if. the; water - from the. refueling water; storage Stank (RWST) is: injected into the containment, . the ' recircu- ;
'lation containment . spray systems (four ' independent trains) are the only.
means of' containment-heat removal considered is this analysis. There are- ;
-nolplant damage states (PDSs) at Surry 'in which : the sprays themselves !
, operate but. thore is no heat removal. from the ' recirculation spray . heat exchangers . due e to service water failures.
Thus - spray operation - implies < ' containment heat removal at Surry in this analysis. Case 1: .This caso defines the conditions for Attribute A, Sp Early. In this case, the sprays operate only in the period bnfore VB.
-Case.2: This case defines the conditions for Attribute B, Sp-E+I. In this case, the sprays operate only before and at VB.
A.1.3-3
Case 3: -This case defines the conditions for Attribute C, Sp E+I+L. In this case, the sprays operate only from the start of the accident through the_ initial part of CCI. Case 4: This case defines the conditions for Attribute D, SpAlways. In this case, the sprays operate continuously from UTAF for at least 24 hours. Case 5: This case defines the conditions for Attribute E, Sp-Late. In this case, the sprays operate only during the initial part of CCI. Case 6: This case defines the conditions for Attribute F, Sp L+VL. In this case, the sprays operate only in the Late and Very Late periods, that is, from the start of CCI through the release of almost all the fission products from CCI, Case 7: This case defines the conditions for Attribute C, Sp VL. In this case, the sprays operate only in the latter part of CCI, which follows a hydrogen burn (if any). Case 8: This case defines the conditions for Attribute H, Sp Never. In this case , the containment sprays do not operate at all when they could contribute to fission product removal. Case 9: -This case defines the conditions for Attribute I, Sp-Final. In this case, the sprays first operate 24 h or more af ter the start of the accident. Characteristic 3. CCI (Coro-Concrete Interactions) 6 Attributes, 6 Cases The attributes for this characteristic are: A. Prmpt-Dry CCI takes place promptly following VB in a dry cavity. There is no overlying water pool to scrub the releases. B. PrmptShlw CCI takes place promptly following VB. The accumulators dump at vessel breach, so when CCI starts there is about 4.5 ft of water in the: cavity. C. No-CCI CCI does not take place. D. PrmptDeep CCI takes place promptly following VB. The cavity is full of water at this time; the pool-is about 14 ft deep. E. SD1yd-Dry CCI takes place after a short delay, in a dry cavity. The debris bed is coolable, but the water in the cavity is not replenished. The delay 'is the time needed ' to boil off the accumulator water. F. LD1yd Dry CCI takes place after a long delay, in a dry cavity. The debris bed is coolable, but the water in the cavity is not replenished. The delay is the time needed to boil off the water in a full cavity. A.1.3-4
This characteristte concerns the CCI; if it takes place, when it takes , place, and whether there is an overlying pool of water to scrub the fission products released from the CCI. Case 1: This case defines the conditions for Attribute A, Prmpt Dry.
-CCI takes place promptly following VB in a dry cavity. As there is no water in the cavity after VB, whether the debris bed is coolable is not relevant. The cavity was dry before breach and the accumulators did
? not discharge at VB. Case 2: This case defines the conditions for Attribute B. PrmptShlw. CCI takes place promptly following VB. The cavity was dry just before vessel failure, but the accumulators discharge at VB. Since there is L water, the debris bed must be noncoolable. about 4.5 ft of water in the cavity. When CCI starts there is Case 3: This case defines the conditions for Attribute C, No CCI. If
' neither prompt CCI nor delayed CCI takes place, there is no CCI.
Either there was no vessel breach, or the debris is coolable, water was present at VB, and the water supply is continuously replenished by the containment sprays.
=
-Case 4: This case defines the conditions for Attribute D, PrmptDeep.
CCI takes place promptly following VB, and the cavity is full of water (about 14 ft deep) when CCI commences. Case 5: This case defines the conditions for Attribute E, SD1yd Dry.
- CCI takes -place af ter a- short delay. The debris bed is initially coolable, and the cavity contains the accumulator water (only). The delay before the onset of CCI is the time needed to boil off the accumulator water, Case 6: This case defines the conditions for Attribute F, -LD1yd Dry.
_ CCI takes place. af ter a long delay. The debris bed is initially
,- coolable, and the cavity is full of water at VB, After all the water is boiled away, CCI commences in a dry cavity.
Characteristic 4. RCS-Pres (RCS Pressure before Vessel Breach) 4 Attributes, 4 Cases The attributes for this characteristic are: A. SSPr Just before VB, the RCS is at system setpoint pressure, about 2500 psia. This pressure is determined by the setpoint of the pressure operated relief valves (PORVs). B. IliPr Just before VB, the reactor coolant system (RCS) is in the range denoted high pressure. The hole in the RCS pressure boundary is small enough that the pressure spike that follows core slump decays away relatively slowly. The pressure at VB can range from 1000 to 2000 psia. A.1.3-5
I
-l l
'C.- ImPr lust before VB, the RCS is in the range denoted intermediate pressure. The hole in the RCS is larger ' than for Attribute B, so- the pressure at breach is within the range of '200 to 1000 psia, j D. LoPr Just before VB, the . RCS is at low pressure (less than-200 psia).
l This. characteristic determines the pressure in the reactor coolant system just before' the _ failure of the vessel. This pressure, together with the .[ mode of VB,. Characteristic 5, largely determines the events that take place j in-the containment-immediately following VB. In most detailed, mechanistic ] analyses _ of; core degradation, vessel failure follows the relocation or [ slumping . of many tons 'of molten core material into the lower. head of the j vessel. The lower _ head usually contains some water at this time, so the q
' cores slump generates a large amount of steam. This will increase the l vessel pressure, at least' temporarily, if the RCS ~ was below- the PORV j
setpoint : pressure _ at the time of the slump. The pressure at VB depends } upon how fast the RCS pressure - decreases af ter core slump and the delay ; between core slump and vessel failure. 'l a t
. Case-1: This case defines the conditions for Attribute A, SSPr. The !
RCS~ is at _ system setpoint pressure, _ about 2500 psia, when the vessel _ , fails.
]
Case ~2: This case defines the conditions for Attribute' B, HiPr. The s RCS is in the range-denoted high pressure, 1000 to-2000 psia, when the
-vessel fails. !
Case 3: 'This caso defines the conditions for Attribute C, ImPr. .The-RCS is . in the -range denoted intermediate pressure, 200'to 1000 psia,.
'when the vessel fails.
Case 4: This case defines : the conditions for Attribute. D, - LoPr. The RCS is~at low pressure, less.than 200. psia, when the. vessel fails.
~
g Characteristic 5.' VB-Mode (Mode of Vessel Breach) 6 Attributes, 6' Cases
~. i The attributes'for this characteristic are:
A. VB HPME' VB occurs when'one or more; penetration (s) fails 'and the ,
~
vessel is above 200 psia. These conditions . ensure High-
- Pressure Melt Ejection (HPME) . j B '.' VB-Pour. Molten core material Pours out of the vessel at breach, !
driven primarily by the effects of gravity. C. VB BtmHd ~ Either there is a circumferential failure of the Bottom Head, or a large portion of the Bottom Head of the vessel fails. D. Alpha An Alpha mode failure occurs, resulting in containment failure as well as vessel failure. ' A.1.3-6
1 l E. : Rocket ;A Rocket mode failure occurs, resulting in containment ' failure as well as vessel failure. F. No VB No VB occurs. This characteristic determines the mode of vessel failure. The mode of 1 vessel failure and'the pressure in the RCS just before the failure of the vessel, Characteristic 4, largely determine the events that take place in the containment immediately following VB. In two of the failure modes, the ' failure - of the vessel directly causes the failure of the containment as well. Characteristic 5 is not used in SURSOR. The information SURSOR requires ~about HPME is obtained from Characteristic 9. Case :1: This case -defines the conditions for Attribute A. VB HPME. HPME results when 'one or more pnnetration(s) fails and the vessel is above 200 psia. Case ' 2: This - case defines the conditions for Attribute B, VB-Pour.
.The molten core Pours out of the vessel, driven primarily by the ,
effects of gravity. This mode of vessel failure always occurs if'the vessel is at low pressure when it fails.
- It can also occur when the j vessel is at higher pressures if the gases in the vessel escape before an appreciable' amount of molten core material leaves the vessel, j
-Case 3: -This case defines the-conditions for Attribute E,. Rocket. If ,;
the bottom head of the vessel . fails and the~ vessel is at very high ; pressure, it is. conceivable that the-entire vessel could be propelled upward and somehow failz the concainment. As the Rocket failure mode ~ requires that the -bottom head failure mode occur, either this' case-has to be placed here, before the BtmHd case, . or the BtmHd' ease has to specify that no Rocket failure occurs. Case 4: This caso defines the conditions for? Attribute C, VB-BtmHd. The vessel failure' involves a substantial part of the Bottom Head. Case 5: This case - defines the conditions for: Attribute D, Alpha. Alpha modo failure : is defined - to be a steam explosion; in the vessel
.that fails'the vessel and aise results-in containment failure.
' Case 6: This case defines the conditions for Attribute F,'No-VB._- Core damage was arrested before VB.
Characteristic 6. SGTR (Steam Generator Tube Rupture) 3 Attributes, 3 Cases The attributes for this characteristic are: A. SGTR An SGTR occurs. The safety relf:f valves (SRVs) on the secondary 'systera are not stuck open.
~
B. SGTR-SRVO An.SGTR occurs. The SRVs on the secondary system are stuck open. C. No SGTR An SGTR does not occur. ; A.1.3 7
l This characteristic determines if an SGTR occurs, and if it does, are the SRVs on the secondary system stuck open. Because the SGTR bypasses the containment, and can occur in addition to a direct containment failure, SGTRs are considered separately in this characteristic. The situation in which there was an SGTR but no failure of the containment pressure boundary itself was considered to be No CF in Characteristic 1. Case 1: This case defines the conditions for Attribute A, SGTR. An SGTR occurred. The SRVs on the secondary system are not stuck open. For a temperature induced SGTR, the secondary SRVs do not stick open. Case 2: This case defines the conditions for Attribute B, SGTR SRVO. An SGTR occurred. The SRVs on the secondary system are stuck open. Case 3: This caso defines the conditions for Attribute C, No SGTR. There is no SGTR. Characteristic 7. Amt-CCI (Amount of Core not in HPME available for CCI) 4 Attributes, 4 Cases The attributes for this characteristic are: A. Lrg-CCI A Large amount of the Core (70-100%) not in HPME participates in the CCI. . B. Med-CCI A Medium amount of the Core (30-70%) not in HPME participates
'in the CCI.
C. Sml-CCI A Small amount of the Core (0-30%) not in HPME participates in the CCI. D. No CCI There is no CCI. , 1 This characteristic determines how much of the core that is not in HPME participates in the CCI. Whether the CCI occurs at all, the timing and the conditions of the CCI are determined in Characteristic 3, The selection of one of the first three attributes in this characteristic implies that CCI occurs. The definition of this binning characteristic is different from the definition used in the APET itself. In the APET,-the amount of core in CCI was the amount of the total core available to participate in CCI,
-without respect to whether HPME had occurred. This value was used in determining the amount of hydrogen produced during CCI and the likelihood of BMT. The primary use of this binning characteristic is to pass infor-mation on to SURSOR for the source term analysis. SURSOR internally '!
subtracts out the amount of core involved in HPME from the amount passed to it in this characteristic. (The fraction of the core involved in HPME is determined by Characteristic 9.) Therefore, in the binner it is necessary to define this characteristic as the amount of the core not involved in HPHE - that takes part . in the - CCI . Otherwise, the amount of the core participating in CCI would be subtracted twice. Case 1: This case defines the conditions for Attribute D, No CCI. If there is no prompt CCI, and there is no delayed CCI, there is no CCI. A.1.3 8
I l Case 2:- This case defines the conditions for Attribute A, Lrg-CCI. ! Either a Large amount of the Core (70 100%) was determined to be , available for. CCI in the APET, or HPME occurred. In SURSOR, the ! fraction of the core involved in HPME will be subtracted from the total i amount of core material. Setting Characteristic 7 to Large - here f ensures that a large fraction of the core not involved in HPME is ! available for CCI. HPME is meant to include all the events in which j core material leaves the vessel first under high gas pressure, followed by blowdown of the gas. The PrEj case in the APET includes only those cases where the hole in the vessel involves only a small fraction of , the area of the bottom head. Thus the situation where the bottom head l falls at, any pressure above a few hundred psia has to be specifically l' included. Case 3: This case defines the conditions for Attribute B, Med CCI. A Medium amount of the Core (30 to 70%) was determined to be availr.* ole ; for CCI in the APET. j i Case 4: This case defines the conditions for Attribute C, Sml-CCI, A ! Small amount of the Core (0 to 30%) was determined to be available for ) CCI in the APET. j Characteristic 8. Zr-Ox (Zr Oxidation in-vessel) 2 Attributes, 2 Cases The attributes for this characteristic are: A. Lo ZrOx A Low amount of the core Zirconium was Oxidized in the vessel before VB. This implies a range from 0 to 40% oxidized, with a nominal value of 25%. B.-_Hi-Zr0x- A High amount of the core Zirconium was oxidized in the
-vessel before VB, _ This. implies that more than 40% of the Zr was oxidized, with a nominal value of 65%. -l This characteristic determines how much of the zirconium in the core was oxidized . in the = vessel before VB. The amount is really the amount of equivalent zirconium oxidized since it is possible to oxidize some of the j iron and chromium in the stainless steel.as tell. Thus the amount oxidized
~
1 can exceed 100% at the very upper end of tl e r'istribution provided by the j Experts. l i Case 1: This case defines the conditions for Attribute A, Lo Zr0x. j ' The fraction of equivalent zirconium oxidized in the vessel before breach was low. !
) . -
i Case 2: This case defines the conditions for Attribute B, Hi-Zrox. The fraction of equivalent zirconium oxidized in the vessel before l breach was high. l A.1.3-9 A
-Characteristic 9. -HPME (High Pressure Melt Ejection) 4 Attributes, 4 Cases The attributes for this characteristic are: -A. Hi HPME- A- High fraction (> 40%) of the core was ejected under pressure from the vessel at failure. B. Md HPME A Moderate fraction (20 to 40%) of the core was ejected under pressure from the vessel at failure. C. Lo HPME A Low fraction (< 20%) of the core was ejected under pressure from the vessel at failure. D. No HPME There was no HPME at vessel failure. This characteristic determines how much of the core participated in high pressure melt ejection. As mentioned in the discussion of Characteristic
- 7. HPME is not limited to vessel failure in which only a small part of the bottom head failed. Thus the requirements for Cases 1, 2, and 3 here are
.similar to-those for Case 2 in Characteristic 7. Case 1: This case definos the conditions for Attribute A, Hi HPME. A l Iligh fraction (> 40%) of the core was ejected under pressure from the vessel at failure. Pressurized ejection, as defined in the APET, implies ejection through one or a small number of penetration failures. If the entire bottom head, or a large portion of it, fails at elevated pressure, the- resulting situation is so similar to-ejection through a relatively small hole that both are considered to be HPME. Case 2: This case defines the conditioas for Attribute B, Md-HPME. A Moderate fraction (20 to 40%) of the core was ejected under pressure from the vessel at failure. HPME is defined as in Case 1. Case 3: This case defines the conditions for Attribute C, Lo HPME. A Low fraction (< 20%) of the core was ejected under pressure from 'the vessel at failure, HPME is defined as in Case 1. l Case 4: This case defines the conditions for Attribute D, No-HPME. There was no HPME at vessel failure. This case includes the Pour mode of vessel failure, bottom head failures at low pressure, Alpha mode failures, and situations where there was no VB. Characteristic 10. CF-Size (Containment Failure Size or Type) 6 Attributes, 6 Cases
.The attributes for this characteristic are:
A. Cat Rupt The containment failed by catastrophic rupture, resulting in a very large hole and gross structural failure. B. Rupture The containment failed by the development of a large hole or rupture; nominal hole size is 7 square ft. A.1.3-10
C. Leak The containment failed by.the development of a small hole or a leak; nominal hole size is 0.10 square ft. D. BMT The containment failed by BMT, and there was no abovegr< ond failure or bypass. E. Bypass The containment did not fail but was bypassed by event V or an SGTR. F. No CF The containment did not fail, and was not bypassed. This characteristic determines how the containment failed. The first three attributes define the hole size if the containment pressure boundary failed , aboveground. The fourth attribute is an underground failure. The fifth l attribute implies that the pressure boundary itself did not fail, but that 1 it was bypassed by Event V or an SGTR. Only the most severe mode of failure is counted. That is, .if the containment ruptures, a subsequent BMT is not o.f interest since essentia11y'all the radioactive release will take place through the aboveground failure. Bypass takes precedence over all the direct failure modes since-it provides a direct path from the RCS to the outside of the containment during core degradation. -> Case 1: This case defines the conditions for Attribute E, Bypass. The containment was bypassed by Event V or an SGTR. The SGTR may be either initiating or temperature-induced during the core' melt. All situations with Event.V or SCTR are considered in this case, even'though they may also have an isolation failure, containment rupture at VB, or core damage' arrest before VB. The reason for this is that the bypass provides sn escape path that allows the fission products to pass l- directly nom ths RCS; to the outside of the. containment. The fission ! products escaping via this route -largely . determine the early radio - nuclide release, which is the most important release for risk. Even tf core degradation is arrested before the vessel- fails, a substantial _ portion of. the fission products in the core. may be released from the fuel tand escape to the environment before a safe, stable state 1s reached. Case 2: This case defines the - conditions fer Attribute A,; Cat-Rupt. The containment failed by catastrophic rupture or major structural failure. This . can occur at VB or due to a hydrogen burn af ter VB.
- Catastrophic ruptures that follow Event V or an-SGTR were included in Case 1.
Case 3: This case defines the conditions for Attribute B, Rupture. The containment failed- by the development of a large hole, denoted-rupture in this analysis. This can. occur at VB or due to a hydrogen burn af ter VB. It may also occur at the start of the accident for large seismic initiators. Ruptures that follow Event V or an SGTR were included ie Case 1. Case 4: This case defines the conditions for Attribute C, Leak. The containment failed by the development of a small hole,' denoted a leak in this analysis. This can occur due to an isolation failure, at VB, A.1.3-11
due to a hydrogen burn after VB, or after a day or more if the contain-ment heat removal is not restored. It may also occur at the start of the accident for large seismic initiators. Leaks that follow Event V or an SGTR were included in Case 1. This case does include situations with an isolation failure and core damage arrest before VB. Case 5: This case defines the conditions for Attribute D, BMT. The containment failed by BMT. There are no aboveground containment failures and the containment is not bypassed. Case 6: This case defines the conditions for Attribute F, No CF, The containment did not fail aboveground or belowground, and it was not bypassed. Characteristic 11. RCS-Hole (Number of large holes in the RCS) 2 Attributes, 2 Cases The attributes for this characteristic are: A. 1 Hole There is only One large Hole in the RCS following VB, so there is no effective natural circulation through the vessel after breach. B. 2-Holes There are Two large Holes in the RCS following VB, so there will be effective natural circulation through the veswei after breach. . This . characteristic determines if there is effective natural circulation through the reactor vessel in the period following its breach. The source term. experts gave two distributions for the parameter that determines the late release of fission products; from the vessel; one distribution applied when there-was' natural circulation and the other distribution applied when there was no natural circulation through the vessel. For effective natural icirculation to take place, two- large holes are required, neither of which involves a long . path between the vessel and the containment atmosphere. The vessel failure, of course, e nates one such hole. ihe question, then, is whether 'there is 'nother hole which is not very small or does not lie at the end of.a long c. circuitous length of pipe. Case 1: This case defines the conditions for Attribute A, 1-Hole. There is only One large Hole in the RCS following VB. " A" and "S 2"- size breaks are considered to be large holes, so they are excluded. Event V is included here, as the pathway is too long for effective natural circulation. The same holds true for SGTR. "S3 "-size breaks are '.too small to allow effective natural circulation, and most S 3 reaks are = pump seal failures, in which ~ case the pach is too long vvay, e 2: This case defines the conditions for Attribute B, 2-Holes.
.ere are Two large Holes in the RCS following VB. A size breaks are tviously large holes, and S2 breaks are also considered to be large
.les. The typical scenario for Alpha mode failure has the entire head A.l.3 12
l l 1 of the vessel torn off. Natural circulation may be expected to be vigorous in this case due to the heat production in the vessel. In the Rocket mode situation, there was gross failure of the bottom head, and the upward motion of the vessel tore off the hot and cold legs, so again natural circulation will be very effective. l P i i i l l l A,1.3-13
A.1.4 Listinc of the Surry Binner Section 2.4 of this volume gives a general description of the accident progression bins and defines each attribute of each characteristic. That material is not repeated here. Subsection A.1.3 is a detailed case-by case description of the binner. The binner itself, a computer input file read by EVNTRE, is given in this subsection. The binner forms an input file separate from the APET. The binner is usually developed with the APET as a single file on a spreadsheet program, but is separated from the APET for evaluation. The Surry binner used in the accident progression analyses for NUREG 1150 consists of 177 lines of computer input. The binner file uses a format similar to that used in the APET, with the same mnemonic abbreviations for each branch of every question. The structure of the binner file is explained in the EVNTRE Reference Manual.^-1 Developing the binner (along with the APET) on a PC spreadsheet program greatly facilitates keeping track of the references to APET questions when questions are added or subtracted, or when the order of the questions is = changed in the course of the development of the tree. The binner appears below as developed on the spreadsheet program. The numbers at the right side of the page are line numbers that are deleted when the file is passed to the mainframe computer for evaluation. Line numbers are useful during the development of the tree and the binner. Comments in the binner appear to the right of $s and are ignored by EVNTRE. A.l.4-1
lurry tlnning Rev. 7.C3 15 feb 89 11 Characteristitt 1266 il Cf time Sprays CCI RC5 Pres VS Mode SGTR Amt CCI 1287 2r Da hME CF $lte RCS hole 1?f8 8 8 V Dry V Wet Early Cf Cf st VB Late Cf VLate Cf finet Cf Wo Cf 1789 4 8 71 1 19 71 $ ist Cher., Cont. Failure ilme 1290 .. 5 *(( 5
- 1)* 4 ) S Case 1. Atte. t (M), ho Cf or SGTR with no Other CF 1291 noCf ce(( 8 $CTR or t $G1R$3) & Bypast ) 1?92 2 1 i 14 S Case 2, Attr. 1 (A), Y Dry 1293 4 + 2 1294 Brk V & V Dry 1295 2 2 1 14 S Case 3. Atte. 2 (B), V Wet 1296 4
- 1 1297 trk V & V Wet 1298 4 3 13 13 43 43 $ Case 4 Attr. 3 (C), Cf before vessel Breach 1299 1+ ( 2
- 1
- 2 )4 Don't count initial Leaks (Isolation f eltt -es) 1300 B*Rupt or ( B* Leak & nolCF CR & notCl*Rp ) S if they are followed by Rupture or CR at VB. 1301 1 4 43 $ Case 5, Attr. 4 (D), Cf nt Vessel Breach 1302 4 1303 l Cf 1304 1 5 $2 5 Case 6, Atte. 5 (E), late CF 1305 4 1306 L Cf 1307 1 6 64 S Late 7, Attr. 6 (f), very Late CF 1308 4 1309 L2 Cf 1310 2 7 70 71 l Case 8, Attr. 7 (G), finst Cf (af ter more than 24 hours) 1311 2 + 3 1312 fCf tesk or f Mi 1313 9 9 $p tarty $p t*l $p tel*L $pAlways Sp Late Sp L+VL l 2nd Characteristic, $ prays 1314 sp VL sp Never sp final 1315 4 1 25 44 46 57 $ Case 1 Attr. 1 (A), Early sprays only 1316 1
- 1* 1 * *1 1317 t Sp & nolt Sp & rwl 5p & noL2 5p 1318 4 2 25 44 46 57 i Case 2. Attr. 2 (B), Early & Im sprays only 1319 i
- 1* 1
- 1 1320 ..
t $p & IP Sp & not $p & noL2 Sp 1321 4 3 25 44 46 57 $ Case 3, Attr. 3 tC), Earty, im & Late sprays 1322 1
- 1* 1
- 1 1323 t $p & 12 Sp & L Sp & noti Sp 1324 4 4 25 44 46 57 $ Case 4. Attr. 4 (D), sprays always 1325 1
- 1* 1
- 1 S ( Always w/r/t releases ) 1326 t 5p & 12 $p & L Sp & L2 $p 1327 4 5 25 44 46 57 $ Case 5, Attr. 5 (t), tote sprays only 1328 i * +1* 1 * *1 1329 reot Sp & nol2 Sp & L Sp & noL2 Sp 1330 4 6 25 44 46 57 5 Case 6, Attr.6 (F), Late & VL sprays only 1331 1
- 1* 1
- 1 1332 not Sp & . .l? Sp & L Sp & L2 Sp 1333 4 7 ?$ 44 46 57 $ Case 7. Attr. 7 (G), very Late sprays only 1314 1
- 1* 1
- 1 1335 not Sp & nol2 sp & not Sp & L2 Sp 1336 4 8 25 44 46 57 5 Case 8, Attr. 8 (H), sprays never 1337 12 Oct 89 Surry APri Rev.11 Page 1 A.1.4-2
1 * *1* 1
- 1 5 ( Wever w/r/t releases ) 1316 not Sp & nolt Sp & not Sp & nott Sp 1339 1 9 65 8 Case 9, Attr. 9 (I), final sprays 1540 i & ( hot important for Release ) 1341 f Sp 1342 6 6 Ptsmt Dry Promtthlw ho CCI PrtatDeep SDtyd Dry LDtyd Dry 8 3rd Characteristic, 1343 3 1 55 32 29 5 Core Concrete Interaction 1344 1
- 2
- 3 $ Case 1 Attr. 1 (A), Pro m t CCI Cavity Dry 1545 PrvtCCI L kt Dry 4. noAcDeVB 1346 3 2 $$ 32 29 5 Case 2, attr. 2 (B), Prcept CCI shat tow tool Scrutting 1347 1
- 2
- 3S Cavity contains acctmulator water only 1348 Pr ytCCI & RC Dry & AcDaVB 1349 2 3 55 60 $ Case 3, Attr. 3 (C), wo CCI 1350 2
- 2 5 Cootable with water, or no VB. 1351 noPrnCCI & nobidCCl 1352 2 4 $$ 32 l case 4, Attr. 4 (D), Prcww>t CCI Deep Poot scruttinD 1353 i
- 1 1 Cavity is futt ( 14 feet ) 1354 PrmtCCI & RC Wet 1355 2 5 60 29 i Case 5, Attr. 5 (E), Delayed CCI Cavity Dry 1356 1
- 3 8 short Delay
- Bolt of f Accatator water only 1357 DelydCCI & AcD*VB 1358 2 6 60 32 S Case 6, Attr. 6 (F), Delayed CCI Cavity Dry 1359 1
- 1 $ tong Delay Bolt off Futt Cavity (14 ft deep) 1360 DelydCCI & RC Wet 1361 4 4 $$Pr HIPr ImPr LoPr S 4th Charac teristic, 1362 1 1 23 $ Case 1, Attr. 1 (A), S RCS Pressure before VB 1363 1 $ system setpoint pressure 1364 l SSPr 1365 1 2 23 $ Case 2, Attr. 2 (B), High pressure 1366 2 1367 l HIPr 1368 1 3 23 5 Case 3, Attr. 3 (C), Intermediate pressure 1369 3 1370 l*lmPr 1371 1 4 23 $ Case 4, Attr. 4 (D), low pressure 1372 4 1373 1 toPr 1374 6 6 VB NPH[ VB Pour VB ttmHd Alpha Rocket ho VB l 5th Char., Modt of Ve" A Dench 1375 1 1 36 S Case 1, Attr.1 ( A), Pressurized tjection (inct. Direct Heatins, 1376 1 1 Characteristic 5 la hot used in SURs0R. 1377 Pr!J l At L HPMt information ie obtained f rom Char. 9. 1378 1 2 36 S Case 2, Attr. 2 (B), Cravity Pour 1379 2 1380 Pour 1381 1 5 37 $ Case 3, Attr. 5 (t), Rocket 1382-1 $ Has to come before 8tmHd since 8tmHd required for Rocket 1383 Rocket 1384 1 3 36 $ Case 4, Attr. 3 (C), Cross Bottom Head fatture 1385 3 1386 BtWid 1337 1 4 35 5 Case 5, At tr. 4 (D), Alpha Mode 1388 1 13P9 12 Oct 89 $urey Atti Rev. 11 Page 2 A.1.4-3
< Ii
?
- Alpha .1390 1 6 24 8 Case 6 Atte. 6 (F), No Vessel treach 1391 1 1392 noV8 1393 3- 3 $C1R SG1R $RVO No $GTR S 6th Chararacteristic, 1394 3 i i 3 19 S Case 1, Attr. 1 (A), SGTR S Steam Generator tube Rupture 1395
( ~$
- 2 )+ 1 S Secondary System $RVs are not stuck open 1396
( 8 $G1R 8 $btVn$to ) ort $G1R$3 1397 i .2 2 1 3 S Case 2, Attr. 2 (B), $GTR with Stuck open $RVs 1398
'$
- 1 1399 t $GTR & $$RV St0 1400 2 3 1 19 $ Case 3, Attr. 3 (C), No $GTR 1401
$+ 2 1402 not $G1R 8 not $G1R 1403 4 4 trg CCI Med CCI . Sml CCI No CCl S 7th ther., Amount of Core in CCI 1404 2-4 55 60 5 Case 1, Attr. 4 (D), No CCI 1405 2
- 2 S this is Amount of Core not in HPMt that is in CCll 1406 noPrmCCI & nobldCCI ..
1407 4 1- $3 - 36 36 23 $ Case 2, Attr. 1 (A), large Amount in CCI ( $ 100%) 1608 1 + 1 +( 3* 4 ) 1409 trg CCI or Prt) or ( 8tmMd 8 not LoPr ) 1410 1 21 53- S Case 3, Atte. 2 (B), Medlun Amount of Core in CCI (30 70%) 1411 2 1412 Med CCI 1413-1 3 53. 5 Case 4, Attr. 3 (C), small Amount of Core in CCI (0 30%) 1414
- 3 1415
$ml*CCI. 1416 2 2 to Pr0x Hl.Zron S 8th Characteristic, Zr Oxidation 1417 1 1 31 $ Case 1, Attr. 1 (A), to 2r Caldation (<40%) In Vesset 1418 2 1419 Lo Zrom 1420 1- 2 31 S Case 2, Attr. 2 (8), Hi Zr Oxidation (>40%) in Vessel 1421
-1 1422 Hi Zr04 1423
=4 4- Hl*HPMt Md HPMt to HPMt. No HPMt S 9th Cher., High Pressure 1424' 4 34 36 36 23 S Case 1,-Attr. 1 (A). S Melttjection 1425 1 *( 1* ( 3
- 4 )) S Highfractiontjected(>40%) 1426
'Hl FCoR & (' Petj or (~ BtmHd 8 nol LOPr)) 1427
'4. 2 34 36 36 23 S Case 2, Attr. 2 (B), Medium Fraction tjected (20 40%) . 1428-2 ~* ( 1+ ( 3
- 4 )) 1429 Md f coR 8 ( - Prtj or ( 8tmHd 8. nol toPr)). 1430
'4 3- 34 36- 36 23' S Case 3, Attr. 3 (C), Low traction tJected (<20%). 1431 3 * (. 1+ ( 3
- 4 )) 1432'
.: - to FCoR & ( Petj or ( BtmHd 8' not LoPr)) 1433 1 4 36 - 5 Case 4. Attr. 4 (D), No HPMt 1434
- 1'- - -1435 noPrtj 1436-6 6 Cat Rupt' Rupture . teak DMT Bypass No CF - S 10th Cher.. Type of Cont. Failure 1437 1- $- 71 S Case 1. Atte. $ (E), Bypass (V or SGTR) 1438 4 1439.
Bypass- 1440 3 1 43 52 64 S Case 2. Attr.1 (A), Catastrophic Rupture 1441 12 Oct=89 surry apt 1 Rev.11 Page 3 A.1.4-4
.s. +
s l l i [, i + 1+ 1 1442
'; ICF*Cttp or LCF.Cttp or 12Cf CRp 144)
. , 4 2 13 43 $2 64 5 Case 3, Attr. 2 (I), Rupture 1444 2+
i
- 2* 2 144$
, $+tet or ICf *R@t or LCf t@t or L2CF hp 1446 i' 3- .71 i Cese 4, Attr. 3 (C), Leek 1447 2 1448 j i 'f* Leek 1449 i
. 1- 4 71 8 Case $, Atte. 4 (D), tesomet Mett thru 1450
' ,3 1451 l f mi ' 1452 -)
1- 6 71 'l Cast 6, attr. 6 (F), to Contelnment fatture 1453 I
.$ 1454 .]
noCF 145$ --
'l
- 2 - 't 1* Note laHoles i 11th Cher., twnber of Holes in RCS 1456- 2
' 4--1 22 22 3$ 37 i Case 1, Attr.' i ( A), One Hole 14$7' l
, *1
- 2 *- 2
- 2 5 Event y a 1 hole
- path too long 14$$' -l
[, nottD*A '& notbD $2 8 noAlphe ~ 5 nosocket 1459 ;
- 4. ~ t 22 22 35 37 8 Case 2,' Attr. 2 (8), two Holes 1660: -i 1- +- 2 + 1 +- 1 8 $3 Holes are too smett for Natural Circutetton - 1461 l[V ttD*A' or (DD 52 or Alphe or Rocket 1462 q
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A.1.5 Description of the Surry Rebinner Section 2.4 of this volume gives a general description of the accident progression bins and defines each attribute of each characteristic. That material is not repeated here. The Surry rebinner used in the accident progression analyses for NUREG 1150 makes very few changes in t.he original binning of the APET output. Attributes $. Late CF, and 6, Very Late CF of the original binning for Characteristic 1 Containment Failure Mode, are combined into one attribute. This was done because SURSOR does not distinguish between the two time periods. Attributes 8, No Sprays, and 9, Final Sprays, of the original binning for Characteristic 2, Containment Spray Operation, are combined into one attribute because operation of the sprays in the final period only does not affect the fission product release as calculated by SURSOR. For Characteristic 10, Containment Failure Size, two pairs of attributes are coalesced. Attributes 3 Leak, and 4, BMT, are combined because SURSOR treats BMT as a leak when computing releases. Attributes 5, Bypass, and 6 No CF, are combined because in either case the primary mode of fission product release is not through a failure of the containment. A.1.5-1
A.1.6 Listing of the Surry Robinner Section 2.4 of this volume gives a general description of rebinnin6 and defines each attribute of each characterjstic of the accident progression bins. That material is not repeated here. Subsection A.1.5 describes the function of the rebinner. The rebinner itself, a computer input file read by the EVNTRE postprocessing code, PSTEVNT, is listed in this section. The rebinner file uses a format similar to that used in the APET binner. It uses mnemonic abbreviations for each attribute of each characteristic in a manner similar to tho way in which the binner itself makes use of the mnemonic question and branch mnemonic indicators of the APET. The struc-ture of the rebinner file is explained in the PSTEVNT Reference Manual.A 2 Comments in the binner appear to the right of $s and are ignored by PSTEVNT. In the listing that follows, the comments appear as a separate line. They have been moved to this position from their original position to the right of the preceding line to facilitate printing. A2 S. J, Iliggins, "A User's Manual for the Postprocessing Program PSTEVNT," Sandia National L.aboratories, NUREG/CR 5380, SAND 88 2988, October 1989. . 3 A.1.6 1
r-. - Si i Surry Rebannant
- Rev. 4
- 11 Feb 88 I 11 CF fles 8 preys CCI RCS Free V8-M Mo SOTR Amt-CCI I i 8t Os NPMB CF Stee hCS Sole i 7 7 V-Dry V Wet Berly-CF CF et V8 LorYL-CF Final CF No CF
$ Source fore Attribute 1 Cont. Failure Mode 1 1 1 1
V* Dry 1 2 1 3 V Wet 1 3 1 3 terly CF 1 4 1 , 4-CF-et V8 3 $ 1 1 3 + 8 Late CF or YLete CF 1 '8 1 7 Finet CF 1- 7 1 8 No-CF 8- 8 8p Early Sp-E+1 Sp-E+I+L SpAlways Sp-Leto 8p L+VL Sp VL Sp*Nonop , 8 Bource fore Attribute 2, Spray Operation 1 1 2' 1 Sp-Berly !i. 1 2 2 2 , . Sp E+1 ' ' 1 3 2 3. Sp-B+1+L 1 4 2 4 SpAlways i l' : $ 2 S Sp Lete 1 '6 2
, 8 Sp-L+ VL' 1 -7 2 7
.8p VL 2 8 2 .
2 8 .+ 8 Sp-Hever or' .8p-Final
- 8 8 Framt Dry Promt8hlw No-CCI FromtBoop 8Di,*d-Dry LD1yd-Dry 8 Source form Attribute 3 CCI 1- 1 3 l'
Prost Dry
'l 2 3 2
ProntShlw 1 3 3 3 No-CCI-1 4 3 4 PromtDeep 1 5 '3
-5 SD1yd Dry .
1 8- 3 A.1.6 2 E
8 LD1yd-Dry 4 4 SSPr RiPr 1mPr LoPr 4 Source fore Attribute 4 RCS Pressure et VB 1 1 4 1 asPr 1 2 4 2 Bitt 1 3 4 3 ImPr 1 4 4 l 4 LoPr 8 6 VB M M VB Pour YB St.edid Alphe Rocket No-YB 4 Source Tern Attribute S Hode of Vessel Breech 1 1 S 1 VB-H M 1 2 $ 2 VB Pour 1 3 S 3 VB-Bt. mild 1 4 6 4 Alphe 1 $ $ Rocket 1 6 5 6 No-VB 3 3 SGTR SOTR-ERVO No 80TR
$ Soutte Term Atttibute 6, Steam Generet.or Tube Rupture 1 1 6 1
80TR 1 2 6 2 80TR-5RVO 1 3 6 3 No-80TR 4 4 tra-CCI Hed CCI Sol-CCI No CCI
$ Bource Term Att.rtbute 7, Amount of Core in CCI 1 1 7 1
Lts-CCI 1 2 7 2 Med-CCI 1 3 7 3 Smi CCI 1 4 7 4 No-CCI 2 2 Lo tros lit-!. rom 8 Bource Term Attribute 6, Er oxidation 1 1 6 1 Lo-tr0x 1 2 6 2 Hi-tr0x 4 4 Itt > HITE Md HitE Lo-HitE No-HitE 8 Source Term Attribute D. High Pressure >:41t Ejection A.1,6 3
= _ _ . _ _ . . . . . .
1 1 9 1 Hi E M 1 2 9 2 Md-H M 1 3 9 3 Lo-M M 1 4 9 4 No E M 4 4 Cat Rupt Rupture Leak ko-CF 8 Source Team Attribute 10, Contatteent Fellure $1:e g 1 1 10 1 Cat *Rupt 1 2 10 2 kupture 2 3 10 10 3 + 4 Leek or DMT 2 4 10 10 S + 6 Bypass or Mo CF 2 2 1 Holo 2 Holes 8 Bource form Attribute it. Number of Holes in the RCS 1 1 11 1 1 Holo 1 2 11 2 2* Holes A.1.6*4
A.2 DESCRIPTION AND LISTING OF Tile USER FUNCTION A.2.1 Descriotion of the User Function for the Surry APET The user function is a FORTRAN FUNCTION subprogram linked with EVNTRE after compilation. Without the user function, EVNTRE is applicable to any event , tree evaluation problem. Once linked with the user function for the Surry l APET, however, an executable snodule of EVNTRE specific for Surry is l created. The user function allows calculations and manipulations to be l performed as the event tree is evaluated that are too complicated to be l treated in the tree itself. In the Surry APET, the user function is used to perform two tasks. First, whether the containment fails and the inode of containment failure are . computed in the sections of the user function evaluated at Questions 43, {
$2 and 64. Although determining whether the containment fails could be '
done by simply comparing the load pressure and the faihtre pressure without resorting to a user function, determining the mode of failure is more complicated and requires a user function. The method used to determine the mode of failure is discussed in Volume 1 (Methodology) of this report and is summarized below. The second usage of the user function is to determine the pressure rise due to hydrogen deflagrations in the containment. The pressure rise is computed by calculating the adiabatic pressure rise using a conversion ratio or combustion efficiency defined in the APET. The adiabatic pressure rise is multiplied by a _ scale factor, also defined in the APET, to obtain I the actual pressure rfse. l I The user function for the Surry APET contains a great many comment lines, and is intended to be self explaining. Like any FORTRAN subprogram, the user function may call other subprograms. The Surry user function uses four subprograins: STMTBL, SURRYCF, BRNTYP, and il2 BURN. FUNCTION STMTBL computes the temperature of steam at saturation from the mass of steam in the Surry containment. It is specific for Surry and is valid only from 85'C to 120'O. FUNCTION SURRYCF calculates whether the containment fails, and the mode of containment failure if it fails, based on the results of 1 the structural expert panel. FUNCTION BRNTYP deteraines what type of combustion event is possible by considering the amounts of hydrogen, steam, oxygen, and inert gases present in _ the containment. FUNCTION ll2 BURN computes'the adiabatic pressure rise due to the adiabatic deflagration of ; hydrogen in an air and steam mixture at constant volurno. i The method of determining containment failure and the rnode of containment ' failure warrants additional discussion. The method for determining the mode-of containment failure for a pressure rise' which is slow compared to the leak rate is straightforward, but the snethod for determining the mode {y of containment failure for a pressure rise which is fast compared to the ;
-leak rate is more complex. For each observation in the sample, the Latin !
Ilypercube Sampling (LilS) code selects a containment failure pressure from the aggregate distribution provided by the structural expert panel (see Issue 2 in Volume 2, Part 3) and a random number between zero and one to be used to determine the mode of failure. The load pressure is obtained from j the pressure rise distribution for the appropriate case for CF at VB, and A.2.1 1
I from the user function calculation of the loads due to hydrogen combustion for late CF, The load pressure is considered a known quantity in the following discussion. The load pressure and the containment failure pressure are compared by the user function in FUNCTION SURRYCF. If the load pressure is less than the containment failure pressure, the containment does not fail. If the load pressure is greater than or equal to the containment failure pressure, the containment fails. If the containment fails, the random number is used to determine the failure mode. If the pressure rise is slow compared to the time it takes a leak to depressurite the containment, the conditional failure probabilities of the aggregate distribution (contained in array COND) for the failure pressure are used directly. If the random number is less than the leak conditional probability, the failure mode is leak. If the random number io greater than the leak conditional probability but less than the sum of the leak conditional probability and the rupture conditional probability, the failure mode is rupture. If the random number is greater than the sum of the leak conditional probability and the rupture conditional probability, the failure mode is catastrophic rupture. Consider an example in which the failure pressure is 130 psi and the load pressure is greater than 130 psig. The data statements in FUNCTION SURRYCF show that the the conditional probability for leak at 130 psi is 0.544, so if the random number is less than 0.544 the failure mode is leak. The interval conditional probability ; for rupture is 0.432, so if the random number is between 0.544 and 0.976 (- 1 0.544 + 0.432) the failure mode is rupture. If the random number exceeds 0.976, the failure mode is CR. If the pressure rise is fast compared to the time it takes a leak to depressurize the contaituent, the determination of the failure mode is more complicated. Developme ".t of a leak will not arrest the pressure rise in the containment, and a rupture or CR may occur at a higher pressure. The ; pressure will keep on rising until the load pressure is reached, or until a rupture or CR occurs that terminates the pressure rise. Figure A.2 1 L illustrates the process for discrete steps. At the failure pressure, there is some probability of rupture and CR. The bulk of the failures are shown as leaks in this illustration, and for them the pressure rises to the next step, where again a fraction are converted to rupture and CR. The process stops at the load pressure. The leak fraction remaining at that pressure is the total leak probability. The rupture probability is the total of all the rupture fractions at all the steps, and similarly for CR. FUNCTION SURRYCF performs a calculation analogous to the process outlined in Figure A.2-1 for a mode of CF, considering all the pressures between the failure pressure and the load pressure. It calculates the probability of rupture or CR at all these intermediate pressures, and then sums them to obtain total conditional probabilities for each failure mode. These probabilities are specific to the pair of failure and load pressures considered. Once the total conditional probabilities for failure mode are computed, the random number is used to choose the failure mode as in the slow pressure rise case. A.2.1 2
Look Rupture CR pg Load Pressure Look Rupture CR Rupture CR Leak Rupture CR Rupture CR Pi Leak Rupture CR Rupture CR Look Rupture CR Rupture CR Fallure Pressure p, Leak Rupture CR Figure A 2 1 Process Used to Determine the Mode of Containment Failure for Fast Pressure Rise l A.2,1 3
Consider an example in which the failure pressure is 130 psi and the load pressure is 135 psi. If the contairr.ient fails by rupture or CR at 130 psi, the failure is so large that the pressure rises no further. However, if a leak develops at 130 psi, the pressure will keep on rising, and a rupture or CR may develop between 130 and 135 psig. The probability of an addi-tional failure between 130 and 135 psi is proportional to the failure probability density (FPD) for this pressure interval. The portion of the cumulative failure probability (CFP) distribution below 130 psi is dis-counted since failure has occurred at 130 psi. Thus the probability used to determine if an additional failure will occur between 130 and 135 psi is not FPD(135) - 0.083, but FPD(135) / ( 1 CFP(130) ) - 0.083 /( 1 0.530) ;
- 0.177. Fhe conditional probability of additional ruptures forming j between 130 and 135 psi is the conditional leak probability at 130 psi times the conditional rupture probability for the 135 psi interval times the failure probability for the interval. For the conditional rupture probability, C,p. for the interval between 130 and 135 psi, the average of the values for 130 and 135 psi is.used: ( 0.432 + 0.562 ) / 2 - 0.497.
Thus, the total conditional probability of rupture, for rapid pressure rise with a failure pressure of 130 psi and a load pressure of 135 pai, is: 0.432 + 0.544
- 0.497
- 0.177 - 0.480.
In general terms, this is: R,p(i) - R,p(1 1) + Rn(1 1)
- 0.5 * ( C,p(i) + C,p(1 1) ) ;
- FPD(1) / ( 1 CFP(1 1) ),
where 0,,, FPD, and CFP have been defined above and R,p and Ra are the conditional probabilities of rupture and leak for fast pressure rise. There is an analogous equation for R ,, the conditional probability of. CR for fast pressure rise. Af ter Ryp and R., have been found, the remaining leak fraction is found from: Ru(1) - 1 R,,(1) R ,(i), For a rapid pressure rise, a failure pressure of 130 psi, and a load pres-sure of 135 psi, the conditional probabilities of leak, rupture, and CR may be shown to be 0.494, 0.480, and 0.026, respectively. To determine the mode of containment failure for fast pressure rise, the random number is used as it is for slow pressure rise. In this example, if the random-number is less than 0.494 the failure mode is leak. If the random number is between 0.494 and 0.974 (- 0.494 + 0.480) the f ailure mode is rupture. If the random number exceeds 0.974,- the failure mode is CR. So, to find the conditional failure mode probabilities for fast pressure rise, FUNCTION SURRYCF integrates up from the failure pressure to the load pressure in 5 psi increments, incrementing, the rupture and CR conditional , probabilities at each step, and decreasing the leak conditional probab- l 111ty. Partial intervals are used at the beginning and the end of this process. With this explanation, the comment statements in SURRYCF should prove an adequate guide to the method. A more detailed explanation of the ! method, giving the exact mathematical formulation of the problem, is contained in Reference A 1. A.2.1 4
,.y - ,- -- - - - - - w-
When documenting the accident progression analysis, it was discovered that the array P in SURRYCF had not been converted to psia from psig. This has no effect on whether or not the containment fails, since the comparison is done in psia, but it has the effect of sli 6htly overestimating the probabi. j lity of the leak failure mode since the function uses the conditional ' failure mode probabilities for pressure values 14.7 psi lower than the pressure it should have used. The effects of this oversight are thought to ; have a negligible effect on source terms and risk. i l I
)
1 l
-1 l
+
i L i r A 1, J.- C. Helton, R. J. Breeding, and S. N. Hora, "Prohnbi1iiv .i t Containment Failure Mode for Fast Pressure Rise," Satulin Nat 1,itial Laboratories (in preparation). A.2.1 5
A.2.2 Listine of the Surry APET User Punction
~
rVNCTION UrUN( NAME, NARG, IDARO, ARO ) , C Rev. 11.04, 20 Jan 89 ! C l DIENSION AR0(*), IDAR0(*) ] CHARACTER *6 NAME i C l REAL NTRON(3), 02(3), H2(3) i C 1 C Til!8 18 THE USER FUNCTION FOR THE SURRY AFET C IT IS CALLED FRm THE EVNTRE CODE DURING THE EVALUATION f>F THE EVENT TREE. C C THE NUMBERS OF THE PARAMETEk8 ARE CONTAINED IN THE ARR/.T IDAR0, C 1.e. IDAR0(1) CONTAINS THE FIRST FARAMETER NUMBER LISfED FOR A GIVEN C FUNCTION CALL. THE ARRAT ARO CONTAIN8 THE VARIOU8 FARAMETER VALVE 8. C NARG 28 THE NUMBER OF FARAN TEk8 LISTED FOR A CIVEN FUNCTION CALL. C MAME CONTAINS file NAME (6 C11ARACTERS) 0F THE HJOULE IN UTUN TO BE C ACCESSED. THIS CHARACTER STRING CORRESFL fDS TO THE NAME ASSIONED IN Tilt C APET, 1.o , IN TUN H2aVI, H2aVI 18 CONTAINED IN NAME UFON ENTRY TO UFUN. C C C The first part of this function calculates contairment f ailure using , C total cumulative f ailure probability and the mode of contairment f ailure C using the interval conditional probabilities for failure mode. It tretts C both slow and fast pressure rises ( slow and fast with respect to the leak C depressurisetton time ). C C The second part of this function concerne hydrogen burns, Combustion is C assumed to occur et SCI steen mole fraction as the conteirment atmosphere C do-inerts. The de inerting will usually be due to the activation of the C sprays following power recovery. Only hydrogen combustion after vessel C breach is considered; the adiabstic pressure rise from a deflagration , C is computed. C C C SET THE INITIAL DAB MASSE 8 FOR THE CONTAINMENT AftOSPHERE ASSUMING TilAT C THE SURRY CONTAll01ENT 18 AT 10 psie AND 100F. C ALL GAS MASSES IN ks moles, NTRON
- NITROGEN, 02 = OXYOEN, H2 = HYDROGEN DATA 02(1), NTRON(1) / 264., 1068. /
C C LET ZX = NTRON, 02, OR H21 C ZX(1) = OA8 MASS BEFOPZ THE BURN AT VB C ZX(2) = OA8 MA88 AFTER BURN AT VB AND BEFORE THE LATE BURN C ZX(3) = OA8 MASS BEFORE THE VERT LATE BURN ! C ' C IN MFa
- m3 / kg mole / Kelvin THE GAS CONSTANT R = 0.0083156 C FOR BURRY. THE CONTAllNENT VOLUME ( V ) = $1,000 CUBIC METER 8; C 80, R / V = 1.630SE-7 MFe / kg mole / Eelvin DATA ROV / 1.6305E 7 /
C C C DOES THE CONTAINMENT FAIL et VBt NAME = ICF81w C WttAT 18 THE PODE OF CONTAINMENT FAILUREf HM1E = ICFFat , C QUESTION 43 IN THE APET l l C AR0(N1) = IFBese = BASE CONTAINMENT PRESSURE AT V.B. (psie) C AR0(N2) = dp1*VB = PRES 5URE RISE AT V.B. (LARGE HOLE) (peig) C AR0(N3) = dp2*VB = PRESSURE RISE AT V.B. (SMALL HOLE) (pais) C AR0fN4) = CF Fr = CONTAINMENT FAILURE PRESSURE (psis) C AR0(NS) = RndNum = RANDCN NWBER BETWEEN 0.0 AND 1.0 C C THE RANDCN NUMBER 18 USED TO DETERMINE THE PODE OF FAILURE C IF( NAME(113) .EQ. 'ICF' ) Ti1EN N1 = IDAR0(1) N2 = IDAR0(2) N3
- IDAR0(3)
N4
- IDAR0(4)
NS = IDAR0($) C A.2.1-6
C OET TOTAL LOAD PRESSURE, CONVERT THE FAILURE PRESSURE 70 pale PL = AR0(N1) + AkO(N2)
- AR0(NS)
PF = AR0(54) + 14.7 M = AR0(NS) C UTUN = $URRYCF ( PL, PF, RN, NAME ) C C THE VALUE OF UM INDICATE 3 THE TYPE OF CONTAINHENT FAILURE C 0 = UFUM = 1 FOR No CONTAINHENT FAILURE C 1 e UFUN < 2 FOR LEAK C 2 e UFUM s 3 FOR RUPTURE C 3
- UFUN e e FOR CATASTROPRIC RUPTURI C
C WLITE (6,1001) NM , FL PF , M , UFUN , C X N1.AR0(N1), M2,AR0(N2), N3.AR0(N3), C X 54,AR0(54), N5,AR0(NS) C 1001 FOMMAT (/,'0 RETURN TkOH UFUN MAME = ' A6 C X 4X,'PL PF M UTUN =', 4F10.3 / C X ' N Ako =', $(13,F9.8) ) C RETURN C C C C DOE 8 THE CONTAINHENT FAIL LATE er VERY LATE? NAME = LCTS1w C MLAT IS THE HDDE OF CONTAllNENT FAILURE? MAME = LCTrot C QUEST 10MB $2 AND 64 IN THE APET C AA0(N1) = p-LHB OR p LENB = PRESSURE DUE TO BURN (pela) C AR0(N2) = CF Pt = CONTAINHENT FAILURE PRESSURE (paig) C AR0(N3) = RndMwe = RANDON NUMBER BETWEEN 0.0 AND 1.0 C ELBE!F( NAME(1:3) .EQ. 'LCF' ) THEN N1 = IDAR0(1) N2 = IDAR0(2) N3 = IDAR0(3) C C CONVERT THE FAILURE PRESSURE T0 pelo PL = AR0(N1) PF = AR0(N2) + 14.7 RN = AR0(N3) C UFUM = BURRYCF ( PL, PF, RN, NAME ) C C C C WRITE (6,1002) N M , FL, PF, RN, UTUN, C X M1,AR0(M1), N2,AR0(N2), N3 AR0(N3) C 1002 FORMAT (/,'ORETURN FROH UFUN NAME = *, A6, C X 4X 'PL PF RN UTUN =', 4F10.3 / C X
- N.ARO =', 3(13,F0.8) )
C RETURN C C C C 8ET CONTAllM NT PRESSURE FOR NO BURN TO 15 PSIA NAME = N05 URN C QUESTIONS $1 AND 63 IN THE APET C AR0(M1) = p LHB OR p L2HB = PRESSURE IN CONTAIMMENT (?sla) C ELSEIF( NAME(a6) .EQ. 'NOBURN' ) THEN N1 = IDAR0(1) AR0(M1) = 15.0 UFUM = 0.0 RETURN C C C C LATE BURN? kESULTING CONTAINHENT PRESSURE? NAME = LBURN C QUESTION $1 IN THE APET C AR0(N1) = ErOx-InV = FRACTION OF Er OKIDIEED IN VESSEL C AR0(N2) = FrH2 Brn = FRACTION OF H2 BURNED AT VB A.2.1 7
C AkO(N3) = HB-ConvR = CONVERSION kAT10 = COMBU$f!ON EFFICIENOT C Ah0(N4) = dp 8cale
- BCALE FACTOR ON PkESSURE. RISE C AR0(NS) = p LEB = PRESSURE AFTER COMBUSTION (1; mari (psia)
C .C 1002 Er OKIDATION AT $URRY PRODUCES 360 kS-moles CF H2 C dp Scolo APPLIES TO LATE BURN 8 WHERE $ PRAYS CAUSE RAPID DE INERTING C C ELSEIF( RAPE (t$) .EQ. 'LBURN' ) THEN N1 = IDAR0(1) M2 = IDAR0(2) N3 = IDAR0(3) M4 = IDAR0(4) MS = IDAkO(S) C C 70 OBTAIN THE APOUNTS OF NYDROGEN AND OKYOEN AFTER VESSEL BRT.ACH AND C DUP.ING THE INITIAL PORTION OF CCI: C AS$1RE TRAT THE 2r TNAT DOESN'T OKID1EE IN VESSEL OXIDIEE8 C RAPIDLY IN THE IW171AL STAot8 0F CCI ( 1.o., BEFORE THE LATE BUkN ). C C H2 AFTER VB = H2 FROM BEFORE VB * ( 1.0 + FRACTION BURNED AT VB ) C + H2 FRCH OX1 DIEING THE REST OF THE Et i C 02 AFTER VB = 02 FROM BEFORE V.B.
- 02 CONSUMED IN COMBUSTION AT VB C 1 molo 0F OKYOEM 18 CONSUMED FOR EVERY 2 moles OF HYDROGEN BURNED C
FREROK = AR4(N1) FRBURN = ARoth2) H2(2) = 360.0
- FREROX * ( 1.0 - FRBURN )
* + 860.0 * ( 1.0 - FREROX )
02(2) = 02(1)
- 360.0
- FREROX
- FRBURN / 2.0 C
C MAKE CERTAIN HYDR 00EN AND OXY 0EN AREN'T LESS THAN EERO C C R2(2) = AMAX1( H2(2), 0.0 ) 02(2) = AMAX1( 02(2), 0.0 ) C NTRON(2)
- NTRON(1)
C C ASSUMING THAT HALF THE OA8 ( moles ) IN THE CONTAIMMENT 18 STEAH, C THE moles OF BTEAM EQUALS THE TOTAL moles OF OTHER OASES IN THE CONTAINHENT C STEAM = H2(2) + NTRON(2) + O2(2) TOTIOL = H2(2) + NTRO. (2) + 02(2) 4 STEAM C C 1F THE ATHDSPHERE 18 NOT FLAPNABLE, THERE 18 MO POINT IN PROCEEDING C C BRNTYP = 0.0 - NO BURN C BRNTYP = 1.0
- DIFFUSION FLAME (CONC
- 41)-
C BRNTYP = 2.0 - DEFLAORATION (CONC
- BI) l C BRNTYP
- 3.0 - DETONATION (CONC
- 143) l C
AR0(NS) = 15.0 UTUN = 0.0 C WRITE (6,1003) NAME, FREROX, FRBURN, R2(2), 02(2), STEAM, C X TOTICL, UFUN, N1, AR0(N1), N2, AR0(N2), N3, AR0(N3), N4, AR0(N4), C X MS, AR0(NS) C 1003 FONMAT (/,*ORETURN FROM UFUM MAME = '. A6,*-l', / C X- 4X,'FRTROX, FRBURN, H2(2), 02(2), STEAM. TOTHOL, UTUN =', C X 7F10.3 / ' N AR0 =',-S(13,F9.3) ) j IF ( BRNTYP ( H2(2), STEAM, 02(2), NTRON(2) ) .LT. 2.0 ) RETURN C C OET THE TEMPERATURE IN CONTAINMENT FRCH THE STEAM TABLE ( ASSUMING C SATURATION ) AND DET THE TOTAL PRESSURE FROM pV = nRT, i.e. p
- n(R/V)?
C TEMP = STMTBL( STEAM ) PBASE = TOTMCE
- ROV
- TEMP C !
C CAN NOT BURN ANY TORE H2 THAN THE MOUNT OF OXYGEN WILL FERMIT l C AFR1SE = ADIABATIC PRESSURE RISE ( MPs ) C FCONT = CONTAINHENT TRESSURE ( MPa ) MUST CONVERT To pain FOR AR0(NS) A.2.1 8 4
C CONY = AMIN 1( AkO(N3), 2.0
- 02(2) / E2(2) )
APRISE = R28 URN ( E2(2), STEAM, 02(2), NTRON(2), CONV, FBA$E ) FCONT = FBASE + AR0(N4)
- APRIEE AR0(NS) = FCONT
- 145.04 C
C USER FUNCTION RETURNS THE AM7JNT ( kg-moles ) 0F N2 BURNED C UFUN = H2(2)
- CONY C
C WRITE (8.1004) NAME, TEMF, FBASE, CONV, APRIEE, PCONT, C X UFUN, B1, AR0(N1) N2, AR0(N2), N3, AR0(N3), N4, AR0(N4), C X R$ AR0(NS) C 1004 FORMAT (/,'0 RETURN FROM UTUN NAME = ', A6,'*2', / C X 4X,'TDir FBASE, CONY, APRISE, FCONT, UFUN =', 6F10.P / C X
- N,ARO **, 5(13,F9.3) )
C RETURN C C C C VEkY LATE BURN? RESULTING CONTAINMENT PRESSURE 7 NAME = L2 BURN C QUESTION 63 IN THE APET C AR0(N1) = HB-ConvR
- CONVERSION RATIO
- COMBUSTION ETFICIENCY C AR0(N2) = dp$ce161
- SCALE FACTOR #1 ON FRESBURE RISE C AR0(N3) = dr$ cole 2 = SCALE FACTOR $2 ON FRESSURE RIEE C AR0(N4) = H2 CCI = H2 FRODUCED BY CCI IN ADDITON TO THAT C FRODUCED BY 1001 Er OXIDATION (kg-molee)
C AkC(N5) = p L2HB = PRESSURE AFTER CCt2VSTION (if any) (pale) C C 1001 E.t OXIDATION AT SURRY FRODUCES 360 kg-moles CF !!2 C dpScale! AFFLIES TO CASES MIERE STRAYS CAUSE RAFID DE*INERTING C dpScale2 AFFLIES TO CAEES WitERE THE STRAYS NEVER COME ON AND THE C DE INERTING IS VERY SLOW. C AS ONLY ONE OF THE SCALE FACTORS IS NON EERO, THEY MAY BE SUttiED. C C ELSEIF( NAME(i6) .EQ. 'L2 BURN' ) TilEN N1 = IDAR0(1) N2 = IDAR0(2) N3 = IDAR0(3) He = IDAR0(4) N5
- IDAR0($)
C C TO OBTAIN Tile #DUNTS OF I!YDROGEN AND OXY 0EN AFTER Tile INITIAL C FORTION OF CCli ( ensuming there was no late burn ) C ADD Tile 112 FRODUCED BY CCI ( OVER AND ABOVE THAT DUE TO OXIDATION OF T!!E C REMAINING Er ) TO THE H2 FRODUCED BEFORE VB Mi!CH DID NOT BURN AT VB AND C Ti!E 112 DUE TO OXIDATION OF THE REMAINING Er C C H2 AFTER VB = H2 FROM BEFORE VB * ( 1.0
- FRACTION BURNED AT VB )
C + H2 FROM OXIDIEING THE REST OF THE Et C
- H2 GENERATED BY CCI ( IN ADDITION TO 1002 Er OXIDATION )
C 02 AFTER VB = 02 FROM BEFORE V.S. - 02 CONSUMED IN COFSUSTION AT VB C 1 molo 0F OXYOEN IS CONSUMED FOR EVERY 2 moles OF HYDROGEN BURNED C H2(3) = 360.0
- FREROX * ( 1.0 - FRBURN )
* + 360.0 * ( 1,0 - FREROX ) + AR0(N4) 02(3) = 02(1) - 360.0
- FREROX
- FRBURN / 2.0 C
C MARE CERTAIN HYDROGEN AND OXYOEN AREN'T LESS THAN EERO H2(3) = AMAX1( H2(3), 0.0 ) 02(3) = AMAX1( 02(3), 0.0 ) C NTRON(3) = NTRON(1) C C ASSUMING TliAT RALF THE CAS ( molea ) IN THE CONTAINHENT IS STEAM, C Tilt moles OF STEAM EQUALS THE TOTAL moles OF OTHER OASES IN THE CONTAINMENT C STEAM = H2(3) + NTRON(3) + O2(3) TOTM L = H2(3) + NTRON(3) + O2(3) + STEAM A.2.1 9
C C IF tnt AftOSPNERt 18 NOT FLAptutLt. THERE !$ NO P01NT IN PhocttDING C AkO(NS)
- 15.0 UTUN
- 0.0 C Mt178 (6,100$) NA>E, FREROK, FRBURN, R2(3), 02(3), BTEAM, C X TOTtOL, UFUN, B1, AR0(pl). N2, AR0(N2), 53 AkO(N3) N4, AR0(N4),
C X N5, AR0(NS) C 100$ PC50%f (/ 'ORETURN TRUM UFUN MAME * ', A6,'*1', / l C X 4X,'FREROK, FRBURN, H2(3), 02(3), BTLAM, TOTMOL, UFUN s'. C X 7F10.3 / ' N.ARO o', $(13,F9.3) ) IF ( BRNTYP ( N2(3) STf.AM, 02(3), NTRON(3) ) .LT. 2.0 ) RETURN C i I C Otf THE TIMPERATURE IN CONTAINMENT FROM THE STEAM TABLE ( AE8UMING C $ATURATION ) AND OET THE TOTAL PRESSURE FROM pV = hkT, i.e. p
- n(R/V)T l C l TEMP
- 81MfDL( $ftAM )
PBAtt
- TOT mL
- ROV
- TEMP C
C CAN NOT BURN ANT ) ORE N2 TRAN THE AM WNT OF OXTOEM WILL PERMIT C AIR 182
- ADIABATIC PRES $URE R181 ( MPa )
C PCONT
- CONTAll#ENT PRES 8URE ( MPa ), MUST CONVERT 70 pois FOR AR0(NS)
C CONY
- AMIN 1( AkO(M1), 2.0
- 02(3) / 112(3) )
APR18E
- N2 BURN ( U2(3), BTEAM, 03(3), NTRON(3), CONV, PBAst )
- PCONT
- PBASE + ( AR0(N2) + AR0(N3) )
- APR15E AR0(NS)
- PCONT
- 145,04 C
C USER FUNCTION RETURN 8 THE AMOUNT ( ks moles ) 0F !!! BURNED i C i UFUN = H2(3)
- CONY C
C WRITE (6,1006) NAMt. ftHP, PBAtt, CONY, APR18t, PCONT, UFUN, C X N1, AR0(N1), N2, AR0(N2), N3, ARG(N3), he, AR0(N4), NS, AkO(NS) C 1006 FORMAT (/,'0 RETURN FROM UFUN NAME * ' A6,'*2', / l C X 4X,' TEMP, PBASE, CONV, APRISE, PCONT, UFUN =', 6F10.3 / C X ' N,ARO s', $(13,F9.8) ) C RETURt1 END1F i C WRITE (6,10) NAME 10 Poltp%f(1X,' USER FUNCTION MAME NOT FOUND
- NAME a' 2X,A6 )
BTOP END
- C i C
C. FUNCTION STHTBL( STEN! ) C DIMENSION P(6), f(6), SPVL(6) e C This subprogram approntmates the temperature (and pressure, if extended)
.C of steam at saturation by interpolating from the Keenan et at steam 1 .C Tables stven the specific volume. It is designed only for temperatures C from $5C to 120C in the Surry Containment ( S1,000 cubic meters ). This C limited range is su(ficient because it is assumed that the atmosphere is C ' $02 steem, and the non steen las can only range from 1172 moles ( no H2 C present and ISO moles of cry 6en burned ) to 1912 moles ( maximum amount C of N2, 560 ka moles, present and no oxygen burned ).
C C C STEAM is THE VAPOR MASS in ks-ocles, SV AND SPVL are in m3/kg C P is in MPs, T is in Dt0REE8 KELVIN C 51000. / 18. = 2833.333, ( 18
- POLtCULAR WE10** OF STEAM )
C DATA P / 0.0$783, 0.07014, 0.06455, 0.1W35, 0.14327. 0.19653 / DATA T/ 358.15, 363.15, 368.15, 373.15, 363.15, 393.1$ / DATA SPVL / 2.828, 2.361, 1.9819, 1.6729, 1.2102, 0.0919 / C C A.2.1*10
SV = 2833.333 / STf.AM ! C Do 10, 2 = 2,6 IF ( SV .07. SPVL(I) > 00 TO 11 10 CONTINUE 11 IM=1-1 C , TDit = f(IM) + ( T(i) - T(IM) ) * ( 8V - SPVL(IM) )/ l X ( SPVL(1) SPVL(IM) ) 1 87tffBL
- TEMP RETURN END C
C C FUNCTION SURRYCF( FL, FF, RN, NAME ) C CitARACTER*6 NAME DtHEN810N P(23), CFP(23), FFD(23), COND(23,3), FR(3), X CB(3), CT(3), CF(3), CL(3), FLTI(3) C C This subprostem calculates containment tetture using the total C cumuistive tellure probability, and the mode et conteitsent f atture C using the interval conditional probabt11 tion for failure mode. C Blow pressure rise means slow with respect to the leak C depressurisetton rate. C C P = PRESSURE ( IN $ pal INCREHENTS ) C CFP = TOTAL CUMULATIVE FAILURE PROBABILITY C FPD = FAILURE PROBABILITY DENSITY C COND = CONDITIONAL FAILURE FROBABILITY FOR EACH IODE, C 1.E., Ti!E PROBABILITY TilAT A FAILURE OCCURRING IN Tilt INTERVAL C P(1 1) 70 P(1) 18 H. 3 H 18 COND(1,M) C Tf!E fitfit FAILURE LODES ARE LEAK, RUPTURE, AND CATASTROPli!C C RUPTURE, IN TIIAT ORD:R IN COND. C C PF = FAILURE PRESSURE C FL = LOAD PRESSURE C RN = RANDCN NUMBER USED TO DETERHINE FAILURE PODE C C FR = FRACTION OF TAILURE8 IN EACil PODE C DP = PRESSURE INCREHENT C NP = MlMBER OF POINTS IN DISTRIBUTIONS C UF = USER FUNCTION VALUE TO BE RETURNED TO EVENT TREE C UF = 0.5 FOR NO CONTAllMENT FAILURE C UF = 1.S FOR LEAK ( 110LE NOMINALLY = 0.1 SQUARE FEET ) C UF = 2,5 FOR RUPTURE ( liOLE N0HINALLY = 7,0 SQUARE FEET ) C UF = 3.5 FOR CATASTROPillC RUPTURE ( 00LE p 7 SQUARE FEET ) C DATA NP / 23 /, DP / S,0 / C C SURRY RESULT 8 FROH AGGRE0ATION DATED 08 DEC 1968 C DATA P/ 70., 75., 40,, 85., 90,, 95., 100 , 105., 1 110,, 115., 120., 125,, 130., 135., 140,, 145 , 2 150., 155., 160., 165., 170., 175., 180 / C DATA CTP / .000, ,002, ,010. 020, .031, .0$9, .095, ,138, 1 .208, 315, ,365, ,446, .530, .613, .743, 863, 2 .963, .986, .992, .997, .998, .999, 1.00 / C DATA FPD / .000, ,002, ,000, ,010, .011, .028, .036, .04., 1 .070, .107, .0$0, .081, ,084, .083, .130, .120, 2 -100, .023, .006 00$, .001, .001, .001 / C DATA COND / 1,00, ,950, .967, .963, .911, .873, .871, .876,
! ,905, .932, .820, .692, .544, 40$, .485, .336, 2 .240, ,214, ,002, .000, .000, .000, .000, 3 .000, .0$0, 033, .037, .089, .127, .129, ,124, 4 .095, ,068, ,180, .296, 432, .562, .444, 466, S .416, .340, .263, .243, .000, 000, .000, 1 1 A.2.1-
6 .000, .000, .000, .000, .000, .000, .000, .000, 7 .000, .000, .000, .013, .024, .033, .071, .198, t .343, .445, .735, .757, 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 / C C i C SET TIIE PARAMETER UF = 0.5, INDICATING NO CONIAINHENT TAILURE UF = 0.5 C IF ft!E LOAD FRESSURE IS LESS THAN THE FAILURE FRESCURE, EXIT IF ( PL .LT. FF ) 00 TO 111 C C FIND PRESSURE INTERVAL CORRESIONDING TO TI:E TAILURE PRESSURE FF C IF0 = INDEX FOR THE ENTRY BELOW PF C FF IS 00ARANTEED TO BE BETWEEN F(1) AND P(NP) SINCE IT WAS CHOSEN C FRCH THE DISTRIBUTION, IFO = INT ( ( FF - P(1) ) / DP ) + 1 IF1 = IFO + 1 C C INTERPOLATE TO GET THE CUtfJLATIVE FAILURE FROBABILITY AND THE C CONDITIONAL FROBABILITIES FOR FAILURE KCE AT FF FRINT = ( FF P(IFO) ) / DP FCFP = CFP(IFO) + FRINT * ( CFF(IF1) - CFP(IFO) ) to 21 H = 1.2 CF(H) = COND(IF0.H) + FRINT
- f COND(IF1,H)
- COND(IF0.H) )
21 FR(H) = CF(H) CF(3) = 1 CF(1)
- CF(2)
FR(3) = CF(3) C C NOTHING KmE BEEDED FOP. THE SLOW PRESSURE RIEE $1NCE ANY FAILUKE C WILL ARREST THE PRESSURE R'8E IF( NAME(4:6) .EQ. 'Elw' ) 00 70 101 C C C DO FAST PRESSURE RISE CASES C C FIND FRESSURE INTERVAL CORRESIONDING TO THE 'OAD FRESSURE FL C DON'T HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT PL BELOW P(1) SINCE THAT WILL BE NO FAILURE C ILO = INDEX FOR THE ENTRY BELOW PL C THE LINE BELOW SHOULD INSURE THAT ILD IS NEVER GREATER THAN NP I C ILO = INT ( ( AMIN 1( FL, P(NP) = 0.1 ) - P(1) ) / DP ) + 1 IL1 = ILO + 1 C C FIND BOTTOH AND TOP PARTIAL INTERVAL FRACTIONS C FRINTB = INTERVAL BETWEEN FF AND P(Irl) FRINTB = 1. - FRINT C FRINTT ** INTERVAL BETWEEN P(ILO) AND PL FRINTT * ( AHIN1( FL, F(NF) ) - P(ILO) ) / DP C Do 10 H = 1,2 C C FIND CONDITIONAL FROBABILITIES, CB(H), FOR THE HIDIVINT OF THE C BOTT m FARTIAL INTERVAL C ALREADY HAVE CONDITIONAL FROBABILITIES FOR P = PF IN ARRAY CF(H) CB(H) = 0.5 * ( CF(H) + COND(IF1,H) ) C C FIND CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES, CT(H), FOR THE HIDPOINT OF THE C TOP PARTIAL INTERVAL C PUT THE CONDITIONAL FROBABILITIES FOR P = FL IN ARRAY CL(H) CL(H) = COND(ILO,H) + FRINTT * ( COND(ILI.H) - COND(ILO.H) ) CT(H) = 0.5 * ( CL(H) + COND(ILO.H) ) C 10 CONTINUE CB(3) = 1.0 - CB(1) - CB(2) CL(3) = 1.0 - CL(1) - CL(2) CT(3) = 1.0 - CT(1) - CT(2) C C HOW WORK UP FRCH FF TO PL -- ADDING UP THE FRACTICN OF THE LEAK C TRANSFERRED TO RUPTURE AND CATASTROPHIC RUFTURE IN EACH INTERVAL C FLTI(H) = FRACTION OF LEAK TRANSFERRED TO KCE H IN THE INTERVAL A.2.1-12
C Do 32 1 = IF1, IL1 Do 30 M = 2,3 C C IF BOTE FF AND PL AM IN THE EAME INTERVAL IF ( IF1 .EQ. IL1 ) THEN FLTI(M) = ( FRINTT
- FRINT )
- 0.S * ( CF(M) + CL(M) )
X
- FPD(1) / ( 1.0
- FCFP )
00 70 28 END IF C IF ( 1 .EO. IF1 ) THEN C BOTTOM FAkTIAL INTERVAL FLTI(M)
- FRINTB
- CB(H)
- FFD(1) / ( 1.
- FCFP )
C ELSE IF ( I .EQ. IL1 ) THEN C TOP FARTIAL INTERVAL FLTI(M)
- FR!NTT
- CT(M)
- FPD(1) / ( 1.000001 - CFP(1 1) )
C ELSt C WOLE INTERVAL FLTI(M) = ( COND(1,M) + COND(! 1.M) )
- 0. 5 K
- FPD(I) / ( 1.000001
- CFP(1-1) )
END 1F
-C 28 FR(M) = FR(M)
- FR(1)
- FLTI(M) 30 CONTINUE FR(1) = 1.0 - FR(2) - FR(3)
C 32 C0H11NUE C C 101 CONTINUE C C SET UF = 1.5 FOR LEAK UF = 1.S C IF RN IF OREATER THAN FR(1),tODE IS RUPTURE IF( RN .0T. FR(1) ) UF = 2.5 C IF RN IF GREATER THAN FR(1) + FR(2), M E 18 CATASTROPd!C RUPTURE IF( RN .07. FR(1) + FR(2) ) UF = 3.S C C 111 SURRYCF = UF RETURN C END C C C FUNCTION BRNTYP( I:2, STEAM, 02, NTRGN ) REAL NTRGN C C BRNTYP
- 0.0 + NO BURN C BRNTYP = 1.0 - DIFFUSION / SLOW BURN - LIMIT = 41 C BANTYP = 2.0 - DEFLAGRATION *- LIMIT = 62 C BRWTYP = 3.0 - DETONATION -- LIMIT
- 141 C
TOTIOL = K2 + STEAM + O2 + NTRON FRSTEAM = STEAM / TOTS L FR02 = O2 / TOTtOL FRH2 = H2 / TOTIOL BRNTYF = 0,0 C C IF LESS THAN $7. OKYCL.1, BURN NOT IOSSIBLE IF( FR02 .LT. 0.0S ) THEN C WRITr(6,1007) BRNTYP, TOTIOL, FRSTEAM, FR02, FRH2 RETURN ENDIF C C IF OVER SSt STEAM - BURN NOT IOSSIBLE IF( FRSTEAM .07. 0.S$ ) THEN A.2.1-13
C 'd!TE(6,1007) BRNTYP, ToftoL, FRSTEAM, FR02, FRH2 RETURN ENk !F C C BUR 1 P041BLE IF TER 18 EN0008 EYDR00EN In ( Et .GE. 0.14 ) TEN
.7 iTYP = 3.0 E11 IF( FRH2 .0E. 0.08 ) TEN BRNTYP = 2.0 ELSEIF( FRH2 .GE. 0.04 ) THEN BRNTYP = 1.0 ENDIF C WRITE (6,1007) BRNTYP, TOTtOL, FRSTEAM, FR02 FRH2 C 1007 FORMAT (/,'0 LEAVING BkNTYF ',3X, 'BRNn P, TOTTOL, FRSTEAM, FR02, FR C KH2 =', S(3X,FD.8))
RETURN END C C C FUNCTION H2 BURN ( H2, STEAM, 02, NTRON, CONV, PBASE ) kEAL NTRON, NTRONP I C C THIS FUNCTION CALCULATE 8 THE PRESSURE R18E DUE TO C THE ADIABA!!C COMBUSTION OF H2 IN AN AIR /8 TEAM HIXTURE AT C CONSTANT VOLUME. IT 18 ASSUMED THAT ALL COMPONENTS ARE IDEAL GASE8. C C H2BRND 18 THE AHOUNT OF H2 (kB-moles) THAT BURNS. C H2BRND = H2
- CONV C
C TI = INITIAL CAS TEMPERATURE (C) C TREF = THE REFERENCE TEMPERATURE (C) CORRESPONDS TO THE TEMPERATURE C AT WHICH THE HEATS OF FORMATION ARE EVALUATED. C TI = 32.2 TREF = 25.0 C C INTERNAL ENER0Y OF REACTANT 8 C UR = UENER0( TI, TREF H2, STEAM, 02, NTRON ) C C HEAT OF REACTION C UREACT = *2.40EES
- H2BRND C
C H]LES OF PRODUCT C H2P = H2 - H2BRND STEAMP = STEAM + H2BRND 02P = 02 - 12BRND / 2. NTRONP = NTRON C C TPLOW AND TPHI DELINEATE TO THE RANGE THAT THE f!NAL OAS TEMPERATURE . C 18 EXPECTED TO FALL WITHIN, ! C TPLOWaTI TPHI*2000. C C THE GAS TDOTRATURE OF THE PRODUCTS IS DETERMINED BY SOLVING THE ENERGY - C EQUATION FOR A CONSTANT VOLUME ADIABATIC COMBUSTION. BECAUSE THE C INTERNAL ENERGY OF THE PRODUCTS 18 CA1IULATED FROH HEAT CAPACITY DATA C WHICH 18 IN THE FORM OF A FOURTH CRDER POLYNOMIAL, THE TDtPERATURE OF I C THE PRODUCTE 18 CALULATED USING A TRIAL AND ERROR HETHOD (BI SECTION C HETHOD). C C INTERNAL ENERGY OF PRODUCTS (BASED ON TPIDW) C UPLOW = UINER0(TFLOW, TREF H2P,STEAMP,02P.NTRONP) C C ENERGY BALANCE (IF TFLOW 18 CORRICT, DULCW WILL = 0.0) A.2.1-14
C DUWW = UPLOW + UREACT
- UR C
C TNTERNAL ENEROY OF PRODUCTS (BASED ON TPHI) C UPHI = UENERG(TPHl. TREF,H2P.ETEAMP,02P.NTRGNF) C C ENEROT BALANCE (IF TPHI IS COFJECT, DUHI WILL
- 0.0)
C DUH!
- UPit! + LTdACT
- UR C
C 1%KE SURE PRODUCT TEMPERATURE IS IN Tl!E ASSUMED TEMPERATURE C RANGE (i.e., ONE DELTA U 18 NEGATIVE AND ONE IS POSIT!YE) C S IF( DUH1
- DULOW .07. 0.0 ) THEN C
C IF BOTH DELTA U'8 ARE OF THE SAME SIGH, INCREASE TPill. HOWINER, C IF THE APOUNT OF H218 700 GREAT (ADIABATIC BURN TDtPERATURES C OREATER TilAN 3000 C), THEN EET PRESSURE RIBE TO 10. C IF( Trit! .07. 3000 ) THEN It2 BURN = 10.0 RETURN ENDIF TPHI a TPHI
- 1.5
{ UPHI
- UENER0(TPH1. TREF.H2P.8TEAMP,02P.NTRONP)
Dull! = UPHI + UREACT - UR 00 TO S ENDIF C C FELECT MIDPOINT IN TINPERATURE RAN05 C 10 TPMED = ( TPHI + TFLOW ) / 2, .- C l C INTERhAL ENER0Y OF PRODUC18 (IMSFD ON MIDICINT TEMP.) C UINED = UENER0(TINED, TREF,H2P STEAMP.02P.NTRONP) I - C ENEROY BALANCE C DUMED = UINED + UREACT
- UR C
C DETERMINE Wil!Cil SIDE OF MIDPOINT THE SOLUTION LIES C IF( DULOW
- DUMED .07. 0.0 ) TilEN TPLOW = TINED DUL W = DUMED ELSE TPHI = TINED Z DUHI
- DUMED ENDIF C
C SUCCESS CRITERION 18 1 C. C IF( ABS ( TFLW
- TPHI ) .0T, 1.0 ) 00 TO 10 TF = ( TPLOW + TFH1 ) / 2.
C C PRESSURE EISE RATIO (Pf/P1) BASE ON IDEAL OAS LAW C PRATIO = ( H2P + STEAMP + O2P + NTRONP ) / ( H2 + STEAM + O2 X + NTRON ) * ( TF + 273.15 ) / ( T1 + 273.15 ) H2 BURN = PRATIO
- FBASE - PBASE RETURN END C
C C FUNCTION UENERO ( TI, TREF, H2, STEAM 02, NTRON ) REAL NTRON C C THIS PUNCT10N CALCULATES THE CHANGE IN INTERNAL ENEROY ASSOCIATED A.2.1 15
I' 1 i 1 C WITN A CSMISE 15 TEMPOATUkt (FR(M TREF 70 TI) FOR TR OABES R2 STEAM,
- . C 02, AND nth 0N. THE INTERNAL ENER0Y 18 IN JOULES.
> C C INTERNAL ENER0Y OF NYDR00EN C l UR3= ( 20. 53 * (!!
- TRET )+ 3. 62 SE S * (T! * *2* TREF *
- 2 ) + 1. 096E
- 6* (
+ T!**3* TREF **3)*2.17$E*10*(fl**4*TREFe*4))
C C INTERNAL ENER0Y OF 87EAM C U87F.4PW ( 2 $ .1 $* ( f!
- TREF )+ 3 . 4 4E* 3 * (T! * *2
- TREF *
- 2 )* 2. $3 SE* 6* (
+ ? !** 3
- TREF *
- 3 ) * $ . 983E* 10* (f !*
- 4
- TREF *
- 4 ) )
L C i C INTERNAL EN20Y OF OXYOEM C .' + UO2=( 20. 7 9* (f1
- TREF )+ S . 7 9E* 3 * (f ! *
- 2* TREF *
- 2 )
- 2. 02 $E
- 6* (
f!**P TREF **3)+3.27tE 10*(71**4* TREF **4)) C C INTERNAL ENER0Y OF NITROGEN ! C UN2=(20.69*(f!* TREF)+1.1E.D(T1**2* TREF **2)+1.906E*6*(
+ f!**3* TREF **3)*7.178E*10*(T!**4* TREF **4))
UENERO = UH2
- H2 + USTEAM
- STEAM + UO2
- 02 + UN2
- NTRON RETURN END I-
[ A.2.1-16
A.3 ADDITIONAL INFORKATION CONCERNING THE ACCIDENT PROGRESSION ANALYSIS A.3.1 Basic Information About the Plant Type of Reactor Pressurized Water Reactor Manufacturer Westinghouse Date of Commercial Operation 1972 Reactor Core Nominal Power 2441 MWt 8331 E6 Btu /h Number of fuel assemblies 157 Fuel rods per assembly 204 Number of fuel rods 32,028 Core weight, total 102,600 kg 226,200 lb Uranium dioxide 79,650 kg 175,600 lb Zircaloy 16,500 kg 36,300 lb Miscellaneous 6,500 kg 14,300 lb Reactor Vessel Inside diameter 4.0 m 157 in. Overall height 12.3 m 40.4 ft Thickness at beltline 0.20 m (excl. clad) 0.20 m 7.9 in. Head thickness (excl. clad) 0.127 m 5.0 in. Water capacity with core and internals in place 105 m3 3720 ft* Reactor Coolant System Volume (nominal, including PZR) 290 m3 10.000 ft8 Water in system (nominal) 192,000 kg 423,200 lb Operating temperature (nominal) 300'C 572*F Operating pressure (nominal) 15.5 MPa 2250 psia PORV setpoint (nominal) 17.2 MPa 2500 psia Number of reactor coolant pumps 3 Number of steam generators 3 Containment Inside diameter 38.4 m 126 ft Maximum inside height 56.4 m 185 ft Free volume 51,000 m3 1,800,000 ft3 Design leak rate 0.10%/ day Design pressure 410 kPa 45 psig Operating pressure 69 kPa 10 psia Operating temperature 37.8'C 100*F Construction Reinforced concrete Wall thickness 1.4 m 4.5 ft Dome thickness 0.76 m 2.5 ft Basemat thickness 3.0 m 10.0 ft Floor thickness above liner (outside cavity only) 0.61 m 2.0 ft A.3.1 1
Pressure boundary Welded steel liner Liner thickness, walls 0.95 cm 0.375 in. Liner thickness, dome 1.27 cm 0.500 in. Liner thickness, floor outside cavity 0.64 cm 0.250 in. Liner thickness, cavity floor 1.90 cm 0.750 in. Atmosphere (at operating pressure and temperature) Nitrogen 1068 kg moles 2355 lb moles Oxygen 284 kg moles 626 lb moles j Reactor Cavity Annular Cavity 3.4 m radius 11 ft radius In Core Instrument Room 3.0 x 7.3 a 10 x 24 ft Floor area (cavity & ICIR) 57.6 m2 620 ft: Water capacity (cavity & ICIR) 350 m3 12,400 ft3 Refueling water storage tank 1325 m3 350,000 gal Recirculation spray pumps Number 4 Design flow (each) 220 L/s 3500 gpm Design head 0.69 MPa 230 ft (100 ; psia) Recirculation spray heat exchangers Number . 4 Design capacity (each) 16.3 MW $5.5 E6' Btu /h Accumulators Number 3 Pressure 4.6 MPa 660 psig -; Water capacity (total) 81 m3 2850 ft3 i Sources of Information: Surry FSAR BMI 2104 EPRI NP 4096 , I A.3.1 2
{ 1 l A 3.2 Initialization Ouestions The first 13 questions of the Surry APET determine the initial conditions for the accident progression analysis; that is, the state of the plant at the time that core degradation starts. This time has been taken to be the UTAF, although it is realized that actual core damage will not start until a short time af ter UTAF. The first thirteen questions distinguish bet-ween the different PDS groups. The branch probabilities and parameter values are the same for the remaining 58 questions in the APET, but the branch probabilities for the first 13 questions depend on the PDS group to be analyzed. This section concerns how the branch probabilities are determined for '.:hese first 13 questions. This group of APET questions is of ten referrec' to as the " tree top." The branch probabilities for most of the first 13 questions in the APET follow directly from the definition of the PDS. For example, in the Transient PDS group, both PDSs have "T" for the first characteristic, indicating that the RCS is intact. This implies that Branch 6, B PORV, should have a probability of 1.0 in the first question. Selection of this branch for Question 1 indicates that the RCS is intact and the water loss is through the cycling PORV. Ideally, the PDS groups would contain so few PDSs. and the case structure of the initialization questions would be so detailed that all the probabi-lity would be associated with only one branch of each initialization question. This was not practical; to obtain a reasonable number of PDS groups, it was sometimes necessary to group together several different PDSs with the result that not all the probability could be assigned to only one branch for all the questions for some PDS groups. And making the case structure detailed enough to consider every combination of PDSs was not I feasible either. Therefore, fractional branch probabilites are required l for most PDS groups. Determining the fractions to be assigned to each branch of the questions for which fractional branch probabilites are required is the subject of this appendix. The information required comes from manipulating the results of the accident frequency analysis. The fractional branch probabilities are determined by taking the ratio of the frequency of one or more PDSs to the frequency of a group of PDSs. These ratios are defined below for each PDS group. The frequency of each PDS varies from one observation to the next in the sample, so each fractional branch probability varies with the observation as well. That is, the file prepared by TEMAC for the APET evaluation for internal initiators contains 20 pieces of information for each observation: the frequency for each of the seven PDS groups, and the values of the thirteen fractional branch probabilities defined below. Sections A.3.2.1, A.3.2.2, and A.3.2.3 contain discussion of, and expressions for, the fractional branch probabilities for the internal, fire, and seismic initiators, respect vely. i Section A.3.2.4 contains a listing of the first 13 questions for each PDS group. A.3.2.1 APET Initialization for Internally-Initiated Accidents. A PDS is by definition, all the cut sets that are indistinguishable for the A.3.2 1
accident - progression analysis. So, each PDS has all the probability { assigned to only one branet for each initialization question. Thus, there are no fractional . branch probabilities for PDS groups which have only a ! single PDS. The seven PDS groups for internal initiators are: 1 Slow Blackout, 2 LOCAs, 3 Fast Blackout, 4 Event V, 5 Transients, , 6 ATWS, and 7 SGTRs. Groups 3 and 4 are single PDS groups (see Table 2.2-2) and require no fractional branch probabilities in the initialization questions. The other five PDS groups for internal initiators require fractional branch probabil- , ities for at least one question, and will be discussed in turn. Note that most of the cases where fractional branch probabilities are required involve . only two branches. When only two branches are involved, only one fraction need be calculated as the other is the complement of the first. ! The following abbreviations are used: FP(Br.n) - the fractional probability of branch n, j
~
f(PDSn) - the frequency of PDSn, and Ef(PDSm + PDSn) - the sum of the frequencies of PDSm and PDSn. PDS Group'1--Slow Blackout PDS Group 1 consists of six alow blackout PDSs. Two of these PDSs have the RCS intact at UTAF, two hcve S3 breaks, and two have Sa breaks. Therefore, Question.1,_which determines the condition ofLthe RCS at the start of the accident progression analysis, must have i actional branch probabilities, j Fractional Branch Probabilities'for PDS Group 1 - Slow Blackout
-Questica 1 - RCS State at UTAF :
Brk S2. FP(Br.2) -Ef( S 2RRR RCR + 2S RRR-RDR ) / Ef( all ) Brk-S3 FP(Br.3). - Ef( S RRR 3 RDR + S3 RP.R-RCR ) / Ef( all )
=B PORV FP(Br.6) - Ef(.TRRR-RDY + TRRR-RDR ) / Ef( all )
- Drk S2 is a mnemonic abbreviation for Branch'2 of Question'1, etc., and Ef( all )-is the sum of the frequencies of all the PDSs in the group. The difference between the two "S 2" and the two "Sa" PDSs in PDS Group 1 is whether the secondary system is depressurized while the AFW is operating before. the core uncovers. This requires fractional branch probabilities for Cases 2 and 3 of Question 11. Fractional Branch Probabilities for PDS Croup 1 - Slow Blackout
. Question 11 - Seconda:y System Depressurization Caso 2 - S3 Breaks A.3.2-2
SecDePr FP(Br.1) - f( S RRR 3 RDR ) / If( S RRR 3 RDR + S RRR 3 RCR ) noScDePr FP(Br.2) - f( S RRR 3 RCR ) / If( baRRR RDR + S RRR 3 RCR ) Fractional Branch Probabilities for PDS Group 1 Slow Blackout Question 11 Secondary System Depressurization Case 3 - S3 Breaks SecDePr FP(Br.1) - f( S RRR 3 RDR ) / Ef( S RRR 2 RCR 4 S RRR 2 RDR ) noScDePr FP(Br.2) - f( S RRR 2 RCR ) / If( S RRR 2 RCR + S RRR-RDR 2 ) The difference between the two "T" PDSs in Group 1 is whether there is cooling for the RCP seals. This requires fractional branch probabilities for Case 1 of, Question 12. Fractional Branch Probabilities for PDS Group 1 Slow Blackout Question 12 RCP Seal Cooling Case 1 RCS Intact and AFWS Operated before UTAF B PSC FP(Br.1) - f( TRRR-RDY ) / Ef( TRRR RDR 4 TRRR-RDY ) BaPSC FP(Br.2) - f( TRRR RDR ) / Ef( TRRR RDR + TRRR RDY ) PDS Group 2- LOCAs PDS Group 2 consists of seven LOCA PDSs. Four of the PDSs have an A size break,- and two of the PDSs have an St -size break, which is considered to be the same thing-in this portion of the analysis. There is one PDS with an S2 size break and one PDS with an S 3 size break. Therefore, Question 1 must have fractional branch probabilities. Fractional Branch Probabilities for PDS Group 2 - LOCAs Question 1 - RCS State at UTAF Brk-A' FP(Br.1) '- If( S 1W-YYN i + S LYY-YYN i + AIYY-YYN + ALYY-YYY
+ St NYY-WN + ANYY-WN ) / If( all )
Brk S2 FP(Br.2) - f( S2 LYY WN ) / Ef( all ) Brk S3 FP(Br.3) - f( S LYY YYN .) / Ef( all ) 3 Four of the PDSs in this group have the LPIS operating at the ' onset of core damage as discussed in subsection 2.2.2.1. The "S" 2 and the "S 3 " PDS are treated by the case structure, but fractional branch probabilities are required to separate out the "S" t and the "A" PDSs which have the ' LPIS operating at UTAF. Fractional Branch Probabilities for PDS Group 2 - LOCAs Question 4 Status of ECCS Case 1 Large Break BfECCS FP(Br.3) - If( S IYY-YYNt + AIYY YYN + S NYY YYN + ANYY YYN ) t
/ Ef( S IW t YYN + S LYY WN + AIYY-YYN +
i ALYY-YYY + S 3NYY-YYN + ANYY-YYN ) B-LPIS FP(Br.4) - Ef( S LYY-YYN1 + ALYY-YYY )
/ If( SgIYY-YYN + S LYY-YYN t + AIYY-YYN +
A YY-YYY + S NYY-YYN 3 + ANYY-YYN ) i A.3.2-3
PDS Group 5--Transients Internal PDS Group 5 consists of two PDSs that have failure of both AFW and Bleed and Feed. In PDS TBYY YNY, both LPIS and llPIS are available, but the FORVs cannot be opened. In PDS TLYY YNY, only LPIS is available. All APW has failed and Bleed and Feed is not successful because the HPIS has failed. Fractional branch probabilities are required in Question 4 Fractional Branch Probabilities for PDS Group 5 - Transients Question 4 - Status of ECCS Case 4 - No Break in the RCS B ECCS FP(Br.1) - f( TBW-YNY ) / Ef( all ) B LPIS FP(Br.4) - f( TLYY-YNY ) / Ef( all ) PDS Group 6--ATWS Group 6 contains the three ATWS PDSs. There are many differences between these three PDSs, but most of them are treated in the case structure of the initialization questions. Only the differences in the RCS state at the onset of core damage need be treated by fractional bearch probabilities. Fractional Branch Probabilities for PDS Group 6 - ATWS Question 1 RCS State at UTAF Brk-S3 FP(Br.3) - f( S 3NW YXN ) / Ef( all ) B-SGTR FP(Br.5) - f( GLYY YXY ) / If( all ) B-PORV FP(Br 6) - f( TLYY-YXY ) / Ef( all ) PDS Group 7--SGTRs PDS Group 7 consists of four PDSs that are initiated by SGTRs and which do not have scram failures. PDSs llINY-NXY and HINY-YXY have stuck-open SRVs in the secondary system while PDSs GLW YXY and GLW-YNY do not. This requires fractional branch probabilities for Question 3. Fractional Branch Probabilities for PDS Grovo 7 - SGTRs Question 3 - Secondary SRVs Stuck Open SSRV St0 FP(Br.1) - Ef( llINY-NXY + llINY-YXY ) / Ef( all ) SSRVnSt0 FP(Br.2) - Ef( GLYY-YXY + GLYY-YNY ) / If( all ) HINY-YXY has the RCS PORVs are stuck open in addition to the secondary SRVs, but in HINY NXY the RCS PORVs are closed. GIYY-YNY has the RCS PORVs open since the operators are attempting to keep the core cooled by feed and bleed, but in GNW YXY they are closed. Thus, fractional branch probabil-ities are required for Question 5. Fractional Branch Probabilities for PDS Group 7 - SGTRs Question 5 - Operator Depressurization Case 2 - SGTRs with the Secondary SRVs Stuck Open Op-DePr .FP(Br.1) - f( llINY YXY ) / If( HINY-NXY + HINY-YXY ) OpnDePr FP(Br.3) - f( HINY-NXY ) / Ef( HINY-NXY + HINY-YXY ) A 3.2-4
Fractional Branch Probabilities for PDS Group 7 SGTRs Question 5 - Operator Depressurization Case 3 - SGTRs with the Secondary SRVs Reclosing i Op DePr FP(Br.1) - f( GLYY YNY ) / Ef( GLYY YXY + GLYY-YNY ) OpnDePr FP(Br.3) - f( GLYY YXY ) / Ef( GLYY-YXY + GLYY-YNY ) IIINY NXY has no possibility of the water from the RWST being injected into the containment; the HPIS pumps the water through the broken tube and out of the containment through the main steam line. In the other three PDSs, the sprays operate while there is still water in the RWST or in the sump, so the cavity is full when the top of active fuel uncovers, or shortly thereafter. This is treated by- the case structure for Question 6, Sprays, but fractional branch probabilities are required for Question 9. The fractions are the same as for Question 5, Case 2. Fractional Branch Probabilities for PDS Group 7 - SGTRs Question 9 - RWST Injected into Containment Case 3 - SCTRs with the Secondary SRVs Stuck Open RWST In FP(Br.1) - f( llINY-YXY ) / Ef( HINY NXY + HINY-YXY ) RWSTfIn FP(Br.3) - f( llINY-NXY ) / Ef( llINY NXY + llINY-YFY ) AFWS is operating for GLYY-YXY, but not for GLYY-YNY, so fractional branch probabilities are required for Question 10. The fraction for Branch I for ' Case 3 is the same as the fraction for Branch 3 for Question 5, Case 3. Fractional Branch Probabilities for PDS Group 7 - SGTRs Question 10 - Heat Removal from the Steam Generators case 3 - SGTRs with the Secondary SRVs Reclosing SG ilR FP(Br.1) - f(.GLYY YXY ) / Ef( GLYY-YXY + GLYY-YNY ) SGfilR. FP(Br.3).- f( GLYY-YNY ) / Ef( GLYY YXY + CLYY-YNY ) A 3.2.2 APET Initialization for Fire-Initiated Accidents. The Fire PDS group is composed of four PDSs: Emergency Switchgear Room S3NNN NDN Auxiliary Building S3NYY-YYN Cable Vault and Tunnel S3NNY-NYN Control Room S2NNY NXY As three c f these PDSs have S3 breaks, and one has and S2 breaks, Question 1, which determines the condition of the RCS at the start of the accident progression analysis, must have fractional branch probabilities. i Fractional Branch Probabilities for PDS Group Fire
-Question 1 - RCS State at UTAF Brk-S2 FP(Br.2) - f( S 2NNY-YYN ) / Ef( all )
Brk-S3 FP(Br.3) - Ef( SaNNN-NDN + S3 NYY-YYN +3 S NNY-NYN ) / Ef( all ) i A.3.2-5
The operators are permitted by the emergency procedures at Surry to depres-surize the reactor af ter core degradation is underway only if electric
-power is available. This requires fractional branch probabilities for Question 5.
Fractional Branch Probabilities for PDS Group Fire
. Question 5 - Operator Depressurization case 1 Sa Breaks Op DePr FP(Br.1) - Ef( S NW-YW 3 + S NNY3 NYN ) / Ef( S NNN-NDN3
+ S 3NYY-YYN + S NNY-_NYN 3 )
OpnDePr FP(Br.3) - f( S NNN 3 NDN ) / Ef( S NNN 3 NDN
+ S 3NYY-YYN + S 3NNY-NYN )
One of the three S PDSs3 has containment sprays operating while the other two do not, so fractional branch probabilities are required for Question 6. Fractional Branch Probabilities for PDS Group Fire Question 6 Containment Sprays Case 2 - Sa Breaks B Sp FP(Br.1) - f( S NYY3 YYN ) / Ef( SaNNN-NDN
+ S 3NYY-YYN + S 3NNY-NYN )
-BfSp FP(Br.3) - Ef( S NNN-NDN 3 + S NNY 3 NYN ) / Ef( S NNN-NDN3
+ S 3NW YYN + S NNY-NYN 3 )
As it is the containment sprays which inject the water from the RWST into the containment, the fractional branch probabilities for Question 9 are identical to those for Question 6. Fractional Branch Probabilities for PDS Group Fire
- Question 9 - RWST. Injected into Containment -
Case 2 - S3 Breaks RWST-In FP(Br.1) - f( S NYY 3 WN ) / Ef( S NNN-NDN 3
+ S 3NYY YYN + S 3NNY NYN )
'RWSTfIn FP(Br.3) - Ef( S NNN-NDN3 + S NNY-NYN 3 ) / Ef( S NNN-NDN 3
+ SaNW-YYN + S3 NNY NW )
AFWS is operating for two of the S 3 PDSs, but not in the third, so fractional branch probabilities are required- for Question 10. The fractions are the same for Question 5. Fractional Branch Probabilities for PDS Group Fire Question 10 Heat Removal from the Steam Generators Case 2 - S3 Breaks SG HR - FP(Br.1) - f( S NYY-YYN 3 + S NNY-NYN 3 ) / Ef( S NNN-NDN 3
+ S 3NW YYN + S NNY-NYN 3 )
SGfRR FP(Br.3) - f( S NNN 3 NDN ) / Ef( S NNN 3 NDN
+ S 3NYY-YYN + S 3NNY-NYN )
A.3.2.3 APET Initialization for Seismicallv-Initiated Accidents. There are three seismic PDS groups: A.3.2-6
EQ 1 LOSP (No SBO) FA 2 SB0 EQ 3 1hCAs. Both groups EQ 1 and EQ 2 are initiated by LOSP, but in EQ 1 the station diesel generators start and run successfully and in EQ 2 they do not. PDS Croup EQ 1 LOSP (No SBO) The setsmic LOSP PDS group consists of five PDSs. Four of these PDSs bave the RCE intact at UTAF and one has an S3 break. Therefore, Question 1, which determines the state of the RCS at UTAF, must have fractional branch probabilitica. Fractional Branch Probabilities for PDS Group EQ 1 LOSP Question 1 - RCS State at UTAF Brk S3 FP(Br.3) - Ef( S 3NNY-NYN) / Ef( all ) B PORV FP(Br.6) - If( TNNY NNY + TLNP NNY + TBYP YNY + TLYP YNY ) / If( all ) Of the four RCS intact or "T PDSs, one has both HPIS and LPIS operating at UTAF, two PDSs have LPIS operating, and one PDS has both ECCS failed. This is resolved in the_ initialization questions by specifying fractional branch probabilities for Question 4. Fractional Branch Probabilities for PDS Group EQ 1 - 1DSP Question 4 - Status of ECCS Case 4 No Break in the RCS B ECCS FP(Br.1) - f( TBYP YNY ) / Ef( TNNY-NNY + TLNP NNY + TBYP YNY + TLYP YNY ) BfECCS FP(Br.3) - If( TLYP-YNY + TLNP-NNY ) / Ef( TNNY-NNY + TLNP-NNY + TBYP YNY + TLYP-YNY ) B LPIS FP(Br.4) - f( TNNY NNY ) / Ef( TNNY-NNY + TLNP-NNY + TBYP-YNY + TLYP-YNY ) Electrical power is available for all - four "T" PDSs in - the LOSP seismic group, but in TBYP YNY, the PORVs are failed. Thus the emergency-procedures permit the operators to depressurize the RCS after the onset of core degradation for all four "T" PDSs, but it may be accomplished for only three of them. Thus, fractional branch probabilities are required for Question 5. Fractional Branch Probabilities for PDS Group EQ 1 LOSP Question 5-- Operator Depressurization Case 3 - RCS Intact Op DJr FP(Br.1) - Ef( TNNY-NNY + TLNP NNY + TLYP YNY ) / Ef( TNNY-NNY + TLNP NNY + TBYP-YNY + TLYP-YNY ) OpnDePr FP(Br.3) - f( TBYP-YNY ) / Ef( TNNY-NNY + TLNP NNY + TBYP-YNY + TLYP '7:n ) A.3.2-7
Two of the four "T" PDSs in the lhSP seis,mic group have sprays operable and two do not. Therefore, fractional branch probabilities are required for Question 6. Fractional Branch Probabilities for PDS Group EQ 1 LOSP Question 6 Containment Sprays Case 4 - RCS Intact B Sp FP(Br.1) - Ef( TBYP-YNY + TLYP YNY ) / Ef( TNNY NNY + - TLNP NNY + TBYP-YNY + TLYP YNY ) BfSp FP(Br.3) - Ef( TNNY NNY + TLNP NNY ) / Ef( TNNY NNY + TLNP NNY + TBYP-YNY + TLYP-YNY ) Since the containment sprays inj ect the water from the RWST into the containment, the fractional branch probabilities for Question 9 are identical to those for Question 6 Fractional Branch Probabilities for PDS Group EQ 1 IDSP Question 9 RWST Injected into Containment Case 4 RCS Intact RUST-In. FP(Br.1) - f( Ef( TBYP YNY + TLYP-YNY ) / Ef( TNNY-NNY + TLNP.NNY + TBYP YNY + TLYP YNY ) RWSTfIn FP(Br.3) - Ef( TNNY NNY + TLNP NNY ) /-Ef( TNNY-NNY + TLNP NNY + TBYP-YNY + TLYP-YNY )- i PDS Group EQ 2--SB0 The seismic SB0 PDS group consists of eight PDSs. Three of these PDSs have the RCS intact at UTAF, two_ have large breaks, ~ one has a small (S 2), break, and two have very small (S )3 breaks. Therefore, Question 1, which deter-mines the state of the RCS at.UTAF, has fractional brar.ch probabilities. Fractional' Branch Probabilities for PDS Group EQ 2 - SB0
-Question 1 RCS. State at UTAF Brk~AL.
FP(Br.1) - If( ARRN-RDR + ANNN-NNN ) / Ef( all ) Brk S2 FP(Br.2) - f( S RRN-RDR 2 ) / Ef( all ) . Brk-S3 FP(Br.3) - E( S RRN-RDR 3 +S 3 NNN-NDN ) / Ef(- all ) B-PORV FP(Br 6) - Ef( TRRN-RNR v TRRN RDR + TNNN-NDN ) / Ef( all ) In two of,the RCS-intact or "T" PDSs, the AFWS operated until the batteries
. depleted. This is treated by defining fractional branch probabilities for -Question 10.
Fractional Branch Probabilities for PDS Group EQ 2 - SB0 Question 10 lleat Removal from the Steam Generators Case 4 kCS Intact SGfilR FP(Br.3) - f( TRRN-RNR ) / Ef( TRRN RNR + TRRN RDR + TNNN-NDN ) SGdllR FP(Br.4) - Ef( TRRN-RDR + TNNN-NDN ) / Ef( TRRN-RNR + i TRRN-RDR + TNNN-NDN ) A.3.2-8
PDS Group EQ 3 - LOCAs < The seismic LOCA PDS group consists of cleven PDSs. Five of these PDSs have large:(A) breaks in the RCS, three have intermediate size (S ) breaks i (which- are treated as large breaks in the accident progression analysis), and three have small (S2 ) breaks. Therefore, Question 1, which determines the state.of the RCS at UTAF, has fractional branch probabilities. Fractional Branch Probabilities for PDS Group EQ 3 LOCAs Question 1 RCS State at UTAF t Brk A FP(Br.1) - Ef( ANNY NYY + AINP NYN + AIYP YW + AIYP WN + S3 NNY-NYY + SgtNP NYY + AIYY-YYY + S LYP YYY ) / Ef( all ) 3
-Brk S2 FP(Br.2) - Ef( S NNY 2 NYY + S2 LNP-NYY +2 S LYP YYY ) / Ef( all )
In both the large and intermediate break accidents, .and in the small break accidents in this group, some of the PDSs have LPIS operating and some do not. This is resolved in the initialization questions by specifying fractional branch probabilities for Question 4. Fractional Branch Probabilities for PDS Group EQ 3 LOCA Question 4 Status of ECCS Case 1 Large Break in the RCS BfECCS' FP(Br.3) - Ef( ANNY-NYY + AINP NYN + AIYP YYY + AIYP.WN + , St NNY-NW + AIYY YYY ) / Ef( ANNY NW + l AINP NYN + AIYP m + AIYP YYN + S NNY t NW
+ S LNP-NW + AIYY YYY + S i 1 LYP-m )
B-LPIS FP(Br.4) - Ef( S LNP-NYY t + S LYP 3 YYY ) / Ef( ANNY NYY + AINP NYN + AIYP-YYY + AIYP YYN + S NNY 3 NW
+ S 3LNP NYY + AIYY-YYY + S 3LYP-YYY )
Fractional' Branch Probabilities for PDS Group'EQ 3 - LOCA Question 4 Status of ECCS Caso 2 .Small Break in the RCS BfECCS FP(Br.3) - Ef( S NNY 2 NYY ) / Ef( S NNY-NW 2 + S2 LNP-NW + S 2 LYP-M ) B LPIS FP(Br,4) -. Ef( 2S LNP NYY + 2 S LYP m ) / If( S2 NNY-NW + S2 LNP NYY- + S2 LYP-YW ) Four of the large and intermediate break accidents have the sprays operable and the other four do-not. One of the small break PDSs has the sprays op-erable and=the other two do not. Therefore, fractional branch probabilities ' are required for Question 6. Fractional Branch Probabilities for PDS Group EQ 3 - LOCA Question 6 - Containment Sprays
' Case 1 - Small Break in the RCS A.3.2 9 i
I B Sp FP(Br.1) - f( S LYP 2 YYY ) / Ef( S NNY 2 NW + i S LNP NW + S LYP YYY ) BfSp FP(Br.3) - Ef( S LNP NW + S NNY 2 NYY ) / If( S NNY 2 NYY + S2 LNP-NW + S2 LYP WY ) Fractional Branch Probabilities for PDS Croup EQ 3 IDCA Question 6 - Containment Sprays Case 4 - Large Break in the RCS B Sp FP(Br.1) - Ef( AIYP YYY + AIYP-WN + S LYP YW + AIYY YYY ) / i If( ANNY NYY + AINP NYN + AIYP YYY + AIYP WN
+ S iNNY NW + St LNP NW + AIW-YW + S LYP 3 YYY )
BfSp FP(Br.3) - Ef( ANNY NYY + AINP NYN + S LNP 3 NYY + S3 NNY NYY ) /
-Ef( ANNY NYY + AINP NYN + AIYP YYY + AIYP YYN
+ SgNNY NW + St LNP-NYY + AIYY YYY + S3 LYP YW )
As it is the containment sprays which inject the water from the RWST into the containment, the fractional branch probabilities for Question 9 are identical to those for Question 6. Fractional Branch Probabilities for PDS Croup EQ 3 - LOCA Question 9 RWST Injected into Containment Case 1 - Small Break in the RCS
.RWST-In FP(Br.1) f( S LYP-YW 2 ) / Ef( S NNY-NW 2 +
S2 LNP NW + S2 LYP YW ) RWSTfIn FP(Br.3) - Ef( S LNP-NW 2 + S NNY2 NW ) / Ef( S NNY 2 NYY + S2 LNP-NYY + S LYP YYY ) - Fractiont.1 Branch Probabilities for PDS Croup EQ 3 - LOCA Question 9 RWST Injected into Containment Case 4 - Large Break in the RCS RWST-In FP(Br.1) - Ef( AIYP-YW + AIYP WN + S LYP-YYY + AIYY-YYY ) / t Ef( ANNY-NW + AINP-NYN + AIYP YYY + AIYP-YYN i
+ S 3NNY-NYY + Si 1RP-NW + AIW-YW + S LYP-YYY3 )
RWSTfIn FP(Br.3) - Ef( ANNY-NYY + AINP-NYN + S1LNP NW + S1 NNY NW ) / Ef( ANNY-NYY + AINP-NYN + AIYP-YYY + AIYP-YYN
+ S tNNY NYY + SgLNP-NYY + AIW-YW + S tLYP-YYY )
All the seismic "A" breaks result from failure of the supports of the steam generators or the ' reactor coolant pumps. These failures are estimated to place' such severe strains on the main steam lines that cracks will form where the stiffener plates for the main steam line penetrations join.the , thinner steel plate that forms the bulk of the containment pressure boundary. That is , . SG or RCP support collapse leads to containment ' failure. It was judged that 10% of these failures would cause cracks large enogh to be classed as ruptures. Since the Si breaks were lumped in with the A breaks in Question 1, it is necessary to split out the A breaks in Question 13 to get the initial containment failure probabilities correct. A.3.2-10 J
Fractional Branch Probabilities for PDS Group EQ 3 LOCA Question 13 Initial Containment Condition Case 1 - Large Break in the RCS B Rupt FP(Br.1) - 0.10
- Ef( AIYP YYY + AIYP YYN + AIYY YYY +
ANNY-NW + AINP-NYN ) / Ef( ANNY NYY + AINP-NYN + AIYP YYY + AIYP YYN
+ S 3NNY-NW + S3 LNP NYY + AIW YYY + S iLYP-YYY )
B Leak FP(Br,2) - 0.90
- Ef( AIYP-YYY + AIYP YYN + AIYY YYY +
'_ ANNY-NYY + AINP NYN ) /
Ef( ANNY NW + AINP NYN + AIYP YYY + AIYP YW
+ S 3NNY NYY + S3 LNP-NW + AIYY YYY + Si LYP YW )
nob-CF FP(Br.3) - Ef( S LYP YYY + + S 1RP-NW + S NNY-NYY i 1 3 )/ Ef( ANNY NW + AINP-NYN + AIYP YYY + AIYP YYN
+ S tNNY NYY + Si LNP NW + AIYY-YYY + S iLYP-YYY )
A.3.2.4 Listinc of the First 13 APET Ouestions for each PDS Group. r. M ii? A.3.2 11
. S , .
Dggf g,g9 g,, g g , g7, 'l% f eb t h $ Il - Que L iku h PDacal p S how Sb0\ : O- ?! <.
i =kowoot c
- 4 .-- : 1.000
- i
=N -
~i '
r's'PD64 1 tie toe e na tes.'tica : eCe .Plett areat -46. 46e c: . eranest.,- Dst A Drt-4J Tet*S 8 . Det *V 4 ' B*0179 0-PO9V - $ eps $ Owestlee + let sde et r < t e co0V $ i ref etenced la too q ;
'12 4- 3- 5 4/ S - 4 4 easy questloes to Alst here.
- - 0. 0'00 - --- 0,000
~0.000 ~> :1.000' - 0.600 - , 0.000 . y ..3 tes the Doorttee been trought under Contto!7 .$ - Dig 15 t
1 3-- Seres- ne* 4e r se 4 1 8s s 3 .,
~ - '
'= .-1.000 2 0.000 I bb' '
1 Per bott, ere the 4econdery 4ystee 49Vs". Atuck Opect ' fe PDs a let Letter . 4 -&&SVa$t0 4 89VR4 40 - . 810 - 4. S 6
- l. ); 3. i 8.000 ;
i . 4.000 : $- 9- 40' ?
' 4 Status Of ECC89;
-$ PDS = 2nd Letter. =l 2+ -)- '4- D-tCC8
-. 1 -
i DetCCS 3,. B f LCC4 D*tril $ Bl0 34 --a 4 I- 4
'4 Casesc >l
~ l'
'l' $ Case ti. tstee Dreat in the BCS -
il Det+A - 0.000 1.000 - 0.000- 0.000 3'- -Ige 1 $ Case la Seelt or very sea.!! Drost la the RCS
, . g --
g i Dat
- t 3 or Det*$4. .- - -
0.000 4.000 - 0.000 0.000 - -
- -~
1-3J 4 Case 3 4 8078 with Secondary Systee Skva eluct open 1 W. 5-
- 4
.D*$GTR 6 '459V*4t0 -
O.000 l.000 , 0.000: 0.000 . .
~
Othervle.-
$ Case ti v, or me steetc or sGtR with seva noctosteo 13- . 0.000 - 4.000- 0 000'- -
=0.000 .!!
JJ 6 0C3 y", ,
.I Depressu,ritallen or*Det OpeDept by the Operators? opapets -
n m J
$ Rtc it i -1.
, , b tames - .
, 1 (t : i c. s. cti veey smell eresta -+
< l !
' 9th*$3= - -
' O.000 0.000 . 4.000
'). $
t
, $ te>-
3 $ -tase it -4GTRs with the $RVs stuck opes 1 t
^~:
' D- $CT R - 6_ $ 5#V
- At0 '-
O.000 .. .0.000 ..l'.000
- i Otherwise . $ Case 3: A. 82, V, he Dreak, or SGtR with the'ARVs pectosing
> - 0.000 - 0.000 1 1.0001 -
- 6 4tatue of spreyat ' - - . -
'$ PDS = 3rd Letter - ; #
4 94&p c talp. :
'Ottr'
- 1. , , 3 ,1; 3
.) ^ ace sunt t
.' $ - 840 - Ji 24 =!
r 4 Cases - - g g; l_ t cu 1
.a- -- $ Ca se l e small areats 34
, agt-33 -
- .. -. t
'b-
'1 - e s 000 - '14000 '-04000. -
3
..0.000 . --
4 j( .1 ic
; $ Ca se Jo'Very Small treata '
7 l~ , Drt*s t -
; . i e .- 0,000 - =' t ;000.' O.000 ?
0,000 ' , - . .
^ =y Jii d 4 f - .2 4 -? 3: I came .ns sotas with the saVs stuck opee .
'3! F i1 . li cp* = D*SGTRc 4 .A$eV-$40- . 0,000 - 5,000 0 000= - 0.000 - Otherwise' s - [t 3
. $ Ca be 4 e ' A . Y, Wo Dreak, et AGtR with the.SAVs Reeleslag} ,
<i- ,
i0.0001 - 3 ' l .000 J 1. [ ie. 000 ' O 060 ? 43 Statua of Fan Coolers) :'
.D=FC ' ttFC
$ PDS + Not used-for Surry -!
a n. S8 The Fas CLolors are not '
-J' 94FC s $ plQ J6.
3- y '* 3
. ;= l ' ' 0 .c06d1 ., 0.0001 t;000 -
selety Grade et suary 8 S t a tus of AC Power ? : . 3 .D+ACP ' Be ACP " SfACP -$ 5 PDS - 4th Letter RIO .31- [NT
.g.
O.000 l'- . 3 l 006
'0,000 -
3 L 19 RNST l'ajected toto . rooteinsee47- _1 .- :- -S PD$ * . Sth Letter'
"!3 R NS f
- l a , ' 1'kWatain= WWATfin- .'$ Used to ladicate .a f ull cavity at surry $ RIQ r. 12- '. [
')-; 3.
~
i
' 1 4 Cases; l.. '.
;l S Alace the sumps and cavity de not commect at surry -
s' 1 I , t =-
= <
J $ a tut t cavnty ,1epites .contalement sprai s eperat toe. i - - f a 1
.g;
$ Case;t t i Amant Greats - -
(i. y
' ' ' 'ILS $; Ort +57 - '
4$f ~ iti; 4 31' 0,000 1.000 D0,000 ;- - i
!# i l' J$_Came 1s;Very Seall preaks. iv
.g.' 3 Drk*81 - . . nL
, ' o,
0.000 i e1.000 "- . . -
;L J
> nJ-t-
l3 '. .s-
' I
'10,000 ' l Tase I t ' ACTR wit h se,evndJty 3RV4 S tutt .Opvn{ i
.. y. z 4 ' D'$0taJ.n '41RV-Ato - ' '
t
= 0.000: . ;- 0.000
.l 000 ;> - , , .
J l0thervlas 4
., $_reaw it'A, Y,-^ No Dreati-or SGit wlt h ,the IRVs Pec,leting :
. -s -
r0<B00 , JL4000 ? O c e0 6 ' =' 3.. ' - 10 Deat'tenovel tros the. steam GenesatorA* .= ,
$ PDs s ! 6 t h let ter 1 1 a(Q-
'll :
i
,4 <
4 (AG NP r AcanR. .tCluk- . ! s,3-- . 4: 4. (J
' 4Gdnt 8 AGetne
- operated lintil batterica 4.3 . depleted but not' imperattag when.; :}2-_
diJ l .JO g 24 : 54p, ' 4 Casaa 1m .$. cote uncovers ' Jt.
'l - 'l jy1 +
J.
-5 Cahu ts 'Small Dresta -
45 %4
-y v Ert-t) - .
t No. case forsLarge Staats as SG*Hk:Is irrelevant- < 5q 4
,0,000 0.'000 / O.'006-- 1.06e .
c' gj j,l.j Mt' ; 4 Cahe Ji'VerySeel'l'Dreata, , ~ 1- . .]
~:
, '- A r k
- t i ,- - - . . .
, .--t
,F ,S '
...'i e.000 0.000.
' i 0.000 l . Goo ' '
'Mf , y 'i.'
- 4 Case la SG(R with Secondary $RVa Not Sturk Upee
?)- k.80TR' 6 ?t489etto = '
yy . 3 P 4.000 ; . io,000 = "G.040=-
. , ih Ot herw t At -- ' 0 < 000 '
Ci
=An'
$, Case -4 t- A.,Y,
- e. s .:, <0.000 . i O. 000 3 - O r 000 ~ .. 'I,000' ' J Nu attak. pr $0TR with $MVs Stuet'Open .
i e Lw 4! sll Did the Operator s (kpresAuf t se t he- %e**yhtlat t bef ore. t he Core Gecoves s?. $ Pp5 "> 6th Lettet-a 1" - J i secnePt- 'poscDept 1 RIQ - . 15 ' 21v <24 1
~ ,;, ' -
@, . 22 _- l f 1 > r i
~ 4 Ca ses . 4 29 41. (4 ' -
i>
, ' ^ -4 60 4
'fi eJ 11
; .h-4s s o$d4NR . or,. SGfnA
- 4 .i 1 (Mae'y eb Ptbcedures whenberresentis.laq .an %rW\ tla henot neeandary Systes i n Prohtbited operat(ng. .:1
; 0:000 . "!*
-1.02G
; I.
i ,I S Caen Ji El breat
! l
$[ ' O r k d a l .'
0.946 6,0 l4 ai
'L'
, t .I $ ranc'li 52 prest
-'. 3 Drk 5J'
. 0,600 - - U.404 ,
-Otherwame if 5 ra u. 4; A.- tj ho her.ae, og SGty
.ls000 .
0.000 :)
"h- .Eli Coolin4 tus tf P Acal%*
- jj $ Pbt Ith Lettet
.*4*y -marsj' q{
4_77 , ai ksj . jg , 3 , 2 - 12 . ' "'* "'
;- u g c l
s 1 F Ub , j^ ,,' ,. _
4 ceaea J I le $ Case li tiow tlachpute with DCS latect 6
- 4 6. In PDA Group 8 0+00$V 4 tud5d 0.900 0.500 0.000 Otheretoe $ Case Je tiew blactosta with ACS tot latset 0.000 1,000 0.000 $ end tDas not la Group 1 la Isillan Costelhoest Condittoat J 0-0upt D-test notaCf 6 Leet
- 9.4 sq.ft. $ 910 28 43 49 5 4' 3 3 $ septure
- 1.0 sq. ft. 8 $0 - 4J 3 reses $ henteen hole st ea. S 68 69 il i= 1 l Care is Large inntistloa treet i S Leat est be either laelat too Failure or solaole et autry.
trn A 4 turture is alwats Selsene at surty. Wo Pre ealan ting test a 4.0000 0.0003 0.9994 6 at surre almee the conta tssent is sub steospheric, btherwise $ Caev Ja De Large inttletlag Daens 4.0000 0.0002 0.9990 SUppt Aptt, tes 11.07, Il teb 09 + 74 Questions - Pesc+J, LOC A's . Il NQuest i l.000
'PDsG 3. Let' Plant 4 Sise and Lot et tes el FCS Brest whom the Core t'ecoverst S PDS - lat Letter i ?
- PotV I 6 art *A tit-&J bat-8) tra-V B-4 Gip 6 Poav $ Question i la ref erenced la too I L J l 4 % 6 $ samy quentless to list here.
l.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 3 Rea the tesetten boos Drought under cont role 6 010 l% 3 Setes te-actes
& L I l.000 . 0.000 3 for DGtp, are t he becondary Systes Seve Stuck Opost 5 PDS - Int Letter J &&SV Ato &&WValto S 980 4 5 6 1 I J l 9 10 0.000 J.000 4 Status ef SCCS7 $ PDS - Jed Letter 4 t
- ECC 6 DatCC4 DitCCS R a t.P il l kl0 J4 2 l J B 4 4 Cases 1 I $ C o me le ter0e Estak La the SCS S
Sth-A 0.000 0.000' O.728 0.J69 J l i l C a se 3 toall or Very Small Dreak le the SCS 3 e i brt*l) or Brk-Si 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 J l I $ Case le >R wit h Seconda t y Systes StVs stuck oPet
%
- I t 8G15 4 Sl*V-Sto 0.000 6.000 0.000 0.000 Ol be r wi se $ C a te 45 V, or No breat, og AGTR with SPV6 Reelesikg 0.000 14000 0.000 0.000
% RCA Inspressurlsa t loa tiy the operators?
1 Op' Dept OpeDePt Opalw P r i RIO 10 2 4 3 .I A Cases i l l C a se 1. Very Emall 9 seeks I trk-bl 0.000 ,0.000 1.000 J & 3 $ Case 25 6ETRs with the SpVa stuck open 1
- i-R RG1W 6 AStV-Sto 0.00n 0.000 1.*06
. tit he r w i se i Case 12 A, 52, T. No breet , or AGTS with the 19Vs Rectoalag 9 000 0.000 1.000 6 St atut of Spreys? 8 PDS - A tti Letter 4 D-1 ba5 BfB pon SWNA $ plQ 31 JS
. Ca.e.
I' I. $ Ca he 1 Beall Breakt J pra-sJ L.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
% 1 4 Ca se 2, very toalt preats 3
Br k 5.1 1,000 ; 0,000 0.000 0 000 3 i 4 & C a te li SG it s wit h the &RVa stuck opes b
- 1 9 SCTN. 6 $$RV*StU 0.000 1, 0 0 r. U.000 0.000 Ot hf tw l te i C a ne 4r A. V. No bredt. cr SGTR wit h the SRVs teclealag 4.000 P.900 0.000 0,000 7 Status el ran fenolersa l PD% - hot used lor Surry I p-tC Dart - BitC 5 the faa Cooleth are not $ #10 26 1 1 J l i Safety.Claite at hurry
- 0. 0 645 0,000 liOOO
% StalH* vs At* Power 4 - . 8 PDS -4th Letter
.I p AC P haACP Hl AC P 5 klQ Ji 1 l J B t.000 .
O,000' O.000 9 RW4Ttinjected lat e t' opt element t $ Pin - %Lb 4.et t e r i p a'11 > l a Re$Talm twstfla . 6 L awl to indic a te a tu a cavity at autry 5 850 II 2' 1 2 .) 6 b l ec e too s ino p a and castly slo not connect at s te r r y , 4 Cases l a fall ca% tty impt ten cont ainment spray operation. L i- S Cane.I amall Decats J stk-hJ t 000 0.000 0.000 t t '
$ C a s* 2 Very nealt tercata l
Det-RI 1.000 0.000 0,000 J l. 1 9 Ca *= 1 AGlw with second a r y SRVs btuck t>pe n 1 -* I e Acte 6 htt0 8t0 0 090 0.000 1.000 Otherw6te 5 Case 4; A .. V, N ts Ateak, or $LIN with the SUVs Rectuel#9 L;000 0.004 0.000 10 Heal Raouvat ltoe 4 he At ede be perator st $ Pos 6th Lettet 5 810 11 4 %L- h# SCANN ALINR %GdWW l 9 utlR R e op&rel east H6141 latterten IJ Jo
. 1 J l 4 % vlep le t e:S laut peu t opet414eq vben Jl J4 4 f.ewet 5 cc ot e stees-ov e r 4 44 1 1 8 t e tu !- AmT4L b r ec k f. 46 %4 J
hrk 52 5 Nu eese tor t a r .se ut out $ as hG- se t> latelevant t.000 4.004 's 000 6 099 1 I i C a to J very heatl hv eat s t bfB'11 3.0G9 0 000 6 00e 0 cm J l 6 5 r a ke b- %G rt with sec onda r y npve Not A t tica Opes a J b I; T N 6 4 Sil Visa t o 1 100 0,H49 0 000 0 604 01he.vt4e i ie + 4 i %. No H r e* 4 h . or ACIN wat h %kV% % t ue 4 Open 0.004 4 r.00 0 000 It U 4:1 t he- 1.0 99, 0, . tort bepressortse the 9et nmlar y Oslore 64 i re is a e
- 1 Pla hth t e.t t e r A.3.2-13
~
7i " 5 . . E., ai i 3 3 ' $eckePr i L e96chePs , I sa0 - 15 ; 24 .
+
' 14 -34 Ca:ee , 4st ' 3 -
01 d4-71 43: 44 '- 't 6?.. , '. - , > -
- ~- - < > ~ . --
3 .t. . _ 10 E. . _ -30 . $ Case la bertt*$ttitity thD $*camentri Systre is Pithl%(led - P b' 2r 2 'e* -- 3- 6' 0y Procedut3a th4n e3 Af 48 14 $54 Op;tzti$g, -) k(if)E
"" N 7 ^ 80:Na=';gg, $?fut -
'k li6 t 64000 ' ' ;&.000 - -- - - . -- --
l i- 1 5 Csse to al Dtral' t 3I us , , - ' ' W' ~ bit *SI i
", 4.000 0,000
- ;i.~ ,
. Case it ., .re.t-x ,
3-
"i .
.: - ~1
. - b3r t + S 3 -- -- 0. 000 '-
e
=
o
- ot. 000.e
- 3.000 rwi
.J 0.000.
, - iCo.eti1A.Vineere.4, or sei -
~
? 13 Coelle0 f or DCP Seelst- 4 PDS
- 7th Lettet
' '.D* U' -
_ 2 9-PSC ' - taPSC DfPSC- $ RIQ 17 ;' i el ' A 3
) Cases
- - 'd, ! ;
- 4 Ces, li slow Blackouts with RCS Intact -i F
6- . 4 $ is PDS Group l ~ 9- Po# V . -- 4-- SGent. i ~ 0.901 < 0. 091 - 0.000 e BN # othervlee - s
' s Case a+ Slow electeute with acs not intact
. 0.000 -
0.000 ,1,000 . 4 sett Peas not le Group 8' .t -
+ - : ll lailled Costalhoest Condittent p%'i 4 f 3-- 6+aupt - .t-test set-CF $ teet
- 0,1 sq.ft 5 alg - 7e =41 49
-)
7-F E e 3 3 .5 Rupture
- 7.0 sq, ft. 8 50 63 E.
M; r 2 Cases - I J'. - l Case 'Is' Large init iat teg treat
$ hoolmal: hole attes. '68. 49' 71 t) . > , -
.1 =. 4 test may be either Iaolettee ratture of 4 ' - toisste at surry. "i U hat A : .'t
<"lt . - 0.0003 -
kupture la siwers Seisele at hurty. ho Pee-entsittag Leats - DJ SE
- - -'0.0000 0.9998 9 at nutty since the costelement la sub-ateosPher te. 'h
*, Othervlso 6 Case as no Large tentleting steet 3r 0.0000 0.0003 ' : 0.9994-
~
[] ' EF
'4 a
'80R$f APETa Det !!ief,.1$ feb $9
- 7) Queettoms = PDSG*l, f ast Sho 18 WQuest f',!_-l 8 -
't 000-("i *PDSG*)4 LOR' - ' Pltti i s
hr* 2Sise omlDtk Loeetles of DCS Dreat when the Cote Deestete? $ PDA
- 14% Letter -( 1
- PORY )
U, L
... _-6i a A , Drt-52 . Brt-S t . Brkav 6 & Git D.Potv $ Questloa i to refetenced in too s . 1l' l 2- t i' -
4 % 6 $ many quentloes to list be t e 4 -
~- : 'O.000 . >= 0.000- - 4.000 -l0,000 0,000 1.000 3 -ges' t he Rosellee bees Drought under Coat.telD : $ 819' ($
#' > Set as - : no+ 5ct ee ,
, 3a '
a.- ! , ln -la r
' 't 000' O.000 O L.J -_9 -
+
41 $ PDS + let letter for'SuTWe'stoare J: SS#Va the Secondary Eystea StVs. Stuck opes * /1 f t > 8 -E . . . . = - g-- Stevetto
. . . . 3 ;. g S 310 4 g
% 6 -I '
30 44 0.000 '- .'t,000 ~ l'PDS k 3sd' Letter , bh L ,
Status of ECC48L 3
}
4 i t-ECCS : i Daters ' aftCC8 D-LPla -9 : 810 'J4 hh ox +>.
'"2- 1 3: '
- . lf
- .J- 4:
~]
x,(4sCas..: 1- .t s case 1, Lerge ereat to the eCS ,
- 1. t ar*
U pe t- A = (P w Ci < ~
~0.000S, . =I.000. i 0000 10.000 - #
i }3 -4 ' 3. 3 l _. . $ Ca se J s saatt et very small. break to the RCS :( - 1lI r;- ! .* tJL L [pSik ;
.}f . . , -
- 3?
- p. f g' < *
. Dat*S2 of brt*S): (
ev , - 'NO.000- 1.0002 =0.000 0.000 -
.e lC av ' * -pq - " $: ' : 4x = ' = 1: $ Case 36 ' 4GTR with Seccedary System $9Vs stuck opes - i
- 9 e . . -t=
e <, ; = p*50ta 6 'astv-sto k' - 0.000 . l .000 a 0.000.! 0;000 i;
,J Othelv6te i '
t 3-; '..;10.000
.=
- 4.000 0,000 - 0,000
$ Case 4 g V, or No Stedt, or SG1b with SRVs Recloaltg ,
4 Die r 1 BCS Depsessur ttat loa by t he Opetetor s* i ' 3: by-pep t t ' ,OpoDept.
;/
K tJ ' Cral*Ps- ! 'S' 810' ..it V.. t'n = i w S Canea r: := l
;&4
>;3 ^
.8'.. . .
- fl -
'4 Case n r very .4eall areat s i
.,* 3n uk- , iprk.nl- ..m J - y Ch O 000 , .1;e00 2, - -- - -
>s . ~
s.
'{
' 23 " 0.000c t
6 e 1-
> l.
!gia 1-
- t
' .-$, = Case 2 r botts wit h the *kva stuck opes ,
i y 't B"$CTR . (t SSSV-S t0 . - . 1-' qq
- l. - 1 0. 000 J
' '0.000 .- 3.000 z - - - . = . .
. . . 1 - -
;t 1
3 : Otherwise- '$. Case If.A.(44g 7, No Breate or,5GTR with the SRVs Reelosteg 'I u
' Os. 0.0^0 - - < 0. 000 " 1 000;
^1-7 ;- E S,t4; ains o f Spr a yaf . 1<
_-e-Sp e .saar L
. alty -
1 mes,smus ,
'S 8, PDS
- did tettet _
, ago. .6
.2$--
yd i ' ,; . - 2s - vi
; b . - . :n
,4< cases . t- 3. } -4
= o 4l' E i
31
- , -- 3
-l' $ Case li small Hreata . .d
- p Y .,
stt*e2 Rt E'= q; r 1 n 0 2 000 = 5 1(000i 0,000 n o. 000 ' - - < 1
'. ,' i t ?
[2 e i ._
=
_-t-
't.. '$ Cane 31 Vefy small Breats. ,
Ag, Ldi ..Stk+4%'
* ,.,,k 1 0.000 i 'il.0001 -0.000 7 0.000'-- '
}j?a-i-0'.
-Jr~'
l54..,; .. - 13' 4 S Case le ..4Gres wt th t he SAva stuet. open. U' i t,9 + St1TW ' 6'!AtaV+Sto sc . so: -0.000 ;44000 ' >:0,000 .0;000-
!?
c. e, 'HG Utnetwise 1 s $ Case 4 i...Ai V, he Dreak, Of SGTE with the StVs koelestag fn
':1--0.000 -l'000 . ? 0. 000 t
- 0,000 .'l '
'iet 4
'a t 4 , -cflStatusruf.tenCentera,t>'
- ' 3: n rC-- - n r: effe. i th. ra. cooie,. er. not .
<$ PDS
- Not used let Surry-J1 .. l '). * < 3 =; $ $afety Crade at Sut ty -
- s. ;aio ; as- i>
A:,'p
"+
i
- M -
' $ S t ai ne o f AC 0.000'- t'0 000 .
t.000 ' $
S PPS - 4th Letter' ti i , 1- - B- AC P Powef?'aACP ' D t ~- BI ACP - -}" b p -If ~.?
'I.= 4- ;
.)
3 .- S Rig - Ji 4 4 . OiOOO 1- 1i000 . 0.000
- gf
_4 y9:#WST:letected ;
$ PD4 ' . 4th Letter is : I kh5 f-i n into Waltain ContainmentAs*'sffin 1 Osel to ledteate a tull cavity et Sorry 6 360 Li J.C JJ - .~ll .4 3 5 since 4 he -sumps and ces L t y de got ec#eect at Surry, lJ !
j v" qap
- -. 74 Cases -
. l :.=.
$e tull cae t t y ist t lem cont a t smeint spray operation ']
3 rese.l seest preats
+
m -+e 11, e 7 1 > s hrt 84s - --
,l ':0.0001 0.000J 1.000 .
, 7' t
st 5 Come J C very small arean n t 7 Lh '
. . a r t a t ) .. . .
':0.000, 0. 4J01 j.900
-J Jt' i- l' Case i ,
t'
%Gtt ul t h see.cu.la r y ANY s s tw's Opyn 1f
%
- _I ji.. -D'AGtt' t. BARV-St4 '
,y O.000 ' O.000- 1.006 . '
OtheFwisO j ; ,.,, s C A se to A. Y, en kr e..s t e r 5t'ly wlth t be %gyn pec t os:(pq u < a t:1
/L . 3 . 2 - 14 '
h^- _' I
<[ 1 >
,}
W - , . . . .
+
F-N,"n i /, . .- 0.000 -
" a .000 ' c0.000 '.~
; 10 Wl Dwoodi Stee the atm esaartturs? 6 Pb4
- 6th &# stet- ' ' $1#10 ( > . 30 la _r [
^
Wi - ; .: : e i . soys : " seIpa .-
- 64': 2- _ '- scue6 .-
pV <h- <&
. 4 Cases -
4 -J * ' SGd4s64.4GCD
,3
, &p lS* seststedt ed tout V24 gst epyreg 6 4 e atlet nag trag ssa ' a '3 3
J4 s 't
-ll ott3 n eo gte 1
16 s 44 i l- -l C$40 it S Alt +tiet s + ={ u U'. ; .. h t t - 6 A J l be rase for 8.arge treats es 10-tR la latelevanti y.* : .
- 1: . 0.000; - 0.000 ? l.000 - 0.000 -( /* ' IL ' -~
4 Cese 2 Very small treats . f; 1
.. - g >
A pre.4)_ - t t 0.000' .'0.000 s .3.000 0.000 = :! p~: 3, ' - I. 3. 1 Case at Soft with Secondary &#Vs pet stuch Opea , sm s 3-r -D-$6ft 6- SBtts6t0 - ~ 'O.006 i 1.000 - 0.000.' 0,000 Otherwise. 4 Case 4e A. V, he tseat, of AGtR wit h Seva Stuct Opea 9.000 - - t 6 000 ,' O.000 0.000
'p'; J ll:Did -the opetelots Depressutise the Soceedaty bef ore t he Core Wacoters' l PDS
- 4th Letter : .
3 SeebePt .~ menebePr- $ kl0 1% 31 34 j C,, 3 - 4 l $ 29 '45 16
- 4 Casee - % =J- .-10 3 10 ' s case 1: Deptessut tslag the Secenaary a stem is trohibited "i S
3 s- .6 by Preceoures when an arms -Le not lperet tet,
> 4e,aus =_e; og- - AGime -
S 0.000 14000 -
=
h ' i& ; 12 4: 9 Us se i t 4) Dreat V y ' . D elill -
- 3 up k
L '0.964 e ' O.034 1 s
.F C- L -~ I. $ Case 3i. 63 praat . .
,t 3L
.6tt-52 i j' f
' = 0.441 ' -O . $ 9"9 .-
Othervlee' L- 5 Case 4i A, V, ha sapet, et SGit '.k b'- . - - = e.000 ~ 4.000 :h
-M 4 PD8 - 7th Lettet
' 4 3 Cooll,mq t f or SCP leals? =
9-PSC Bf PSC '
$ Big baPSC 7
- it
[? .3 . -l: l .)> 3'
' ' a reses to 'l Case l e Slow blachput s with 90s latset --t aat l' . '4 "
p ,
'6 '8 4- 8 la PDS Group t d D-PoeV 6 BGdut M 0.909.- , 0.098 : 0.000 i . - -
6 ! E0therwise. 1
.~ ~: 4 Case kr 4 tow plectouts wit h RCs Not latest ' '
Qv> 1
, 1- . 0.000 .. 1.000 0,000 = l- and Ppsa act to Group 1.. 2
= 13 a n t i t e.l C.e,et a i nmen.t condit t ee7. . <, ,
-p
- 7,p it.
4e.t- o 44 4.-
- y puten re 0.i _ .m g.0 F,, , i ue4- d -- I- 6,3 t
n . m 6.a in to,u.Plu.a t.ho.ie .sq . f L. vi ; m4 1Ca.es--- 1 = .. Case i.-. i .li .t ti. nr.es.at , b, -4^ - - test may be e ther footet tet tat tute at Sossete at Suery. [ ip ~ De t'
- A - . . : pupture is siveva Solante at &urty. No Pre estettleg teate i 13 . 0.0000 0.0003; '0,9990' - $ et etnce the contalaneet is sub-atmosphette. +
. + 'Otherwise $ Case J,-surttWo Large lettlettag preat s .c
+ , 3 0.0000 0.0003.' ;0.9990 ,, ,j{
t . .. . . ,
.' ; St!Rtt-AttT4 Ret 4ti07[ ~15 tob 09 '* .71 Queet t'ons > PDSG 4 Ceest V ' (f
. 4, .;
s .. 17 g
' ? Ngiesst ~
t . 1.000 c .*
**PDSQate-th4' = .~ Platt
[r tl Alle and bevaP es et RCS Break whee tt he Cate.Wacovets? : .l PD4 - let tettet: ( 't
- PotV . ) .'
l-p i 0
- t
-- ? - - -
. , . . i Ir uu%
, tit *$1
- c. 1 . 4l Det-A' S-80TN oi '
p >>- . - o J. Da k a5Ll D-. i St k
- V. '. 3 B+-Po#V . . 8.aOue.,st queion.i o .a .14ioroterveced ust here. in too - o
- T 0 000 - 0.000 . 0.000 J. .- - .-2 r ?0.000 -
0.000 - _ t . 000 - ;f e
# N J3-pas the Rosetlen been Stought undet controit .. $ 910 15 '*
~ Q' ' : b- Setae me-Se tso - '
- l_ ; I J. , ,
_M ( .' ..c 4,p00 .
*0,000- . . . .
13
-f ret . tote are the Secondary 4ystem ARVs stuck Opeet. +
9 PPS ~ l et~Lettet i {7
. 3 AspV sto _ = 458ve400 . SL R19. 4- . 5' .8 s j
t 4-( ,1 80. i 1 .t t - 3 9 yz A . 0.000 -- - 12000-t i* s'4 4tatue of RCCAP
$ PD5880 + $mt - tetter-
' 4-
~
. . . < 4 1.-: D kCCS m ,
'u sattT4 af tCCS . - t<tPls r i J4 p= 4L= -J. -4_
1: 3 y ;,
.a 1- .
-y tg. M.T
. 1]
[4 Cases _ ,i. tvg!.- ' l Case it .Large break le t he RC5 : hi' ,L : Det + A s - - - -- -- - ,
.i"
- E0.006 '.l.000is 0.000- 0.000 4 .- ; - . - -
;p - .
ic.. : -$ Case Ja Amall pt,Very amallytreat 44 the RCS
-pen.g3a-'Ot . 28 t:
Drt 51l az ,
' ' .j '. 1, ' . 0. 090 - l.000 a 0.000
--0.000 - . ' .' "
I 3f ~ .' . :lg':et_ J=. $ Case'l:EsGit with 4econdary Systes save stuck open; n-L
- = -
5 3 , . -.
.)
t , 4... i J 8 Acte ': 6 bSStV-Ato <. . ; -] l3 t 4 . 0.000 1 ~~ . 1,000.' : 0.000. 0.000 - :
. SATR 'wlth .SRVs ReclesIng
, votherwitec -
.- ' ~ 6. Case 4 t V, or No Bredt, et 6,: 1.000'
.0.000
'G $ : 1 0.000 i .- . . 0 000 - ' 1 S SCA bottessierisation by the Operators 3 s.'
)- :op-pePr Opapeer - opnoerr ~ $ :510 19 .
=
,3' .1 I y >/ hi.
'. i f .l Ca ses ' . <
.n l s 4 i
a 3 il 5 . ' l ,Ca se : l e' Vety Small Breats (
$ 'I ec q ,g'g ,g g } ,
0.000> 0.000 - '3.000 . , li.- 1. -
' 'B . $ Case A n 4 Gras wit h the SRVs stuck open 1 -
g.i4 , *, 4 ' s .- -4 id
' i
. B0.000.- lGtR '4l^'SSNV* 000 5 te- a .l.000- ;
f.
.Pt
.'0
, p" % '. Otherwise = - ,- S Case'3e A.' 47 V, ho prest, or'SGTR wit h 't he 88vs pectuelaq c . .tatua ce .00Pta,.,." 4.000 1:. 0,000 - '([
.- 0.0 _;
1 . y i ens ird t.iie, (, " Y *- "
> m ' A. . Ca se
?! M a+'"r "
q m a,ev4
=~
~ i -
. n .e.i, ..an .,ea.-
3
- c st%~% 8 : . v .
-t.0001 0.000 0 000 1- ' ( . ' . 0. 000 I:. 4 Case Je very meall pseats i
.t!. .. }; at t -s t '. - (l> - 0.000.1
~
1;o00 0.000' O.000 .( l3 '8 s,..
$ C a te* tr Sti11t t with t he ARVs st uck ope e 7j
' .l ;
. Ds>s t: 45tV=St0 0.000 . . ' t 000 0.000 0 000 -
no Breat. or $ Git with t he 4RVa N5eles t aq
,' i Otheswese' $ Case 42 A. Y, 0.000.. . 0.000 4 000 0.000 . q Wt '. ? st atus of ran Co.alet sp $ Pt1 - not used tot sent r y -
- s- a tc talc - site i t he Pan Cuuler s a re not s ato J6 g: t . I J e 4 $ dict y tir ade e sur ry
, . T; ;..3-.t a wa 70.000
* ' F ="
- 0 000 i.000 A.3.2-15 * " ' ' ' ' ' " " "
m
?[*- <
+
]u
' g' ~e ' r , d , . . - . v g - - 3
=
1 y A
)L .D-ACP, $1ACP - DihCP :
A~ 8 ' ele. It'
.,'p
' 3 l' 3
=1.000 0.0 0'- 0.000 -
9 puty injected 1143 C+a talesett9 4 PDs = ~ S4 b tit tgr '}
. 3 " 0u47-8) 9 stals. DI4til t - 4 Deed 49 et surry 8 BIO - 13 '
8 timet th)lbdicats a lull eavity de et stjeeet at Surry. __g~,
+--
', 31' 1- 3 3 4umya and esitte 4 cas 4 ' l a stil es?lty 4:patte esalatseest ePray a pertt ste.
- 1. 1 6 Case is 6eall treets set s!i ~I' 0.000 : _ 0;000 1.000' if 4
.g- S Case 3e very Sosta Dreats
' tak.s)
O 000 0.000 1.000 T. g 7,- g. $ C e se J t SGTR with secondary Seva aluet open 9-4Gtt 6~$$pV+8t0 - O.000 0. 000 = 4.000 ' '
.I otherwise - s C e se 4 o n. V , ens a r e st , et sGia with the sev. seelease, ;
6.000 0.000 , 1.600
, ' 80 test topoest itse the stese Generaterst ' O PDS - 6th Letter -4 810 il
- 4. 46*DO 6GahR sGrB9 SCdNA 9 Sodbk
- creret ed unt l4 bat t er ies la 30
-3 1 3, 3 4$ oepleted but not operstieg when 34 34 ?
!4 Ceaes 5 core uncovers 49 ?
i l l- 4 C a se it small treaks 4% Se set-al ' s me case not ter,e stests .a re-me la stretetaet. :; 0.000 ' O.000~ ' t . 000 ' O.000
> .r ,
- g. i Ca.e 3 Ver, .. n .resie Drt-8) 0.000 ' O.000 ' 4;000 1 0 000 j- _-- , 3'
$ Ca se '): SGTR with ' Secondary SRVs Not stuck Dres
{. .Stevetto f
- D-$ste - 6 ; ,
8.000 ' O.000 0.006 'O.000 Otherwlse. 5 Case 4e A. V, he treats et 4GTR with StVs Stuch Opee 6 1.000 0.000 0.000 - 0,000 - e s il Did the Opetetore Depressurite the secondary before the Core Useeeers? 8 PDS - 6th Lettet
' 3: SacDePt hoseDePr- $ ElO 15 il 34 3' J. 4 at 46 36 !
4 Caset- 1 3 3 se 3 a 40 - r. s Ca se i s oepre aurtst o th s by Precedures who. a.eAt=s secondary sies i. Ptehiested is met aleerating. j seast - et '44tua 0.000- -1.000 ' i
$ Case .3 e 8) Stest
.l &
.l 1 -
Drt-4)
'0.9644 - 0,084 :[
-i 1 l'Cese h 83 Deedt 3' t
; att-s3 ?
4.448 0.959 5 -
' Ot herwise -' S Case 4 -A. V, he breat , e t sGit !
. 6.000 O.000 13 Cooling f or ACP See L ee -- .
. $ PDS - -7 t h Let ter r
** - taPSC ' Ofr50 l 880
,J 5 Psf 17 - -!
'3':. ; i .J. 2- I
.t' 3 Cases -
'3 -
l' $ c e a, l e slow plecteute with prs Intact
'6, .* -'110i 4- 5' in Pps Group n i
D Po#V L'. -tudut ss :-0.909 ^0.094 .0.000' Otherwise" $ Case Ji .4&ow Blasteuts wit 6 BCs Not latact -
- . . "1 000 - ' 0l 000 ' O 000 . t' l$
shd PU4s not la Grunp i
ll lettlel Cont ainseat 'D-Leat Condition? :
0.4 s '38' s 1 B+9 ppt ' , ' son-C r 8 Leat * $ R 10 - 41 49-
'i 3 1 $ pupture
- 3.q.ft; o aq. ft. 8 %D 63
- 3. "asess 3C l . $ Noelmat hole elsea. -8 68 69 31 t
3 4,: '1:'
,t 5 Case ti Large tattiat taq sesen . - , .
l1 1 Leat eat be either laelsttee ratture or selsste at austy. 3 p"; ert- A - $ ', 'A
$ .aupture is alwara seteste et sutry. No Pre entsittag tests -
, 0.0003- 0.9194 $ .at suer s nt t a sub-a teospbet ic. ~'
.~0.0000.e.-
Otherwi , C.se a i _ .e Ier,6 ace.t ee con.t a.t ame.t
- e. i iiiati. re p 0.0000 0.000). 0.9998 -
- t
' l ,
\
'? '
200R1 Aptt, See 11;01,145 Feb 89
- 11 Quest!0ea =' PDsG S,: f ransienta tl- .
{
.NQueett
,?
I; s' ' 1 - ' -
,1. 000 t y:. ,
- 8P054-54'Lutt - ' Pennt :- F b'. 'I Stae and-teostles of aCl Dreat when.lbe Core prn-V Uncovera? -
$ Pos * !st Letter ' .t f.* Popv i *
' drb .f' ' ' .0
; 17
-Det-At, Drt-8)-
' Dat es t : ' B-8Gtt%- p+PORV l Queatloa t la referenced la too t
-J- it .
4 . 4 $ easy questions to list here, '
'O.00s . . 0.000 0.000 - 0.000* ' 0.000' I,000 <
' 3 gas2 the teaction bees brought under Coettol? ' '
-lt Pl0 15 '-
1
; ,?).s
; Serae metacrae .
I, 1 '. n. 0;000 -
~ 1,000 - - -
3 for Satt, are the secondary ,8y stes sWVs St uet Opett .S PDs - lat Letter i 3 - SStV-S t0 84eVsSto - 8 940 4 5 6 ;
't .
I. J- .S' 9 to i
' O.000 -14000 '
;: . . 4 Status of ECCA7... -
$ PDa + 2 nd le t t e r
' a .B*$0C5 ' D a f C'C S J 016004 < - B
- tPI S - S, big 34 r e 3 J . .I f -4 'l
_,-6.'. 44:Canes ' . % - 1 Case is targe Great la the Aca - "4 i
-l itO
'" ' Drt*A 0.000 - 4.000 4.000 0.000' 'I
\
* ;31 .i 3 s-.
i g_
- Case- a t seali or very. seat t are t in the mes -
- i,
-Srk*12 er'Det*st - -
,.. 0.000- 1.030 : 0.000= 0.000 -
-d
.3- t 1.
3 . $ Ca se 3e SGtt with Seevadery syntes SR??s stuck opes ;b
,$ t- 3 q;- >t 9G'fp; 6'498V+4t0 - -
4i . 0.000 - 4.000 0.000 0.000 Otherwise 1 Cate 4r We er No $8eate er SCTR with SRVs f acloalpq 5_
.- - 0.129 . 0.004 . 0.000 0 491
$-RCS pepressurtsstion by the Operatura? . -l,.
"! " 1 op-bePr ;. opepeer . urutwer . -$ alO le -
3' I J t
-1 taaea
.' L : ~1, 6 Case 11 very anell pre. ins
.-g OrthSt *
'9.000 . 0.000 '3.000 3 l 1 1 Case di SC r0 4 with t he S Av e st uct open +
1-
- I
.h=%Crt -6 ASNT*4to 0.000 0.000 1.000
. Otherwl%e.
$ Case 3: i. A? \ 4e breat, or Ef.tB with the Savs avviesing I 0.000 0.000 8.000 17 9;_ "4 Statue or sprayat- $ Pps - 3rit Letter -!
.?s 4 R+S i Das nimp hon hwnt S atQ 3% Je .(
A,3.2*16 ! gi i -<>. . i
' - - =~ - - . - _ _ u
4 Cette I l 4 (ese is $nall Diesta 2 Set =82 0.000 1.000 0.000 6.000 t a l Case 3: tery 6 mall treaks Drn-83 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 2 1 g a 3 $ Case .it AGTRe with the tave stuck opea 1 D+SGTO 6 $$RV-St0 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 Otherwise 6 C a se 4 A. V, ho Stest, et >S with t he SRVs Declosing 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 T Status of ras Cooler 67 $ PD4 - Not used let Surry 3 D-FC DaFC DfFC $ The f aa Coolers are mot 6 R10 24 1 1 2 1 $ Safety Grade at Sutty i -0.000 0.000 1.000 0 Status of AC P owe r 7 8 PDS - 4th Letter 3 B ACP baACP O f AC P $ Rl9 21 1 8 2 3 1.000 0.000 0,000 t Dulf latected Late Costalement? 8 PDA - 5th Lettet __ 3 SuST-In SW81 ale PNAffle l Weed to t hd tea t $ a full faTity at Sutty $ klQ 32 2 4 2 1 $ s i nce t he s uspe a nd c av i t y de not coneeet at Sutty, 4 Casee Sa full castly implies conlateneet spray opetettom. I 1 l Case le Small Dreats 2 D84-82 0.000 0.000 l,000 1 1 1 Case Ji very Small Dreats 3 Det-83 0.000 0.000 4.000 2 1 3 $ Cape Ji $GTR with Secondary stVs stuck Opet S
- I D-SGTR 6 SERV St0 0.000 0 000 1.000 Otherwtee $ Case et A. V, to Dreat, of SGTR with the SRVs lectosteg 1.000 0.000 0.000
-' 10 Reat Removal f rom t he stese Generators? 6 PD8 - 6th Letter $ BIO 31 4 64-pt EGaut SGfut SGdus 8 Andat e operated until batteries 12 20 2 l 2 2 4 1 depleted but set operetteg when 21 24 4 Cases 6 core uncovers 29 4 1 9 Case 1: Amall breaks 45 $6 2
Sth-52 9 No case f or Large Dreak a as SG tm is Ittelevant. 0.000 0.000 4,000 0.000 1 1 % Case Ji very small treaka S
. Ert-5)
O.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 2 3 4 5 C a se 1, scre with secondary &#Vs not stuck open
%-
- 2
[! B*SGTS & SSRVetto L 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Otherwise 1 Case 4: A. V- ho Steak, or >R with SRVs Stuck Opee 0.000 0.000 4.0v0 0.000 11 Did the operators Depressurtre the secondary bef ore t he Cote tacover at 1 PDs - 6th Letter 2 SecDePr soScDept 8 plO 15 21 J4 2 1 2 6 29 4% S4 4 Cases 2 10 4 10 $ Case 11 Depressurnalag the Seconda ry Syst em is Prohibited 2 1 6 by Procedures when ao Alw$ is 30% Operettag, AGaut or SGthR 0.000 1.000 l & S Case 2: Si Breat 3 Brk 13 0.966 0.014 1 1 4 Case li 12 Brest 2 Brk-42 0.444 0.459 Otherwlte l Case 4g A. V. No breaks et 4GTR 0.000 1.000 12 Coollag for kCP Seanas ' $ PDS - 7th Letter
) D Pac SsPSC StP1C $ ple IT
) 1 2 3 2 Cases
.J l .40 5 Case 1: Alow Blackouts w t t h RCS letact
=
4
- 4 8 le PD4 Group L
.B PORY 6 SGd5R 0.909 0.011 0.000 Otherwise l Case 2> Elow Blackouts wit h RCS hot latact l 1.000 0.000 0.000 $ and PDss not to broup I 11 lett Lal Coste nneemt Coedit test i B-Rupt D Lest e05 Cr S Leat = 0.1 sq , t t . 8 plQ 28 44 41 2 1 2 3 $ Rupture = 1.0 sq. ft. 8 SO $2 2 Cases . $ Nootpal hole sLges. $ 60 49 Tl n 1 i
ll Case l e targe Initiatto9 break Leak may be either i so tat ion ra t ture or se tsete a t surry. Ort-A 6 supture is always Me tsoir at surry , ho Pre emisilleg Leaks 0.0000 0.0002 ' 0.9998 % at surry stoce the contatseest as sub-atmospherte. Otherwtae S Case 2. no Large lettiatlog Brest 0.0000 0.0002 0,1998
$UBRT APET, Rev 14.0), il Feb 09 - il Questtoot - PDAG-6, ATW5 71 NQuest i 1,000
PDS4- 6, Platt tRS'ntos of I Stae a nd Loca RC4 great when t he Cote Weeover a7 9 PDS - 1st Letter ( T
- PORY )
6 Stk-A Sth-52 Stk-5) hik-V B h47R B PORV $ Quesitos I is referenced la too t i 2 - 1 a 5 6 $ many questions to list here. 0.000 0.000 n.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 L 2 Ba s the Rose t too beca prought under Con t rol* 8 R10 1% 2 Scras no4setaa I i J 0.000 1.000
) For RCTR, see the Secondary Systee SkYe stack Opps? 8 FDS
- lst Letter 2 518V-Ato StBVeSto S Pig 6 4 6
, .I 1 2 8 9 to 04006 1.000-4 Status of RCCS) $ PDS - 2nd Letter
__ 4 B-ECCS 84rCCS s t rCC h 8-LPts S 91Q J4 2 L 2 3 4 a Ca egs 1 L i C a se 1- La r ere preek in the RCS I set 4 0.000 1 000 0.000 0 000 J l 1 1 C a se Ji heal t -se very sed!! Break to the RCS 2 4 )
'rt-52 et Brk Si
. 000 0.000 1-000 0.000 2 l i S rase s %c re w t t h sec ond a r y Systes seVs stuct open
%
- l B lGTR 6 ilRv-sto A.3.2-17
_' ---mm- mm- ..
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 Otherulee l Case 4, V, or to hseat, or &Gia with 6tVe terloalbg 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 % FCS DePsessurlaaline by the Operators 9 8 Op-DePs OpoDePr Op e bvP r 8 tlQ 18 3 3 3 3 3 Cases 1 4 4 Case l e very small Dreate l Det-Si 0,000 1.000 0.000 3 ) l 3 Case Ji SGips with the 6pva stuck opea 1
- I D 4 Git 6 8599-440 0.000 0.000 1.000 Otherwise l Case la A, 63 V, Na Stedt, or SGTR with the SpVs Declostag 0.000 1.000 0.000 4 Status of sprayat 3 Ptis - 3rd tetter 4 D-Se DalP DISP nob +Saut $ ble il 30 3 1 2 3 4 4 Cases 1 3 $ Case la Small Dr eat s 3
Det-13 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 4 1 8 Case 3, very small treats 3 trk sl 5.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 3 4 3 6 Case li Agita with t he SeVa st uck open
%
- i D SG19 6 S&DV*Ato 0.000 1,000 0.000 0.000 Otherwise l C a se 4 A, V, hp Dreet, or SGtt with the sRVs tectosteg 1.000 0.009 0.000 0.000 7 Status of fan Coolerat 4 PDS - bot used for Surry A D tc Date DftC $ The fan Coolers are evt S D10 JS 1 1 3 1 i Safety Grade at surry 0.000 0.000 1.000 4 S t a t ua el sc P owe r * $ Pb4 - 4t h Let ter 1 6 ACP DaACP 98407 $ BlQ JL 1 l J )
1,000 0.000 0.000
$ pu17 injected into ContaiseenL9 $ Ppl - 9th let ter 3 SwS1 la WWEfals tuSTfin i Used to indicate a fuit cavity at Sutry 4 Pl0 13 J l .A 1 6 Stuce t he sumpe and cavity de hot cotheel at Surry, 4 Cases S a full reelty topttes costalpeest sys ay oper et ton .
1 L $ Case li heall Dreata 3 Det-4 3 - 0.000 0.000 6.000 t t $ Case 4: Very neall presta Det*A) . 4.000 0.000 0.000 3 1 1 1 Cate 1$ SGTB With Secondary itVe Stuct Open S
- 4 t-$ Git 6 45tv-Sto '
0.000 0,000 1.000 Otherwtav $ C a se 4a A. V. No Brest, or SGit with the 50Vs tectoslag l 1.000 0.000 0.000 le heat pesoval (som the Steam Generators? 5 PDS - 4th Letter 5 kl0 11 4 4G ## 4 Game SGtRa bGdut $ SGdua e operated until batteeles 43 20 J 1 J l 4$ depleted tout not operating when Ji 34 4 Cases 8 core uncovers #9 L 1 4 Case la seelt arpaks 4% 54 i Brt-12 l Me case for targe Dreats as AG NR is Irrelegant. 0.000 0.000 n.000 0.000 1 1 $ Case Je very small Dreaks 3 Drt St. l.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 J l I l Case St AGTR wit h Secondary SpVa Not Stuck Opve S
- 2 p-SGTR 6 St#Vallo 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Otherwise l Ca se es A. V, ho areat, or SGTR with SRVs Stuft Open 1,000 0.000 0.000 0.000 il Diel the Operatore Depressurtse the secondary bef ore the Core Vncovers? $ PDs - 6th Letter J .SecDePr soleDePr l RIQ . t% 71 24 3 4 J l 29 41 %6
-4 Cases J 10 10 $ Case 1: Depressut t ala<p t he Seconda ry $f stem is Prohibited 3 6 I l by Procedteres whea se AtWS la mot 6perettaq.
SGaRR of SGftt 0.000 .l.000 i L l Case J: Al Brean 3 trt+5h 0.000 1.000 t t 0 Case le 53 Brest i sen-A3 0.441 0.%59 Otherwise l Case 4r A, V, No Brest, or AG1p 0.000 1.000 8 3 Cool tag f or PCP Seals
- 5 PD4 + 7th letter 3 9 PSC BaPSC 9tPSC $ FlO 17 4 8 J )
J Cases - 3 l. 40 1 Case 11 tiow assenouta with RCA lutact 6
- 4 $ La PDA Group 4 D*PO9V a SGdMR 0.909 ' 0.098 0.000 Otherwise l case J: Slow Blackouta with BCS Not lateet L.000 0.000 . 0.000 $ and PDss not in Group 1
- 1) lelttet Costelnoemt Conottlan* 41 49 1 8 84pt B-test mob Cr 5 test
- 0.1 wj ft, S BlQ J8 4 % J B $ tupture
- 1.9 sq. ft. l %0 63
# Cases % Noetast hole etses. S 64 69 71 1 1 4 Ca se li targe initiattaq Oteat i S Lest may be either Isolation fatture or Settelo at Autry.
Art a $ Pupture is alwaye Actselv at surry No Pre entsittaq teats
'O.0000 0.0003 0.9998 5 at bur e r since l he cost alhoent i s sub -a tentP te r ic .
Otherwise $ C a se li No large i n t t le t in.t Brear 0.0000 0.0003 0.9990 SVERY APit, Rev tl 01, 1% Teb 09 71 Questtoms PtW4-7, hr.tk's 71 hQ4e tt i 1.000
'PDSG+7, 18$' Platt i Stae and 1.ocatLos et RCS treat when the Core Wacove s4 i PDS - let Letter ( ?
- Porv )
6 9th 4 Brt 52 hak-sl Bat v p - tu rn p PokV $ Queatkoo 1 is referenced an too 4 i J ) 4 6 % many que st ions t o 41st here. 0 000 0.000 0.000 0 000 4 400 0 000 2 Nat the Spection under Control? 5 91Q li I J cree b.eeo. s e sem D, r oug h t i & S A.3.2-18
l.000 0.000 1 $pr Scie, are the secondary Systee $9ys Stuet Open? 4 pp4
- 164 1.e t te r J &hpV+ht0 $6tvettO l PlQ 4 5 6
% l- i 4 9 10 4.llo 0.100 4 status of ECCap 8 P DS - Jed Letter 4 D-SCCS DalCC 8 DitC04 D+ttl8 % BlO 34 J l 3 3 4 4 Cases 1 4 $ Cane is large Dreat la the tem 1
6th-k 6.604 4.000 0,000 0.000 J l 1 4 C a se J e $nall or very Small $ reek t e t he &*4 3 a 1 Dit*S2 or Drk-45 6.000 1.000 0.600 0.000 3 1 3 5 Ca se li bGit with accondary systee $tVa stuck on ee
%
- I D-AG1t 6 &&tV-sto 0:000- 0.000 1.000 0.000
( Otherwise 5 Case 4 V, et ho Dreat, et SGTR with StVa pectoalag
- 0. 00 0.000 e.000 t. 00
- $ 6C4 tepressurisellom by the Opos ator se i op-DePr opeDePr etabePr 9 910 - ll 3- 4 J l S Cases 1 1 % Case is very small Dreata i
Drt-SI 0.000 0.000 1.000 2 4 .I l C a se J a 6GTBa with the spva stuct open 5 a I D 8Gts 6 SavV-Sto 0.014 0.000 0.924 oibe, wise 4 Case 3, x, ,J. V, he Dre. . O, .Gi, with the itva ,e,iesi , 0.3 0.000 0.651 4 re ,s,
. .t.a 0..6,1.y $ Pn. .iQ* led iette,, 2.
; Dag Deig .c...;i i J 4 C..ee i- i $ C. .e i, ie.ii Dre.ta J
Det-Sk 0.000 i.000 0.00. 0.00. i . i 4 C..e ,, ve,y .e.ii .rea.a 1 Drk+S) 0,000 1.000 0,000 0.000 J l n 4 Case li 4Gits with t he 89Va st uck open
%
- 1 D-$ Cit 6 'S$pV-ato 0.000 O.000 1.000 0.000 Otherwlse $ Case 4: A, V, ho treat, or SG1R with the SRYS Doekoslog 1.000 0.000 0.n00 0.000 1 Stattes et r an Cooler s* $ PDA - het used f or Surry I D-FC tatC OffC $ The fee Conners are not 4 RIQ J6 1 1 3 5 - $ Sately Grade at Surry 0.000 - 0.000 1.000 0-Statua et AC Power 7 $ PDS - 4th Letter i D-ACP BaACP B f AC P l 880 31 l' l J l I.000 0.000 0.000 9 DNST la jected lato Cont a tmoent y .
$ PDs
- 9th Letter i Rutt-in 9Nsteln es11(In $ U ned t o i ndic a t e a full caetty at Surry 5 RIQ IJ J l J l l S t ace t he sisers a nd cavit y dre act connect at Sorry, 4 Cassa $a tull cavity toplies costanament spray operstloa.
I L $ Case li small Dreate h erk-si 0.000. 0.000 1.000 t t $ Case J Very sea)! Breata i Btt Al 0.000 0.000 1.000 - J l i $ Case 3 t . sG1R wit h Revoadary SRVs Stuct Cpen 3
- 1 D 501R 6 S%BV-Sto 15 } t t$ 2 J 11 J )
Otherwise $ Case 4. A. Y, Wo Dreat, or SGra with the ERVs tectostag 1,000 0.000 0.000
. 40 Deat Desoeal tree the Steae Generatcrs* POS - 6th Letter S 980 14 4 40 pR AGauR SGtRB 'SGdHR S AGdHR = Operated unti}a batterles 13 20 J l '
J 1 49 depleted but not operettag when Ji 34
.4 Casee S core uncovera 29 1' i r l C a ne li Sealt Dreats 45 54 3
Det+a) $ No ease f or Large Breaks as AG 93 18 lif elet aat. 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
- 1. I l Case J. Very small breaks I
Det*Si 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 J l . b 5 Ca no 3- $GTW wit h locondary ARVa No t Stuck Open
%
- J D-5410 -6 S1RVn940 f% 3 i 11 .t J t$ i 1 0.000 Otherwtae ' S Case 4r A, V, No Dreat, or SGTR wit h SRVs $tuch Opep 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 11 Did the Oper ator s DePre snor t ae t he Aecondary bef ore t he Core Oncovers) $ PDn
- 4t h Let ter J 6efDePr noScDePr $ elQ 8% al 24 J 4- J l 29 4$ S6 4 taava -
2- 10 10 $ Cane ke tiep r en auf l a l og the Secomtary ayatee is Prohibit ed j e 5 5 by Procedures when as Atw& na act Operetteg. 5 Gate or SGimp 0.000 4,000 1 & 5 C a se 2 : Si Breat I art *El 0.964 0.014 l' I l Case it AJ ereat k Bat <&) 03445 4=S%9 Otherwlte $ Case 4- k, v. No Breat, of %GIR 0.000 4.000 13 Cooling for acP Aeal*P 1 PPS - 7th Letter 3 E Ptr SaPsc 9fPSC S plQ 17
'J t 2 )
J-Casea J 1 i 10 $ Case ti blow Blac40ut s wit h pf4 Intact
&
- 4 5 in FIA Groop t D,PORY 6 9Qla t 0.909 0.011 0 000 Otherwise l t'a Ae J- 9 tow Steckouts ulth RC4 kot lateet l.000 0 000 0 000 % aml Ph91 not tu Group t
, il feltlat Contatssent l'ond t e Lon*
I 8 aupt R test hob CF i leak 0 i Hj 14. $ RIQ 29 41 49 J l 2 1 $ anpiore 1 v sq ft. t $0 6J J Casen S hoenmal hule sises. 5 og 69 75 l 4 i Cane li Leeue I n i t 4 s t i n'6 E t t A h
!(.3.2 19
;.7 g - -
n - 7 s r i 13 LN4 may be qlther istigtln tellurp tt $1tamie at autr "5 f at* A ' - - Suptise le sant) 61& sont ill Sur ry. ' ke tr ee2ifttl ig Ly. la tuts-atsotphTrac. at e - m : 0,00:0~ 0.0003: .0.9098 - -- at tuert alte) th) esatsineert
, itherwise - - -
i . Ca se 2 Xu &seg) ' 146 4 454 8$3 htMk - p 6.00001 .0.000)- 1 0.9998 y ,
'[ t ,. !,A g- ,sgeV_APtTy Pet _ll.01( ll f eb 09
- 16 Questions tiet. Ilse croup; t
.0ue.1 ; ,
i _1 000. i '?
,l 6{: lts, 488' - .. P I s e t .
n the Core escovers? - - -
' $ PD4
- let tetter i t
- PotV )
30 ,. and tecellos .of htt*83 908 Dreat whe.48 . t 4 9th=A Det Drt-V D 'SG19 - D-Potv $ guestlos I la referenced in too L,0 1 1- 8 1' 4 t 6 4 esey quentlops to list here.
' ;'t.410 A" D O.006 s = 0.460 .
*6 . - 0.000 0.000 .
-3 ass the pesettes been eseught useder Cor; eel) - -
l' 410 it - 2- . Scree me-Se t an hM N I' ' l.00 ' O.00 -
' 3 tot sett, are the Secondary Syst** 6tVs stuck Opent 4 PDs - 1st letter 6' .J 46pV-sto StPvnsto 9 - DIO 4- 6 6-F l- - t J 6 9 10
' t. 000 - .' 3.000 ':
. 4 Status of ECCat - - 5 PDS - lad Letter
'p .4- D4CC8 ; DetCC4 #flCCs ' D4 Pit4 8 Rig 34
.- 3 li J: 3
, ,-4 . C. - i , tar,e .reat i. ihe .C. Ca
' Det A !
ses i4 - -
- 0.000 1.000 0.000 . ' 0.000 - - ,
2 1 -~ - 1 $ Ca se J e small os very small treet le the ecs 3 -s . . J c> Det-42 et Dth*15 f>* 0.000 - 0.000 - 1 000 0,000 i ,4 -$ Cate 3 _Scit witt Secondary Systee &#Vs stuck opea f= 3L 9t S
- p. : 4
' t-30T9 S SRV-S tO s ' -0.000 I.000 - 0.000 - 0.000.
* ' t'therwise 4 Ca se - 4 : V,'or ho Dreat, or AGTR with 611Va peelostag b"n -0.000 .l.000 -
0.000 0.000 1,e- t S DCS Depressurisat ten by t he operatee s?
.g; ' ,1 1 Op-Dets _opubePr ' _ opetsor t ' 8 " pig St
-2" R. 1 ..I 'A 1
') Cases)
U 1- 'lt 4 Case la Vety 4eall Steate
.-Jr
); r
.5, 4' pit *sti .
. ; s-6: -
s 0,000; 0.370 , 0.400 pq 3 - g, j $ Case 30 sotas with the $2Vs stuck open a,p 2'
- 6+8 Cit 6.$$tv-sto-
- 0.000 0.000 ' <t.000-EOtherwise =- - 1 $ Case '3: A, 53.'Y, No Dreek , et 4GTR With the 88Vs tecteslag
_- -' O.000 4.000- '0.000 6 status el sprays 7 s PDs - 3rd Letter 4 ' p-Ap. ;BaSP pity. .kob-seat 3 pig J) it-q::% , ,.I' 2s 1- -4
.24 Cance".
S ' t y'. *
.I 1
-1, 4 Ca se l e small psest a
^ DetES . , - -
< '0.000 10,000. '
14,000 - 0,000 .
=
dn ~'
, l' $ Case Ji Very Small treats i 1
($
! ,, t .c -s b . Bet-53 i Ma ' -' , 0. 310,_ 0.000.' t 0.700 - 0:'000 ' = - -
,. Q3 et.,.4
...!,- 3 3 S Case li SCTBs with the SRVs stuck open
, i s
.-' t -1 ,
- -9-44T8 4 X SSRY-S t0 l -
0.000 - 4.000 ' -O.000 - 0.000 '
+' e Ctherwise $ ^ Case 4 t' A f 'vi No Dreat, or ' AGTR 'ulth t he SRys Rectosteg ;
s #
.- '--0.000-.: ,
4.000 s' .- - 0.000- :0.000 r
? Status of84Cc fan Coolefs? 6' - .' --' $ PDS = Not used f or $wtry ~-
1--3'+ 6
) parC 4 '. S t rC ; $ The Fat Cooler s a re tot -
3 Av - : I; 2, - 1-' 9 Safety Ctade at surry Rig . '26. ,l 1
+
' ' . - 0J00tt .,0.000 .
t1.000 , s C G S $ tangs of AC Power? ? cp 'qN- 3- ; aqCp - pa AcP q .. al ACP : ',8:PDS'*'4th
- s. sig . tetter-
.Al
~g 3 gc 3_ a-
_; 3-t y i i
- t - ' t.000 l J $.000 " 4.000t t
ft DN$t Islected lato-Costate.est*'- 4
$ PDS -~ 5th Lettet.
eg9j' 0 .- n-- =3 aust*Ie+ -DNStala - u ppSTfle , $ Daed to ladieste a full cavity at autty .S 810 ' 14 t ; .m 't' 2 2, -J-
-4 CasesE' '.
+ ~ i t. b. z 2 : -
'z '
; - ' S a tull cartty toplies costelement4.s tace t he sumps spray and gavlt e do not connect at Surth, operetton 3 5
'l
; l -:- 5 Case lt amall prests
_e. 1 d ( get[gl . i 'g: 0.00 0 ~ 10,000' l.000
; 4 ,; , J . l Case 14:Very Amall 8 testa q
;H . < ' Drn 43 . ~ - -
f a" .s. 16 3.1:
' s i
-3 'I ' 116.3 1, 7.(,'96' fi
=
p E I' 8:. Case le scTu with Secondary s#Vs stuct open
. 1 os' ' B-5GTR '6.SSRV-Sto .' :d-N W, , - ['
O * . 3- , 0.000 - 0.000 ' - 4 ' ' J0thetwisei l.000 - l Case to:A !V,- No Steak, or AGTR wit h t he SRVs Reglest pq , .
>,i "
. -- 1 0
' 10 seat me.0.0,04e ar from ih 0001 no.e 000:o r., e f '
4 A4aNR si e
$4fBB s- . . .
3Cdnt 5 SGdHR
- operated unt il better nes -
- = PDs a u h I.. tie, . .ie m I:- s c3"; sG.l p e '. -
12 1 20 : ..
-4 ;# -3 3 4 $. -depleted but not operattag when. 14 % . , J4 - -
l 't 1
' 4 Cases . . 5 '
$ core useovers -
39- gj A4 , - .1 . u:
't-_ 1 S = C a se - 6 : Seall preaks . 14% ' $6 ;q
.. J i !
, " ': ' .Det*83 ' = - - -
. > - l he ease for targe Steeks as 4G-st is larelevant.
/2 4 C.
-n '1 000 .1
- 0.000 ;
'9.000.. ' 0 4 005 < -
t i n: l 3.Cese 2,. verr-sealt Dreats
, odt ', 3- -
AV/ O ; pet S$ < - 4 c s' y . tit 1 3 -0. 0 00 i -0.000 tl$ 1 $ - - - ,
, t 1, -4.
't' -
' 5- ' ~ _ $ C a ne,is'SGTR < with. Secondary SRVs Not Stuet 4 pes i
~-
9 f ; s; . g-3 g+s4TR. 6'v8stvasto - r 44 u .l.000' "' 0,000 > -0.000 - 0.000 = Ej
-i
$ Ca se 4f- A.. V, No prest, or AGTR with stV4 stuck Opee
. Otherwtoo 3, : i . 0.000-- - - 1,000 t -! - 0.000 . 0.000 .
'- n'i Did the operators Wertesour tse the Secondary before the tute Qaeovetat. 1 PDS - 4th Letter !
' :J -SeeDert'. soneDePr - $ kig 15 = .2 6 24 :
x4= . J: $, J9 4% $4 ' 4 Cases ; A . 10 - 10 ' l rese li hepressustning the secondaty syntee ts Pf ahlbited
-}7- I 4' )~ $ ,tsy procedoges whee as AtW5 n a ho t opp t a t i ng .- -h
+- !r :
, 1 - "s.000
,14 ENS
-6 of .. $GINa -
% a00 :
- , Ca.
2, a i mee . .- t 1 a' prt 68 0 000 :
? 6 , n.000.i.> = -
i c..e 1, .
, .,e44 1
% p. - - g A;3l2*20 1
m G
, . -4 - _ - :_1 i>
___..._.s. . D.r.00 t-6 i.000 Otherwtoe 4 C a se 4 A. V. We treate or 4G19 1.000 0.000 4 4 Chollte f or BCP 4e4147 4 PDA = 7th Letter i D PtC terSC titsc 6 slQ 47 8- S 3 4-J Cases
& l 10 - t Ca se ti slow niecteute wit h RC4 latect 4
- 4 4 la pot Group 4
'p toeV 4 sodse-0<t09 0.096 0.000 otherwise t Case J. slow slecteut e vilb aCs hot intact 4.000 0.000 0.000 $ eso ress set an Group A il leillai Costelmeest Condit teet
! D-purt D-Leet soe-C t $ Leet = 0.1 s 4 kl0 38 43 49 2 4 J l 6 turt ur e = 1. q0 fsq.t. ft. $ 10 62 4 Cases 6 Noeteel hoto anses. t 68 49 ?!
I j l i l$ C a se le t ttarge lattlettog P.reat ort-A s surture mayistioenvaveithe.r seinelaelotton 6e et Fa11ere sorry. weorPre-e=4stateg satsele at surry. teats 0.0000 0.0003 0.9999 4 et surry stare the costelmeest la sub-at eospher te . Otherwihe l Cate 21 No Large laittattaq hetet 0.0000 0.0003 6 4918 89991 APkt. Dev 11.01, il lob 46 = 76 Questions - LO-le Lost. No Aho 74 NQwest t 6.000
*tQ+le LSS' Plett 1 Alse and Loestion of Dr4 Dreat when I he Core l'ecover s? 9 PDS + let Letter ( T= Po#V l 4 set A Det-SJ 6tt-&l bet-V b 4Gia b PORY 1 Queetton I la referenced in too i l J l 4 % 4 $ easy queettoes to llat here.
0.000 0.000 0.300 0.000 0.000 0.100 3 Res the teactice been Drought under Contrelp $ 310 15 3
Scree so- Ec r ee
! 4 A 1.000 - 0.000
. 3 tot 8G19. are the secundary System Savn Stuck Open? S Ppa - 1st tetter J 4tpV*$to SERVtStO $ BlQ 4 4 4 8 4 3 8 9 le 0.004 1.000 4 St e tsia of 1008 8 8 Pb1 - kml tetter 4 t Ett s matCCs eftrCs p4LPts 6 atQ 34 2 4 3 l t
- 4 reses I l l Case 1 Large breat to the 8C5 Det-A 0.000 1.060 0.000 0.000 2 i i i Case 2 .e.ii or te,y so.ii e, eat i. the .C.
2 . I Drt-$J 0.000 or htt-i.l 0.00 i.000 0.000 a i i C..e 4, sur. wiik .eco.d.ry .,sies 3.v. .iuet ope.
. .- i B-tG1R 6 568V~4t0 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 Otherwise 5 Came 4c Y, or No Brest, or >R wit h ARVe Seelostag i.0 .
0 0 0.0c0 u yt
%.C. net,re.00.iratio.000 i ..ove r or..=P,he ove,r.000.,
o coePr tor
. .iQ i.
4 L J 1 i C..es i i . C a .e i, Ver, As.ii . ,e.t e i. Detaal 0.000 i.000 0.000 3 4- 3 $ Come Jr SG tts wit h t he SRVs stuck open
% a l 9.tGia - 6 4AfV-hto 0.00 0.000 i.000 oiber.0is. . C..e i. A. s,. V, . .r e.i , o r .G, w i t h t he ..v s . e. io. .q 0.000 0.440 0.460 6 Status of spreyst $ PDA - trd Lettet B-4 - Dat ett sop Suut S RIO JS 28 4 C. sos
- 1. I' 3
8 Case li Small breat s
'Det*S2 O.00e .l.000 0,000 0.000 i 1- $ Case 3 Very seati creats l'
Drt=3) 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
& l n. I Case It 4GTDs with the 58Vs stuct npee
% 5 L 9-Stif t & SSDV*St0 0.000 t.000 0.000 0.000 Otherwise .
$ Case 4: A. V. No breek. or 1GTR wit h the SRVs Reelosteg 0.340. 0.090 0.680 0.000 7 $letut of Fan Coolers * $ PDS
- hot used for Surry n 540C Darc a f t'C $ the rte Cuoters are act 9 Rio 26 l- 1 J .I $ salety %*ede at aurry
. 0.000 0.000 L.000
't Statua of AC Power? $ PD4 - 4th letter i D-ACP DaACP BfACP $ RIU Ji l - 1 J l 1.009 0.000 0.000 9 Runt lajerted late Containeest ? $ P D.4 - 5th Letter 3- ' Rut?*le pestate puR1tle i Uselto indtrate a f ull cavity at Surry $ B10 42 2
4 Cases =
. t J B $ s toce t he sumps emi s e vit y do not connect at Surry.
,t 5 a tutt caelty nepttes weakenneemt spray oper a t tes.
5 $ Case le sealt treat s 3 Det *S A - 0.000 - 0.000 1,000 1 -t S Case Jt Very Seall breat a 2
..Sth*44 0,000 0.000 1.000 J' 1 1 8 Ca no li sG'ft with Setemlary $3Vs 4 tuft Opee 1 9 I S *2G rt 6 4$9V'St0 0.000 e 900 l.000 Otherwise . $ Cate 4s A. V. No Breat. or 1 GIN w6th the $Rfs teclottaq ft 4 8 '4 4 2 14 4 5
'le seat temoval t rum t he Steen Gener alpr o
- 4 .1G+Rt soluu
$ PDS -4th Lettes 4 310 il
~ scaea sGdna 1 Aneiny
- operat ed until bat ter tea 17 20 J B 2 3 4 8 depleted but not operat4mq when 26 24
-4 Ca sea $ eere encoeesa 29 I I $ Case ti boalt meest a 41 46 4
Br4*ta . $ No came f or Large breata 4.e SG-gu ts irrelecast. 0.006 0,000 t,000 0.000 L t $ taae 21 Very so.44 Re eat a
'S Mrt*S)
A.3.2 21
- .~
1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
)- I
% e a
b l Case 3: AGTD eit h Secondar y SRVs hut St urt Ores O-sGT* 6 sseVosto ' 1.000 0.000 a.000 0.000 ! Dtherwise- 9 Case 4: A, V. No Dreat, of hG10 wit h &#Vs Stut t Opee 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 11 bid the Operators bePressurtte the 6econdary belate the Core encovers' S Pb4 + 6th Letter a 6eeDePr so4cbett 6 800 1% 31 24 i 6 3 5 29 48 $6 4 Cases J 40 le i Ca se l a l is Pach tbited 3 e 1 $ by Pr'epr essuriting oce$sres whent anhe Secondary Ath& to outSyst ee operettag.
&GaRR es 4GtBR !'
0,000 1.000 l i i Case as St Dreat 3 i Ork-SI l.000 0.000 i g 1 C.se i, ,, .,e.t
.,t-.3 4 0.44% 0.519 Othervlse i C a se 4 : A. V. No break, et SG tR ;
9.000 1.000 S PD6 - 7th letter 43 Cooling 3 f or 3CP teens'ec D-P6C Dep etPsc $ plO !? 7 4 2 i 1 teses J l 10 $ Case 1, s low slack out s wit h *Ca l at ect i e 4 % in PDs Group i D-PotV 6 4Gd88 0.90% 0.094 0.000 Otherwise i C a se 3 Alow plectout s wit h WCS hot latact 4.000 0.000 0.000 $ and Ppss not in Group i 13.lsillas restalhetet Condillos? I n-purt e-leat mot-CF $ Les t - 4.1 sq ft. 5 alQ 28 el 49 2 1 3 3 $ Dupture = 7.0 sq. ft. 8 $0 42 3 Cases 8 hootman hole staes. t 64 69 78 4 1 l C a se le targe lettiattay Breat i l Leat say be either isoletion rallure or selsete at Surry, trt-A 4 tupture is etways Setante et sorry. no pre-estatting test s 0.0000 0.0003 0.9998 $ et Autry e ttee t he cont alstent is autre teospher ic. Otherwise 5 Case 2: No large Isillatino breat : 0,0000 0.000J 0.9995 i-
$URRy Aptt. Rev %) .01, il feb 09 - 78 Questions ty 3, 550 il NQuest t 1.000 ,
'60-2, lat' Plant j i 44se and Locallos of RCS preet when the Cose Uncovers? 6 PDs a let Letter ( T* Potv ) .
6 Brk-A Bit *43 hat-51 Drt-V D+tG1R D . Pon y 5 Question I as referensed to too i I J l 4 % 6 5 many quest toes to list here. { l.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 J t a s t he Deeet ton bete Drought under Coet roit 5 plQ 1% J Seres me scram i 1 3 l.000 0.000 3 for ECTR, a re t he heroadary Systes &#We S tuen Open? 5 POS let letter i ESRV+540 15RVesto S kly 4 5 6 i L J 1 9 le 0 000 1.000 4 Statum of $CCSS S l'D5 Jnd Letter 4 D-tCCA DatCCS BtECCA D-LPl2 1 #10 24
,3 4 J ) 4 4 Cases i l l C a se le Latee Breat to the RCS Stt-A 0.000 1.000 0.000 0 P00 3 % i l Case Ji small or very small areak la t he RCl 3 e 1 prk 52 or Drt sl 0.000 1,000 . 0.000 0.000 J l 3 6 Case li 14tR with Aerendary System SRVs pluet open i
%
- 4 l 9 5Gtt 6 SERV Stu O.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 -
Otherwies 4 Case 4 V, or ho B r e .' t , or $ Gip wit h 48Vs tec teslag 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 S DCl egressurltallea by the Operators 7 1 Op+pePr OpapePt OpnDeP r 910 19 2 1 3 3 i Cases n L 5 Case le very seath treats l' Brt-Si 0,000 0.000 1.000 2 l I $ Case it SGits wit h the AeVs stuen pren , t e i B-SGTR & A5RV-st0 0.000 0.000 1.000 Otherwise s Case ). A. A1 V. No Dreat, or $G1R wit h t he SRVs bec tost eg 0,000 0.000 1.000 - 6 Status of Sprays? 5 Ph4 - Ird letter a #10 D-SP Ba4P 6t%P ens'adH1 $ 2% 38 2 1 3 3 4 I e case. I 1 l Case li seali nreat a J Grt 82 0.000 4.000 0.000 0.000 1 1 1 C a se 3r tery small areams 1 prt Si 6.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 3 I l l Case 1: ActRs witb the 6tVs stuct open
% e 1 B-4CtR 6 '95RV-Sto
-0.000 1.000 0.000 0 000 Otherwise $ Ca se 4 : A. V. No Secah , or AGtR With the SRVs tectnalag 0.000 . - 1.000 0.000 0.000 1 9ta t us of rae Cooler s 8 8 PDS Not u s est for Surry
) part Balc StrC $ The ree Coolers are mot t Pty 24
% i 2 I l ta ge t y G r a<te at sorry 0.040 'O.000 1.000 t Statu4 of SC Power
- l PD$ - 4th Letter i D- ACP S 4 &c P S f Ar y 5 Rig 26 L l J l 0.000 0.000 1 000 9 # wit (blected teto Containeest8 5 Pps 5th letter n 9d%f le tdtfalo RW4ffin 5 b seal to i nsitea t e a full cas.ty at bursy 5 #10 12
) i J l 6 h l nc e tse susps sad oavity do not connect at Surry, a Casee 6 e ful i i i C a .e i- soeu nl s'a eatsv i t y fepiles contanament spray operattua.
2 \ met 52 0 000 1.000 0.000 1 I l t aan 7: vesy sm.5i i o n.s e = 1
/t.3.2 22 '
1
. art-sl 0.000 1,000 0.000 3- t I l Case is SG1a wit h secondary heVa St uck open
% * .i D'SGTO 6 SSPV $to 0.000 0.000 1,000 Otherwtae $ Case 4 A V, ho tseat, or hGit with the 49V6 Declosteg 0.000 8.000 0,000 le test Genovel f rom t he Steae Generators 9 i Pb6 - 6th let ter 6 plQ 11
- 4. SG se . 4Gast & Glut &Gdue $ &GdN8 = operated unt ti batt eries 12 70 2 4 2 3 48 depleted but not operettsq whee 21 Je 4 Casea $ core uncovers J9 8 1 8 Case 11 Small Dreats 45 56 J
Dat-l) $ De cose tot Large Dreaks as 80 tm La irrelesant. 0.000 0.000 0.000 4.000 1 1 8 C a 6e 2 : Very small Dreaks 1 Brt-Si 0 000 0.000 0.000 3.000 2 1 J l Case li $GtR with Secondary $9Vs hot Stuck Open
%
- J D 80ft 6 SltVallo 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Otherwi6s $ Case 4i A. V. No Dreek, of SGit with StVs St uch Opes 0.000 0,000 0.6%0 0.1%0 11 bid the operaters DePressurtse the secondary t.efore t he Core b erover s* $ 9 tis - 8th lettes J SecDePr honchePr 9 I Q 11 21 24
# 1 J l 29 4% $6 4 Cases J 10 10 0 Cate le tepressur ts ing t he secomtary syst ro la Prohthited J 4 I l ty Psocedures when en AFws is not opetettaq.
AGast or AGftR 0 000 L,000 1 1 0 Case 2! Si Strek 3 Drb Al 1.000 0.000
- t. 1 $ Case li A2 Steak 2
brt-RJ _ a 900 0.000 Otherwise $ C a se 4 : A. V, no bredt. et AGTR
\ 000 0.000 12 Cooling for RCP besla? 6 Pb4 11h Letter 3 B PSr DePac BfPsc 6 310 17 J -1 J A 3 Cases J l '10 9 C a se 1 4 tow Blacteuts wlth 304 Intact 6 4 4 8 la PDA Group 1 B PONV & EGdND 0.000 1.000 0.000 Otherwise $ Case J- Slow Blackout a wit h 90% hot thtact 0.00s 1.000 0,000 $ a hd PD&s hot th G r ou t. 1 li lat tial Cont ainneet Condit toa?
J .B-pupt b-Leat nos -C f' 5 test
- 0.4 s I ttQ Je 44 49
[_ J l J l 4 pupture
- 7.g.it. v ft 5 50 6J J Cassa l hoeiosi hole .sq ,43. $ as 6, 71 "
1 l l Case li Large inntlattaq Brest l l test say be eithee isoletton Failure or telselv st Surry. Drt-A 8 kupture is always Setaste at autry. ho Pre estalttog Leaks 0.1000 0.9060 0.0000 % at autrV since the containment se auti . a t eo sphe r nc . Othervlhe & r ate Jr No [atge lettnatthq hiesk 0.0000 0.0002 0.9998 EE 40WRV APFt. kee 11.07. 1% Feb 59 - 71 Questions I V- 1 LOCA's it NQuest L 1.006
'FQ-), Lut*- Platt == 1 Sino and Local ten of WCs Stest when the Core teenvern7 $ PDS - let letter t T= PORY l 6 nrk A pak EJ Sth-El Art-V D Sett h-PDFV $ Queet tus 1 ta refetenced t o t oo 5 1 2 % a S 6 $ saay questions to ltat here.
9.140 . 0 460 0.000 0 000 0.000 0.000 2 846 the Reaction been stought werber Coat t ol) $ stu 1%
) Actas to 6ctao
& L J l.000 0.000 3 for AGTN. at e t he Secondar y Systea ARVn aluct Opes? $ PDA lat Letter 3 $$RY-Stu Steinito $ ElQ 4 % 6 i~ L J $ 9 to 0.000 1.000 4 S t a t tts o f ECCL 3 $ PDS - 2 nit Lotter 4 D ECCS DatCC% StfCCS D-IPit 8 RIQ 34 2 L 4 4 4 4 Cases i l l case li Large breat la the nel
_ l hat- A 0,000 0 000 0,4%0 0.140
'J l 1 5 Cate J: Amall Or Very healt hreat in the kC S
) s i hrh-5 2 ' or bit-il 0,000 0.000 0.400 0.600 J l a $ Case li %Gtt with locoedary system Sava stuck open
%
- I 9 tGle a ssey sto 0.000 n.000 n.000 0.000
- Ot het e t se -
$ Cave t' V. or ho Dreek. or 4GTR with 5FVp peelosinq 0,000 1.000 0.000 0 000 i NC$1 !>epr,e s sur i s a tOpeDePr ion Dy the Oper4 tort 4 Op al'eP r Og-pePr l stQ 13
.J 1 J l i Cates t t $ rase ir Very soall Dreata
)
' Bet-ll 0,000 1.000 0,000
) I l l Came J. hGrk* wit h the $R V s At eo:t open
% e 1 H-%CtN 4 4tNV 9td 0 000 0.000 1.000 Othelvite l Case (* A. 41 V, No treat. or SGTR with the SWts 9vennstaq 0 000 1.040 0 040 6 Status of Spgart# $ Pld trd letter 4 5 5p taSp Ditp hop %hn1 S plQ J5 28 J t 2 I t t Cates 1 I & l'a te t< 42.e l l Niestt J
brt=8J o.110 0.000 u.4LO 0.000 1 i $ r.t ze J Veey seuil tt e eek n 1 Bena%I O 900 1 090 0 *R* O 0.000 , J l I l t a nc t- M'. t m u with the %Nfs a n ne t open I
% 1 l w v.iw . nsav- sto A.3.2-23
4.006 - ' 1.000 0.000 0.000 Othervlae 4 Case 4 e A. V. he Dreat, or $C16 wit h t he PRVs Deeleolog 0.134 0.000 9.684 0.006 7 Stetue of Fan Cooler 49 -
$ PDS - Wet used for Surty I 3 h F{ 04FC 6ftC S the ten Coolers are set 4 klO 34 4 s 3 ) $ $sf ety Grada et Surty 0.000 0.906 1.000
'S Stetwa of AC Power? $ PD4 - 4th Letter i n 9 ACP 94ACP B f 4C P $ PIO JL l l l 3 3 4.099 0.000 0.00$
$ esST lejected lato Contetsoests - 4th Letter i 3 punt Is twstale tuttfle $ bsed to todteate a f u$ PDSll esvity at Surry 8 pig 13 !
3 8 3 ) l Staee the sumps and cavity do not connect at Sutrie i 4 Cases f i
; . C.se i, .6.a.i u.ll,ec.avity ts lept ies cost a t ement spray creretton, 6th-83 j' 16 8 5 16 1 3 16 1 3
.1 4 8 Case 3 Very Small treeks 3
Det-81 0.000 0.0be 1.004 3 4 3 6 Case 3i 60?R eith Secondary Srvn Stuct open !
%
- 1 9 Scia 6 SShv-Sto 0.000 0.000 4,000 Otherwise 5 C a se 4 : A. V. We Breate of SGTR with t he StVs tectoalmg t6 4 4 t6 4 3 96 4 )
19 Dest Demoval f rom t he Steen Gener aterst $ PDS
- 6th Lettet $ pIO 11 4 SE-be 4 Game SGlut SGdup 8 SGdNB
- operated until betteries 12 30 J & 3 3 4 9 depleted but tot operatisq whos Ji 34 4 teses 8 tore uncovers 39 4 I l Case Is Small treats 45 54 3
Sit-63 8 ko case f or targe Dreats as SC-se is irrelevast. 1.000 0,000 0.000 0.000 t t $ Case 3 Vesy 6 salt aseats i' l Stk Si 9.000 0.000 .000 0.900 1
$ Case 1: 4019 wit h Secondary SRVs het Sturt Opea 3 3 3 6 8 3
D Scia 6 $$mVmS40 1.009 0.003 0.000 0.000 otherwise $ C a se 4 : A, V. ho treat, of SGTR wit h SpVs Stuck open 5.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 11 Did the Operators DepressuelSe t he Secostlery bef ore t he Core Uncover s* t PDs - 6th Lettet ! 3 SecDert ac6cleePr 4 010 11 il 34 3 1 3 $ J9 el 56 4 Cases J 10 10' S Case ti Depressu ste i a a 4 . ny e r oc edu r e.rwhe. t a l og
..t he a s. e.c.o nda r y &lpe.t.
is out i i .s..P t oh ib i t ed SCaus or SGfWe 0.000 4.000 i L 1 $ Case in St Dreat 4 Det-SI 0.966 0.014 1 1 $ Case 3t SJ Dreat 3 Bak-52 1.600 0.000 Othervlee $ C a se t o 4. V. No Breat, or St.fR l.000 0.000 13 Cooling for PCP Seats * $ PDS 7th Letter I
- l. B-PSC ' B4P&C SfPSC $ RlQ 17 3 i J B J Casen 3 1 40 $ Case ir Slow Blackouts with pCS Intact 6
- 4 5 in PDS Croup i i B-PORV. 6 4GdWR 9.909 0.098 0.000 "l Otherwise 5 Case 37 Slow Blackouta with RCS Not latact L.000 0.000 0.000 $ amt PDAs not in Group 1 11 Inittat Costelement Cond4tton? ,
n . D aupt D-l. eat noH Cr S Lost
- 0.4 sq It. S tlQ JB 41 49 i 3 4 J J $ Rupture = 1.0 sq. ft. $ 50 63 !
J Cohes 9 hostaan hole staen. 8 68 69 74 1 1 S Case to Large lettlette9 proat t t teet may be either Isonettaa f ailure or solaste at Surry. >
'j Det-A 5 Aupture la always Setsmic at Surry. No Pre-estalttaq tests 4.0000 9,0000 0.0000 % at autry atace the contatement ta sub-atsoapherte.
Otherwise $ Case Js ho lar.je lat tistlag Breat 0.0000 0,0003 9.9998 s 1
.1 A,3,2 24
A.3.3 Additional Diccussions of Selected Ouestions i Thi:: Suosection cont.ains additional discussions for three questions in the APET which are too lengthy to fit conveniently in Subsection A.1.1. The . three questions are:' f
- 14. Event V Break Location under Water?
- 21. Is ac Power Available Early? (Also relevant to the other offsite power recovery questions - 45 and 56.)
- 24. Is Core Damage Arrested? No Vessel Breach?
Ouestion 14. Event V - Break Location under Water? This discussion concerns the . distribution used for the probability of submergence .of the break location for Event V. If the break location is covered by a few feet of water when the fission products release commences, , the releases to the atmosphere are likely to be substantially reduced relative to those from a break location that is not submerged. The LPIS
- 1. piping in the safeguards building at Surry is located so that there is a I
substantial chance that the break location will be under water when the releases start. The water comes from the RCS inventory that escapes out the break, and the'RWST. The contents of the RWST are diverted out the j break from the LPIS pumps instead of flowing into the RCS, Acdefinitive l resolution of this problem might be obtained by detailed thermal-hydraulic and structural analyses of the low pressure piping. As resources did not permit this, four experts vere consulted on = this problem for the first draft of NUREG-1150. A 3-1 The treatment of ~ this problem at that. time is described in Appendix B,9 of Volume 1 of the previous version of NUREG/CR-4 3 51, ^. a .t When the analyses for the. Second Draft of NUREG-1150^.33 were being revised, it was determined that there was no new information on this issue, and that the'information available was sufficient. The-conclusions of the.
'four experts who considered .this issue were treated somewhat differently.
for the revised accident progression analysis, so this' ~ issue is discussed here, , Event V is the failure of the check valves in one of the 6 in. cold leg
'ECCS ' injection. lines and the subsequent failure of LPIS piping outside the '
containment. The check valves separate the high pressure RCS piping from ' the LPIS piping which is 10-in., ASME Class 2, . designed for 600 psi and 200*F. The: check valve failures expose this low pressure piping to full RCS pressure (about 2500 psi) .and the low pressure piping fails. Because the three LPIS trains all feed a single header,: this LPIS piping failure simultaneously creates-a break in the RCS, fails the safety system required to supply water to the core, and bypasses the containment. A 3.3-1
1 The four experts who considered the problem of the probability that the break location would be submerged by the water flowing out the break are: Peter R. Davis, Intermountain Technology Corp.
-James E. Metcalf, Stone & Webster Engineering Robert L. Ritzman, Electric Power Research Institute Walter A. von Riesemann, Sandia National Laboratories These experts reviewed the location of the LPIS piping in the safeguards building, and determined that about 80% of the piping is located within 2 feet of the floor, and so would be covered by several feet of water by the time core damage commenced. The other approximately 20% of the piping is located higher, and break in this portion of the piping would result in the break location being covered by only 0.5 ft of water or less. r Expert A reasoned that the most-likely location for a pipe rupture would be the- first elbow on the low pressure side of the transition from high pressure pipe to low pressure pipe. This elbow would be the first to ;
~
experience high stress levels, and is restrained in a manner which would increase the t stress . Expert A also drew on an analysis of operating . stresses on the system in question. Although the flow direction, velocity,
- and: thermodynamic conditions are different from those for Event V, he found -
the insights;from that study helpful. In this study, the .the first elbow on the-low pressure side of the transition from high pressure pipe to low pressure. pipe was:the second highest stress location. The highest stress location was another -elbow which is at the same location, so a break at this elbow!would also result in a submerged release location. Expert A's q views are summarized-in Reference A.3 4 He concluded that the-probability ; of:the break , location being submerged by several feet of water was 0.90. Export- Biagreed'in general with the observations 'and conclusions of Export A. Given the uncertainty in the basic ~ accident scenario, he thought that a-
. submergence probability of 0.90 was too high, but he did not offer a specific-probability.
Expert C1 performed hisJ own assessment of the accident based on a visit to t Lthe-plant, review of the drawings, and discussions with utility personnel. ,
; and ; with engineers a t the architect-engineering firm that designed and l constructed the _ plant. He concluded that the submergence probability was 1 0.80.
.i' Expert' D had previously analyzed this accident for Surry A 3-5 In that
' analysis, no conclusions regarding the break location could be justified.
Based on the lengths of LPIS piping at different levels, Expert D estimated tho ' submergence probability to be 0.80. But, he - noted that if a cican, double-ended guillotine break occurred, bubble collapse or break up before the bubbles ' reach the pool surface is unlikely, thus rendering effective pool scrubbing' improbable. However, the confined nature of the safeguards building would result in' considerable two-phase mixing and turbulence above
~ the pool surface, and Expert D was of the opinion that this would result in tonsiderable fission product removal (decontamination factors on the order L of 10) in the safeguards building if not in the pool itself.
l A.3.3-2
Based on this information from the four experts, a uniform distribution from 0.70 to 1.0 was selected for the probability that the break location would be submerged under several feet of water when the fission product release starts in Event V at Surry. This distribution captures the uncertainty expressed by the experts, and the mean value (0.85) reflects the submergence probabilities of the three experts who provided quantitative values. The removal mechanism is referred to as poc1 scrubbing, event though the mechanisms described by Expert D might be more effective. Question 21. Is AC Power Available Enriv? Whether offsite electrical power is recovered durit g a specified period following the onset of core degradation is determinnd by sampling from a set of distributions for power recovery,^3*5 These distributions reflect the type of electrical switchyard at Surry, as explat aed in NUREG-1032. A 3-7 Figure A.3-1 is a plot of 5th percentile, median, and 95th percentile of this set of distributions. A single curve of the sot summarized in Figure A.3 1 gives the probability that the time to offsite power recovery will be greater than time t, where t is measured from the start of the accident, i.e., from the loss of offsite power. Figure A 3-1 shows that the probability of power - recovery is quite high in the first two or three hours, and that the probability of power recovery is fairly small after 6 or 8 h. The remainder of the discussion in this appendix section concerns the determination of the lengths of the periods used for the recovery of offsite power in the Surry APET. The APET considers three time periods: Early - from the end of the recovery period considered in the accident. frequency analysis to 30 minutes before vessel failure; Late - from 30 minutes before vessel failure to the end of rapid CCI; and Very Late - from the end of rapid CCI to 24 hours. It may be possible to arrest the core degradation process, achieve a safe stable state, and avoid vessel failure if power is recovered in the early period. For internal initiators, it is estimated that power will almost always be recovered about a day after the initial LOSP. The use of exactly 24 h for the end of the Very Late period is arbitrary. In the interface with the accident frequency analysis, it is important to account for all
.the time since the start of the accident, and not count any period twice.
There are three questions in the Surry APET concerning the recovery of offsite power: Question 21 for the Early period; Question 45 for the Late period; and Question 56 for the Very Late period. For Sorry there is a further complication: the service water canai must be refilled before the ECCS pumps can be started (service water to cool the pumps comes from the canal, and the canal is expected to drain during SB0s that last more than a few tens of minutes). The time needed to refill the SW canal was a sampled A.3.3-3
l l l' variable in the accident frequency analysis, but the nominal time. 30 minutes, is used in the accident progression analysis. If it were not for the need to refill the SW canal, the end of the Early period would be the time of VB. Instead, 30 minutes before VB is used because it represents the latest time at which power can be recovered in time to restore injection to the core before the vessel fails. 1-i 0.8-2 Al 0.6 - w 2
- 0.4 -
F-CL 0.2 -- 0= i i i i 0 2 , 6 8 10 TIME TO RECOVER LOSP
. Figure A.3-1. Mean and 90% Bounds of the Offsite Power Recovery Distributions for Surry.
The seven SB0 PDSs for Surry are given below with the percentage each PDS contributes (see Table 2.2 2) to the total mean core damage frequency (MCDF) and the nominal times to which power recovery was considered in the accident frequency analysis. AFA Recovery PDS % MCDF Time (hours) ' TRRR-RSR 13 0.5 S2RRR RCR S 1.0 S2RRR-RDR 2 1.0 S3RRR RCR 1 2.5 4.3 (4.0) S3RRR-RDR 21 2.5-4.3 (4.0) TRRR RDR 3 7.0 TRRR RDY 25 7.0 A.3.3 4
l l l l PDS TRRR RSR is the only PDS in the Fast SB0 group; the other six PDSs constitute the Slow SB0 group. The AFWS driven by the steam turbine runs I until battery depletion in the Slow SB0 accidents whereas it fails at, or l shortly after, the start of the accident in the Fast SB0 group. The start and end of the offsite power recovery time periods in clock time depend L upon the PDS, since some of the accidents develop much faster than others. Both whether the AFWS operates until battery depletion and the size of the break in the RCS determine the time until core damage commences, and the rate at which it progresses. The end of the time period for electric power recovery is a sampled vari-able in the accident frequency analysis. As the start of the period is fixed at the start of the accident, this is feasible for the accident frequency analysis. Treating the start of the period, the end of the period, and the power recovery distribution itself did not prove feasibic in the accident progression analysis. Therefore, fixed time periods are used in the accident progression analysis. The start of the early power recovery period is fixed at the nominal time for the end of the period used in the accident frequency analysis. These times are given above. The power recovery times for the S3 RRR-F. A and S 3RRR-RDR PDSs depend upon the cutset, and varied from 150 minutes to 258 minutes, as explained in the report of the accident frequency analysis. A.3-s The bulk of the frequency is concentrated in cutsets for which power recovery times of 216 minutes (3.6 h) and 258 minutes (4,3 h) were used. Therefore, 4.0 h is used as the start of the early power recovery period in the accident progression analysis for these two PDSs. The time to the UTAF, taken to be the nominal time for the start of core degradation, and the time of VB, are taken from STCP analyses A 3 8to15 performed for the NUREG 1150 project. While it would have been preferable to rely on other codes that perform detailed modelling of the core melt progression as well, this did not prove feasible. The time from the st+.3= of the accident to UTAF is determined primarily by a warer boil ff calculation, and this does not vary greatly from code to code. The ts: of progression for the core melt and the time from core slump to VB may differ from code to code, but these differences are considered to be small relative to the uncertainty in the time at which offsite power will be recove re d .' Tables A.3-1 and A.3-3 summarize the information available from the STCP runs made in the last few years for NUREG 1150 ^ 3-3 The information in these tables was analyzed to determine UTAF and VB times that were appli-l cable to the seven PDSs for SB0 at Surry. The results are summarized in Table A. 3-1. The end of the period period for which power recovery was considered in the accident frequency analysis forms the start of the early APET period. This must be the case to avoid a period in which power recovery is not considered, even though the start of the early period is i conceptually at UTAF. The end of the early period is half an hour before l VB. In general, 30 minutes was allowed in the accident frequency analysis for restoring power to the busses in the plant, refilling the SW canal, starting the ECCS, and providing enough water to core to remove a significant amount of heat. A.3.3-5 l l
m . rf, ,
# .A,gr t
['! Table A.3+1 Timing Information for Surry Blackout PDSs , (Times in hours) j l Start Early End Early Relevant I PDS Period M VB Period _ _ Seouencent . l.
'~
TRRR.RSR 0.5 1.7 2.7 2.2 Q,R.TMLB' P S RRR.RCR 1,0 1.8 4.0 3.5 Q.S HF, Q.S 3HF S RRR.RDR- 1.0 1.9 5.0 4.5 R.S 2DY , ~
! i .
[
$ 3RkR.RCR 4.0 4.0 6.2 5.7 Q.S3 B (2139) :
, 5 3RRR.RDR. -4.0 8.6 10.3 9.8 Q,n.SaB (Letter)
C TRRR.RDR 7.0 11.0 12.7 12.2 R.TB ( TRRR.RDY' 7.0' 11.0 12.7 12.2 R.TB
~
1 Q:indleates a Sequoyah sequence in Tables A.3 1 and A.3 2i R indicates a p Surry sequence. Where there are two sequences with the same identifier, 1, , the source is indicated in parentheses, nf b r t i i L E s, h F
- +
4 p A.3.3 6
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Ij}'ysit 0 2 1. 53 88: 55 888B j l as "'I 'RI' R 33jj888:5888j i i 1 ga nii gi... . 1 53 :: :: siii 5 511 as 222: i R ii gj .ii .is g a gg ..... .... ,
= gg ..... ....
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j a Ili 8"S}} 8 i i . .' 55}$$ Ebb 5 I ee St. etee y 2 niiII5Ij.I Idj eg
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eg Id.I.}I 5335 A.3.3 7
Estimating the time of VB for the Sa blackout PDSs is more difficult than for the other PDSs since there are no STCP results for blackout accidents with the PORVs stuck open. The UTAF and VB times for SakRR RCR and S RRR- 2 RDR are estimated from other sequences. For S 2RRR RDR, the UTAF and VB times for uncovering of TAF and VB are based on the Surry S DY times. Comparing the $ 3D, S DX , and S DZ times with the S3 B (Letter) times shows 3 3 little difference in the UTAF times for blackout sequences versus break-initiated sequences. Therefore, the S DY times are used for S RRR 2 RDR. For S RRR RCh, the SCs are not depressurized by the operators and there are no comparable STCP analyses. Comparing Sequoyah 3S D with S3 }ir shows a very marked effect of depressurizing the SGs. But RCS pressures will be much ' lower in an $3 sequence, so this may not apply. The UTAF time is actually lon8er for toe Sequoyah Salir sequence than for the Surry S DY 2 sequence even thou6h the Salir run did not have the AIN operating. It was estimated that the stuck open PORVs will depressurize the RCS enough so that the effects of the depressurizacion of the secondary system are minimal, so 4.0 h appears to be a reasonable VB time. The differences between VB at 5 h for S RRR RDR and VB at 4 h for S RRR RCR are unlikely to be significant compared to other uncertainties. # Table A.3 4 recapitulates the start and end times of the early period, the ' period in which electric power recovery may lead to the arrest of the core
- degradation process. Times have been rounded off to the nearest half hour.
In light of the uncertainty in the VB time for the PDSs with stuck open PORVs, 4.0 h is adopted for the end of the early period for both Sa PDSs. Table A.3 4 also . contains two times for the end of rapid CCI. The time from VB to the start of CCI will depend on the amount of water to be boiled off if the core debris is coolable. Table A.3 4 shows the end of rapid CCI times for a cavity which is dry at VB and receives no substantial amount of additional water, and for a cavity which is dry at VB but receives the ' accumulator contents shortly after VB. Table A.3-4 Electric Power Recovery Times for Surry [ Times in hours) Plant 4 Start of End Of End CCI End CCI t Damage Total Early Early Dry Cavity State ti@I Period y,ggig.d Cavity 1/4 Full TRRR RSR 14 0.5 2.0 8.0 9.0 S RRR RCR 5 1.0 4.0 10.0 11.0 S RRR RDR 4 1.0 4.0 10.0 11.0 S3RRR RCR <1 4.0 5.5 11.5 12.5 S3RRR RDR 20 4.0 10.0 16.0 17.0 TRRR RDR 3 7.0 12.0 18.0 19.0 TRRR RDY 24 7.0 12.0 18.0 19.0 A.3.3 8 r
1 The containment sumps are not connected to the cavity at a low level in the Surry containment. Thus, the only way for RCS or RWST water to reach the cavity is if it is sprayed in from above. As electric power is required to operate the spray pumps, with one exception, it is not possible to have a full cavity at VB for the blackout PDSs. The exception is the case in which electric power is recovered just before VB, but too late to arrest core damage and prevent VB. It is conceivable that the sprays could ope-rate long enough before VB to at least partially fiil the cavity. Even with all f0ur recirculation spray pumps operating, it is estimated to take about an hour to fill the cavity (see the discussion of Question 9 in Subsectior A.1.1). If power is recovered an hour before VB, the chances of arresting core damage are very good. Thus, the probability of a full ca-vity at VB for SB0 accidents is negligiblo. The Surry TM1.B' c results in BMI 2104 Lao show that it takes about 60 minutes to boil off the accumu-lator water. (The accumulator water (2800 f t ) fills the cavity about one 8 quarter full.) The period of rapid CCI denotes the period in which most of the fission products that will eventually be released from the CCI are indeed released. As the releases decrease slowly over time, this period cannot be rigidly defined. A length of about 5 to 6 h is used for this period here. The power recovery distributions (Figure A.3 1) are very flat after 8 to 10 h, so many of the time distinctions in Table A.3 4 are not significant compared to the variation between the curves in the distribution. Thera-fore, the simplified electric power recovery perio.is in Table A.3 5 are used. This scheme preserves the differences between cases in the Early period in which power recovery is more likely and more important, but condenses cases at long times when power recovery is less likely and less important. Table A.3 5 Electric Power Recovery Periods for Surry [ Times in hours) Plant t Start Start Start Damage Total Early Late Very Late State EDI Period Period Period S RRR RCR 5 1.0 4.0 9.0 S2RRR RDR 4 1.0 4.0 9.0 TRRR RSR 14 0.5 2.0 9.0 c .RRR RCR <1 4.0 5.5 9.0 S3RRR-RDR 20 4.0 10.0 17.0 TRRR RDR 3 7.0 12.0 17.0 TRRR RDY 24 7.0 12.0 17.0 A.3.3 9 I
Civen the time periods for each PDS as shown in Table A.3 5, the case structure for the offsite power recovery questions can be defined. The cases are listed below for the three offsite electric power recovery questions in the Surry APET. Question 21, is ac Power Available Early? Case 1: Had Power Initially Have Power Now Case 2: Power Failed Initially, Not Reusverable Case 3: TRRR RSR, no AFW, Recovery Period - 0.5 2.0 h Case 4: S RRR RDR and S RRR RCR, APW, Rec. Period - 1.0 4.0 h Case 5: S 3RRR RCR, APW, no Secondary Depressurization, Recovery Period - 4.0 5.5 h case 6: S RRR 3 RDR, AFW, Secondary Depressurization, Recovery Period - 4.0 10.0 h Case 7: TRRR RDR and TRRR RDY, APW, Secondary Depressurization, Recovery Period - 7.0 - 12.0 h Question 45. Is ac Power Available Late? Case 1: Had Power Initially - Have Power Now case 2: Power Failed Initially, Not Recoverable Case 3: TRRR-RSR, no APW, Recovery Period - 2.0 - 9.0 h Case 4: S2 RRR RDR and 2S RRR RCR, APW, Rec. Period - 4.0 9.0 h Case 5: S 3RRR RCR, AFW, no Secondary Depressurization, Recovery Period - 5.5 9.0 h Case 6: S 3RRR RDR, AFW, Secondary Depressurization, Recovery Period - 10 17 h Case 7: TRRR RDR and TRRR RDY, AFW, Secondary Depressurization, i Recovery Period - 12 17 h Question 56. Is ac Power Available Very Late? Case 1: Had Power Initially - Have Power Now case 2: Power Failed Initially, Not Recoverable Case 3: S RRR 3 RDR, TRRR RDR and TRRR RDY, Recovery Period - 17 24 h Case 4: TRRR RSR, 0 RRR 2 RDR S RRR 2 RCR, and S RRR 3 RCR, Recovery Period - 9 24 h Question 24. Is Core Damage Arrested? No Vessel Breach? The problem of arresting core damage before VB has received little atten-tion since the accidents which are most important to risk are those which , proceed on to core melt. The THI 2 accident in the primary source of information on this subject. Based on the current understanding of the THI 2 accident, a method has been devised for estimating the probability of core damage arrest for each of the SB0 PDSs. This method utilizes the electric power recovery periods defined in the previous portion of Appendix A.3.3 (see Question 21). The application of this method to the Surry APET is described here, following a brief recapitulation of the relevant parts ) of the THI 2 accident. A.3.3 10 q
l The TMI-2 Acelen t. The THI 2 core was finally quenched in a series of events starting about 200 minutes after the start of the accident when HPI operated for 17 minutes and filled the vesselA.3 ts. A.sm. Evidently the core was not in a coolable configuration when first covered with water as the steaming rate was less than the decay heat generation rate until the ; relocation of about 25 MT of melt to the lower plenum at 224 minutes (Reference A 3 16, p. 56). After the relocation or slump, the core assumed . a coolable configuration and the temperature in all parts of the core began l to decrease. However, the temperature decrease of the molten material in the center of the lower part of the core may have been quite slow due to i the thick insulating crust around it. The temperature decrease of the { molten material that flowed down into the lower plenum is believed to have i been much more rapid. ! l For reference, the estimated end state of the TMI 2 core is as follows (Reference A.3 16 Table 1, p. 26, updated with information from Reference A.3 18): Recion Fraction of Total Core Mass Upper Core Debris (Rubble Bed) .24 Previously Molten Zone .26 Standing Rods .32 Debris in Lower Plenum .18 , If it is assumed that all of the lower plenum debris came from the molten ' zone at the time of relocation, then the molten zone at one time contained - about 454 of the core (mass). Note that the computer simulations often track " fraction relocated" or some other measure of core damage, which may be ret.arted as fraction of core molten. By these measures, the mass in the rubble bed would count as wollt and the value for " core no longer in origi-nal geometry" would be about 60s. Some computer codes assume core " slump" and vessel failure when the fraction molten or otherwise damaged reaches a i threshold value. These threshold values have ranged from 50% to about 856. Background. The problem is to determine distributions for the probability that power recovery in the early time period (see the discussion of Question 21 above) will arrest the core degradation process and prevent
- vessel failure. Core damage arrest is envisaged in resulting in a safe stable state as in TMI 2, although the extent of damage may be much less than that at TMI 2. As discussed under Question 21, the period of interest for power recovery is from the end of the power recovery period used in the accident frequency analysis to 30 minutes before vessel breach. (The 30
- minutes stems from the need to refill the service water canal at Surry.)
Once power is restored and the SW canal refilled, the initiation of appropriate core injection systems is considered highly likely as the ! I operators are periodically trained in this procedure. The uncertainty in whether the operators will promptly restore ECCS flow to the vessel has been subsumed in the uncertainty in whether the flow of water will terminate core degradation and prevent vessel breach since the uncertainty in the latter is so much larger. The power recovery period in the APET that is of interest here is the Early period. The beginning and end of this period (in minutes) for the SB0 PDSs are given below: A.3.3 11
PDS Power Recovery Period AFA STCP Start End UTAF UTAF TRRR.RSR 30 120 60 102 S RRR RaR 60 240 90 111 S3RRR RCR 240 330 270 240 l S RRR.RDR 240 600 270 $16 , TRRR RDa 420 720 450 660 where S RRR.RaR means S RRR RCR and S RRR.RDR, and TRRR.RDa means TRRR. , RDR and TRRR.RDY. The AFA UTAF column contains the nominal time used ' for UTAP and the onset of core damage in the accident frequency analy- j sis. The STCP UTAF column contains UTAF times derived from STCP 1 analyses as explained above in the discussion of Question 21. AFA UTAF is derived by taking the start of the early period, and adding to it the j 30 minutes needed to refill the service water canal. (The start of the early period is constrained to be the end of the power recovery period used in the accident frequency analysis so that there are no gaps in the ' times for which power recovery is considered.) The end of the APET early period was obtained by determining the VB times from available STCP calculations, and subtracting the 30 minutes needed to refill the service water canal. This value was then rounded to the nearest 30 , minutes as discussed above (see Question 21). Basis of the Method. From the TMI 2 dataA.s se and subsequent analyses, ; it has been estimated that if less than 30 MT of the core is in debris form when ECCS flow refills the vessel, the chances of vessel breach are small; and if more than 60 MT is in debris form when the vessel is refilled, the chances of vessel breach are large. If the amount of debris is between 30 and 60 MT, it is difficult to say what the outcome would be. (Note that the core at Surry weighs about 103 MT, so 30 MT is . about 30% of the core, etc.) If less than 30 MT is in debris form, then ! either all the debris is coolable in the core, or, if part of the debris relocates to the bottom head, then the mass in the bottom head is small l enough that the bottom head will not be heated to the failure point. If more than 60 MT is in debris form, then it is not coolable. This was shown at TMI where the debric in the " crucible" or " teacup" in the central core region continued to heat up after_the core was reflooded. If 60 MT of the core is in debris form, then about half that amount may relocate into the bottom head as at TMI. With 30 MT of core debris L- located in the bottom head, heat transfer analyses show that the head will probably heat up to the point where its loss of strength is significant. If the ends of the power recovery periods were fairly close to UTAF.30 and VB-30 minutes, the relative amounts of time from UTAF to 30 MT of debris, from 30 MT of debris to 60 MT of debris, and from 60 MT to VB (as derived from the STCP runs) could be used to estimate the condi. tional probability of core damage arrest. This approach cannot be used
- because the start of the power recovery period is of ten not very close to UTAF 30 minutes as shown above. Furthermore, it appears that the STCP overestimates the rate of core degradation.
A.3.3 12
l l l A comparison of the results of the different detailed, mechanistic codes i indicates that the newer codes such as MELCOR, MELPROG, CORMLT, and MAAP predict a slower core melt progression than the MARCH module of the STCP. The newer codes are in general agreement that 30% of the core is molten or relocated about 50 to 60 minutes after UTAF, which is consid-etably later than typical MARCH results. Obtaining the times when 30 MT and 60 MT are molten from the STCP analyses would underestimate the chances of core damage arrest. Therefore, the method u.ed to estimate the probability of core damage arrest is based on a MELCOR runC818 for I which UTAF occurred at 100 minutes and with the PORVs stuck open (RCS at 6.6 MPa). Allowing a few minutes for refilling the vessel to the TAF, this simulation showed that injection had to start at 47 minutes af ter , UTAF to have the core covered before 30 MT was in debris form, and that - injection had to start at 63 minutes af ter UTAF to have the core covered before 60 MT was in debris form. Aeolication to Surry. The results of this MELCOR run are applied to the Surry blackout PDSs by means of a multiplier on the times for 30 MT and 60 MT in debris form. This multiplier is comprised of two factors: one based on the decay power level, and the other based on the latent heat of vaporization. These two factors suffice for this purpose because the rate of core degradation is largely a function of the rate at which water is boiled off. The rate of water boiloff depends directly on the heat available and the amount of heat necessary to change liquid water - to steam, which is a function of pressure. The following table gives the reactor power at UTAF (time derived from the STCP runs), the nominal pressure, latent heat of vaporization, and the total multiplier, total multiplier (MPX). The MPX is used to scale the MELCOR times and is calculated from the equation MPX - [1.11 / tRP) * (hr, / 1530) where 1.11 is the reactor power at 100 minutes (t of rated power) and 1530 is the latent heat of vaporization (kJ/kg) at 6.6 MPa. For the S 3 PDSs, values of hg, in the middle of the range were used. PDS Reactor RCS h is MPX Power Pressure (t) (MPa) (kJ/kg) MELCOR Run 1.11 6.6 1530 1.00 TRRR.RSR 1.10 15.2 990 0.66 S3RRR.RaR 1.06 2.8 1810 1.23 S3RRR.RCR 0.85 7 14 1500 1100 1.10 SaRRR.RDR 0.66' 7-14 1500 1100 1,43 TRRR.RDa 0.57 15.2 990 1.25 Using the multipliers given above, the times when 30 MT and when 60 MT of the core are in debris form can be calculated for each PDS from the MELCOR results. That is, for the time after UTAF when 30 MT is in debris form, the value of 47 minutes calculated by MELCOR is scaled oy the appropriate A.3.3 13
MPX. The time when 60 MT is in debris form is similarly calculated from the 63 minute MELCOR value. The results are as follows: Relative to UTAF Relative to Accident PDS STCP 30 MT 60 MT 30 MT 60 MT UTAF Debris Debris Debris Debris (min) (min) (min) (min) (min) TRRR-RSR 102 31 41 133 143 S RRR RaR 111 58 78 169 189 S3RRR-RCR 240 52 70 292 310 S3RRR RDR 516 67 90 583 606 TRRR RDa 660 59 79 719 739 For example, for TRRR RSR, MPX is 0.66, so 47 minutes is multiplied by this value to obtain 31 minutes for the time to 30 MT for TRRR RSR relative to UTAF. UTAF is estimated by the STCP to occur 102 minutes after the start of the accident, so, for TRRR RSR, 30 MT of the core is estimated to be in debris form 133 minutes after the start of the accident. These times can be used to estimate the conditional probability for each PDS or groups of PDSs that, given power recovery in the period before vessel breach, when the vessel has been refilled the core will have less than 30 MT in debris form, between 30 MT and 60 MT is debris form, or more than 60 MT in debris form. 12RRR RCR and S RRR RDR. The MELCOR analysis is almost directly applicable to S RRR RCR and S2 RRR RDR as the uncovering time and the pressures are close to those used in the MELCOR run. The nominal value for the intermediate pressure range (400 psia - 2.8 MPa) is somewhat lower than the pressure observed as typical during core degradation in the MELCOR run, so there is an adjustment for the latent heat of vaporization. The total multiplier is 1.23 as given in the table above. The SCTP UTAF time for the Sa PDSs is 111 minutes (decay power - 1.06%). Let to (30mR) be the time (minutes), relative to UTAF, at which injection has to start to refill the vessel to TAF before 30 MT of the core is in debris form. Let t o (60mR) be the analogous time for 60 MT. Using the multiplier defined above, for S 2RRR RaR, to (30mR) - 58 and t o(60mR) - 78. Let t (30mR) be the time (minutes), relative to the start of the accident, at which injection has to start to refill the vessel to TAF before 30 MT of the core is in debris form. Let t, (60mR) be the analogous time for 60 MT.- From the table above, the UTAF time is 111 minutes, so c.(30mR) - 169 minutes. Let' t (30mRmC) be the time (minutes), relative to the start of the accident at which injection has to start to refill the vessel to TAF before 30 MT of the core is in debris form, minus the 30 minutes needed to refill the service water canal. That is, t.( 30mRmC) is t (30mR) 30, so, for - these two PDSs, t,(30mRmC) - 139 minutes. The time t (60mRmC) is defined analogously to t,( 30mRmC) . Based on these definitions, the relevant times for S RRR 2 RCR and S RRR-RDR 2 may be summarized: A.3.3 14
l t,(30mR) - 169 t (60mR) = 189 t,(30mRmC) - 139 t,(60mRmC) - 159 where the times are in minutes. Let A(<30) be the period when less than 30 MT of the core is in debris form, which extends from the start of the APET power recovery period to t,(30mRmC). If power is recovered in this period, core damage arrest and the prevention of VB is very likely (on the order of 0.90). Let At(30-
- 60) be the period when between 30 MT and 60 MT is in debris form. This period extends from t,(30mRmC) to t,(60mRmC). If power is recovered in this period, the probability of arresting core damage and preventing of VB is indeterminate (about 0.50). Finally, let at(>60) be the period when more than 60 MT of the core is in debris form. This period extends frr% t (f0mRmC) to the end of the power recovery period. If power is recovered in this period, core damage arrest and the prevention of VB is very unlikely (on the order of 0.10).
Based on the information above, the lengths (minutes) of these three periods can be found for S RRR 2 RCR and S RRR 2 RDR: At(>30) - 70 At(30 60) - 20 at(>60) - 81 If power recovery is equally likely at all times during the early period for S RRR RCR and 2S RRR RDR, the probability of core damage arrest would be on the order of 0.50. However, from 1 to 4 h, the power recovery curve is not flat, and the probability of power recovery is much higher in the earlier part of the period than in the latter part. Considering the relative lengths of the three periods given above, and the shape of the power recovery curves (see Figure A.3 1 above in the discussion of Question-21), a cumulative probability distribution defined by y - x2, where y is the probability and x varies from 0.0 to 1.0, was selected for the Sa pDSs. The mean and median values for this distribution are around 0.70. S 3RRR RCR. The STCP UTAF time for S 3RRR R//RCR is 240 minutes (decay power = 0.85%). Compared to the previous case, the longer time to UTAF results in a lower decay power at UTAF. But this is not as important as the lower value of the latent heat of vaporization due to the higher pressure in the RCS. The result is that MPX - 1.10 for this PDS. Scal.
- ing the 30 MT and 60 MT debris times from the MELCOR reference case by this value gives the following values:
t o(30mR) - 52 t u(60mR) - 70 t (30mR) - 292 t,(60mR) - 310 t,(30mRmC) - 262 t,(60mRmC) - 280 A.3.3 15
i and At(<30) - 22 At(30 60) - 18 At(>60) - 50 Based on the lengths of these three periods, the probability of core , damage arrest would be about 0.35 if power recovery is equally likely for , all times in the early period for S RRR3 RCR. For the 4 to 5.5-h period for this PDS, the power recovery curves are not as nonlinear as they are ; for the 1 to 4 h period considered for the previous case. Nonetheless, the probability of power recovery early in the period is greater than . recovery late in the period. Therefore, a uniform distribution from 0.0 to 1. 0 . was selected for the failure probability density for this PDS. This indicates that core damage arrest is as likely as not for this PDS, and is the maximum entropy distribution for this variable, indicating maximum uncertainty. The mean and median values for this distribution are 0.50. 13RRR RDR. The STCP UTAF time for SaRRR RDR is $16 minutes (decay power
- 0.666). Scaling ' the 30 MT and 60 MT debris times from the MELCOR reference case by the multiplier of 1.43 based on the ratios of the decay power at UTAF and the latent heat of vaporization gives the following values:
t,(30mR) - 67 t,(60mR) - 90 t,(30mR) - 583 t,(60mR) - 606 t (30mRmC) - 553 , t,( 60mRmC) ' - 576 and At(<30) - 313 At(30 60) - 23 i At(>60) - 24 ! For this PDS, the start of the power ecovery period is so late that the
~
power recovery curve is quite flat for the time period of interest. 'The length . of At(<30) is much greater that.- the lengths of the other two periods together. Thus, the arrest of the core degradation process and the prevention of. VB is quite -likely. However, there are so many-uncertainties involved in core melt progrestion and lower head failure, that core' damago arrest cannot be considered certain or nearly certain.
~
i A linear cumulative distribution from 0.8 ' to 1.0 is considered appro-i,' priate for core damage arrest for S RRR 3 RDR. This results in a uniform l probability density from 0.8 to 1.0. The median and mean values of this curve are 0.90, A.3.3 16 l
TRRR RSR. The STCP UTAF time for TRRR RSR is 102 minutes (decay power - 1.10%), so the scaling by ratio of the decay power at UTAF is negligible. However, the difference in hrs between this PDS and the reference MELCOR conditions is large. Thus, the total multiplier is 0.66 as explained above. This results in the following times: t,(30mR) - 31 t o(60mR) - 41 t (30mR) = 133 t.(60mR) - 143 t,( 30mPac) - 103 t.(60mRmC) - 113 and At(<30) - 73 At(30 60) - 10 At(>60) - 7 If the RCS pressure boundary could be assumed to remain intact until VB, the relative lengths of these three periods, together with the steep descent of the power recovery curves for the times of interest for TRRR-RSR, imply that the arrest of core damage and the prevention of VB is likely. However, the probability of at least one depressurization event occurring af ter UTAF is large. If the hot leg or surge line fails, a great deal of the remaining core inventory is likely to be lost by flashing as the vessel depressurizes. This is more than compensated for by the discharge of the accumulators, however, so the time to t,(60mR) will probably be longer than if the hot leg failure did not occur. The hot log failure will not occur until some time after UTAF, and whether it precedes or follows t,(30mR) is indeterminate. The effects of a PORV sticking open, or a RCP seal failure are more uncertain. Which depressurization event will occur is uncertain, and the effects and the timing of the depressurization events are uncertain as well. Even though the period before 30 MT are in debris form is much longer than the period after 30 MT are in debris form, core damage arrest cannot be assured due to the many uncertainties involved. Therefore, the linear cumulative core damage arrest distribution from 0.8 to 1.0 used for S RRR 3 RDR is applicable to TRRR RSR as well. TRRR RDa. This PDS.is very lengthy due to the operation of the S10 AFWS until battery depletion and the absence of a break in the RCS at UTAF. The STCP UTAF time for TRRR-RDR and TRRR RDY is 660 minutes (decay pcwer
- 0.57%). These two PDSs should not be confused with Tnnn-Raa in whien the STD AFWS fails at the start of the accident and the UTAF time is 102 minutes. The value of MPX (1.25) for TRRR RDa is not as large as might be expected from the from the low decay power level due to the low value of hrs. The following times are obtained for TRRR RDR and TRRR RDY:
A.3.3 17
t,(30mR) - 59 t,(60mR) - 79 t (30mR) - 719 t.(60mR) - 739 t.(30mRmC) - 689 t (60mRmC) - 709 and At(<30) - 269 At(30 60) - 20 At(>60) - 11 As in SaRRR RDR, At(<30) is much greater than At(30 60) and At(>60) togetner, and the power recovery curves are relatively flat. So the arrest of core damage in time to avoid vessel failure is rather likely. In addition to the uncertainties involved in core melt progression and lower head failure, TRRR RDa has the uncertainties involved with the inadvertent, temperature induced RCS depressurizetion events that were i discussed above with respect to TRRR RSR, so arrest cannot be considered certain or nearly certain. The linear cumulative core damage arrest distribution from 0.8 to 1.0 used for S 3RRR RDR and TRRR RSR is appropriate for TRRR RDa also. l t 1 A.3.3 18
References A.3 1. USNRC, " Reactor Risk Reference Document, NUREG 1150, Draf t for Comment, February 1987. A.3 2. A. S. Benj ainin e t al . , " Evaluation of Severe Accident Risks and the Potential for Risk Reduction, Surry Power Station, Unit 1," NUREC/CR 4551, SAND 86 1309, Volume 1, Sandia National Laboratories, February 1987. A.3-3 USNRC, " Severe Accident Riska: An Assessment for Five U. S. Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG 1150, Second Draft for Peer Review, June 1989 A.3 4 A. Drozd et al., "The V Sequence: An Engineering Viewpoint," 6Eli Tonical. Meetine on Fission Product Echavior and Source Term Researen, Snowbird, UT, July 15 19, 1984. A.3 5 R. L. Ritzman et al. "Surry Source Term and Consequence Analysis," EPRI 4096 Electric Power Research Institute, June 1985. u A.3 6 R. L. Iman and S. C. Hora, "Modeling Time to Recovery and m Initiating Event Frequency for Loss of Off Site Power Incidents at Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG/CR 5032, SAND 87 2428, Sandia National Laboratories, January 1988. A.3-7 P. W. Barnowsky, " Evaluation of Station Blackout Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG 1032, Draft, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1985. A.3 8 R. C. Bertucio and J. A. Julius, " Analysis of Core Damage Frequency: Surry Unit 1," NUREG/CR 4550, SAND 86 2084, Vol. 3 Rev. 1. Sandia National Laboratories, January 1990. A.3-9 J . A. Cieseke , P. Cybulskis , R. S. Denning, M. R. Kuhlmen, K. W. Lee, and H. Chen, "Radionuclide Release Under Specific LWR Accident Conditions, Volume V: PWR Large, Dry Containment Design (Surry Plant Recalculations)," BMI 2104, Battel: Columbus Division, 1984. A 3 10 J, A. Gieseke, P. Cybulskis, R. S. Denning, M. R. Kuhlman, K. W. Lee, and H. Chen, "Radionuclide Release Under Specific LWR Accident Conditions, Volume IV: PWR, Ice Condenser Containment Design," BM1 2104, Battelle Columbus Division, 1984. A.3 11 R. S. Denning, J . A. Gieseke, P. Cybulskis , K. W. Lee , H. Jordan, L. A. Curtis, R. F. Kelly, V. Kogan, and P. M. Schumacher, "Radionuclide Release Calculations for Selected 3evere Accident Scenarios, Volume 2: PWR, Ice Condenne Design," NUREG/CR-4624, BMI 2139, Battelle Columbus Divisior., 1986. A.3.3-19 mens -iimmmmmiisimm.
A.3 12 R. S. Denning, J. A. Cieseke, P. Cybulskis, K. W. Lee, H. Jordan, L. A. Curtis, R. F. Kelly, V. Kogan, and P. M. Schumacher, "Radionuclide Release Calculations for Selected Severe Accident Scenarios, Volume 3: PWR, Subatmospheric Containment Design," NUREG/CR 4624, BMI 2139, Battelle Columbus Division, 1986. A.3 13 M. T. Leonard, P. Cybulskis, K. W. Lee, R. F. Kelly, H. Jordan, P. M. Schumacher, and L. A. Curtis, " Supplemental Radionuclide Release Calculations for Selected Severe Accident Scenarios," NUREC/CR 5062, BMI 2160, Battelle Columbus Division, 1987. A.3 14 P. Cybulskis, "Effect of Emergency Operating Procedures on Severe , Accident- Progression," Letter Report to C. Ryder, USNRC, April 5 29, 1988. (This report is contained in Volume 2, Part 6.) , A.3 15 P. Cybulskis "Effect of Emergency Operating Procedures on Severe - Accident Progression - Sequoyah Ice Condenser PWR," Letter , Report to C. Ryder, USNRC. May 12, 1988. (This report is contained in Volume 2, Part 6.) A.3 16 =E. L. Tolman et al., "TMI 2 Accident Scenario Update," EGG TMI-7489, EG6G. Idaho, Inc. (Idaho National Engineering Laboratory), December 1986. A'.3 17 E. L. Tolman et al, "TMI 2 Accident Scenario Update," Trans. 15th Water Reactor Safety Information Meetine. Gaithersburg; MD. Oct, t 26 29, 1987, pp. 22-3 to 22 6, USNRC, 1987. A.3 18 J, L. Anderson and J. J. SienickL, " Thermal Behavior of Molten Corium During the TMI 2 Core Relocation Event," Trans. ANS/ ENS 1988 Int: Conf. Washincton. DC. Oct. 30 to Nov. 4, 1988, pp. > 429-430
.A 3 19 E. A. Boucheron,." Core Damage Arrest for SB0 at Surry," Informal -
report. attached to a Memo from E. A.'Boucheron to R. J. Breeding,
' dated January 24, 1989. (This report and memo are contained in Volume 2, Part 6.)
i 1 - 1 l r A.3.3 20
- e. _ - - - - ---- ----- - ... -- - - - - - - - - . _ . - - - - - - - . -
i APPENDIX B SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR THE SOURCE TERM ANALYSIS [
1 i I l l CONTENTS I j B.1 Li s t i n g o f SURS 0R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B .1 1 ; I B.2 S UR S OR Da t a F 11 e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B . 2 1 B.3 S our c e Te rm Re s ul t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B . 3 1 B.4 Information Used in Partitioning................................B.4 1 I s FIGURES d i B.3 1 Relationship of Exceedance Frequency to s Release Fractions (200 Observations) . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . .B.3 2 i i B.3 2 Source Term Distributions for Containment i Bypass at Surry........................................B.3 6 s 'B.3 2 Source Term Distributions for' Late Failure r a t S u r ry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B . 3 7 , B.4 1. -Mean Early Fatalities Versus Released i Activity for Surry.....................................B.4 1
- l TABLES ;
.. e
.B.4 1 Selected MAACS Mean Results for-Single j Isotope Releases for Surry............ ................B.4 2 B;4 2 PARTITION Input File for Surry Anr.iysis- f Containing Dose >cct ors. Reacter Inventory .;
Site Specific-MAACS Results. : and Other ! Information Needed to Defint the Early.and Chronic He al th Ef f e c t We i gh t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B . 4 5 . a
.s t.-
f r e l 1 B.i . h -
B.1 Listing of SURSOR i B.1 1 4
1
.j i
i PP00 RAM $UR80R C CALCULATE BOURCE TEAMS FOR SURRY (CENTRAL AND/OR LHS) C MAXIM H niMBER OF BIN ENTRIES * $000 C MAXIMH 60. OF ST OROUPS
- 9 ,
C MAXIKH N3. OF ISSVES
- 200 )
C NI887= TOTAL NO OF 188UE8 IN BAMPLE ! C N188= TOTAL No OF ST ISSUES (MAX =20) ! C NBP= ACTUsJ. N'MBER OF STRCE TERM GROUPS C UTIL1EED IN THE ANALYSIS. j C ! PRINT
- Uf!T NO. FOR
- FILE e C IBINNR
- WIT No. FOR
- BIN" FILE -
I C 38AMPL = UNIT NO. FOR "$ AMPLE
- FILE C IRELOUT
- UNIT NO. FOR
- RELEASE" FILt C IWROUT = UNIT NO. FOR " WEIGHT 8" FILE C ISTDAT
- UNIT No. FOR "80VRCE TEMM DATA" FILE DIMENSION ST(0),87E(9),87L(9),XNDX(200) '
DIMENSION 1888T(20) i DATA N8P/9/ 2 DATA NTOT/0/ CHARACTER 81NJ($000)*20 CHARACTER NA>9tVM*$0, NAM 81N*B0 ; CHARACTER BINDUT*20
- LOGICAL EAkLY,11 CALL,12 CALL,DIAO BYOBS C OET TNE RUN TITLE READ ($,1000)NAPetUN C OET THE 3/0 UNIT NUMBER 8 kEAD(S,*)! PRINT,!BINNR,18AMPL,1WROUT.!RtLOUT, 8 !$TDAT .
C UET THE ISSUE NUpstR8 READ (5,*)MISST,NISS,NSAM C READ WHICH 188UE No. AIPLIES TO EACH 87 IS8UE READ ($,*)(1882T(K),K=1,NISS) l IF DIAONOSTICS ARE REQUIRED, DIA0 * .TRUE. C C IF SOURCE TER>W ARE TO BE READ BY OBSERVAT10N, C BYoss a .TRUE. READ ($,999)DIAO.BYo88 ! C WRITE THE IDENTIFICATION AND UNIT NUMBER 8 i WRI TE ( I PR I NT ,1004 ) M AP9t DN , NBAM , I PRI NT ,18AMPL , I B I NNR . I RELOUT , 8 IWROUT,18TDAT WkITE(IPRINT,1044) MIS 87,N!88 L 11 CALL =.TRUE. IF(.NOT,8Yo88) THEh READ (IBINWR.10CO)MAMBIN READ (IBINNR,*)MDIM,NBIN NTOT=NBIN*NSAM , WRITE (! PRINT,1005)NAMBIN,NDIM,NBIN,NTOT l READ (IBINNR.1008)(BINJ(J),J=1,NBIN) i' .C PUT A NEADER ON THE
- RELEASE" OUTPUT FILE l Mt! T E ( I RELOUT , 2002 ) N A>9 TUN , NDIM , N S P . NTOT , NB AM ELSE '
DO 890 IEAM=1,NSAM C PUT A HEADER ON THE
- RELEASE" OUTPUT FILE READ (!BINNR,1001)10BSD,NAMBIN READ (IBINNR,*)NDIM,WBIN NTOT*NTOT4NBIN NEAD(IBINNR,1006)($1NJ(J),J=1,NBIN) .
800- CONTINVE WITE(IPRINT 1007)MAMBIN,NDIM,NTOT WRITE (IRELOUT,2002)NAMRUN,NDIM,NSP.NTOT,NSAM REWIND 181NNR ENDIF DO 900 ISAM*1,NSAM C STEP THROUGH 8 AMPLE. READ (18AMPL,*)l0BSD,NLHS,(XNDX(J),Jal,NISST) 12 CALL =.TRUE. C STEP THROUGH MASTER BIN LIST, BT OBSENVATION IF(BYOBS) THEN READ (IBINNR.1001)l0BSD,NAMBIN READ (181NNR,*)NDIM,NBIN READ (IBINNR,1006)(BINJ(J),J=1,NBIN) B.1-2
k h i END IT C CALCULATE SOUkCE TERHS DO 910 IB=1,NSIN CALL 80kST ( NSP ,11 CALL . B I NJ t IS ) NISS , ! S587,120ALL , 8 XRDX,87,BTL,EARLY,187DAT DIAO,1 PRINT, 4 TW,T1,DT1.E1 T2 DT2,E2,ELEV.15AM) C 11 CALL =. FALSE, 12 CALL =.T ALSE, C OET EARLY AND LATE EFFECT WEIGHT 8 C WEL = EARLY EFFECT OF EARLY RELEASE C WLE
- LATE EFIECT OF LARLY RELEASE C WEL
- LARLY EFFECT OF LATE FILEASE C WLL = LATE EFFECT OF LATE kELEASE DO 770 ISP*1.NSP IF(EARLY)THEN STE(18P)=8T(ISP)
BT(ISP)=$TE(ISP)*STL(ISP) ELtt STE(18P)=0, 87L(18P)=8T(ISP)+87L(18P) ST(ISP)=BTL(IbP) END IF 770 CONTINUE IF(EARLY)THEN CALL WE10HT(NEP,8TE, WEE,WLE) CALL WEIOUT(NSP,STL,WEL,WL1) ELSE WEE =0, WLE=0, CALL WE109tf(NSP,87,WEL,WLL) END IF DO 868 IJ=1,20 IF(IJ.LE.HDIH)TilEN BINDUT(1J !J)=BINJ(IB)(!J !J) ELSE BIN 00T(1J:!J)=' ' END IF 060 CONTINUE WRITE (IRELOUT.1775) ISAM BIN 007,7W.T1,DT1,T2,DT2,ELEV WRI T E ( I RELOUT ,17731 ) E 1, ( STE ( 18 ) ,18= 1, NS P ) WRITE (IRELOUT.17751) E2,(8TL(18) IS=1,NSF) WET = WEE *WEL WLT=WLE+WLL C WRITE (IWROUT 1777) ISAM,18, WEE,WLE.WEL,WLL WET.WLT IF(DIAO)THEN WRITE (IPRINT,2010)1P,BINJ(IB) 15AM,(STE(ISP), 8 ISP=1,NSP), (87L(15P) ISP=1,NSP), 8 (ST(ISP),15P=1,NSP) WRITE (! PRINT,2011), WEE.WLE.WEL.WLL, WET.WLT END IF 910 CONTINUE 900 CONTINUE 909 FORMAT (Lt )X,L1) 1000 FORMAT (A) 1001 FORMAT (15,A) 1004 FORMAT ($X,'RUN TITLE: ' A60/ , 8 5X,'5 AMPLE 81EE = ',13/ 8 SX,'PR1kT FILE ON UNIT ',12/ 8 SX,' INPUT SAMPLE FILE ON UNIT ',12/ 8 $X,' INPUT BIN FILE ON UNIT ',12/ 8 5X,'0UTPUT BT FILE ON UNIT ',12/ 8 $X,'0UTPUT WEIGHTS FILE ON UNIT ',12/ 4 $X,' INPUT PARAMETERS ON UNIT ',12) 100$ FORMAT ($X,' BIN TITLE: ' A80/5X,' DIMENSIONS .' 13/ 8 SX,'NtlHBER OF BINS: '.14/ 8 $X,' TOTAL NUMBER OF SOURCE TERHS1 ',!7) 1006 FORMAT (1X,A20) 1007 FORMAT ($X,' BIN TITLE: ',A86/5X,' DIMENSIONS: 8,13/ 8 SK,' TOTAL PO SER OF SOURCE TERMSt ',17) d 1044 FORMAT ($X,' TOTAL NO. OF ISSUES =',13/$X 'NO. OF ST 155UES=',13) B,1-3
1775 FC8 HAT (14.2X,A20/6(1FE12.3)) 1777 FONMAT(215,6(1FE11.3)) 2002 FC5 HAT (2X,A60/417) 2010 FORMAT (//SX,'0UTFUT FOR BIN ENTRY d ',14,2X, A20/SX. l
$ '8AMFLE MD2ER',14/SX,'8TE * ',0(1FE9.1)/
$ SX,'STL = ',9(1FE9.1)/SX,'87T = ',9(1FE9.1))
2011 FC5 HAT (SX,' WEE * ',Ft.4,' WLE * ',F8.6,' WEL = ',F6.A. 8 ' WLL * ',F8.4/SX,' WET = ',F8.4.' WLT * ',F8.4) 17751 FORMAT (10(1FE12.3)) END SUBkouTINE 80RST(NSF.11 CALL. BIN,N188,18SST,12 CALL,XNDX,87, #
$ STL.EARLY,ISTDAT,DIAO,IFRINT TW,T1, 8 DT1.E1.72,DT2,E2,ELEY,IBAM) j C r C i C 2 ND GENERATION FR00 RAM TO CALCULATE SOURCE TERM 5 FOR SURRY l C
C THE SOURCE TERM FCR 8FECIES GROUF I (I.NE.2 OR 3) IS C AFFROX! MATED BY C ST(!)=FCOR(I)*(FIC0(1)*FOSGt!)+(1 FISO(I))*FVES(1)*FCONV/DFE C +FFART*(1 FCOR(I))*FCCI(1)*FCONC(!)/DFL+ C + (1 FCOR(I))*FItE*FDCH(I)*FCONV+ C + FLATE ( 1 ) * ( FCCR ( ! ) * ( 1 FVES ( ! ) ) + FRDt* ( 1
- FCOR ( I ) ) )
- FCONRL ( I ) / DFL ( 1 )
C WHERE: C ST(!)* FRACTION OF INITIAL INVENTORY RELEASED TO ENVIRONMENT. C FISO(1)* FRACTION OF INITIAL INVENTORY RELEASED INTO STEAM OENERATOR C FOSO(1)* FRACTION OF INITIAL INVENTORY RELEASED FRCH STEAM OENERATOR C FCOR(I)* FRACTION OF INITIAL INVENTORY RELEASED FROM FUEL C FRIOR TO VES$tt BREACH. , C TVES(I)= FRACTION OF FCOR NOT DEPOSITED IN THE VESSEL. C FCONV= FRACTION OF MATERIAL RELEASED TO CONTAINMENT FRIOR 70 C OR AT VESSEL BREACH WHICH WOULD BE RELEASED FROM CONTAINMENT IN C THE ABSENCE OF DECONTAMINATION HECHANISMS. C DFE* DECONTAMINATION FACOR AFFL1 CABLE TO RCS RELEASE, C FFART= FRACTION OF CORE INVOLVED IN CCI C FCCI(I)* FRACTION OF INVENTORY REMAINING IN THE MELT C RELEASED DURING CORE CONCRETE INTERACTION (CCI). C FCONC(I) FRACTION OF CCI RELEASE ESCAFING CONTAINMENT. C DFL(1)* DECONTAMINATION FACTOR APPLICABLE TO CCI RELEASE, C FFME* FRACTION OF CORE INVOLVED IN FRESSURIEED MELT EJECTION, C FDCff(!)* FRACTION OF MATERIAL INVOLVED IN FRESSURIZED MELT ' C EJECTION RELEASED FROM CONTAllHENT DUE 70 DIRECT HEATING C FLATE(!)= FRACTION OF MATERIAL AINAINING IN THE RCS AFTER VESSEL C BREACH WHICH 18 REVOLATILIEED LATER. C FRDHFRACTION OF CORE MATERIAL RDMINING IN VESSEL AFTER BREACH. C FCONRL(!)* FRACTION OF LATE REVOLATILIZED MATERIAL WHICH WOULD BE
.C RELEASED FROM CONTAINHENT IN THE ABSENCE OF DECONTAMINATION C HECHANISpel, C
C FOR IODINE, AN ADDITIONAL TERM IS ADDED: C +XLATE*(RELIV RELIC) C WHERE: + C XLATE 18 THE FRACTION OF IODINE RDu!NING IN CONTAINMENT LATE l C IN THE ACCIDENT WHICH IS CONVERTED TO CROANIC 2001 DES. ' C RELIV= FRACTION OF INITIAL INVENTORY OF IODINE RELEASED TO C CONTAIN>ENT, L. C RELIC = FRACTION OF INITIAL INVENTORY OF10 DINE RELEASED FROM
- l. C CONTAINMENT.
I C ( C NIS8*NUPSER OF ST ISSUES C ISSUE 1: IN VESSEL RELEASE FROM FUEL (FCOR) C 188UE 2: RELEASE FRCN VESSEL (IN-VESSEL RITENTION) (FVES) C ISSUE *3: V-SEQ. DF WITH SUBMER0ED RELEASE (VDF) C ISSUE-4: RELEASE OF RCS 8PECIES FACH CONTAINMENT (FCONV) l C ISSUE-S: RELEASES FROM MELT IN CCI (FCCI) C 183UE-6: RELEASE OF CCI SPECIES FROM CONTAINMENT (FCONC) C ISSUE 7: 8 FRAY DF'8 (SPRDF) C ISSUE-6: LATE IODINE RELEASES FROM CONTAIMMENT (XLATE) C ISSUE 9: LATE REVOLATILIZATION (FLATE) C 188UE-10: RELEASE DUE TO DIRECT HEATING (FDCH) B.1 4
C ISSUE 11t STEAM OENERATOR TUBE BUPTURE FISO & FOSO C ISSUE-121 POOL SCRUBBINJ OF CCI C C ST BIN 8 ARE DEFINED BY AN 11 LETTER WJRD,
- BIN-C 1ST LETTER: CONTAINMENT FAILURE DODE.
C A= CONT, BYFASS, NOT SU M RGED C MCONT. BYFASS, SUMJt0ED C C= CONT. FAILURE BEFORE VESSEL BREACH C D= CONT. FAILURE NEAR THE TIME OF VESSEL FAILURE C E LATE OR VERY LATE (SEVERAL HR8 AFTER VB) CONTAINMENT FAILURE C F= FINAL PERIOD (CA. 24 HRS AFTER VB) CONTAINMENT 7AILUkt C 0=NO CONTAIMMEFT FAILURE C ! C 2ND LETTER: SPRAY OPERATION C (E*EARLY, UP TO VESSEL BREACH) C (1*!NTERMEDIATE, VB TO VB+4SM15) C (L*1 ATE, VB+4SMIN TO END OF CC1) C (V*VERY LATE. AFTER CCI) C (~=NON OPERATION) C A*E--- C PEl-- C C=EILe C D=EILV C E= -L-C F= -LY C 0= V C H* -
- C C 3RD LETTER: CORE-CONCRETE INTERACTION C A* PROMPT DRY--FULL UNSCRUBBED CCI C M FROMPT SHALLOW SCRUBBED C C=NO CCI C D= MLOMPT DEEP SCRUBBED C E=8HORT DELAYED, THEREAFTER DRY C F*1DNQ DELAYED. THEREAPTER DRY C
C 4TH LETTER PRESSURE TH RCS AT VB C A=AT SYS SETPOIN) T SEQUENCES: OUTFLOW T'! ROUGH CYCLING PORV, 2500 PSIA C pHIGH MLE8; S3 SEQUENCES: VERY SMALL LEAK W/0 80 COOLING, 600 2000 P8IA C C=1NTENDIATE PRE 8; 82 SEQUENCE 8; ACCWfJLATORS DISCHARGE, 200-600 PSIA C DalDW PRESEURE: Alb1 SEQUENCE 8; NEAR ADOSPHERIC PRESSURE, a 200 PSI A C C STH LETTER MJDE OF VESSEL BREACH C A=HIM C M POUR C C=0ROSS BC. TOM HEAD FAILURE C D= ALPHA M3DE C E ROCKET C F*No VESSEL BREACH C C STH llTTER: SOTR C A=0CCURS, SRV CLOSES C > OCCURS, SRV REMAINS OPEN C C= NOME C C 77H LETTER 1 APOUNT OF CORE IN CCI C A*LARGE AIOUNT (70-1001) H m!NALLY BSI C B 400ERATE AMXJNT (30 703) Nm!NALLY SCI C C*SMALL APOUNT(0 301) NOMINALLY 153 C D=NONE C C BTR IJ ffER: ER OKIDATION C A*1A ER OXIDATION (0*403) N m!NALLY 258 C kHIJH ER OX1DATION (>401) NOMINALLY 651 C C Off LETTER: H10H PRESSURE MELT EJECTION C A'd10H HFME (PSTR PERCENTILE OF IN-VESSEL PANEL) C ' atODERATE RINE (SOTH PERCENTILE OF INWESSEL FANEL) C C=1DW HPME (2STH PERCENTILE OF IN WESSEL PANEL) C D=No HftE C B,1 5
C 1078 LETT Ds CONTAINHENT TAILURE $1tE C A= CATASTROPHIC RUPTURE "0ROSS STRUCTURAL FAILURE C > RUPTURE"NMMALLY 7 SQ. FT, C C= LEAK " NOMINALLY 0.1 SQ. FT., (INCLUDING B C ) C D=No FAILURE OR 8YFAt$ C C 11?H LETTER: NOLE8 IN RCS C A=0NE LARGE HOLE C >TWO LARGE NOLES C C C C PARAM TDS 70 DE SET BY ISSUE 8 HAVE 10 LEVELS-* LTVELS 1 0 C DEFINE THE CDF, I.E., THEY Akt MINU>fJM, MAXIMUM, AND 7 INTERHEDIATE C PERCENT 1LES, (11, $1, 251, 508, 755, 951, 991) 0F CDP. C LEVEL 10 FOR ANY ISSUE INDICATES THE
- CENTRAL" LEVEL, HENCE 1F ALL C LEVELS ARE SET TO 10 THE " CENTRAL" kELEASE WILL BE CIVEN. ,
C C THE LEVELS FOR EACH BAMPLE PEMBER Akt 8tf BY A VECTOR, XNDX, WHERE C XNDX(1) IS A REAL NUMBER. IF XNDX(1) 18 $ET TO A VALUE GREATER THAN C OR EQUAL TO 1.0, THE *MAXIHUH" PERCENTILE VALUES FOR THE O!VEN FARAMETER C ARE BELECTED. 1r XNDX(1) 18 SET TO 0.0, THE *MINIMUH" PERCENTILE VALUES C FOR THE O!VEN PARAMETER ARE EELECTF.D. IF XNDX(!) IS 8FECITIED A8 C A REAL VALUE BETWEEN 0.0 AND 1.0, EITHER A LINEAR OR A LOGARITHMIC C INTERPOLATION SCHEHE 18 INVOKED 10 $ ELECT THE PROPER VALUE FOR A GIVEN 7 C FARANTER. TO OET THE
- CENTRAL" RELEASE MENTIONED IN THE PREVIOUS C PARAGRAPH, BPECITY A NEGATIVE REAL VALUE FOR XNDX(!). s C
- DIMENSION FC0kL(10,0,4),FCOR(9) FVHH(10,9),FYHP(10,9) FV1P(10,9),
8 FVLP(10,9),FVV(10,0),FV80(10,9),FYES(0), i 8 FCX*VI(10,5),VDFL(10 ), ; 8 CCI(10,0.4),FCCI(9) FCONCI(10,9,5).DF8PR1(10), 8 DF8PR2(10).DF8PRC(10),FPHEL(4),FFARTL(4), . 8 LATE!L(10),FLATE(10,0,4),FLATEX(0),FCONC(9), 8 FDCHL ( 10, 0, 2 ) , DLATE ( 9 ) , DFL ( 9 ) , FCONRLX ( 9 ) , 8 LYL(20),XNDX(200),VP8L(10,9,2),VP8(9), 8 X30(9),87(9),BTL(0),F180(10,0,2),F080(10,0,2),XOSO(9), , C 8 FCONRL( 9) . DST ( 0),1885T(20 ) i 8 D8T(0) 1858T(20) REAL LATE 1L.LVL LOGICAL 28PR(4),DIAO,EARLY, TEST,11 CALL,12 CALL t CHARACTER *20 BIN CHARACTER CHU C FRACTION OF CORE REMAINING IN VE5SEL1 THIS HAY EVENTUALLY BE C PASSED PT CET, FOR THE PRESENT, THIS QUANTITY 18 FIXED AT St. DATA FREH/.05/ DATA FFARTI /1...$. 15,0./ C FOR THE FIRST CALL TO THIS SUBROUTINE, PIAD IN ST DATA > IF( N07.11 CALL) 0070 9550 C BLOCK 1 FCOR* FRACTION OF EACH NUCLIDE RELEASED FRW CORE i C CASE != LOW ER OXIDATION (HIGH ER REMAINING) C Cast 2*H10H ER OXIDATION (LOW ER RIMAININO) READ ( 18TDAT , * ) ( ( ( F00RL ( L ,18 P ,1C ) , I Elw l , NS P ) , L= 1,10 ) ,1 C= 1. 2 )
- IF(DIAO) WRITE (! PRINT,2004)(((FCORL(L,18P,1C),1SP=1,NSP),
8 L=1,10),1C=1,2) 2004 FORMAT (/SX,'FCORLi'/(9(1PE10.1))) C 8 LOCK 2: TVES, FRACTION RELEASED FRCH VESSEL C 8ASED ON RC8 PRESSURE AT TIME OF VESSEL BREACH C TVHH SYSTEM BETro!NT PRESSURE C FYHP: HIGH PRESSURE (LUMPED WITH INTERM. BT EXPERTS) C TVIP: H!OH OR INTERHEDIATE PRESSURE C .FVLP: LOW PRESSURE C Fvvi LARGE INTERFACING SYSTEM LOCA C READ (ISTDAT,*)((TVHH(L,ISP),ISP=1,NSP),L=1,10) IF(DIAO) WRITE (IPRINT,2010)((TVHH(L,ISI),ISP=1,NSP), (- 8 L=1,10) 2010 FORMAT ( /5X, ' FVHN * /( 9(1FE10.1))) READ (!$fDAT,*)((FYHP(L,18P),ISP=1,NSP),L'*1.10) l~ B.1 6
IF (DI AO ) WRITE ( ! !1t!NT ,2011 ) ( ( TVHP (L ,18 P ) ,1 S P= 1, NSP ) , 8 L*1,10) 2011 FORMAT (/5X,'FYHP '/(9(1FE10,1))) READ (ISTDAT,*)((TVIP(L,1SP),ISP*1,NSP),L*1,10) I F (DI AO ) WRITE ( I FRINT ,2012 ) ( ( TV!F( L ,1 S P ) ,1 Sl* 1, NS P ) , 8 L=1,10) 2012 FORMAT (/5X,'FVIPr*/(9(1FE10.1))) kEAD(ISTDAT,*)((FVLP(L ISI).18P=1,NSP),L=1,10) IF ( DI AG ) WRITE ( I PRI NT ,2014 ) ( ( FVLt( L ,18P ) . ! Sf* 1, NSP ) , 8 L=1,10) 2014 FORMAT (/$X,'FVLP '/(9(1PE10.1))) READ (ISTDAT,*)((TVV(L ISP) IS N 1,NSP),L*1,10) IF ( DI AG) WRIT E (I FR1NT ,2016 ) ( ( TVV(L . !S P ) , IS P= 1, NSF ) , 8 L*1,10) 2016 FORMAT (/5X,'FVVi'/(9(1PE10.1)H C FVES FOR 80TR READ ( ISTDAT , * ) ( ( FYSO ( L ,1SP ) .1SP= 1, NSP ) , Lo l .10 ) IF (DI AO ) WRIT E (I FRINT ,2010 ) ( ( TVSO ( L ,18P ) 1SP= 1, NS F ) , 8 La1.10) 2016 FORMAT (/$X,'FYSO:'/(0(1PE10.1))) C BLOCK 31 FISO AND *080 C F180= FRACTION ENTERING $0 IN SOTR C FOSO= FRACTION LEAVING ETEAM CENERAT0k C CASE lt SRV CLOSES, CASE 2: SRV DOES NOT CLott READ ( I STDAT , * ) ( ( ( F I SO ( L ,1 S P ,1 C ) ,18 P= 1, NS P ) , L* 1,10 ) ,1 C* 1,2 ) IF(DIAO)THEN Do 20201 1C-1,2 WRITE (! PRINT.2020)1C ((FISO(L,ISP.1C),18P=1,NSP), 8 L*1,10) 20201 CONTINUE ENDIF 2020 FORMAT (/5X,'F1006'/$X,' CASE ',1J/(0(ift10,1))) READ ( I STD AT , * ) ( ( ( FOSO ( L , I S P ,1 C ) . I S P= 1, NS P ) , L= 1,10 ) ,1 C= 1, 2 ) IF(DIAO)Ti1EN DO 20221 1C=1.2 WRI T E ( I PRI NT , 2022 ) 10, ( ( FOSO ( L ,1 S P .1 C ) .181* 1, NS P ) , 8 L-1,10) 20221 CONTINUE ENDIF 2022 FORMAT (/5X,'F030 '/5X,' CASE ',13/(9(11110,1))) C BLOCK 4: VDF*DF APPLIED TO SCRUBBED V SEQUENCE, READ (ISTDAT,*)(VDFL(L),L=1,10) IF(DIAO)WR11E(IFRINT,2024)(VDFL(L),L*1,10) 2024 FORMAT (/SX,'VDF:8/($(1FE10,1))) C C BLOCK St FCONV= TRACTION OF RCS RELEASE LEAVIN3 C CONTAINMENT; FIVE CASES C CASE 1: EARLY 1.EAK, DRY CONTAINMENT C CASE 2: EARLY LEAK, WET CONTAINMENT C CASE 3: EARLY RUPTURE C CASE 4i VERY LATE RUPTURE C CASE 5: V SEQUENCE C RE AD (I STDAT , * ) ( ( FCONVI ( L ,1 CASE ) , L= 1,10 ) ,1 C ASE = 1, $ ) IF(DIAO)THEN 00 2222 ICASE=1,S WRITE (IFRINT,2025)lCASE,(FCONVI(L,1 CASE),L=1,10) 2222 CONTINUE END IF 202$ FORMAT ($X,*ITONV--CASE ',IS/(10(1rE10,1))) C C BLOCK 6: FCONC+ FRACTION OF CCI RELEASE LEAVING C CONTAINHENT: FIVE CASES C CASE 1: EARLY LEAK (BEFORE CCI). DRY CONTAINMENT C CASE 2: EARLY 1EAK (BEFORE CCI), WET CONTAINMENT C CASE 3: EARLY RUPTURE (BEFORE CCI) C CASE 4: VERT LATE RUPTURE (AFTER CC1) C CASE St V SEQUENCE C B.1 7
READ ( 187DAT , * ) ( ( ( FCONCI ( L , IS P ,1 CASE ) , I S P= 1, NS P ) , L= 1,10 ) , 8 ICASE=1,S) IF(DIAO)THEN DO 2223 ICASE=1,S WLITE ( I PRINT ,2026 )ICASE , ( ( FCONCI ( L , ISP. ! CASE ) , 8 18 b l,NSF),L=1,10) 2223 CONTIFUE END IF 2026 FORMAT ($X,8FCONC--CASE ' 13/(9(1PE10,1))) C BLOCK 7: CCI= TRACTION OF HATERIAL RD%!NING IN DEBRIS C RELEASED IN CCI C CASE 1: LOW ER OK!DATION (E108 ER RDu!NING), NO WATER C CASE 2: HIGH ER OXfDATION (LOW ER RDu!NING), NO WATER , C CASE 3: LOW ER OXIDATION, WATER PRESENT C CASE 4 8108 ER OK!DATION, WATER PRESENT READ (I STDAT , * ) ( ( (CCI ( L . IS P, IC ) . I SP=1, NSF) , L= 1,10 ) , IC= 1,4 ) IF(DIAO) WRITE (IPRINT,2026)(((CCI(L,18P IC),18 b l,NSP), 8 L=1,10),1C=1,4) 2028 FORMAT (/$X,'CCIt'/(9(1PE10.1))) C BIDCK 8: SPRAY DF 4 C DFSPR1=8 PRAY DF FOR HIGH PRESSURE, EARLY C 00NTAINHENT RUFTURE, FOR RCS RELEASE. C CURRENTLY ONE VALVE FOR ALL NUCLIDE GROUPS (EXCEPT NG). READ (ISTDAT,*)(DFSPR1(L),L=1,10) IF(DIAO) WRITE (! PRINT,2034)(DFSPR1(L),L*1,10) 2034 FC* MAT (/SX, 'DFSPR168/(10(1FE10.1))) C DFSPR2= SPRAY DF FOR ALL OTHER CASES, FOR RCS RELEASE, ' READ (ISTDAT,*)(DFSPR2(L),L*1,10) IF(DIAO) WRITE (IPRINT,2036)(DFSPR2(L),L=1,10) 2036 FORPMT(/$X,'DFSPR2 '/(10(1PE10.1))) C DFSPRC= SPRAY DF FOR CCI RELEASE READ (ISTDAT,*)(DFSPRC(L),L*1,10) IF (DI AO ) WRITE ( I PRINT ,2038 ) ( DFSPRC ( L ) , L= 1,10 ) 2038 FORMAT (/SX,'DFSPRC '/(10(1PE10.1))) C BLOCK 9: FRACTION OF IODINE RDMINING IN CONTA!! MENT C WHICH IS CONVERTED TO VOLATILE FCRMS READ (ISTDAT,*)(LATEIL(L),L*1,10) ! IF(DIAG) WRITE (IPRINT,2044)(LATEIL(L),L*1,10) 2044 FORMAT (/5X,'LATEILi'/(10(1PE10,1))) C BLOCK los FRACTION OF MATERIAL REMAINING IN RCS WHICH IS C REVOLATILIEED LATE IN THE ACCIDENT. C CASE 11 ONE HOLE IN RCS C CASE 2: TWO HOLES IN RCS READ (ISTDAT,*)(((FLATE(L,ISP,1C),IS N1,NSP),L=1,10),1C=1,2) IF(DIAO) WRITE (IPRINT,2046)(((FLATE(L,ISP,IC),ISP=1,NSP), 6 L=1,10),1C=1,2) 2046 FORMAT (/5X,'FLATE '/(9(1FE10.1))) C BLOCK 11: FOR DIRECT HEATING C FDCH= TRACTION OF FPHE RELEASED FROH CONTAINHENT (FOR EARLY CF l C ONLY) READ (!$TDAT,*)((FCCHL(L,ISP,1),18b1,NSP),La1,10) IF(DIAG) WRITE (! PRINT,20$1)((FDCHL(L ISP,1).IS b l,NSP),L=1,10) 2051 FORMAT (ISX,'FDCHL: HI PRESSURE'/(9(1FE10.1))) READ (ISTDAT,*)((FDCHL(L.ISP.2) IS bl,WSP),L=1,10) I F ( DI AO )WRI TE ( I IRI NT ,2052 ) ( ( FDCHL( L , I S P ,2 ) , I S P= 1, NS P ) , L= 1,10 ) 2052 FORMAT (/5X,'FDCHL: INT PRESSURE'/(9(1FE10.1))) C BLOCK 12t DF IVR POOL SCRUBBING. C CASE 1: ACCUHULATOR HATER ONLY C CASE 2: FULL CAVITY READ f !STDAT , * ) ( ( (VPSL (L , I SP. IC ) , ISN 1, NS P) , L=1,10 ) ,1C= 1,2 ) I F ( DI AO ) WRITE ( I FRI NT ,20!4 ) ( ( (VPSL( L , ISP,1C ) , ISP= 1, NSP) , 8 L=1,10),1C=1,2) 20$6 FORMAT (/$X,'VPSLt*/(9(1PE10.1))) C BLOCK 13: FRACTIONS OF CCRE IN RM (8108, M)DERATE, LOW) READ (!$TDAT,* )(FINEL(L),L=1,3) FINEL(4 )=0. 0 B.1 8
IF(DIAO) WRITE (IPRINT,20566)(FPHEL(L),L*1,3) 20566 FONMAT(5X,' FRACTION OF CORE IN HPHE:'/5X,'BIGH ' , Ft.3/ 8 SX,*lODERATE ',F8.3/5X,'14W ',FO.3) C THIS IS THE END OF THE DATA Ir?UT, 6550 CONT 1WUE 1F(12CA11) THEN Do 10 188=1,N!88 ISSUE *1855f(ISS) LYL(183)*XNDX(ISSUE) 10 CONTINUE END IF CHB =b!N(1:1) EARLT=. FALSE. IF(CHH.LE.'D'.0R. BIN (6:6).LT.'C')EARLY*.TRUE. IF(DIAG) WRITE (IPRINT,1000) BIN,! SAM,(LYL(155),1BS*1,NISS) 1009 FORMAT (///5X,' DIAGNOSTIC OUTPUT FOR BIN ',A20, 8 ' SAMPLE MD1BER * ,14/ 8 SX,'ET LEVELS * ',4(SF6.3.3X)) C HAIN CALCULATION C C SET UP SPRAY INDICES C *TRUE" 1NDICATES SPRAT IS OFERATING DURING Titt FOLLOWING TIME C PER1005 C PERIOD 1: UP TO VESSEL BREACH (EARLY) C PERIOD 2: VESSEL BREACH TO START OF CCI (INTERHEDIATZ) C PERIOD 3: DURING CCI (LATE) C PERIOD 4: AFTER CCI (VERY LATE) CALL 8 PRAY (BIN.15PR) IF(DIAO) WRITE (1 PRINT.1010)(15PR(L),L=1,4) 1010 FCRMAT($X,'"8 PRAY" CALLED; 18PR = ',4L1) C RELEASE CHARACTER!BTICS CALL RELChAR(BIN,TW,71,DT1.El,T2,DT2,E2,ELEY,18PR) DTW=T1 TW IF (DI AO )WRI TE ( I PRINT ,214 5 )TW , DTW ,71.DT 1,11 T2 DT 2, E 2, ELEV 2145 FONMAT(5X,RE14HAR" CALLED; RELEASE CHARACTERISTICSi'/ 8 9X,'TW',7X,'DTW',6X,'T1',7X,'DT1',6X,'E1',7X,'T2', 8 7X,'DT2',6X 'E2',7X,*ELEV'/5X,9(1PE9.1)/5X, 8 ' TIMES IN BEC.--REL RATES IN WATT 8**ELEY. IN HETERS') C IN VESSEL RELEASE FCR EACH GROUP (FCOR) CALL CORER (BIN,NSP.FCOR.FCORL.LVL(1)) IF(DIAO) WRITE (1 PRINT 1014)LVL(1),(FCOR(18),IS=1,NSP) 1014 FONMAT(5X,'* CORER" CALLED'/5X,'LVL(1)=',F6.3 /5X,'FCOR = ',0(1PE
$9.1))
C IN-VESSEL RETENTION CALL VESREL(BIN FVES,FVHH.FVHP,FVIP,FVLP,FVV, 8 FV90,NSP.LYL(2)) IF(DIAO) WRITE (IPRINT,1016)LVL(2),(TVES(18),15=1,NSP) 1016 FONMAT($X,'"VESREL" CALLED */5X,'LYL(2)=',F6.3.I5X,'FYES = ',0(1P 8E9.1)) C CALCULATE ALL FISSION PRODUCT RELEASES THROUGH RUPTURED % TEAM C OENERATOR TUSE, (FOR SOTR ONLY) DO 195 ISP=1,NSF XSO(18P)=0. X050(18P)=0, IF(BIN (6:6).EQ.'C')00TO 195 1 CASE =1 IF(BIN (6:6).EQ.*B')1 CASE =2 XSO(!$P)*KINTERPLSC(LVL(11),F180,1SP.ICASE.ILOO) XOSO(!$P)*XINTERPLSC(LVL(11),FOSO,1SP,1 CASE ILOO) 195 CONTINUE IF(DIAG) WRITE (IPRINT,2076)LVL(11),(XSO(ISP) 1SP=1,NSP) 2078 FORMAT (5X,'LVL(11)*',F6.3,/5X,' RELEASE TO $0-8:',9(1PE9.1)) I F ( D I AG )WRI T E ( I PRINT , 20781 ) ( XOSO ( I S P ) ,1 S Pa l , NSP ) 20 781 FORMAT (5X,' RELEASE FRCH SG-Si'/ 5X,9(1PE9.1)) ILOO-1 VDF=1.0 I F (CHH . EQ .
- B ' )VDF=XINT ERPL ( LVL ( 3 ) , VDFL ,1140 )
IF (DI AO ) WRITE ( t rRI NT ,20701)LVL ( 3 ) , VDF 20791 FONMAT(5X,'LYL(3)*',F6.3,/5X,'VDF = ' 1PE10.1) C RELEASE OF HATERIAL FROM CONTAINHENT(FCONV AND FCONC) B,1-9
). !
l !' b l I CALL FCONVC(BIN,ISPR FCONVI,FCONV,FCONCI, j
$ F00NC,LVL(4),LVL(6),MSP) i i IF(DIAO)*ITE(IPRINT,1018)LYL(4),LYL(6),FCONV,(FCONC(IS),IE=1,NS )
$P); j 1018 FORET ( $X , "'FCONYC" CALLED ' / SX , ' LVL ( 4 )= ' , F6. 3. / $X , ' LVL ( 6 )= ' , F 6. 3 8,/5X,*FCONV = ',1PE)J.1/SX,'FCONC = ' 9(IPE10.1)) ;
C. CCI RELEASE i CALL CCIREL(BIN,NFt.CCI,FCCI.LYL($)) ' IF(DIAO) *ITE(*,FRINT,1020)LVL($),(FCCI(18),IS=1 MSP) i 1020 FORMAT (SX'*CC REL" CALLED'/SX,'LVL($)=',F6.3 /SX,'FCCI = ',9(IPE
$9.1))
C DCH P.ELEASE - IDCN=ICHAR(BIh'***. e4 -'
, F M *F M L(IDCH)*(1.*FREM) i IF(DIAG)*ITE(IPRINT,20777)F M 20777 FOB'uT($X,' FRACTION OF CORE IN RPHE = ',F6.4)
- i C FRA*l TION OF CORE PARTICIPATING Ik 'TT ICC =ICHAR(BIN (7 7)) 64 '
C MATER 10. REMAINING IN VESSEL, AND MATERIAL INYOLVED IN HIGH C PRESSURE E LT EJSCTION, CANNOT FARTICIFATE IN CCI FPAr **FPARTL(ICCI)*(1.*FREM-FM) IF(FIAO)*ITE(IPRINT,10200)FPART i 10200 FCN ET($X ' FRACTION OF CORE IN CCI a.',F8.3) j C EFFECIS OF SPRAYS p CALL SPRDF(b!N.ISPR,DFSPR1,DFSFR2.DFSPV.DFSPPC.DFSPC, . SLYL(7)) ? IF(DIAG) WRITE (IPRINT,1022)LVL(7) DFSPV,DFSPC 'h I 1022 FORMAT (SX '*STRDF" CALLED;',/$X,'LVL(7) = ',F6.3,/$X,'DFSPV = ',
- 8F7,1 ' DFSPC = ',FF.1) "
C' POOL SCRUB 91NO DF t C- FIND CASE (SHALLOW OR DELP) , ICASE=3 !' IL00=1 IF(BIN (3:3).EQ.'B')1 CASE =1' IF(BIN (3:3).EQ 'D')1 CASE =2 DO 18$ ISP=1,NSP ! IF(ICASE.EQ.3)THEN p VPS(ISP)=1,
- ELSE
.VPS(ISP)=XINTERPLSC(LYL(12),VPSL,ISP,1 CASE,1140). ,
END IF
- 18$ CONTINUE
,IF(DIAG) WRITE (IPRINT,2077)LYL(12),(VPS(ISP),ISP=1,NSP)
- 2077 FORMAT (SX,*LYL(12)=',F6.3,/SX,'DF(POOL SCRU3' ',9F7.1) -
o C FIND OVERALL DF ; ILOO=1 ' DFE=1.0
'Do 22620 ISP=1,NSP 4 DFL(ISP)=1.0 .
22620 CONTINUE C. .FOR V-SEQUENCE WITH WATERt . IF(CHN.EQ.'B')THEN' DFE=VDF 00 22621 ISP=2 NSP DFL(ISP)=AMAX1(VDF,VPS(ISP))
'l 22621- CONTINUE t ELSE ,,
C FOR ALL OTHERSi . C OVERALL DF IS SET EQUAL TO THE LARGEST Fok ALL OPERATILl: E C MECHANISMS,' F(5t EARLY CF (BEFORE CCI) DFL CANNOT BE GREATER g C' TRAN WHAT THE SPRAT DF WOULD BE, IF SPRAYS WERE OPERATING. l DFE=DFSPV . IL00=1 l" 'Do 22622 ISP=2.NSP-l- DFL(ISP)=AMAX1(VPS(ISP),DFSPC) IF((BIM(1:1).EQ.*D'.OR. BIN (1:1).EQ.'C') ,
;8 .AND.DFL(ISP).GT.1.)DFL(ISP)*
8 - AMIN 1(DFL(ISP),XINTERPL(LVL(7) DFSPRC.ILOG))
-22622 CONTINUE '
END IF C DO NOT ALLOW OVERALL DF 5 TO EXCEED 10,000. > B,1 10 r o-y'k4 y _ _ . . - ,, , .
f DFE= AMIN 1(DFE.1.E4) Do 11211 18P=2.N8P DFL(ISP)* AMIN 1(DFL(ISP),1.E4) 11211 CONTINVE IF(DIAO)Wi!TE(! PRINT 1026)DFE,(DFL(ISP),ISP=1,NSP) 1026 . FOIt%T(SK,'DFE = ',F7.1/5X,'DFLi'/4X,(9(1PE10.1))) CALL DNEAT(BIN.FDCML.LYL(10),NSF. DST.FCOR,DIAO,IPRINT, 8 F M ,18PR) IF (DI AG )WLITE (17RINT .1777 $ )LYL ( 10 ) , (DST ( 18P) ,18P=1, NSP) 17775 FOIMAT(/SX,'LYL(10)=',F6.3,/,'DCH RELEASE To CONTAINHENT:, ' /$X,0(
$1PE)0.1))
DI2= DST (2) C EARLY RUPTURE OR LARGE LEAK, No EFFECT OF $ PRAYS ON DCH RELEASE.
<DO 176 ISP=2.NSP D87(18P)=D8T(18P)*FCONV 176 CONTINUE IF(BIN (1:1).EO.'0') DST (1)=.00$* DST (1)
IF(DIAO) WRITE (IPRINT,17776)(DST (ISP),1SP=1,NSP) e 17776 FORMAT ($X,'DCH RELEASE FROM CONTAINHENTa'/9(1PE10.1)) C CAlfULATE SOURCE TERMB FCN0=1, IF(BIN (1:1).EO.'O')TCN0=.00$ ET ( 1 )=FCOR ( 1 ) * ( X80 ( 1 )
- X0SO ( 1 ) + ( 1
- XSO ( 1 ) )
- FVES ( 1 )
- FCNO ) + DST ( 1 )
STL ( 1 )=F PART * ( 1.
- FCOR ( 1 ) )
- FCCI ( 1 )
- FCNG ORCS =ST(1)
OCC1=STL(1) DO 20018P=2 NSF ST ( 18P)=FCOR ( 18 P ) * (XSO ( !$P) *XOSO ( 1s t )+ ( 1. *XS0 (18F ) )
- 8 FVES(ISP)*TCONV/DFE)+ DST (ISP)
STL(18P)=(1,*FCOR(18P))*FFART*FCCI(ISP)*FCONC(ISP)/ 8 DFL(ISP) 200 CONTINUE C
- LATE" RELEMES OF OROUP5 1*3 ARE TRANSFERRED TO EARLY C RELEASES, IF CCI 18 PROMPT AND CONTAINHENT FAILURE IS EARLY C 1 IF SOTR OCCUBS NOBLE GA8 RELEASE 18 TERMED F.ARLY IF((BIN (1:1) 07.'D'.0R. BIN (3:3).EQ.'F').AND. BIN (6:6),EQ.'C')
8 0070 2333
- DO 230 18P=1,3 ST(ISPl=ST(18P)+8TL(ISP)
STL(18P)=0, 230 CONTINUE
~C LATE REVOLATILIEATION FROM THE RCS. RELEASE FRACTIONS FROM C- CONTAIWlENT ARE SET EQUAL TO THOSE FOR " LATE * (CCI) Te. -
2333 IL00=0 FCONRLX(1)=1, FLATEX(1)=1. C ' N08LE GASE8 RELEASED IN VESSEL NOT YET RELEASED TO CONTAINMENT 80Q1=FCNG IF(BIp(6:6).EQ.'B')S001=1.
.DL1=FCOR(1)*(XSO(1)*(1.*XOSO(1))* W i+(1.*X50(1))*
8' (1.*FVE8(1))*FCNO) C NOBLE GABES NOT YET RELEASED, FROM MATERIAL RD1AINING IN RCS l' . DL2=(1.*FCOR(1))*FREM*FCNG= L C- NOBLE GASE8 IN MATERIAL LEAVING VESSEL BUT NOT IN CCI
- j. DL3=(1.*FCOR(1))*(1 *FPART*FRDI-FPHE)*FCNG L, 'C REVOLATILIEED NOBLE GASES DLATE(1)=(DL1+DL2+DL3) t- GTOT=0RC8+0CCt+DLATE(1) l IF(DIAO) WRITE (! PRINT,7763)0RCS,0CCI.DL1,DL2 DL3,0 TOT 7763 ~ FORMAT (//5X,' NOBLE GASES '/5X,*FROM RC8: ',1PE12.3/
8 5X,'FROM CCI: ' 1PE12.3/5X,' LATE RC84 l 8 $X,' LATE REM: ',1PE12 3/5X,' LATE NCC: ',1PE12.3/ ' 1PE12.3/ 8 SX,' TOTAL- ' 1PE12
, 3)
' C- NO REVOLATILIEATION !T NO VESSEL BREACH I
IF(BIN (5:5).EO.'F')THEh l DO 99570 ISP=1,NSP ' DLATE(ISP)=0. 99570 CONTINUE ELSE i j' .ICASE = ICHAR(BIH(11:11))*64 . I DO 9957 ISF=2,NSP B.1-11 q l
DFLX=DF8PC IF(.NOT.18PR(4))DFLX=1. PCOMRLX(ISP)*FCONC(4)- l TLATEX (I S P )*KI NTERPL8C (LVL ( 9 ) , FLATE , I S P. ICASE , ILOO ) j 800=0, IF(BIN (6:6).EQ.'B')S0Q-FCOR(ISP)*XSO(ISP) 8 *(1. X080(ISP))~ DLATE ( ISP ) =FIATEX ( ISP ) * ( FCOR ( IS P ) * ( 1. - X80 ( I S P ) )
- 8 ( 1, - TVES ( 18 P ) ) + FREH* ( 1. - FCOR ( I SP ) ) )
- FCONRLX ( I S P ) / DFLX 8 +FLATEX(ISP)*80Q BTL(ISP)=8TL(ISP)+DI. ATE (ISP) 9957 CONTINUE END IF STL(1)=87L(1)+DLATE(1)
IF(DIAG) WRITE (IPRINI 10$0)LVL(9),(FLATEX(ISP),IS N 1,NSP),
-8 iDLATE(ISP),ISP=1,NSP) 1050 FORMAT ($X,' LATE REVOLATILIZATION , ' /$X,'LVL(9)='4F6.3,/$X, 8 FLATE = ',9(1PE10,1)/5X,'DLATE = ',0(IPE10,1))
C MISCELLANEOUS LATE SOURCES OF I"'ME , XLATE=XINTERPL(LVL(8),LATEIL,ILOL CALL CLATE!2(PCOR(2),FVES(2),FCCI.2), 8 FLATEX(2),XLATE,DILD,IPRINT, BIN,FPART, 8 ST(2),87L(2) D12,DLATE(2),XSO(2),X050(2),LVL(6)) C IF EARLY RELEASE OVERLAPS LATE RELEASE, A FRACTION OF THE EARLY C RELEASE IS PUT INTO THE LATE RELEASE. IF(T1+DT1.07.72) THEN OVERLAP =(T1+DT1-?2)/(T1+DT1) DTirAMAX1(T2*T1,0.) DO 7772 ISP=1,NSP FRACT=0VERLAP*ST(ISP) ST(ISt>=ST(ISP) FRACT STL(ISP)=STL(ISP)+FRACT 7772 CONTINUE ENDIF C MASS BALANCE OF COR3 MATERIAL
'IF(DIAO)THEN PM1=FREM FM2=FIMS FM3=FPART Fh'=(1. fAEM-FPME) FPART
' BUM @ l*(M2+PM3+FM4 WRITE (IPRIN1,1058),FM1 FM2,FM3,PM4,5UM ;
1056 FORMAT (/SX,' CORE DISTRIBUTIONt'/ ' 8 10X,'IN RCS ',F7.3/- 8 -10X,* HINE ',F7.3/
$2 10X,'CCI ',F7.3/ ;
8 10X,'OTHER 8 , F7. 3 / -- ' 8 10X,' . ------+ 'l 8 10X,' TOTAL ' , F7,3) WRITE (IPRINT,1032)(ST(IS).IS=1,NSP), 8 (STL(IS),IS=1,NSP)-
-1032 FORMAT ( $X,
- SOURCE TERMS t ' /SX, 'RCS ' ',9(1PE9.1)/ i 8 SX,'CCI: ' 9(IPEO.1))
END IF C- TEST THAT RELEASES FOR ALL SPECIES DO NOT EXCEED 1.0 'i TEST =. FALSE. DO 300 ISP=1,NSF IF(JT(ISP)+STL(ISP) 1, .07.1.E 3)THEN TEST =.TRUE, BAD =ST(ISP)+STL(;'P) WRITE (IPRINT,5000) BIN.ISP BAD END IF 300 CONTINUE IF(TEST)STOP9999 >
$000 FORMAT (' BIN ',A20,' OROUP ',II,
$' ERROR IN SOURCE TERM; TOTAL RELEASE = ',E15.7)
C. NOBLE GA,3 RELEASE SHOULD EQUAL 1.0, EXCEPT FOR BASEMAT MELTTHRO'JGH t C' OR NO CONTAladt.dT FAILURE. != RN0=8T(1)+STL(1) ITICHH.LT. 'O' , AND. AB3(1.-RNO) .0E.1.E 2. AND. BIN ($: 5) .NE. 'F' )THEN WRITE (IPRINT,5010) BIN,R.90 i B.1-12 l
STOF 8998 END IF >
$010 FCatHAT(* BIN ',A20,' GROUF 1 ',
8 ' TOTAL RELEASE = ',Fi).7,' SHOULD BE 1.0') RETURN END SUBROUTINE RELCHAR ( BIN, TW,T1 DT1.E1, 72,DT2,E2, ELEV,ISFR ) C C ortlinal by WBM, Autumn 1968 r C Revised by RJB, 11 Feb 1989 C LOGICAL ISFR(4) CHARACTER *20 BIN CHARACTER CHH1, CHH3' CHH6, CHH10 C , C THIS SUBROUTINE COMFUTES THE RELEASE CHARACTERISTICS -- C WARNING TIME, RELEASE TIHES, AND ENERGY OF THE RELEASE > C ALL TIMES ARE IN SECONDS C TW = WARNING TIME -- USUALLY THE TIME OF CORE COLLAFSE, BUT C^ THE TIME THE CORE UNCOVERED (TAF) FOR V OR CF BEFORE CH ; C NOTE: TW IS NOT THE WARNING INTERVAL, BUT TIME SINCE THE ' C START OF THE ACCIDENT C C T1 = TIME OF START OF THE FIRST OR EARLY RELEASE j C ( T1 IS THE SAME AS T2, IF THERE IS NO EARLY RELEASE) , C DTW = WARNING INTERVAL = T1-- TW L C 071 = DURATION OF THE EARLY RELEASE C El = ENER0Y RELEASE RATE OF THE EARLY RELEASE ( WATTS ) p C C T2 = TIME OF START OF THE SECOND OR LATE RELEASE, C DT2 = DURATION OF THE LATE RELEASE C E2 = ENERGY RELEASE RATE OF THE LATE RELEASE ( WATTS ) C
.C ELEV = ELEVATION OF THE RELEASE ( HETERS )
C C GET THE LETTER FOR FOUR CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BINt i C CHARACTERISTIC 1 - CF TIME C CHARACTERISTIC.'3 - CCI C CHARACTERISTIC 6 + SOTR' ! C CHARACTERISTIC 10 - CF BIEE ! Cml1 = BIN (1:1) CHH3 = BIN (3:3)' CHH6 = BIN (6:6) CHH10 = BIN (10:10) l C C SET THE DEFAULT CORE UNCOVERY TIME TO 300 HINUTES = 5 HOUR 1 TCU = 18000. C C SET DEFAULT RELEASE DURATIONS -- C- CHH10 = A FOR CATASTROPHIC RUFTURE ( 10 SECONDS ) C CitB10 = E FOR RUFTURE ( 3.3 MINUTES ) C CHH10 = C FOR LEAK OR BASEMAT HELT-THRU ( 3 HOURS } C Call 10 = D FOR NO CF OR BYFASS ONLY ( 24 HOURS ) IF ( CHH10 .EQ. 'A' ) THEN DTI = 10. DT2 = 10. ELSEIF ( CHH10 .EQ. 'B' ) THEN r DT1 = 200. DT2 = 200. ELSEIF ( CHH10 .EQ. 'C' ) THEN DT1 = 10800 DT2 = 10000. ELSEIF ( Cml10 .EQ. 'D' ) THIN ; DT1 = 86400. DT2 = 66400. ENDIF
'C C SET DEFAULT ENERGIES AND ELEVATION B.1-13
[ i 1 1 4 3 -; V d > g. El = 0.
- , E2 = 0, .
ELEV = 10.. k Cl
' C FIRST CONSIDER THE 80TRS
-IF ( CHH6 .NE. 'C' ) 00 70 70 C~ ..
. C NEXT COMBIDER THE V's, AND THEN BORT ON CF TIME
- IF ( CHH1 .LE. 'B' )
~
00 TO 10
, . !F ( CHH1..LE. 'D' ) 00 70 30
' IF ( CHH1.EQ.- 'E' ) 00 TO 40 i If.( CHul .50. 'F' ) 00 TO $0 IF . ( CHH1.EQ. 'O' ) 00 TO 60 :
C !
- C V SEQUENCE ~ CHH1 = A FOR V-DRY, CHH1
- B FOR V-WET !
10' TCU = 1250.
- TW = TCU l-T1 = 2400.:+ TCU-DT1 = 1800.
El = 3.7E6 ~ l
'IF ( CHH1 .EQ. 'B' ) El = El / 2.
( T2 = 9000.'+ TCU 'k DT2
- 21600.
E2 = 1,7E$-
. ', . ELEV = 0,
. RETURN:
- C c' C: CF AT OR BEFORE VB - CHH1 = C FOR CF'BEFORE VB.'* D FOR CF AT VB 30 . TW = 4300. + TCU lT1 =.10000. + TCU
.El = $.6E9'/ DT1'
-IF ('I8PR(1) .OR. 18PR(2) )^ El = El / 10. f i s DT2 = 21600 G
E2 = 1.6ES E I IF ( .ISPR(3)- ) - E2 = E2 - / 10. : lC; .
- C DETERMINE IF CCI WILL BE PRCNPT OR DELAYED '"
3 l CL CHH3 = A FOR PROMPT
- DRY CitH3 = B FOR PROHPT - SI! ALLOW a C- CHH3 = C FOR NO CCI:. .. . CHH3 = D FOR PROMPT - DEEP
, C< , CHH3 = E FOR SHORT DELAY - DRY CHH3 - F FOR LONO DELAY - DRY' C
. < IF-( CHH3 .EQ. 'C) 00 TO 34 h' -C., FROMPT CCI ~ CHH3 = A, B. OR D; .
t iIF'( CHH3 .LE. 'D'.) .72 = 11000, + TCU i
> C' SitoRT DELAYED CCI -* CHH3 = E .
El,
- IF ( CilH3 .EQ. 'E' ) T2 = 16000. + TCU
' a
,_ C ~ LONO DELAYED CCI -- Cl!!!3 = F ,
- IF ( CIIH3 .Ea 'F'-) ,'
T2 - 28000, + TCU
.C . . . . RETURN
~ C' MO CCI'-* CHH3 = C .
' 34' --T2 = 1.E6 ,(
DT2 = 1.E6' -i t ' RETURN. I
'C !
Oi i C : LATE OR VERY LATE FAILURE --- CHH1 = E
-40 TW =4300. + TCU-
[. ' T1'= 29000. + TCU
.DT1 = 0.'. i T2 = 29000. + TCU. '
i, - E2 = 7.E9 / DT2
, 'IF ( ISFR(3)')' E2 *'E2-/ 10.
RETURN C C ' FAILURE IN THE FINAL'FERIOD ( AFTER 24 HOURS ) -- CHH1 = F
'$0' .TW = 4300..+ TCU 7
T1 = 29000. + TCU 73 < DT1 = 0. r 'T2 = 86400. + T1 B.1-14 . l 4 i
+
4 ~
-----.---.-------------------------------------.----Ya
E2 = 7.E6 / DT2 IF ( ISPR(4) ) -E2 = E2 / 10. RETURN C~ C NO CONTAINMENT FAILURE -- CHH1 = 0 60 TW = 4300, + TCU T1 = 29000. + TCU DT1 = 0. T2 = T1 DT2 = 66400, ELEY = 0. RETURN C C STEAM OENERATOR TUBE RUPTURES -- SOTRs 70 El = 1.0E6 C USE THE DEFAULT VALUES FOR DT2 UNLESS THERE IS NO CF, C THEN USE 6 HOURS IF ( CHH10 .EQ. 'D' ) DT2 = 21600. C SOTRa - SErARATE THE "H* SOTRs FROM THE "0" $0TRs IF ( CHH6 .EQ. 'A' ) 00 TO 80 C C SOTRs WITH THE SECONDARY SRVs STUCK OPEN -- HINY-NXY C TW = 10 HOURS, T1 = 14.2 HOURS. DT1 = 1 HOUR TW = 36000. 71 = 31000. DT1 = 3600. 00 TO 63 C C SOTRa WITH THE SECONDARY SRVs RECLOSING -- OLYY TeY
'C TW = 3.5 HOURS. T1
- S.S HOURS, DT1 = 1 HOUR 80 1W = 12600.
71.= 19600. DT1 = 3600. C C NOW SORT OUT THE CCI RELEASES 63 IF ( CHH3~.EQ. 'C' ) 00 TO 88 C PROMPT CCI -- CHH3 = A, B, OR D -.- ADD 16.7 HINUTES IF ( CHH3 .LE 'D' ) T2 = T1 + 1000. C SHORT DELAYED CCI -- CHH3 = E -- ADD 1,67 HOURS IF ( CHH3 .EQ. 'E'.) T2 = T1 + 6000. C LONO DELAYED CCI -- CHH3 = F -- ADD S.O HOURS IF ( CHH3 .EQ. 'F' ) T2 = T1 + 18000. RETURN' C' C NO CCI -- CHH3 = C 88 T2 = 1.0E6 DT2 = 1.0E6 RETURN END SUBROUTINE CORER (BIN,NSP FCOR.FCORL,LVL) REAL LVL' CHARACTE.820 BIN C- RELEASE OF RADIONUCLIDES FROM.THE CORE. DIMENSION FCOR(9),FCORL(10,9,4) IC=ICHAR(BIN (8:8))*64 ILOO*1 Do 10 ISP=1,NSP FCOR(ISP)*XINTERPLSC(LYL FCORL,ISP,1C ILOO) 10 CONTINUE RETURN-END SUBROUTINE CCIREL(BIN,NSP,CCI,FCCI,LVL) DIMENSION CCI(10,0,4),FCCI(9) REAL LVL CHARACTER *20 BIN C DEGREE OF ER OXIDATION IC=ICHAR(BIN (8:8))-64 B.1 15
C 15 WATER PRESENT?~ IF(BIN (3:3).EQ,'B'.OR. BIN (3:3).EQ.'D')lC=IC+2 IL00=1 FCCI(1)=1.0 C CALCULATE RELEASE DURING CORE CONCRETE INTERACTION. IF(BIN (3:3).EQ.'C') 00T0 20 C NON C00LABLE BED: CCI OCCURS. Do 1018P=2 NSP FCCI ( I S P ) =XI NTERPL8C ( LVL , CCI , I S P ,10 , ILOO ) 10 CONTINUE RETURN C PERM 4NENTLY C00LABLE DEBRIS BED: NO CCI OCCURS. 20 DO 30 15P=2,NSP FCCI(18P)=0, 30 CONTINUE RETURN END SUBROUTINE SPRAY (BIN,ISPR) LOGICAL ISPR(4) CHARACTER *20 BIN CHARACTER CHSP C SETS UP THE *ISPR" HATRIX. C. 18PR(1) = .TRUE. : SPRAYS BEFORE VESSEL BREACH. C' ISPR(2) = .TRUE. : EPRAYS AFTER VESSEL BREACH BUT BEFORE CCI C ISPR(3) = .TRUE : 8 FRAYS DURING CCI. C ISPR(4) = .TRUE. i SPRAYS AFTER CCI. C CHSP= BIN (2: 2 ) DO 10 ISP=1,4 ISPR(ISP)=. FALSE. 10 CONTINUE IF(CH8P.LE.'D')!SPR(1)=.TRUE. IF(CESP.08.'B'.AND.CHSP.LE.'D')!SPR(2)=.TRuJ. IF(CH8P.0E.'C'.AND.CHSP.LE.'F')ISPR(3)=.TRUE. IF(CESP.EQ 'D'.(R.CHSP.EQ.'F'.0R.CHSP.EQ.'O')1SPR(4)= TRUE. RETURN-END SUBROUTINE CLATE12(FCOR.FVES.FCCI.FLATE,XLATE, 8 "DIAO,IPRINT, BIN,FPART,ST,STL,DI2 DLATE,XISO,XOSO,LVL) LOGICAL DIA0
-REAL LVL CHARACTER *20 BIN CHARACTER CHH CHH* BIN (111)
C CONTRIBUTION OF MISCELLANEOUS LATE BOURCES OF IODINE, C- INCLUDING (BUT N')T LIMITED TO) ORGANIC 10DIDES. C C RELRCS = FRACTIO'l RELEASED FROM THE RCS AND CCI, C: - CONTI2 = ' FRACTION REMAINING IN CONTAINHENT. C RELI= FRACTION RELEASED TO THE ENVIRONMENT, FROM CONTAINHENT. C
'C REVOLATILIZATION AND I FRCH SO'S IE NOT INCLUDED
.C DS0=FCOR*KIS0*X0SO RELI=8T+8TL-DLATE DSO _
11tCS*Fvts*(1. XISG) RELRCS*FCOR*FRCS+(1.-FCOR)*FPART*FCCI+D12 CONTI2*RELRC8 RELI C IF SOE OR HORE HAS ALREADY BEEN RELEASED, REDUCE ADDED C AMOUNT. AD0!2= CONT!2*XLATE IF(RELI.07.0.5) ADDI2=Afn,12*2.*(1.-AHAX1(0.5,RELI)) IF(CHH.EQ,'O') ADDI2*ADDI2*.005 STL*STL+ADDI2 IF(DIAO)HRITE(IPRINT,1000)LYL,XLATE RELRCS,RELI.CONTI2,ADDI2 1000 FORMAT (/5X,'LVL(8)=',F8.3,/5X,'XLATE = ',F8.4/ 8 SX,'REL. TO CONT. = ',1PE10.1.'REL. FROM CONT. = ', 8 IPE10.1.' RIN. IN CONT. = ',1PE10.1/5X, 8 'ADDED IODINE = ',1PE10.1) B.1-16 I
, t t. L l i .-
, RETURN END
[ SUBROUTINE VESREL(BIN,FVES.TVHH FVHP,
;~
8 FVIP.TVLP,TVV FVSO,NSP,LVL) i D IMNS ION FVES ( 9 ) , FYHH ( 10, 9 ) , FVH P ( 10, 9 ) , FYI P ( 10 , 9 ) , FVL P ( 10, 9 ) , 1-8 FVV(10,9),FVB0(10,9) L REAL LYL-CHARACTER CRH CHARACTER *20 BIN CHH* BIN (1:1) ILOO-1 C RELEASE OF RADIONUCLIDES FRCH THE VESSEL C C V SEQUENCE HAS SPECIAL TREATHENT C IF(CHH.LE,*B')OOTO 100 IF(BIN (6:6) LE,'B')00To 200 100=ICHAR(BIN (4:4))-64 Do 10 ISPal,NSP 0070 (11,12,13,14),100 11- FVES(ISP)*XINTERPLS(LVL,FVHH,ISP 1 LOO) 00T0 10 12 FVES(ISP)*XINTERPLS(LVL,FVHP,ISP,ILOO) 0070 10 13 FVES(ISP)=XINTERPLS(LYL,FVIP,ISP,ILOO) 00T0 10 14 FVES(ISP)*XINTERPLS(LYL,FVLP,ISP,ILOO) 10 CONTINUE C IF NO VEUL BREACH, REDUCE RELEASE (EXCEPT NO) BY 2.0 IF(BIN ($35).EQ,'F')TPM Do 17 ISP=2 NSP FVES(ISP)*FVES(ISP)/2. 17 . CONTINUE END IF RETURN 100 DO 40 ISP=1,NSP FVES(ISP)*XINTERPLS(LVL,FVV,IGP ILOO) 40 CONTINUE RETURN w 200 ' DO SO ISP=1,NSP IP(BIN (6:6).EQ.'A')THEN FVES(ISP)*XINTERPLS(LVL,FVSO,ISP,ILOO) ELSE FVES ( I S P )*XINTERPLS ( LVL , FVV , I S P, I LOO ) l END IF i 50 CONTINUE l RETURN
.END SUBROUTINE TCONVC(BIN,ISPR,FCONVI.FCONV FCONCI, 8 FCONC,LVL4,LYL6,NSP)
DIMENSION FCONVI(10,5) DIMENSION FCONCI(10,0,$),FCONC(9) l REAL LVL4,LVL6 CHARACTER *20 BIN LOGICAL ISPR(4) CHARACTER CHH1.CHH10 CHH1=8tN(1:1)' CKH10= BIN (10:10) ILOO=1 C RELEASE OF HATERIAL FROM CONTAINHENT. C FCONV: RELEASE OF HATERIAL FROH RCS C FCONCs. RELEASE OF MATERIAL FRCH CCI C C CASE 1 =.EARLY SMALL LEAK,' DRY CONTAINHENT. C CASE 2 = EARLY SMALL LEAK, WET LWTAINHENT. O CASE 3 = EARLY RUPTURE OR-LARGE LEAE. O CASE 4 = LATE RUPTURE OR LARGE LEAK C CASE S = V-SEQUENCE l C , B.1 17 l l
i l l IF(CHitt.LE.*B')OOTO 100 IF(CMH1.EQ.'C')DOTO 110 IF(CNH1.EQ,'D')1J1=1 IF(CHB 1.EQ.'E')IJ1=2 IF (CilH1.EQ. ' F ' )1J1=3 IJ2=IHAR(CHH10 )* 64 IF(IJ1.EQ.4.0R.IJ2.EQ.4)00TO 120 100=(IJ1-1)*3+IJ2-0070(10,20,30,40,40,60,00,60,80),100 C CATASTROPHIC RUPTURE AT VESSEL BREACH; USE LARGE FCONV & FCONC 10 FmFCONf1(5,3) FI-XINTERPLC(LVL4,FCONVI,3,ILOO) C USE DS-TM PERCENTILE OF CASE 3 AS HEDIAN FX=FCONVI(7,3) IF(FI.EQ,1..OR.FM.EQ.1..OR.FX.EQ.1.)THEN FCONV*1. ELSE YI=FI/(1,*FI) YW FH/(1. FH) YS=FX/(1.*FX) I PHI =YS/YH FCONV*PflI*YI/ (1.+ Pili *YI) END IF Do 11 ISP=2.NSP FleFCONCI(5,ISP,3) FI*XINTERPLSC(LYL6,FCONCI,ISP,3,ILOG) FX-FCONCI(7,ISP,3)
, IF(FI .EQ.1. .OR.FM.EQ.1. .OR.FX EQ,1. )TilEN FCONC(ISP)=1.
ELSE YI=FI/(1.-FI) YWIN/ (1. -FM) YS=FX/(1.*FX) Pt!!=YS/YH
~ FCONC(ISP)* Pili *YI/ (1.+ PHI *YI) f' END IF 11- CONTINUE FCONC(1)=1, RETURN.
C .LARGE BREAK AT VESSEL BREACil
=20 ICASV=3 ICASC=3
'00T0 150~ i
- C SMALL LEAK AT VESSEL BREACil 30 ICASV=1 :
IF(ISPR(1))ICASV=2 .f ICASC=1 IF(ISPR(1).OR.ISPR(2).OR.ISPR(3))ICASC=2 00T0 150 C . CATASTROPHIC RUPTURE OR RUPTURE LATE $ 40 IF(ISPR(2).OR.ISPR(3))THEN FACTV=XI NT ERPLC ( LVL 4 , FCONVI ,4 , ILOG ) / FCONVI ( 5, 4 ) l
. FCONV=.01*FACTV.
ICASC=4 C FOR DELAYFD CCI, A LATE CF IS THE SAME AS EARLY CF IF(BIN (3:3).EQ.'F')ICASC=3 DO 41 ISP=2,NSP FCONC(ISP)=XINTERPLSc(LVL6,FCONCI,ISP.ICASC,ILOO) 41' .CONIINVE FCONC(1)=1.
, RETURN
+: ELSE
.ICASV=4 ICASC=4 I IF(BIN (3:3).EQ,*F')1CASC=3 00T0 150 i
END IF C LATE LEAX
., 60 IF(ISPR(2).OR.ISPR(3))00TO BS C No STRAYS AFTER VB FACTV*XINTERPLC(LVL4,FCONVI,1,ILOO)/FCONVI(5.1)
B.1-18 ;
= FCONV=S.E 3*FACTV FCONC(1)=1. DO 61 ISP=2.NSP C IF CCI IS LONO DELAYED, " LATE" LEAK IS SAME AS EARLY C USE EARLY FOR TE AND RU IF(BIN (3!3).EQ.'F'.OR.1SP.EQ.4.OR.ISP.EQ.6)THEN FCONC(ISP)=XINTERPLSC(LYL6,FCONCI,1SP,1,ILOG) ELSE FACTC*XINTERPLSC(LVL6,FCONC1,ISP,1,ILOO)/FCONCI(5,ISP 1) FCONC(!SP)=1.E*2*FACTC END IF 61 CONTINUE RETURN C SPRAYS OPERATE AFTER VB REMOVE RCS RELEASE BS FACTV=XINTERPLC(LVL4,FCONVI,2,ILOO)/FCONVI(5,2) FCONV*.001*FACTV DO 67 18P=2.NSP IT(BIN (3:3).EQ.'F'.CR.ISP.EQ.4.OR.Isr.EQ.6)THEN FCONC(ISP)*XINTERPLSC(LYL6,FCONCI,ISP,2,1 LOO) ELEE FACTC=XINTERPLSC(LVL6,FCONCI,ISP,2,ILOO)/TCONCI($,lSP,2) IF(ISPR(3))THEN FCONC(ISP)= 005*FACTC ELSE FCONC(ISP)=1.E 2*FACTC IF(BIN (3:3).EQ.'F'.OR.1SP.EQ.s .4.lSP.EQ.6) 8 FCONC ( IS P ) =XINTERPLSC ( LYL6 , FCONC I ,1 S P , 2 , I LOG ) END IF END IF 67 CONTINUE FCONC(1)=1.
~ RETURN C VERY LATE-(24 HRS) RUPTURE OR LEAK 80 FCONV=1.E 6 DO 8$ ISP=2 NSF FACTC=XINTERPLSc(LVL6,FCONCI,ISP,3,ILOG)/FCONCI($,ISP,3)
FCONC(ISP)=1.E 4*FACTC 85 -CONTINUE FCONC(1)=1. RETURN C. - V SEQUENCE (CASE 4) 100 ICASV=5 ICASC=$ IF(BIN (10:10).EQ.'C')1CASC=2 IF(BIH(10:10).LE.'B')ICASC=3 00T0 150 C CONTAINHENT FAILURE BEFORE VESSEL BREACH OR ISOLATION FAILURE 110 IF(CHH10.1.E.'B')THEN C CATASTROPHIC RUPTURE OR RUPTURE BEFORE VESSEL BREACH TH=FCONVI(5,3) FI=XINTERPLC(LYL4,FCONVI,3,ILOG)= C ' ORDINARY RUPTURE USES 75 TH PERCENTILE AS HEDIAN FX=FCONVI(6,3)' C CATASTROPHIC RUPTURE USES 99 TH PERCENTILE - IF(CHH10.EQ.'A')FX=FCONVI(8.3) IF(FI.EQ.1..OR.FM.EQ 1.'.CR.FX.EQ,1.)THEN FCONV=1. ELSE YI=FI/(1.-FI) YH=FH/(1.-FM) YS=FX/(1 *FX) PHI =YS/YM FCONV= PHI *YI/(1.+ PHI *YI) END IF DO 111 ISP=2.NSP IF(CHH10 EQ.'A')THEN FW FCONCI(S ISP,3) FI=XINTERPLSC(LVL6,FCONCI,ISP,3,1L00) FX=FCONCI(8.ISP.3) IF(F1.EQ.1..OR.FM.EQ.1..OR.FX.EQ.1.) THIN FCONC(ISP)=1. B.1-19
I
' ELSE YI=FI / (1. - FI)
YH=FH/ (1. -FH) YS=FX/(1.-FX) PN!=YS/YH FCONC(ISP)= PHI *YI/(1.+ PHI *YI) END IF ELSE FCONC(ISP)=XINTERPLSC(LVL6,FCONN .ISP,3,ILOO) END IF 111 CONTINUE FCONC(1)=1. RETURN C LEAK OR SHALL ISOLATION FAILURE BEFORE VESSEL BREACH C USE AVERAGE OF CASES 1 OR 2 AND 3 ELSE IITC=1 IF(ISPR(1))11FC=2 Fl=XINTERPLC(LYL4,FCONVI,11FC,ILOO) F2=XINTERPLC(LVL4,FCONVI,3,ILOG) FCONVa(F1+F2)/2. DO 114 IS=2,NSP FCONC(18)=XINTERPLSC(LVL6,FCONCI,IS.IIFC,ILOO) 114 CONTINUE FCONC(1)=1. END IF RETURN C 110 FAILURE 120 FCONV=1.E-6
'FCONC(1)=.005 DO 121 ISP=2,HSP FCONC(ISP)*1.E 121 CONTINUE RETURN
'C- CALCULATE FCONV AND FCONC FRCH OIVEN CASE 1$0 .FCONV=XINTERPLC(LVL4,FCONVI ICASV,ILOG)
Do 151 ISP=2,HSP-FCONC(ISP)=XINTERPLSc(LVL6,FCONCI,ISP.ICASC,ILOG) 151 CONTINUE
.FCONC(1)=1.
RETURN END-SUBROUTINE SPRDF(BIN ISPR,DFSPR1,DFSPR2,DFSPV,DFSPRC DFSPC, 8 LVL)
. DIMENSION DFSPR1(10) DFSPR2(10),DFSPRC(10)
LOGICAL ISPR(4) REAL LVL
~ CHARACTER *20 BIN CHARACTER CHH1.CHH10 CHH1= BIN (1:1)
CHH10= BIN (10:10)
-IL00=1' C 'DF FOR SPRAYS.
C -DFSPV IS THE DF F(A VESSEL RELEASE. DFSPC IS
~C TRE DF FOR CCI RELEASE. NO CREDIT FOR SPRAYS (EARLY OR LATE)
-C. FOR V-SEQUENCE OR LARGE CF BEFORE HELT.
C DEFAULT IS NO SPRAYS. DFSPV=1. DFSPC=1, IF(CHRI .LE . ' B ' .OR, (CHH1.EQ. 'C ' . AND.CHH10.LE .
- B ' )) RETURN C EARLY FAILURE
'IF(CHH1.0T.'D')00TO 100 IF(ISPR(3))DFSPC=XINTERPL(LVL,DFSPRC,ILOO)
IF(BIN (4:4).LE.'B'.AND.CHH10.LE.'B') THIN IF(ISPR(1))DFSPV=XINTERPL(LVL DFSPR1,ILOO) ELSE IF(ISPR(11)DFSPY=XINTERPL(LVL.DFSPR2,ILOO) END IF C SPRAY DF SHOULD NOT BE GREATER THAN 10,000. { DFSPC= AMIN 1(DFSPC,1.EA) ) B.1-20 ) c
b-DFSPV= AMIN 1(DFSPV,1.E4) RETURN-100 IF(CHH1.07.'E')OOTO 110 IF(ISPR(1).OR.ISPR(2) OR.ISPR(3))DFSPV= 8 10.*XINTERPL(LYL,DFSPR2,ILDO) IF(ISPR(3))DFSPC=XINTERPL(LVL DFSPRC,ILOO) C SPRAY DF SHOULD NOT BE GREATER THAN 10,000. DFSPC= AMIN 1(DFSPC.1.E4) DFSPV= AMIN 1(DFSW,1.E4 ) RETURN 110 IF(ISPR(1).OR.ISPR(2) OR.ISPR(3).OR.ISPR(4))
$ DFS PV* 10 .
- XI NTERPL ( LYL . DFS PR2 ,11DO )
IF(ISPR(3) OR.ISPR(4))DFSPC=10.*XINTERPL(LVL,DFSPRC,ILOO) C SPRAY DF SHOULD NOT BE GREATER THAN 10,000. DFSPC= AMIN 1(DFSPC,1.E4) DFSPV= AMIN 1(DFCPV.1.E4) RETURN END SUBROUTI NE DHEAT ( B IN FDCHL , LDCH , NS P . DST , FCOR . DI AO , I PRI NT , FIHE , I S PR ) C C ICDEL DEVELOPED BY D. A. POWERS C DCH RELEASE OF NUCLIDE "I": (ADDITION TO ST "I") C DST (1)=(1.-FCOR(I))*FPME*TDCH(I) C FIHE= FRACTION OF CORE PARTICIPATING IN PRESSURIZED MELT EJECTION C FIME ASSUMED NOT TO PARTICIPATE.IN CCI C FDCH(I)* FRACTION OF EJECTED MELT RELEASED TO CONTAINHENT f !NSION FDCHL(10,9,2), DST (0),FCOR(0),FDCH(9)
; CAL DIAO,ISPR(4)
LDCH. ACTER*20 BIN C CtefRIBUTION DUE TO AEROSOLIEATION IB ONLY CALCULATED FOR C CONTAINHENT FAILURE AT VESSEL BREACH. C NOT CALCULATED FOR LOW PRESSURE SEQUENCES D0 1 ISP=1,NSP
. DST (ISP)=0 1 CONTINUE IF(FPME.EQ 0..OR. BIN (4:4).07.'C') RETURN C CASE lt HIGH PRESSURE-C CASE 2: INTERMEDIATE PRESSURE IC=1 IF(BIN (4:4) 0T.'B')IC=2
.C CONTAINMENT FAILURE LATE: DO NOT CALCULATE DCH RELEASE.
C EARLY LEAK AND SPRAYS OPERATE: D0 NOT CA14VLATE DCH RELEASE
~IF((BIN (1 1).EQ 'D',0R. BIN (111).EQ 'C')
8 .AND.(BIH(10:10).LE.'B',0R. BIN (10:10). 8 EQ.'C'.AND..NOT.ISPR(1))) 00T0 5 IF(DIAO) WRITE (IPRINT,950) 950 FORMAT ($X,'DCH RELEASE NOT CALCULATED') DST (1)=(1.-FCOR(1))*)PHE RETURN
$ ILOO=1 D0.10 ISP=1,NSP FDCH ( I SP ) =XI NTERPLSC ( LDCH , FDCHL , I S P . IC , I LOO )
~ DST (ISP)=(1.-FCOR(ISP))*F1HE*FDCH(ISP) 10 CONTINUE IF (DIAO) WRITE (IPRINT.1000)(FDCH(ISP),ISP=1,HSP) 1000 FORMAT (5X,'TDCH a ' 0(1PE8.1))
RETURN END-SUBROUTINE WEIGHT (NSP,ST.WE WL) DIMENSION ST(0),WFE(9),WFL(9) DATA (WFE(1),1=1,9)/.08,1.. 12,.78, 8,2.13,8.31,8...$5/ DATA (WFL(I),1=1,9)/.0011,.1.1.. 104,.7,1,19,2.62,$.4. 2/ WE=0. WLa0. DO 10 ISP=1,NSP WE=WE+ST(ISP)*WFE(ISP) WL*WL+ST(ISP)*WFL(ISP) 10 CONTINUE B.1 21
.v' ,
1 g j RETUlut ENDL REAL FUNCTION XINTERPL(LEVEL PARAM,ILOO) ;
'DIMENEION PARAH(10).CDF(9),PARAMX(10)
=
REAL LEVEL ! DATA CDF /0. . 01 05. 25, 5; .75, .9S, .99,1. / IF(LEVEL.LT.0.)THEN.
, XINTERPL*PARAM(10)
RETUlut ELSE IF(LEVEL.0E.1.)THEN
. XINTERPL*PARAM(9) '
e RETURN. . ELSE IF(LEVEL.EQ.0.)THEN
, XINTERPL*PARAM(1) .
RETURN )
'ELSE IF(ILOO.EQ.0)THEN l Do 2 L*1,9 . i I , PARAMX(L)=PARAM(L) ,5 2 - CONTINUE '
ELSE-
' DO 4 L=1,0 . . . . ,
PARAMX(L)= LOO (PARAM(L))- '
- 4. 1 CONTINUE END IF
. t
. DO 6 L=2,0 .
IF(CDF(L).LE. LEVEL)0070 6 ~
! FR=(LEVEL CDF(L-1))/(CDF(L)-CDF(L-1)) .
0070 8 ', 6 CONTINUE, - L*9
'4
;FR=1, .
f67 XINTERPL=PARAMX(L*1)+FR*(PARAMX(L)*PARNIX(L-1))' !; IF(ILOO 07.0)XINTERPL=EXP(XINTERPL) RETURN '
.END IF
.END
;g REAL FUNCTION XINTERPLS(LEVEL,PARAM,ISP,ILOO)-. ~- 1
. DIMENSION PARAM(10,0),PARAMX(10) CDF(9)-
[
,REAL LEVEL- '
1 DATA CDF . /0, , ,01, .0S t .23, .S,' .73. 9S,'. 99,1. / : s
'IF(LEVEL.LT.0,)THEN* .
'XINTERPLS=PARAM(10.ISP)
RETURN ~ ELSE IF(LEVEL'.0E,1.)THEN 1 l XINTERPLS=PARAM(9,ISP) . RETURN _i
< s
;ELSE IF(LEVEL.EQ 0.)THEN~
iXINTERPLS=PARAM(1,ISP) RETURN
'ELSE--
i R IF(ILOO.EQ.0)THEN l Do 2 L=1,0. . i PARAMX(L)=PARAM(L.ISP).
,2- . CONTINUE.
ELSE f ;3;,
- DO 4 L=1,9 ,
PARAMX(L)* LOO (PARAH(L,ISP))- l1 . p g 4 CONTINUE ' [ END IF i DO 6 L=2,0
'IF(CDF(L).LE, LEVEL)0OTO 6 l FR=(LEVEL-CDF(L-1))/(CCF(L)-CDF(L 1)) i 00T0 6 '
6 CONTINUE = '
-La9 FR=1.
-8. XINT F.RPLS= PARAMX ( L- 1 ) t FR a ( PARAMX ( L ) - PARAMX ( L- 1 ) )
!F(! LOO.OT.0)XINTERPLS=EXP(X!NTERPLS)
B.1-22
RETURN END IF END REAL FUNCTION XINTERPLSC(LEVEL,PARAM,18P,1 CASE,ILOGi DIt2NSION PARAM(10,0,5),PARAMX(9),CDF(9) REAL LEVEL DATA CDF /0.. 01. 05 25,.5. 75. 95,.99,1./ IF(LEVEL.LT.O.)THEN XINTERPLSC=PARAM(10,ISP,1 CASE) RETURN ELSE IF(LEVEL.CE.1.)THEN XINTERPLSC*PARAM(0,ISP,1 CASE) RETURN ELSE IF (LEVEL.EQ.0.) THEN XINTERPLSC=PARAM(1,ISP.ICASE) RETURN ELSE IF(ILOO.EQ.0)THEN Do 2 Lal,9 PARAMX(L)=PARAM(L,ISP,1 CASE) 2 CONTINUE ELSE DO 4 Lal,9 PARAMX(L)=LC"(PARAM(L.ISP,1 CASE))
- 4. CONTINUE END IF
' DO 6 L*2,0 IF(CDF(L).LE. LEVEL)GOTO 6 FR=(LEVEL-CDF(L-1))/(CDF(L)-CDF(L-1))
0070 8-6 CONTINUE
- L=0 FR=1.
0 XINTERPLSC=PARAMX(L-1)+FR*(PARAMX(L) PARAMX(L-1)) IF(ILOO.07.0)XINTERPLSC*EXP(XINTERPLSC) RETURN END IF END REAL FUNCTION XINTERFLC(LEVEL,PARAM,1 CASE ILOO) DIMENSION PARAM(10,4),PARAMX(9),CDF(9) REAL LEVEL. DATA CDF /0.. 01. 05. 25,.5. 75,.95,.99,1./ IF(LEVEL.LT.O.)THEN'
~ XINTERPLC=PARAM(10,1 CASE)
RETURN ELSE IF(LEVEL.0E.I.)THEN XINTERPLC=PARAM(9,ICASE) RETURN ELSE IF (LEVEL.EQ.0.) THEN
- XINTERPLC*PARAM(1,ICASE)
RETURN ELSE IF(ILOO.EQ.0)THEN DO 2 L=1,9
' PARAK((L)=PARAM(L,ICASE) 2 CONTINUE ELSE DO 4 L-1,9 PARAMX(L)= LOO (PARAM(L,ICASE))
4 CONTINUE END IF DO 6 L=2,0 IF(CDF(L).LE. LEVEL)GOTO 6 FR=(LEVEL-CDF(L-1))/(CDF(L)-CDFtL-1)) 0070 8 6 CONTINUE L*Q FR=1. 8 XINTERFLC=PARAMX(L-1)+FR*(PARMtX(L)-PARMiX(L-1)) B.1-23
~_ws wg_,~%~%.% -
-- _s- -mm ~m~y._- -_~~w- m, ~
t .:$.e , b IF(ILOO,07.0)XIRTERPLC=EXP(XINTERPLC) RETURN t END IF r END r f
?
e I 5-C k
-T 5- .
f.: + t E-g r. Y.
- h. ,
r f IA e! h p x t: C !, B.1-24 kWwA . m ....,; :m. : _ ,;_ m , ,
-~. , ..n
B.2 SURSOR Data File This section contains the data file read by SURSOR when it begins execution. Most blocks of data contain separato distributions for each radionuclide class. In these blocks, the nine columns give the distributions for the nine radionuclide classes: Column Radionculide Class 1 Noble Gas 2 Iodine 3 casium 4 Tellurium 5 Barium 6 Strontium 7 Ruthenium 8 Lanthanum 9 Cerium In the blocks of data containing separate distributions for each radio-nuclide class, each line contains the values for a given percentile of the distribution. These values are: Line 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Percentile 0 1 5 25 50 75 95 99 100 The tenth line contains a nominni value used for running SURSOR in a non-sampling mode for checkout. For the data blocks that do not contain separate . distributions for each radionuclide class, each entry is the percentile value in the order given above and the tenth entry is a nominal value~. The comment lines starting with $s have been added for listing in this appendix to explain each block of data. Listing of SURSOR Data File B.2-1
i < .' I r
~
P t
.8 FCOR distributions for . low' Er oxidation in vessel ~*
8.0E-02 2.0E 02 1.0E-02 1.0E 09 1.0E 09 1.0E-09 1.0E 09 1.0E 09 1.0E 09-9.9E 02 3.3E-02 2.4E 02 2.3E-03 3.0E 05 1.0E 09 1.0E 09 1.0E-09 1.1E 04
- 1.8E*01 8.4E 02 6.7E 02 1.3E 02 1.5E-04 1.0E-09 1.0E-09 1.0E-09 2.2E-04 8.0E 01 3.7E 01 3.0E-01 7 6E-02 7.6E-04 5.0E 05 2.0E-05 2.0E-05 1.7E-03 9.0E-01 6.9E-01 5.9E 01 2.0E-01 4.0E-03 2.0E-03 1.0E-04 1.5E 04 6.4E*03 1.0E+00 9.1E 01 8.3E-01 4.6E-01 1.3E 02 1.2E-02 9.5E-04 2.5E 03 2.7E-02 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 8.9E-01 5.2E-01 5.8E 02 2.1E 02 8.5E-02 5.2E 01 l
< gf . 1.0E+00.1.0E+00 1.0E+00 9.8E-01 1.0E+00 1.4E-01 1.0E-01 5.1E-01 1.0E+00_ i
't.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 2.7E*01 1.1E-01 1.0E+00 1.0E+00
-1.0E+00 9.9E-01 9.9E-01 2.7E 01 1.3E 01 1.0E 06 1.0E-07 1.0E-07 1.3E-01
'$ FOOR. distributions for h!8h Er oxidation in-vessel f
+ 9.9E-02.9.9E*02 3.5E-02 1.0E-09 1.0E 09.1.0E-09 1.0E-09 1.0E-09 1.0E-09 1.6E-01 1.4E 01 0.1E-02 3.0E 03 1.0E-09 1.0E-09 1.0E-09 1.0E-09 2.2E-04 l 4.2E 01'2.8E 01 1.7E 01 1.8E 02 2.5E-04 1.0E 09 1.0E-09 1.0E-09 1.2E-03 1 8.0E 01 5.6E 01 4.2E-01 9.7E 02 2.1E-03'5.0E-05 2.0E-05 2.0E-05 4.2E 03 I
'9.2E 01 7.5E 01 8.2E 01 3.*E 01 6.4E-03 4.6E 03 1.0E-04 1.5E-04 8.6E-03 I
'1.0E+00'9.6E 01 8.9E 01 5.9E-01 1.8E-02 2.0E-02 1.2E 03 3.0E-03 3.0E 02
'1.0E+00 1.0E+00.1.0E+00 9.1E-01 5.1E-01 8.1E-02 2.1E-02 8.5E-02 5.2E-01
-1 CE+00 1,0E+00.1.0E+00 9.9E-01 1.0E+00 1.4E-01 1.0E-01 5.1E 01 1.0E+00 ,
1.0E+00 1.0E+00'1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 2.9E 01 1.1E 01 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 .! igCE*00 9.9E-01 9.9E 01 8.4E-01 1.3E-01 1.0E-06 1.0E-07 1.0E-07 1.3E-01 FCOR* ! i
- 8 FVES distributions for.YB with the RCS at system setpoint pressure -
[.1.0E+00 1.0E*09 1.0E*00 1.0E-05 1.0E-09 1.0E-05 1.0E-05 1.0E-09 1.0E-09 1.0E 05 1.0E 05 1.0E 1.0E-09 05 1.0E-051.0E-09 1.0E 05 - 1.0E-09 1.0E-09 ,
'1.0Et00 1.0E-05 1.0E 05 1.0E 05 1.0E-05 1.0E-05 1.0E-05 1.0E-05 1.0E 05 -4
=1.0E+00 9.3E-03 5.1E-03 1.8E-03 1.8E-03 1.8E-03 1.8E-03 1.8E-03 1.8E-03
.1.0E+00 8.6E-02'4.25 02 2.8E-02 2.8E-02 2.8E-02'2.8E-02 2.8E-02 2.8E-02 1.0E+00 3.5E-01 3.5E 01 1.8E-01-1.8E-01 1.8E-01 1.6E 01 1.8E-01-1.8E-01' >
i 1.0E+00 7.'7E 04 7.7E-01.7.6E*01 7.6E 01 7.6E 01 7.6E 01 7.6E-01 7.6E-01
-1.0E+00 9.6E-01.9.6E-01 9.62 01 9.6E-01 0.6E 01 9.6E-01 9.6E-01,9.6E-01' 1.0E+00 1;0E+00 1.0E+00:1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 y
-1.0E+00 2.4E 01 2.0E-01'1.5E-01 1;1E-01 1.0E-01 1.0E-01 1.0E-01 1.1E-01 FVHH* _ Jr
'4 t - . .
D$ FVE5 distributions for VB with the'RCS at ht8h pressure I 1.0E+00 1-0E
. 09 1.0E 09 1.0E 09:1.0E-09 1.0E-09 1.0E 09 1.0E-09 1.0E-09 Y
-1.0E+00.1.0E-05 1.0E 05.1.0E-05 1.0E-05 1.0E-05 1.0E-05 1.0E+05 1.0E 05 - >
1.0K+00 1,0E-0$.1.0E-05 1.0E-05 1.CE-05 1.0E-05 1.0E 05 1.0E-05 1.0E-05
, l1.0E+00 9.3E 03 5.1E 03 1 SE-03 1.8E-03 1,8E 03 1.8E-03 1.8E-03 1.8E*03 !
1.0E*00 8.6E-02 462E-02 2.8E 02 2.8E-02'2.8E-02 2.8E-02 2.8E 02'2.CE-02 .; 1.0E+00 3.5E-01 3;$E-01 1.8E-01 1.8E 01 1.8E-01 1.8E 01 1.8E-01 1.8E ' 1.0E+00 7.7E*01.7.7E-01'7,6E-01'7.6E-01 7.6E-01 7.6E-01 7.6E-01 7.6E-01 11~0E+00 9.6E-01 9.bE 01 9.6E-01 9.6E-01 9.6E-01 9.6E 01 9.6E 01 9.6E 01
'~
3 fl.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00'1.0E+00 1.0E+00 l'.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 16 0E+00 2. 8E 01 2.8E-01 0.0E 02 2.7E*01 2.7E-01 2.7E-01 2.7E-01 2.7E-01 = FVHP* . 6 FVES distributions for VB with the RCS at intermediate pressure i 1.0E+00 1.0E-09 1.0E 09 1.0E 09 1.0E-0S 1.0E 0911.0E-09 1.0E-09'1.0E-09 1.0Et00 -3.0E 05 3.0E-05 3.0E-05 3.0E-05 3;0E-05 3.0E-05 3.0E-05 3.0E-05
'1~.0E+00 1.1E-02'9.0E-03 8.0E-03 8,6E 03 8,6E-03 8,6E-03 8.6E-03 8.6E-03 1.0E+0C 2.0E-01 1.3E 01 1.2E-01 1.3E-01 1.3E-01 1.3Ea01 1.3E-01 1.3E-01 if 1.0E+00 4.15-01. 2.9E-01 2.5E 01 2.4E-01 2.4E-01 2.4E-01 2.4E-01 2.4E-01 'I 1.0E+00 6.1E-01'5.9E-01 4.3E*01 3,7E-01 3.7E 01 3.7E-01 3.7E-01 3.7E-01
.1.0E+00 8.9E-01-8.9E-01'8.9E-01 8.7E-01 8.7E-01 8.7E*01 8.7E-01'8.7E-01
_1.0E+00 9.9E-01.9.9E-01 9.9E-01 9.9E 01 9.9E-01 9.9E 01 9.9E*01 9.9E-01 1.0E+00 1.0Et00 1; 0E*00 :1,0E *00 :1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 5,0E-01 5.0E-01 2.0E 02 3.4E-013.4E-01 3.4E 01 3.4E-C1' 3.4E-01 FVIP*
^
$ TVES distributions for VB with the RCS at low pressure ,
1.0E+00 1.0E-09 1.0E 09 1.0Ea09 1.0E-09 1.0E-09'1.0E-09 1.0E-09 1.0E-09
- >- 140E+00 2~5E 02 1.1E-02 5.9E-03 5,9E 03 5.9E-03 5.9E-03 5.9E-03 5.9E-03 1.0E+00'1.2E-01'7.2E 02 4.0E-02 4.0E-02 4.0E 02 4.0E-02 4.0E-02 4.0E-02~
1.0E+00 3.1E-01 2.0E-01 1.7E 1.7E 01 1.7E-01 1. 7E-01 1. 7E-01 1.7E-01 1.0E+00 5.2E 01 4.0E-01 3.3E-01 3.3E-01 3.3E-01 3.3E 01 3.3E*01 3.3E-01 1.0E+00 8.7E-01 8.7E-01 6.7E 01 6.2E-01 6.2E-01 6.2E-01 6.2E 01 1.2E-01 i 1.0E+00 9.9E 01 9.9E 01 9.9E-01 9.9E-01 9.9E-01 9.9E-01 9.9E-01 n ,9E-01 < 1.0E+00'1.0E+00 1.0E*00 1.0E+00 1.0E*00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.'E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0Et00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0L 90 ; 1.0E+00 8.7E-01 8.7E 01 8.3E-01 7.7E 01.7.7E*01 7.7E-01 7.7E-01 7.7E-01 'VLP* B,2-2
?
8 FVES distributtons for Event V 1.0E+00 6.5E*02 6.2E-02 5.1E 02 8.1E 02 8.1E-02 8.1E-02 8.1E 02 8.1E 02
-1.0E+00 7.9E 02 1.4E 01 5.3t*02 8.5E 02 8.5E-02 8.5E-02 8.5E 02 8.5E-02 '
1.0E+00 1.6E 01 1.5E 01 6.4E 02 1.0E*01 1.0E 01 1.0E-01 1.0E-01.1.0E 01
'1.0E*00 4.1E 01 4.0E-01 1.1E 01 1.7E-01 1.7E-01 1.7Z-01 1.7E-01 1.7E-01 1.0E+00 6.1E 01 6.0E-01 2.5E 01 3.5K 01 3. 5E-01 3.5E-01 3.5E*01 3.5E-01
.1.0E+00 7.9E-01 7.8E 01 5.5E-01 6.7E 01 6.7E 01 6.7E 01 3.7E 01 6.7E 01 '
.1.CE+00 9.8E-01 9.7E-01 9.3E*01 9.6E*01 9.6E*01 9.6E 01 0.6E 01 9.6E 01 1.0E+00 9.9E*01 9.9E-01 9.8E 01 9.9E-01 9.9E 01 0.92 01 0.9E*01 9.9E 01 '
1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1;0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00~1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 2.0E 01 2.0E 01 1.0E 01 1.0E 01'1.0t 01 1.0E-01 1.0E-01 1.0E-01 FVV*
$ FVES distributions for 60TRs 1.0E+00 9.0E 03 8.3E-03 7.1E-02 1.0E 02 7.5E 03 1.0E-02 1.0E-02 1.0E-01 i 1.0E+00 1.1E*02 2.2E-02 7.3E-02.2,2E-02 7.9E 03 1.1E 02 1.1E 02 1.1E 02 ;
- 7) 't.0E+00:2.4E 02 2.4E-02 8,8E 02 1.3E-02 9.4E-03 1.3E-02 1.3E-02 1.3E 02 ,
1.0E+00 8.3E-02 8.3E 02 1.5E-01 2.3E-02 1.7E 02 2.3E-02 2.3E-02 2.3E-02 1.0E+00 1.7E-01.1.7E-01 3.2E-01 5.8E 02 4.4E-02 5.8E 02 5.8E-02 5.8E-02 1.0E+00 3.3E 01 3.3E 01 f.3E 01 1.9E 01 1,5E-01 1.9E-01 1.9E 01 1.9E 01 1.0E+00 8.7E-01 8.2E 01 9.5E 01' 7.3E-01 6.7E-01 7.3E 01 7.3E 01 7.3E 01 1.0E+00 9,3E-01 0.3E 01 0.9E-01 9.2E 01 8.9E 01 9.2E 01 9.2E-91 9.2E 01- , i
- c. 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+0C 1.0E+00 1.0E+00'1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00~1.7E-01 1.7E 01 3.2E-01.5.8E-02 4.4E-02 5.8E 02 5.8E*02 5.8E-02 FVS0* r
(
~$ F150 distributions for SOTRs with the secondary SRVs reclosins >> '
.1.5E-01 6.6E-02 6.4E 02 2.6E-01 1.4E-01 1,5E 01 1.5E-01 1'.5E*01 1.4E 01 1.7E 01 7.3E 02 9.9E-02 2.6E-01 1.5E-01 1.5E-01 1.5E-01 1,5E 01 1.5E-01 i
' 2.5E-01 1.1E-01 1.0E 01 2.9E-01 1,6E-01 1.7E-01 1'.7E-01 1.7E-01'1.6E-01 1 c4.4E 01 2.0E 01 2.0E-01 3.8E-01 2.2E-01 2.2E-01 2.2E 01 2.2E-01 2.2E 01 ]f 3.8E-01 2.9E-01 2.8E 01 5.6E-01 3.3E 01 3.4E-01 3.4E 01 3.4E-01 3.3E 01 .[
7.2E 01 4.1E*01 3.9E-01'8.5E-01 5.3E 01 5.4E 01 5.4E-01 5.4E-01 5.3E-01 i 9.5E-01 8.5E-01~7.7E 01t,0E+00 9.0E-01 9.0E 01 9.0E-01 9.0E-01 0.0E 01 '* 9.8E-01 9.2E-01 9.2E-01 1,0E+00 9.7E*01 9.8E-01 9.8E-01 9.8E-01 9.8E-01 , 1,0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1,0Et00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 5.9E-01 2.9E-01 2.8E 01^ 5.6E 01 3.3E-01 3. 4E-01 3.4E-01 3.4E-01 3 ' 3E-01. i 8 FISG distributions Ecr SOTRs with the secondary SRVs stuck open 1.0E+00 0.00000_0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 i 1.0E+00 4.9E 07 4.9E-07 5.2E 07 5.2E 07 5.2E-07 5.2E-07 5.2E 07 5.2E-07 11.0E+00 2.8E 05 2.8E 07 3.8E-05 3.8E-05 3.8E 05 3.8E-05 3.8E-05 3.8E-05 3
'1.0E+00 7.3E-02 6.2E-02 4.0E-02 3.0E-02 3.0E 02 3.0E-02 3.0E-02 3.0E-02J
.1.0E+00 2.7E-01 2;6E-01 1.7E*01 2.4E-01 2.4E-01 2.4E-01 2.4E 01 2.4E-01 ,
? I'.0E+00.5.6E-01 5,5E-01 4,3E-01. 5.5E-01 5.5E 01 5.5E-01 5.5E-01 5.55-01
. ' t.0E+00 8.0E*01-- 7.8E-01 7.7E 01 7.6E 01 7i6E 01 7.6E 01 7.6E 01 7.6E-01 1.0E+00 9.6E 01:9.5E-01 9.4E-01 9.1E-01 9.1E-01 0.1E-01--9.1E-01-9.1E-01 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 '1.0E*00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 ' 1.0E +00 .1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 2.7E 01 2.6E-01 1.7E-01 2.4E 01 2.4E-01 2.4E-01 2.45 01 2.4E-01 F150*- ._
f 1 0 FOSO distributions for S01R4 with the secondary SRVs raciosing . . 1.8E 01.1.2E*01 1.2E-01 2.3E 01 2.3E-01 2.3E-01 2.3E-01 2.3E+01 2.3E - 2.0E-01 1.3E 01 1.9E 01 2.3E 01 2.4E 01 2.3E 01 2.4E 01 2.4E-012.4E-01 :f 2.9E*01 2.0E*01 2.0E-01 2; 6E 01 2.6E-01 2.5E 01 2,5E 01 - 2.6E-01 2.6E-01
< 5,0E-01 3 7E 01 3.8E 01.3.4E-01 3.5E-01 3.4E-01 3.5E-01 3.5E-01 3.5E-01 ,[
' 6.7E-01 S.3E-01 5. 4E-01. 5.0E 01 5.2E-01 5.3E-01 5.3E-01 5.3E 01 5.3E-01 l
- 8. 4 E-01 7.4 E-01 7. 6E-01 7.2E-01 8. 4E-01 6,3E-01 6,4E-01 8.4E-01 8. 4E-01 )
.1.eL+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 9.2E-01 1.0E+00 '1.0t t00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00. 3
..a.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 9.4E-01 1.0E+00'1.0E*00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00'1.0E+00 1,0E+00 9,4E*01 1.0E+00.1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 6.7E 01 5.'3E 01'5.4E 01 5.0E-01 5.2E-01 5.3E-01 5.3E-01 5.3E 01 5.3E-01 8 FOSO distributions for SOTRs with the secondary SRVs stuck cpen '
1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0Et00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E*00 1.0E+00 1,0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 i 1.0E+00 1.UE*00~1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0Et00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 , l
-1.0E+00 1.0E+00.1.0E*00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00.1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0Et00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E600 1.0E+00'1.0E+00 1.0E+00'1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 :
' 1. 0E +00 1. 0E *00 1.0E+00 1. 0E+00 1. 0E+00 1.0E t00 1. 0E+00 1.0E+00 1. 0E +00 1.0E+00 1.0E*00 1.0Et00 1.0E+00 1.0E*00 1.0Et00 1.0E+00 1.0E*00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1;0E*00 1.0E+00.1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1,0E*00 B.2-3
L v 11 b 1.0E+00 1.0E*00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 FOS 0*
- 8 Decontaminetton factor distribution for pool scrubbing for Event V 5.1E+03.4.5E+03 4,1E+03 1.3E+02 6.2E+00 3.0E+00 1.8E+00 1.7E+00 1.6E+00 5.0E+00 VDF*
8 FCONY distribution for early leak - dry containment 1.0E*05 2.0E 03 6.0E 03 S.8E-02 1.4E-01 3.6E 01 6.9E 01 7.8E-01 8.0E-01 1.07.11 8 FCONY distribution for early leak - wet contoinment
'1.0E-03 2.0E-03 7.0E 03 8.6E 02 1.8E-01 4.2E-01 7.1E-01 7.9E-01 8.9E-01 1.0E 01 l 8 FCONY distribution for early rupture of contalment 1.8E-02 8.0E 02 2.1E-01 4.2E 01 5.8E-01 7.6E-01 8.9E 01 9.6E 01 9.8E-01 8.0E-01 j J
$ FCONY distribution for late containment failes i 3.0E-05 7.0E 05 2.0E 04 2.0E 03 2.2E 02 6.8E-02 2.1E 01 2.9E 01 4.5E-01 1.0E-01 'l 8 FCONY distribution for Event V i 1.3E 02 5.9E 02 1.6E-01 3.4E-01.5.0E 01 7.0E 01 8.6E 01 9.5E 01 9.7E 01 8.0E-01 FCORV*
8 FCONC distributions for early leak - dry containment 1.0E+00 1.0E-03 1.0E 03 1.0E 03 1.0E 03 1.0E 03 1.0E 03'1.0E-03 1.0E 03 1.0E+00 2.0E-03 2.0E-04 4.0E-03 4.0E 03 4.OE*03 4.0E-03 4.0E-03 4.0E-03 1.0E+00 6.0E-03 6.0E-03 1.0E-02 1.0E 02 1.0E-02 1.0E 02 1'.0E-02 1.0E 02 1 1.0E+00 5.8E-02 5.8E 02 6.5E-02 6.5E-02 6.5E-02 6.5E-02 6.5E*02'6.5E-02 '$ 1.0E+00 1.5E 01 1'5E-01 1.7E 01 1.7E 01 1.7E*01'1.7E-01 1.7E-01 1.7E-01 k
- 1. 0E+00 3. 7E -01 3. 7E-01 3. 7E-01 3. 7E-01 3. 7E 01 3. 7E-01 3. 7E-01 3. 7E-01 1.0E+00 6.7E 01 6.7E 01 6.7E 01 6.7E-01 6.7E*01 6.7E-01 6.7E-01 6.7f-01 ']<
1.0E+00 7.7E-01 7.7E 017.7E 01 7.7E 01 7.7E 01 7.7E-01 7.7E 01 7.7E-01 l
- 1.0E+00 8.0E-01 8.0E-01 ' 8.0E-01 8.0E-01 8.0E-01 8.0E-01 8.0E-01 8.0E 01 1.0E+00 1.5E-01.1.5E 01 1,$E-01 1.5E-01 1.5E-01 1. 5E-01 1.5E 01 1. 5E-01 '
. 8 FCONC distributions for early ' leak - wet containment .
1.0E+00 1.0E-03 1.0E-03 3.0E-03 3.0E 03 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 3.05-03 3,0E-03 1.0E+00 2.0E-03 2.0E-03 7.0E-03 7.0E-03.7,0E-03 7.0E-03:7.cE-03 7.0E-03 1.0E+00 7.0E*03 7.0E 03 1.7E-02 1.7E-02 l'.7E-02 1.7E 02 1.7E-02'1.7E 02 1.0E+00 8.6E-02 8.6E-02 9.6E-02 9.6E-02 9,6E-02 9.6E-02 9,6E-02 9.6E-02
'1.0E+00 1,9E 01 1.'9E-01 2.1E-01 2.1E 01.2.1E 01 2.1E-01 2.1E 01 2i1E-01 .
1.0E+00 4.4E 01'4,4E-01 4.4E 01 4.4E-01 4.4E-01 4.4E 01 4.4E-01 4.4E-01 H
- 1.0E+00 7.0E-01'7.0E-01 7,0E-01 7.0E 01 7.0E 01 7.0E 01 7.0E-01 7.0E-01 I
^1.0E+00 7.9E-01 7.9E 01 7.9E-01 7.9E-01 7.9E 01 7.9E*01 7.9E-01 7,9E 01' ' -3 1.0E+00 8.9E 01 8.9E-01 8.9E-01 8.0E-01 8.9E-01~8.9E-01 0.0E 01 8.9E-01 j 1.0E+00 1.5E 01 1.5E 01:1.5E-01 1.5E 01 1.5E-01 1.5E 01 1.5F-01 1.5E 01
\
l 8 FCONC distributions for early rupture of containment l 1.0E+00 9.0E-03 9.0E 03 9.0E*03'9.0E-03=9.0E 03 0.0E-03 9.0E-03 9.0E-03 -' 1.0E+00 4.0E-02 4.0E-02 4.0E 02 4.0E-02 4.02-02 4.0E-02 4,0E-02 4,0E 02 1.0E+00 1.7E-01 1.7E 01 1.5E 01 1.5E-01 1.5E-01 '1.5E-01 1. 5E 01 1.5E-01 1.0E+00 4.3E-01 4.3E 01'3.9E-01 3.9E-01 3.9E-01 3.9E 01 3.9E-01 3.9E-01 11.0E+00 6.3E-01 6.3E-01 6,0E-01 6.0E 01 6.0E-01 6.0E*01.6.0E-01 6.0E 01
'1.0E+00 7.7E-01 7.7E*01 7.6E-01 7.6E-01 7.6E 01 7.6E-01 7.6E-01 7.6E 01 l 1.0E+00 8.5E-01 8.5E-01 8.5E-01 8.5E 01.8.5E-01 8,5E-01 8.5E-01 8;5E*01 ;}
11.0E+00 0.0E-01 9.0E 01 0.0E-01 9.0E 01 9.0E 01 9:0E-01 9.0E 01 0.0E 1 1.0E+00 9. 5E-01 0.5E 01 9. 5E-01 9.5E 01 0.5E-01 9. 5E-01 9.5E-01 0.5E 01 _j
'1.0E+00 4.3E-01 4.3E-01 4.3E 01 4.3E-01 4.3E 01 4.3E-01 4.3E 01 4.3E 01 1 y
7 . 8ITONCdisthibutionsforlateruptureofcontainment ~l
'3, 1.0E+00 1.0E-09.1.0E-09 1.0E-03.1.0E 03 1.0E-03 1.0E-03 1.0E 03 1.0E-03 ', -1.0E+00 1.0E-03 1.0E-03 1.0E-03 1.0E 03 1.0E 03 1.0E-03 1.0E 03 1.0E-03 c!
1.0E+00 2.0E 03 2.0E-03 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 3.0E 03 3,0E 03 f j 1.0E+00 1.2E 02 1;2E-02 3.0E 02 1,8E-02 3.0E 02 1.8E-02 1.8E 02 1.8E-02 L1 1.0E*00 4.5E-02 4.5E-02 8.5E-02 6.3E 02 8.5E 02 6.3E 02 6.3E 02 6.3E-02 : 1.0E+00 1.0E-01 1;0E-01 1,9E-01'1.2E-01 1.9E-01 1.2E-01'1.2E-01 1.2E-01 1.0E+00 2.1E-01 2.1E-01 4.8E 01 2,6E-01 4.8E-01 2.6E-01 2.6E-01 2.6E 01 1.0E+00 2.9E 01 2.9E 01~7.3E-01.3.4E-01 7.3E-01 3.4E-01 3.4E 01 3.4E-01 l 1.0E+00 4. 9E-01 4.9E-01 9.0E-01.5,5E-01 0.0E-01 5.5E 01 5. 5E-01 5.5E 01 ' 1;0E+00 1.0E 01 1. 0E-01 3.7E-01 1.6E-01 3.7E-01 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 8 FCONC distributions for Event'V 1.0E+00 5,3E-03 5.3E 03 5.3E-03 5.3E 03 ' 5.3E 03 5.3E-03 5.3E-03 5.3E-03 l 1.0E+00 2.4E-02 2.4E-02.2.4E-02'2.4E-02 2.4E-02 2.4E-02 2.4E-02 2.4E-02 i'- 1.0E+00 1.1E 01 1.1E-01 9.3E-02 9.3E-02 0.3E-02 9.3E 02 9.3E-02 9.3E-02 k ) .1.0E+00 3.1E 01 3.1E-01 2.7E-01 2.7E-01 2,7E-01 2.7E-01 2.7E-01 2.7E-01 1.0E+00 5.0E-01 5.0E 01 4.7E-01 4.7E-01 4.7E-01 4.7E-01 a .7E 01 4.7E 01 1.0E+00 6.6E 01 6.6E 01 6.5E-01 6.5E-01 6.5E-n1 6.5E-01 6.5E-01 6.5E-01 B.2-4
1.0E+00 7.7E 01 7.7E 01 7.7E-01 7.7E 01 7.7E*01 7.7E 01 7.7E-01 7.7E-01 1.0E+00 ' 8.4t*01 8. 4E 01 8. 4E-01 8.4E-01 8.4E 01 8.4E-01 8.4E-01 8. 4E 01
-1.0E+00 9.2E-01 9.2E-01 9.2E*01 9.2E-01 9.2E 01 9.2E-01 9.2E 01 9.2E-01 1.0E+00 4.3E 01 4.3E-01 4.3E-01 4.3E-01 4.3E 01 4.3E-01 4.3E-01 4.3E-01 FCONCe .i 8 FCCI distributions for low Er oxidation in-vessel and dry containment 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 5.8E 03 1,0E 09 1.0E-09 1.0E 09 1.0E 09 1.0E-09 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.3E 02 1.CE 05 1.0E 09 1.0E*09 1.0E-09 6.0E-05 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1 CE+00 6.0E 02 2.7E-04 1.2E-09 1.0E 05 1.0E 05 3.6E 04 1.0E+00 1.0E+00-1.0E+00 2.9E-01 1.6E-03 2 AE 00 2.2E-04 2.3E-04 2.0E-03 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.4E+00 5.5E-01 3.4E 0. 5.6E-09 7.1E-04 9.7E-04 2.5E-02 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 6.5E-01-1.9E-01 5.0E-06 1.5E-02 1.6E-02 1 dt 01 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 9.6E*01 7.7E-01 7.3E-03 0.2E-02 9.6E-02 6.7E-01 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 0.0E-01 9.7E-02 1.7E-01 1.7E-01 8.7E 01 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 2.5E-01 2.2E 01 2.2E-01 1.0E+00 :
1.0E+00 l'CE+00
. 1.0E+00 3.3E-01 1.1E*01 1.0E 05 5.4E-04 5.4E-04 1.1E-01 !
l 8 FCCI diettsbutions for high Er oxidation in-vessel and dry containment 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 3.9E 03 1.0E 09 1.0E*09 1.0E-09 1.0E-09 1.0E-09 j 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 8.9E 03 1.0E-05 1.0E-09 1.0E 09 1.0E-09 3.0E-05 ; 1.0E+00 1.tt+00 1.0E+00 4.0E 02 1.8E 04 1.2E-09 1.0E-05 1.0E 09 2.7E-04 l 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.8E-01 1.5E-03 2.4E 09 2.2E-04 2.2E-04 1.3E-03 l 1.0E+00 1.0E*00 1.0E+00 4.9E 01 1.7E-02 5.6E 09 6.3E-04 7.2E 04 1.2E-02 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 6.6E-01 1.4E-01 5.0E-06 7.8E-03 8.1E-03 8.0E-02 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 9.1E 01 5.9E-01 7.3E-03 8.8E-02 8.8E-02 4.8E-01 1.0Et00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 9.7E-01 8.6E-01 9.7E-02 1,7E-01 1.7E-01 8.4E-01 ;
-1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 9.9E-01 1.0E+00 2.5E-03 2.2E-01 2.2E-01 1.0E+00 l 1.0E+00 1.0E400 ' 1.0E+00 3.3E 01 1.1E-01 1.0E 05 5.4E-04 5,4E-04 1,1E 01 !
$ FCCI distributions for low Er oxidation in-vessel and wet containment 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.4E-03 1,0E 09 1.0E 09 1.0E-09 1.0E-09 1.0E 09 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1,0E*00 4.7E-03 1.0E-05 1.0E-09 1.0E-09 1.0E-09 3.0E-05
. :1.0E+00 1.0E t00 1.0E*00 2.7E-02 1.7E 04 1.1E-09 1.0E-05 1.0E-09 '2.7E-04 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.JE+00 1.7E*01 1.5E-03 1.3E-09 1.6E-04 2.2E-04 1.3E-03 ;f 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 4.2E 01 1.7E-02 1.7E*09 4.6E 04 7.5E*04 1.2E-02 i 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 6.1E-01 1.4E 01 1.0E-06 7.6E-03 8.6E-03 8,3E 02- j 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 9lbE-01 6.4E-01 2.5E-03 8.4E*02 8.8E-02 5.3E-01 l 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 9.9E-01 8.7E 01 5.8E-02 1.6E-01 1.7E-01 8.6E-01 ;
- 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 9.9E-01 1.0E+00 1.5E-01 2.2E-01 2.2E-01 1.0E+00 -j 1.0E+00 1.0Et00 1.0E+00 3.3E 01 1.1E-01 1.0E-05 5.4E-0 5.4E 04 1.1E*01 !
$ FCCI distributions for high Er oxidation in-vessel and wet containment 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 9.6E-04 1.0E 09 1.0E-09 1.0E-09 1.0E-09 1.0E-09
' 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 3.2E-03 1.0E*09 1.0E-09 1,0E-09 1.0E-09 1.0E-05 1.0E+00 1.0E+0D 1.0E+0C 1.9E-02'1.0E-04 1.1E-09 1.0E 09 1.0E-09 2.1E-04 (4 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.5E-01 1.5E-03 S.3E-09 1.1E-04 2.0E-04 9.7E-04 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 3.9E 01 1.5E-02 1.7E-09 4.3E-04 5.1E-04 9.3E 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 6.0E-01 1.3E-01 1.0E-06 7.3E-03 7.9E-03 6.8E 02 I l'.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 8.8E-01 4.6E-01 2.5E-03 8.4E-02 8.4E-02 3.7E-01 f 1.0Et00 ;1.0E+00 1.0E+00 9.6E-01 8.5E-01 5.8E 02 L EE-01 1.6E-01 8.3E 01 -l 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E*00 9.7E-01 1.0E600 1.5E-01 2.3E-01 2.3E-01 1.0E+00 ';
1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 3.3E 01 1.1E-01 1.0E-05 5.4E-04 5.4E-04 1.1E-01 FCCI* ] 1 8 Spray DF distribution for RCS release. CF at YB. RCS at high pressure 2.8E+00 2.6E +00 2.2E+00 2.0E+00 1,8E+00 1.7E+00 1.6E+00 1. 4E*00 1.0E+00 2.6E*00 DFSPR1* ' ] 4 8 Spray DF distribution for RCS releasw. all cases not included above 2.8E*03 2.6E+03 1.8E+2 7.4E+01 4.0E+01 9.4E+00 3.0E+00 2.4E+00 2.3E+00 4.5E+01 ' DFSPR2* .i l 3 Spray DF distribution for CC1 release 3.2E+03 2.9E+03 2.0E+03 2.8E+02 2.8E+01 1.4Et01 7.7E+00 6.8E+00 6.7E*00 3.0Et01 DFSPRC* 8 Distribution for the late lodine release j 0.0E+00 1.0E-03 5.0E-03 1.0E-02 5.0E-02 8.0E-02 1.0E-01 1.0E-01 1.0E-01-6.0E-03 LATEIL* f
$ Distribution for the revolatilization release from the RCS, one hole in RCS -
1.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E*00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E*00 1.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0Et00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 .j 1.0E+00-0.0E+00 0.0E*00-0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 ' 1.0E+00 1.1E-02 1.0E-03 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 1.0E*00 4.5E-02 2.3E-02 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0,0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0Et00 0.0E+00 o B.2-5 -
Y
-i i
5? 1 s'
.1.0E+00 1.0E 01 7.2E*02 2.4E-02 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 '
1.0E+00 4.4E 01 1.7E 01 2.1E-01 0.0E+00'O.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 g , 1.0E+00 8.0E-01 2.5E-01 4.1E-01 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00'?.5E-01 8.0E-01 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 i
?0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00'0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 1
$ Distribution for the revolatilisetion release from the RCS, two holes in RCS 1.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 1.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 1.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 e 1.0E+00 3.6E 02 2.7E-02 0.0E+00 0.0Et00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0 1.0E+00 1.3E 01 0.5E-02 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 b' '
1.0E+00 3.0E-01 2.7E 01 7.7E-02 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 ; 1.0E+00 7.2E*01 7.0E 01 6.3E*01'0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 g) 1.0E+00-0.2E 01 9.1E-01 8.9E-01 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 0.CE+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 l 0.0E+0C 0,0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 T1. ATE * !
'i
$ Distribution for the DCH release - RCS et high pressure 1.0E+00 6.7E-01 6.7E 01 2.3E-03 5.2E-05 5.0E-05 5.2E-05 5.2E-05 5.2E-05 1.0E+00 6.7E-016.7E-013.4E 03 7.0E-05 7.3E 05 7.0E 05 7.0E-05 '.Sh-05 1.0E+00 6.8E*01 6.8E-01 1.7E-02 2.3E-04 3.3E 04 2.3E-04 1.3E-04 2.3E 04 '
~
1.0E+00 7.5E 01'7.5E-01 6.8E-02 1 3E 03 7.7E-03 1.3E-03 1.3E-03 1.3E-03 ' 1.0E+00 9.2E-01 9.2E-01 2.0E 01 6.0E-03 2.2E-02 6.0E-03 6.0E-03 9.0E 'u~
!1.0Et00 9.7E 01 9.7E 01 2.8E 01 2.5E 02 8.2E-02 1.8E-02 1.8E-02 4.3E 02
- 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1. 0E+00 3.6E-01 2.3E*01 2.1E-01 6.3E*02 6.3E 02 2.9E "
1.0E+00 1.0E*00 1.0E+00 4.0E-01 3.9E-01 3.6E 01 1.3E-01 1.6E-01 3.9E-01 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 4.0E 01 4.4E-01 4.2E*01 1.6E-01 2.0E 01 4.2E 01
.liOE+00 9.2E 01 9.2E 01 2.0E-01 6.0E 03 2.2E-02 6,0E 03 6.0E 03 9.0E-03 FDCPi.-HP*
l
- $ Distribution for.the DCH release - RCS et intermediate pressure J 1.0E+00 6.7E 01 6.7E-01 2.3E-03 5.5E-05 5.2E-05 5.5E 05 5.5E-05 5.5E 05 p~ ,,1.0E+00 6.7E 01 6.7E 01 3.4E 03'7.0E-05 7.3E-05 7,0E 05 7.0E 05 7.0E-05 1,0E+00 6.8E*01 6.8E 01 1.7E-02 1.8E-04 2.8E-04 1.8E 04 1.8E 04 1.8E-04 1[
1,0E+00 7.5E 01 7.5E 01 6.7E-02 7.7E-04 7.1E-03 7.7E-04 7.7E-04 7.7E 04 1
~ 1.0E+00 9.2E-01 9.2E 01 2,0E-01 4.7E 03 2.0E 02 4.7E-03 4.7E-03 7.7E 03 --
'l'0E+00 9.7E 01 0.7E-01 2.8E-01 2.1E-02 7.8E-02 1.5E 02 1.5E-02 3.9E-02 cl.0E+00.1.0Et00 1.0E+00 3.5E 01 2.2E-01 2.0E-01 5.0E 02 5.0E 02 2.8E-01 -;
l' 0Et00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 3.8E 01 3.7E-01 3.4E 01 1.1E-01 1.4E-01 3.7E 01
,1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 3.8E-01 4.2E 01 3.9E-01 1.3E-01 1.8E 01.4.0E-01' -i '
1.0E+00 9.2E 01 9.2E-01 2.0E-014.7E-03 2.0E 02 4.7E 03 4.7E-03 7.7E 03 FDCHL-ipa -
- $ DF distribution for pool scrubbins of CCI release partially full cavity--
*1.0E+00 1.3Et02 1.3E+02 4.1E+01 1.3E+02 4.1E+01 1.3E+02.1.3E+02 1.3E+02 i; F (1.0E+00 1.2E+02 1.2E+02 3.7E+01 1.2E+02 3.7E+01 1;2E+02 1.2E+02 1.2E+02 t
'1.0E+00 8.4E+01 Si4E+01 2.4E+01 8.4E+01 2.4E+01 8.4E+01 8.4E+01 8.4E+01-
.1.0E+00 1.8E+01 1.8E+01 5.0E+00 1.8E+01 5.0E+00 1.8E+01 1.8E+01 1.8Et01
'1.0E+00 5.5E+00 5.5E+00 2.1E+00 5.5E+00 2.1E+00 5.5E+00 5.5E+00-545E+00 1.0E+00 2.7E+00 2.iE+00 1.6E+00 2.7E+00 1.6E+00.2.7E+00.2.7E+00.2.7Et00 j 11.0E+00<1.6t*00 1.6E+00 1.4E+00 1.6E+00 1.4E+00 1.6E+00 1.6E+00 1.6E+00
- 1; 0E+00 : 1. 4E+00 1. 4 E +00 1.4E +00 1.4 E +00 1.4 E+00 1.4E +00 1. 4 E+00 1. 4 E +00 :
; '1.0E+00 1.4E+00 1.4E+00 1.3E+00 1.4E+00 1.3E+00-1.4E+00 1.4Et00 1.4E+00 y ,1.0Et00 5.0E+00 5.0E+00 2.0E+00 5.0E+00 2.0E+00 5.0E+00 5.0E+00 5.0E+00 .
4; 6 DF distribution for pool' scrubbing of CCI release ~ full caviIy- , L 1.0E+00 1'8E+04
. 1.8E*04'1.6E+03'1.8E+04 1.6E+03 1.8E+04 1.8E+04-1.8E*04 ,
le, t 1.0E+00 1.5E+04 1,5E+04 1.3E+03 1.5E*04-1.3E+03 1.5E+04 1.5E+04 1.5E+04 ~ ? [ -1.0E+00 6.8E+03 6.8E+03-7.5E+02 6.8E+03'7.5E+02 6.8E+03 6.8E+03 6.8E+03 1.0E+00 2.9E+02 2.9E+02 6.8E+01 2.9E+02 6.8E+01 2.92+02 2.9E+02 2.9E+02
} 1 1.0E+00 3.0E+01 3.0E+01 1.5E+01 3.0E+01 1.5E+01 3.0E+01 3.0E+01 3.0E+01 y P 1.CE+00'8.5E+00 SiSE+00 3.7E+00 8.5E+00 3.7E+00 8;5E+00 8.5E+00 8.5E+00- '
1.0E+00 3.3E+00 3.3E+00 1.4E+00 3.3E+00 1.4E+00 3.3E+00 3.3E+00 3,3E+00 _( 1.0E+00 3.0E+00 3.0E*00 : 1.4E+00 3.0E+00 1.4E+00 3.0E+00 3.0E+00 3.0E+00 ' 1.0E+00 2,6E+00 2.6E+00 1.3E+00 2.6E+00 1;3E+00 2.6E+00 2.6E+00 2.6E+00 -
~'
1; WO 2.5E+01 2, $E+01 1.3E+01' 2.5E+01 1.3E+01 2. 5E+01 2. 5E+01 2. 5E+01 VPSL* L
$ 4ctions of core in HFME for high. moderate,- and low ranges of traction ejected
.39$ '.265 .195 F mE*
s j,s, B.2-6 f
B.3 Source Term Results This E section contains examples of additional source term results for internal initiators. Figure B.3 1 presents the CCDFs for release fractions for the iodine, cesium, strontium, and lanthanum radionuclide classes. The CCDFs for noble gases is not particularly interesting since almost all the r noble gases .that escape from the fuel are eventually released to the environment. If the containment fails, the noble gases are released within a day or-less. If the containment does not fail, the xenon and krypton fission products are -released from the> containment over many days due to design level le akage. The CCDFs for the other . four. radionuclide classes are not shown because they are similar to the CCDFs that are displayed.
-Fiauro B.3 1 shows the relationship of exceedance frequency to release fraction for each of the 200 observations in the sample for Surry.
Figure B.3-2 illustrates another way to present the results of the source b term analysis. This figure shows the range of release fractions for > containment bypass and for late failure of the containment. These plots were constructed by considering all the source terms computed for each radionuclide class without-regard for their frequency. To obtain the mean 3 value for iodine for bypass accidents, for example, all the iodine' release ' fractions-for source terms resulting from bypass are simply averaged. That is, ,al1 bypass iodine - total release fractions are treated equally even though- one may be more likely than another by. several orders of magnitude.
. Thus it-is = not possible to give a probabilistic -interpretation to the means - .
or the_.quantiles shown in Figure B.3.2. l l-a ~.i i 4. f [ t B.3-1 s
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i-Release Fraction: 1.OE+00 =
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M M M _ M 1.OE .05 NG I Cs To Sr' Ru La Ba Ce ! Radionuclide Group t i i I Figure B.3-2. Source Term Distributions for Containment Bypass at Surry.
E i '
,,, g, , . .
k-f Release Fraction 1.OE+00 : - oss wi.. 1.0E-01 g _
- es-1.OE-02 a_
= _ _
m a 1.OE-03 a 1.0E-04 g g n h - 1.OE-05 Ru La Ba Ce NG I Cs Te Sr Radionuclide Group Figure B.3-2 (continued). Source Term Distributions for late Failure at Surry. l - - - - - - - _ _ _
1 l l l l B.4 Information Used in Source Term Partitioning This section contains one figure and two tables that present information used in source term partitioning for Surry. Specifically, Figure B.4-1 and Table B 41 presents the results of site-specific MACCS calculations for Surry used in the definition of early and chronic health ef fec* weights, respectively. The generation of these results is discussed in to Volume 1 of this report and in NUREG/CR-5353,81 Table B.4-2 lists the PARTITION input file for the Surry analysis. It contains dose factors, reactor inventory, sunnaries of the results in Figure B.4 1 and Table B.4-1, and other information needed to define the early and chronic health effect weights. 10E4 ' i
/
10E3 _ cn :
.m s : .,O_ .
O 10E2 . t-i 6 : b 10E1 _ e =
- F. I 10E0 ._.
i SURRY j
/ ' iiid i i ii'i l i i i iiii!
10E-1 LEIS . LE19 .LE20 1E21 1-131 Release (80) Figure B.4 1, Mean Early Fatalities versus Released Activity for Surry. The curve relates released activity (Bq) for 1-131 to a corresponding mean number of early fatalities predicted by a full MACCS calculation. This calculation assumed an instantaneous ground level release, no plume rise, and no evacuation or other mitigating actions. The assumptions / data used in the calculation are the same as those described in Volume 2, Part 7 of this report. B.4-1 1
l i l' Table B.41 presents the results of a full MACCS calculation for each isotope. Each calculation assumes the indicated quantity of the isotope under consideration is released. Additional computational assumptions are the same as those indicated in conjunction with Figure B.41. i Table B.4 1 l Selected MACCS Mean Results for Single Isotope Releases for Surry l t
.l j
Releasel Element 2 Isotope Half-11to Release Early3 Early' E.1..C.F.5 C.L.C.F.6 Class (Days) (bq) Feta 11 ties Injuries j 1 1 0.00E+00 1.46E-03 1.08E+00 0.00E+00 j KR 0.t.E+00 1.46E 03 8.25E-01 0.00E+00 KR-85 3.919E+03 2.475E+15 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 1.03E-04 0.00E+00 KR-85H 1.867E 01 1.159E+17 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.32E-02 0.00E+00 KR-87 5.278E-02 2.118E+17 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 6.56E-02 0.00E+00 KR-88 1.167E-01 2.864E+17 0.00E+00 1.46E-03 7.36E-01 0.00E+00 XE 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.58E-01 0.00E+00 XE-133 5.291E+00 6.782E+17 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 1.95E-01 0.00E+00 { XE-135 3.821E-01 1.273E+17 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 6.29E-07 0.00E+00 ., 1 1 2 9.25E-02 6.18E-01 3.53E+01 7.36E+01 ; I 9.25E-02 6.18E-01 3.53E+01 7.36t+01 l I-131 8.041E+00- 3.206E+17 7.70E-04 1.18E 02 1.89E+31 7.36E+01 .! I-132 9.521E 02 & ?25E+17 1.26E 02 9.18E-02 1.20E+00 0.00E+00 j I-133 8.667E-01 6.779E+17 1.84E-02 1.26E-01 9,39E+00 2.03E-04 j I-134 3.653E-02 '.440E+17 6.19E-03 6.43E-02 4.72E-01 0.00E+00 ' I-135 2.744E-01 6.392E+17 5.45E-02 3.24E-01 5.32E+00 1.52E-15 1 3 1.82E 04 2.93E 03 1.99E+01 6.07E+03 RB 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 4.82E-03 4.75t-03 4 RB-86 1.865E+01 1.888E+14 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 4.82E-03 4.75E-03 ! CS 1.82E 04 2.93E-03 1.99E+01 6.07E+03 l cS-134 7.524C+02 4.324E+16 1.82E-04 2.83E-03 1.29E+01 3.32E+03 j CS-136 1.300E+01 0.00E+00- 9.56E-05 3.12E+00 4.12E+00 1.31AE+16 CS-137 1.099E+0* 2.417E+16 0.00E+no 0.00E+00 3.87E+00 -2.75E+03 4- 1.17E-01 6.37E-01 6.47E+01 7.71E+00 ; SB 7.00E 2.39E-03 2.75E+00 1.29E 01 i 88-127 3.800E+00- 2.787t+16 0.00E+00 2.ffE-05 2.31E+00 1.20E-01 SB-129 1.808E-01 9.672E+16 7.90E-06 2.3eJ 03 4.39E-01 1.30E-24 TE 1.17E-01 6.35E-11 6.20E+01-7.58E+00 TE-127 3.896E-01 2.692E+16 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2,19E-02 1.28E-14 TE-127M 1.090E+02 3.564E+15 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.43E-01 2.11E-01 TE-129 4.861E-02 9.267Et16
'l 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 4.10E 03 0.00E+00 ,'
TE-129H 3.340E+01 2.443E+16 0.00E+00 0.00Et00 2.66E+00 1.04E+00 TE-131M- 1.250E+00 4.680E+16 7.48E-06 1,85E-03 2.97E+00 1.92E+00- l TE-132 3.250E+00 4.658E+17 1.17E-01 6.33E 01 5.61Et01 4.41E+06 t l 1
)
B.4-2
Table B.4-1 (continued) _ $ 3.49E-02 1.66E-01 2.35E+01 2 89t+03 ~ 3.49E 02 1 66E-01 2.35E+01 2 89E+03 sk Ek-89 S.200E+01 3 $90E+17 1 28E 02 1 881-09 9 78E+00 6 11t +02 SA-90 1 C26E+04 1. 918E + 1f. t DOE +00 0.00*+00 / 72E+00 2 tBE+03 Ek-91 3 DSOE 01 4 61tJ+)7 1.59E-09 1 10E-01 ( 41t+00 26E-01 Ek-92 1.1291-01 4.803E+17 6.17E 03 $ 41E-02 1 $8E+00 1 331 29 6 2.S7E-01 1.11E-01 3.07t+02 6.1SE+02
--s CO O 00E+00 0 00E+00 2.45f+00 1 48E+02 =_.
CO-58 7.130E+01 3 223E+1S 0 .0E*00 0.00t+00 4.81E-01 4 32E+00 _ _! CO-60 1.921E+03 2 66SE+15 0 00E+00 0 00E*00 1.97t+00 1.44E+02 n) 2 9BE-02 3.94t-02 2 <6t+01 3 59E-01 .- _ m-99 2 7$1E*00 6 098t+17 2. 9 tie - 02 3,94E-02 2 76t+01 3.S9E-01 [ TC 0.00E+00 3 97E-04 2 94E-01 3 63E-18 TC-99M 2 50BE-01 S.263E+a? O 00t+00 3 97E-04 2.94E 01 3 63E-18 RU-103 3.959E+01 4.S42E+17 1.30E-02 S. Set-02 3.72t+01 1 6SE+02 , RU-105 1.BSOE-01 2.954E+17 3.22E-04 1 07E-02 1 OSt+00 1.52E-04 RU-106 3 690E+02 1.032t+17 2 141-01 4 44E-03 2.37t+02 3.01E+02 - Ril 0 00%+00 S.86E-05 1.69E+00 7 37E-04 RH-10$ 1.479E+00 2 046E+17 0.00E+00 S.86E-05 1 60t+00 7 37E-04 7 9 29t-01 3.47E+00 S.79t+02 1 SSE+03 Y 2.27E-01 4.13E 02 1.23E+02 3.16t+01 g: Y 90 2.670E+00 2.079E*16 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 1.22E+00 9.02E-04 Pf, Y-91 S.880E+01 4. 3 7 4 E+ 17 . 96E-01 0 13E-03 1 17t+02 3.16t+01 Y-92 1.475E-01 4 821t+17 4 4SE-03 9 OSE 03 6.31E-01 4.00E-30 Y-93 4.208E-01 S,454t+17 2 66E-02 2 31E-02 4.48t+00 2.89E-11 ER 1.79E-01 1 DSE+00 9.18E+01 1.10t+03 Ek-95 6.S$0E+01 S.526E+17 4.89E-02 1.93E-01 6.6BE+01 1.10E*03 ER 97 7.000E-01 S 'S9E+17 1.30E-01 8 61E-01 2.50E+01 9.90E-06 NB 2.97E-02 1.71E-01 4.40E+01 2.$0E+02 NB-95 3.510E+01 S.224E+17 2 97E 02 1 71E-01 4.40E+01 2.SOE+02 LA 3.07E-01 2.20E+00 S.43E+01 3.11E-01 LA-140 1.676E*00 6.352E+17 2.92E-01 2.11E+00 S 28t+01 1 42E-01 LA-141 1.6415-01 S.826t+17 2. ME-03 1.!SE-03 S.39E-01 1.69E-01 LA-142 6 62SE-02 S.616E*17 1.241-02 8.64E-02 9.79E-01 0 00E+00 PR ; 6E-02 2.S4E-03 3.04E+01 1.56t+00 PR-143 1.35BE+01 S.395E+17 2.7bE-02 2.54E 03 3.04E+01 1.56E*00 WD 2.40E-03 1.50E 03 1.34E+01 4.22E+00 ND-147 1 099E+01 2.412E+17 2.40E-03 1.50E-03 1.34E+01 4.22E+00 J E~ B.4-3
I t t Table B.4 1 (continued) i AM 0.00t+9C 0.00t+00 3.34t+00 S.62t+00 . AH-241 1.501t+0S 3.159t+13 0. s et+ P - 0.00t+00 3.34t+00 S.62t+00 ; OH 1.57E-01 0.00t+00 2.19t+02 1.61t+02 CM-242 1.630t+02 4.436t+15 1,$7t*01 0.00t+00 1.63t+02 9.23t+01 QM-244 6.611t+03 2.$96t+14 0.00t+00 0.00t+00 5.$8t+01 6.83t+01 -j 6 2.82t+00 2.01t+00 1.43t+03 1.20t+03 CE 1.$9t+00 7.75t 02 6.99t+02 S.12t+02 i CE 141 3.253t+01 S 631t+17 1.$62 02 4.362 03 3.14t+01 3.24t+01 CE 143 1.37St+00 S.494t+17 1.85t-02 3.70E 02 1.69t+01 1.62t 01 CE 144 2.844t+02 3.405t+17 1.S6t+00 3.61E 02 6.51t+02 4.79t+02 ; I NP 1.22t+00 2.78t+00 1.79t+02 2.50t+00 MP 339 2.350t+00 6.464E+16 1.22t+00 2.73t+00 1.79t+02 2.56t+00 i i PU 3.012 03 0.00t+00 S.54t+02 6.84E+02 i PU 236 3.251t+04 3.664E+14 3.01t 03 0.00E+00 2.74E+02 3.16t+02 ! PU 239 6.912t+06 6.263t+13 0.00E+00 0.00t+00 S.$1E+01 7.42t+01 i PU-240 2.469t+06 1.042t+14 0.00t+00 0.00t+00 7.12E+01 9.36t+01 i PU 241 S.333t+03 1.75St+16 0.00t+00 0.00t+00 1.$4t+02 2.01E+02 ! 9 3.57t-02 7.19t 02 0.0$t+01 2.36t+02 bA 3.572 02 7.195 02 0.0$t+01 2.36t+02 - bA 139 S.771E-02 6.282t*17 0.00t+00 7.51E 04 S.00E 02 0.00E*00 . BA*140 1.279t+01 6.216t+17 3.372 02 7.11t 02 9.04t+01 2.36t+02 ! L I The " release elete" row 'containe the sum of the results for. ell f ootopes in the rolesso class. 2 The ' element" row ea *ains the sum of the results for all footopes of the { oloment.
-7 8 Heen number of worly fete 11tles.
1
!" ' 'Heen E sesor of prodromel vomitin6 cases.
~t Sheen number of latent concer fate 11 tion due to early esposure (i.e.,
- within 7 days of 4he accident).
. 6Mean number of latent conces fatalities due to chronic exposure. '
r b i t s l 1-I B.4-4 r
, - --- , , >p . ,-,,e -- -
Table B.4 2 PARTITION Input File for Surry Analysis Containing Dose Factors, - Reactor Inventory, Site Specific MACCS Results, and Other Infortnation Needed to Defitu the Early and Chronic Health Ef fect Weights
=
$URRY: (1) 3 RATE. (2) CLD SF, (3) INH $F, (4) ORD EF, (S) Dtt VE1.
- 2. 66T a, 0.75 0.41 0.33 0.01 MACCS 12E CONVERSION F11.Et M3D BER 932, 1 NOV 66, 10:20:02 (RED HARROW ONLY)
CLUJDSHINE GROUND OROUND GROUND INEALED INHA1.ED INGEET10N SHINE 6HR EH1NE 7 DAY SEINE RATE ACVIE CHRONIC 60 00-58 3.669E 14 2.179E*11 4.430E 10 7.579E 16 1.577E-10 9.226E 10 2.601E 10 Co-60 9.957E 14 S.032E 11 1.0SSE 09 1.747E 15 3.966E 10 1.716E-06 1.311E*00 m KR 6S 6.$62E*17 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 0.000t+00 6.608E 14 7.007t 14 0.000t+00 KR 0 SM S.549E 15 0.000E*00 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 6.369E 14 6.372E 14 0.000E+00 KR-67 3.4$6E 14 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 2.179E 13 2.179E 1b 0.000t+00 KR-68 1.1$6E 13 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 3.666E 13 3.666E-13 0.000E+00 kB 86 3.00SE*15 1.979E 12 3.662E*11 6.913E*17 6.076E 10 2.362E 09 3.769E*09 ER 60 S.51BE*16 2.996E-15 6.017E*14 1.043E 19 9.360E 10 S.651E-09 3.261E 09 ER 90 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 1.72SE 09 3.0$1E-07 1.752E 07 SR 91 3.936E 14 1.599E 11 3.760E*11 7.62JE 16 7.944E-11 1,446E 10 1.233E 10 ER 92 S.327E 14 1.266E 11 1.S$6E 11 9.196E 16 4.11+E 11 4,213t*11 4.22SE 11 . Y-90 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 6.666E 12 1.S07E*11 3.664E-13 = Y 91 1.436E 16 7.310E-14 1.476E-12 2.S43E 16 2.798E-11 3.174E 10 6.562E 12 1.012E 14 2.706E 12 3.423E 12 1.661E 16 2.061E*12 2.079E-12 4,930E 12 Y 92 Y-93 3.710E*15 1.446E-12 3.427E 12 6.532E-17 3.495E-12 4.016E*12 4.036E 12 ER 95 2.924E*14 1.6S6E 11 3.S7$E 10 S.740E 16 2.64SE 10 3.207E*00 2.13SE*10 E.R* 07 6.064E*14 2.673E-11 1.044E 10 1.191E 15 1.079E*10 1.396E 10 1.297E*10 NS-9$ 3.0$1E-14 1.711E*11 3.367E-10 S 961E*16 1.212E 10 4.42SE-10 1.993E-10 HO-99 6.057E-15 4.111E*12 S.687E 11 1.202E 16 3.096E 11 S.074E 11 7.972t 11 TC-99H 4.217E 15 1.75SE-12 2.915E-12 9.323E 17 2.296E 12 2.369E-12 6.273t*12 RU+103 1.649E 14 1.093E 11 2.166E 10 3.606E 16 0.176E 11 3.163E 10 1.666E 10 ' RU 105 3.076E*141.021E-11 1.S$6E 116.152E 16 7.221E 12 7.686E*12 2.340E*11 RU 106 6.054E 1$ 4.622E 12 0.660E-11 1.608E 16 6.744E 11 1.770E 09 1.463E 09 RX 10S 2.936E*15 1.662E*12 1.116E 11 6.310E*17 S.36SE 12 7.746E 12 1.463E-11 56-127 2.564E*14 1.456F.-11 1.799E 10 S.200E-16 9.334E 11 1.547E 10 1.317E-10 88 120 5,771E 14 1.611E 11 2.540E 11 1.078E 15 1.606t*11 1.654E-11 3.661E*11 TE-127 1.636E*16 6.40SE-14 1.679E-13 3.869E 16 3.342E 12 3.086E 12 6.413E-12 TE-127H 2.632E-17 S 643E-14 2.669E 12 1.03.S*16 2.769E*10 S.309E-09 S.373E-09 - TE-129 2.042E 15 2.501E 13 2.522E 13 4.166E 17 6.131E 13 6.131E-13 7.610E*11 = TE 12aN 1.2SDE-15 1.344E-12 2.940E*11 2.524E-17 4.654E 10 3.036E-09 3.432E *1 TE-131H 6.028E 14 3.011E-11 1.916E-10 1.14SE-15 9.441E 11 1.366E 10 2.393E 10 TE 132 7.642E 15 3.$31E-11 6.006E-10 1.661E-16 2.500E-10 3.951E-10 4.064E-10 1 131 1.440E 14 6.676E-12 1.366E 10 3.0$7E 16 3.S!4E-11 6.16DE 11 9.444E*11 1-132 9.132E-14 1.910E-11 2.099E 11 1.757E 15 1.401E-11 1.401E-11 2.450E 11 1-133 2.350E-14 1.1D6E-11 S.196E-11 4.72SE*16 2.4$4E 11 2.717E-11 4.313E 11 I 134 1.059E 13 9.008E 12 9.02SE*12 1.982E 15 6.067E*12 6.067E 12 1.090E 11 , 1 135 6.656E 14 2.377E 11 4.662E-11 1.165E*15 2.194E 11 2.231E-11 3.636E 11 XE 133 7.293E-16 0.000E*00 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 1.S$8E 13 1.666E-13 0.000E+00 XE 135 0.228E 15 0.000E*00 0,000E+00 0.000E+00 2.S32E-13 2.SS4E-13 0.000E+00 C8 134 6.152E 14 3.488E*11 7.303E 10 1.211E-15 9.057E-10 1.176E-06 1.668E-06 CS-136 6.S93E 14 4.653E 11 6.24SE 10 1.630E 15 7.018E-10 1.8SSE-09 2.952E 09 B.4 5
Table B.4 2 (continued) C8 137 2.2178 14 1.260E 11 2.606t 10 4.4101 16 S.62SE 10 8.295t 09 1.31tt-06 6A-139 1.227t 15 1.641t-13 1.475E 13 2.607t 17 4.351E-12 4.3 Sit 12 9.6101 13 RA 140 7.0711 IS 7.29tE*12 6.$25t 101.471E 16 4.739t 101.221t 09 4.219t 10 LA 140 9.461t-14 4.419E 11 3.242t-10 1.6432 15 's.440E 10 2.124E 10 2.016t 10 LA 141 1.712E 15 4.5451 13 7.461E 13 2.917t 17 S.106t 12 6.64St 12 1.073E 12 LA 147 1.221E 13 1.521t 11 1.Sc4s 11 1.899t 15 6.790E-12 6.799t 121.030E*11 CE-141 2.410E 1$ 1.SStt 12 3.047E 11 S.422E 17 2.434E 118.691t 113.39tE*11 CT 143 9.$4St-15 S.3301 12 3.34St 11 2.010t 16 2.030E*11 2.953t 11 S.074t 11 CE 144 1.662t 15 0.613t 13 2.070E 113.4S7t-17 4.025E 112.76tt 09 0.660E 11 FR 143 3.S$2t 221.983t 19 3.531t-16 6.944t 24 4.664t 121.497E-11 1.039E-12 KD-147 4.471E 1$ 2.729E*12 4.682E 11 0.5701 17 3.420E 11 9.219t 11 S.042E-11 NI-239 S.454t-15 3.314t 12 3.095t*11 1.208E 16 7.943E 112.075t*10 4.660E 11 PU 236 4.$3SE 19 1.113t 15 2.340E 14 3.669E 20 2.S$2E 09 S.76St-05 1.260t 06 FU 239 1.671t 16 1.3791 1$ 2.66SE 14 4.766t 20 2.400E*09 6.5681-0$ 1.40$t-08 PU-240 4.661t 19 1.095E-15 2.301E 14 3.60$t-20 2.400E 09 6.$021 05 1.40$t 06 PU 241 0.000t+00 8 $39E-10 3.14tt 16 0.000t+00 4.411E 13 1.42EE 06 2.780t-10 AH 241 3.203t 16 2.657E 13 S.560E 12 9.226t-16 4.6472-06 1.738E 04 1.448t-06 CM 242 4.915t 191.296E 15 2.664t 14 4.503E-20 S.12SE-08 3.908E-06 3.$61t 06 CH-244 3.583t-191.097E 1$ 2.301E-14 3.605E-20 S.102E-06 9.3300-05 7.766E 07 1 131 EARLY FATALITIES V8 QUANTITY RELEAEED RELLAtt # EAkLY FATALIT1t8 (BQ) 1$ 2.000E+18 1.14E 01 3.000E+18 2.66E 01 S.000t+18 7 $6t 01 7.000!+16 1.42E+00 1.000E*19 2.93t+00 2.000t*19 2.27t+01 3.000t+19 6.31E+01
$.000E+19 1.72t+02 7.000E+19 3.01E+02 1.000t+20 S.46t*02 2.000E+20 1.32E+03 3.000E+20 1.96t+03 ' S.000E+20 3.15t+03 7.000E*20 4.16t+03 1.000t+21 S 00E+03 !$0f0FE IIALF-LIFE RELEASE !.ARLY EARLY E.L.C.F. C.L.C.F.
(DAY 8) (h0) !AIALITIES INJURIFS CO-56 7.130E+01 3.223E+15 0.00E+00 0.00t+00 4.81t-01 4.32t+00 Co-00 1.921E+03 2.46St+15 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 1.97t+00 1.44E+02 KR 85 3.919t+03 2.47SE+15 0.00t+00 0.00t+00 1.03E 06 0.00t+00 KR-65H 1.067E-01 1.159t+17 0.00t+00 0,00E+00 2.32E-02 0.00t+00 KR 87 S.278E 02 2.118t+17 0.00E+00 0.00t+00 6.56t-02 0.00t+00 KR 68 1.167E-01 2.064E+17 0.00t+00 1.46E-03 7.36t-01 0.00t+00 RB-66 1.66St+01 1.866t+14 0.00E+00 0.00t+00 4.62E 03 4.7SE-03 SR-69 S.200E*01 3.500t+17 1.26E 02 1.86E-03 9.76t+00 6.11t+02 SR-90 1.020t+04 1.936t+16 0,00E+00 0.00E+00 /.72E+00 2.28t+03 b.L 6
Table B.4 2 (continued) ER-91 3.950E-01 4.61tt+17 1.59E 02 1.10E-01 4.41E+00 2.26t 01 Ek-92 1.129E 01 4.803E+17 6.17E 03 S.41E-02 1.56t+00 1,33E-29 Y*D0 2.670E+00 2.079t*16 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 1.22E+00 0.021 04 Y-01 S.860E+01 4.374t+17 1.96E 01 9.13E 03 1.17E+02 3.16E+01 Y-92 1.475t*01 4.821E+17 4.4SE-03 9.0$E 03 6.31E 01 4.09E 30 Y 93 4,206t*01 S.454E+17 2.66E-02 2.31t 02 4.46E+00 2.69E-11 ER 95 6.S$0E+01 S.$26E+17 4,69t-02 1.93E ?t 6.66t+01 1.10E+03 ER-97 7.000E*01 S 759E+17 1.30E 01 6,61t 01 2.50E+01 9.99E-06 NB+95 3.510E+01 S.224E*17 2.9?E-02 1.71E-01 6 40E+01 2.$0E+02 MD-99 2.751E+00 6.096E+17 2,96E-02 3,94E-02 2.7Ct+01 3.59E-01 TC 99M 2.$06E 01 S.263t+17 0.00E+00 3.97E-04 2.94E*v* 3.63E-18 RU-103 3.959t+01 4.S42E+17 1.30E-02 S.58E 02 3.72E+01 1 6SE*02 RU 10$ 1,830E 01 2.954E+17 3.22E 04 1.07t 02 1.0$t+00 1.$2E 06 RU-106 3.600E*02 1.032E+17 2.14E-01 4.44E-03 2.37E+02 3.01E+02 Ril 10$ 1.470E+00 2.046E+17 0.00E+00 S.86E-05 1.69E+00 7.37E 04 58-127 3,600E*00 2.787E+16 0.00E+00 2.6CE 0$ 2.31E+00 1.29E-01 EB-129 1.808t-01 0.872E+16 7.00E-06 2.36E-03 4.30E 01 1.30E-24 f t 12'/ 3.696E 01 2.692E+16 0.00E+00 0.00t+00 2.10E 02 1.28E 14 TE 127H 1.090E402 3.$64E+15 0.00t+00 0.00E+00 2.43E*01 2.11E-01 TE-129 4.861t i2 9.267E+16 0.00E+00 0 00E+00 4.10E 03 0.00E+00 TE-129H 3.340E+01 2.443E+16 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.66t+00 1.04E+00 TE*131H 1. 40E+00 4.680E+16 7.48t-06 1.8SE 03 2.97t+00 1.92E*00 TE** 32 3. 250t + *,0 4.658E+17 1.17E-01 6.33t 01 S.61E+01 4.41E*00 1 131 8.041E+00 3.206E+17 7.70E 04 1.16E-02 1.89t+01 7.36E+01 1 131 9.521E 02 4.72SE+17 1.26t 02 0.16E-02 1.20E+00 0,00E+00 1 133 8.667E-01 6.779E+17 1.64E 02 1.26E-01 9.39E+00 2.03E-04 1 134 3.653E 02 7.440E+17 6.19t-03 6.43E*02 4.72E-01 0.00E+00 1 135 2.744E 01 0.392E+17 S.4SE 02 3.24E-01 S.32E+00 1.$2E 15 XE-133 S.291t+00 6.762E+17 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 1,95E-01 0.00E+00 XE-135 3.621E 01 1.273t+17 0,00E+00 0.00E400 6.20E-02 0.00E+00 CS 134 7.$24E+02 4.324E+16 1.82E-04 2.63E-03 1.29E+01 3.32E*03 C8-136 1.300E*01 1.316t+16 0.00E+00 9.56E-05 3.12E+00 4.12E*00 C5-137 1.099E+04 2.417E+16 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 3.87E+00 2.75E+03 BA 139 S.771E 02 6.282E+17 0.00E+00 7.$1E-04 S.00E 02 0.00E+00 BA-140 1.279E*01 6.216E+17 3.%7E-02 7.11E 02 9.04E+01 2.36t+02 LA 140 1.676E+00 6.3S2E+17 2.L;E-01 2.11t+00 S.28t+01 1,42E-01 LA*141 1.641E 01 S.826E+17 2.14E-03 1.SSE 03 S.39E-01 1.691 01 LA 142 6.62SE ;2 S.616E*17 1.24E-02 8.64E-02 9.79E-01 0.00E+00 CE-141 3,253E+01 S.651E+17 1.56E-02 4.36E 03 3,14E+01 3,24E+01 CE-143 1.375E+00 S.494E+17 1.8SE-02 3.70E 02 1.69E+01 1.82E-01 CE-144 2.844E+02 3.40$E+17 1.56t+00 3.61E 02 6.51E+02 4.79E+02 PR 143 1,3S6t+01 S,395E+17 2,76E-02 2.54E 03 3.04E+01 1.56EiOO ND 147 1.000E*01 2,412E+17 2.40E-03 1.50E-03 1.34E+01 4.22E+00 RP-239 2,350E+00 6.46.E+18 1.22E+00 2.73t+00 1.79E+02 2.58t+00 PU-238 3.251E+04 3.664E+14 3,01E-03 0.002+00 2.74E*02 3,1$1+02 PU 239 8.912E*06 8.263E+13 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 S.51E+01 7.42E+01 PU 240 2,469t+06 1.042E+14 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 7.12E+01 9.36E+01 PU-241 S.333E+03 1.755E+16 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 1.S4E+02 2.01E+02 AM 241 1.581E+0S 1.159E+13 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 3,34E+00 S.62E+00 CM 242 1.630E+02 4.436t+15 1.57E 01 0.00E+00 1.63E+02 9.23E+01 CM 244 6.611E*03 2.596t+14 0.00E+00 0.00t*00 S.58t+01 6.63;+01 B.4 7
Table B.4 2 (continued) : 0.715 POWER LEVEL FOR SURRT (PtEl IN41NTCatY) NUCuAM 10h0UP RAFLIF ACTIVITY (5) (DQ) l 00 $4 6 6.160E+06 3.223E+16 00-60 6 1.660E+08 2.46SE+16 KR 85 1 3.366t+08 2.475E+16 KR 83H 1 1.613E+04 1.159E+18 KR 87 1 4.560E+03 2.116E+18 KR-88 1 1.006t+04 2.8641+18 - i ka 66 3 1.611E*06 1.666E+15 BR 89 5 4.493E+06 3.590E+18 l SR 90 $ 4.66SE+06 1.936t+17 RR 91 S 3.413E+04 4.616t+18 SR*02 S 9.756t+03 4.603E+18 ' Y 90 7 2.307t+0S 2.07CE+17 Y 91 7 S.000E+06 4.374E+10 ' Y-82 7 1.274E+04 4.821E410 7 93 7 3.636E+04 S.454E+16 , ER 95 7 S.659E+06 ,$ 526t+18 ER 97 7 6.048E+04 S.759E+18 MB-93 7 3.033E+06 S.224E+18 ' MO-De 6 .2.377E+0S 6.004E+18 TC DuM 6 2.167E+04 S.263E+18 RU 103 6 3.421E+06 4.S42E+10 RU 10$ - 6 1.500E+04 2.954E+18 ; RU 106 6 3.166E+07 1.032E+18 ! RM-10S 6 1.276E+0S 2.046E+16 88-127 4 3.283E+0S 2.787E+17 . 88 129 4 1.562E+04 9.472E+17 TE 127 4 3.366E+04 2.692E+17 TE 12?H 4 9.418E*06 3.$64E*16 TE 129 4 4.200E+03 1.002E+16 { TE 120H 4 2.866t+06 9.267t+17 TE-131M 4 1.000E+0S 4.640E+17 TE 132 4 2.606t+0S 4.656t+16 1 131 2 6.9472+0S '3.200E418 , 1 132 2 6.226E+03 4.72SE+18 1 133 2 7.468E+04 6.779E+16 1 134 ' 2 3.156t+03 .7.440E+16 1 13$ -2 2.371E*04 6.392E+18 EE 133 1 4.571E+05 6.782E+16
- XE 135 1 3.301E+04 1.273E+16 C8-134 3 6.501E+07 4.324E+17 CS*136 3 '1.123E+06 1.316E417 C8-137 3 9.495E+08 2.417E*17 BA 139 9' 4.986E+03 6.262E+18 ;
BA 140 0 1.10SE+06 6.216E+18 i LA 140 7 1.446E+0S t.3S2E+16
.LA 141 7 1.418t+04. 5.826E+18 LA 142 7 S.724E+03 S 616E+18 CE 141 6 2,811E+06 S.651E+18.
I l. f i B.4-8 j
Table B.4 2 (continued) L1 143 0 1.166t+0S $.494E+14 CE 144 6 8.457t+0? 3.405t+16 m+143 7 1.178t+06 S.395E+16 WD 147 7 9.495t+05 1.412t+14 BP 239 6 2.030E+05 6.464t+10 FU 236 8 2.409t+09 3.664t+1$ 19-339 8 7.700E*11 4.263t+14 FU-240 6 8.133t+11 1.042t+15 FU 241 4 4.606t+06 1.75$t+17 AM 341 7 1.366t+10 1.1$9t+14 CM 242 7 1.408t+07 4.436t+16 B.4 9
-i i
l e Reference i B.4 1 R. L. Inan, J. C. Helton, J. D. Johnson.. "A User's Guide for f PARTITION: A Program Defining the Source Term / Consequence Analysis l Interface in the NUREC 1150 Probabilistic Risk Assessments," } NUREC/CR.5253, SAND 88 2940, Sandia National Laboratories, 1989. j
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APPENDIX C SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR THE CONSEQUENCE ANAINSIS
CONTENTS TABLE C.1 Detailed Listing of Mean Consequence Results for Internal Initiators............................................ C.3 i C.i
APPENDIX C SUPPORTINC INFORMATION FOR THE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS Tablo C.1 provides a more detailed representation of the mean consequence analysis results for internal initiators at Surry than is given in Table 4.3 1. Equivalent results for fire and seismic initiators are generated in the course of the analyses for these initiating events, but are not listed here. Table C.1 shows mean results for the population within ten miles of the plant under the assumptions that everyone evacuates, everyone continues normal activity, and everyone takes shelter. Furtherrare, divisions of results between within 10 miles and beyond 10 miles and betwecn early exposure (within 7 days) and chronic exposure (beyond 7 days) are also shown. In addition, the mean result for the effects of early exposure (obtained by combining the results for normal activity beyond 10 miles with the results for evacuation, normal activity, and sheltering within 10 miles) is listed. This result is labelled TOTAL EARLY in Table 1 .a indicated in the table, 99.5% of the population is assumed to , e. 0.5% is assumed to continue normal activity, and On is assume <' lter. The mean effects from early exposure are also combined s ..e mean effects from chronic exposure to produce a mean that includes ects from both early and chronic exposure (labeled TOTAL). The source .s used for the MACCS calculations that produced the results in Table C.t ne given in Table 3.4 4 A more detailed description of the information L. each column of Table C.1 follows. The column labeled EVACUATE, 0 10 MI contains the mean offects incurred by the population within 10 miles of the reactor due to radiation exposure within seven days of the accident under the assumption that everyone within 10 miles evacuates two hours af ter the warning time. For the two popula-tion dose consequence measures, the results are only for the part of the population initially within 10 miles. (The results for the population initially beyond 10 miles are in the column headed NORMAL ACTIVITY, >10 MI.) The value 0.995 in the row labeled WEICHT at the top of the column indicates that 99.5% of the population within 10 miles evacuates; the results in this column are multiplied by 0.995 in the generation of the mean results in the columns headed TOTAL EARLY and TOTAL. The column labeled NORMAL ACTIVITY, 0 10 MI contains the mean effects incurred by the population within 10 miles of the reactor due to radiation exposure within seven days of the accident under the assumption that everyone within 10 miles continues their normal activities after the accident. For the two population dose consequence measures, the results are only for the part of the population initially within 10 miles. (The results for the population initially beyond 10 miles are in the column headed NORMAL ACTIVITY, >10 MI.) The value 0.005 in the row labeled WEICHT at the top of the column indicates that 0.5% of the population within 10 miles continues normal activities; the results in this column are multi-plied by 0,005 in the generation of the mean results in the columns headed TOTAL EARLY and TOTAL, C.1
The column labeled SHELTER, 010 MI contains the mean effects incurred by the population within 10 miles of the reactor due to radiation exposure within seven days of the accident under the assumption that everyoi.- within 10 miles takes shelter 45 minutes after the warning time. For tb two population dose consequence measures, the results are only for th; part of the population initially within 10 miles. (The results for the population initially beyond 10 miles are in the column headed NORMAL ACTIVITY, >10 MI.) The value 0.000 in the row labeled WEIGHT at the top of the column indicates that none of the population within 10 miles takes shelter; the results in this column are ignored in computing the mean results. The column labeled NORMAL ACTIVITY, >10 MI. contains the mean effects incurred by the population further than 10 miles from the reactor due to radiation exposure within seven days of the accident under the assumption that everyone beyond 10 miles continues their normal activities. For the two population dose consequence measures, the results are only for the part of the population initially beyond 10 miles. The value 1.000 in the row labeled WEIGHT at the top of the column indicates that everyone beyond 10 miles continues normal activities; the results in this column are multiplied by 1,000 in the generation of the mean results in the columns headed TOTAL EARLY and TOTAL. The column labeled TOTAL EARLY contains the total mean effects incurred by l the entire population due to radiation exposure within seven days of the accident. The values in this column are weighted sums of the values in the i first four columns as explained above. The column labeled CHRONIC contains the total mean effects incurred by the l entire population due to radiation exposure more than seven days after the ' accident. The column labeled TOTAL contains the total mean effects incurred by the ; entire population due to both early (within 7 days) and chronic (after 7 ' days) radiation exposure. The values in this column are weighted sums of the values in columns 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6. The weights used are contained in the first row, labeled WEIGHT. As column 5 contains the weighted sum of columns 1 through 4, the TOTAL values may' equivalently be obtained by summing columns 5 and 6. ' I l c.2
t Table C,1 Detailed Listing of Mean Consequence Results for Internal Initiators SOURCE TERH SUR-01*1, MI.AN FREQUENCY = 0.00E+00 /YR SOURCE TERH $UR 01-2, HEAN TREQUENCY = 4.53t*10 /YR EVACUATE NORMAL $HELTER NCRMAL TOTAL Cl!RONIC TOTAL CONSEQUENCE ACTIVITY ACTIVITY EARLY 0 10 MI 0 10 MI 0-10 H! *10 HI
~~
WE101t? 0.995 0.005 0.000 1.000 ~~ 1.000 EARLY TATALITIES 0.00E+00 1.87E-02 2.95E 03 0.00E+00 9.3SE-0$ --~ 9.35E 05 PRODR011 VOMITING S.69E 04 1.36E 01 S.63E-02 0.00E+00 1.24E-03 ~~ 1.24E-03 ET RitK, 1 MI 0.00E+00 6.52E 05 S.37E 06 --- 3.24E-07 ---- 3.26E-07 CANCER FATALITIES 4.37E*01 s . 41E4 00 2.13E+00 1.16t+01 1.23E+01 0.00E+01 9.31E+01 POP DOSE, 0 50 HI 2.57t+01 3.13E+02 1.66t+02 4.98E+02 S.2SE*02 1.81E+03 2.34E+03 10P DOSE, 0*1000 HI 2.$7t+01 3.13E+02 1.66E+02 8.96E+02 9.2SE+02 4.80E+03 S.72E+03 Econ 0MIC COSTS (8) ~~ ~" ~~ ~~ ~~ 1.2SE+06 1.25E+00 POP Er RIEK, 0-1 HI 0.00E+00 9.26E-04 1.46E 04 ~" 4.64E-06 "" 4.64E-06 POP CF RICK, 010 M1 S.95E-05 6.01E 05 2.90E*05 --~ 6.22E-06 S.90E-05 6.S3E-05 BOURCE TERM SUR*01*3, HEAN FREQUENCY = 1.63E-07 /YR CONSEQUENCE EVACUATE NORMAL CHELTER NORMAL TOTAL CHRONIC TOTAL ACTIVITY ACTIVITY EARLY 0-10 MI 0 10 MI 0-10 MI *10 H1 WEIGHT 0.995 0.00$ 0.000 1.000 - -- 1.000 - -- EARLY FATALITIES 3.66E-02 1.64E-02 6.26E-03 0.00E+00 3.67E-02 ~~ 3.67E-02 PRODRCH VOMITING 4.96t+00 6,96E 01 2.64E 01 0.00E+00 4.95E+00 ~~ 4.95E+00 EF RISK, 1 MI 4.20E-04 2.24E-04 S.80E 05 ---- 4.28E 04 -- - 4.28E 04 CANCER FA1ALITIES 6.72E+00 4.24E+00 2.62E+00 6.40E+00 1.31E+01 2.59E+01 3.90E+01 ItP DOSE, 0-50 MI 2.36t+02 2.2SE+02 1.35E+02 2.58t+02 4.94E+02 7.51E+02 1.24E+03 POP DOSE, 0 1000 H1 2.36E+02 2.2SE+02 1.35E+02 4.2SE+02 6.60E+02 1.S6t+03 2.24E+03 ECONOMIC COST 8 (8) "" --- -~* -'- ~~ 2.26E*07 2.26E+07 FOP EF RISK, 0 1 HI 1.31E-03 6.12E-04 2.91E 04 ~~ 1.31E 03 ~" 1.31E 03 IVP CF RISK, 0 10 MI 9.15E 05 S.76E 05 3.57E 05 ~~- 0.13E-05 S 07E-05 1.42E 04 BOURCE TERH SUR-02-1, HEAN FREQUENCY = 1.SSE-10 /YR CONSEQUENCE EVACUATE NORMAL BHELTER NORMAL TOTAL CHRONIC TOTAL ACTIVITY ACTIVITY EARLY 0-10 MI 0 10 H1 0 10 HI slo HI WFIGI!T 0.995 0.005 0.000 1.000 '" 1.000 ~~- EARLY FATALITIES 0.00E+00 1.14E 01 6.76E-03 0.00E+00 S.721 04 ~~ 5,72E-04 PRODR m VCHITING 0.00E*00 7.56E-01 6.68E-02 0.00E+00 3.78E 03 --- 3,76E 03 EF RISK, 1 HI 0.00E+00 1.66E-03 6.42E-06 ~~ 9.29E-06 --- 9.29E 06 CANCER FATALITIES 0.00E+00 1.14E+01 4.4SE+00 S.68t+01 S.69E+01 1.86t+02 2.43E+02 FOP DOSE, 0-50 HI 0.00E400 6.02E+02 2.50E+02 1.79E+03 1.79E+03 3.43E+03 S.22E+03 ICP DOSE, 0 1000 HI 0.00E+00 6.02E+02 2.50E+02 3.39E+03 3.30E+03 1.12E*04 1.46E+04 ECONOMIC COST 8 ($) ~- --- - * ~ ~~ -~- 7.62E+06 7.62E406 IVP EF RIEK, 0-1 HI 0.00E+00 4.01E-03 3.37E 04 --- 2.4SE 05 --- 2.45E-05 FOP CF RISK, 0-10 HI 0.00E+00 1.SSE-04 6.06E 05 ---- 7.75E 07 8.30E-OS 8.37E 05 SOURCE TERM SUR 02-2, MEAN FREQUENCY = 1.50E 06 /YR CONSEQUENCE EVACUATE NORMAL SHELTER NORMAL TOTAL Cl!RONIC TOTAL ACTIVITY ACTIVITY EARLY 0-10 H! 0-10 MI 0-10 MI *10 MI WE10ttT 0.995 0.005 0.000 1.000 --- 1.000 --~ EARLY FATALITIES S.71E 01 2.06E 02 6.6SE-03 0.00E+00 S.66E 01 ~-- S 66E 01 PRODRCH Vat 1 TIN 3 2.6SE-01 0,16E-01 2.51E-02 0.00E+00 2.68E-01 --- 2.68E-01 EF RISK, 1 HI 2.34E-03 3.51E-05 7.06E-06 ---- 2.32E*03 --- 2.32E-03 CANCER FATALITIES 1.04E+02 1.13E+02 6.54E+01 2.66E+02 3.70E+02 3.97E+02 7.67E+02 FOP COSE, 0-53 HI 2.27E+03 2.56E+03 1.95E+03 S.15E+03 7.43E+03 3.64E+03 1.13E+04 IVP DOSE. 0-1000 HI 2.27E+03 2.58E+03 1.95E+03 1.31E+04 1.53T+04 2.69E+04 4.43E+04 ECONOMIC COGTS (3) ---- --- ---- ---- *-" 5.02E+09 S.02E+09 IVP ET RISK. 0-1 HI 3.63E-03 9.53E-04 4. tee 04 ---- 3.82E 03 ---- 3.82E-03 It? CF RISK. 0-10 HI 1.42E-03 1.54t-03 1.16E-03 --~ 1.42E-03 6.13E-05 1.46E-03 C.3
l t l , 6 p Table C.1 (continued) ! SOURCE TERM ' SUR 02*3, HEAN FREQUENCY = 2.61E-07 /YR , CONSEQUENCE EVACUATE NORMAL SHELTER NORMAL TOTAL CHRONIC TOTA 1. ACTIVITY ACTIVITY EARLY 0 10 HI 0-10 MI 0-10 MI *10 MI , WEIGHT 0.99$ 0.00$ 0.000 1.000 -- 1.000 --- [ EARLY FATALITIES 4.94t*02 4.73E 02 1.$7E 02 0.00E+00 4.94t 02 . - - ~ 4.94E 02 > PRODRCH VOMITING $ 3$E+00 1.03E+00 3.7$E-01 0.00E+00 $.33E+00 ---
$ 33E+00 l !- Er RISK, 1 HI $.64E 04 6.13E 04 1.62E 04 --- $.64E 04 ~~ $.64E 04
[' CANCER FATALITIES 8.f 4E+00 7.89E+00 4.08E+00 1.61E+01 2.4SE+01 2.48E+02 2.73E+02 f POP DOSE, 0 $0 MI 3.$3E+02 4.43E+02 2.33E+02 6.23E+02 9.76E+02 4.84E+03 $.81E+03 POP DOSE, 0 1000 HI 3.$3E+02 4.43E+02 2.33E+02 1.06E+03 1.41E+03 1.47t+04 1.61E+04 ECONOMIC COSTS ($) =~- ~~ -~- ~~ ~~ 6.89E+08 6.89E+08 POP EF RISK, 0 1 HI 1.6SE 03 1.99t 03 7.23E 04 ~~ 1.66E 03 -~ 1.66E-03 i POP CF RISK, 0 10 MI 1.15E 04 1.07E 04 $.$$E 0$ ---
'1.1$E 04 1.13E 04 1.2tt 04 SOURCE TERM. SUR-03+1, HEAN FREQUENCY = 1.011 09 /YR CONSEQUENCE EVACUATE NORMAL SHELTER NORMAL TOTAL CHRONIC TOTAL ii ACTIVITY ACTIVITY EARLY' 0 10 HI 0 10 HI 0 10 HI *10 HI WEICHT ~ 0.995 0.005 0.000 1.000 -- - 1.000 ---
EARLY TATALITIES 0.00E+00 2.33E+00 3.32E-01 0.00Z+00 1.17E 02 --~ 1.17E-02 I f PRODROH VOMITING 0.00E+00 1.$$E+01 1.30E+00 0.00E+00 7.73E 02 ~" 7.73E 02 - EF RISK, 1 HI 0.00E+00 1.83E-02 $.19E 03 .~~ 9.16E-05 -~~ 9.16E 05 CANCER FATALITIES 0.00E+00 8.$4E+01. 4.2SE+01 2,47E+02 2.48t+02 4.42t+02 6.00E+02 FOP DOSE, 0*$0 MI 0.00E+00 2.44E+03 1.20E+03 $ 80E+03 $.81E+03 $.70E+03 1.1$t+04
. POP DOSE, 0 1000 HI 0.00E+00 2.44E+03 1.20E+03 1.34E+04 1.34E+04- 2.8SE+04 4.19E+04
' ECON NIC COSTS (8) ---
.-~- --- ~~ ~~
3.$3E+09 3.$3E+09 POP ET RISK, 0 1 HI 0.00E+00 3.21E-02 1.14E-02 . ~~~ - 1.61E 04 ~~ 1.61E ; ICP CF RISK 010 MI 0.00E+00. 1.16E 03 $ 79E 04
^
$.82E 06 1.06E 04 1.12E 04 '
~ SOURCE TERH SUR 03 2. HEAN FREQUENCY = 1.97E 08 /YR CONSEQUENCE EVACUATE NORHAL SHELTTR NORMAL TOTAL CHRONIC TOTAL ACTIVITY ACTIVITY EARLY 0 10 H1 0 10 MI 0-10 MI *10 MI
- WEl'HT 0.995 0.00$ 0.000 - 1.000. ~~ 1.000 ' - - ~
L EARLY FATALITIES. 4.22E-01 2.83E 02.1.09E-02 0.00E+00 4.20t-01 ~~ 4.20E 01 PRODR m VOMITING 2.73E*01 1.77E+00 1.49E 01 0.00E+00- 2.81E 01 ~~ 2.81E-01 ; EF RISK,.1 HI .2.63E 03 7.96E-05. 1.36E 0$ ---- 2.61E 03 --~ 2.61E-03 CANCER FATALITIES 9.67E+01 '1.22E+02- 8.82E+01 .3.46t+02 4.43E+02 1.1$E+03 1.60E+03 POP DOSE,.0-50 MI 2.16E+03 2.97E+03 2.03E+03. 7.$3E+0) 9.69E+03 1.29E+04 2.26E+04 i ICP Dott,~0 1000 HI 2.16E+03 2.97E+03 2.03E+03 .1.82E+04 2.04E+04 7.$6E+04 9.60E+04 ECON WIC COSTS (8) ~~- ---
-~t ~~ ~~ 1.07E+10 1.07E+10 IVP EF RISK, 0*1 HI-. i 4.53E 03 1.12E*03. $ 30E-04 ~~
4.$2E-03 - - ~
.4.$2E-03 POP CF RISK,.0 10 MI 1.32E 03 1.66E-03 1.20E 03 ~~
1.32E-03 2.22E 04 1.54E 03 m SOCRCE TERH - SUR 03 3, HEAN FREQUENCY = 7.32E-07 /YR ' CONSEQUENCE EVACUATE' NORMAL SHELTER NORMAL TOTAL CIDONIC . TOTAL e _ . ACTIVITY ACTIVITY EARLY 0-10 MI 0-10 HI 10 MI *10 M1 WEIGHT .
'0.995 0.00$ 0.000 . 1.000 - ----
1.004 '-*-*
- y. EARLY FATALITIES 1.56E*01 3.95E 01 1.48E-01 0.00E*00 1.$7E-01 --~
1.$7E 01 PRODROH V0HITING 9.09E+00 4.$3E+00; 1.7$E+00 0.00E+00 9.06E+00 ~~- 9.06E+00 EF.F.1SK; 1 HI 1.77E-03 4.4SE-03 1,80E-03 ~~ 1.78E-03 --- 1.78E-03' * . CANCER FATALITIES ,1.80E+01 .2.10E+01 1.27E+01 6.02E+01 7.83E+01 7.16E+02. ) 04E+02 k ICP DOSE, 0 $0 M1 9.15E+02 1.14t*03 7.2BE+02 2.22E+03 3.14E+03 8.20E+03 1.13E+04 5 !; ICP DOSE, 0-1000 MI 9.15E+02 1.14E+03 7.28E+02 3.96E+03 4.BBE+03 4.29E+04 4.78E404 ECONOMIC COSTS ($) --* ~ ~ . *~- -- . ~ - - 3.42E+09 '3.42E+09 10P.EF RISK, 0-1 HI 4.34t-03 1.12E-02 .$.72E 03 ---- 4.37E-03 ~-- 4.37E-03 FOP CF RISK. 0-10 HI. 2.45E-04 2.6$E-04 1.72E 04 - -- 2.4SE*04 1.17E 04 3.62E-04 4 C.4 i i
l Table C.1 (Continued)
$0URCE TERM SUR 04 1, MEAN FREQUENCY
- 1.99E 07 /YR CONSEQUENCE EVACUATE NORMAL SHELTER NORMAL TOTAL CHRONIC TOTAL ACTIVITY ACTIVITY EARLY 0 10 MI 0 10 MI 0-10 MI *10 MI
~~
WEIGHT 0.995 0.005 0.000 1.000 ~~ 1.000 f.ARLY FATALITIES 0.00E+00 1.36E-01 2.22E-02 0.00t+00 6.82E-04 ~~ 6.82E-04 it0LROH VQtITING 0.00E+00 8,31E 01 1.95E-01 0.00E+00 4.16E-03 ~~ 4.16E 03 ET RISK, 1 HI 0.00E+00 1.90E 03 1.10E 04 -- - 9.50E 06 -- 9.50E-06 CANCER FATALITIES 3.32E-03 1.51E+01 0.59E+00 S.11E+01 S.12E*01 9.90E*01 1.04E+03 It? DOSE, 0-50 MI 2.81E-01 9.83E+02 6.22E+02 1.91E+03 1.91E+03 8.47E+03 1.04E+04 ICP DOSE, 0-1000 MI 2.81E-01 9.83E+02 6.22E+01 3.54E+03 3.54E+03 S.78E+04 6.14E+04 ECONOMIC COSTS ($) ~*- ~~ ~~ ~~ -- 3.09E+09 3.00E+09 ICP EF RISK, 0 1 HI 0.00E+00 S.19E 03 1.10E-03 --- 2.60E-05 ~~ 2.60E-05 ICP CF RISK 0 10 HI 4.52E-06 2.06E 04 1.17E-04 - - - 1.07E 06 1.16E-04 1.17E-04 SOURCE TERM SUR-04 2, MEAN FREQUENCY
- 8.50E-08 /YR CONSEQUENCE EVACUATE NORMAL SHELTER NORMAL TOTAL CHRONIC TOTAL ACTIVITY ACTIVITY EARLY 0 10 H! 0 10 H! 0 10 MI *10 HI WEIJHT 0.995 0.005 0.000 1.000 ~~ 1.000 ~~
EARLY TATALITIES 1.08E 04 2.07E 02 2.14E 03 0.00E+00 2.11E-04 ~~ 2.11E-04 1*0DRai V0HITING 1.18E-02 S.02E-01 7.47E*02 0.00E+00 1.43E 02 --- 1.43E 02 EF RISK, 1 MI 0.00E+00 7.57E-05 3.43E-06 ---- 3.78E 07 ---- 3.78E-07 CANCER FATALITIES 2.74E+00 1.61E+01 8.4SE+00 4.92E+01 S.20E+01 8.85E+02 9.37E+02 ICP DOSE, 0 50 MI 1.56E+02 8.11E+02 4.24E+02 1.66t+03 1.62E+03 1.27t+04 1.4SE+04 ICP DOSE, 0 1000 MI 1.56E+02 8.11E+02 4.24E+02 3.12E+03 3.28E*03 S.22E+04 S.SSE+04 ECONOMIC COSTS ($) --- --- ---- --- --- 3.14E+09 3.14E+09 POP EF RISK, 0 1 HI S.39E-06 9.71E 04 1.07E-04 ~~ 1.02E-0S ~~ 1.02E-0$ POP CF RISK, 0 10 HI 3.73E 05 2.19E 04 1.1SE-04 ---- 3.82E 05 2.48E 04 2.66E-04 SOURCE TERM SUR-04-3, MEAN FREQUENCY = 0.00E*00 /YR COURCE TERM DUR-05-1, MEAN FREQUENCY = 0.00E+00 /YR SOURCE TERM SUR-05-2, HEAN FREQUENCY = 6.76E-10 /YR CONSEQUENCE EVACUATE NDRMAL RHELTER NORMAL TOTAL CHROF'.C TOTAL ACTIVITY ACTIVITY EARLY 0-10 MI 0-10 HI 0-10 MI >10 MI WEIGut 0.995 0.005 0.000 1.000 ---- 1.000 ---- LARLY FATALITIES 2.52E+00 6.98E+01 4.12E+01 8.89E-04 2.86E+00 --~ 2.86E+00 FRODRat YQi! TING 1.20E+00 1.30E+02 4.46E*01 3.29E+00 S.13E+00 -~~ S.13E+00 EF RICK, 1 MI 1.84E-02 3.37E-02 3.02E-02 - -- 1.BSE-02 --- 1.8SE-02 CANCER FATALITIES 2.80E+02 0.07E*02 7.52E+02 1.77E+03 2.PSE+03 1.56E+03 3.61E+03 1CP DOSE, 0-50 MI 6.42E+03 2.SSE+04 1.97E+04 3.16E+04 3.81E*04 1.34E+04 S.15E+04 Itr DOSE 0 1000 MI 6.42E+03 2.SSE+04 1.97t+04 7.32E*04 7.97E+04 1.12E+0S 1.91E*05 ECONat!C COSTS ($) ---- ~~ --~ *-~ ~~ 1.83E+10 1.83E+10 POP EF RISK, 0 1 MI 2.96E 02 4.70E-02 4.32E-02 --~ 2.97E-02 ~ - - 2.97E-02 IOP CF RISK, 010 MI 3.82E 03 1,24E-02 1.02E-07 - -- 3.86E 03 1.24E-04 3.98E-03 SOURCE TERM CUR-05-3, MEAN FREQUENCY = 0.43E-06 /YR CONSEQUENCE EVACUATE NORMAL SHELTER NORMAL TOTAL CHRONIC TOTAL ACTIVITY ACTIVITY EARLY 0-10 MI 0-10 MI 0-10 MI >10 MI WEIGHT 0.995 0.005 0.000 1.000 ---- 1.000 ---- EARLY FATALITIES 1.82E+00 4.62E+00 1.70E+00 0.00E+00 1,83E+P0 ~~ 1.83E+00 FR00R31 VCet! TING 3.33E+01 4.60E+01 1.54E+01 4.37E 01 3.38E+01 ~~- 3.3BE+01 EF RISK. 1 HI 9.30E-03 3.11E-02 2.16E-02 ---- 9.41E-03 ---- 9.41E-03 CANCER FATALITIES S 86E+01 1.29E+02 8.90E+01 3.17E+02 3.76t+02 2.18E+03 2.SSt+03 Itr DOSE, 0 50 MI 3.22E+03 4.87E+03 3.47E+03 9.42E+03 1.27E+04 1.36E+04 1.62f:+04 POP ICSE, 0 1000 MI 3.22E+03 4.67E*03 3.47E+03 1.95E*04 2.28E+04 1.35E+0S 1.57E+0S ECONatIC COSTS ($) ---- "-- ---- -- -~ 1.38E+10 1.38E+10 C.$ l
t Table C.1 (Continued) POP EF RISK, 0 1 HI 1.S6E 02 4.79E 02 3.59E 02 -"* 1.59E-02 "" 1.S9E 02 POP CF RISK, 0-10 MI 7.99E 04 1.76E 03 1.21E 03 ~~ 8.03E 04 8.70E 05 8.90E*04 SOURCE TERH SUk 06-1, HEAN FREQUENCY = 0.00E+00 /YR SJURCE TERH $UR*06 2. HEAN FREQUENCY
- 4.63F*09 /YR CONSEQUENCE EVACUATE NORMAL $HELTER NORMAL TOTAL CHRONIC TOTAL ACTIVITY ACTIY17Y EARLY .
. 0
- 10 MI . 0 10 MI 0 10 HI *10 HI WEIGHT 0.99$ 0.005 0.000 1.000 ~~ 1.000 ~~ i EARLY FATALITIE8 4.06t*02 1.04E+01 2.81E+00 0.00E+00 9.2SE 02 ~~ 9.2SE 02 PRODRCH V0MITING 1.16E 01 7.40E+01 1.81E+01 7.14E 01 1.20E+00 ~~
1.20E+00 Er RISK, 1 MI 1.53E 04 2.68E*02 1.90E*02 **** 2.87E 04 **** 2.87E 04-CANCER FATALITIES 4.49E+01 2.94E+02 2.22E+02 4.66t+02 S.63E*02 1.89E+03 2.42E+03 POP DOSE, 0 50 HI 1.24E+03 8.09E+03 6.01E+03 1.11E+04 1.24E+04 1.18E+04 2.42E+04 ICP DOSE, 0 1000 MI - 1.24E+03 8.09E+03 6.01E+03 2.56t+04 2.69E+04 1.17E+0S 1,43E+0S ECONOMIC COST 8 (8) ~~ ~~ -a- "" ~~ 1.00E+10 1.09E+10 POP EF RISK, 0 1 HI 1.98E-03 3.89E 02 3.01E 02 ~~- 2.16t*03 ~~ 2.162 03 ICP CF RISK, 0 10 MI 6.12E-04 4,00E-03 3.02E 03 - -- 6.29E 04 1.16E 04 7.47E 04 SOURCE TERH SUR 06 3, HEAN FREQUENCY = 6.95E 00 /YR CONSEQUENCE EVACUATE NORMAL SHELTER NORMAL TOTAL CHRONIC TOTAL ACTIVITY ACTIVITY -EARLY 1 0 10 MI 0+10 HI 0-10 MI *10 HI , WEIOUT 0.995 0.00$ 0.000 1.000- -- -* 1.000 - *-
- EARLY FATALITIES 1,48E+00 3.07t+00 1.09E+00 0.00E+00 1.40E+00 ~~
1.49E+00 I PRODROM V0HITING; 2.8tE+01 3.6SE+01 1.17t+01 3.23E-01 2.89E+01 -~- 2.89E401 EF RISK, 1 HI- 7.46E-03 2.00E 02 1.13E-02 "-- 7.54E 03 ~~ 7.54t*03 CANCER FATALITIES 6.29E+01 7.57E+01 S.00E+01 1.98E+02 2.61E+02 1.93E+03 2.10E+03 POP DOSE, 0-S', HI 3.08E+03 3.34E+03 2.34E+03 6.4tt+03 9.56t+03 1.19E+04 2.14E+04 POP DOSE, 0 1000 HI 3.08t+03 3.34E403 2.34E+03 1.27E+04 1.5bE+04 1.16t+0S 1.32E+0S ECONOMIC COSTS (8) "" -~- -~ ~~ ~~ 9.46E+09 9.46E+09 , ICP ET RISK, 0*1 HI 1.33E 02 3.35E*02 2.26E 02 ~~ 1.34E 02 -~~ 1.34E 02 POP CF RISK, 0-10 MI 8.57E-04 1.03E 03 6.82E-04 ~~ 6.58E 04 1.00E 04 9.67E*04- I SG 'CE TERM SUR 07-1, HEAN FREQUENCY
- 3.20E*06 /YR.
L " SEQUENCE EVACUATE- NORMAL -SHELTER NORMAL TOTAL CHRONIC TOTAL ACTIVITY ACTIVITY EARLY 0-10 MI 0 10 MI 0 10 HI *10 H! WE10HT 0.995 0.005 0.000 1.000 ----
-1.000 - *=
EARLY FATALITIES 0.00E+00- 1.31E+01 4.09E+00 0.00E+00- 6.54E*02 ~~ 6.54E-02 PRODROH VCHITING 0.00E+00 4.56E+01' 7.74E+00 1.6SE*01 3.93E*01 -- - 3.93E-01 EF RISK, 1 HI 0.00E+00 2.70E-02 2.10E*02 **-- 1.35E 04 - -- 1.3SE*04 CANCER FATALITIES .1.31E-01 S.201.+02 4.06E+02 6.25E+01 8.26E+02 1.SSE+03 2.36E+03 , POP DOSE, 0*SO HI 3.74E+00 -1.31E+04 9.93E+03 1.63E+04 1.64E+04 1.12E+04 2.76E+04 POP DOSE, 0 1000 HI 3.74E+00 1.31E+04 9,93E+03 3.90L+04 3.90E+04 1,03E+0S 1.42E+0S ECONOMIC COSTS ($)- "" ~~ ~~ ---- --~- 1.53E+10 1.53E+10 POP EF RISK, 0 1 HI 0.00E+00'3.92E 02 3.23E 02 --- 1.96E 04 --a 1.96E 04 PCP CF RISK, 0 10 H1- 1.79E*06 7.08E 03 S.53E*03 ~~ 3.72E 05 7.57E*0$ 1.13E 04 ' SOURCE TERM - SUR 07 2. HEAN FREQUENCY
- 1.13E 07 /YR CONSEQUENCE EVACUATE NORMAL SHELTER NORMAL TOTAL' CHRONIC TOTAL ACTIVITY ACTIVITY' EARLY 0 10 MI 0-10 MI 0 10 MI >10 HI WEIGHT 0.99S 0,005 0.000 1.000 -*-- 1.000 ---- r EARLY FATALIIIES 3.33E+00 1.27E+01 2.0$E*00 0.00E+00 3.37E+00 --~
3.37t+00 l'RODROH V0HITINO 2.72E+00 : S 73E+01 1.33E+01 2.00E+00 S.06E400 "" 5.0CE+00 EF RISK. 1 HI . 2.18E-02 1,26E 02 8.40E 03 ---- 2.18E-02 ---- 2.18E-02 CANCER FATALITIES 1.86E+02. 3.6SE+02 2.66E+02 6.00E+02 8.77E+02 1.95E+03 2.83E+03-ICP DOSE, 0-50 MI 4.75E+03 9.44E+03 7.03E+03 1.47E+04 1.94E+04 1.49E+04 3.43E+04 > ICP DOSE, 0-1000 MI 4.75E+03 9.44E+03 7.03E+03 3.52E+04 3.99E+04 1.27E*05 1.67E+0S ECONOMIC COSTS (8) ~- ---* --~ --- "~ 1.64E+10 1464E410 C6
Table c.1 (continued) POP ET RICK, 0 1 HI 3.74E-02 2.0St-02 1.51E-02 **
- 3.73t 02 ---* 3.73E 02 POF CF RISK. 0 10 HI 2.53E-03 4.97t-03 3.92E 03 ---- 2.54E-03 1.75E-04 2.72E-03 SOURCE TERM SUR 07 3, NLAN TREQUENCY = 1.331-07 /YR CONEEQUENCE EVACUATE NORMAL SHELTER NORMAL TOTAL Cl!RONIC TOTAL ACTIVITY ACTIVITY EARLY 0 10 HI 0 10 H! 0 10 H! >10 HI WE10nf 0.99$ 0.005 0.000 1.000 ---- 1.000 ---
LARLY FATALITIES $.00E 01 1.15t+00 4.79E 01 0.00E+00 $.03E 01 - -- S 03E 01 PRODROH V0HITING 1.57E+01 1.26t+01 4.61E+00 0.00E+00 1.$7t+01 -- 1.57t+01 ET RIEK, 1 HI 4.43E-03 1.23t 02 S.73E 03 - -- 4.47E-03 ---- 4.47t-03 CANCER FATALITIES 3.72E+01 3.64E+01 2.20E+01 1.03t+02 1.40E+02 1.26E+03 1.40E+03 POP DOSE, 0 50 MI 1.62E+03 1.01E+03 1.28t+03 3.76t+03 S.58t+03 9.02E+03 1.49E+04 POP DOCE, 0 1000 MI 1.81t+03 1.91t+03 1.28E+03 6.60E+03 8.62E+03 7.44E+04 6.30E+04 ECONOMIC COST 8 (8) *** -- --*- --* ---- $.11E+09 S.11E+09 POP ET RICK, 0-1 HI 8.00E 03 2.30E 02 1.38E 02 ---- 6.97E*03 ---- 6.97E-03 POP CF RISK, 0 10 H! S.07t-04 4.95t 04 3.11E-04 -- $.07E-04 8.67t 05 S.95t 04 BOURCE TERM BUR 06 1, Mr.AN FREQUENCY = 1.37E 07 /YR CONSEQUENCE EVACUATE NORMAL SHELTER NORMAL TOTAL CHRONIC TOTAL ACTIVITY ACTTVITY LARLY 0 10 M1 0 10 M1 0 10 H1 *10 HI WE!aHT 0.995 0.00$ 0.000 1.000 -- 1.000 ---* EARLY FATALITIES 0,00t+00 1.5$E*00 3.60E 01 0.00E+00 7.77E 03 -- - 7.77E 03 PRODROH VOMITING 0.00E+00 1.37E+01 2.18E+00 S.17E 03 7.38E 02 - -- 7.38E 02 EF RIBK, 1 HI 0.00E+00 1.38E 02 S.22E-03 -- 6.88E-05 -- - 6.88E 05 CANCER TATALITIES 1.30E 02 5.32E+01 3.25E+01 1.43E+02 1.43E+02 2.06t+03 2.21E+03 P0F DOCE, 0 50 H! 1.0$E+00 2.63t+03 1.76t+03 4.65t+03 4.67E+03 1.21E+04 1.68t+04 POP DOSE, 0 1000 M1 1.0$E+00 2.63E*03 1.76E+03 9,47E+03 9.46E+03 1.22E+0S 1.31E+0S ECONOMIC COST 8 ($) -- -* **-- ---- -- - 7.66E+09 7.6tt+09 POP EF RISK, 0 1 H1 0.00E+00 2.10E 02 1.09E 02 -- - 1.10E-04 ---- 1.10E 04 POP CF RIEK, 0 10 H1 1.90E-07 7.2$E-04 4.42E 04 -- 3.61E-06 1.28E 04 1.32E-04 DOURCE TERM BUR 08 2. HEAN FREQUENCY = 8.30E 06 /YR CONSEQUENCE EVACUATE NORMAL SHELTER NORMAL TOTAL CIIRONIC TOTAL ACTIVITY ACTIVITY EARLY 0 10 MI 0-10 H! 0 10 H! *10 MI WEIGHT 0.995 0.005 0.000 1.000 - -- 1.000 -- - EARLY FATALITIES 2.30E 02 S.28E 01 7.40E-02 0.00E+00 2.64E 02 -- - 2.64E-02 FRODROH V0HITING 1.64E 01 1.60E+01 2.SSE+00 3.06E-01 S.62K 01 -- - 5.62E 01 ET RISK, i HI 6.76E-05 2.26E 03 4.37E-04 -*-- 7.68E-0$ *- - 7.88E-05 CANCER FATALITIES 9.47E+00 S.13E+01 2.90E+01 1.52E+02 1.61E+02 2.11E+03 2.27E+03 POP DOSE, 0-50 MI S.14E+02 2.26E+03 1.35E+03 4.$8E+03 S.10E+03 1.63E+04 2.14E+04 POP DOSE, 0 1000 HI S.14E+02 2.26E+03 1.35E+03 9.56E+03 1.01E404 1.24E+0S 1.34E+05 ECONOMIC COST 8 ($) ---- -- --** ---- -- - 7.88E409 7.68E+09 IOP EF RIBK, 0 1 HI 1.19E-03 6.85E 03 2,61E 03 ---- 1.22E 03 ---- 1.22E-03 POP CF RISK, 0 10 MI 1.29E*04 6.99E-04 3.95E-04 ---- 1.32E-04 2.40E 04 3.72E-04 BOURCE TEkH SUR 06-3, HEAN FREQUENCY = 1.59E-10 /YR CONSEQUENCE EVACUATE NORMAL SHELTER NORMAL TOTAL Ci!RONIC TOTAL ACTIVITY ACTIVITY EARLY 0 10 HI 0-10 MI 0-10 MI $10 H! WEIGHT 0.995 0.005 0.000 1.000 - -- 1.000 ---- EARLY FATALITIES 2.33E-01 6.24E-01 2.37E-01 0.00E+00 2.3SE-01 - -- 2.35E-01 PR00ROH \M141 TING 1.00E+01 C.94E+00 2,76E+00 0.00E+00 1.09E+01 ---- 1.09E+01 EF RICK, 1 HI 2.37E-03 6.75E-03 2.79E-03 ---- 2.40E 03 -- 2.40E-03 CANCER FATALITIES 2.26E+01 2,26E+01 1.35E+01 6.47E+01 6.74E+01 1.35E+03 1.44t*03 POP DOSE, 0*$0 H? 1.23E+03 1.37t+03 8.86E+02 2.$5E+03 3.78t+03 1.23E+04 1.61E+04 ICF DOSE. 0-1000 HI 1.23E+03 1.31E+03 6.66E+02 4.45E+03 S.68E+03 7.86E+04 6.42E+04 ECONOMIC COSTS (8) --- ---- ---- ---- ---- 3.60E+09 3.80E+09 POP EF RISK. 0-1 HI 5.52E-03 1.54E 02 8.09E 03 -- 5.57E-03 ---- 5.57E-03 POP CF RISK, 0-10 MI 3.10E-04 3.08E-04 1.84E-04 ---- 3.10E-04 2.01E-04 5.11E-04 C.7
1 Table C.1 (Continued) : 80URCE TERM SUR-09 1 E AN FREQUENCY
- 1.SSE 07 /YR CONSEQVENCE EVACUATE NORMA 1. $HELTER NORMAL TOTAL CHRONIC TOTAL ACTIVITY ACT!YITY EARLY 0 10 H1 0 10 MI 0 10 MI *10 MI WEIOfff 0.995 0.005 0.000 1.000 "" 1.000 -~-
EARLY FATALITIES 0.00E+00 6.17E 01 1.26E 01 0.00E+00 3.06E 03 "" 3.08E-03 FRODROM VOMITING 0.00E+00 4.50E+00 7.07E 01 0.00E+00 2.2SE 02 "" 2.2SE-02 EF RISK, 1 M1 0.00E+00 7.42E 03 1.80t 03 -- 3.71E 05 *- 3.71E 0$ CANCER FATALITIE8 0.98E 03 3.60E+01 2.19E+01 9.89t+01 9.91t+01 1.56t+03 1.66t+03 POP DOSE, 0-50 M1 6.74E 01 1.83E+03 1.20E+03 3.37t+03 3.38E+03 1.02E+04 1.36E+04 , POP toSE, 0 1000 MI 6.74E 01 1.83E+03 1.20E+03 6.62E+03 6.63E+03 9.17t+04 9.84E+04
- ECOM MIC COST 8 (8) "" ~~ "" "" "-- S.23E+ )9 S.23E+09 .
POP EF RISK, 0*1 M1 0.00E+00 1.3SE 02 S.23t-03 "" 6.77E 0S "" 6.77E-05 POP CF RISK, 0 10 MI 1.22E 07 4.90E*04 2.98E 04 '"" 2.57E-06 1.18E 04 1.21E 04 ! BOURCE TERM BUR 09-2, HEAN FREQUENCY
- 7.00E*06 /YR CONSEQUENCE EVACUATE NORMAL SHELTER NORMAL' TOTAL CHRONIC TOTAL ACTIVITY ACTIVITY EARLY 0 10 MI 0 10 MI 0 10 MI >10 MI WEIGHT 0.995 0.005 0.000 1.000 ---- 1.000 --
EARLY FATALITIES 3.34E 04 3.28E 01 6.81E 02 0.00E+00 1.97E-03 "" 1.97E 03 FRODRm V0HITING 1.93E 02 3,73E+00. 6.92E 01 0.00E+00 3.79E 02 *"- 3.79E 02 EF RISK,-1 MI 0.00E+00 3.40E-03 S.74E-04 "" -1.70E 05 "" 1.70E 05 CANCER FATALITIES 4.17E+00 3.11E+01 1.78E+01 8.41E+01 8.64E+01 1.26E+03 1.35E+03 POP DOSE, 0 50 MI . 2.23E+02 1.41E+03 8.18E+02 2.7?E+03 3.00E+03 1.44E+04 1.74E+04 POP DOSE, 0 1000 H! 2.23E+02 1.41E+03 8.18E+02 S.26t+03 S.49E+03 7.42E+04 7.97t+04
' ECON 0 HIC CO3TS ($) ~
"" "" **" 4.58t+09 4.58E+09 POP Er k18K 01 HI 1.67E 0$ 8.68E 03 3.01E*03 ~ ~ - 6.00E 0$ "" 6.00E 05 POP CP RISK, 0 10 MI S.69E 05 4.23E 04 2.43E 04 ""
S.67E 05 2.47E 04 3.06E 04 t SOURCE TERM SUR 09 3, HEAN FREQUENCY = 0.00E+00 /YR
' SOURCE TERM. SUR 10 1, HEAN FREQUENCY
- 1.631-09 /YR CONSEQUENCE EVACUATE- NORMAL SHELTER NORMAL. TOTAL .Cim0NIC TOTAL.
ACTIVITY ACTIVITY EARLY 0-30 MI 0-10 M! 0-10 MI *10 MI WEIGHT 0.995 0.005 0.000 1.000- ""' 1.000 "" ' EARLY FATALITIES 0.00E+00 1.26E+02 4.4SE+01 -2.00E-01 8.38E 01 "" 6.38E-01 PRODRUM VOMITING 0.00E+00 3.54E+02 9.$1E+61 2.2SE+01 2.42E+01 "" 2.42E+01 ! Er RISK, 1 HI 0.00E+00 3.75E 02 3.33E 02 "" .1.87E-04 "" 1.87E*04 , CANCER TATALITIES 2.27E 01 7.4SE+02 6.43E+02 1.67t+03 1.66E+03 3.11E+03 4.79E+03 i 19P DOSE, 0 50 HI -6.27E400 2.43E+04- 1.80E+04 2.01E+04 2.92E+04 1.86t+04 4.78E+04 POP DOSE, 0 1000 HI 6.27Et00 2.43E+04' 1.80E+04 7.61E+04 7.62E+04 1.07E+0S 2.73E+0S l ECONOMIC COSTS (8) "" - -~* "" "" , "" 3.70E+10 3.70E+10 , POP EF RISK, 0-1 MI' O.00E+00 S.25E-02 4.67E*02 ~~ 2.62E-04 --- 2.62E 04 " POP CF RISK, 0 10 MI '3.09E*06' 1.02E 02 8.76E-03 -*-- S.38E-05 1.0SE-04 1.S9E 04 - SOURCE TERN SUR-10-2, MEAN FREQUENCY = 1.72E 09 /YR-CONSFQUENCE= EVACUATE NORMAL SHELTER NORMAL TOTAL CIRONIC TOTAL ACTIVITY ACTIVITY.' F.ARLY 0 10 HI 0 10 MI 0 10 MI *10 MI WE10HT - 0,995 0.005 0.000 -1.000 . 1.000 ~~ t EARLY FATALITIES 7,422-01 1.26E+02 4.72E+01' 1.07E+CD 2.44E+00 -~~ 2.44E+00' PRODROH VOMITINO 2.S3E+00 3.73f+02 1.35E+02 3.1 21 . 1 3.S6E+01 -~~ 3.S6E+01 '
. ~ET RISK, 1 HI 1.15E*02 3.69E 02 3.27E-02 -"- 1,16E 02 -~-
1.16E-02 i CANCER FATALITIES 1.21E+02 S.76E+02 4.93E+02 1.28E+03. 1.40E+03- 3.11E+03 4.51E+03 It? DOSE, 0 50 MI 3.04E+03 1.93E+04.-1.42E+04 2.34E+04 2.66E*04 2.00E+04 4.66t+04 ICP DOSE,' 0 1000 MI 3.04E+03 1,93E+04 1.42E+04 6.0SE+04 6.36E+04 1.96E+0S 2.S9t+0$ ECONOMIC COSTS (8) --" --" --" ~~ "-- 2.99E+10 2.99E+10-POP EF RISK 0-1 MI- 2.24E*02 S.17E 02- 4.61E-02 - - " 2.26E-02 ""
. 2.26E-02 '
IVP CF RISK, 0 10 MI 1.6SE 03 7.84E 03 6.72E-03 "" 1.68E-03 1.67E-04 1.8SE-03 ! C.8
Table C.1 (Continued) SOURCE TERM SUR 10 3, HEAN FREQUENCY
- 4.$3E-06 /YR CONSEQUENCE EVACUATE NORMAL SHELTER NORMAL TOTAL CIIkONIC TOTAL ACTIVITY ACTIVITY EARLY 0 10 H1 0-10 MI 0-10 MI *10 MI WEIORT 0.99$ 0.00$ 0.000 1.000 -* 1.000 ---
EARLY FATALITIES 1.17t+01 4.37E+01 7.59E+00 S.64E-02 1.19t+01 ---- 1.19t+01 PRODROM YUNITING 9.3SE+01 1.61E+02 6.62E+01 6.06E+00 1.02E+02 --- 1.02E+02 EF RICK, 1 HI 2.01E-02 3.01E-02 2.31E 02 ---- 2.01E-02 ---- 2.01E-02 CANCER TATALITIES 1.26E+02 1.43E+02 1.0$t+02 3.73E+02 $.02E+02 3.17E+03 3.68E+03 POP DOSE, 0*SO HI 6.6SE+03 6.61E+03 4.70E*03 1.11E+04 1.76E+04 1 $6t+04 3.33E+04 POP DOSE, 0 1000 MI 6.6St+03 6.61E+03 4.70E+03 2.37E+04 3. 0.iE+ 04 1.91E+05 2.22t+0S ECONOMIC COSTS (6) **** -*-- ***- --*- --** 1.76E*10 1.76t+10 POP EF RISK, 0 1 M1 2.6tE-02 4.90E-02 3.69E 02 -- - 2.90E-02 -- 2.90E-02 POP CF k!EK, 0-10 MI 1.75E*03 1.95E-03 1.43E-03 ---- 1.75E-03 6.37E-0S 1.63E 03 SOURCE TERM SUh-11 1. HEAN FREQUENCY = 2.70E*06 /YR CONSEQUENCE EVACVATE NORMAL CHELTER HORMAL TOTAL Cf1RONIC TOTAL ACTIVITY ACTIVITY EARLY 0 10 MI 0 10 MI 0-10 HI *10 HI WEIGHT 0.995 0.005 0.000 1.000 ---- 1.000 ---- EARLY FATALITIES 0.00E+00 7.06E+01 3.16E+01 3.96E-03 3.57E-01 ---- 3.S7E-01 PRODRDH VOMITING 0.00E+00 1.66t*02 4.56t+01 0.32E*00 7.26E+00 ---- 7.26t+00 EF RISK, 1 H1 0,00E+00 3.$3E*02 3.09E-02 ---* 1.76E 04 +--- 1.76E 04 CANCER FATALITIEB 3.03E-01 6.1SE+02 6.77t+02 1.61E+03 1.61E*03 2.69E+03 4.30E*03 IOP DOSE, 0 50 MI !.98E+00 2.36E+04 1.60E+04 2.92E*04 2.93E*04 1.63E+04 4.56t+04 POP DOSE, 0 1000 HI 7.9BE+00 2.36t+04 1.60E+04 7.12E+04 7.13E+04 1.74E+0$ 2.46E*05 ECONOMIC C06T3 (6) - -- ---- -*-- ---- --
- 2.79E*10 2.79E+10 POP EF RICK, 0 1 HI 0.00E+00 S.10E-02 4.46E 02 **-- 2.SSE 04 ---- 2.$$E*04 POP CF RISK, 0 10 MI 4.13E 06 1.11E 02 0.22E*03 ---* 5.06E 05 1.00E 04 1.60E 04 BOURCE TERM SUR 11 2, HEAN FREQUENCY = 3.01E-06 /YR CONSEQUENCE EVACUATE NORMAL SHELTER NORMAL TOTAL CHRONIC TOTAL ACTIVITY ACTIVITY EARLY 0-30 HI 0 10 H1 0 10 MI *10 H!
WEIGHT 0.995 0.005 0.000 1.000 ---- 1.000 ---- EARLY TATALITIES 1.57E-03 1.90E+00 3.25E 01 3.12E-01 3.23E 01 --** 3.23E 01 PRCOROH VOHITING 1.94E-01 1.99E+01 4.7SE+00 1.04E*01 1.07F+01 ---- 1.07E+01 Er kiSK, 1 HI 3.91E 0$ 1.56E 03 1.02E 03 ---- 4.68E-05 ---- 4.66E 05 CANCER FATALITIES 4.15E+01 S.44E+01 3.45E+01 6.60E*02 7.22E+0. 4.23E+03 4.95E*03 POP DOSE, 0-50 MI 1.36E+03 2.05E+03 1.34E+03 1.14E+04 1.2BE+04 1.49E+04 2.77E+04 POP DOSE, 0 1000 MI 1.3fE+03 2.0$E+03 1.34E+03 3.94E+04 4.06t+04 2.SSE+05 2.95E+0S EC040 HIC COSTS (8) ---- ---- ---- ---- - -- 2.74E+10 2.74E+10 POP ET RISK, 0 1 HI 6.631 05 1.37E-03 9.46E 04 **** 7.46E-0$ --- 7.46E 05 POP CF RISK, 0-10 MI S.6SE-04 7.41E-04 4.t9E 04 ---- S.66E-04 1.31E-04 6.97F.-04 SOURCE TLRH SUR 11 3, HEAN FREQUENCY = 1.27E-07 /YR CONSEQUENCE EVACUATE NORMAL CHELTER NORMAL TOTAL CitRONIC TOTAL ACTIVITY ACTIVITY EARLY 0-10 H1 0-10 H! 0-10 Hi *10 HI WIIGHT 0.995 0.00$ 0.000 1.000 ---- 1.000 ---- EARLY FATALITIES 4.00E+00 1.10E+01 2.76t+00 0.00E+00 4,04E+00 -- 4.04E+00 TRODROM V0HITIPO S.46E+01 0.21E+0) 3.00E+01 1.62E+00 S.66E+01 ---- S 68E+01 Er RISK, 1 HI 1,46E 02 2.65E 02 2.00E*02 ---- 1.46E-02 . - - - 1.40E-02 CANCER FATALITIES 1.05E+02 1.22E+02 6.27E+01 3.00Et02 4.05E+02 2.51E+03 2.92E+03 POP IOSE, 0-50 MI 4.65E+03 5.06E+03 3.5BE+03 0.29E+03 1.41E+04 1.37E+04 2.79E+04 POP EOSE, 0-1000 MI 4.65E+03 S 06E+03 3.S6E+03 1.69E+04 2.36t+04 1.$2E+0S 1.76E*0$ ECONOMIC COST 3 ($) ---- ---- ---- -*-- *--- 1.32E+10 1.32E+10 POP EF RISK, 0-1 HI 2.22E-02 4.60E-02 3.49E-02 ---- 2.23E-02 ---- 2.23E-02 POP CF RISK, 0-10 H! 1.43E 03 1.66E-03 1.13E 03 ---- 1.43E-03 6.95E 05 1.52E-03 C.9
Table C.1 (continued) i l BOURCE TERM 9UR*12 1. MEAN FREQUENCY = 1.00E*07 /YR COMEEQUENCE EVACUATE WORMAL $HELTER N3HAL TOTAL CHRONIC TOTAL ACTIVITY ACTIVITY EARLY 0 10 Mt 0*10 MI 0 10 MI >10 MI
-I WEIGHT 0.995 0.00$ 0.000 1.000 **-* 1.000 **--
LARLY FATALITIES 0.00E+00 2.35E+01 3.04E+00 9.$1E 04 1.18E*01 a-- 1,18E 01 t PRODROM YuMITING 0.00E+00 1.0$E+02 2.01E+01 2.35E+00 2.8BE+00 -*-- 2.88t+00 EF RIBK, 1 MI 0.00E+00 2.$7E*02 1.83E 02 **** 1.29E 04 *--* 1.29t 04 CANCER FATALITIE8 1.22E*01 2.f9E+02 2.0$E+02 S.20E+02 S.22E+02 2.66E+03 3.38E+03 POP DOSE, 0*SD MI 4.31E+00 8.51E+03 6.11E*03 1.17E+04 1.17E+04 1.52E+04 2.69E+04 POP DOSE, 0+1000 MI 4.31E+00 6.51E+03 6.11E+03 2.85E+04 2.86t+04 1.74E+0$ P.02E+0$ . ECONOMIC C0878 (8) **** --** **** **** ---- 1.68E+10 1.b!E+10 POP EF RIBK, 0*1 M1 0.00L+00 3.77E 02 2.83t*02 --** 1.69E*04 * +- 1.89E*04 POP CF RICK, 0 10 MI 1.66E*06 3.67E 03 2.79E*03 **-- 2.00E 0$ 1.27E 04 1.47E 04 f SOURCE TERM SUR 12*2. HEAN FREQUENCY
- 2.92E-08 /YK !
CONSEQUENCE EVACUATE' NORMAL EHELTER NORMAL TOTAL CHRONIC TOTAL ACTIVITY ACTIVITY EARLY 0 10 MI 0 10 MI 0 10 MI >10 M1 WEI0tti 0.995 0.005 0.000 1.000 +-
- 1,000 ---*
~'l LARLY FATALITIES 3.2SE 02 4.34E+00 2.23E 01 8.8SE*03 6.20E*02 *- -
6.20E-02 PRODROM YOMITINO 2.95t*01 6.61E+01 1.26E+01 7.33E+00 7.96E+00 ---- 7.96E+00 ET RIBK. 1 MI 1.94E 04 3.1SE 03 1.0$E 03 ---* 2.00E 04 ***- 2.09E*04 ' CANCER FATALITIES 2.56E+01 1.0SE+02 6.7$t+01 3.70E+02 3.96E+02 3.$3E+03 3.92E+03 POP DOSE, 0*$0 MI 1.08E+03 3.96t+03 2.60E+03' 9.11E+03 1.01E+04 1.99E+04 3.01E+04 POP DOSE, 0*2000 MI 1.08E+03 3.D6E+0! 2.60!+03 2.2SE+04 2.3tE+04 2.11E+0S 2.34E+0S
**** **** -** ***=
ECONOMIC COST 8 (8) _
**** 1.82E+10 1.82E+10 POP EF RISK 01 MI 1.$2E 03 S.60E-03 2.96E 03 --* 1.$4E-03 *+++ 1.$4F 03 POP CF RISK. 010 MI 3.48E 04 1.43E 03 4 19E*04 *- - 3.64E 04 2.20E*04 $.74E*04 t
SOURCE TERM $UR 12 3, MEAN FREQUENCY
- 2.03E*14 /YR CONSEQUENCE EVACUATE NORMAL BHELTER NORMAL TOTAL CHRONIC TOTAL ACTIVITY ACTIVITY EARLf 0-10 MI' 0 10 M1 0 10 MI *10 MI WE10HT - 0.995 . 0.005 0.000 1.000 **-* 1.000 ****
.EARLY FATALITIE8' 4.$6E 01 2.16E+00 9.19E 01 0.00E+00 4.6$t-01 *--* 4.65E-01 PRODROM VOMITING- 1.S$E+01 1.91E+01- 6.72E+00 2.43E 02 =1.55E+01 ---* 1.55E+01 EF RIBK, 1 HI 3.77E 03 2.64E*02 1.42E 02 **-- 3.66t*03 *--- 3.68E 03 CANCER FATALITIES 3.36E+01 -$.6$E+01' 3.$6t+01. 2.00E+02 2.33E+02 3.00E+03 3.23E+03
- POP DOBE, 0-$0 MI 1.93E+03. 3.25E+03 2.23E+03' 6.88E+03' 8.82E+03 1.79E*04 2.67E+04 POP DO$E. 0-1000 MI 1.93E+03 3.25E+03 2.23E+03 1.31E+04 1.51E+04' 3.76E+0S 1.91E+0$
---* -~~- -*--
9.79t+09 9.79t+09 ECONOMIC COST 8 (8) -- *-** POP EF RISK, 0 1 MI 7.91E*03 4.22E*02 2.75E 02 **
- 8.00E 03 ***- 8.09E 03
-POP CF RISK, 0-10 MI' 4.$7E 04 7.70E-04 4.87E-04 *-** 4.59E 04 1.S7E 04 6.16E*04 BOURCE TERM SUR*13+1, MEAN FREQUENCY = 1.19E*07 /YR -
r CONSEQUENCE TVACUATE NORMAL SHELTER NORMAL TOTAL CilRONIC TOTAL ! ACTIVITY ACTIVITY EARLY 0 10 MI 0-10 MI 0 10 MI >10 MI -r WEIGHT- 0.995 0.005 0.000 . 1.000 --*-- 1.000. *-+- EARLY FATALITIES 0.00E+00 S.67t+00 1.17E+00 0.00E+00 2.93E 02 -**- 2.93E*02 PRODROM VOMITING 0.00E+00 S.42E+01 8.14E+00 '3.68E 01 6.39E 01e ---- 6.39E-01 EF RISK, 1 HI 0.00E+00' 2.06E 02 1.28E 02 - -- 1.03E*04 --** 1.03E-04 CANCER FATALITIES 2.67E-02 9.94E+01' 6.20E+01 2.40E+02 2.41E+02 2.76E+03 3.00E+03 POP DOSE, 0 50 MI 1.77E+00 4.29E+03 2.66E+03'7.00E+03 7.02E+03 1.45E+04' 2.16E+04 POP DOSE, 0-1000 MI 1.77E+00 4,29E+03 2.86E+03 1.$2Et04 1.53E+04 1.63E+0$ 1.78t+05 EODNOMIC COSTS ($) -a-- ---- --** **-- ***- 1.21E+10 1.21E+10 POP Er RISK 0 1 MI 0.00E+00 3.13E 02 2.07E*02 -***- 1.56E-04 **-* 1.56E*04 I POP CF RISK, 0-10 MI 3.64E 07 1.35E 03 8.45E 04 ---- 7.13E-06 1,4SE 04 1 $2E*04 l h C.10 1
_,__,u-,a.,a. , , , - , , , , , , , ,, Table C.1 (Continued) SOURCE TERM SUk- 1F 2 MTAN FKEQUENCY = 1 S4E-09 / YR CONSEQUENCE EVACUATE NORMAL EKELTEk NORMAL TOTAL CHRONIC TOT A1. ACTIVITY ACTIVITY E.AAL Y 0-10 MI 0-10 MI 0-10 MI =10 MI WEIGHT 0 995 0.005 0 000 1 000 - 1 000 - EJJtLY FATALITIES 1 091-01 3 S2E+00 3 05E 01 0 00E+00 1 26E 01 - 1 26E-01 PRODROM V WITING S 34E-01 5 31E+01 1 01E+01 2 137.+00 2 93E+00 - 2 93E+00 EF ktSK, 1 MI 8.97E-04 7.09E-03 2 20E 03 - 9.2BE-04 - 9 2BE 04 CANCER TA1 ALITIES 1 41L+01 7 27t+01 4.31E+01 2 13E+02 2 28t+02 3 27t+03 3 SOE+03 POI' DOSE. 0-50 MI 9 19E+02 3.SBE+03 2 33E+03 6 71E+03 7 64E+03 1 92E+04 2 68t+04 P0f' DOSE , 0-1000 MI 9.19t+02 3.SBE+03 2 33E+03 1 42E+06 1 51E+04 1 93E+0S 2 08t+0S ECON TIC COSTS (8) -- -- -- - ---- 1 2SE+10 1 2SE*10 POP EF RISK, 0-1 MI S 33E-03 1 28E-02 6 76E-03 -- 5.37E-03 ---- S 37E-03 ICI' Cf RISK, 0-10 MI 1 92E-04 9.91E-04 5 87E-04 -- 1 GEE 04 2 42E 04 4.39E 04 SOURCE TERM SUR-13-3, MEAN TkEQUENCY = 0 OCE+00 /YR BOURCE TERM SUR-14-1, MEAN FREQUENCY = 1.0$E-07 /Yk CONSEQUENCE EVACUATE NORMAL SHELTER NORMAL TOTAL CHRONIC TOTAL ACTIVITY ACTIVITY LAklY 0-10 MI 0-10 MI 0-10 MI >10 M1 WTIGHT 0.995 0.00* 0.000 1 000 --- 1 000 -- E.ARLY FATALITIES 0.00E+00 2 67t+00 6.30E-01 0.00E*00 1.33E-02 -- 1.33E-02 PRODROM V NITINO 0.00E*00 2.68E+01 4.0SE+00 1.92E-02 1.53E-01 -- 1.53E-01 EF RISK, 1 MI 0.00E+00 1.67E-02 8.33E-03 - - 8 35E-05 --- 8.3SE-05 CANCER F ATALITIEB 2 00E-02 6.41E+01 3.8SE+01 1 68E+02 1.69E+02 2.48E+03 2.6SE+03 POP DOSE, 0-S0 MI 1 51E+00 3.20E+03 2.12E+03 5 36E+03 5 38E+03 1 34E+04 1.88E+04 IOP DOSE, 0-1000 MI 1 $1E+00 3 20E+03 2.12E+03 1.12E*04 1.12E+04 1.46E+0S 1.57t+0S ECONOMIC COSTB (8) ---- --- -- -- - ---- 8 99E+09 8.99E+09 POP EF RISK, 0-1 MI 0.00E+00 2.$6E-02 1.48E-02 --- 1.28E-04 --- 1.28E-04 POP CF RISK, 0-10 M1 2.73E-07 8.74E-04 S.24E-04 --- 4 64E-06 1 4SE-04 1.49E-04 BOURCE TERM SUR-14-2, MEAN FREQUENCY = 1.40E-ta /YR CONSEQUENCE EVACUATE NORMAL I,t!ELTER NORMAL TOTAL CIIRONIC TOTAL ACT I VI. ACTIVITY EARLY 0 10 M1 0-Au MI 0-10 MI *10 MI WE10HT 0.995 0.005 0 09u 1.000 --- 1.000 ---- EARLY FATALITTE8 1.34E-04 1.09E-01 2.96E-02 0.00E+00 6.80E-04 ---- 6.80E-04 PRCORN VOMITINO 2.75E-02 7.83E-01 2.20E-01 0.00E+00 3.13E-02 --- 3.13E-02 EF RISK, 1 M1 0 00E+00 1.04E-08 S.91E-0$ ---- S.19E-06 ---- S.19E-06 CANCER TATALITIES 1.04E+00 2.99E+01 1 41E*01 1.30E+02 1.40E+02 3.02E+03 3.15E+03 IVP DOSE, 0 50 MI 6.48E+01 2.0SE+03 1.06E*03 4.73E+03 4.81E*03 1.75E+04 2.23E+04 la0P DOSE, 0 1000 MI 6.48t+01 2.0$E+03 1 06t+03 9.52E+03 9.S9E+03 1.76E*05 1.85E+0S ECON W3C COSTS (8) ---- -- ---- -- ---- 9 95E+09 9.95E+09 POP Et RISK, 0 1 MI 0.00E+00 5.02E-03 1.4BE-03 --- 2.51E 05 ---- 2.51E-05 POP CF RISK, 0-10 Mt 1. 4 2E-0 S 4.07E-04 1 92E 04 - - 1 61E-03 1 87E-04 2.03E-04 SOURCE TERM SUR-14-3, MEAN FREQUENCY = 0.00E+00 /YR SOURCE TERM BUR-1S-1, MEAN FREQUENCY = 1 54E-0S /YR CONSEQUENCE EVACUATE NORMAL SHELTER NORMAL TOTAL CHRONIC TOTAL ACTIVITY ACTIVITY EAktY 0 10 MI 0-10 MI 0-10 MI *10 MI WE!OHT 0.995 0.005 0.000 1.000 ---- 1.000 ---- EARLY FATALITIES 0 00E*00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E*00 0.00E*00 - - - 0.00E+00 PRODRCH V m! TING 0.00E*00 0.00E+00 0 00E+00 0 00E+00 0 00E*00 --- 0.00E+00 ET RISK, 1 M1 0 00E+00 0.00E+00 0 00E+00 ---- 0.00E+00 - - 0.00E+00 CANCER FAT ALITIES 0.00E+00 1 07E-03 6 59E-05 S 72E-03 5 72E-03 4 40E-03 1.01E-02 IOP DOSE, 0-$0 M1 0 00E+00 8 19E-02 7 ISE 03 1 221 01 1 23E-01 3 06E-01 4.2BE-01 IOP DOSE. 0-1000 M1 0 00f+00 8 19E-02 7.1SE-03 3 85E-01 3 8SE-01 5 OSE-01 8.90E-01 EColut!C COSTS (8) - - -- 1 04E+06 1.04E+06 POP ET RISK. 0 1 M1 0 00E+00 0 00E+00 0.00E+00 0 00E+00 0 00E+00 l'OP CF RISK . 0 - 10 M1 0 00E*00 1 46E-08 1.17E-09 7 28E-11 2 34E-09 2 42E-09 C.11
k Table C.1 (continued) SOURCE TERM $UR 1$ 8, HEAN FREQUENCY = 3.15E*12 /YR CONSEQUENCE EVACUATE NDimL $HELTER N0le%L TOTAL CHRONIC TOTAL ACTIVITY ACTIVITY EARLY 0 10 MI 0-10 MI 0-10 MI *10 MI WE10NT 0.99$ 0.00$ 0.000 1.000 ~~ 1.000 ~~ ! E.ARLY FATALITIES 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 ~~ 0.00E+00 PRODROH YUNITING 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 -~* 0.00E+00 EF k!SK, 1 HI 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 -*-* 0.00E+00 +* 0.00E+00 CANCER FATALITIES J.71E 03 $.36E 02 4.28E 02 1.$2E 01 1.$8E 01 1.37E 03 1.$9E 01 POP DOSE, 0 $0 MI 2.82E 01 2.68t+00 2.14E+00 2.75E+00 3.04E+00 $.87E 02 3.10E+00 POP ICSE, 0*1000 MI 2.82E*01 2.68t+00 2.14E+00 0.71E+00 0.00E+00 8.39E*02 9.00E+00 ECONOMIC COST 8 ($) -~~ *~* ~~ - -* ~~ 1.17t+06 1.17E+06 POP EF RIBK, 0 1 HI 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 ~~- 0.00E+00 --- 0.00E+00 ICP CF RICK, 010 MI ?.78E 06 7.30E 07 $ 63E-07 ~~ 6.11E*06 1.78E 09 8.28E 06 SOURCE TERM BUR 1S*3, HEAN FREQUENCY = 0.00E+00 /YR SOURCE TERH $UR-16 1, HEAN FREQUENCY = 1.87E 0$ /YR CONSEQUENCE EVACUATE NORMAL SHELTER NORMAL TOTAL CHRONIC TOTAL ACTIVITY ACTIVITY EARLY 0-10 MI 0 10 MI 0 10 MI *10 MI WEIGHT 0.99$ 0.00$ 0.000 1.000 - - - 1.000 ~~ EARLY FATALITIE8 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 ~~ 0.00E+00 1 PRODRCM VCHITING 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E*00 0.00E+00 ~~ 0.00E+00 EF RISK, 1 HI 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 ~~ 0.00E+00 *~- 0.00E+00 i CANCER FATALITIES 0.00E+00 1.22E 02 1.10E 03 4.1$E-02 4.16E-02 $.20E 02 0.36E 02 ! POP DOSE, 0 $0 HI 0.00E+00 9.90E 01 9.14E-02 1.40E+00 1.41E+00 2.88E+00 4.29E+00 POP DOSE, 0 1000 MI 0.00E+00 9.90E-01 9.14E-02 3.10E+00 3.11E+00 S.83E+00 8.93E+00
~~ ~~-
ECON 0 HIC COSTS (8) ~~ ~~ --* 1.06t+06 1.08L+06 POP ET RIBK, 0 1 H1 0.00E+00- 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 ~~- 0.00E+00 ~-- 0.00E+00 POP CF RISK, 0-10 H! 0.00E+00 1.66E*07 1.50E-06 ~~ 8.31E 10 3.49E 06 3.$7E-06 BOURCE TEltH BUR 16 2. HEAN FREQUENCY = 4.66E 10 /YR CONSEQUENCE EVACUATE NORMAL SHELTER NORMAL TOTAL CHRONIC TOTAL ACT!YITY ACTIVITY EARLY 0 10 MI 0 10 MI '0-10 MI *10 MI : WEIGHT 0.995 0.00$ 0.000 1.900 ~~. 1.000 ~~ EARLY FATALITIES 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00= 0.00E+00 -- 0.00E+00 PRODRCH VCMITINO 0.00E+00 1.21E 03 4,71E-04 0.00E+00 6.07E 06 ~~ 6.07E-06 EF RISK, 1 MI 0.00E+00 0.00E+Jd 0.00E+00 ~~ 0.00E+00 ~~ 0.00E+00 CANCER FATALITIES 3.29E*02 3.30E 01 2.$1E-01 9.11E 01 9.4SE 01 4.$8E-01 1.40E+00 ICP DOSE, 0-50 MI 1.62E+00 1.68E+01 1.23E+01 1.7$E+01 1.92E+01 1.83E+01 3.7$E+01 POP DOSE, 0-1000 MI 1.62E+00 1.68E+01 1.23E+01 S.34E+01 S.$1E+01 3.33E+01 8.84E+01 ; ECONOMIC COSTS ($) ~~- ~~- ~~ ~~ ~~ 1.35E+06 1.3SE+06 POP EF RISK, 0 1 HI 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 -~* 0.00E+00 -~- 0.00E+00 POP CF RISK, 0 10 HI 4.48E 07 4.$0E 06 3.42E-06. ~~ 4.69E 07 6.$4E 07 1.12E*06 SOURCE TERM BUR 16 3, HEAN TREQUENCY = 0.00E+00 /YR SOURCE TERM BUR *17-1, HEAN FREQUENCY = 3.20E-06 /YR CONSEQUENCE EVACUATE NORMAL SHELTER NORMAL TOTAL CHRONIC TOTAL , ACTIVITY ACTIVITY EARLY 0-10 HI 0 10 MI 0-10 MI *10 MI - WEIOHT 0.995 0.00$ 0.000 1.000 -- - 1,000 ---* EARLY FATALITIES 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 ~-* 0.00E+00 PRODRCH V0HITING 0.00E+00 8.43E-04 3.19E-05 0.00E+00 4.21E-06 --- 4.21E 06 l ET RISK, 1 HI 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 ~~ 0.00E+00 -~ 0.00E+00 CANCER FATALITIES 0.00E+00 3.0$E+00 3.30E-01 8.0$t+00 0.07E+00 1.0$E+02 1.14E+02 POP DOSE, 0 $0 MI 0.00E+00 2.49E+02 2.69E+01 3.43E+02 3.45E+02 2.32E+03 2.67E+03 POP DOSE, 0-1000 MI 0.00E+00 2.49E+02 2.69E+01 6.37E+02 6.38E+02 6.30E+03 6.94E+03
--~
ECONOMIC COST 8 ($) -- ~~ --- -* 1 80E+08 1.80E+08 POP ET RISK, 0 1 HI 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 --- 0.00E+00 ---- 0.00E+00 ; ICP CF BISK. 0-10 MI 0.00E+00 4.16E-05 4.50E 06 -~ 2.08E-07 7.56E-0$ 7.6CE 0$ C.12
i i i Table C 1 (continued) .j i 80VhCE fthM $UR 17-2, MEAN TktOUENCY
- 1.96t 07 /YR -
CON $t0UENCE EVACUATE N0lHAL $HELTER N000%L TOTAL CHkONIC TOTAL i ACTIVITY ACTIVITY LARLY l 0 10 MI 0 10 Mt 0 10 MI *10 MI I
- WEIGHT 0.995 0.005 0.000 1.000 ++-- 1.000 ---- I EARLY TATALITIE8 0.00t+00 S.79t 03 S.13t 04 0.00t+00 2.89t 05 -*-- 2.691 0$ i PRODhdM YQMITING S.14t 06 7.718-02 2.17E 02 0.00t+00 3.912 04 a+ - 3.91E-04 ;
EF kl8K, 1 M1 0.00t+00 6.59t+06 4.57t 09 + +- 3.30E 06 --** 3.30E 06 j CANCtk FATALITit8 S.06t 01 4.97t+00 2.2SE+00 1.46t+01 1,51t+01 3.48t+02 3.63t+02 POP D08t, 0 50 MI 3.71t+01 3.16t+02 1.54t+02 S.52E+02 S 90E+02 6.12t+03 6.71E+03 POP Do8t, 0*1000 MI 3.71t+01 3.16t+02 1.54t+02 9.64t+02 1.0Ct+03 2.03t+04 2.13t+04 $ ECONG4!C C0878 ($) ++++ -*+= **** -+a **+- 7.90t+06 7.90t+06
. PDF tr RISK, 0-1 MI 0.00t+00 2.892 04 2.56t 0S ** - 1.45t 06 **** 1.4St-06 '
. POP CF RISK, 0 10 M1 6.09t 06 6.772 05 3.06E 05 --** 7.20E 06 1 $9E 04 1.662 04 .
DOURCE fthM BUR 17 8, Mr.AN FREQUENCY = 0.00t+00 /YR SOUkCE TERM SUR 16 1, MEAN FREQUENCY = 0.00t+00 /YR . h f s
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l I4 e i I t C APPENDIX D f RISK RESULTS x b
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l l i CONTENTS FIGURES i D.1 Ea r l y Fa t a l i t i e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D . 2 D.2 La te n t Canc e r Fa tal i t i e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D . 3 D.3 Population Dose (person res) Within 50 Miles.................... D 4 j D.4 Population Dose (person rea) Within Region. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D. 5 i l' D.5 Early . Fatality Risk Within 1 Mile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D 6 D.6 Latent Cancer Fatality Risk Within 10 Miles..................... D.7 l 1 TABLE D.1 PRAMIS Results for Surry Internal Initiators Sample 1......... D.8 ; i D.2 PRAMIS Results for Surry Internal Initiators Sample 2. . . ..e . . . .D.25
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APPENDIX D RISK RESULTS This appendix presents datat:ed risk results for Surry for internal initiators. Figures D.1 t '.. c o u gh D.6 contain the CCDFs for early fatalities, latent cancer fatalities, population dose within 50 miles, population dose within the entire region, individual risk of early fatality within one mile of the site boundary, and individual risk of latent cancer fatality within ten miles of the plant. Each plot displays 200 CCDFs: each individual curve results from one observation in the LHS sample for Surry. These families of curves are the most basic risk results generated in this probabilistic risk assessment. Similar f amilies of curves are generated for the second sample for internal initiators and for fire and seismic initiators, but are not shown. Tables D.1 and D.2 present the PRAMIS output for internal initiators in slighity edited form for Sample 1 and Sample 2, respectively. The PRAMIS output uses PDS as an abbreviation for PDS group. The seven PDS groups for internal inttiators at Surry are: PDS Group 1 Slow SBO PDS Group 2 LOCAs PDS Group 3 Fast SB0 PDS Group 4 Event V PDS Group 5 Transients PDS Group 6 ATWS PDS Group 7 SGTR i PRAMIS - uses CSQ as an abbreviation for consequence measure. The nine l consequence measures for which results are reported are: 1 Early Fatalities 2 Early Injuries 3 Individual Early Fatality Risk at 1 mile 4 Latent Cancer Fatalities 5 Population Dose . 10 miles (Sv) 6 Population Dose Entire Region (SV) 7 Economic Cost ($) 8 Individual Early Fatality Risk within 1 mile 9 Individual Latent Cancer Fatality Risk within 10 miles i PRAMIS uses PAR as an abbreviation for source term groups. The source term groups are defined in Section 3.4. PRAMIS uses APB as an abbreviation for accident progression bin; the APB attributes and characteristics are i defined in Section 2.4. The two methods of calculating fractional contribution to risk are discussed in Section 5.1. 3. The lists of the fractional contributionJ of individual APBs have been truncated to show only the top 63 contributors. I l D1
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1.E-16 ' - ~ ' - - ~" - - "' ""' ' " -' - 1.E-9. 1.E-7 1.E-5 1.E-3 1.E-1 Latent Cancer Fatdity Risk Within 10 Miles Figure-D 6. Latent Cancer Fatality Risk Within 10 Miles D.7
l-l' l 1 q Table D.1 PRAMIS Results for Surry l Internal Initiators - Sample 1 CSQ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 MEAN RISK = 2.0E-06 3.0E-05 9.0E*00 5.2E 03 5.8E-02 3.3E-01 2.1E+04 1.6E 08 1.7E-09 i l HTCR -- TRACTIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF PDS TO CSQ, NORMALIZED ON A SAMPLE BASIB ) CSQ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 P05 1 0.07745 0.06384 0.07562 0.15198 0.17880 0.15306 0.13968 0.09920 0.20827 'j 2 0.00623 0.00558 0.00683 0.04007 0.05022 0.04062 0.03307 0.00886 0.05775 l 3 0.01344 0.01402 0.01242 0.03597 0.04267 0.03628 0.03197 0.01995 0.04898 4 0.57409 0.66728 0.59806 0.15851 0.14949 0.15829 0.18497 0.56448 0.19930 5 0.00274 0.00236 0.00207 0.00780 0.00850 0.00780 0.00842 0.00365 0.00932 i 6 0.03854 0.02830 0.03071 0.03810 0.03658 0.03$89 0.03847 0.03834 0.04782 7 0.28950 0.21863 0.274ti9 0.56956 0.53374 0.56806 0.56253 0.26543 0.42856 FCHR -- FRACTIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF PDS TO CSQ CPQ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 PDS 1 0.08570 0.01533 0.11614 0.10923 0.14813 0.10972 0.10248 0.11158 0.19202 2 0.00032 0.00010 0.00043 0.01340 0.02313 0.01356 0.00796 0.00064 0.01975 j 3 0.08549 0,00020 0.12155 0.04580 0.06069 0.04571 0.04937 0.11492 0.10522 , 4 0.77277 0.93627 0.70434 0.34272 0.36347 0.34565 0.36537 0.71377 0.49342 5 0.00055 0.00044 0.00061 0.00369 0.00399 0.00368 0.00339 0.00075 0.00314 i 6 0.01376 0.00396 0.01825 0.02038 0.02107 0.02025 0.02097 0.01820 0.02394 j 7 0.04141 0.03466 0.03858 0.46470 0.37952 0.46144 0.45046 0.04014 0.16181 .- j i i t s Y i i D.8 s
FRACTIONA1. CONTRIBUTIONS OF PAR 70 CSQ, NORMA 1.!!ED ON A SAMPLE BASIS C5Q 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 PAR ! 1 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 2 0.00004 0.00001 0.00002 0.00005 0.00005 0.00005 0.00003 0.00010 0.00006 3 0.02455 0.06927 0;03620 0.00106 0.00260 0.00102 0.00021 0.04370 0.01068 4 0.00000 0.00000 0.00001 0.00001 0.00002 0.00001 0.00000 0.00001 0.00003 5 0.05074 0.01249 0.04276 0.00217 0.00197 0.00208 0.00494 0.03543 0.00657 6 0.01700 0.12767 0.07956 0.02073 0.02751 0.02047 0.01915 0.00013 0.03759 7 0.00426 0,00299 0.00523 0.00071 0.00060 0.00072 0.00155 0.00493 0.00026 8 0.02507 0.00269 0.0*244 0.00320 0.00373 0.00323 0.00464 0.01814 0.00677 9 0.08141 0.14037 0.11832 0.04738 0.04823 0.04736 0.05713 0.12521 0.04034 10 0.02289 0.01041 0.03250 0.07693 0.06402 0.07845 0.07763 0.03178 0.04305 11 0.00224 0.01142 0.00076 0.02749 0.02840 0.02721 0.03339 0.00541 0.02691 12 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 13 0.C0000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 14 0.00274 0.00052 0.00432 0.00054 0.00065 0.00050 0.00047 0.00412 0.00272 3 15 0.02551 0.01931 0.02287 0.00865 0.00738 0.00885 0.01123 0.01872 0.00793 16 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 17 0.00300 0.00212 0.00291 0.00148 0.00166 0.00150 0.00153 0.00630 0.00390 18 0.13990 0.10702 0.12121 0.02619 0.02055 0.02629 0.03309 0.10000 0.02986 19 - 0.00061 0.00177 0.00021 0.00432 0.00426 0.00432 0.00449 0.00018 0.00112 20 0.08563 0.04742 0.09344 0.01617 0.01790 0.01607 0.02165 0.08904 0.04474 21 0.00034 0.08987 0.1053* 0.02450 0.02014 0.02436 0.02693 0.09503 0.02899 22 0.01538 0.00855 0.0222e 0.05000 0.04268 0.05087 0.05175 0.00927 0.02280 23 0.04499 0.05204 0.02555 0.03627 0.03035 0.03588 1.04096 0.08028 0.03208 24 - 0.00192 0.00386 0.00334 0.00005 0.00004 0.00005 f.00005 0.00273 0.00006 25 0.03454 0.02104 0.04688 0.08587 0.07040 0.08560 J.08581 0.03740 0.04356 26 0,01077 0.01464 0.01150 0.03268 0.03546 0.03246 0.03644 0.01563 0.03770 27 '0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 1 28 0.00267 0.00417 0.00016 0.00327 0.00200 0.00322 0.00380 0.00012 0.00061 20 0.00389 0.00282 0.00577 0.00137 0.06131 5,00138 0.00139 0.00577 0.00426 30 0.03482 0.02612 0.02552 0.00842 0.00666 0.00842 0.00978 0.02016 0.00847 31 0.01684 0.01706 0.00639 0.01745 0.01707 0.01723 0.01959 0.00395 0.00498 32 0.02112-0.02456 0.00302 0.01715 0.01200 0.G1720 0.01934 0.00276 0.02059 33 0.11857 0.08378 0.08592 0.02145 0.01636 0.02148 0.02740 0.06772 0.02636' 34 0.02877 0.02581 0.02448 0.03599 0.03411 0.03604 0.03716 0.01959 0.01640 35 0.00916 0.03557 0.01103 0.01327 0.01179 0.01334 0.01531 0.02779 0.01605 36- 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 37 0.02736 0.02315 0.02899 0.05259 0.04562 0.05246 0.05220 0.01673 0.02326' -' 38 ' 0.00488 0.00451 0.00635 0.00240 0.00138 0.00239 0.00288 0.00993 0.00111 39 - 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 40 0.00358 0.00410 0.00420 0.02773 0.02231-0.02763 0,02632 0.00253 0.00988 1 41 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00000 0.00001 ! 42 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 43 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00015 0,00037 0.00023 0.00690 0.00000 0.00009 44 - 0.000^0 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 _, 45 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 ' 46 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00087 0.00232 0.00137 0.00433 0.00000 0.00081 < 47 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000-48 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 49 0.00000 0.00037 0.00000 0.24998 0.?*372 0.2538$ 0.18b31 0.00000 0.35945 50 0.00445 0.00228 0.00070 0.08046 0.07737 0.07842 0.08009 0.00835 0.07094 51 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000'0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 52 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0,00000 0.00000 0.00000 D.9
FRACTIONA1. CONTRIBUTIONS OF I AR TO CSQ CSQ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 HEAN RISK = 2.0E-06 3.0E 05 9.0E-09 5.2E 03 5.8E-02 3.1E-01 2.1E+04 1.6E-08 1.7E*09 PAR - 1 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 2 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00001 0.00002 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000 0.00002 3 0.00359 0.03036 0.00875 0.00138 0.00394 0.00133 0.00019 0.01472 0.01500 4 0.00'10 0.00000 0.00000 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00000 0.00001 5 0.00432 0.00013 0.00391 0.00223 0.00295 0.00215 0.00354 0.00352 0.01282 6 0.00651 0.04635 0.01639 0.01368 0.02629 0.01354 0.00841 0.02635 0.03421 7 0.00001 0 00000 0.00001 0.00013 0.00020 0.00014 0.00017 0.00001 0.00007 0 0.00418 0.00018 0.00575 0.00604 0.00771 0.00610 0.00966 0.00544 0.01745 0 0.05800 0.22160 0.14534 0.11218 0.14343 0.11298 0.11731 0.19608 0.15203 10 0.00007 0.00003 0.00021 0.03987 0,03582 0.03932 0.02876 0.00032 0.0133@ 11 0.00001 0.00004 0.00000 0.01537 0.02137 0.01523 0.01250 0.00005 0,01400 12 _ 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 13 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 14 0.00096 0.00012 0.00140 0.00047 0.00060 0.00042 0.00058 0.00123 0.00155 15 0.04723 0.10638 0.09898 0,04650 0.04264 0.04811 0.06006 0.09240 0.04830 16 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 17 0.00022 0.00010 0.00015 0.00216 0.00194 0.00215 0.00236 0.00061 0.00199 18 - 0.05235 0.06704 0.05846 0.02938 0.02501 0.02962 0.03081 0.05709 0,03871 19 0,00100 0.00043 0.00050 0.01512 0,01575 0.01509 0.02360 0.00040 0.00214 20 0.19223 0.01908 0.27359 0.06145 0.06602 0.06067 0.08646 0,25724 0.17627 21 0.03372 0.06049 0.06612 0.03583 0,03357 0.03554 0.03175 0.07291 0.04552
- 22 0.00054 0.00034 0.00105 0.05811 0.03987 0.05789 0.04912 0.00001 0.01041 23 0.00111 0.00155 0.00073 0.03634 0.03078 0.03589 0.03063 0.00620 0.01777 24 ~ 0.00002 0.00006 0.00004 0.00004 0.00004.0.00004 0.00003 0.00005 0.00005 25 0.00024 0,00012 0.00064 0.04981 0.03666 0.04934 0.03810 0.00064 0.01083 26 0.00008 0.00010 0.00015 0.02031 0.02351 0.02006 0,01673 0.00020 0.01374
, 27 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00600 28 0.00077 0.00148 0.00004 0.00168 0.00151 0.00161 0.00316 0.00003 0.00017 20 0.00213 0.00205 0.00223 0.00150 0.00139 0.00145 0.00242 0.00238 0.00184 30 0.27271 0.15435 0.10215 0.03211 0.02626 0.03235 0.03739 0.08059 0.04779 31 0.00488 0.00655 0.00053 0.02243 0.02137 0.02138 0.03534 0.00042 0.00249 32 0.00492 0.01076 0.00016 0.02879 0.01447 0.02880 0.03869 0.00014 0.01210 33 0,25857 0.24064 0.20812 0.07153 0.06119 0.07213 0.07851 0.17350 0.11112 34 0.00598 0.00961 0.00143 0.06541 0.04677 0.06572 0.07893 0.00116 0.00849
,35- 0.00093 0.00774 0.00068 0.02211 0.01521 0.02212 0.02486 0.00275 0.00962 36- 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 37- .0.00176 0.00254 0.00137 0.06899 0.04442 0.06848 0.06756 0.00114 0.01043 38- 0.00010 0.00015 0.00016 0.00104 0.00071 0.00103 0.00090 0.00051 0.00039 39 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 40 0.00071 0.00054 0.00098 0.05380 0.03429 0.05333 0.04431 0.00083 0.00909 41 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000 42 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 43 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00003 0.00011 0.00004 0.00075 0.00000 0.00002 44 : 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 45 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 46 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00034 0.00139 0.00054 0.00095 0.00000 0.00038 47 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 48 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0,00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 49 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.06984 0.14770 0.07176 0.02701 0.00000 0.14018 50 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.01388 0.02305 0.01363 0.00733 0.00002 0.01894 51 0.00000 0.00000 0,00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 52 0.00000 0,00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000-D 10
FRACTIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF AFB ATTRIBUTES TO CSQ 1, NORMALIZED ON A SAMPLE BASIS CSQ 1 i APB ATTRIBUTES i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 A 0.34542 0.01309 0.75116 0.01115 0.12535 0.20018 0.83622 0.56507 0.04866 0.00447 0.84321 B 0.22867 0.00000 0.01361 0.09040 0.72304 0.15236 0.05717 0.43493 0.04446 0.06598 0.11679 C 0.00531 0.00000 0.10661 0.10651 0.02602 0.64746 0.00000 0.06364 0.33786 I D 0.08300 0.17763 0.07553 0.79195 0.05421 0.10661 0.84324 0.59169 l' E 0.00454 0.00000 0.03525 0.00539 F 0.13001 0.02100 0.01784 0.06599 0 0.20305 0.00956 H 0.77663 FRACTIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF APB ATTRIBUTES TO CSQ 2. NORMALIZED ON A SAMPLE BASIS CSQ 2 APB ATTRIBUTES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 A 0.24878 0.01003 0.80700 0.00940 0.09967 0.14437 0.83663 0.56102 0.04134 0.00432 0.86627
,B-0.41850 0.00000 0.01243 0.07036 0.75658 0.11573 0.05296 0.43898 0.03691 0.06188 0.13373 C 0.00000 0.00000 0.11021 0.08272 0.02171 0.73991 0.00000 - 0.04887 0.33506 D 0.07719 0.13607 0.02911 0.83752 0.05102 0.11021 0.87288 0.59874 E 0.00341 0.00000 0.02694 0.00573 F 0.05856 0.01367 0.01342 0.06528 0 0.18556 0.00904 H 0.83118 +
FRACTIONAL Cotr$dIBUTIONS OF APB ATTRIBUTES 70 CSQ 3. NORMALIZED OH A SAMPLE BASIS CSQ 3 AFB ATTRIBUTES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 A ' 0.28253 0.01404 0.78327 0.01146 0.12191 0.16443 0.86177 0.56988 0.04692 0.00264 0.85285 B' - 0.31553 0.00000 0.01508 0.08669 0.74755 0.16470 0.05476 0.43012 0.04061 0.06419 0.14715 C. 0,00676 0.00000 0.08346 0.09695 0.02391 0.67087 0.00000 0.06340 0.36499 D 0.07625 0.14252 0.06415 0.80400 0.05205 0.08346 0.84907 0.56818 E- 0.00658 0.00000 0.03449- 0.00512 F' O.12713 0.02003 0.01956 0.04947 0 0.18522 0.00974 B' O.81276 + c FRACTIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF APB ATTRIBUTES 70 CSQ 4 NORMALIZED ON A SAMPLE BASIS l CSQ 4 APB ATTRIBUTES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 A 0.06250 0.01284 0.59767 0.01074 0.25942 0.17506 0.80518 0.58001 0.09295 0.00647 0.71594 B 0.09502 0.00000 0.04537 0.18135 0.55991 0.44350 0.04625 0.41999 0.11073 0.05365 0.28406
-C 0.00235 0.00000 0.14857 0.22664 0.05244 0.38134 0.00000 0.10847 0.40901 D 0.07468 0.22452 0.08025 0.54126 0.03946 0.14857 0.68785 0.53087 E~ 0.01984 0.00000 0.09121 0.00030 F 0.31450 0.08898 0.02793 0.08847 0 0.43012 0.02591 R 0.64775 FRACTIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF APB ATTRIBUTES TO CSC 5. NORMALIZED ON A SAMPLE BASIS CSQ 5 AFB ATTRIBUTES I 1' 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 A 0.04673 0.01175 0.59294 0.01152 0.24974 0.17096 0,81393 0.57557 0.09216 0.00629 0.68700 B 0.10275 0.00000 0.04322 0.17610 0.57787 0.41038 0.03830 0.42443 0.10676 0.04407 0.31300 L C 0.00206 0.00000 0.14776 0.21939 0.05265 0.41866 0.00000- 0.10364 0.44710' D 0.06513 0.23861 0.10385 0.59300 0.03149 0.14776 0.69744 0.50255 E 0.02019 0.00000 0.08684 0.00017 F 0.35190 0.11430 0.02538 0.08807 0- -0.41123 0.03283 H 0.60251 D.11 l l
l l
i i FRACTIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF AFB ATTRIBUTES TO CSQ 6. NCRMALIEED ON A SAMPLE BASIS C8Q 6 APB ATTRIBUTES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 to 11 A 0.06277 0.01269 0.59879 0.01076 0.25915 0.17255 0.80731 0.57987 0.09285 0.00646 0.71514 5 0,09552 0.00000 0.04544 0.18121 0.56162 0.44393 0.04584 0.42013 0.11061 0.05314 0.28486 i C 0.00230 0.00000 0.14685 0.22627 0.05240 0.383S2 0.00000 0.10838 0.41120 , D 0.07410 0.22333 0.08977 0.S8175 0.03905- 0.1468S 0.68816 0.52919 E 0.01986 0.00000 0.09137 0.00029 F 0.31684 0.09000 0.02779 0.03749 0 0,42661 0,02622 8 -0.64776 FRACTIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF APB ATTRIBUTES TO CSQ 7 NONMALIZED ON A SA!7LE BASIS CSQ 7 i APB ATTRIBUTES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 A 0.00006 0.01471 0.593S2 0.01208 0.254S3 0.19479 0.77696 0.57862 0.00067 0.00607 0.72805 B 0.10411 0.00000 0.04235 0.17566 0.54435 0.42240 0.05473 0.42137 0.10768 0.06463 0.27194 C 0.00285 0.00000 0.16P11 0.22469 0.0$069 0.38272 0.30000 0.10749 0,37123 D 0.08586 0.23641 0.00073 0,$8757 0.04824 0.16631 0.69397 0.55808 , E- 0.01891 0.00000 0.08621 0.00001 F 0.26822 0.07038 0.02888 0.10138 0 0.43920 0.02141 i H 0,65709 FRACTIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF AFB ATTRIBUTES TO CSQ 6. NORMALIEED DE A SAMPLE BASIS 1h CSQ 8 i APB ATTRIBUTES 1 2 3 4 5 6 . 8 9 10 11 A' O.22780 0.01700 0.74826 0.01388 0.12388 0.20840 0.78945 0.56773 0.04671 0.00265 0.81216 , B- ,0.33868 0.00000 0.01131 0.08468 0.69495 0.11982 0,07794 0.43227 0.04268 0.09031 0.18784 C 0.00942 0.00000 0.13261 0.09811 0.02225 0.67178 0.00000 0.06217 0.33769
..i D 0.10214,0.18962 0.06116 0.80333 0.07541 _0.13261 0.84643 0.56915 E. 0.00665 0,00000 0.02518 0.00544 ,
F 0.10078 0,02290 0.02148 0.07607. 0 0,21652 0.01264 H 0.75686
' FRACTIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF AFB ATTRIBUTES TO CSQ 9. NORMALIZED ON A SAMPLE BASIS CSQ 9 APS ATTRIBUTES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 A- 0.06838 0.01162 0.56727 0.01348 0.21384 0.21566 0.7818$-0.56236 0.08148 0400621 0,64985 8 0.13092 0.00000 0.03083 0.14560 0.60574 0.27474 0.03770 0.43764 0.08734 0,04}}