ML18152A345

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Evaluation of Util Response to Suppl 1 to NRC Bulletin 90-01:North Anna-1/-2 & Surry-1/-2.
ML18152A345
Person / Time
Site: Surry, North Anna  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 10/31/1994
From: Udy A
IDAHO NATIONAL ENGINEERING & ENVIRONMENTAL LABORATORY
To:
NRC
Shared Package
ML18152A346 List:
References
CON-FIN-L-1695 IEB-90-001, IEB-90-1, INEL-94-0103, INEL-94-103, TAC-M85414, TAC-M85415, TAC-M854449, TAC-M854450, NUDOCS 9411170138
Download: ML18152A345 (24)
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Text

NA . .ONAL ENGINEEitfNG LABORATORY PffL-9 .. *c103 I e October 1994 Alan C. Udy Evaluation of Utility Response to Supplement 1 to NRC Bulletin 90-ul:

North Anna-1/-2 and Surry-1/-2 Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Enclosure 2 Work performed under

~Lockheed DOE C"untract Idaho Technolo6les Company No. DE-AC07 -94ID 13223 (q~l.111-~ii) M

NOTICE This report was prepared as an a.:count of work sponsored by an agency of 1he Uni1cd Slates Govcrnmen1. Nei1hcr the United Sates Governmcnl nor any agency thereof. nor any of their employees, makes any warran1y, e,;pressed or implied, or assu11*cs any legal liahil11y or respomibili1y for any 1hird party's use, or the resulls of such use. of anr 1nforma11on. appara1us, product or proc-ess disclosed 1n th1, report, or rcpresenls 1ha111s use by such 1hird par1y would no1 infringe pri,*a1cly owned righl\.

  • INEL-94/0103 TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT Evaluation of Utility Response to *supplement 1 to NRC Bulletin 90-01: North Anna-1/-2 and Surry-1/-2 Docket Nos. 50-338, 50-339, 50-280, and 50-281 Alan C. Udy Published October 1994 Lockheed Idaho Technologies Company Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415 Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 and for the U.S. Department of Energy Under DOE Idaho Operations Office Contract DE-AC07-941013223 FIN No. Ll695, Task No. lla TAC Nos. M85414, M85415, M85449, and M85450
  • e

SUMMARY

This report documents the Lockheed Idaho Technologies Company review of the Virginia Electric and Power Company submittals that respond to Supplement 1 to NRC Bulletin 90-01 for Unit Nos. 1 and 2 the North Anna Power Station and Unit Nos. 1 and 2 of the Surry Power Station. This NRC Bulletin provides information regarding the loss of fill-oil in certain pressure and differential pressure transmitters manufactured by Rosemount, Inc. This report finds the licensee complies with the requested actions and the reporting requirements of the Supplement.

FIN No. Ll695, Task No. Ila B&R No. 320-19-15-05-0 Docket Nos. 50-338, 50-339, 50-280, and 50-281 TAC Nos 1 M85414, M85415, M85449, and M85450 ii

PREFACE This report is supplied as part of the "Technical Assistance in Support of the Instrumentation and Controls Systems Branch." It is being conducted for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Reactor Controls and Human Factors, by Lockheed Idaho Technologies Company, National Nuclear Operations Analysis Department.

iii

  • CONTENTS

SUMMARY

............................................................... ii PREFACE .............................................................. iii

1. INTRODUCTION ................................................... . 1
2. NRC SPECIFIED REQUESTED ACTIONS ................................ . 4
3. EVALUATION .............................. ~ ...................... . 7 3.1 Evaluation of Licensee Response to Reporting Requirements . 7 3.2 Evaluation of Licensee Response to Requested Actions ...... 8
4. CONCLUSIONS ..................................................... 15
5. REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . 16 iv

e Evaluation of Utility Response to Supplement 1 to NRC Bulletin 90-01: North Anna-1/-2 and Surry-1/-2

1. INTRODUCTION The NRC issued Bulletin 90-01 on March 9, 1990 (Reference 1). That Bulletin discussed certain Rosemount pressure and differential pressure transmitter models identified by the manufacturer as prone to fill-oil leakage. The bulletin requested licensees to identify whether these transmitters were or may later be installed in safety-related systems.

Actions were detailed for licensee implementation for certain identified transmitters installed in a safety-related system. These same actions apply to those identified transmitters presently held in inventory for later installation in a safety-related system.

With the gradual leakage of fill-oil, the transmitter would not have the long term accuracy, time response, and reliability needed for its intended safety function. Further, this condition could go undetected over a long period. Redundant instrument channels are subject to the same degradation mechanism. This increases 'the potential for a common mode failure. Thus, this potential failure mechanism raised concern for the reliability of reactor protection systems (RPS), engineered safety features (ESF) actuation systems, and anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) mitigating systems. To achieve high functional reliability, there must be a low probability of component failure while operating, with any failures readily detectable.

Supplement 1 to NRC Bulletin 90-01 (Reference 2) was issued on December 22, 1992. The Supplement informed licensees of NRC staff activities regarding the subject transmitters, and noted continuing reports of transmitter failures. The NRC requested licensee action to resolve the issue.

The Supplement also updated the information contained in the original bulletin. The licensee was requested to review the information and determine if it was applicable at their facility. Further; the licensee was requested to modify their actions and enhanced surveillance monitoring programs to conform with the direction given. Finally, the licensee was instructed to 1

e e respond to the NRC. The Requested Action~ in Supplement 1 to NRC Bulletin 90*

01 supersede the original NRC Bulletin 90-01 Requested Actions.

In responding to Supplement I to NRC Bulletin 90-01, the licensee is directed to address three items.

1. A statement either committing the licensee to take the NRC Bulletin 90-01, Supplement 1, Requested Actions or taking exception to those actions.
2. Addressing the actions committed to in the above statement, provide:
a. a list of the specific actions, including any justifications, to be taken to complete the commitment,
b. a schedule for completion, and
c. after completion, a statement confirming the actions committed to are complete.
3. A statement identifying the NRC Bulletin 90-01, Supplement 1, Re~ed A~ons not taken, along with an evaluation providing the basis for exemption.

In implementing the replacement option of the NRC Requested Actions, plant shutdown exclusively for replacing the transmitters is not required.

This allowance infers that replacements can be scheduled. With replacement in a timely manner, enhanced surveillance monitoring for interim operation is not required.

The Virginia Electric and Power Company, the licensee for Unit Nos. 1 and 2 of the North Anna Power Station and Unit Nos. 1 and 2 of the Surry Power Station, responded to Supplement 1 of NRC Bulletin 90-01 with a letter dated March 16, 1993 (Reference 3). The licensee provided additional information on October 14, 1993 (Reference 4), and July 12, 1994 (Reference 5). This technical evaltiation report evaluates the completeness of those submittals.

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  • e It also determines whether proposed surveillance methods are adequate to determine fill-oil loss-caused degradation of the transmitter. Finally, this report addresses the interval of surveillance proposed by the licensee for any transmitters included in the enhanced surveillance monitoring program.

Many Rosemount transmitter failures have been attributed to the use of stainless steel "O"-rings between the sensin~ module and the process flanges.

Rosemount improved the manufacturing process for transmitters manu~ctured after July 11, 1989. Those improvements included a limit of the torque applied to the flange bolts. This limits the stress caused in the sensing module by the "O"-ring. Post-production screening, including pressure testing of the sensing module for this potential latent defect, was also implemented at that time. Therefore, as described in Supplement l of NRC Bulletin 90-01, those Rosemount transmitters manufactured after July 11, 1989, are not subject to this review.

3

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2. NRC SPECIFIED REQUESTED ACTIONS  !

The NRC staff specified the following Reaucsted Actions of licensees of operating reactors.

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1. Review plant records and Identify the following Rosemount transmitters F (If manufactured before July 11, 1989) that either are used In or may be used In either safety-related or ATWS mitigating systems.
  • Rosemount Hodel 1153, Serles 8
  • Rosemount Model 1153, Serles D
  • Rosemount Model \154 following Identification, the licensee ts lo establish the following:
a. For those Identified transmitters having a normal operating pressure greater than 1500 psi, and are Installed as part of reactor protection trip systems, [SF actuation systems, or ATWS mitigating systems, either replace the transmitter In an expedited manner, or monitor monthly, for the life of the transmitter, using an enhanced surveillance program.

lf the Identified transmitter exceeds the 60,000 psi-month or the 130,000 psi-month criterion (depending on the range code of the transmitter) established by Rosemount, enhanced surveillance on a refuel Ing (not exceeding 24 months) basis Is acceptable. Under this option, justification must be based on the service record and the specific safety function of the transmitter. That justification can be based on high functional reliability provided by redundancy or diversity.

h. for those tdenttfted transmitters having a normal operating pressure greater than 1500 psi, and are Installed as part of a safety-related system other than reactor protection trip systems, rsr actuation, or ATWS mlttgatlng systems, either replace the transmitter or monitor quarterly, for the life of the transmitter, using an enhanced 5utvelllance program.*

If the Identified transmitter exceeds the 60,000 psi-month or the 130,000 psi-month criterion (depending on the range code of the transmitter) established by Rosemount, enhanced surveillance on a refuel Ing (not exceeding 24 months) basis Is acceptable. Under this option, Justification must be based on the service record and the spectflr. safP.ty function of the transmitter. Thal 4

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  • e justification can be based on high functional reliability provided by redundancy or diversity.
c. For boiling water reactors (BWR)--

For those identified transmitters having a normal operating pressure greater than 500 psi and less than or equal to 1500 psi, and are installe~ as part of reactor protection trip systems, ESF actuation systems, or ATWS mitigating systems, either replace the transmitter, or monitor monthly with an enhanced surveillance monitoring program, until the transmitter reaches the designated (by Rosemount) psi-month criterion (60,000 psi-month or 130,000 psi-month, depending on the transmitter range code).

For transmitters that provide signals to the RPS or ATWS trips for high pressure or low water level, the enhanced surveillance must be monthly. For other transmitters in this classification, enhanced surveillance on a refueling (not exceeding 24 months) basis is acceptable. Under this option, justification must be based on the service record and the specific safety function of the transm,tter. That justification can be based on high functional reliability provided by redundancy or diversity.

For pressurized water reactors (PWR)--

For those identified transmitters having a normal operating pressure greater than 500 psi and less than or equal to 1500 psi, and are installed as part of reactor protection trip systems, ESF actuation systems, or ATWS mitigating systems, either replace the transmitter, or monitor with an enhanced surveillance monitoring program, until the transmitter reaches the designated (by Rosemount) psi-month criterion (60,000 psi-month or 130,000 psi-month, depending on the transmitter range code) on a refueling (not exceeding 24 months) basis.

d. For those identified transmitters having a normal operating pressure greater than 500 psi and less than or equal to 1500 psi, and are installed as part of a safety-related system other than reactor protection trip systems, ESF actuation, or ATWS mitigating systems, either replace the transmitter or monitor with an enhanced surveillance monitoring program, until the transmitter reaches the designated (by Rosemount) psi-month criterion (60,000 psi-month or 130,000 psi-month, depending on the transmitter range code) on a refueling (not exceeding 24 months) basis.

5 a

e.

  • e Those transmitters having a normal operating pressure greater than SOO psi and less than or equal to 1SOO*psl, and have accumulated sufficient psl*month operating history to exceed the criterion established by Rosemount, may be excluded from the enhanced survellhnce monllorlr,g program al the discretion of the licensee.

llowever, the licensee should retain a .high level of confidence that a high level of reliability Is maintained and that transmitter failure due to loss of fill-oil Is detectable.

f. Those transmitters having a normal operating pressure less than or equal to SOO psi may be excluded from the enhanced surveillance monitoring program at the discretion of the 1lcensee. However, the licensee should retain a high level of confidence that a high level of reliability is maintained and that transmitter failure due to loss or fill-oil Is detectable.
2. Evaluate the enhanced surveillance monitoring program. The evaluation ts to ensure the measurement data has an accuracy corrrnensurate with the accuracy needed to compare the data to the manufacturers rlrlft data criteria. It Is this comparison that determines the degradation threshold for loss of fill-oil failures or the subject transmlt~ers.

The Supplement also states the NRC may conduct audits or Inspections In the future to verify-compliance with the established requirements.

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  • 3. EVALUATION The licensee responded to Supplement 1 of NRC Bulletin 90-01 on March 16, 1993. The licensee provided additional information on October 14, 1993, and July 12, 1994. Those responses were compared to the Bulletin Reporting Requirements and Requested Actions as described below. Both North Anna and Surry have 2 PWR units. The licensee *reports having Rosemount transmitters that are subject to the Requested Actions of the Supplement.

Other Rosemount transmitters are outside the scope of the Supplement due to replacement or refurbishment. The licensee notes that one transmitter was replaced in the 7 month period between submitting Reference 3 and Reference 4.

The replacement transmitter is outside the scope*of the enhanced surveillance monitoring program due to its replacement.

3.1 Evaluation of Licensee Response to Reporting Requirements The licensee states they will perform the Requested Actions detailed in Supplement 1 of NRC Bulletin 90-01. Included with that statement is clarification, interpretation, and the limits placed on that conrnitment. The licensee described the specific actions taken to implement the Requested Actions.

A statement that the Requested Actions are complete is included in the submittal. Reference 4 modifies that conrnitment for some transmitters in transmitter classification l.b. The submittals identify where licensee actions are taken. The licensee evaluated deviations and provided justification to .support any deviations from the Requested Actions of the Supplement.

The licensee submittals conform to the Reporting Requirements of Supplement 1 of NRC Bulletin 90-01.

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3.2 e

Evaluation of Licensee Response to Reaucsted Actions Supplement l of NRC Bulletin 90-01 requested licensee action to resolve the Issue of fill-oil leakage In Rosemount transmitters. In this Technical Evaluation Report, the Reaucsted Actions and associated transmitter criteria are summarized In Section 2. The licensee response to the Supplement Is discussed In the following sections.

3.2.t Licensee Resoons...e to Reaucsted Actlo~

The licensee states there are ~osemount transmitters from this transmitter classification al both the North Anna and the Surry Power Stations. These transmitters monitor the reactor coolant system (RCS) pres\urr, flow, and level. Upon reaching the psi-month maturity threshold, a transmitter In this transmitter ~lasslflcatlon may participate In an enhanced surveillance monitoring program on a refueling basis (not to exceed 24-months)

If supported by a satisfactory operational history and system design features such as redundancy and diversity. These transmitters were Initially monitored both monthly and on a refueling basis. See Section 3.2.7 for a description of the monitoring methodologies. Monthly operational data checks compared the operational signals of redundant transmitters by computer monitoring.

Reference S notes that this method Is no longer used because the transmitters either exceed their maturity threshold (psi-month) or have been replaced. All remaining transmitters have redundancy. Operators are stated lo compare the redundant channels frequently. The enhanced calibration methodology trends the accumulated zero shift of the transmitters and tests for transmitter response to step changes In the process Input. The enhanced s11rvC'lllancC' monitoring proqram for these transmitters Is acceptable.

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e e 3.2.2 Licensee Response to Requested Action 1.b The Supplement requires monitoring transmitters in this transmitter classification quarterly for the life of the transmitter if the transmitter is not replaced. Upon reaching the psi-month maturity threshold, a transmitter in this transmitter classification may participate in an enhanced surveillance monitoring program on a refueling basis (not to exceed 24-months) if supported by a satisfactory operational history and system design features such as redundancy and diversity. The licensee states there are Rosemount transmitters from this classification at both the North Anna Power Station and the Surry Power Station.

Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Wide-range Pressure Transmitters The RCS wide-range pressure transmitters at both North Anna and Surry exceed the psi-month operational maturity threshold. The licensee is monitoring these transmitters with enhanced surveillance testing at refueling outages. The licensee justified extending the surveillance interval from quarterly to refueling outages, as required by the Supplement. The justification included 8 years in service with no failures in 5 or more calibrations and pressure response tests. Therefore, we conclude that these transmitters are part of an acceptable enhanced surveillance monitoring program.

Charging Pump Makeup Flow Transmitters/North Anna Power Station The Unit 1 charging pump makeup flow transmitter has been replaced.

Thus, it is outside of the scope of the Supplement. The Unit 2 charging pump makeup flow transmitter has achieved its maturity threshold. It had weekly operational surveillance until the psi-month maturity threshold was reached.

The makeup flow is stable for a given power level. Thus, the transmitter output was compared to previous readings at the same power level. This method is acceptable per Rosemount Technical Bulletin No. 4. The licensee now 9

e e monitors this transmitter with the refueling outage enhanced refueling calibration. The licensee states that operators are sensitive to the Rosemount issue in regards to this transmitter and can verify proper functioning by cross checks with other parameters such as pressurizer level and letdown flow. Therefore, we conclude that this transmitter is part of an acceptable enhanced surveillance monitoring program.

Charging Pump Makeup Flow Transmitters/Surry Power Station Both the charging pump makeup flow transmitters exceed the psi-month maturity threshold. These transmitters, as at North Anna, have no redundant counterpart. Thus these transmitters are included in the enhanced refueling calibration surveillance monitoring program. These transmitters have been in service for over seven years and exhibit no symptoms of fill-oil loss. The licensee states that operators are sensitive to the Rosemount issue in regards to these transmitters and can verify proper functioning by cross checks with other parameters such as pressurizer level and letdown flow. Therefore, we conclude that these transmitters are part of an acceptable enhanced surveillance monitoring program.

In-containment High-head Safety Injection Flow Transmitters/Surry Power Station The Rosemount transmitters that monitor the high-head safety injection flow inside containment at Surry are considered safety-related for pressure boundary purposes only. The licensee does not include these transmitters in the enhanced surveillance monitoring program. The purpose of the Supplement is to identify and repair, before the safety function of the transmitter is compromised, those Rosemount transmitters where the safety-related signal deteriorates due to the loss of fill-oil. Because no safety-related signal is involved, the exclusion of these transmitters from the enhanced surveillance monitoring program is acceptable.

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  • e Outside Containment High-head Safety Injection Flow Transmitters For the three transmitters that monitor the high-head safety injection flow outside containment at both units at both stations, the licensee committed, in Reference 3, to either: a) provide enhanced calibration quarterly; b) replace the transmitters; or c) provide justification for a lengthened surveillance interval. Any of the stated options are acceptable (provided the justificltion provided for option c is adequate and satisfactory). The licensee clarified their actions for these transmitters in Reference 4.

At the time of the Reference 4 submittal, there were two rema1n1ng transmitters that do not exceed the psi-month maturity threshold. At North Anna, l-Sl-FT-1943-1 is expected to exceed the maturity threshold in 1995. At Surry, 2-SI-FT-2940A is expected to exceed the maturity threshold *in 1994.

All other Rosemount transmitters in this application have accumulated an operational history in excess of the psi-month maturity threshold.

All the transmitters in this transmitter classification participate in a calibration-based zero-accumulated drift trending program. This program is based on the drift limits of Rosemount Technical Bulletin No. 4. Calibrations have a nominal 18-month frequency. None of the transmitteri in this application exhibit symptoms of fill-oil loss or excessive drift. The licensee indicates that these transmitters are redundant and diverse by design. The flow is also monitored inside containment. Based on the justification provided by the licensee, we find the enhanced surveillance monitoring program provided for these transmitters acceptable.

For l-SI-FT-1943-1 at North Anna and 2-S1-FT-2940A at Surry, the licensee supplemented this monitoring with a monthly comparison of inter-channel drift between redundant transmitters. These transmitters normally operate at no flow. The licensee compares the drift between channels to the zero-span shift limits of Rosemount Technical Bulletin No. 4 to determine if additional investigation or calibration is needed. Comparison of the zero 11

  • e reading of redundant transmitters monthly is acceptable in meeting the Supplement requirements for these transmitters.

3.2.3 Licensee Response to Requested Action 1.c The licensee states there are Rosemount transmitters from this transmitter classification at both the North Anna and the Surry Power Stations. These transmitters monitor the narrow-range steam generator level and the main steamline flow and pressure. The iransmitters in this classification will be monitored every refueling cycle (not exceeding 24 months) until they exceed the psi-month maturity threshold. This agrees with the Requested Actions of the Supplement and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.2.4 Licensee Res~onse to Requested Action l,d The licensee states that Rosemount transmitters in this transmitter classification monitor the following at both the North Anna and the Surry Power Stations.

a. Safety injection accumulator pressure.
b. Steam flow to the turbine-driven a11-<iliary feedwater pump.
c. Auxiliary feedwater flow.

The transmitters in this classification will be monitored every refueling cycle (not exceeding 24 months) until they exceed the psi-month maturity threshold. This agrees with the Requested Actions of the Supplement and is, therefore, acceptab 1e.

3.2.5 .Uscnsec Respon2.L.t~guested Action I .e The 1 icensee indicates that as Rosemount transmitters in transmitter classifications l.c and l.rl exceed the psi-month maturity threshold, these 12 ii

transmitters will be removed from the enhanced surveillance monitoring program. This is permitted by the Supplement.

The Supplement requires the licensee to maintain a high degree of confidence that these transmitters remain highly reliable. The licensee performs normal calibration testing that includes step response testing at every refue 1i ng outage. Step response test i n*g i dent i fies transmitters with sluggish response characteristics. If sluggish response is evident, further evaluation is conducted by the licensee to determine the acceptability of the transmitter for continued operation. This agrees with the Requested Actions of the Supplement and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.2.6 Licensee Response to Requested Action 1.f The licensee indicates there are Rosemount transmitters from this

  • classification at both the North Anna Power Station and the Surry Power Station. The Supplement requires the licensee to maintain a high degree of confidence that these transmitters remain highly reliable. The licensee performs normal calibration testing that includes step response testing at every refueling outage. Step response testing identifies transmitters with sluggish response characteristics. If sluggish response is evident, further evaluation is conducted by the licensee to determine the acceptability of the transmitter for continued operation. This agrees with the Requested Actions of the Supplement and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.2.7 Enhanced Surveillance Monitoring Program The enhanced surveillance monitoring program consists of two parts --

monthly operational data monitoring and the trending of the zero drift data taken from calibration data nominally taken during refueling outages. As high-pressure transmitters achieve their psi~month maturity threshold, the monthly operational data monitoring* is deleted for that transmitter.

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  • e Calibration procedures also provide for transmitter response testing, another indication of satisfactory transmitter performance.

In monthly operational monitoring, the transmitter signal is recorded on magnetic tape via the Emergency Response Facility (ERF) computer. The inputs to the ERF computer are calibrated to within +/-0.25 percent. This data accuracy is consistent with Rosemount requirements for enhanced surveillance monitoring. The magnetic tape is processed on a mainframe computer to convert the signal data into a personal computer (PC) database. The PC calculates the variation between redundant channels and cornparis the variation from the Rosemount established allowance for variation between channels. If a transmitter signal is outside the limit, the transmitter undergoes additional evaluation.

Pertinent calibration data from each calibration is extracted from calibration data sheets and entered into a PC database. The database program calculates the zero drift that has occurred. As drift data accumulates, any faulty transmitters are identified by comparison to Rosemount-established drift limits. The licensee notes their data has accuracy consistent with the Rosemount requirements. The.licensee also performs normal calibration testing that includes step response testing at every refueling outage. Step response testing identifies transmitters with sluggish response characteristics. If sluggish response is evident, further evaluation is conducted by the licensee to determine the acceptability of the transmitter for continued operation.

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  • 4. CONCLUSIONS e

Based on our review, we find the licensee has completed the reporting requirements of Supplement 1 of NRC Bulletin 90-01. Further, the licensee conforms to the requested actions of Supplement 1 to NRC Bulletin 90-01.

15

,

  • S. REFERENCES
1. NRC Bulletin No. 90-01: "Loss of Fill-oil in Transmitters Manufactured by Rosemount," March 9, 1990; 0MB No. 3150-0011.
2. NRC Bulletin No. 90-01, Supplement 1: "Loss of Fill-oil in Transmitters Manufactured by Rosemount," December 22, 1992, 0MB No. 3150-0011.
3. Letter, Virginia Electric and Power Company (W. L. Stewart) to NRC, "Response to NRC Bulletin 90-01, Supplement 1, Loss of Fill-Oil in Rosemount Transmitters," March 16, 1993, Serial No.92-846.
4. Letter, Virginia Electric and Power Compan"y (W. L. Stewart) to NRC, "Supplemental Response to NRC Bulletin 90-01, Suppl~ment 1, Loss of Fill-Oil in Transmitters Manufactured by Rosemount," October 14, 1993, Serial No.93-429.
5. Letter, Virginia Electric and Power Company (J. P. O'Hanlon) to NRC, "Supplemental Response to NRC Bulletin 90-01, Loss of Fill-Oil in Rosemount Transmitters," July 12, 1994, Serial No. 94-846A.

16

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3211, 3202 BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET (SH instructions on the reverse)

U.S. IIUCLUII IIEGULA TOIIY c9s1011 1. REPORT NUMBER INEL-94/0103

2. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 3. DA TE REPORT PUBLISHED Evaluation of Utility Response to Supplement 1 to MONTH YEAR NRC Bulletin 90-01: North Anna-1/-2 and Surry-1/-2 October 1994 '
4. FIN OR GRANT NUMBER Ll695
5. AUTHOR(S) 6. TYPE OF REPORT Alan C. Udy Technical Evaluation
7. PERIOD COVERED,,_,_
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
  • NAME AND ADDRESS ,,r ,ec, ,_., ...._ ""- * ...,._ u.,. -...i-,c... _ _. -"* _ ,, _ _ ,_,. -
  • _. -*** _ ,

National Nuclear Operations Analysis Lockheed Idaho Technologies Company P.O. Box 1625 Idaho Falls, ID 83415-3870

9. SPONSORING ORGANIZATION - NAME AND ADDRESS ,,, ,ec. .,,. .,_.-*:or-.,_. , e c - . orr.. * ......_ u.,. ---c-.,-.. -"* _,

Division of Reactor Controls and Human Factors Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

10. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
11. ABSTRACT ""' - w ,_,

This report documents the Lockheed Idaho Technologies Company review of the Virginia Electric and Power Company submittals that respond to Supplement 1 to NRC Bulletin 90-01 for the North Anna Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, and the Surry Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. This NRC bulletin provides information regarding the loss of fill-oil in certain pressure and differential pressure transmitters manufactured by Rosemount, Incorporated. This report finds the licensee conforms to the requested actions and the reporting requirements of the supplement.

12. KEY INORDS/DESCRIPTORS ..., - *-- .u - - ,. * - * - . . . , , 13. AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Rosemount Transmitters Unlimited Distribution Loss of Fill-Oil 14. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION NRC Bulletin 90-01, Supplement I

-- Unclassified

--* Unclassified

15. NUMBER OF PAGES
16. PRICE
  • 1

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SALP INPUT FACILITY NAME: Surry Power Station, North Anna Power Station

SUMMARY

OF REVIEW The staff completed its review of the licensee's response to Nuclear Regulatory Commission Bulletin 90-01, Supplement 1, submitted by the Virginia Electric Power Company for the Surry Power Station and North Anna Power Station. The staff finds the licensee's response for this item acceptable.

NARRATIVE DISCUSSION OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE - FUNCTIONAL AREA The initial response provided to the staff was supplemented with additional information to meet the requested actions.

Author: D. Spaulding Date: November 4, 1994

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ATTACHMENT 3

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