ML20058F003
| ML20058F003 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 07/14/1982 |
| From: | Branch M, Reyes L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058E962 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-409-82-05, 50-409-82-5, IEB-82-01, IEB-82-1, NUDOCS 8207300269 | |
| Download: ML20058F003 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000409/1982005
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-409/82-05(DPRP)
Docket No. 50-409
License No. DPR-45
Licensee: Dairyland Power Cooperative
2615 East Avenue - South
Lacrosse, WI 54601
Facility Name: Lacrosse Boiling Water Reactor
Inspection At: Lacrosse Site, Genoa, WI
Inspection Conducted: A ril 1 - May 31, 1982
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Inspector:
M. W.
anch
Approved B
I2 Reyes
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Projects
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Inspection Summary:
Inspection on April 1 - May 31, 1982 (Report No. 50-409/82-05(DPRP))
Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspection of Operational Safety;
Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin Followup; Licensee Event Report Followup;
Preparation for-Refueling, Refueling Activities; Maintenance During Refueling;
Surveillance Testing During Refueling; Response to Regional Request; Part 21
Report Followup; Surveillance - Containment Leak Rate Testing - Type "B" and
"C" Tests, and Followup on Previous Inspection Findings. The inspection in-
volved a total of 124 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector including
16 inspector-hours onsite during offshifts.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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8207300269 820714
PDR ADOCK 05000409
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
- R. Shimshak, Plant Superintendent
- J. Parkyn, Assistant Plant Superintendent
- G. Boyd, Operations Engineer
- L. Goodman, Operations Engineer
- S.
Rafferty, Reactor Engineer
M. Polsean, Shift Supervisor
W. Nowicki, Supervisor, Instrument and Electric
R. Wery, QA Supervisor
- G.
Joseph, Security Director
- L.
Kelley, Assistant Operations Supervisor
- P.
Shafer, Radiation Protection Engineer
- B.
Zibung, Health & Safety Supervisor
- R.
Brimer, Electrical Engineer
D. Rybarik, Mechanical Engineer
- Denotes those present at exit interview.
2.
General
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The plant shut down on April 9, 1982, to perform a scheduled seven week
refueling and turbine maintenance outage. During the fuel element
inspection, fuel element (Allis-Chalmers 1-8) was discovered to have
approximately 8 inches of damaged cladding on one fuel pin. This
damaged fuel element was one of the two remaining Allis-Chalmers fuel
elements that were used during fuel Cycle 7.
The licensee did not
reinstall either of the Allis-Chalmers fuel elements during the Cycle
8 fuel reload.
During the routine main generator inspection and repairs, a factory
representative discovered cracks in the generator rotor field coil
soldered joints. The generator rotor (a 60 MW Allis-Chalmers design)
has been shipped to National Electric Coil in Columbus, Ohio, for
disassembly and repairs. This unscheduled repair is expected to pro-
long the current outage until late summer.
3.
Operational Safetv Verification
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The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable
logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during
the month of April and May 1982. The inspector verified the oper-
ability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and
verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of
the reactor building and turbine building were conducted to observe
plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid
leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests
had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector
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by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security
plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
IE Bulletin Followup
For the IE Bulletin listed below the inspector verified that the
Bulletin was received by licensee management and reviewed for its
applicability to the facility.
If the Bulletin was applicable the
inspector verified that the written response was within the time
period stated in the Bulletin, that the written response included
the information required to be reported, that the written response
included adequate corrective action commitments based on information
presented in the Bulletin and the licensee's response, that the 11-
censee management forwarded copies of the written response to the
appropriate onsite management representatives, that information dis-
cussed in the licensee's written response was accurate, and that
corrective action taken by the licensee was as described in the
written response.
(Closed) IE Bulletin 82-01 (Alteration of Radiographs of Welds in
Piping Subassemblies). The licensee was not listed on Table 1 of
the bulletin, therefore, they were not required to respond. The
licensee did review the generic aspects of the bulletin and issued
a memo (R. Wery-to-file, dated April 23, 1982).
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Licensee Event Reports Followup
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel,
and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed
to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate
corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent
recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifi-
cations.
(Closed) LER 81-13, including Revision (1) (The No. 1B Reserve Breaker
(252-RIB) Failed to close when signaled).
(Closed) LER 81-14 (Total loss of offsite power following a reactor
scram).
(Closed) LER 81-15 (Excessive cooldown of the No. 1B Forced Circulating
Loop to below Technical Specification limits). This item is addressed
in Inspection Report 81-23.
(Closed) LER 82-01 (Failure of Containment Spray Valve Reach Rod). The
licensee failed to meet the 14 day followup requirement for this event,
but the inspector's review of licensee's Safeguards Report revealed
that Section 14.3.18.3 of that report states that no credit is taken
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for the operability of the Containment Building Spray System. Therefore,
the failure of the Containment Building Spray Valves reach rod, while
undesirable, was not actually reportable under the requirements of
Technical Specification 6.9.1.8.e.
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(Closed) LER 82-02 (Fire Zone No. 19 placed in bypass due to spurious
alarms).
(Closed) LER 82-04 (Emergency Service Water Supply System Hoses failed
Hydrostatic Test).
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Preparation for Refueling
The inspector verified that technically adequate procedures were
approved for fuci element removal, core internal inspection and core
reload. The inspector verified that the licensee had performed a
10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation of the reload core and that the li-
censee had determined that no unreviewed safety question existed.
The inspector also reviewed the licensee's program for overall outage
control.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Refueling Activities
Prior to the licensee handling fuel in the vessel, the inspector veri-
fled that all surveillance testing required by the technical specifica-
tions and procedures had been completed; verified that during the out-
age the periodic testing of refueling related equipment was performed
as required by technical specifications; observed six shifts of the
fuel handling operations (removal, inspection and insertion) and veri-
fled the activities were performed in accordance with the technical
specifications and approved procedures; verified that containment
integrity was maintained as required by technical specifications;
verified that good housekeeping was maintained on the refueling area;
and, verified that staffing during refueling was in accordance with
technical specifications and approved procedures.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
Maintenance - Refueling
The inspector verified maintenance procedures include administrative
approvals _for removing and return of systems to service; hold-points
for inspection / audit and signoff by QA or other licensee personnel;
provisions for operational testing following maintenance; provisions
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for special authorization and fire watch responsibilities for activities
involving welding, open flame, and other ignition sources; reviews of
material certifications; provisions for assuring LCO requirements were
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met during repair; provisions for housekeeping during and following
maintanence; and responsibilities for reporting defects to management.
The inspector observed the maintenance activities listed below and
verified work was accomplished in accordance with approved procedures
and by qualified personnel.
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Removal and blanking of the No. 1 Primary Safety Valve per maintenance
procedure.
Replacement and testing of Source Range Detector No. N-1 per procedure
No. I/E 42-02.
Testing of position indicator on Lower Control Rod Drive.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
9.
Surveillance - Refueling
The inspector observed portions of the ISI testing of Core Spray
System Piping, Calibration of Primary Pressure Transmitter and Cali-
bration of Containment Building Pressure Transmitters to verify that
the tests were covered by properly approved procedures; that the
procedures used were consistant with regulatory requirements, licensee
commitments, and administrative controls; that minimum crew require-
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ments were met, test prerequisites were completed, special test
equipment was calibrated and in service, and required data was recorded
for final review and analysis; that the qualifications of personnel
conducting the test were adequate; and that the test results were
adequate.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
10.
Regional Requests
The Resident Inspector was requested by Region III to determine if
Woodward Governor Part No. 75041-103 was being used on the diesel
generators at LACBWR. The reason for this request was to ensure that
adequate procedures were being utilized for the determination of oil
level in the governors so that the diesel generator operability would
be maintained. The inspector verified that Woodward Governors of the
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Part No. listed were not being utilized by the licensee. The inspector
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also verified that the condition described above is not applicable to
the type of diesel generator governors utilized by the licensee.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
11.
Part 21 Report Followup
The inspector reviewed the licensee 10 CFR Part 21 report, dated
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April 29, 1982, that described a defect condition that was discovered
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by the licensee. The defect condition involved the coil retaining
clip on ASCO Environmentally Qualified solenoid valve, catalog No.
206-380-2F, Serial No. 48976J. The inspector verified that the li-
censee report accurately described the defect and that the reporting
requirements as described in 10 CFR Part 21 were met.
The inspector also reviewed the licensee evaluation of the defect
described above and verified that the generic implications at the
facility were analyzed.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
12.
Surveillance - Containment Leak Rate Testing - Type B and C Tests
The inspector observed / reviewed the following Type B and C Local
Leak Rate Test:
a.
Main steam line penetration per Section 3.5.3 of Volume XI to
LACBWR Operating Manual,
b.
Feedwater penetration per Section 3.5.3 of Volume XI to LACBWR
Operating Manual.
c.
Heating steam penetration per Section 3.5.3 of Volume XI to
LACBWR Operating Manual.
d.
Freight Door per Section 3.5.4 of Volume XI to LACBWR Operating
Manual.
e.
Ventilation Inlet Damper per Section 3.5.9 of Volume XI to LACBWR
Operating Manual.
f.
Ventilation Discharge Damper per Section 3.5.9 of Volume XI to
LACBWR Operating Manual.
g.
Containment Atmosphere Post-Accident Sampling System Discharge
Isolation Valves (84-25-017 and 84-25-018) per Section 3.5.25
of Volume XI to LACBWR Operating Manual.
h.
Electrical penetration ID per Section 3.5.6 of Volume XI to
LACBWR Operating Manual.
Items described in a, b, c and d were acceptable. However, for items
described in e, f, g and h, the inspector noted that the licensee had
allowed the test pressure to decay below the required pressure during
the test.
For items f and g, the licensee temporarily changed the pro-
cedure to shorten the duration of the test and reanalyzed the results
to be acceptable. For items e and h, the licensee reperformed the test
maintaining the test pressure 252 psig for the duration of the test.
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For a long term correction of the above problem, the licensee committed
to permanently changing test procedures and to reevaluate the testing
method utilized on small penetrations to ensure test pressure can be
maintained below design limits but above the minimum test pressure
specified in the Technical Specifications. This long term corrective
action program will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection. This
is considered to be an unresolved item (409/82-05-01).
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
13.
Followup on Previous Inspection Findings
(Closed) Unresolved Item (409/80-09-01): Calibration of air flow
meters used for environmental air sampler and stack flow indication.
The licensee has calibrated all of the air flow meters that were
questioned and have modified data sheets to utilize these corrected
flows in determining environmental results.
(Closed) Open Item (409/79-17-03): Number of inconsistancies between
test procedures and data checkoff sheets. The inspectors' daily
review of operating activities contains a check of data checkoff sheets
utilized for valve lineup, surveillance test and special procedures.
Based on these daily reviews, the inspector has concluded that the
condition described above has been corrected. The inspector has noted
a few cases of missed data, but after discussion with management
personnel these conditions were corrected and personnel reinstruction
has greatly reduced the number of these observations.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (409/80-06-01): Vent system for oil storage
room. This item was inspected by the IIealth Physic Inspectors from
Region III and was found to be an item of noncompliance in IE Inspection
Report 80-409/80-15. This item was later closed in IE Inspection
Report 80-409/81-11 after the licensee installed a shutoff valve in
the vacuum pump loop seal line.
14.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required-
in order to ascertain they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance,
or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are
discussed in Paragraph 12.
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15.
Exit Interview
The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection and sum-
marized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
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