ML20057B104
| ML20057B104 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 09/14/1993 |
| From: | Bajwa S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20057B105 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9309170192 | |
| Download: ML20057B104 (4) | |
Text
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U?t!!TED STATES
,3'} Ec ~t NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g,,,
,j WASHING TON, D. C. 20555
\\...../
I CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY. et al.
DOCKET N0. 50-325 BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT. UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. IfA License No. DPR-71 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment filed by Carolina Power & Light Company (the licensee), dated December 31, 1992, as revised by letter dated July 20, 1993, and supplemented August 9, 1993, and August 27, 1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment cart be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations:
D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
1 2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technicsl Specifications, as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; and pcragraph 2.C.(2) of facility Operating License No.
DPR-71 is hereby amended to read as follows:
j 9309170192 930914 -
PDR ADOCK 05000324
.P PDRx
. (2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.jfA, are hereby incorporated in the license.
Carolina Power & Light Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION S. Singh Bajwa, Acting Director Project Directorate 11-1 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:
Septstrr 14, 1993 l
i e
1
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 1M FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-71 DOCKET NO. 50-325 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages.
The revised areas are indicated by marginal lines.
Remove Paaes Insert Paaes XI_
XI XII XII 3/4 7-2 3/4 7-2 l
3/4 7-2a 3/4 7-2a 3/4 7-2b 3/4 7-2b 3/4 10-5 3/4 10-5 B3/4 7-1 B3/4 7-1 B3/4 7-la B3/4 7-la B3/4 7-lb B3/4 7-lb B3/4 7-Ic B3/4 7-Ic B3/4 7-Id B3/4 7-Id B3/4 7-le, B3/4 7-le i
B3/4 7-lf B3/4 7-1f B3/4 7-19 B3/4 7-19 l
83/4 7-lh B3/4 7-lh 83/4 7-11 B3/4 7-lj 4
e
f INDEX
' BASES SECTION PAGE 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (Continued) 3/4.4.4 CHEMISTRY................................................
B 3/4 4-2 3/4.4.5 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY..................................
B 3/4 4-2 3/4.4.6 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS.............................
B 3/4 4-3 3/4.4.7 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES........................
B 3/4 4-7 3/4.4.8 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY....................................
B 3/4 4-7 i
3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.1 HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM.................
B 3/4 5-1 3/4.5.2 AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM (ADS).................
8 3/4 5-1 3/4.5.3 LOW PRESSURE COOLING SYSTEMS............................
B 3/4 5-2 3/4.5.4 SUPPRESSION P00L........................................
B 3/4 5-4 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT.....................................
B 3/4 6-1 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS....................
B 3/4 6-3 3/4.6.3 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES....................
B 3/4 6-4 3/4.6.4 VACUUM RELIEF...........................................
B 3/4 6-5 3/4.6.5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT...................................
B 3/4 6-5 3/4.6.6 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTR0L..........................
B 3/4 6-6 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS...................................
B 3/4 7-1 3/4.7.E CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM................
B 3/4 7-Ic l
BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 XI Amendment No.133, tai, 149,161, 1@$
INDEX BASES SECTION PAGE 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS (Continued) 3/4.7.3 FLOOD PR0TECTION.......................................
B 3/4 7-lj 3/4.7.4 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM..................
B 3/4 7-lj 3/4.7.5 SNUBBERS...............................................
B 3/4 7-2 3/4.7.6 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION............................ B 3/4 7-3 3/4.7.7 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS...............................
B 3/4 7-3 3/4.7.8 FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS.............................. B 3/4 7-4 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS.................................
B 3/4 8-1 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.1 REACTOR MODE SWITCH.................................... B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION........................................ B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.3 CONTROL R00 P0SITION................................... B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.4 DECAY TIME............................................. B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS......................................... B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.6 CRANE AND H0IST 0PERABILITY............................
B 3/4 9-2 3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL-SPENT FUEL STORAGE P00L................... B 3/4 9-2 3/4.9.8 WATER LEVEL-REACTOR VESSEL, and 3/4.9.9 WATER LEVEL-REACTOR FUEL STORAGE P00L.................. B 3/4 9-2 3/4.9.10 CONTROL R00 REM 0 VAL.................................... B 3/4 9-2 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY..........................
B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.2 R0D SEQUENCE CONTROL SYSTEM (DELETED).................. B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.3 SHUTDOWN MARGIN DEMONSTRATIONS......................... B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.4 RECIRCULATION L00PS.................................... B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.5 PLANT SERVICE WATER.................................... B 3/4 10-1 1
1 BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 XII Amendment No. 62,133-151,1@6,161 1 64
3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.2 The Service Water System shall be OPERABLE with at least:
In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3:
Three OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps, and two OPERABLE conventional service water pumps capable of supplying the nuclear and l
conventional headers.
In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 AND 5:
Three OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps, and two OPERABLE Unit I service water pumps, nuclear and/or co1ventional, powered from separate emergency buses and capable of supplyti g the nuclear header.
APPLICABILITY:
OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, I, 4, and 5 8_GTlq!i:
T a.
In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, or 3:
1.
With one OPERABLE conventional service water pump:
Ensure that, if only one Unit I nuclear service water pump a.
is OPERABLE, the OPERABLE conventional service water pump is powered from a separate emergency bus than the OPERABLE-Unit I nuclear service water pump, and.
b.
Restore at least one additional conventional service water pump to OPERABLE status within 7 days.
Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
2.
With no conventional service water pumps OPERABLE:
Ensure both Unit I nuclear service water pumps are OPERABLE, a.
l and b.
Restore at least one conventional service water pump to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
3.
With two OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps, unless the provisions of ACTION b.4 apply for Unit 2, restore one additional site nuclear service water pump within 7 days or be in at least
-l HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 3/4 7-2 Amendment No. 74,- l 14,164
PLANT SYSTEMS LhMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION(Continued)
ACTION:
(Continued) 4.
With two OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps and one OPERABLE conventional service water pump:
a.
Ensure at least one Unit I nuclear service water pump is OPERABLE, and b.
Ensure that, if only one Unit I nuclear service water pump is OPERABLE, the OPERABLE conventional service water pump is powered from a separate emergency bus than the OPERABLE Unit I nuclear service water pump, and c.
Restore two conventional service water pumps or three site nuclear service water pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTOOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
5.
With less than two OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
b.
In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 or 5:
1.
With one OPERABLE Unit I service water pump, restore at least two Unit 1 service water pumps to OPERABLE status within 7 days.
Otherwise, suspend all operations that have a potential for draining the reactor vessel.
2.
With no OPERABLE Unit I service water pumps, suspend all operations that have a potential for draining the reactor vessel.
3.
With two OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps, unless the provisions of ACTION b.4 apply, restore at least one additional nuclear service water pump to OPERABLE status within 7 days.
Otherwise, take the ACTION required by Specification 3.8.1.2.
l j
4.
With the service water system nuclear header inoperable, operation of both units may continue provided that two Unit 2 nuclear service water pumps are OPERABLE, both units' nuclear service water header valves are administratively controlled as required to ensure cooling water to the diesel generators, at least two Unit I conventional service water pumps are OPERABLE on the conventional header, and vital ECCS loads are aligned to the conventional service water system header.
Restore the service water system nuclear header and at least three site nuclear service water pumps to OPERABLE status within 14 days.
Otherwise, take the ACTION required by Specification 3.8.1.2.
5.
With less than two OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps, take the ACTION required by Specification 3.8.1.2.
BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 3/4 7-2a Amendment No. 26, l
.e
- 2, 164
PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.2 The service water system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a.
At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
b.
At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that each automatic valve servicing safety-related equipment actuates to its correct position on the appropriate ECCS actuation test signals.
c.
At least once per 92 days by verifying that the alternate diesel ganerator service water supply valve will open on a low header pressure signal.
l BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 3/4 7-2b Amendment No. 164,l 146
SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3'4 10.5 PLANT SERVICE WATER
/
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.10.5 The service water conventional header required to be operating per Specification 3.7.1.2 ACTION b.4 may be removed from operation by l
stopping the pumps to permit isolating and draining the service water nuclear header for maintenance provided that:
a.
The service water conventional header remains lined up to supply. cooling water to the required ECCS loads.
b.
The draining / maintenance on the service water nuclear header will not affect the service water conventional system or lineup described in a. above, c.
Average coolant temperature is s100*F and the heatup rate is s10*F per hour.
d.
Two dedicated, qualified members of the unit operational staff are assigned to initiate the service water conventional header pumps, should any of the following occur:
1.
Any event occurs which requires ECCS actuation.
2.
Primary coolant temperature exceeds 180*F.
3.
A loss of offsite power occurs.
APPLICABILITY:
OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5 with the nuclear header inoperable.
ACTION:
With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, as soon as practicable, restore the:
a.
Service water conventional header to operating status per the requirements of Specification 3.7.1.2 ACTION b.4, or l
b.
Service water nuclear header to OPERABLE status per Specification 3.7.1.2.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.10.5 When the service water conventional header is not operating as specified above:
a.
Prior to-securing all service water pumps, verify that the service water conventional header is lined up to supply cooling water.for ECCS by verifying that each valve servicing safety-related equipment that is not locked in the proper position is administratively controlled in-the proper position.
BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 3/4 10-5 Amendment No. 76, 164
1/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS BA%ES 3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS The service water system is designed to provide cooling water for the removal of heat from equipment such as the emergency diesel generators, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump coolers, and room coolers for Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) equipment, that is required for a safe reactor shutdown following a design basis accident (DBA) or transient.
The service water system also provides cooling to the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) System and the Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System, as required, during normal and shutdown operation.
The service water system provides lubricating water for the service water pumps and cooling water for the service water-pump motors. During the initial stage (0 - 10 minutes) of a LOCA or LOOP, the service water system must automatically provide cooling water to the emergency diesel generators.
Following the first 10 minute period, additional safety-related and shutdown cooling loads must be supplied.
The service water system also provides flow to the Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water System, the Chlorination System, and fill to the Circulating Water System.
The service water system design allows either (or both) unit's nuclear header to supply diesel generator cooling water when required. The phrase " site nuclear service water pump" refers to any nuclear service water pump on either unit. Other pump designations refer to the specific unit under discussion.
The four nuclear service water pumps on site, two per unit, are each on a separate emergency bus so that a single failure could prevent only one nuclear service water pump from operating.
The OPERABILITY requirements are structured to ensure that the service water system is capable of automatically supplying sufficient cooling water for the Diesel Generators assuming no operator action for the first 10 minutes following a DBA, and that at least one service water pump per unit is available to supply the safety-related and shutdown cooling loads after the first ten mi;utes following a DBA. The OPERABILITY requirements for the service water system are, in general, based on a LOCA (Loss of Coolant Accident), and in some cases combined with a LOOP (Loss of Offsite Power),
since this event or combination would provide the most significant challenge to the system's capabilities.
The four nuclear service water pumps are powered from separate emergency j
buses.
The three conventional service water pumps on each unit are on separate emergency buses.
For each unit, two of the conventional pumps are on i
the same emergency buses as the two unit nuclear service water pumps.
The loss of one nuclear pump and one conventional pump on the unit due to a single failure of one emergency bus has been accounted for in the OPERABILITY requirements.
However, conventional service water pump OPERABILITY will be more strictly defined in cases where only one nuclear pump and one conventional pump are available for operation.
Therefore, with one unit nuclear service water pump and one conventional service water pump available, the conventional service water pump must be powered from a separate emergency bus to be considered OPERABLE.
BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-1 Amendment No. f#, if4
3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES
=
3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS (Continued)
In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3, a conventional service water pump must be capable of supplying water to both the nuclear header and the conventional header to be considered OPERABLE. This will ensure that the vital header and RHR service water heat exchangers can be supplied from either header when a single failure of any header isolation valve is assumed and personnel access is not available for manual valve alignment.
In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, because of reduced primary pressure, the possibility of a LOCA is not considered credible and access is considered available to manually position header isolation valves if required.
Therefore, in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, a conventional pump may be considered OPERABLE when only the nuclear header discharge valve is OPERABLE except as specifically identified in the ACTION statement for a nuclear header outage. This allows maintenance on the conventional header without reducing service water system OPERABILITY.
However, a conventional pump aligned to the nuclear header is not considered to meet the requirements for an OPERABLE nuclear pump since it is not automatically powered and restarted on the diesel generators following an accident signal.
For OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, E 3, 4, and 5, and a DBA in either unit, two nuclear service water pumps from one or both units are capable of supplying sufficient flow to cool all four emergency diesel generators under worst-case scenarios while also supplying flow to other potential flow paths (vital header loads, cross-header leakage, and lubewater).
To prohibit any single failure from preventing the supply of service water to the diesel generators during the first 10 minutes following a DBA, at least three nuclear service water pumps per site are required while in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5.
After the first 10 minutes following a DBA, additional loads require cooling water on the affected unit. These loads include RHR and CS pump room coolers, RHR service water heat exchangers, and RHR pump seal heat exchangers.
Evaluations have determined that the RHR pump seals, as well as the equipment in rooms serviced by the RHR and CS room coolers, remain within the manufacturers' temperature limits for at least the first 10 minutes of a DBA.
Operator action is credited after the first 10 minutes following a DBA to make the necessary pump and valve alignments either remotely or manually, except that manual action inside the Reactor Building following a LOCA while in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3 is not credited because of the potential for unsafe conditions.
In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3, one conventional service water pump supporting the affected unit is capable of supplying the additional required safety-related and shutdown equipment.
No single failure can prevent the necessary loads from being aligned to one of the nuclear or conventional headers by manual or remote operator action. To prohibit any single failure from preventing the supply of service water after the first 10 minutes following a DBA, at least two operable conventional service water pumps are required while in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, or 3.
BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-la Amendment No. 146,161, 1 61
3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS BA5ES 3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS (Continued)
In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, one unit service water pump, nuclear or conventional, is capable of supplying additional required safety-related' and shutdown equipment.
Manual action in the Reactor Building is credited to align equipment to the nuclear header if required.
To prohibit any single failure from preventing the supply of service water after the first 10 minutes following a DBA, at least two operable unit service water pumps, nuclear or conventional, are required while in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5.
The allowed out-of-service times and compensatory measures established in the ACTION statements are conservative.
Although the probability and consequences of a DBA are reduced in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, the ACTION statements for the nuclear service water pumps for a unit in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 or 5 are based on the assumption that the other unit is in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, or 3.
Specific ACTION statements and LCO time limits have not been established for both units in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 or 5 since the ACTION statements for one unit in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 or 5 are more conservative.
In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, because of reduced core decay heat load, the reduced possibility of a LOCA, and the accessibility to the reactor building for manual operator action, the vital header loads could be manually aligned to the nuclear header if a failure prevented remote valve alignment.
Therefore, the operability requirements for the unit service water pumps apply for nuclear or conventional pumps.
With one OPERABLE unit service water pump, the core spray and LPCI systems remain OPERABLE. However, to minimize the possibility of loss of these systems due to loss of the single pump, the out-of-service time for one OPERABLE unit service water pump is set at 7 days.
For no OPERABLE unit service water pumps, the core spray and LPCI systems must be declared inoperable. This is equivalent to the ACTION statement for core spray and LPCI systems inoperable.
ACTION statement 3.7.1.2.b.4 for OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5 allows one unit to operate with the nuclear service water header inoperable for up to 14 days provided that:
a) two nuclear service water pumps are OPERABLE on the other unit, b) both unit's nuclear service water header valves are administratively controlled as required to ensure cooling water to the diesel generators.
c) the service water system conventional header is OPERABLE with two unit conventional service water pumps OPERABLE, and d) vital ECCS loads are aligned to the conventional service water system header.
Considering any additional single failure, this requirement ensures at least one OPERABLE nuclear service water pump to supply the Diesel Generators during the first 10 minutes after a DBA and one OPERABLE conventional service water pump to supply the unit safety-related and shutdown cooling loads following the first 10 minutes after a DBA.
By requiring administrative control of both unit's nuclear header valves, the ACTION statement minimizes the risk of inadvertent valve action that could reduce cooling water flow to the diesel generators.
BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-lb Amendment No.161, 164
PLANT SYSTEMS BA5ES 3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM Backaround One of the principal design objectives of the Control Building Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (CBHVAC) System is to permit continuous occupancy of the Control Room Emergency Zone under normal operating conditions and under the postulated design basis events throughout the life of the plant.
The Control Building HVAC System must function to provide protection to the operators for three type events:
a radiation event, up to and including a Design Basis Accident (e.g., Main Steam Line Break [MSLB] Accident, Refueling Accident, Control Rod Drop Accident, or Loss of Coolant Accident [LOCA]), a toxic gas event (complete rupture of the 55 ton chlorine tank car located near the Service Water Building, or a slow leak lasting for an extended period of time), and an external smoke event.
These events form the basis for the design of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREVS) function of the CBHVAC System.
The CREVS is designed to meet General Design Criterion (GDC) 19 (Reference 1).
In addition, the system is designed using the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.95, Revision 1 (Reference 2).
Commitments have also been made to design the radiation protection function of the CBHVAC System to meet the j
single failure criteria described in IEEE 279-1971, and the chlorine detection and isolation logic to single failure criteria, both with approved exceptions (Reference 12, Section 3.6).
LC0 Operability of the CREVS ensures that the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all credible hazard event scenarios external to the control room, consistent with the assumptions in the various analyses.
Two redundant subsystems of the CREVS are required to be-OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available, assuming a single failure disables the other subsystem.
The CREVS is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to control operator exposure are operable in both subsystems.
For the Radiation / Smoke Protection Mode, a subsystem is considered OPERABLE when its associated:
1.
Fan is OPERABLE, 2.
HEPA filter and charcoal adsorbers are not excessively restricting flow and are capable of performing their filtration functions, and BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-Ic Amendment No.161,164l
Pl, ANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)
LCO (Continued) 3.
Ductwork and dampers are OPERABLE, and air circulation can be maintained as required in Reference 12, Section 3.1.
For the Chlorine Protection Mode, a subsystem is considered OPERABLE when:
1.
The isolation dampers are OPERABLE, and
~
2.
The logic components necessary to achieve automatic isolation are functional, as described in Reference 12, Section 3.1.
Two coditional CPERABILITY requirements apply to all modes of CREVS operation.
The CBHVAC Control Air System must be OPERABLE to support damper operation.
In addition, the Control Room Envelope must be maintained, including the integrity of the walls, floors, ceilings, ductwork, and access doors.
The Control Room Envelope includes the electronic equipment rooms, the central control room area, computer rooms, kitchen, restrooms, and the supply and return ductwork up to and including the isolation dampers.
The following components, including their associated logic trains, actuation devices, and power supplies, are non-redundant.
Their OPERABILITY affects both trains of the CREVS, These components are: control room (washroom) exhaust isolation damper, control room normal make-up damper, and the control room emergency recirculation damper.
In addition, the Brunswick control room is not equipped with redundant outdoor air intakes (References 4 and 5).
The Radiation / Smoke Protection Mode of operation protects the control room operators from those events which may result in the release of radioactivity.
The Radiation / Smoke Protection Mode of operation also provides protection to the control room operators in the event of an external smoke event.
During a radiation event, the CBHVAC System is required to automatically isolate and enter the Radiation / Smoke Protection Mode on a Control Room Intake High Radiation signal from the Area Radiation Monitoring System. Upon receipt of a high radiation signal, the CBHVAC System is automatically realigned to the emergency mode of operation. The normal fresh air inlet closes, and, at approximately the same time, the emergency air filtration units begin operation, recirculating control room air and providing filtered makeup air to minimize contamination build-up and provide positive pressure in the Control Room Envelope. The CBHVAC System responds to an external smoke event in the same manner as it does for a radiation event.
In the event of a chlorine release, the CBHVAC System enters a full recirculation mode (Chlorine Protection Mode), with no outdoor air intake.
The emergency filtration trains do not start, since they do not effectively remove chlorine and may be damaged by the presence of chlorine.
Protection for chlorine gas events " overrides" any concurrent, ongoing, or subsequent radiation or smoke initiation signals.
The override design offers protection i
BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-1d Amendment No. 16f, l 164
PLANT SYSTEMS B'ASES 3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)
LC0 (Continued) to operations personnel in the Control Room by providing protection against potentially fatal chlorine gas releases. This protection is required any time the chlorine tank car is within the exclusion area.
Applicability The OPERATIONAL CONDITION applicabilities ensure that the system is capable of performing these functions when the potential for radiation releases and external smoke hazards exist.
In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3, the system must be OPERABLE to reduce control operator exposure during and following a design basis accident, since the accident could lead to a fission product release.
In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a design basis accident are reduced because of the pressure and temperature limitations in these OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS.
Maintaining the CREVS OPERABLE is not required in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, except for the following situations under which significant radiological releases can be postulated:
I.
During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, 2.
During CORE ALTERATIONS, and 3.
During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.
Rcquiring OPERABILITY of the Radiation Protection Mode of the CREVS during OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5 ensures that the system is available during the above evolutions, with the exception the movement of irradiated fuel in secondary containment; therefore, a specific applicability 0PERATIONAL CONDITION has been added for this activity.
OPERABILITY of the Chlorine Protection Mode of the CREVS is required any time the chlorine tank car is within the exclusion area.
Analyses demonstrate that movement of the tank car outside the exclusion area sufficiently reduces the threat of control room operator incapacitation from a release of this chemical.
Action a.
With one emergency filtration subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. With the unit in this condition, the remaining subsystem is adequate to perform control room radiation protection.
The loss of a single emergency filtration unit means that the CREVS reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in reduced or lost system capability. The 7 day out of i
BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-le Amendment No. 161,164l
PLANT SYSTEMS BA*SES 3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)
Action a. (Continued) service time is based on the low probability of a design basis accident and a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem occurring during this time period, and the capability of the remaining subsystem to provide the required capabilities.
During OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2, the plant must be placed in an OPERATIONAL CONDITION that minimizes risk if the inoperable subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required 7 days. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. These allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to allow the plant to reach these OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS from full power operation in an orderly manner and without unnecessarily challenging plant systems.
The loss of both emergency filtration subsystems means that the radiation protection function is lost.
The plant must be placed in an OPERATIONAL CONDITION that minimizes risk.
To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. These allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to allow the plant to reach these OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS from full power operation in an orderly manner and without unnecessarily challenging plant systems.
Action b.
With one emergency filtration subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days.
With the unit in this condition, the remaining subsystem is adequate to perform control room radiation protection.
The loss of a single emergency filtration unit means that the CREVS reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in reduced or lost system capability.
The 7 day out of service time is based on the low probability of a design basis accident and a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem occurring during this time period, and the capability of the remaining subsystem to provide the required capabilities.
During OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3, the plant must be placed in an OPERATIONAL CONDITION that minimizes risk if the inoperable subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required 7 days. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The allowed completion time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to allow the plant to reach this OPERATIONAL CONDITION from HOT _ SHUTDOWN in an orderly manner and without unnecessarily challenging plant systems.
The loss of both emergency filtration subsystems means that the radiation protection function is lost. The plant must be placed in an OPERATIONAL CONDITION that minimizes risk.
To achieve this status, the plant must be BRUNSWICK - UNIT I B 3/4 7-lf Amendment No. @,
l L
PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)
Action b. (Continued) placed in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The allowed completion time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to allow the plant to reach this OPERATIONAL CONDITION from HOT SHUTDOWN in an orderly manner and without unnecessarily challenging plant systems.
Action c.
With one emergency filtration subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. With the unit in any of these conditions, the remaining subsystem is adequate to perform contrM room radiation protection. The loss of a single emergency filtration unit means that the CBEVS reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in reduced or lost system capability. The 7 day out of service time is based on the low probability of a design basis accident and a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem occurring during this time period, and the capability of the remaining subsystem to provide the required capabilities.
During OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4, 5, and while irradiated fuel is being moved in secondary containment, if the inoperable emergency filtration subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days, the remaining OPERABLE subsystem may be placed in the Radiation / Smoke Protection Mode.
This action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, and that no failures which could prevent automatic actuation will occur. This action also ensures that any active failure would be readily detected.
An alternative to placing the remaining subsystem in service is to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require operation of the CREVS.
This alternative places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk.
Action d.
With the Chlorine Protection Mode inoperable, the chlorine tank car must be removed from the exclusion area within the next eight (8) hours to ensure adequate protection for the operators.
Chlorine gas protection is not required with the tank car outside of the exclusion area.
Eight hours is considered adequate time to perform the necessary system alignments and to allow plant personnel to remove the chlorine tank car from the site in an orderly manner.
With the plant physically unable to remove the cnlorine tank car from the site, as required by this statement, ACTION d. requires the plant to take actions to place the plant in a condition that minimizes risk of core damage or other types of radiological release events.
g, l
BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-lg Amendment No.
Pl. ANT S1 STEMS BASES 3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)
Surveillance Recuirements The SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (SR) in this specification verify that a subsystem in the standby mode starts on demand and ct,i.inues to operate.
L Standby systems are checked periodically to ensure that the automatic start i
function is consistent with the assumptions in the Control Room Habitability Analyses (References 4 and 6).
Since the environmental conditions on this system are not severe, monthly demonstration of the capability of the system to operate by SR 4.7.2.a is considered adequate.
The > 15 minute run time is considered adequate for operation of systems without heaters (Reference.16).
SR 4.7.2.b verifies the capability of the filtration system at least once every 18 months, or 1) following any structural maintenance on the filtration l
nnit HEPA filter or charcoal adsorbers or 2) following painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communication with the system.
Testing is performed in accordance with applicable sections of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 1, a H ANSI N510-1975. Acceptance criteria provides assurance that the efficiency used in the Control Room dose analyses is conservative.
This is consistent with the guidance provided in Generic Letter 83-13 (Reference 7).
SR 4.7.2.c verifies adequacy of the charcoal filtration system following every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of operation.
The time of operation is based on the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 1 (Reference 8), and early nuclear plant filter testing (Reference 10).
SR 4.7.2.d demonstrates functional capability of the system by verifying
- 1) pressure drop across the HEPA and charcoal filtration units, 2) automatic emergency system initiation upon receipt of a m ke detector or high radiation I
test signal, 3) the override function of the chlorine protection function, and
- 4) ability of the system to maintain a positive pressure relative to the outside atmosphere during system operation. The maximum pressure drop of f 5.25 inches water gauge is based on a CREVS pressure drop analysis (Reference 9) and fan capability.
This maximum pressure drop ensures the system is capable of delivering rated flow with 1 inch water gauge margin for filter loading. The positive pressure test is performed to ensure that the control room is maintained positive to any potentially contaminated external atmosphere, inc.luding the outside atmosphere and adjacent building atmosphere (s).
Testing of the chlorine override function ensures operability of the chlorine protection mode of the CREVS by demonstrating the capability of the system to prevent the emergency filtration units from initiating during I
a chlorine event.
SR 4.7.2.e and SR 4.7.2.f verify that the filtvion capability of the HEPA and charcoal adsorber banks is consistent with w! assumed in the Control Room Habitability Analyses (References 4 are Ninwing partial or complete replacement of either filtration component.
W
>=c ing is performed in accordance with the applicable sections of ANSI W ' 1975 (Reference 14).
BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 B V4 7-lh Amendment No.161 l
164
11 ANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)
References 1.
10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 19, Control Room.
2.
Regulatory Guide 1.95, Revision 1, Protection of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Operators Against an Accidental Chemical Release.
3.
Updated FSAR, Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 & 2.
4.
NUS-3697, Revision 2, February 1983, Control Room Habitability Analysis.
5.
NLU-83-673, TMI Action Item III.D.3.4 - Control Room Habitability, NRC Safety Evaluation dated October 18, 1983.
6.
NUS-4758, Control Room Radiological Reanalysis, Auoust,1985.
7.
Generic Letter 83-13, Clarification of Surveillance Requirements for HEPA Filters and Charcoal Adsorwr Units in Staadard Technical Specifications of ESF Cleanup Systems, March 2, 1983.
8.
Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 1, July 1976, j
9.
CP&L Calculation G0077A-01, Control Room Emergency Filter System i
Differential Pressure Analysis.
10.
Original FSAR, BSEP, Units 1 and 2, Appendix K.
11.
IEEE 279-1971, IEEE Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.
12.
DBD-37 Nsign Basis Document for Control Building Heating, Ventilation, and At iitioning System.
m 13.
NRC-89-IC3, NRC Safety Evaluation for Control Room Habitability, February 16, 1989.
14.
ANSI N510-1975, Testing of Nuclear Air Cleaning Systems.
15.
ANSI N509-1976, Nuclear Power Plant Air Cleaning Units.
16.
NUREG-1433, Standard Technical Specifications, General Electric Plants, BWR/4, Revision 0, September 28, 1992.
BRUNSWICK - UNIT I B 3/4 7-11 Amendment No. 164 l
PLANT SYSTEMS BA5ES 3/4.7.3 FLOOD PROTECTION The limitation on flood protection ensures that facility protective actions will be taken and operation will be terminated in the event of flood conditions.
The limit of elevation 17'6" Mean Sea Level is based on the maximum elevation at which facility flood control measures provide protection to safety-related equipment.
3/4.7.4 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM The reactor core isolation cooling system (RCICS) is provided to assure adequate core cooling in the event of reactor isolation from its primary heat sink and the loss of feedwater flow to the reactor vessel without requiring actuation of any of the Emergency Core Cooling equipment.
RCICS is conservatively required to be OPERABLE whenever reactor pressure exceeds 113 psig even though the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system provides adequate core cooling up to 150 psig.
The condensate storage tank provides sufficient water to reduce the reactor coolant temperature and pressure to permit the RHR system to be operated.
I
~ BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-lj Amendment No.164 l
p',"'cv
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' ;y ;
,'W E
UNITED STATES
/
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001
<..g f CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY. et al.
DOCKET N0. 50-324 BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT. UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.195 License No. DPR-62 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment filed by Carolina Power & Light Company (the licensee), dated December 31, 1992, as revised by letter dated July 20, 1993, and supplemented August 9, 1993, and August 27, 1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and i
E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; i
and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-62 is hereby amended to read as follows:
t,
(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.195, are hereby incorporated in the license.
Carolina Power & Light Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
U i
S. Singh Bajwa, Acting Director Project Directorate 11-1 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: Septaiter 14, 1993 P
T
-f 1
2 i.
O
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE Aii FDMENT NO. 195 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-62 DOCKET NO. 50-324 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages.
The revised areas are indicated by marginal lines.
Remove Paaes Insert Paaes XI XI XII XII 3/4 7-2 3/4 7-2 3/4 7-2a 3/4 7-2a 3/4 7-2b 3/4 7-2b 3/4 10-5 3/4 10-5 B3/4 7-1 B3/4 7-1 B3/4 7-la B3/4 7-la B3/4 7-lb B3/4 7-lb B3/4 7-Ic B3/4 7-Ic B3/4 7-Id, B3/4 7-Id B3/4 7-le B3/4 7-le B3/4 7-If B3/4 7-1f B3/4 7-1g B3/4 7-19 B3/4 7-lh B3/4 7-lh B3/4 7-li B3/4 7-lj
INDEX BA'SES SECTION PAGE 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (Continued) 3/4.4.4 C H E M I ST R Y............................................... B 3/ 4 4 - 2 3/4.4.5 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY........................................ B 3/4 4-2 3/4.4.6 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS.............................. B 3/4 4-3 3/4.4.7 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES......................... B 3/4 4-7 j
3/4.4.8 STRUCTU RAL INT EGRITY..................................... B 3/4 4 -7 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 1
3/4.5.1 HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM...................
B 3/4 5-1 3/4.5.2 AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM........................ B 3/4 5-1 3/4.5.3 LOW PRESSURE COOLING SYSTEMS............................. B 3/4 5-2 3/4.5.4 SUPPRESSION P00L......................................... B 3/4 5-4
)
l 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT......................................
B 3/4 6-1 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND C0OLING SYSTEMS..................... B 3/4 6-3 3/4.6.3 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES..................... B 3/4 6-4 3/4.6.4 VAC UUM RE L I E F............................................ B 3/4 6 - 5 3/4.6.5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT.................................... B 3/4 6-5 3/4.6.6 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTR0L........................... B 3/4 6-6 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS.................................... B 3/4 7-1 3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM.................B 3/4 7-Ic l
BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 XI Amendment No. 101, D7, 179, 192, 195
i INDEX BASES s
~
SECTION PAGE 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS (Continued) 1 3/4.7.3 FLOOD PROTECTION.........................................B 3/4 7-lj 3/4.7.4 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM....................B 3/4 7-lj 3/4.7.5 SNUBBERS.................................................B 3/4 7-2 3/4.7.6 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION..............................B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.7 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS.................................B 3/4 7-4 I
3/4.7.8 FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS................................B 3/4 7-5 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS..................................
B/3/4 8-1 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.1 REACTOR MODE SWITCH......................................B 3/4 9-1 j
3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION..........................................B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.3 CONTROL R0D P0SITION.....................................B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.4 DECAY TIME...............................................B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS.........................
.................B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.6 CRANE AND H0IST OPERABILITY..............................B 3/4 9-2 3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL-SPENT FUEL STORAGE P00L.....................B 3/4 9-2 3/4.9.8 WATER LEVEL-REACTOR VESSEL, and 3/4.9.9 WATER LEVEL-REACTOR FUEL STORAGE P00L....................B 3/4 9-2 3/4.9.10 CONTROL R0D REM 0 VAL.............................
........B 3/4 9-2 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS l
3/4.10.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY............................B 3/4 10-1 1
3/4.10.2 R00 SEQUENCE CONTROL SYSTEM (DELETED)................... B 3/4 10-1 1
l 3/4.10.3 SHUTDOWN MARGIN DEMONSTRATIONS.......................... B 3/4 10-1 j
1 l
3/4.10.4 RECIRCULATION L00PS....................................
B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.5 PLANT SERVICE WATER..................................... B 3/4 10-1 1
I 1
BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 XII Amendment No. BI, 57, 1
70,163,175,177,192, 1 95
3f4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3'4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS
/
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION I
3.7.1.2 The Service Water System shall be OPERABLE with at least:
In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3:
Three OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps, and two OPERABLE conventional service water pumps capable of supplying the nuclear and conventional headers.
In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 AND 5:
1 Three OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps, and two OPERABLE Unit 2 service water pumps, nuclear and/or conventional, powered from separate emergency buses and capable of supplying the nuclear header, j
APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 ACTION:
a.
In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, or 3:
1.
With one OPERABLE conventional service water pump:
a.
Ensure that, if only one Unit 2 nuclear service water pump is OPERABLE, the OPERABLE conventional service water pump is powered from a separate emergency bus than the OPERABLE Unit 2 nuclear service water pump, and i
b.
Restore at least one additional conventional service water pump to OPERABLE status within 7 days.
i Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
2.
With no conventional service water pumps OPERABLE:
l a.
Ensure both Unit 2 nuclear service water pumps are OPEi!ABLE, and b.
Restore at least one conventional service water pump to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Otherwise, be ir at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and COLD j
SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
1 3.
With two OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps, unless the provisions of ACTION b.4 apply for Unit 1, restore one additional site nuclear service water pump within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 3/4 7-2 Amendment No. 57, l
177, 195
PLANT SYSTEMS
'. LI'MITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)
ACTION:
(Continued) 4.
With two OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps and one OPERABLE conventional service water pump:
a.
Ensure at least one Unit 2 nuclear service water pump is OPERABLE, and b.
Ensure that, if only one Unit 2 nuclear service water pump is OPERABLE, the OPERABLE conventional service water pump is powered from a separate emergency bus than the OPERABLE Unit 2 nuclear service water pump, and c.
Restore two conventional service water pumps or three site nuclear service water pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
5.
With less than two OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps, oe in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />si b.
In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 or 5:
1.
With one OPERABLE Unit 2 service water pump, restore at least two Unit 2 service water pumps to OPERABLE status within 7 days.
Otherwise, suspend all operations that have a potential for draining the reactor vessel.
2.
With no OPERABLE Unit 2 service water numps, suspend all operations that have a potential for draining the reactor vessel.
3.
With two OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps, unless the provisions of ACTION b.4 apply, restore at least one additional nuclear service water pump to OPERABLE status within 7 days.
Otherwise, take the ACTION required by Specification 3.8.1.2.
l 4
4.
With the service water system nuclear header inoperable, operation of both units may continue provided that two Unit I nuclear service water pumps are OPERABLE, both units' nuclear service water header valves are administrative 1y controlled as required to ensure cooling water to the diesel generatois, at least two Unit 2 conventional service water pumps are OPERABLE on the conventional header, and vital ECCS loads are aligned to the conventional service water system header.
Restore the service water system nuclear header and at least three site nuclear service water pumps to OPERABLE status within 14 days. Otherwise, take the ACTION required by Specification 3.8.1.2.
5.
With less than two OPERABLE site nuclear service water pumps, take j
the ACTION required by Specification 3.8.1.2.
BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 3/4 7-2a Amendment No.57.
l 177, 195
PLANT SYSTEMS 50R' LANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.2 The service water system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a.
At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
b.
At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that each automatic valve servicing safety-related equipment actuates to its correct position on the appropriate ECCS actuation test signals.
c.
At least once per 92 days by verifying that the alternate diesel generator service water supply valve will open on a low header pressure signal.
BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 3/4 7-2b AmendmentNo.TEf,l 1 95
SRECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 374 10.5 PLANT SERVICE WATER LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.10.5 The service water conventional header required to be operating per Specification 3.7.1.2 ACTION b.4 may be removed from operation by l
stopping the pumps to permit isolating and draining the service water nuclear header for maintenance provided that:
a.
The service water conventional header remains lined up to supply cooling water to the required ECCS loads.
b.
The draining / maintenance on the service water nuclear header will not affect the service water conventional system or lineup described in a. above.
c.
Average coolant temperature is s100*F and the heatup rate is s10*F per hour, d.
Two dedicated, qualified members of the unit operational staff are assigned to initiate the service water conventional header pumps should any of the following occur:
1.
Any event occurs which requires ECCS actuation.
2.
Primary coolant temperature exceeds 180*F.
3.
A loss of offsite power occurs.
APPLICABILITY:
OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5 with the nuclear header inoperable.
i ACTION:
With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, as soon as practicable, restore the:
a.
Service water conventional header to operating status per the requirements of Specification 3.7.1.2 ACTION b.4, or j
b.
Service water nuclear header to OPERABLE status per Specification 3.7.1.2.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.10.5 When the service water conventional header is not operating as specified above:
a.
Prior to securing all service water pumps, verify that the service water conventional header is lined up to supply cooling water for ECCS by verifying that each valve servicing safety-related equipment that is not locked in the proper position is administratively controlled in the proper porition.
BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 3/4 10-5 Amendment No. 57,195
3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS BhSES 3/4,7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS The service water system is designed to provide cooling water for the removal of heat from equipment such as the emergency diesel generators, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump coolers, and room coolers for Emergency Core Cooling
)
System (ECCS) equipment, that is required for a safe reactor shutdown i
following a design basis accident (DBA) or transient. The service water system also provides cooling to the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) System and the Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System, as required, during normal and shutdown operation. The service water system provides lubricating water for the service water pumps and cooling water for the service water pump motors.
During the initial stage (0 - 10 minutes) of a LOCA or LOOP, the service water system must automatically provide cooling 4
water to the emergency diesel generators.
Following the first 10 minute period, additional safety-related and shutdown cooling loads must be supplied.
The service water system also provides flow to the furbine Building Closed Cooling Water System, the Chlorination System, and fill to the Circulating i
Water System.
The service water system design allows either (or both) unit's nuclear header to supply diesel generator cooling water when required.
The phrase " site nuclear service water pump" refers to any nuclear service water pump on either unit. Other pump designations refer to the specific unit under discussion.
The four nuclear service water pumps on site, two per unit, are each on a separate emergency bus so that a single failure could prevent.only one nuclear service water pump from operating.
The OPERABILITY requirements are structured.to ensure that the service water system is capable of automatically supplying sufficient cooling water for the Diesel Generators assuming no operator action for the first 10 minutes following a DBA, and that at least one service water pump per unit is j
available to supply the safety-related and shutdown cooling loads after the first ten minutes following a DBA.
The OPERABILITY requirements for the i
service water system are, in general, based on a LOCA (Loss of Coolant i
Accident), and in some cases combined with a LOOP (Loss of Offsite Power),
since this event or combination would provide the most significant challenge i
to the system's capabilities.
The four nuclear service water pumps are powered from separate emergency buses.
The three conventional service water pumps on each unit are on separate emergency buses.
For each unit, two of the conventional pumps are on the same emergency buscs as the two unit nuclear service water pumps. The loss of one nuclear pump and one conventional pump on the unit due to a single failure of one emergency bus has been accounted for in the OPERABILITY requirements.
However, conventional service water pump OPERABILITY will be more strictly defined in cases where only one nuclear pump and one conventional pump are available for operation. Therefore, with one ani.
nuclear service water pump and one conventional service water pump available, the conventional service water pump must be powered from a separate emergency bus to be considered OPERABLE.
BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-1 Amendment No. 177, 195
PLANT SYSTEMS B'SES A
3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS (Continued)
In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3, a conventional service water pump must be capable of supplying water to both the nuclear header and the conventional header to be considered OPERABLE.
This will ensure that the vital header and RHR service water heat exchangers can be supplied from either header when a single failure of any header isolation valve is assumed and personnel access is not available for manual valve alignment.
In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, because of reduced primary pressure, the possibility of a LOCA is not considered credible and access is considered available to manually position header isolation valves if required.
Therefore, in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, a conventional pump may be considered OPERABLE when only the nuclear header discharge valve is OPERABLE except as specifically identified in the ACTION statement for a nuclear header outage.
This allows maintenance on the conventional header without reducing service water system 0PERABILITY.
However, a conventional pump aligned to the nuclear header is not considered to meet the requirements for an OPERABLE nuclear pump since it is not automatically powered and restarted on the diesel generators following an accident signal.
For OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, and a DBA in either unit, two nuclear service water pumps from one or both units are capable of supplying sufficient flow to cool all four emergency diesel generators under worst-case scenarios while also supplying flow to other potential flow paths (vital header loads, cross-header leakage, and lubewater). To prohibit any single failure from preventing the supply of service water to the diesel generators during the first 10 minutes following a DBA, at least three nuclear service water pumps per site are required while in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5.
After the first 10 minutes following a DBA, additional loads require cooling water on the affected unit.
These loads include RHR and CS pump room coolers, RHR service water heat exchangers, and RHR pump seal heat exchangers.
Evaluations have determined that the RHR pump seals, as well as the equipment in rooms serviced by the RHR and CS room coolers, remain within the manufacturers' temperature limits for at least the first 10 minutes of a DBA.
Operator action is credited after the first 10 minutes following a DBA to rake the necessary pump and valve alignments either remotely or manually, except that manual action inside the Reactor Building following a LOCA while in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3 is not credited because of the potential for unsafe conditions.
In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3, one conventional service water pump supporting the affected unit is capable of supplying the additional required safety-related and shutdown equipment.
No single failure can prevent the necessary loads from being aligned to one of the nuclear or conventional headers by manual or remote operator action. To prohibit any single failure from preventing the supply of service water after the first 10 minutes following a DBA, at least two operable conventional service water pumps are required while in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, or 3.
BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 8 3/4 7-la Amendment No. 177,192 195
PLANT SYSTEMS l
BASES j
i 3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS (Continued)
In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, one unit service water pump, nuclear or conventional, is capable of supplying additional required safety-related and i
shutdown equipment.
Manual action in the Reactor Building is credited to align equipment to the nuclear header if required. To prohibit any single i
failure from preventing the supply of service water after the first 10 minutes following a DBA, at least two operable unit service water pumps, nuclear or l
conventional, are required while in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5.
]
The allowed out-of-service times and compensatory measures established in the ACTION statements are conservative. Although the probability and consequences of a DBA are reduced in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, the ACTION statements for the nuclear service water pumps for a unit in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 or 5 are based on the assumption that the other unit is in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, or 3.
Specific ACTION statements and LC0 time limits have not been established for both units in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 or 5 since the ACTION statements for one unit in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 or 5 are more conservative.
In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, because of reduced core decay heat load, the reduced possibility of a LOCA, and the accessibility to the reactor building for manual operator action, the vital header loads could be manually aligned to the nuclear header if a failure prevented remote valve alignment.
Therefore, the operability requirements for the unit service water pumps apply for nuclear or conventional pumps.
With one OPERABLE unit service water pump, the core spray and LPCI systems remain GPERABLE.
However, to minimize the possibility of loss of these systems due to loss of the single pump, the out-of-service time for one OPERABLE unit service water pump is set at 7 days.
For no OPERABLE unit service water pumps, the core spray and LPCI systems must be declared inoperable.
This is equivalent to the ACTION statement for core spray and LPCI systems inoperable.
ACTION statement 3.7.1.2.b.4 for OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5 allows one unit to operate with the nuclear service water header inoperable for up to 14 days provided that:
a) two nuclear service water pumps are OPERABLE on the other unit, b) both unit's nuclear service water header valves are administratively controlled as required to ensure cooling water to the diesel generators.
c) the service water system conventional header is OPERABLE with two unit conventional service water pumps OPERABLE, and d) vital ECCS loads are aligned to the conventional service water system header.
Considering any additional single failure, this requirement ensures at least one OPERABLE nuclear service water pump to supply the Diesel Generators during the first 10 minutes after a DBA and one OPERABLE conventional service water pump to supply the unit safety-related and shutdown cooling loads following the first 10 minutes after a DBA.
By requiring administrative control of both unit's nuclear header valves, the ACTION statement minimizes the risk of inadvertent valve action that could reduce cooling water flow to the diesel generators.
BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-lb Amendment No.172 195
PLANT SYSTEMS-BASES 3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM Backaround One of the principal design objectives of the Control Building Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (CBHVAC) System is to permit continuous occupancy of the Control Room Emergency Zone under normal operating conditions and under the postulated design basis events throughout the life of the plant.
The Control Building HVAC System must function to provide protection to the operators for three type events:
a radiation event, up to and including a Design Basis Accident (e.g., Main Steam Line Break [MSLB] Accident, Refueling Accident, Control Rod Drop Accident, or loss of Coolant Accident [LOCA]), a toxic gas event (complete rupture of the 55 ton chlorine tank car located near the Service Water Building, or a slow leak lasting for an extended period of time), and an external smoke event.
These events form the basis for the design of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREVS) function of the CBHVAC System.
The CREVS is designed to meet General Design Criterion (GDC) 19 (Reference 1).
In addition, the system is designed using the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.95, Revision 1 (Reference 2).
Commitments have also been made to design the radiation protection function of the CBHVAC System to meet the single failure criteria described in IEEE 279-1971, and the chlorine detection and isolation logic to single failure criteria, both with approved exceptions (Reference 12, Section 3.6).
LC0 Operability of the CREVS ensures that the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all credible hazard event scenarios external to the control room, consistent with the assumptions in the various analyses.
Two redundant subsystems of the CREVS are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available, assuming a single failure disables the other subsystem.
The CREVS is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to control operator exposure are operable in both subsystems.
For the Radiation / Smoke Protection Mode, a subsystem is considered OPERABLE whcn its associated:
1.
Fan is OPERABLE, 2.
HEPA filter and charcoal adsorbers are not excessively restricting flow and are capable of performing their filtration functions, and BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-Ic AmendmentNo.g l
PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)-
LC0 (Continued) 3.
Ductwork and dampers are OPERABLE, and air circulation can be maintained as required in Reference 12, Section 3.1.
For the Chlorine Protection Mode, a subsystem is considered OPERABLE when:
1.
The isolation dampers are OPERABLE, and 2.
The logic components necessary to achieve automatic isolation are functional, as described in Reference 12, Section 3.1.
Two additional OPERABILITY requirements apply to all modes of CREVS operation.
The CBHVAC Control Air System must be OPERABLE to support damper operation.
In addition, the Control Room Envelope must be maintained, including the integrity of the walls, floors, ceilings, ductwork, and access doors. The Control Room Envelope includes the electronic equipment rooms, the central control room area, computer rooms, kitchen, restrooms, and the supply and return ductwork up to and including the isolation dampers.
The following components, including their associated logic trains, actuation devices, and power supplies, are non-redundant.
Their OPERABILITY affe-ts both trains of the CREVS. These components are: control room (washroom) exhaust isolation damper, control room normal make-up damper, and the control room emergency recirculation damper.
In addition, the Brunswick control room is not equipped with redundant outdoor air intakes (References 4 and 5).
The Radiation / Smoke Protection Mode of operation protects the control room operators from those events which may result in the release of radioactivity.
The Radiation / Smoke Protection Mode of operation also provides protection to the control room operators in the event of an external smoke event.
During a radiation event, the CBHVAC System is required to automatically isolate and enter the Radiation / Smoke Protection Mode on a Control Room Intake High Radiation signal from the Area Radiation Monitoring System. Upon receipt of a high radiation signal, the CBHVAC System is automatically realigned to the emergency mode of operation. The normal fresh air inlet closes, and, at approximately the same time, the emergency air filtration units begin operation, recirculating control room air and providing filtered makeup air to minimize contamination build-up and provide positive pressure in the Control Room Envelope. The CBHVAC System responds to an external smoke event in the same manner as it does for a radiation event.
In the event of a chlorine release, the CBHVAC System enters a full recirculation mode (Chlorine Protection Mode), with no outdoor air intake.
The emergency filtration trains do not start, since they do not effectively remove chlorine and may be damaged by the presence of chlorine.
Protection for chlorine gas events " overrides" any concurrent, ongoing, or subsequent radiation or smoke initiation signals. The override design offers protection BRUNSWICK - UNIT.2 B 3/4 7-ld Amendment No. yg2 l
195 i
o
PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)
LCO (Continued) to operations personnel in the Control Room by providing protection against potentially fatal chlorine gas releases.
This protection is required any time the chlorine tank car is within the exclusion area.
Applicability The OPERATIONAL CONDITION applicabilities ensure that the system is capable of performing these functions when the potential for radiation releases and external smoke hazards exist.
In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3, the system must be OPERABLE to reduce control operator exposure during and following a design basis accident, since the accident could lead to a fission product release.
In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a design basis accident are reduced because of the pressure and temperature limitations in these OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS.
Maintaining the CREVS OPERABLE is not required in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, except for the following situations under which significant radiological releases can be postulated:
1.
During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, 2.
During CORE ALTERATIONS, and 3.
During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.
Requiring OPERABILITY of the Radiation Protection Mode of the CREVS during OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5 ensures that the system is available during the above evolutions, with the exception the movement of irradiated fuel in secondary containment; therefore, a specific applicability OPERATIONAL CONDITION has been added for this activity.
OPERABILITY of the Chlorine Protection Mode of the CREVS is required any time the chlorine tank car is within the exclusion area. Analyses demonstrate that movement of the tank car outside the exclusion area sufficiently reduces the threat of control room operator incapacitation from a release of this chemical.
Action a.
With one emergency filtration subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days.
With the unit in this condition, the remaining subsystem is adequate to perform control room radiation protection.
The loss of a single emergency flitration unit means i
that the CREVS reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in reduced or lost system capability.
The 7 day out of BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-le Amendment No. 172, l
1%
PLANT SYSTEMS ishSES 3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)
Action a. (Continued) service time is based on the low probability of a design basis accident and a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem occurring during this time period, and the capability of the remaining subsystem to provide the required capabilities.
During OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2, the plant must be placed in an OPERATIONAL CONDITION that minimizes risk if the inoperable subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required 7 days. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
These allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to allow the plant to reach these OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS from full power operation in an orderly manner and without unnecessarily challenging plant systems.
The loss of both emergency filtration subsystems means that the radiation protection function is lost.
The plant must be placed in an OPERATIONAL CONDITION that minimizes risk. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
These allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to allow the plant to reach these OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS from fall power operation in an orderly manner and without unnecessarily challenging plant systems.
Action b.
With one emergency filtration subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days.
With the unit in this condition, the remaining subsystem is adequate to perform control room radiation protection. The loss of a single emergency filtration unit means
- that the CREVS reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in reduced or lost system capability. The 7 day out of service time is based on the low probability of a design basis accident and a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem occurring during this time period, and the capability of the remaining subsystem to provide the required i
capabilities.
During OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3, the plant must be placed in an OPERATIONAL CONDITION that minimizes risk if the inoperable subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required 7 days.
To achieve this status, the l
plant must be placed in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The allowed completion time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to allow the plant to reach this OPERATIONAL CONDITION from HOT SHUTDOWN in an orderly manner and without. unnecessarily challenging plant systems.
s The loss of both emergency filtration subsystems means that the radiation protection function is lost.
The plant must be placed in an OPERATIONAL CONDITION that minimizes risk.
To achieve this status, the plant must be BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 8 3/4 7-lf Amendment No. 192 l
195
PLANT-SYSTEMS EfASES 3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)
Action b. (Continued) placed in COLD SHUTOOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The allowed completion time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to allow the plant to reach this OPERATIONAL CONDITION from HOT SHUTDOWN in an orderly manner and without unnecessarily challenging plant systems.
Action c.
With one emergency filtration subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days.
With the unit in any of these conditions, the remaining subsystem is adequate to perform control room radiation protection.
The loss of a single emergency filtration unit means that the CBEVS reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in reduced or lost system capability.
The 7 day out of service time is based on the low probability of a design basis accident and a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem occurring during this time period, and the capability of the remaining subsystem to provide the required capabilities.
During OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4, 5, and while irradiated fuel is being moved in secondary containment, if the inoperable emergency filtration subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days, the remaining OPERABLE subsystem may be placed in the Radiation / Smoke Protection Mode.
This action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, and that no failures which could prevent automatic actuation will occur. This action also ensures that any active failure would be readily detected.
An alternative to placing the remaining subsystem in service is to immediately 1
suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require operation of the CREVS.
This alternative places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk.
Action d.
With the Chlorine Protection Mode inoperable, the chlorine tank car must be removed from the exclusion area within the next eight (8) hours to ensure adequate protection for the operators. Chlorine gas protection is not required with the tank car outside of the exclusion area.
Eight hours is 4
considered adequate time to perform the necessary system alignments and to allow plant personnel to remove the chlorine tank car from the site in an orderly manner.
With the plant physically unable to remove the chlorine tank car from the site, as required by this statement, ACTION d. requires the plant to take actions to place the plant in a condition that minimizes risk of core damage or other types of radiological release events.
BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-19 Amendment No. 32 l
195
i PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)
Surveillance Reauirements l
The SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (SR) in this specification verify that a subsystem in the standby mode starts on demand and continues to operate.
i Standby systems are checked periodically to ensure that the automatic start function is consistent with the assumptions in the Control Room Habitability Analyses (References 4 and 6).
Since the environmental conditions on this system are not severe, monthly demonstration of the capability of the system to operate by SR 4.7.2.a is considered adequate. The > 15 minute run time is considered adequate for operation of systems without heaters (Reference 16).
SR 4.7.2.b verifies the capability of the filtration system at least once every 18 months, or 1) following any structural maintenance on the filtration unit HEPA filter or charcoal adsorbers or 2) following painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communication with the system.
Testing is performed in accordance with applicable sections of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 1, and ANSI N510-1975. Acceptance criteria provides assurance that the efficiency used in the Control Room dose analyses is conservative. This is consistent with the guidance provided in Generic Letter 83-13 (Reference 7).
SR 4.7.2.c verifies adequacy of the charcoal filtration system following every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of operation.
The time of operation is based on the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 1 (Reference 8), and early nuclear plant filter testing (Reference 10).
SR 4.7.2.d demonstrates functional capability of the system by verifying
- 1) pressure drop across the HEPA and charcoal filtration units, 2) automatic emergency system initiation upon receipt of a smoke detector or high radiation test signal, 3) the override function of the chlorine protection function, and
- 4) ability of the system to maintain a positive pressure relative to the outside atmosphere during system operation.
The maximum pressure drop of 1 5.25 inches water gauge is based on a CREVS pressure drop analysis i
(Reference 9) and fan capability.
This maximum pressure drop ensures the system is capable of delivering rated flow with 1 inch water gauge margin for filter loading.
The positive pressure test is performed to ensure that the control room is maintained positive to any potentially contaminated external atmosphere, including the outside atmosphere and adjacent building j
atmosphere (s).
Testing of the chlorine override function ensures operability of the chlorine protection mode of the CREVS by demonstrating the capability of the system to prevent the emergency filtration units from initiating during a chlorine event.
SR 4.7.2.e and SR 4.7.2.f verify that the filtration capability of the HEPA and charcoal adsorber banks is consistent with that assumed in the Control Room Habitability Analyses (References 4 and 6) following partial or complete replacement of either filtration component. The testing is performed in accordance with the applicable sections of ANSI N510-1975 (Reference 14).
BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-lh Amendment No. 192 l
195
n PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)
References 1.
10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 19, Control Room.
2.
Regulatory Guide 1.95, Revision 1, Protection of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Operators Against an Accidental Chemical Release.
3.
Updated FSAR, Brunswick Si 3m Electric Plant, Units 1 & 2.
4.
NUS-3697, Revision 2, FeL-e ! 1983, Control Room Habitability Analysis.
5.
NLU-83-673, TMI Action Item III.D.3.4 - Control Room Habitability, NRC Safety Evaluation dated October 18, 1983.
6.
NUS-4758, Control Room Radiological Reanalysis, August,1985.
7.
Generic Letter 83-13, Clarification of Surveillance Requirements for HEPA Filters and Charcoal Adsorber Units in Standard Technical Specifications of ESF Cleanup Systems, March 2, 1983.
8.
Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 1, July 1976, 9.
CP&L Calculation G0077A-01, Control Room Emergency Filter System Differential Pressure Analysis.
10.
Original FSAR, BSEP, Units I and P., Appendix K.
11.
IEEE 279-1971, IEEE Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.
12.
DBD-37, Design Basis Document for Control Building Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning System.
13.
NRC-89-103, NRC Safety Evaluation for Control Room Habitability, February 16, 1989.
14.
ANSI N510-1975, Testing of Nuclear Air Cleaning Systems.
15.
ANSI N509-1976, Nuclear Power Plant Air Cleaning Units.
16.
NUREG-1433, Standard Technical Specifications, General Electric Plants, BWR/4, Revision 0, September 28, 1992.
BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-li Amendment No. 195 l
PLANT SYSTEMS
. #ASES 3/4.7.3 FLOOD PROTECTION The limitation on flood protection ensures that facility protective actions will be taken and operation will be terminated in the event of flood conditions.
The limit of elevation 17'6" Mean Sea Level is based on the maximum elevation at which facility flood control measures provide protection to safety-related equipment.
3/4.7.4 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM The reactor core isolation cooling system (RCICS) is provided to assure adequate core cooling in the event of reactor isolation from its primary heat sink and the loss of feedwater flow to the reactor vessel without requiring actuation of any of the Emergency Core Cooling equipment.
RCICS is conservatively required to be OPERABLE whenever reactor pressure exceeds 113 psig even though the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system provides adequate core cooling up to 150 psig. The condensate storage tank provides sufficient water to reduce the reactor coolant temperature and pressure to permit the RHR system to be operated.
BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-lj Amendment No. 1 95 l
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