ML20055A704
| ML20055A704 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 07/16/1982 |
| From: | Shoemaker C NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ALAB-680, ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8207190351 | |
| Download: ML20055A704 (35) | |
Text
e' DOCKETED UNITED STATES OF AMERIdyta,C NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSIN@2APNAN B Administrative Judges:
F]
Stephen F. Eilperin, Chairman W ANCRSfCht' Dr. W. Reed Johnson Dr. R6ginald L. Gotchy SERVED JUL101982
)
In the Matter of )
)
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON ) Docket Nos. 50-361 OL COMPANY ET AL.
) 50-362 OL
)
(San Onofre Nuclear Generating)
Station, Units 2 and 3) )
)
Mr. Charles E. McClung, Jr., Laguna Hills, California, for the intervenors, GUARD and-Carstens, et al.
Mr. Edward B. Rogin, San Francisco, California (with whom Messrs. David R. Pigott, Samuel B. Casey, John A. Mendez, Charles R. Kocher, and James A. Beoletto were on the brief) for the applicants Southern California Edison Company, et al.
Mr. Lawrence J. Chandler for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff.
DECISION July 16, 1982 (ALAB-680)
Intervenors Guard and Carstens, et al., have asked us to stay the Licensing Board's May 14, 1952 initial decision which authorizes the issuance of a full power operating license for the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3. LBP-82-39, 15 NRC __. Their principal argument is that the deficiencies the Licensing Board found in San 8207190351 820716 gDRADOCK 050003g (()S[()y[)
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Onofre's emergency plan should preclude full power operation. More particularly, we are told that (1) the applicants' failure to provide a siren warning for some 30,000 peo~ple who live in the Dana Point and San Juan Capistrano areas, (2) the failure to make medical arrangements for the general public that might suffer radiation injury in a serious nuclear accident, and (3) the inadequate radiation monitoring capability of the localities near San Onofre should have resulted in the denial of a license until the deficiencies are corrected. A number of other arguments, mostly procedural in nature, are also urged in support of the stay motion. For the reasons given in this opinion, we deny the stay motion.
I. Legal Principles In determining whether a stay should be granted we apply 10 CFR 2.788(e), which calls upon us to consider:
(1) Whether the moving party has made a strong showing that it is likely to prevail on the merits; (2) Whether the party will be irreparably injured unless a stay is granted; (3) Whether the granting of a stay would harm other parties; and (4) Uhere the public interest lies.
The first of those determinations -- the merits of the emergency planning issues -- has a decided influence on the issues of irreparable injury and the public interest: for in deciding whether to allow operation of a plant during our
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3 appellate review we look to whether " operation of the plant over the period required to complete the additional proceedings [is] consistent with the requirement that there be reasondble assurance that the public health and safety not be endangered." Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 2), ALAB-486, 8 NRC 9, 46 (1978). That standard, we have said, does not call upon intervenors to show that a serious nuclear accident is likely during the pendency of the appeal. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-673, 15 NRC __, (slip opinion at 18). To paraphrase our earlier San Onofre opinion, it would be enough if apparent inadequacies-in emergency planning "were sufficient to raise the question whether plant operation would present an undue risk to the public in the event of [a serious nuclear accident]." Id.
at __ (footnote omitted) (slip opinion at 18-19).
In considering the merits, however, we do not take the text of the emergency planning requirements in isolation.
I Recognizing that those requirements are new, and that they necessitate extensive coordination among licensees and local and state governments (and thus are not whoJ1y within the power of its licensees to satisfy), -1/ the Commission
_1/ See generally 45 Fed. Reg. 55403-04, 55406-07 (August 19, 1980).
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has provided that , even if there are deficiencies, the applicant will have an opportunity to demonstrate to the. satisfaction of the Commission ~
that deficiencies in the plans are not significant for the plant _in question, that adequate interim compensating actions have been or will be taken
. -promptly, or_that there are other compelling reasons to permit plant operation.
10 CFR 50.47 (c) (1) . -2/ Thus, when determining the merits of an emergency planning issue, the Commission's regulations call upon us not only to look to the requirements that have been imposed, but also to exercise judgment as to the significance of whatever deficiencies there may be and the adequacy of interim measures to rectify them.
II. The Merits We now turn to a consideration of the merits of intervenors' arguments for a stay of the full power license authorization for San Onofre.
A. Siren Coverage
- 1. Background Basic to emergency planning is the requirement for a notification system so that protective action can be taken by the public. The Commission's regulations require that,
_2/ Another part of the emergency planning regulations, 10 CPR 50. 54 (s) (2) (ii) , provides as well a four-month grace period for already-operating plants to correct emergency planning deficiencies. If deficiencies remain after that time the Commission then determines what enforcement action to take, guided by the same considerations we have already quoted.
5 within 15 minutes of declaring an emergency, a licensee must have the means to notify government officials of the seriousness and nature of the accident. In turn, should those officials decide that protective measures such as sheltering or evacuation are required, in about another 15 minutes they must be able to alert the general public who reside-in the plume emergency planning zone (EPZ).. The plume EPZ is an area within approximately 10 miles of the plant, the precise bounds of which are to be determined by local conditions and needs. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3; 10 CFR 50.47 (b) (5) , (c) (2) . --3/
The means of prompt notification proposed by the applicants was a network of 41 sirens to cover the plume EPZ. The precise configuration for that zone was a contested issue in the proceeding. The Licensing Board concluded that the applicants' 10-mile zone was too constricted because it did not afford siren coverage to the 30,000 people who reside across San Juan Creek in the
_3/ After specifying that the plume EPZ shall consist of an area "about 10 miles (16 km) in radius," 10 CFR 50.47 (c) (2) further provides that:
The exact size and configuration of the EPZs surrounding a particular nuclear power reactor shall be determined in relation to local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries.
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community of Dana Point and the northern half'of-the town of San Juen Capistrano. In all other respects these areas were fully included in the emergency plan'. Tr. 7371-72, 8910-11; 15 NRC at ~
__ (slip opinion at 18-19). Accordingly, the Board extended the EPZ two to three miles to encompass those areas. In its view, this extension (1) falls well within the dictates of 10 CFR 50.47 (c) (2) that the plume EPZ be "about 10 miles," (2) is supported by the requirement in that regulation to pay heed to local characteristics such as-jurisdictional boundaries, (3) will eliminate the confusion that could be caused by applicants' bifurcated-EPZ, and (4) has the benefit of giving full coverage to a populated area at little additional cost. Id. at ___ (slip j opinion at 18-19).
The Licensing Board ruled further, however, that the current absence of siren coverage for the populated areas l across San Juan Creek was not grounds for denying the j ap'plicants a license _for full power operation. The Board's I conclusion was based on its finding that alternative means (such as loudspeakers from helicopters and police cars) exist to provide a prompt alert to this public in the event of an emergency. Id. at , (slip opinion at 55, 172).
j _ Hence, - in the words of 50. 47 (c) (1) , there was reasonable assurance that " adequate interim compensating actions have been or will be taken." The Board imposed a license condition, which it clarified in a subsequent order
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4 (LBP-82-40, 15 NRC __ (1982), that requires the applicants
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to-remedy the siren warning deficiency within six months of the commencement of full power operation.
InterVenors do not quarrel with the Board's reliance on f the alternatives to sirens in deciding whether the warning system can function. adequately until full siren coverage is i in place. They do contest, however, the Board's factual i
i conclusion that helicopter and police car-loudspeakers will be adequate for the job. Intervenors argue that the record is devoid of factual support for the conclusion that .,
helicopters and emergency vehicles can be diverted to notify 30,000 people within an adequate period of time. App. Tr.
22-23.
- 2. Analysis -
On factual issues that arise in the context of a 9
stay motion we are very hesitant to substitute our judgment for that of the Licensing Board. The Board has, after all, pr'esided over the entire proceeding. Our familiarity with the facts in the limited time we have had for review is perforce much less. The normal deference that an appellate body owes to the trier of the facts when reviewing a i
- decision on the merits is thus even more compelling at this preliminary stage of review. See Toledo Edison Co.
(Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2 and 3),
ALAB-385, 5 NRC 621, 629 (1977).
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Here, while the record on the issue is sparse,'there is enough to support the Licensing _ Board's conclusion'as to the.
adequacy of interim alerting measures. The 30,000 people who live adross San Juan Creek in the Dana-Point.and San Juan Capistrano areas are clustered in-a densely populated area of a relatively few square miles. See Applicants' Exhibit 132, fig. 10 and Appendix A-2. To alert these people, Orange County could call upon some of its 2,000 emergency vehicles, practically all of which have either loudspeakers or sirens. Tr. 8763, 8916. The marine base at nearby Camp Pendleton has helicopters equipped with loudspeakers that could also be pressed into emergency service. Tr. 9342-43, 9373. California Highway patrol cars equipped with loudspeakers may also be of assistance. Tr.
8268-72.
While the record does'not indicate how many emergency vehicles or helicopters can be deployed to cover the Dana ~
Point and San Juan Capistrano areas on short notice, it was the opinion of Mr. Egbert S. Turner, Manager of the Emergency Management Division, Orange County General Services Agency, that with existing siren coverage and county resources he could get notice out to all people within his jurisdiction (including'those in Dana Point and San Juan Capistrano) within 30 minutes. Tr. 9003-05,
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9021-22. -4/ Moreover, siren covdrage would nth'be wholly
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absent because two of the 41 sirens 4already ir(blace are outside the 10-mile radius near th se populated a,reas, and' V
would providb an adequate level of alerting sop /nd to at ,
.s least some limited part of that region! Sc'e Applicants' Exhibit 135; Tr. 6931, 7372'. ,J. ..
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Mr. Turner's 30-minute alert estimate suffices .:, to
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support thc Board's conclusion that adequate'comppnsating measures to address the siren deficiency will be yhdertaken. ' ,
' f The emergency planning regulations provide /
as a "43 sign 0
5 objective" that local officia\s musy be able to alert
't essentially all of the public initially "within about 15 t
minutes" from the time the officiafrj th,emselvey arc, notified t .
of the emergency by the licensee. 10 CF ,Part'50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3., The guidance that ingfements the Commission's regulations < reiterates ther objective of an 4 ,
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4/ This is the only timelestilmate we'hAve been able to discover in the record on'this p~ofr.t. See also Applicants' Exhibit 53 at V-6, which ind Orange County believed it'could notify a,icates ll people thatin the plume EPZ within one hour, even before the applicants' siren warning system yas installed. We .
note also that the Orange County emergency procedures still inclu'de the idea that mobile units would be used in arcas to be evacuated even when there is siren coverage. Tr. 9021-22. ,
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, 10 alert signal on an arca-wide basis throughout the 10-mile E'PZ within 15 minutes. -5/ It goes on to provide that the objective of the initial notification shall be to assure ce terage of essentially 100 percent of the population within five miles of the site. As to those who are more distant, or those who did not receive the initial notification, the guidance provides that "[s]pecial arrangements will be made to assure 100% coverage within 45 minutes of the population who may not have received the initial notification within the entire plume exposure EPZ." -6/
As we read that implementing guidance, it calls for those nearest the nuclear power plant to be assured of the most prompt warning, while those farther away -- in the remaining portion of the plume EPZ -- are to be notified in all circumstances within 45 minutes. The allowance of additional time to notify people farther from the nuclear power plant site is in recognition of not only the
~~5/ NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Pre: Mess in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Rev. 1 (Nos r 1980), Appendix 3 at 3-3. This document was jointly prepared by the NRC staff and the staff of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
6/ Ibid.
11 potentially more difficult notification problem but, more importantly, the lesser risk to those farther away. Thus, the report that provided much of the technical basis for the Commission"s choice of a 10-mile plume EPZ 1/ explained that although protective actions may be required for individuals located in areas further than 10 miles from the reactor for an
" atmospheric" release, the actual measures used and how rapidly or efficiently they are implemented, will not strongly influence the number of effects. -gyojected early health So too, in discussing the time factors associated with releases, the guidance document implementing the Commission's regulations stated:
The range of times between the onset of accident conditions and the start of a major release is of l ~-
7/ See 44 Fed. Reg. 61123 (October 23, 1979); 45 Fed. Reg, i 55406 (August 19, 1980).
~~
8/ NUREG-0396, Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants (December 1978) , at I-52. The report explained further (id. at I-50):
In the intervals beyond 10 miles, there is little apparent distinction between the effectiveness of evacuation and sheltering strategies in terms of projected early fatalities or injuries. The mean number of early fatalities is 0 in both of these intervals, and projected early injuries, although not 0, are greatly reduced for each of the protective strategies investigated.
l 12 the order of one-half hour to several hours. The subsequent time period over which radioactive material may be expected to be released is of the order of one-half hour (short-term release) to a few days (continuous release).
NUREG-0654; note 5 supra, at 13. The time for a radioactive release to travel to a point 10 miles from the plant is typically another one to four hours. Id. at 17. EI In short, time is not of the essence for people living more than 10 miles from the site of a potential accident at San Onofre. The technical analysis underlying the Commission's regulations recognizes this, and the implementing guidance of NUREG-0654, which requires less immediate notification to those persons farther away from the accident (45 minutes for essentially 100 percent-notification), is to the same effect. See generally-NUREG-0396, note 8 supra, at I-44 through I-52. While it is prudent to provide as much alerting time as possible, we conclude that the 30 minutes Mr. Turner thought it would
--9/ If the travel time were shorter, the-expected doses would be correspondingly lower. As observed in NUREG-0396, note 8 supra, at 18:
[U]nder poor dispersion conditions associated with low windspeeds, two hours or more might be required for the plume to travel a distance of five miles. Higher windspeeds would result in shorter travel times but would provide more dispersion, making high exposures at long distances much less likely.
M 13 take to notify the people in his area provides an adequate interim compensating measure to an arca-wide siren alert.
Intervenors have not made a strong showing that they are likely to prevail on the merits of their argument to the contrary.
B. Medical Assistance for the Radiation-Injured in the General Public
- 1. Background The Licensing Board ruled that 10 CFR 50.47 requires the emergency response plans of the applicant and the surrounding area jurisdictions to provide for medical arrangements for members of the general public who might suffer radiation injury in a serious nuclear accident.
15 1;RC at __ (slip opinion at 43-44). --10/ The Board also 10/ The applicants and staff disputed the Board's interpretation. When the meaning of the regulation was debated before the Licensing Board the applicants took the position that the requirement in 10 CFR
- 50. 4 7 (b) (12) to make medical arrangements for
" contaminated injured individuals" referred to contaminated persons who had been traumatically injured. Tr. 9637-40.
The staff's position has been less than clear. Before the Licensing Board the staff argued that the term contaminated injured was " broad enough to include an injury with a contaminated wound or just an excessive (FOOTI;OTE CO:JTI!!UED ON : EXT PAGE)
14 concluded that the absence of such medical arrangements for a period of six months should not preclude full power operation. The Board based this latter conclusion on i several fac' tors: (1) the remote possibility of a nuclear accident in the six months the Board allowed for the
~~10/ (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE) radiation dose without a wound." Tr. 9650.
Nevertheless, despite this position that " injury" could mean either traumatic injury or radiation injury, the staff went on to argue that the regulations require no specific medical arrangements for the general public who might be injured in the most serious and improbable of nuclear accidents. Tr. 9651-52. On appeal, the staff termed its disagreement with the Licensing Board a disagreement over whether " planning" or
" pre-planning" was required, the Board calling for the former and the staff arguing only fcr the latter. App.
Tr, 69-70. This distinction, we are tole, is the difference between requiring specific medical arrangements and merely identifying general medical resources. App. Tr. 69-72.
While neither the applicants nor the staff has appealed the Board's ruling, we nevertheless are free to disagree with the Board's interpretation even if no party presses an appeal on the issue. Virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-491, 8 NRC 245, 247 (1978).
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applicants and local officials to plan for medical arrangements; (2) the capability of the applicants'~
emergency medical plan for its own employees to care for
- some persons injured offsite as well; (3) the extant ability
! to provide medical services for the general public on an ad 4
i hoc basis; and (4) the good faith efforts of the applicants i and local officials to meet a "sometimes less than completely clear" emergency planning requirement. Id. at __
l (slip opinion at 44-46, 216).
Intervenors challenge the Board's decision.to allow j full power operation in the face of this emergency planning deficiency. Their challenge is said to be more than a j factual dispute about whether alternative measures will i
! compensate for the deficiency in medical arrangements.
Here, intervenors argue, the Licensing Board has provided the applicants a six-month grace period without making any
! finding that interim compensating actionn will be taken.
I Moreover, in their view, the Board afforded the grace period i
j only because of the unlikelihood of an accident, a factor intervenors contend the emergency planning regulations do l not allow the Board to consider. App. Tr. 9-11. See 10 CFR i
- 50. 47 (c) (1) .
- 2. Analysis i_ Despite the Licensing Board's' detailed examination of the history of the medical services regulation, we entertain t
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16 serious doubts that the Board's reading is accurate. The text of 50.47 (b) (12) is as follows (emphasis added) :
(b) The onsite and offsite emergency response plans for nuclear power reactors must meet the following standards: ** * (12) Arrangements are made for medical services for contaminated injured individuals.
On its face, the regulation requires arrangements for l medical services only for " contaminated injured" individuals, not for members of the general public who may have suffered radiation exposure or injury in a nuclear accident. The distinction between the two classes of people is not inadvertent. --11/ It is based upon a judg-11/ For present purposes, the primary distinction is between those persons who have been contaminated and traumatically injured (i.e., persons who have radionuclides on or in their bodies and also are physically injured) as opposed to persons who have been exposed to radiation. In actuality, there could be additional categories, based on the factors of (1) radiation exposure, (2) traumatic injury, and (3) contamination.
For persons who suffer radiation injury (i.e.,
approximately a 200 rem radiation dose) and are contaminated, generally 90 percent of their surface contamination can be removed simply through bathing or showering. This reduces the contamination to levels that are medically quite small so that whatever residual contamination may remain does not interfere with the treatment for radiation injury. Tr. 7743-45.
Persons who are contaminated but have not received substantial radiation doses would not need any hospital treatment. Decontamination would be a natter of washing with soap and water. Tr. 7720. See also Tr.
7087-88, 10,822, 10,850-51.
pullus ' i 17 ment as to their anticipated needs for emergency treatment.
And it is an emergency planning regulation we are construing.
" Contaminated injured" is a distinct category encompassing potential patients.whose traumatic (i.e.,
physical) in3uries are complicated by radioactive contamination. As Dr. Roger E. Linnemann explained:
A patient who has been exposed to radiation does not, in turn, give off radiation any more than a burn [ed] patient gives off heat. There has been damage and . . . the clinical course unfolds over a period of time.
This means that we do have time to react and time to plan.
[T]he problem arises if the person is injured and contaminated. This requires special facilities at a hospital. It requires special facilities because we would rather not admit those persons to our normal emergency room because contamination is loose. It can fall on the floor
. . . in the emergency rooms, where people move in and out quite quickly, and the first thing you know you could cause contamination in the hallways of the hospital. . . . [T]herefore we have designed facilities where a patient can be treated for his traumatic injury while you control the contamination.
Tr. 7719-21. See also Tr. 7082-84, 7727-29, 7745-48. Dr.
Linnemann further explained that because the clinical course of radiation injury unfolds over time and "is seldom, if ever, life threatening [,] . . . in all cases [ treatment of]
the traumatic injury takes precedence." Tr. 7721.
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18 In short, the contaminated injured need emergency care for their traumatic injuries. Plans must be in place to provide that care without contaminating the persons or facilities providing it. People who suffer radiation injury, on the other hand, are unlikely to need emergency treatment.
The record is clear that relatively few people are expected to be both contaminated and traumatically injured in a nuclear accident. The estimate was from one to perhaps 25 or so. Tr. 11,060-61. See also Tr. 7747. These people would be principally workers onsite who become contaminated and injured during the course of the accident. The contaminated injured could also include members of the general public, such as emergency workers, who might be involved in monitoring a contaminated area onsite and are then injured (for example) in a traffic accident. Tr.
11,059-61. See also Tr. 7746-48. The applicants' present emergency plan is fully adequate to cope with these
, eventualities. The applicants have specific arrangements l
l with three hospitals to provide medical services to l
contaminated injured individuals, and Orange County's emergency response plan identifies 13 area hospitals that have the capability of handling patients with radioactive contamination. Applicants' Exhibit 53 at IV-2, V-39; Tr.
7107-09, 11,059-61. See also Testimony of John R. Sears, fol. Tr. 10,644, at 7-8. See generally Applicants' Exhibits
9 19 85-99. These existing plans can be built upon and expanded on an ad hoc basis should the need arise. Tr. 10,830-33.
Both Dr. Linnemann for the applicants and Dr. Mary Reed for the intervenors agreed it was not likely that large numbers of the general public would receive such high doses of radiation in a nuclear accident as to warrant hospitali-zation or emergency treatment. Tr. 7087, 7727, 10,276-
- 78. 12/
Hospitalization would be recommended for persons who had received an exposure of 150 to 200 rem or upwards over the course of a few hours. Tr. 7728, 7767. Under the emergency response plans, it is envisioned that protective action (for example, sheltering or evacuation) would be initiated when projected doses to the general public are in the range of one rem. Tr. 7210-11. See NUREG-0654, note __
supra, at 60-61, Criteria J.7, J.9. Thus, for a serious nuclear accident to result in the hospitalization of large 12/ Dr. Linnemann foresees the possibility that in a serious nuclear accident there would be large numbers of people slightly exposed to radiation and exceed-ingly anxious. He thinks that they would require monitoring attention at reception centers and information by persons knowledgeable about the effects of radiation, as are currently provided for by local ,
emergency plans. See generally Applicants' Exhibit 53 at IV-11-12, V-39-42 through 43-44. Dr. Linnemann believes, however, that hospitalization would be undesirable for such persons. Tr. 7087.
20 numbers of people, not only must an already unlikely accident be severe, --13/ but also the emergency response to protect the public must be ineffectual. Even then, intervenors* witness Dr. Rex Ehling agreed with Drs. Reed and Linnemann that hospitalization would not be an emergency matter. Tr. 7087, 7109, 7718-19, 9979, 10,277-78.
Moreover, Dr. Ehling testified that there are several thousand hospital beds immediately available in Orange County that could care for people who require hospitalization for radiation injury.
~~13/ The Licensing Board's initial decision reproduces Table 7.4 from NUREG-0490, Final Environmental Statement (April 1981). 15 NRC at __ (slip opinion fol. p. 41).
It shows, for example, that the probability of an accident at San Onofre that would deliver doses of over '
200 rem to 2,000 people is one in one million in any one year of reactor operation. The staff thinks this calculation is conservative -- perhaps unrealistically so -- because (1) it assumes that the general public will be evacuated in the direction of the radioactive plume; (2) the probability of the most severe accident is now thought to be lower than calculated in the FES; (3) it assumes that people who would not be evacuated would simply go about their usual business; and (4) no timely protective action was assumed for. people beyond the EPZ during a severe accident that might threaten them. Tr. 10,330, 10,335-36, 10,339-41. The staff
, concluded that Table 7.4 "should not be used for
! emergency planning purposes due to the degree of
', conservatism in the assumptions used in the calculations on which the table is based." Tr. 10,341.
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21 Tr. 9979-80, 9991-92. 1AI The foregoing discussion indicates that intervenors have failed to make a strong showing that they are likely to prevail on~their claim that San Onofre should not operate at full power until plans are in place-for medical arrangements for those members of the general public who may suffer radiation exposure in a serious nuclear accident. As we have explained (see pp. 15-18, supra), there is serious doubt that the'Ccmmission's regulations require arrangements of that kind. Assuming that such arrangements are required, however, the standard of 10 CFR 50. 47 (c) (1) allowing for plant operation in the face of emergency planning deficiencies has nonetheless been met. This is so for two reasons. First, given the expert medical testimony that immediate hospitalization would not be necessary for radiation injury, the asserted rianning deficiency is "not significant." Second, in view of the immediate availability of' hospital beds and trained people to care for those who have received substantial radiation doses, there is reason to conclude that " adequate interim compensating actions have
--14/ Dr. Linnemann noted that it is not at all unusual for hospitals to be capable of treating patients with radiation injury. Tr. 7728-29.
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been or will be taken promptly." 1E/
C. Ability of Offsite Jurisdictions to Monitor and Assess Radiological' Emergencies I. Background j The governing regulation, 10 CFR 50. 47 (b) (9) , requires the applicants and local jurisdictions to have "[a]dequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring i
actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological -
emergency . . . ." -16/ The Licensing Board explained the I
1 15/ In view of our disposition of this point, we need not decide whether the Licensing Board erred in considering as one of the. bases for allowing full power operation that the probability of any nuclear accident during the first six months of operation was remote.
16/ This requirement is generally broken down to cover two-distinct types of radiological hazard -- that associated with exposure to the radioactive plume and that associated with the ingestion pathway. Plume l exposure occurs when persons are (1) directly exposed
! to radiation emitted by the plume, (2) exposed to materials they may have inhaled from the plume, or (3) exposed to radiation from material deposited on the ground from the plume. Radiation exposure from the ingestion pathway occurs when persons eat or drink j material that has become contaminated by the depositing of radioactive material from the plume onto the ground or into the water supply. The most important ingestion pathway is typically the grass-cow-milk-human chain.
See generally NUREG-0654, note 5 suora, at 14-17; Applicants' Exhibit 53 at II-2-3.
- Intervenors' argument is directed mainly to the plume EPZ monitoring and assessment requirement. See pp. 24, 29-32, infra.
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23 importance of this requirement in its decision (15 NRC at (slip opinion at 47));
i j Should there be an actual or potential radiological release from San Onofre, the nature
'and magnitude of the release and the prevailing
! meteorological conditions must be established and
! kept current so that potential offsite doses can
- be projected. Such projections give decision-makers in the offsite response organizations the information they need to make correct decisions concerning the appropriate protective action --
sheltering or evacuation. Field monitoring j confirms the accuracy of offsite dose projections made on the basis of onsite data.
The Board noted that all parties had acknowledged there i
4 were deficiencies in the radiation assessment capabilities
]
l of the local jurisdictions. Id. a t __ (slip opinion at 48).
Accordingly, the Board focused its attention primarily on whether the applicants' capabilities could meet all needs j for radiation monitoring and assessment in the plume EPZ.
! After reviewing those capabilities, the Board found that.
"the [alpplicants, at least with the emergency support from other utilities, can carry out all of the necessary radiological assessment and monitoring, both onsite and in f the plume EPZ." Id. at __ (slip opinion at 49). In addition, the Board found that the offsite organizations possessed significant capabilities in this regard and would i
l assist the applicants in an emergency. Ibid. The Licensing i
Board's ultimate finding was that deficiencies in the offsite response organizations in meeting applicable standards for assessment and 4 monitoring in the plume exposure pathway are not significant for San Onofre within the meaning of i
. . - - - - _ _ -,, . . . _ - - . . . . - - _ , . ,- , , . , _ . - _ , . - . ~ , - - _ . . - - . . _ _ _
24 10 CFR 50. 47 (c) (1) . This means that such deficiencies are not an impediment to licensing.
Id. at __ (slip opinion at 49-50). See also id. at __ (slip opinion at 165-67. 17/
Intervenors challenge the factual basis for the Board's conclusion and contend that, as a matter of law, redundant monitoring and assessment capability must exist in offsite jurisdictions in order to provide a reasonable basis for protective action response. 18- /
- 2. Analysis The NUREG-0654 guidance that-implements the Commission's emergency planning requirements provides, among
! other things, that in an accident situation a licensee must
! have the capability to measure the radiation levels in the 1
plant. It must also have an onsite Technical Support Center
~~17/ These facts also led the Board to conclude that.
adequate interim compensating action to monitor and l assess radiological releases would be taken within the meaning of 10 CFR 50.47 (c) (1) . 15 NRC at - (slip
! opinion at 213-14). The Board also imposed license conditions requiring the applicants to maintain their-monitoring and assessment capabilities at no less a level of readiness than was described at the hearing, and to have installed and operating within six months after full power operation a second meteorological tower and a health physics computer to perform offsite dose calculations in the event of an accident.
18/ Application for Stay of Full Power License (June 1, 1982) at 3-4.
_ _ - _ - - .= =-
i 25 j (TSC) and an offsite Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) capable of taking radiological and meteorological data and making an acsossment of actual and potential offsite radiatica exposure. See NUREG-0654, note 5 supra, at 56-57, Criteria I.1-I.6. The offsite organizations (i . e . , the local governments) are to be able to put equipped, trained j monitoring teams into the field to make dose measurements, including the measurement of radioiodine in the air. Id. at 57-58, Criteria I.7-I-11. These localities should then be able to decide upon and implement protective actions, such as sheltering or evacuation, based upon and consistent with the radiological hazards information that has been provided.
Id. at 61-64, Criteria J.9-J.10.
i
- a. It is plain from the record that the applicants have the ability to assess potential offsite radiological i
! consequences and to provide local officials with the l
information necessary for their decisions. Two independent fa~cilities are at the applicants' disposal for this purpose.
i l The most important dose assessment capability is that l
provided by the applicants' Technical Support Center adjacent to the plant control room. This facility has immediate access to in-plant radiation and effluent i monitoring information, as well as to meteorological I information and data regarding the status of other crucial plant parameters that may govern the future course of an accident. See NUREG-0712, Safety Evaluation Report l
l
26 (February 1981), at 13-8; Tr. 7165-67. The TSC is in direct communication with each of the surrounding jurisdictions through their emergency operations centers and can provide them directly with dose assessment information. Tr. 7377.
The TSC also receives offsite dose monitoring results from field teams sent out by the applicants and by the offsite l organizations. Tr. 7170-75.
In addition, the applicants have an offsite dose L
assessment center (ODAC) in the Emergency Operations Facility. 19/
In the event of an accident the ODAC will be manned by the applicants' trained technical personnel, a health physicist from Orange County, and representatives from other local organizations and the State. Tr. 7379-80.
This facility is in direct communication with the TSC and.
would receive the results of offsite radiation monitoring activity. Consequently,-the present facilities provide independent capabilities for radiological consequences assessment in which the offsite jurisdictions would participate directly in a technical role.
The ODAC is also capable of being used to provide local officials who are stationed at the various emergency
--19/ At present the EOF and ODAC are located in a fire station in San Clemente several miles from the plant.
A new EOF is under construction on company land considerably closer to the plant. Completion is projected for October 1982.
27 operations centers with information upon which-their protective action decisions can be based. While the ODAC does not have direct access to plant monitoring information, these data are accessible through the communications link with the TSC. See Tr. 7379-80. The Licensing Board's requirement that the applicants are to install a dedicated computer for the calculation of offsite dose information will strengthen this system further. Tr. 7176, 7607-08.
See n.17 supra, i
- b. In terms of monitoring capability, each of the surrounding jurisdictions has the ability (as do the
' applicants) to send equipped and trained dose. monitoring
- teams to the field. These jurisdictions include Orange County, the City of San Clemente, San Diego County, and Camp Pendleton. Tr. 8606-08,8919, 9320-21, 9338. There has been i significant improvement in this regard since the May 1981 l
l- emergency planning exercise, when the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) criticized the local jurisdictions' monitoring capabilities. 15 NRC at __ and materials there l
I l
l l
l t
i i
28 cited (slip opinion at 143-44). --20/
In sum, the applicants have two facilities, each capable of providing local officials with timely dose assessments from information generated at the nuclear power plant and obtained by offsite monitoring teams. 21/
Moreover, each of the offsite jurisdictions has substantial dose monitoring capability that can supplement that of the applicants. We conclude, therefore, that there exists redundant capability to gather and assess radiological consequences information and to provide that information in l
l 20/ Another training exercise involving these jurisdictions was carried out on April 15, 1982 and evaluated by FEMA. Although FEMA's evaluation material is outside the record of these proceedings, no party objects to our looking at the evaluation for the specific purpose of confirming that the monitoring capabilities have not deteriorated since the time of the evidentiary hearing.
App. Tr. 82. They have not deteriorated. We note this summary statement found on page ii of the evaluation:
"Overall, our observations concluded that all jurisdictions reflected an adequate or better capability to respond to an offsite emergency at San Onofre N.G.S."
~~21/ We do not mean to suggest that both the Technical Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility should provide this information to the emergency operations centers. The ODAC in the EOF is to be the primary source of information, once it is functioning.
Tr. 7379-80, 8948-49.
)..
4 29 a timely manner to those officials who must use it to make protective action decisions.
As to intervenors' other argument (offered without j support), We are unpersuaded that as a matter of law
! deficiencies in the monitoring and assessment capabilities of offsite jurisdictions cannot be compensated for by the applicants' system. On its face, 10 CFR 50.47 (c) (1) allows
! compensating measures to be undertaken for any emergency l planning deficiency. There is no reason why one trained, 1
equipped, and capable offsite radiation monitoring team can i not be substituted for another, whether it is that of the i applicants or that manned by local government personnel.
Moreover, to the extent the requirement for local monitoring and assessment capability evinces a policy judgment that those who bear the responsibility for sheltering or evacuation decisions should be closely involved in the-f monitoring and assessment process, the record demonstrates that such is already the case. See pp. 26-27, suora.
Intervenors have not made a strong showing that the i
Licensing Board's decision on the adequacy of radiological assessment and monitoring capability is erroneous.
D. Other Issues J Intervenors also seek a stay of full power operation based upon the Board's refusal to find that emergency plans i for radiological monitoring and assessment in the ingestion 1
emergency planning zone are adequate. The Board termed the J
_ _ , _ . . - - . . ,. . . , - , . . . _ - , _ - . . _ _ _ - - _ . . ,m.~. . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . .
i l 30 record on this matter " decidedly equivocal" and (because of intervenors' failure to propose findings of fact) ruled that the issue was uncontested, to be resolved informally by the staff prior to full power operation. 15 NRC at __ (slip opinion at 63-67). The Board's hesitancy on the question of adequacy stemmed from the fact that the lead role in emergency planning and implementation for the ingestion EPZ is given to the State. While the applicants had "done about all that might reasonably be expected of them in this' area,"
the Board found that the State plan was still evolving. .Id.
at , (slip opinion at 64, 65-66). 22/
22/ Applicants submitted an extensive study of potential radiological hazards in the ingestion pathway EPZ in the event of a serious accident, a study that included suggested protective response levels for food, milk, and water. -Applicants' Exhibit 121. They also presented an emergency response plan for the ingestion pathway. Applicants' Exhibit 143. The latter document was reviewed by the State Health Department and was found to be " excellent, generally well organized, concise and consistent with the RHS [Radiologica.1 Health Services]) planning procedures document."
Applicants' Exhibit 159. See also Tr. 7388-89. Mr.
David F. Pilmer, for the applicant, testified that the State had prepared a draft emergency plan for the ingestion pathway, which assigns responsibilities to the local jurisdictions and designates the State's supporting role. Tr. 11,115. He also indicated that the applicants' plan would guide the ODAC personnel in selecting appropriate pathway samples and evaluating them. Tr. 11,123. The Orange County Emergency plan includes provisions for taking samples of water and foodstuffs, and the County has an agreement with the University of California at Irvine to analyze such samples. Tr. 8982-83.
0 31 Intervenors have not made a strong showing that the Board's disposition of this issue was erroneous. Where a party has not pursued a contention before the Licensing Board through proposed findings of fact, we will not entertain it "for the first time on appeal -- absent a
' serious substantive issue.'" Public Service Electric and Gas Co. (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1),
ALAB-650, 14 NRC 43, 49 (1981). Here, a serious substantive issue is not presented by the Licensing Board's determina-tion to leave the monitoring adequacy question for resolution by the staff. As we have previously remarked:
"at the operating license stage, the staff generally has the final word on all safety matters not placed into controversy by the parties." South Carolina Electric and Gas Co.
(Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1) , ALAB-663, 14 NRC 1140, 1156 n.31 (1981). This does not work an unfairness or compromise safety. The NRC staff has a continuing responsibility to assure that all regulatory requirements are met by an applicant and continue to be met throughout i
l
D 1
1 32 the operating life of a nuclear power plant. 2}/
We thus see no basis for a stay based upon the Board's relegation of an uncontested issue to the staff for resolution."
Lastly, intervenors argue that the Licensing Board applied an erroneous standard in judging the adequacy of applicants' emergency plan, violated intervenors' due process rights by not allowing discovery directed to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and erroneously countenanced ex parte communications among the NRC staff, applicants, and FEMA.
These arguments can be disposed of quickly. As to the first, intervenors claim that the Licensing Board adopted "a
--23/ As we said in South Carolina Electric and Gas Co.
(Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1) , ALAB-642, 13 NRC 881, 895-96 (1981), affirmed sub. nom. Fairfield United Action v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, No.
81-2042 (D.C. Cir., April 28, 1982):
(Aln operating license may not issue unless and until this agency makes the findings specified in 10 CFR 50.57 -- including the ultimate finding that such issuance "will not be inimical to * *
- the health and safety of the public". As to those aspects of reactor operation not considered in an adjudicatory proceeding (if one is conducted), it is the staff's duty to insure the existence of an adequate basis for each of the requisite Section 50.57 determinations (footnote omitted).
e o
33 standard that what there is, is adequate." 24/ -
The argument is offered without elaboration, and we can see no support for it. The Licensing Board's 220-page opinion provides the detailed factual basis and regulatory support for the Board's conclusion that the applicants' emergency plan passes muster. To the extent intervenors' mean to argue that the adequacy of the emergency plan must be tested by a cost / benefit analysis, again we are offered no supporting elaboration for such a requirement. In any event, we are of the view, at least preliminarily, that the emergency planning rule itself already accounts for whatever cost / benefit analysis might be necessary. As the applicants rightly remark, "[t]he emergency planning zone concept [in the Commission's rules already) takes into account the broad range of radiological accidents and dose consequences to the public from such accidents." 25/ It need not be reanalyzed -
in each individual proceeding.
The claimed violation of due process rights and ex parte irregularities also fall far short of a strong showing 24/ Application for Stay of Full Power License (June 1, 1982) at 5.
15/ Applicants' Response in Opposition to Application of Intervenors Guard et al. for a Stay of Full Power License (June 16, 1982) at 7.
_ -..___ _ .. I
34 on the merits. While intervenors now urge that they were-denied discovery against FEMA, the record reveals that intervenors never sought to depose any FEMA witnesses. Tr.
643-49. So too, nothing in the Commission's ex parte rule (10 CFR 2.780) precludes conversations among parties, none of whom is a decisionmaker in the licensing proceeding. We doubt intervenors will persuade us in the pending appeal that it was improper for FEMA, the applicants, and the staff to confer about defects in the applicants' emergency plan and to suggest ways to correct them.
In sum, intervenors have not made a strong showing that.
they are likely to prevail on the merits of either the substantive or procedural issues they have raised. To the extent the Licensing Board identified deficiencies in applicants' emergency planning for San Onofre, those deficiencies are being compensated for by other measures now in place. We therefore conclude that intervenors are not threatened with irreparable injury by the prospect of a full power operating license being issued for San Onofre and that
- )
35 the public interest favors denial of their stay appplica-
-tion. 26/
For all the foregoing reasons, intervenors' motion for a stay pending appeal is denied. ,
It is so ORDERED. ',-
FOR THE APPEAL BOARD Q,b -3M___A. -
C. J44n Slfoemaker SecreYary to the Appeal Board r
f k
/
l 26/ We also note that before a full power license issues, !
the. Commission must complete its immediate effectiveness review pursuant to 10 CFR 2.764 (f) (2) ,
and the staff must resolve certain open issues. See p..
- 30, supra.
i s
1 i
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