ML20054G807
| ML20054G807 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 06/18/1982 |
| From: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Fiedler P JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| TASK-04-02, TASK-15-08, TASK-15-8, TASK-4-2, TASK-RR LSO5-82-06-056, LSO5-82-6-56, NUDOCS 8206220318 | |
| Download: ML20054G807 (6) | |
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June 18, 1982 Docket No. 50-219 LS05-82 056 Mr. P. B. Fiedler Vice President and Director - Oyster Creek Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Post Office Box 388 Forked River, New Jersey 08731
Dear Mr. Fiedler:
SUBJECT:
0YSTER CREEK - SEP TOPICS IV-2, REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS DESIGN AND PROTECTION AGAlflST SINGLE FAILURES AND XV-8, CONTROL R0D MISOPERATI0tl l
The enclosed staff safety evaluation report notes that, because you have not provided sufficient information regarding reactivity control, our review of Topic IV-2 is not complete. As a result, our previous safety evaluation of Topic XV-8, Control Rod Hisoperation, which was based on the assumption that the criteria of Topic IV-2 are met, is not considered valid until GPU can show how the reactivity control systems meet the criteria specified in the enclosure to this letter. Accordingly, our conclusion regarding Topic IV-2 is that there exists a potential for single failures in the rod control system that would allow multiple control rod withdrawals and this condition does not meet current licensing criteria.
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You are requested to::
1 1.
Demonstrate the similarity between Oyster Creek and Dresden Unit 2, or 2.
Provide a suitable single failure analysis upon which the staff can substantiate its assumption, or D
3.
Revise Topic XV-8 to reflect the consequence of multiple control rod g~
withdrawal.
T This safety evaluation may be revised in the future if your facil.ity design is changed or if the NRC criteria relating to this topic are modified before the integrated assessment is completed.
In future correspondence l
l re9arding this topic, please referrto the topic number in your cover letter.
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Docket No. 50-219 LS05 Mr. P. B. Fiedler Vice President and Director - Oyster Creek Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Post Office Box 388 Forked River, New Jersey 08731
Dear Mr. Fiedler:
SUBJECT:
OYSTER CREEK - SEP TOPICSTIV-2, REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS DESIGN AND PROTECTION AGAINST SINGLE FAILURES AND XV 8, CONTROL ROD MISOPERATION The enclosed staff safety evaluation report notes that, because you have 7
not provided sufficient information regarding reactivity control, our review of Topic IV-2 is not complete. As a result, our previous 1 safety t
evaluation of Topic XV-8, Control Rod Misoperation, which was based on the assumption that the criteria of Topic IV-2 are met, is not consid-ered valid until GPU can show how the reactivity control systems meet j
the criteria specified in the enclosure to this letter. Accordingly,
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our conclusion regarding Topic IV-2 is that there TexTsts a potent'ial for ~~
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single failures in the rod control system that would allow multiple j
control rod withdrawals and this condition does not meet current licensing criteria.
i You are requested to provide your basis for assuming that the reactor protection systen provides protection against all such failures. This infonnation, supporting contained operation, must be provided within 30 days.
Sincerely, Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licensing
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/ enclosure:
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Mr. P. B. Fiedler
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CC G. F. Trowbridge, Esquire Resident Inspector Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trewbridge c/o U. S. NRC 1800 M Street, N. W.
Post Office Box 445 Washington, D. C.
20036 Forked River, New Jersey 08731 J. B. Lieberman, Esquire Commissioner Berlack, Israels & Lieberman New Jersey Department of Energy 26 Broadway 101 Commerce Street New York, New York 10004 Newark, New Jersey 07102 Ronald C. Haynes, Regional Administrator Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsyl.vania 19406 J.. Knubel BWR Licensing Manager GPU Nuclear 100 Interplace Parkway Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 Deputy Attorney General
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State of New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety 36 West State Street - CN 112 Trenton,' New Jersey 08625 Mayor Lacey Township 818 Lacey Road Forked fiver, New Jersey 08731 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Region II Office ATTN:
Regional Radiation Representative 26 Federal Plaza New York, New York 10007 Licensing Supervisor Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Post Office Box 388 Forked River, New Jersey 08731
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SAFETY EVALUATIONIEPORT SEP TOPIC IV-2,1 EAGTIV N E CW Tft0t4 YSTEMS INCLUDING FUNCTIONAL DESIGN AND PROTECTION AGAINST SINGLE FAILURES OYSTER CREEK NUCL9Rf0WERfLANT DOCKET NO. 50-219 1.
INTRODUCTION The purpose of this evaluation is to insure that the design basis fo r the Oyster Creek reactivity control systems is consistent with analyses rmed to verify that the protection system meets General Design Criterion 25 Gen-eral Design Criterion 25 requires that the reactor protection sy to assure that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceed d f e
or any single malfunction of the reactivity control systems, such as accid rawal of control rods.
Reactivity control systems need not be single failure proof However, the protection system must be capable of assuring that acc e fuel design limits are not exceeded in the event of a single failure in t c v ty control systems.
The review criterion, covered in this evaluation, is addressed 7.
in Section II.
Review areas that are not covered, but are related and esse G
the completion of this topic, are covered by other SEP topics addressed n Section III.
The scope of the SEP topics is defined in the " Report on the System Evaluation of Operating Facilities" dated November 25, 1977.
This report is limited to the identification of inadvertent control rod withdrawals and malpositioning of control rods which may occur as a result of single failures in the control rod drive system.
j "%'l-2 II.
REVIEW CRITERION The review criterion for this topic is based upon Section 7.7, Part II of the NRC Standard Review Plan.
In the specific case of the reactivity control systems a single failure shall not cause plant conditions more severe than those for which the reactor protection system is designed.
111.
RELATED'SATETY TOPICS The following listed review areas are not covered in this report, but are related and essential to the completion'of this topic.
These review areas are covered by other SEP topics as indicated below.
1.
Analyses of, the consequences of control rod withdrawals and the i
malpositioning of control rods which may occur as a result of single failures in the electrical circuits of the reactivity control 4
systems are covered by SEP Topic XV-8, " Control Rod Misoperation (System Malfunction or Operator Error)".
2.
Analyses of reactivity insertions occurring as a result of inadvertent reactor coolant pressure increases or temperature decreases are covered in SEP Topic XV-1, " Decrease In Feedwater Temperature, Increase In Feedwater Flow, increase In Steam Flow and Inadvertent Opening of Steam G, enerator Relief or Safety Valve;" SEP Topic XV-3, " Loss of External Load, Turbine Trip, Loss of Condenser Vacuum, Closure of Main Steam Isolation Valve (BWR),and Steam Pressure Regulator Failure (Closed);"
l and SEP Topic XV-9, "Startup of an Inactive Loop or Recirculation Loop at an Incorrect Temperature, and Flow Controller Malfunction Causing an Increase in BWR Core Flow Rate."
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W IV.
REVIEW GUIDELINES The purpose of this evaluation is to identify inadvertent control rod withdrawals and malpositioning of control rods which may occur as a result of single failure in the control rod drive system for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Plant.
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V.
EVALUATION Information describing single failures within the control rod drive system which can cause control rod withdrawals and malpositionings at the Oyster
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Creek Nuclear Power Plant was not provided as requested in a D. M. Crutch-t field letter to I. R. Finfrock, Jr., d:ted December 15, 1980.
Based upon an audit review of the information provided by other licensees we conclude m
that there is no basis for assuming that Oyster Creek will not be subject
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to uncontrolled motion of one or more rods (i_ncluding rod drift and rod h
dropl as a result of single failures.
VI.
CONCLUSION The NRC review of Topic XV-18, " Radiological Consequences," assumed rod motions which are consistent with the design of the Dresden 2 Nuclear Power Plant control rod drive system which precludes operation of more than one control rod at a time (excluding reactor trip).
The licensee should either perform (1) comparison to Dresden 2 or (2) single failure analysis or (3) perform an evaluation of the effects of multiple rod drops, rod drifting and movement upon the reactor core,
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