ML20054D812

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Discusses Actions to Be Taken to Resolve Deficiencies in Emergency Preparedness Program,Per 810629 Telcon.App B, Deficiencies & App C,Preparedness Improvement Items Encl
ML20054D812
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/30/1981
From: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To: Robert E. Uhrig
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
Shared Package
ML20054D801 List:
References
NUDOCS 8204230406
Download: ML20054D812 (8)


Text

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6/30/81 APPE!! DIX A Florida Power and Light Company ATTM: Dr. R. E. Uhr19. Vice President Advanced Systems and Technology P. O. Box 529100 Miami FL 33152 Gewitlemen:

Subject:

Confirmatica of Action This refers to a telephone conversation on June 29. 1981, between Mr. A. D. Schmidt. Vice President. Power Resources and Mr. R. C. Lewis of this office conesraing our appraisal of the energency preparedness program fbr the St. Lucie facility. Our findings were also discussed on June 22, 1981, by Mr. G. R. Jenkins of this office with Mr. C. M. Wethy.

Plant Manager, 1

With regard to matters discussed. it is our understanding that you have undertaken or will undertake the fbilowing actions to resolve apparent deficiencies,in your suergency preparedness progren:

metourslegical data (g the intei..^dtion of delta temperature (AT)

Instructions regardin 1.

digital vs. strip chart recorder) fa procedure

~

EPIP #33 were completed on June 22. 1981, and incinded in the night order book fbr the Necteer Plant Supervisor (Emergency coordinator) and others who may succeed to the position of Emergency Coordinator, to provide an accurate estimation of the projected offsite dose. The digital readout instrusset will be modified fees the 10 second instanta-neous roedout to a 15 minute average readout fbr AT meteorological data and appropriate revision will be made to EPIP #33 by August 24. 1981.

2.

A procedure will be developed for verificattaa of radiation readings of the post Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) monitors before estimation of the projected offsite dose by July 13. 1981.

3.

A procedure will be developed to determine the source tern in the event of an accident, including the means for converting concentrations to release rates in units of curies per second to arrive at the projected l

doses, by August 24. 1981.

4.

Offsite radiological monitoring teams composed of Plant St. Lucie personnel will be established by July 13. 1981.

5.

The capability will be developed to usesure radiciodines to a sensitivity of 10 7 micro-curies per cubic centimeter (pC1/cc) under field conditions by S.v^ c r 21, 1981.

8204280 D

5 *::.

Florida Power and Light Company -

Please inform this office inmediately if your understanding of this matter is different from that stated above.

Sincerely, nr.o-ames P. O'Reilly frector cc:

C. M. Wethy, Plant Manager B. J. Escue, Plant Manager Nat Weems, QA Construction flanager I

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t APPENDIX B EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS DEFICIENCIES Based on the results of the NRC's appraisal of the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness Program, conducted June 8-19, 1981, the following emergency preparedness deficiencies were identified.

(References are to Sections in OIE Report No. 50-335/81-13.)

l'.

10 CFR 50.47(b) planning standard (2) states, "On-Shift facility licensee responsibilities for emergency preparedness are unambiguously defined, adequate staffing to provide initial facility accident response in key functional areas is maintained at all times, timely augmentation of response capability is available, and the interface among various onsite response activities and offsite support activities are specified."

The onsite staff augmentation of the initial emergency response capability does not meet the specific staffing recommendations _ expressed in NUREG-0654, Table B-1, and an acceptable alternative has not been provided. (2.1) 2.

10 CFR 50.47(b) planning standard (9) states, " Adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of s radiological emergency condition are in use."

Emergency procedures for offsite dose assessment have not been adequately established in that the following items have not yet been resolved.

a.

There is no procedure to implement the accident assessment scheme (operational and radiological) to provide for collection of information needed for decisions on escalating or de-escalating onsite corrective /

protectiv3 actions for emergency events and announcing termination of such events. (5.4.2) b.

There has been no modification and clarification of EPIP 3100021E so as to not " override" the instructions of EPIP 3100033E. (5.4.2) c.

There are no emergency procedures containing instructions for Health Physics personnel defining methods, equipment, communications and radiation protection guidance for emergency in plant and onsite (out-of plant) radiological surveys.

(5.4.2.2, and 5.4.2.3) d.

There has been no development of a radiological and environmental emergency monitoring program, including procedures, which interfaces with the offsite support in this area from the State of Florida and responding federal agencies. (5.4.2.12) 3.

10 CFR 50.47(b) planning standard (7) states, "Information is made available i

to the public on a periodic basis on how they will be notified and what

l Appendix B 2

Emergency Preparedness Deficiencies their initial actions should be in an emergency (e.g., listening to a local broadcast station and remaining indoors), the principal points of contact with the news media for dissemination of information during an emergency (including the physical location or locations) are established in advance, and procedures for coordinated dissemination of information to the public are established."

In this area, the following items were identified:

a.

A coordinated public information program has not been established for dissemination of emergency planning information to the public within the plume EPZ.

b.

There are no provisions for establishment and distribution of the information package.

c.

Provisions have not been established for updating and dissemination of emergency planning information on an annual basis. (6.2)

APPENDIX C PREPAREDNESS IMPROVEMENT ITEMS Based on the resuls of the NRC's appraisal of the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness Program, conducted on June 8-19, 1981, the following items should be considered for improvement. (References are to Sections in OIE Report No. 50-335/81-13).

1.

Appointing an individual to the position of Emergency Planning Coordinator at the site with no other additional duties. Consider also appointing this person as a member of the Facility Review Group. (1.0) 2.

Including in the Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) a description of the duties, responsibilities and authority of the Radiological Emergency Planning Supervisor. (1.0) 3.

Expanding the radiological emergency training for the RPM to include estimation of dose rates on a location-by-location basis under varying accident conditions. (3.1) 4.

Incit ding in the training for Nuclear Plant Supervisors and Nuclear Watch Engineers emphasis on radiological assessment and protective actions. (3.1) 5.

Establishing and/or finalizing the following items and incorporating them into the training program:

a.

HP emergency and radiological assessment procedures, b.

Operational aspects of the emergency organization and the relationships of the various functional areas to the entire organization. (3.1) 6.

Identifying the OSC supervisor and alternate. (4.1.1.3) 7.

Including a dedicated telephone extension in the OSC communications system to the Control Room and one to the TSC. (4.1.1.3) 8.

Identifying a backup OSC location in the event the primary facility becomes untenable and establishing procedures for evacuation of OSC personnel, and how the relocated OSC will perform its function. (4.1.1.3) 9.

Providing a larger assembly area for the evacuees from the Protected Area as defined in the REP. (4.1.2.1) 10.

Providing assembly and evacuation guidance for personnel working on Unit 2 side. (4.1.2.1)

Appendix C 2

Preparedness Improvement Items 11.

Coordinating with the Lawnwood Medical Center in establishing procedures for determining waste hold-up tank level, sampling and action levels and disposal of waste water. (4.1.2.2) 12.

Providing and indicating specific decontamination equipment and procedures at each of the personnel assembly / reassembly areas. (4.1.2.3) 13.

Identifying clearly the Emergency News Center (ENC) in the training trailer adjacent to the interim EOF. (4.1.4) 14.

Improving the telephone facilities for the press with regard to number and capability for long distance calls. (4.1.4) 15.

Describing the provisions for media badging and crowd control at the ENC.

(4.1.4) 16.

Describing the suppart services provided at the alternate ENC (i.e.,

telephone service, copying, audio-visual equipment and security). (4.1.4) 17.

Upgrading the emergency kit located at the Lawnwood Medical Center to incorporate the following items:

Removing old implementing procedures from the emergency kit storage a.

area, and b.

Listing on the inventory sheet the large roll of blotter paper which is stored in the emergency kit area for protection of the corridor from contamination. (4.2.1.1) l 18.

Detailing the meteorological considerations used in the dose assessment procedure.

(A unique technical bases document supporting the assessment does not exist.

This document should address " sea breeze" effects.)

(4.2.1.4) 19.

Clarifying the meteorological data used in the dose assessment procedure, e.g., data source (strip chart vs. LED), and data resolution (delta T scaling, stability grouping, wind speed stratification and default values).

(4.2.1.4) 20.

Installing separate commercial lines, plant PAX and TSC/ EOF tie-lines for both licensee and NRC personnel in the TSC. (4.2.3) 21.

Providing dedicated transportation for emergency team transportation.

(4.2.6) 22.

Providing controls to insure availability of licensee twned vehicles to provide emergency transportation. (4.2.6)

T Appendix C 3

Preparedness Improvement Items

23. Me3hing the following Off-normal / Emergency Operating Procedures with the EPIP: (5.2)

NUMBER REV. #

PROCEDURE TITLE 0030140 19 Blackout Operation 0030141 7

Control Room Inaccessibility 01200031 5

Excessive Reactor Coolant System Leakage 01200032 2

Excessive Reactor Coolant System Activity 0120040 7

Loss of Reactor Coolant Flow 0120041 8

Steam Generator Tube Leak Failure 3

0360040 1

Operational Requirements for Interim Ultimate Heat Sink 0810040 10 Main Steam Line Break 1300030 1

Loss of Containment Integrity: Off-Normal Operation 1600030 1

Accident Involving New or Spent Fuel 24.

Providing emergency procedures and instructions for the Health Physics l

personnel to define methods and equipment for the detection of particulate activity in air of IE-09 pci/cc, communications, and radiation protection l

guidance for emergency offsite radiological surveys. (5.4.2.1) 25.

Providing sample storage and proper radiation area demarcation in the j

alternate (cold) lab.

(5.4.2.4-5.4.2.9) 26.

Including in the present liquid effluent sampling and analysis procedures specific instructions which could apply to emergency sampling or provide a separate emergency procedure. (5.4.2.10-11) 27.

Designating a primary and secondary evacuation route. (5.4.3.2) 28.

Establishing evacuation route signs at the intersections of the plant egress roads and Route AIA, and to the designated assembly areas. (5.4.3.2) 29.

Developing specific procedures for the Security Guard Force for emergency conditiens involving personnel accountability. (5.4.3.3) 30.

Developing specific procedures for Security Guard Force Personnel under emergency conditions.

(5.4.4) l l.

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l Appendix C 4

Preparednes's Improvement Items 31.

Providing emergency procedures defining repair / corrective actions. (5.4.5) 32.

Providing additional specification of some State and County officials in order to complete the notification lists. (5.4.7) 33.

Clarifying plans for coordinating information among the various spokesmen of the various organizations and groups. (5.4.7) 34.

Finalizing the plans for rumor control. (5.4.7) 35.

Revising the procedure for inventory of emergency equipment to provide additional assurance that the emergency kits will have dedicated, up-to-date equipment at all times. (5.5.1) 36.

Changing the reference in Operating Procedure HP-90, in item 8.10 from "4.5" to "4.4", and adding another column to inventory sheets titled " Operability Check" to assist in the operational check of the equipment. (5.5.1) 37.

Including in the proper emergency kits:

1) stop watches, 2) appropriate H.P. procedures, and 3) high-range dosimeters to allow monitoring of emergency-type radiation doses. (5.5.1) 38.

Cacumenting communication tests when conducted. (5.5.2) 39.

Changing Section 7.3.1, of the REP to require EPIPs to be reviewed at least every 12 months. (5.5.3) 40.

Documenting the review of EPIP's 24E and 31E. (5.5.3) 41.

Changing Section 7.3.4 of the REP to require audits of the emergency preparedness program at least every 12 months. (5.5.4) 42.

Developing a specific program for familiarizing the news media with emergency plans and associated details. (6.3) 43.

Conducting the initial,1ews media familiarization and provide for a repeat on an annual basis. (6.3)