ML20052H670
| ML20052H670 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron, Braidwood, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 04/30/1982 |
| From: | GENERAL ATOMICS (FORMERLY GA TECHNOLOGIES, INC./GENER |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20052H663 | List: |
| References | |
| GA-C16444, GA-C16444-R01, GA-C16444-R1, NUDOCS 8205210324 | |
| Download: ML20052H670 (150) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:, o, . . .- GA-C16444 i e B B I Byron Units 1 & 2 B Braidwood Units 1 & 2 E Auxiliary Feedwater System i Reliability Analysis FINAL REPORT ' i 5 h PREPARED FOR
! Commonwealth Edison a
O AUGUST 1981 REVISION 1 - APRIL 1982 s a m ts w as e m m3g g a MEY
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u e a TABLE OF CONTENTS I FOREWORD 1.0 I n tr o du c t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 1.1 Obj e c t iv e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 1.2 Background ............................................ 1-2 1.3 S co p e o f S t u dy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2 1.4 Cr i t er ia and A s s um p t io n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2 2.0 Summary of the AFS Reliability S tudy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1 2.1 NUR EG-0611 Method of Analy s is (Qualitative) . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1 2.2 Me thod o f Quan tita tiv e Analy s is . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1 2.3 Comparison of Assessment Methods ...................... 2-7 2.4 Findings .............................................. 2-2 2.5 Recommendations for the AFS Operation ................ 2-3 3.0 S y s t em s D e s c r i p t i o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1 3.1 G ener al AFS Inf orma tion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1 3.2 S y s t em O pe r a t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1
. 3.2.1 Water Pathway .................................. 3-3 y 3.2.2 Auxiliary Fe edva ter Drive s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3 7 v 3.2.3 Valving ........................................ 3-5 2 p .3 Inspection and Testing Requirements .................. 3-6 d
31 . 4 Instrumentation and Control .......................... 3-6 46 . 5 Sup por ting Sy s t em s and S our ce s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - 3-6
@ h .6 Technical Specification Limitations .................. 3-7 W ).7 S urveil lan c e R eq uir em en t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1 4.0 s e11ab i11 t, ina 1y s i s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1 4.1 Event Tree Construction .............................. 4-1 4.1.1 LMFW ........................................... 4-1
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4.1.2 Loss of the Offsite Power (LHFW LOOP) .......... 4-2 i 4.1.3 Los s of All AC Power (LMFW LQAC) . . . . . . . . . .'. . . . . 4-2 4.2 Qualitative Reliability Analy s is . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3 p 4.2.1 NUREG-0611 Comparative Reliability Analysis .... 4-3 l 3 4.3 Quantitative Reliability Evaluation .................. 4-3 4.3.1 R eliability BLo ck Diagr am Analy sis . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4 ] v 4.3.2 Faul t Tree Quantif ica tion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-10 0 5.0 References ................................................. 5-1 Y as 1. Am
c. TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued APPENDICES l Appendix A Data Base ' i ) Appendix B AFS Reliability Block Diagram Appendix C Master Fault Tree Appendix D Human Error Fault Tree E
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- -~- Appendix E ~ Testing and Maintenance Fault Tree ~~ Appendix F Common Cause Failures l Appendix G Fault Tree Analysis Using MOCUS and STADIC Appendix H B/B Piping and Instrumentation Drawing for Auxiliary Feedwater Appendix I B/B Electrical Drawings I 3 D E B G l ii.
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- 3 h LIST OF TABLES 2.1 Summary of B/B AF3 Unreliability Estimates 2-4 4.1 Criteria for EUREG-0611 Reliability Comparison I 4.2 R ef . 1 4-12 NUREG-0611 Qualitative Reliability Analysis 4-13 4.3 Byron /Braidwood AFS Unreliability Estimates 4-14 4.4 Byron /Braidvood AFS Unreliability Estimates 4-15 Automatic Switchin vs. Remote Manual Switchin
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of ESW A.I.1 Recommended Data from NUREG-0611 A-5 i A.I.2 Data Tables from WASH-1400 (Ret. 2) A-9 U A.II.1 First Cut AFS Component Estimated Failure , , Rates from Ref. 3 Data A-16 A.II.2.1 Troj an Nuclear Power Plant AFS Experience from Operational Reports A-19 A.II.2.2 Event Summary A-21 A.IV.1 Fault Tree Data Input A-25 It. 3 F.1 A Guide for Assessing the Impact of Common Mode Failures on System Reliability (Ret.13) F-6 G-1 Minimal Cut Sets fcc LMFW Initiating Event G-1 G-2 Unavailability Expressions (STADIC INPUT) G-46 for LMFW IE G-3 Unavailability Expressions (STADIC INPUT) G-48 for LOOP & LQaC IEs i E n
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- k1 LIST OF FIGURES s
2.1 Comparison of This Byron /Braidwood Qualitative 2-5 Assessment with Other Westinghouse AFS Using NUREG-0611 J 2.2 Byron /Braidwood AFS Unreliability Error Spread 2-6 Statistical Independent Estimate E g I 3 .1 Simplified Diagram of AFS for B/B Units 3-8 4.1 Event Tree for LMFW Events with Electric Power 4-16 4.2 Event Tree for LMFW/ LOOP and LMFW/LOAC Events 4-17 4.3 345-KV Switchyard Bus Arrangement-Byron 4-18 i 4.4 345-KV Switchyard Bus Arrangement-Braidwood 4-19 4.5 Comparison of This Byron /Braidwood Qualitative 4-20 Assesscent with Other Westinghouse AFS Using - NUREG-0611 4.6 Byron /Braidwood AFS Unreliability Error Spread 4-21 Statistical Independent Estimate 4.7 Byron /Braidwood AFS Unreliability Error Spread 4-22 Statistical Independent Estimate + Common Cause Estimate 4.8 Byron /Braidwood Simplified Master Fault Tree 4-23 4.9 Maintenance Fault Tree 4-24 C-1 Master Fault Tree C-2 D-1 Human Error Fault Tree D-2 E-1 Maintenance Fault Tree E-2 E-2 Test Fault Tree E-3 I-1 1A(2A) Aux Feedwater Pump Power Sources 1-2 I I-2 6.9KV and 4KV Distribution I-3 I-3 6900 Volt Distribution System I-4 iv .
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f FNWORD GA-C16444 This report was prepared by Torrey Pines Technology Company, a division of General Atomic Company for Commonwealth Edison Company under Purchase Order 25476 (IPT Project Number 2966.054). The issuing of this report completes the work assigned this project. The report authors are: Torrey Pines Technology T. Taniguchi D. Ligon W. Hannaman Commonwealth Edison 4 L. Bowen T. Weis B E E I B l i
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A 3 BYRON /BRAIDWOOD NUCLEAR GENERATING STATONS d AFS RELIABILITY ANALYSIS GA-C16444 1.0 Introduction 1.1 Objectives The objectives of this study were to
. Meet the requirements of the NRC generic letter dated March
- 10. 1980 (Ref. 8).
~ ~
. Meet the acceptance criteria II.5.c7 of NUREG-0800 (Ref. 5).'~~~~
1.2 Backcround The reliability characteristics of the four Byron /Braidwood (B/B)
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LJ Auxiliary Feedwater Systems (AFSs) were evaluated in response to the NRC generic letter of March 10. 1980. NUREG-0611 provides the basis of qualitative comparison for the Byron /Braidwood AFS reliability with F Westinghouse designed operating plants. NUREG-0800 provides the acceptable AFS quantitative range per demand as well as the methods and data to be used. Both qualitative and quantitative reliability results are presanted in this study. B The Byron Unit 1 and 2 and the Braidwood Unit 1 and 2 AFSs are identical systems. The system evaluated in this study is the Byron Unit 1 AFS. The only difference identified between Byron Station and Braidwood Station is the reliability of the of f site power systems. The Braidwood offsite power system is considered to be more reliable for the reasons stated in section 4.1.2. Hence. to be conservative and to simplify the analysis a Byron AFS was chosen to be evaluated. The Byron /Braidwood AFSs are redundant and diverse. The AFSs consist of three (3) trains; saf ety Trains A and B. and a non-safety Train C. Each train can supply 100% of the flow required for residual heat removal. Each pump has a dif ferent power supply. Train A and C
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pumps are electrically dependent. The Train B pump is electrically independent. ,B l {! N 1-1 ll' l l
Trains A and B have two independent water supplies. the condensate storage tank and the essential service water system. The Train C water supply is the condenser hotwell. Trains A and B are automatically actuated. Train C is manually actuated. Trains A and B flows enter the . steam generators (SGs) via the tempering flow lines. Train C flow _ 'f enters the steam generators via either the main feedwater lines or the tempering flow lines. Trains A and B are tested on a monthly basis and .e following each maintenance outa.ge. Train C is operated non periodically on each plant start up and shutdown. Hence, considerable difference b exists between the trains. The potential common cause f ailure areas is the check valves in the pump discharge lines. The remainder of this report describes the Byron /Braidwood AFS reliability analysis assumptions methodology and results. 1.3 Seone of study This study presents a qualitative comparison of the Byron /Braidwood _ AFS design to the operating Westinghouse designed plants using the methodology of NUREG-0611. T This study also presents a quantitative analysis of the AFS using C methods and data presented in NUREG-0611 and NUREG-0635. This quantitative method of analysis consists of two approaches. The detailed analysis was performed using Reliability Block Diagrans (RBD). The uncertainty analysis was perf ormed using f ault trees (FT). The results of each approach were compared to uncover data inconsistencies. modeling differences and unreasonable assumptions. 1.4 Criteria and Assumptions The following analytical criteria. definitions and assumptions have , been made: A. The top event for this study is taken from NUREG-0611 which states: "The time interval of interest for all transient events considered is the availability of the auxiliary feedwater system during the period of time to boil the steam generator dry." B. The 20 to 30 minutes boil dry time assumed in NUREG-0611 is used in this study. C. The following initiating events were used in this study as required by NUREG-0611 and are assumed to occur on one unit , only : ! Event A: Loss of main feedwater (LMFW) with reactor trip (LMFW/RT) Event B: LMFW coincident with loss of offsite power to both units (LMFW/ LOOP) ] I Event C: LMFW coincident with loss of all AC power except for J any derived f rom batteries (LMFW/LOAC) 1-2 1
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n= e D. Availability Criterion: Given that one of the postulated demand events occurs unit AFS availability is detinbd as a success i$ when at least one pump train starts and provides adequate d! f eedwater to at least 2 of 4 steam generators in .5 20 minutes (dryout time). Repair and recovery was not included in this study. E. Availability of AFS Power Sources: The following conditions are met with respect to the postulated demand events and the resulting AFS success.
- 1. LMFW: All AC and DC power available.
I 2. 3. LMFW/ LOOP: Diesel Generator lA or 2A is available for Train A LMFW/LOAC: DC and battery-backed AC available for Train B F. The f ailure rate data base used for quantification was taken I _ _ _ primarily from NUREG-0611. Additional data were taken from Ref erence 2. The compenent f ailure data determined the level of . - detail to which the analysis was taken. G. Degraded Failures: A partially successful performance of any active or passive component was not considered. Each component and each operator action was assumed to be either successful or failed.
, H. AFS Actuation and Control: For automatic operation during emergency shutdown conditions the Engineered Saf ety Feature (ESF) signal is initiated by any steam generator low-low level, saf ety
. injection and/or loss of off site power. This starts AFS Trains A and B. The AFS Trains A. B. and C can also be actuated manually.
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3 y - a 2.0 Semary of the AFS Reliability Study rt: y The two objectives of this study were to evaluate the reliability of the Byron /Braidwood Auxiliary Feedwater Systems for three initiating events and to meet the requirements of the NRC generic letter dated March
% 10. 1980 and NUREG-0800. The results of these evaluations are presented.
4 Findings stem from insights gained through the modeling and calculations indicates that the Byron /Braidwood AFS are Sell designed from the reliability viewpoint. 2.1 NUREG-0611 Method of Analysis (Qualitative) The qualitative analysis of the AFS was achieved according to the qualitative criteria in NUREG-0611. Details of this comparison are presented in Table 4.2 and discussed in Section 4.2. The results are summarized in Figure 2.1.
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2.2
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Method of Ouantitative Analysis ~ h stated: The quantitative analysis of the AFS complied with NUREG-0800 which "An acceptable AWS should have an unreliability in the range of 10-4 to 10-5 per demand on an analysis using methods and data presented in
'i " NUREG-0611 and NUREG-0635.~ Details are presented in Table 4.3 and discussed in Section 4.3. The results are summarized in Table 2.1.
The quantitative analysis was achieved using two methods. The first c method used hand calculations based on point estimated reliability methodology. The second method used prob.bility distributions in a fault tree code. Insights into the impact of AFE reliability were first determined with event trees on a qualitative basis. Reliability Block Diagrams
, (RBDs) were used to study components in the AFS and provide first cut hand calculations to determine important contributors to unreliability. Next.
a fault tree (FT) was developed and processed for the minimal cut sets. Then the STADIC computer code was used to calculate the probabilities and uncertainties for the fault trees under different initiating event conditions. Finally, the computer and hand calculations were compared to assure that the quantitative results are reasonable and within the error spread as determined frem the fault tree analysis. Details of these calculations are presented in Section 4.3. B B~ z 2 m; 2-1
r i 2.3 Comnarison of Ouantitative Methods i i I The two assessment methods should give consistent results if the same assumptions are used in the logic of both RBDs and f ault trees. The two me thods can be made identical for simply defined systems. In this " I analysis both methods were employed to complement each other. The RBD and FT numerical unavailabilities were in close sgreement. The RBD y unavailability estimates were well within the error spread as determined L from the FT estimates. b In the calculation of common cause factors a simplification was made [ in which the point estimates of Beta. c. factor used in common-cause e. , f ailure methodology (Ref. 9 and App.F). were 0.1 for incra train redundancy and 0.03 for inter train redundancy. 2.4 Find in cr e
. The Byron /Braidwood (B/B) three train design is assessed to have high
~, reliabilities (see Figure 2.1) based on the qualitative criteria described in NUREG 0611 for the three initiating events. (LMFW.
LMFW/ LOOP. and LMFW/LOAC). (Section 4.2)
. The B/B AFS meets the NUREG-0800 acceptable unreliability range of 10-4 to 10-5 per demand for the LMFW and LMFW/ LOOP (see Table 2.1).
1
. Testing does not incapacicate the ESF trains due to the autcmatic opening of the ESF pump discharge test valve if an AFS requirement q occurs.
. Low NPSH problems does not incapacitate the ESF pump train due to the autcmatic transfer to the standby water supply system (ESW - Essential M Service Water). U
. Inadvertent ESF pump maintenance valve closures due to human errors ry are minimized because of the autcmatic opening of the ESF pump j discharge test valve and of the automatic transfer to the standby water supply system. Both automatic systems have remote manual overrides in the control room.
. Full flow testings of ESF pump trains and its associated valves from the condensate storage tank into the SGs at power operation during Q periodic testings and following maintenance outages will verify proper M valve alignment. exercise check valves and test for valve plugging.
. The Byron /Braidwood Trains A and B are partly diverse and therefore, resistive to some types of common cause f ailures. Train C is diverse from Trains A and B. but is dependent on off-site power availability.
(Appendix F) L3 2-2 1 1
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l LJ r j . The major component contributor to the ESF train unreliability is the pump startup and its local control circuit f ailure. T . The major contributor s to the non-ESF train unreliability are the ; k three manual operations (manual reset of Logic A. manual reset of l Logic B and the manual start of Train C pump) required to start Train l C.
. The major common cause component contributor to the B/B AFS unreliability indicated to be the pump discharge check valves.
. The major operational contributors to the B/B AFS unreliability (independent and common cause) indicated to be the normal I
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hardware / operator error unreliability and the AFS unreliability during ~ maintenance" of a pump train. The point estimates indicated that the " maintenance" unreliabilities to be slightly greater than the 1 g " hardware / operator error" unreliabilities. however, the error spread g '~ ~ (uncertainty) for each of these values determined from the fault tree - analysis showed that these values were well within the error spread of the other.
. The ~ test" and " human error ~ operational contributors to the B/B AFS unreliabilities (independent and common cause) were calculated to be at least 2 orders (<10-2) less than the ~ hardware / operator error" and
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" maintenance operational contributors. Thus, the ~ test and " human
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error" unreliabilities were determined to be insignificant in the r total B/B AFS unreliability and were not estimated with the fault tree code. Autcmatic switching to the essential wcter service systen on low suction pressure for Trains A and B does not significantly improve the AFS quantitative reliability. (Section 4.3) 2.5 Recommendations for the AFS Oneration Supply the Train C auxiliary feedwater pump electric power from the bus fed by off-site power from the System Auxiliary Transformer (SAT) to eliminate bus transf er unreliability. Conrider manual instead of automatic actuations of the Essential h Service Water System (ESW). Spurious operation could introduce
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untreated water into the steam generators. Manual operation cf ESW would prevent spurious automatic actuations.
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l f l Table 2.1 SIRHfARY OF BYRON /BRAIDWOOD AFS UNRELIABILITY ESTIMATES - INITIATING POINT ESTIliATE FROM RBD MEDIAN ESTIMATE FROM FAULT TREE EVENT (unavailability / demand) (unavailability / demand) l LMW 3.4E-6 1.8E-6(7)*
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L* 9.2E-5 I ug LOOP ; 9.8E-5(4)* Y US B1 mm . - f LOAC 1.1E-2 1.2E-2(3)* l I i u 6,
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UfFW 8.2E-6 1 1. 2E-5 (4)
- e &E 18 -
, "a LOOP 1.0E-4 ' 1.5E-4 (3)
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w+ h LOAC 1.2E 1.2E-2(3)* , m i
- Error spread = Q 950% assuming log normal distribution 95%
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-I 10 10 10 UNAVAILABILITY PER DEMAND Figure 2.2 BYRON /BRAIDWOOD AFS UNRELIABILITY ERROR SPREAD Statistical Independent Estimate ,
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f. ti 3.0 Auxiliary Feedvater System Descrintion 1 m lr 3 .1 General AFS Information
'rf The function of the Auxiliary Feedwater System is to provide residual heat M removal when the main feedwater (MFW) system is unavailable. The AFS consista d$ of three 100% trains. Each train has the capacity to supply the stean generators with sufficient feedwater to cool down the unit safely to 3500F. the temperature at which the low pressure residual heat removal system can be I utilized. One of the trains is used during start up and shutdown of the unit.
A simplified drawing of the Bryon/Braidwood AFS is shown in Fig. 3.1. Auxiliary feedvater is supplied by diverse means with two automatically initiated saf ety trains. Trains A and B. and one manually initiated non-saf ety train. Train C. ESF Bus 141, the bus that supplies the Train A motor driven
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auxtliary feedwater pump, is capable of being supplied from one of three sources: the system aux transformer (SAT 142-1); the diesel generator (DG 1A); or the Unit 2 ESF Bus 241. In the event of a LOOP event. Bus 141 autanatically a transf ers to DG 1A. If DG 1A f ails to start, the operator is able to close two
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breakers from the control room to feed Bus 141 from Bus 241. which still has power from the system aux transformer associated with that hus or from diesel The operator is capable of closing these breakers within the 20
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% minute steam generator boil dry time assumed in this analy sis. Train B u utilizes an ESF seismic Category I diesel-engine driven pump. This diesel-engine pump is AC power independent. Trains A and B are located in the 7" Auxiliary Building.
L Train C utilizes the start up feedpump, a non-ESF electric-motor driven pump. This train is also used during unit startup and normal unit shutdown from less than 10% power. It is also used in the hot standby mode. Train C is located in the Turbine Building. 3.2 System Oneration Successful unit cooldown can be achieved by supplying feedwater to any two of the four available steam generators. Saf ety analysis has shown that 160 gpm delivered to each of three steam generators or 240 gpm delivered to each of two steam generator s is sufficient for residual heat removal. Each of the ESF tr ains. Trains A or B. has two times the minimum capacity. The non-ESF train. Train C. has approximately four times minimum capacity. Hence, any one of the three trains can supply the needed cooling water to the secondary side of the stean generators. )d The Train A pump motor drive is powerea from ESF Bus 141. The Train A AFS regulating valves are powered by 125 V DC ESF 131I4. The Train A AFS isolation g valves are powered from 480 V AC ESF Bus 131. The AFS isolation valves are D normally open and are not required to change position on AFS actuation. 3 The Train B pump diesel engine is supplied by its own 24 volt DC 3
$ batteries. This diesel drive is self-contained and completely independent of l AC power under energency conditions. Train B AFS regulating valves are powered 9
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ --_m --- --*
l 8 9 , by 125 V DC ESF Bus 112. Train B AFS isolation valves are powered by 480 V AC i ESF Bus 132. The AFS isolation valves are normally open and are not required ' to change position on AFS actuation. 4 The Train C pump motor is powered from a non-ESF bus. This train is d unavailable on loss of offsite power. The ESF logic system will automatically start Trains A and 3 on three signals: lo-lo level in the secondary side of the stean generator; a safety injection signal; and a loss of offsite power signal. Manual start up capability from the control room backs up the automatic system start. Instrumentation and controls are also provided at the remote shutdown panel in the unlikely event that the control room must be evacuated. Train C is manually operated from the control room and provides a manual back up to Trains A and B. The normal water supply for Trains A and B is the condensate storage tank. R The alternate supply is the essential service water system. Train C takes .a
~ .
M suction on the condenser hotwell via the condensate / condensate-booster pump. The Train A and B pumps are protected against low suction pressure with a run inhibit signal. This condition is corrected by the automatic opening of essential service water (ESW) valves to the suction of the auxiliary feed pump. . This occurs when a low suction pressure signal is received.1 The automatic ' startup can be initiated within about 1 minute from the initiation of the Lo-Lo steam generator level signal. This is well within the limit of 30 minutes set by the inventory of secondary water already in the steam generators. To prevent pump damage a recirculation line is provided on each AFS pump discharge which bypasses flow to the condenaate storage tank or essential service water sy st em for the ESF pumps and to the condenser hotwell for the non-ESF pump. Excessive recirculation flow is prevented by orifices in the piping, hence each of the pumps can supply the full feedwater requirement with full recirculation flow. Monthly periodic tests are required for Trains A and B. Only one train is tested at a time, the other train remains in a normal line up. The air-operated discharge test valve is closed and the pump is warmed up on recirculation flow. The ESF logic start signals stated above will autcmatically open the discharge valve. Hence. the train under test is always available to supply auxiliary feedvater to the steam generators. The conclusion of the test requires the train valves to be aligned to the steam generator for a full flow test. This portion of the periodic test will identify any plugged or inadvertently closed valves. The same test is required ', f ollowing each maintenance or repair activity. L ' B 1 This action provides unprocessed water to the main steam generators. Section 4.3 shows that this action does not significantly improve AFS reliability. for the initiating events considered. l 3-2
- v. , ,
m pe-I Train C operation is tested by normal use during startup .nd shutdown of 3 the unit. It is always available except following loss of offsite power. 4 From the reliability viewpoint. the key components which contribute to the d-AFS unreliabilities are the electric and diesel drives and their controls. Valves in the water pathway have been contributors to system f ailure in other AFS but the normally opened valves. the application of check valves, and the monthly full flow tests reduce their contributions. A f ailure of the condensate water supply is not a major contributor because of the partly diverse valve train from the tank and the automatic backup water supply systesa. Maintenance outage of a train is also a contributor to AFS unreliability. 3.2.1 Water Pathway 3.2.1.1 Trains A and B The normal water supply is the 500.000 gallon condensate storage tank. A E minimum capacity of 200.000 gal is reserved for the Trains A and B. In addition to this normal water supply and the essential service water (ESW) _ systen. the condensate tank from the other unit can be manually valved in by changing the position of one valve. The auxiliary feedwater pump discharge is routed to the stean generators via the tempering flow lines. From tha stean generator the stean is normally discharged to the condenser through the steam dump system. Should the condenser be unavailable. the stean is vented to atmosphere through the secondary relief valves. Either path provides for successful operation of the
~
AFS. since the AFS function is to remove heat from the steam generators until either a restart condition or the residual beat removal system condition is
,s reached.
The auxiliary feedwater flow to the stean generators is controlled from t' e control room. The control valves are throttled as the desired stean !@ generator level is reached and the decay heat load diminishes during a cool 'U down cy cle. Depending on which tr ains. pu:nps. and steam generators are available. the operator can line up the appropriate valves to establish AFS g flow paths. Any train can feed any of the four steam generators. In the unlikely event that the control room must be evacuated. the AFS valves and pumps can be operated at the remote shutdown panel. When the AFS has cooled the plant down to 3500F. about 5 hours af ter the initiating event. the residual heat removal system can manually be placed in operation and the AFS trains are manually placed in standby condition. 3.2.1.2 Train C The Train C water supply is the condenser hot well. The normal volume is approximately 100.000 gallons. Four 33% condensate / condensate booster pumps are available. Each condensate / condensate-booster pump is driven by one motor. y b
\
3-3 s i. 3eog, a,he =6== e-ai.4s % 81pp* * *
- With of f-site power available. the running pumps will remain operating and recirculating to the condenser. thus providing NPSH (net positive suction head) !
to the Train C pump. This pump is manually controlled from the control room. An ESF logic start of Trains A and B will autcmatically close the main f eedvater valves used by Train C. To start Train C. the steam generator (SG) :i feedwater valves must be manually reset with pushbuttons. one for Logic Train A and one for Logic Train B. Ej 3.2.2 Auxiliary Feedvater Drives L 3.2.2.1 Diesel Driven Auxiliarv Feedvater Pumn This 1250 HP diesel driven pump is designed to be independent of AC power under emergency conditions. It is automatically started by a self contained 24 Volt D.C.. battery powered start system. When any of three energency g El signals (e.g. the Lo-Lo steam generator level saf ety injection. or loss of AC power) are received the diesel is started. The pump provides 840 gpm at a 3350 g feet head. This Detroit Diesel has its own 500 gallon supply of fuel intake g and exhaust air ducts. internal labe oil pump. and water jacket cooling pump. An axial vane f an driven from the gear box circulates air over the engine to provide cooling during operation. The heated air is exhausted through passive , building vents. When AC power is available. backup pumps are available for oil pressure. water jacket cooling and room a'r cooling. These backup systems help , reduce engine wear during testing periods by providing prestartup oil pressure to the bearings and providing backup engine cooling. 3.2.2.2 ISI Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumn The electric motor driven pump is used in most Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) as a diverse method of supplying suxiliary feedwater. In the B/B design the Train A pump is powered from the 4160 volt ESF Bus No. 141. This horizontal pump rated at 1250 HP provides 890 gpm at 3350 feet of head. This pump is functionally redundant to the diesel driven pump under all conditions except the loss of all AC power. 3.2.2.3 Non-ESF Motor Driven Auriliarv Feedwater Pum n The non-ESF electric motor driven pump is rated at 2000 HP and can provide 5300 gpm at 1200 feet of head. It is powered from a non-ESF 6.9 KV bus. This electric motor driven pump has two requirements. Off-site power and at least one of the four condensate / condensate-booster pumps running to provide auxiliary feedwater to the four steam generators. The condensate / condensate-booster pumps also require of f-site power. Commonwealth Edison's practice is to operate with ~50% of the house load on the unit auxiliary transformers f' L : (UATs) and 50% on the system auxiliary transformers (SATs)(FSAR pg. 8.3-2). On a turbine generator trip, twc condensate / condensate-booster pumps will continue ~ g to operate on the SATs. The other condensate / condensate-booster pumps will continue to run while the bus breakers automatically transf er from UAT to SAT. g 1 l t i 3-4 3 l l
~- ~
~ --
- s. .
J
? 3.2.3 valvine 5
3.2.3.1 Condensate Storace Tank valves l m
+
jy The ESF AFW pumps are supplied from the Condensate Storage Tank via two separate lines. both of which are normally oligned to supply the ESF AFW
. sy s t em .
l One line has a manual. locked open valve and a check valve in series. The l other line has two manual. normally open valves in series. The lines combine I downstream of these valves in the Turbine Building and this common line splits to supply the two ESF AFW pumps in the auxiliary building through a manual. locked open valve and a check valve in series in each pump supply line. 3.2.3.2 Auxiliary Feedvater Pumn Suetion Valves (Manual) The manual suction valves to the Train A and B are locked open. In the case of low suction pressure the check valves in the suction line prevent E-
~~
, backflow from the essential service water system to the condensate tank. ,.The ,__.
positioning of these valves are verified by the full flow testing procedure. Q Plugging or manually closing these valves are the most likely cause of loss of l 3 normal suction from the condensate storage tank. j 3.2.3.3 Auxiliary Feedvater Sunnly Valves d Each train supplies all four steam generators. The separate Train A and _ Train B supply lines combine into a common header prior to entering the tempering flow lines at each st eam generator. Each supply line has three L valves; a check valve; a motor operated isolation valve; and a flow control valve. The control valves are air operated valves controlled from the centrol 4 room or from the remote shutdown panel. The valves fail open on loss of air or d) loss of power to the solenoids. The control valves have an autematic setpoint controller which limits flow .to 160 gpm to each steam generator when the pumps 9 are running. The setpoint is monitored by the ESD (Engineered Safety Display) V(
- panel. Any controller output les s than the setpoint value will initiate an alarm on the ESD panel.
3.2.3.4 Auxiliary Feedvater Backun Water Sunpiv (Automatic) The essential service water back up supply valves are normally closed. cotor-operated valves. There are two valves in series to each pump suction. these valves are powered by ESF buses. A low pump suction pressure signal developed independently by each train in conjunction with a lo-lo SG level. SI. Loss of Power signals will autematically open these valves. I opened from the control room or manually at the valve. They can also be bb
.P 3-5 l
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)
3.2.3.5 Train c valves 1 The Train C flow path utilizes the normal main feedwater lineup. All the valves are to remain in operating position following a loss of main feedwater condition except for the main feedwater flow control valves. These valves muet , be reset and manually positioned from the control room for auxiliary feedwater flow from the Train C pump. o 3.3 Inenection and Testine Recuirements The AFS trains are capable of being tested while the plant is in normal operation. A full flow test through the AFS valves allows the valve positions to be operationally tested. Discharge pressures and flow indications are provided locally and in the control room. Periodic testing will identify any B
~p lugged" valve failures. During the first phase of the test procedure. the 3 discharge test valves are closed and the auxiliary femdwater is recirculated back to the condensate storage tank. Af ter the pump is tested. the discharge valves will be opened to allow full flow into the steam generators. These valves are designed to open on an ESF start signal for the AIS. Thus. the - -
~
train is available during the test. 3.4 Instrumentation and control Control rocm instrumentation includes stcan generator level indications. r controls. hand switches. and position indicators for power operated valves.
]
l W The control start logic for the AFS. which is part of the Engineered - Saf ety Features Actuation System, is an automatic two-of-four input signal with manual override. The following main control room monitors are provided fu purposes of AFS M control: E
. Input to ESD panel.
. AFS trip status light.
. Discharge presssure of each AFS pump.
. Auxiliary feedwater flow to each steam generator.
. Status lights for each regulator valve.
. Alarms for AFS diesel engine temperature. oil pressure, and speed. f L
. Status lights for AFS power operated valves.
The instrumentation and control system is designed such that undervoltage on two of the four instrument channels results in automatic initiation of the auxiliary feedwater Trains A and B. J, 3-6 u h 1 I
e i . 3.5 Supoortino svnte== and Sources
, The active components of the AFS are dependent upon diverse sources or 'y electrical power. Lube oil and cooling subsystems are supplied internally from S the diesel engine. All valves and controls in the same train are similarly matched to the same power source as its pump. and key devices can be manually g or locally actuated as well. Four independent transmission lines supply the y off site power, and two dedicated diesel generators back up the onsite Class IE power busses. In addition, the operator is able to close two breakers from the control room to feed each of these busses which still has power from the other Unit system aux transformer or from the other unit diesel generator. Up to 300.000 gallons of demineralized water can be made available to the AFS from the Unit 2 condensate storage tank by a manual cross tie valve.
I 3.6 Technical Soecification Limitations 3 Technical Specifications require the availability of 200.000 gallons of C water in the condensate storage tank for AFS use. Tank levels are alarmed and _ annunciated in the main control room. A maximum of 72 hours out of service is allowed for maintenance or repair of an ESF AW pump / train while the reactor is critical. If th at time is exceeded. the reactor must be placed in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours. The 2A(IA) diesel generator is allowed to be inoperable for 7 days. If this time is exceeded. Unit 1(2) must be placed in HSD (hot shutdown). 3.7 Surveillance Reouirements
- 1) Each auxiliary feedwater pump shall be demonstrated operable:
A. At least once per 31 days by: (1) Verifying that each pump develops discharge pressure of 3 at least 90% of the manuf acturer pump performance curves. d (2) Verifying that each valve (manual. power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed. or otherwise secured in position. is in correct position. B. At least once per 18 months during shutdown by: (1) Verifying that AFS starts automatically upon receipt of an ESF test signal.
- 2) The condensate storage tank shall be demonstrated operable at least once per 12 hours by verifying that the contained water volume is within its l limits when the tank is the supply source for the auxiliary feedvater -
pum ps .
- 3) The essential service water system shall be demonstrated to be available l}a whenever the condensate storage tank is inoperable.
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1 4.3 Ouantitative Reliability Evaluation The purpo se of this analy sis is to meet the quantitative reliability criteria of NUREG-0800 which states: An acceptable AFWS should have an , unreliability in the range of 10-4 to 10-5 per demand based on an analysis " using methods and data presented in NUREG-0611 and NUREG-0635. Data not given in NUREG-0611 and NUREG-0635 was supplemented with WASH 1400 data except for [ diesel generator "f ail to start". This was assumed to be 10-2/ demand with an E error factor of 3. This seemed to have been the value used in NUREG-0611 and NUREG-0635. NRC Saf e ty and Licensing Branch agreed on the usage of this _ number. The significant place of the quantitative results is basically to one Place. If the numbers are rounded to one place, many numbers will appear to be the same. Thus two place numbers are shown as a difference indicator. The 5% to 95% error spread as determined by the fault tree analysis will indicate the uncertainty of the results. Two logic model ty pes are utilized. each having strong points and ' ' " ~ weaknesses. First. the reliability block diagrams (RBD) logic model developed from questions such as: What is needed to make the system operate? What backups exist? What redundancies exist? This modeling technique requires knowledge of valve po sitions , chan,,cs of state. signal operations, etc.. to r' properly model the system reliability characteristics. The weakness of the RBD logic modeling is that outside system interdependencies could be overlooked. l For exam ple, valve positions in other systems which impact flow in the AFS l could be missed. Fault trees (FT) logic models are constructed to calculate ~ the probability of the " top event". The top event should be carefully defined a using event trees to define the boundaries of the f ault tree analysis. For exam ple, in the event tree of Figure 4.2 there is no special provision for - onsite power (i.e. Diesels 1A.2A). Therefore. these items should be included in the f ault tree. A drawback to f ault trees is that so many conditions can be described that the reduction of the FT to its important contributors can be very difficult. To simplify this step, e minimal cut set computer code was
- employed to identify each set of failure conditions within the FT. These
! minimal cut sets helped in assessing the common cause failure potential between l required components. Af ter the minimal cut sets were developed. FT equations were written to describe the probabilities and associated uncertainties of the M l U AFS unavailability. A computer code called STADIC can accept this FT equation along with data inputs for each component or supercomponent. Based upon this input a probability distribution for the top event was formulated. The component failure data determined the level of detail to which the analys#.s was taken.
.V .
L 0 i'g is 4-4
p# . n *
'! 4.3.1 Reliability Block Diactram Annivaig w (
4.3.1.1 A s s umnt ions
?
M The RBD (Appendix B) for the Bryon/Braidwood AFS was developed assuming the need for the AFS fzom plant near full power. The RBD delineates the various
]a success paths for starting the sy stem on demand. It also shows the various i
components that were considered in the analysis and how they are inter-related i to each other. The various types of redundancies (active, automatic standby. remote manual and local manual standbys) are symbolized. The top train on RBD pages 1. 2. 3. and 4 shows the model for Train A with
. the ESF electric motor drive pump and the bottom train shows the model for Train B with the ESF diesel drive pum~p. These trains are identical except for the pump drives. The inter-relations between these trains are the common source of water supply. the condensate storage tank. However. each train bas g an independent, automatic switching capability to the ESW (emergency service water) system when low pressure occurs on the pump suction coincident with a Safeguards Actuation Signal. a Loss of off-site power. or a low-low SG level tr ip. The ESW is operable from the ESF electrical bus.
For the initiating events considered in this analysis, an automatic ESF AFS start signal was assumed. The ESF logic A signal actuates Train A and ESF hw logic B signal actuates Train B. Manual over-ride capabilities Trains A&B are available in the control room and the remote shutdown room. AFW pump recirculation is only required when the flow is thro t tled. or s to pped, to th e SG s . During initial demand of the AFS when full flow is required to th e SG s. the recirculation is not required. Each train has an o automatic recirculation switchover from the condensate storage tank to the ESW j system. The recirculation is used during pump testing for pump warmup before reopening the pump discharge test valve to provide full flow test into the SGs.
, By procedure. this same test will be used af ter each maintenance action on the
] train to assure complete train functioning.
3 Train A and Train B can independently supply AW to each SG through the a flow limiting orifice, flow control valve and a containment isolation valve. [ Cross flow between these trains is prevented by check valves in the tempering flow line at the SG and on the SG blowdown line and valves. Train A is available for two of the three postulated initiating events (IE); loss of main feedwater (LMFW) with of fsite power. and loss of main feedwater with loss of off-site power (LMFW/ LOOP) (onsite power from Unit 1 and l Unit 2). 0 l 1a 1 3) !Q l 's ! 3 4-5 P"*
-.--~,..w.n, - r,. - :,--
1 Train B is available for all IEs. namely : LMFW. LMFW/ LOOP and LMFW/LOAC (EC battery power. only). , Train C (10% full plant capacity) utilizes the normal condensate system and provides AW through the main W piping to the SG s . Therefore. Train C is - available only for LMFW and requires remote manual startup from the control room. Train C utilizes the condensate hot well as the water source. f:] L Assuming the plant is at power , three of the four (1/3 capacity) condensate / condensate booster pumps (one motor drives both pumps) will normally be operating. The fourth pump is on automatic s t andby . Two of the condensate / condensate booster pumps motors will be on SAT and two will be on UAT. With reactor / turbine tr ip. the UAT bus breakers will rapidly transfer (within 3 cycles) to the SAT. This will not af f ect the motor operation on these buses unless breaker t ansfer is not successful. The operating condensate / condensate booster pumps were assumed to continue to operate af ter a reactor / turbine trip. This requires that the condensate booster recirculation g ~ functions successfully. Otherwise. these pumps will be pumping against _ a. ._ W shutoff head. In addition to the condensate booster pump recirculation. the two normally operating 50% capacity main FW pump recirculation valves are operable for added condensate recirculation. The standby 50% capacity main FW recirculation requires remote manual action before it can be placed into recirculation operation. The normal condensate to the FW p p suction piping requires passing through several low pressure feedwater heaters. At least two flow paths are available. with a remote manual bypass line available around all LP FW beaters. The star tup FW pump is started from the control room. This pump motor is f ed from the 6.9 kV Bus 159 and will be available af ter a reactor / turbine trip and the LMFW initiating event. Startup W pump recirculation was assumed to normally operate. With no flow on its di.7 charge line. the recirculation valve will be fully open and allow recirculation flow. Thus. with condensate / condensate booster ptsap operating and recirculating. this pump will also be recirculating. The startup FW pump is discharged directly into the main FW discharge piping. The main FW pump discharge check valve or stop-check valve must close in order to prevent backflow through the' main FW pumps. The feedwater from the FW pump discharge piping to the SG inlet must pass through the high pressure heaters. Two flow paths are available with a remote manual bypass line available around these heaters. When the automatic AFS start signals. ESF logic A and logic B. are initiated. the FW control valves in the main FW lines and in the tempering flow q lines to each SG will autematically close. In addition. a check valve in each M of the above lines will also close. In order to return these lines to operation for Train C use, the operator must reset Logic trains A and B. J 4-6
D - e i The pref erred path is to use the main FW lines to the SG. A redundant path using the tempering flow lines is also available to each SG. The Train C main W line discharge to each SG is independent of Trains A and B. The Train C tempering flow line paths are the same as Trains A and B. h' 4.3.1.2 Reliability Block Dineram Ouantitative Annivnin The RBD model shown in Appendix B for the Byron /Braidwood AFS was manually l quantified using the data from Appendix A. The f ailure probability calculated is for the AFS f ail to start and to provide AFW to 2 stean generators (SGs). Failure probabilities were estimated for three initiating events (IE). Two quantitative estimates were performed assuming statistical independence of the various trains and common cause on similar or identical redundant paths. Each Q block in the RBD was assigned a failure rate. These f ailure rates were used to B calculate the overall failure probability. or unavailability of the AFS. ' Each initiating event (IE) was divided into the following: _ . _ _ , . . Hardware / Operator Error - this assumed th at the total AFS is available and is the f ailure probability that the AFS f ail to start and provide FW to 2 SGs.
. Test - This assumes that one ESF train is being tested when the IE % occurs. During the first 15 to 20 minutes of testing when the y
discharge test valve is closed to warm up the pump in the recirculation mode. a demand for the AFS would automatically open
=
this valve. Af ter warm up. the discharge test valve is opened as
^
part of th e test. The pump then provides full auxiliary feedwater flow to th e SG s . For this analysis. the ~ warm up" test mode was considered. The pump discharge valve is designed to open on ESF
- logic signal to start th e AFS flow to the SG's and thus the unreliability of these components were used. Since the pump would be running and continue to run. the f ailure rate of the pump to start 7 was assumed to be zero.
3
. Maintenance - This assumed the IE occurred during the time a train was out for maintenance. The train would not be available for AFS operation and thus. the failure probability of this train is 1.
Human Error - This assumed plant personnel f ailed to reopen valves af ter pump testing or maintenance operation or inadvertently a closure of these valves. In th e Byron /Braidwood design and procedure. this type of error appears to be greatly minimized because lg of automatic opening to the discharge test valve and autcmatic i5 switching to the ESW. In addition, af ter each maintenance action on the AFS train, it will use the same test procedure as the monthly periodical test which includes a full flow test into the SGs. The test. maintenance and human error outage contribution utilized the data in Ref. 1. Fault trees for test, maintenance and human error were ' M, developed and shown in Appendix D. Q Portions of the RBD model were used as inputs to estimate AFS failure probability as applicable to these g J 4-7 L:
--o, w-. mv.n-o,.,o :e g s v o s v % =*w ^e**'
. . *t
- i trees. The sum of the f ailure probabilities for hardware, test. maintenance, and human error became the estimate for the AFS f ail to start and provide AFW "
to .t2 SGs on demand. 4.3.1.2.1 Statistien1 Indeoendent Es tim m te t The statistical independent estimate assumes th at all redundant components are truly independent. The results are shown on Table 4.3. The , NUREG-0800 acceptable unreliability range of 10-4 to 10-5 per demand was met for the LMFW and the LOOP initiating events (IEs). 3.4E-6 and 9.2E-5 res pe ctively . The results show that the greatest contributor to AFS unreliability is in the maintenance outage portion with the hardware / operator error portion a relatively close second. The test and human error portions are shown to be at least 2 orders of magnitude (10-2) less than the others, thus, are insignificant contributor s. This is due to the automatic valve action which keeps these trains available during test and many human error problems. The LOAC IE was estimated to be 1.lE-2 per demand. Due to a concern of an inadvertent automatic initiation of the ESW. a separate analysis assuming a remote manual backup using two valves in-line was calculated. These results are also shown on Table 4.4 for comparison with the previous results. A slight increase in the failure probabilities was noted. However. the summation. or the unavailability per demand, was essentially unchanged. Thus. use of manual actuation for ESW will not impact the overall AFS quantitative reliability for the three initiating events. 4.3.1.2.2 Cet men Cause E s t im a t e The common cause estimate assumes that redundant components are not ' truly independent. This estimate assumes that some commonality exists between redundant components , or tr ains. i.e., same maintenance personnel. same procedure, same manufacturer. same environment (humidity , tenperature. earthquake, etc.), same design. etc. In order to quickly estimate the common cause effect. a generic Beta Factor of 0.03 for inter-train redundancy and 0.1 for intra-train redundancy was used. The electric motor driven pump and diesel driven pump were assumed to be diverse. Using these assumptions, the results are shown on Table 4.3. The NUREG-0800 cceeptable unreliability range of 10-4 to 10-5 was met for the LMW and LOOP IEs. 8.2E-6 and 1.0E-4. respectively. In most cases the table shows that the hardware / operator error contribute to the greatest unreliability with the maintenance outage a relatively close second. Again, the test and human error por tions were found to be insignificant contributor s to AFS unr eliabili ty . Hence. this AFS design and procedure has done an outstanding job of reducing the test and human error contributions which have impacted many other AFSs in the past. The LOAC IE was estimated to be 1.2E-2 per demand. - 4.3.1.2.3 O mmarv of Dominant Failure Modes The dominant failure modes for each initiating event have been assessed by review of the dominant contributors to unreliability fr om the RBD in - Appendix B. 4-8 1
, 7= . 3 L ** 3 3 LMFW with Off-site Power Available Automatic start with manual backup except for Train C.
$q For both independent and common cause estimates, the dominant component f ailures are the failure of the pumps to start and its local control circuit f ailure in Trains A and B and the operator error in manually starting Train C.
For maintenance outage portion of the A. the dominant f ailure modes are the f ailure to start and its local control circuit f ailure the 2 pumps when both 4 auto-start trains (Trains A and B) are available. or either Train A or B pump m f ail to start and its local control circuit f ailurt and the operator errors in manually starting Train C. The results are shown on Table 4.3 I The test and human error portions of the I were insignificant and thus did not contribute to the overall AFS f ailure. LMFW with LOOP
,,_ , . _ . . . _ _ _. .. - - - - -- -- * * ~ '
Automatic start with manuni backun For the independent estimate, the dominant component f ailures are the f ailure of the pumps to start and its local control circuit f ailure in Trains A p and B. For maintenance outage portion of the I the dominant f ailures are the
" f ailure to start and its local control circuit failure of the pumps. Two auxiliary power supplies (Unit I and Unit 2 diesel generators) are available to , Train A motor drive auxiliary feedwater pump via Bus 141. The redundant power supplies to this pump contributed a minor portion of the f ail to start L- unr eliability .
1 The test and human error portions of the A were insignificant and thus y did not contribute to the overall AFS failure. T
' 't LMFW with LOAC d
Auto-start with annuni backup For the independent and common cause estimates. the dominant component f ailures for the hardware / operator error A the diesel pump fail to start and its local control circuit failure in Train B. the only train available for this initiating event (IE). For the maintenance outage portion of the I. the dominant failure is when Train B is out and no train is available for this IE. This does not considar recovery of the offsite power and main feedwater within 20 minutes. The test and human error portions of the I were insignificant and thus
'E did not contribute to the overall AFS f ailure.
b m a e r 4-9
- p. P be
4.3.2 Fault Tree Onantification In addition to the RBD analysis a fault tree analysis was undertaken to quantify the uncertainty range and provide independent check on the impact of the modeling assumptions. Three initiating events were considered: .i Loss of main feedwater (LMFW) Loss of of f site power (LMFW/ LOOP) ]T Loss of AC power (LMFW/LOAC) U 4.3.2.1 Methods The fault trees were developed to consider faults within each train which could cause failure to supply auxiliary feedwater to the steam generators within 20 minutes af ter an initiating event. The analysis considered l
=
hardware / operator error and maintenance f ailures only. since the RBD analysis showed testing and human error failures to have insignificant contributions. In most cases data were taken frem Ref. I and 2. Probability distributions and % uncertainty ranges were taken from Ref. 2. A more detailed discussion of the W method of determining minimal cut sets and quantifying the failure probability of the system including uncertainty considerations is given in Appendix G. Common cause failures were considered on a case-by-case basis. Two ty pes of common cause failures were included; first. those within a train where redundant components are found. and second. those between trains where redundant components are found. A third type of common cause f ailure. that of external faults which impact the AFS. was not considered as its ef fect on the # overall system reliability is minimal and was not included in the NUREG-0611 o and NUREG-0635 study. Examples of the third type are common f aults which block the steam generator output steam flow and piping faults which cause the flow to g by pass the steam generator s. The common cause f ailures were considered as explained in Appendix F with Beta factors which represent the ratio of the g common cause failures to independent and common cause f ailures as measured by e data from redundant systems. t i Each train could be out for maintenance during a 72 hour period while the plant operation continues. During this period, the AFS consists of two D tr ains . After 72 hours. the plant must be shutdown according to the technical specifications. NUR EG-0611 (Appendix A. Table A.I.1) suggest that the U maintenance outage contribution calculation be performed as follows: n L QMAINT. n 0.22 f No. hrs /maint. hrs) 720 The pump range on duration time is given as one-half hour to 72 hours. with a mean act time of 19 hour, thus. O at V QMAINT 0 0.22(19) = 0.0058 r3 720 ' 4-10
s ,
,m 4.3.2.2 Fault Tree Es t im a t es m
y, The fault tree (PT) results are shown cn Table 4.3 and the uncertainty curves (error spread) are shown on Figure 4.6 for the statistical independent
., estimates and on Figure 4.7 for the independent plus common cause estimates.
$ In most cases, the FT results were slightly higher than those estimated by the 4 RBD. however, all RBD estimates were well within the error spread as determined by the FT analysis. Data input to the FT are shown on Table A.III.l.
For the LMFW initiating event, the FT median values are well within the l NUR EG-0800 acceptable range of 10-4 to 10-5 2E-6(6)* or 9.8E-5(4)* for I independent and common cause. For the LOOP initiating event. the FT median value for the independent es timate of cr 9.8E-5(4)* is in the NUREG-0800 acceptable range, but the independent plus common cause estimate of 1.5E-4(3)* is on the border line or the NUREG-0800 acceptable range for a one significant number. _ _ Q Maintenance outage contributed about 60% of the &FS unreliability when laj only independent failures are considered and 30% to 45% when common cause failures are included. 4.3.2.3 Simolified Fault Tree (FT)
, A simplified master FT was developed incorporating only the components which dominated the overall unreliability. For the B/B AFS. the
' hardware / operator error portion and the maintenance outage portion were the dominant contributors. With the master FT (Figure 4.8) and haintenance FT L (Figure 4.9). a relative easy point estimate of the B/B AFS unreliability may be calculated.
The master FT represents the LMFW IE hardware unreliability per demand. p( c For the other IE hardware unreliabilities. portions of this FT are used as applicable. Portions of the master FT are also used for the maintenance unreliability per demand. Assuming one train is out for maintenance the unreliability is calculated for the balance of the system using the master FT g and the result inserted into the appropriate portion of the maintenance FT. g The completed maintenance FT is the estimate of the AFS unreliability due to maintenance outage. l The sum of the hardware / operator error and maintenance oatage unreliabilities is the point estimate of the B/B AFS unreliability. J
- Error Spread
' ?
?!
i n J 4-11 b ee I .
1 l . . ,
*1able 4.1 Criteria for NUREG 0611 Reliability Comparison - Ref. 1 T_MFW and LOOP AC Blackout Low Reliability Low Reliability
. Manual actuction* . AC dependencies-turbine lube pumps * ; i
. Minimum redundancy - 2 pump '
. Single point f ailure
. No time limit on train outage Medium Reliability Low to Medium Reliability
. Auto start with manual backup . AC dependencies - valves with local manual contro1*
. Single point f ailure*
. No time limit on train outage
. No time limit on train outage Water-hammer concerns
. System interactions (saf ety and non-saf e ty)
EJ Human interactions {bi
. tests not staggered
. test by same personnel and same shift "
. Testing incapacities more than one train High Reliability High Reliability
. High redundancy . No identifiable AC power dependencies
. Auto start with manual backup
. Auto start with manual backup
. No observed single point f ailure
. Human interactions
. Tests staggered and different shifts
. Testing incapacitates only one train
. Time limit on train outage
- Dominant contributor.
I 4-12 i , 1 l l l l 1
e , l
- :, i I
Table 4.2 NUREG 0611 Ounlitative Reliability Analysin "i IE NUREG NUREG CRITERIA BYRON /BRAIDWOOD REMARR ASSESS. AND ASSESSMENT CRITERIA e LMFW High . High redundancy . Three trains
. Auto start with manual backup. . Two trains-auto start with manual backup; third train - manual start.
. No observed single point . Comply failure.
. . Human interactions . Exceeds criteria. - -
n . Test staggered and Testing does not i different shifts. incapacitate ESF train. Maintenance suction
. Maintenance valve valve inadvertently lef t
; inadvertently lef t closed does not L closed. incapacitate ESF train.
E2 . Testing incapacitates only . Exceed criteria. one train. Testing does not incapacitate ESF train.
. Time limit on train outage. . Tech Spec requirement on train outage.
Qualitative l Assessment: Med/High range LOOP Low . Minimum redundancy (2 pump) . 2 Pump system, but moter y pump has backup DG from g other Unit. thus assess into Med range. High . Same as LMFW except minimum . Same as LMW except one redundancy. criteria assess in Med range. Q Qualitative B Assessment: Lo/High range. m LOAC High . No identifiable AC . Complies jj power dependencies.
, . Auto start with manual . Complies f backup.
Q Qualitative
, Asses sment: Med/High range.
A' 4-13 v.
.......g..* ,. .-.e - -
l Table 4.3 BYRON /BRAIDWOOD AFS UNRELIABILITY ESTIMATES , Unavailability Per Demand Initiating Method Event ~
";;M;;4 1- -
""":: ro m LMFW 1.0E-6 1.8E-9 2.4E-6 2.9E-10 3.4E-6 9
N NI 8 E LOOP 2.9E-5 1.0E-7 6.3E-5 2.6E-9 9.2E-5 ' LOAC 5.5E-3 1.5E-5 5.8E-3 2.9E-7 1.1E-2
]
M O LMFW 5.6E-7(10)* - 1.2E-6(6)* - 1.8E-6(7)*
; C 3 u LOOP 3.2E-5(6)* -
- 6. 2E-5 (4) * -
9.8E-5 (4)
- 5 LOAC 5. 2E-3 (3) * -
5.4E-3(3)* - 1.2E-2(3)* LMW 4.9E-6 1.4E-8 3.3E-6 2.1E-8 8.2E-6
- [
a 3 o 3.5E-5 1.4E-7
@ LOOP 6.3E-5 1.7E-S 1.0E-4 E
S 6 LOAC 5.6E-3 2.1E-5 5. 9E-3 6.6E-7 1.2E-2
+
b' @ LHW 7.5E-6(6)* - 3.5E-6(5)* -
- 1. 2E-5 (4)
- l 5 E 3
LOOP
$ 6. 8E-5 (4) * -
6.6E-5(4)*- - 1.5E-4(3)* a LOAC 5.2E-3(3)* -
.5.4E-3(3)* -
1.2E-2(3)* (a) Point Estimate - (b) Median Estimate Not Estimated
- Error Spread = Q /Q assuming log normal distribution 95 Significant Number %toNePlace 4-14
z J Table 4.4 ?4 BYRON /BRAIDL'00D AFS UNRELIABILITY ESTIMATES . S $ Unavailability Per Demand Initiating % Method LI Event Hardware & " #" Test Maint. TOTAL Oper Error. Error i UIW 1.0E-6 1.8E-9 2.4E-6 2.9E-lb 3.4E-6 u v c o 8 $ LOOP __ 2.9E 1.0E-7 6.3E-5 2.6E-9 9.'2E g f
- I L i LOAC 5.5E-3 1.5E-5 5.8E-3 2.9E-7 '1.1E-2 R 'A
[t S uim 1.0E-6 1.8E-9 2.4E-6 3.4E-10 3.4E-6
$ Q
- t ; 3 g LOOP 2. 9E- S 1.0E-7 6.3E-5 4.2E-9 9.2E-5
- c. m LOAC 5.5E-3 1.5E-5 5.9E-3 2.9E-7 1.1E-2 (1) Assumed as designed case: Automatic switchin of ESW to Trains A & B water supply system.
(2) Assumed: Only remote manual switchin of ESW to Traihs'A & B water supply system. Significant Number to.One Place t B - 7 . mm O y . O W - 3 5 k 7 4-1S
l l l l t O @ G @ @ c @ @ Itsue.y %ese Eccs SamueNw g,gg m"= i hat. w MLanJN Fwo==e 4 *#tEt=Ntit QscvAL, wo wr g,, ,, m., .P m3 r,,.. c..,m - ly.- M CR2ATuS SY % " *4 bl h er iwrwauuusveD fear, t ** W L - l 6 R a:.
% t2,.. N *
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- 9. ir, a r.= P. t 9, s P,* a r. n P. = % i .
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Figure 4.1 Event Tree for LMFW Events with Electric Power E-
~
4-16 I
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- R.
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,_ 4
- i R ne, are
----- --- g.e,=aP3 k <
q..._ w:, e. n P. 1 j - . . ~ P,aP[ sk aPa8ks I P,s P[ sk sk,. 3 9 . . y* E a P[ a P,* P38 P. e I - w Rs P[af, f l
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O _ a P sP*sP, a P_S 1 P, a Is* d, a ksk I P,, P3 's4 s F, 3 4 i _ t P, s P[ sP, S P, a f. l a Figureg2 .Event Tree for IIIFW/ LOOP and IJfFW/LOAC Events
'4417
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, lLOAC
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~
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. I
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, , , ,,,,, , [ 7 ,,,,,
-6 -5 10-7 10 10 10'4 10 -3 10 -2 10
-I UNAVAILABILITY PER DEMAND Figure 4.6 BYRON /BRAIDWOOD AFS UNRELIABILITY ERROR SPREAD Statistical Independent Estimate
i 1 0 , s,
\.
\.
08 '..
\.
\
1 _ . i 1 l 0.6 i*
~
l C i C i l. O ; ' i. i F '
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-7 -6 -4 10 1C 10-5 10 10 -3 .1 0
-2 UNAVAILABILITY PER DEMAND Figure 4.7 BYRON /BRAIDWOOD AFS UNRELIABILITY ERROR SPREAD Statistical Independent + Common Cause Estimate I
_ _ y C r 7 C"3 G G E G W E O @ - < , --
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Fij.<e 4. 2 etRoNfbRA1)v100D SIMPLIFIED MASTElt. FAOLT TREE e m, ,.a. . ,. u,. y p p ,.u. .a. . Note; % 4.tal fault trte retresea+3 M LHFW IE lle<disaru fo uebr r E, roc tin <=fiab;lify rer demand.
- o
, !r .
f . Af1 UN AVAIL ABLE Out In MAINIINANCE *
.
- s
. ! I I
' TD AIM AOUI ,
. g n gpe g gg y IR AIN C OU T
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= x x F . p *
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ICA* T0 08 ttVin Itow 10 Df ttvin flow f uss 10 0f tsvin f LOW f use M AINf( ti To 2: 2 SC'S 10 E 2, SC'S W AINI[N ANCg TO ) 2 1G'S MAWitNANCE
\ m ., r3 5.8E-3
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- 5.9E-3
., ._x_ x.'. .,
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+ .
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+
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V G i w 5.0 Enterences
- 1. NUREG-0611 G "' eneric Evaluation of Feedwater Transients and Small Break Loss of Coolant Accidents in Westinghouse Designed Operating M Plants". Jan . 1980.
p 2. WASH-1400 (NUREG-75/014) Reactor Saf ety Study an Assessment of j Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Plants.1975.
- 3. Atwood. C. L.. " Common Cause and Individual Failure and Fault Eates for Licensee Event Reports of Pumps at U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants". EGG-EA-5289. (Draf t). November,1980.
- 4. Byron /Braidwood FSAR Chapters 8.10.15.
- 5. NUREG-0800 Standard Review Plan 10.4.9 Auxiliary Feedwater System (PWR). Rev. 2 - July 1981.
___._. _ 6. Common Cause Failure Experience in Nuclear Plant Auxiliary " ~ ~ " Feedwater Systems for Reliability Analysis (WARD-SR-3045-4) Topical report by G. E. Edison.
- 7. A study of operating data at the Trojan Nuclear Generating Station.
General Atemic Report by T. Taniguchi,1981.
- 8. NRC letter of March 10. 1980.
um
~
- 9. " Common Cause Failure Considerations in Predicting Cooling System Reliability . K. N. Fleming and G. W. Hannaman. IEEE Transactions
, on Reliability . Volume R-25. No. 3. August.1976.
- 10. "M0CUS - A Computer Program to Obtain Minimal Sets from Fault Tree". J. B. Fussell et. al. Aerojet Nuclear Company. National 7 Reactor Testing Station. Idaho Falls. Idaho. August 1974.
1
- 11. "STADIC-II. A Computer Program for Combining Distributions: Users Manual". P. Koch. et. al. GA-A16227. to be published.
- 12. "Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Auxiliary Feedvater System Reliability Analysis." Arizona Nuclear Power Project.
Docket No. 5052C-8102250251. Feb. 10. 1981.
- 13. " Defenses Against Common-mode Failures in Redundant Systems" by J.
Bourne, et. al. SRD R196. System Reliability Service. Jan.1981. M N a k a 5-1 N _ e. .. s . . . .-o -
1 , e o l e I
'1' s
I w I lg "g l d-APPENDIX A DATA BASE 1 _ _ . . -. . _ _ _ _ - .- . ... . _ . , . .. . . . . . - _ . . . . . -. -~.- 0 6. S
- e. e be
..~
Q d 4 3 0 Hus' A-1
APPENDIX A ,, DATA BASE e A I. Basic Reliability Data - Used for the Evron/Braidwood Annivses r The basic reliability data (f ailure rates) utilized for the 2i quantitative analysis were taken from Ref.1 (NUREG 0611) and are repeated i bere in Table A.I.1. When the required data were not given in Ref.1 j then Ref. 2 (WASH-1400) was utilized and these data are repeated here in lM' Table A.I.2. The diesel generator "f ail to start" used in this analysis
~
was 10-2/ demand with an error factor of 3. This was the value indicated , to have been used in the NUREG-0611 and NUREG-0635 studies. NRC Saf ety and Licensing Branch agreed on the usage of this number. Ref. I was also utilized for the test and maintenance outage contributions. human acts and error f ailure data and the frequency of occurrence for the various initiating events. _ __ A special investigation was undertaken to search for data on the ' diesel driven auxiliary feedwater pump. A first cut sample was reviewed , from Ref. 3 and this was updated from Trojan AFS experience. The results are that (1) the diesel driven pump. af ter correction of early problems - has achieved a reliability equivalent to turbine driven pumps. and (2) the , diesel pump is more reliable than diesel generator start data by about a " factor of three as compared to WASH-1400. _. A II. A FW Pumn Dat u r l A II.1 AFWS Data From Ref. 3 d.. j A review of data sources showed that the generic base presented in L i Ref. I for pumps does not differentiate between the type of drives. Most , AFW pumps are either electric-motor- or steam-turbine-driven. Ref. 3. which is a study of LER (Licensee Event Report) pump f ailures. listed a ] table of PWR plant data with the number of the various AFW pump type, critical hours, calendar months, etc.. Ref. 3 also had a listing of the PWR AN pump problems from LERs. The AFW pump problems were divided into the following categories as required by the model or various components and classifications: "
. Fail to start or Fail to run af ter start. ~
au
. Motor drive -
k
. Turbine drive -
. Diesel drive ,
. Auto / Manual start circuit
. Human / Operator error A-2
-t v. -
[] ". - L: 7 g To estimate a failure rate from that data the system demand cycles were first determined by assuming one test per pump per month plus three y AFS start requirements per reactor year. This first-cut comparison is
#t summarized in Table A II.1.1.
2 In this first cut analysis the diesel drive AFW pump appears to have a very high f ailure rate. both demand and run. Therefore, additional investigation was undertaken to more accurately understand the nature of the f ailures and the demand and run frequency estimates. This indepth
; investigation is discussed in Section A II.2.
A II.2 Irgian Nuclear Power AFS Experience The Reference 3 listing of AFS drives showed that the only diesel driven auxiliary feedwater pump with any experience was at the Trojan Nuclear Power Plant. Trojan utilizes their AFS for normal startup and shutdown operations.2 Thus, the numbers ~of AFS starts were underestimated in Section A II.1. q causing the failure rate of the AFS diesel pump to be high. The Graybooks y (through March 1981) and the annual operation reports for the years 1975. 1976. and 1977 were used to estimate the numbers of starts and runs that the Trojan AFS had experienced. d From initial criticality (12/15/75) through 2/29/76. Trojan was l ' experiencing many problems with both the turbine ud diesel drive pumps. ' Docket 50344-250 summarizes the major equipnent changes and modifications to improve the reliability of the AFS. These changes and modifications occur between 2/29/76 through 3/21/76. The data were analyzed in two
^
parts, before corrective actions (CA) and af ter CA. The AFS components and its f ailure modes, estimated numbers of starts and runs, and estimated time to restore the system are presented in Tables A II.2.2. Tables A II.2.1 summarizes the data and provides estimates of the f ailure rates for different modes of failure. including both before
~
corrective action and af ter corrective action. Af ter CA, the diesel pump p and its controls was estimated to be 5.2x10-3/ demand. Including a human L' factor " fail to start". the diesel pump would be estimated to be
~1.0x10-2/ demand. Reference 2 (WASH-1400) diesel / generator fail to start is assessed at 3x10-2 with an error f actor cf 3. Thus, the Troj an diesel I
AW pump f ailure rate per demand appears to be less than that of Ref. 2 diesel / generator. Including the before and af ter data for the pump and its controls without operator error. the failure rate per demand would be 3
~
1 2 Conversations with the plant operating personnel. A-3
'e
=.,..a p.. w w* enO
1 assessed at 7/254 = 0.029 or with operator error at 8/254 = 0.031. In both cases, these assessments are practically the same as that for diesel / generators in Ref. 2. The Trojan experience on both the diesel pump and its controls (without human f actor) f ail to start on demand of 0.0052 and the turbine [.5 drive and its controls of 0.0063 are practically the sese. The turbine E drive and its controls from Section A II was assessed at 0.0068. Thus, from this data, it can be concluded that diesel pump f ail to start failure race is at least as good as for the turbine pumps, and about a f actor of 3 {
^.
better than the diesel generator start failure rate. l F l 9 l E s A-4
* " " * * " " * *'*^/**
A 9 S . Table A.I.1 Recommended Data from NUREG 0611 f). b BASIC DATA USED FOR PURPOSES OF CONDUCTING i A CCMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF EXISTING l AFW5 DESIGNS & THEIR POTENTIAL RELIABILITIES l Point Value Estimate of Probability of* l Failure on Demand Component (Hardware) Failure Data -
- a. Vaives: .
Manual Valves (plugged) * *1 x 10.44 I Check Valves Motor Operated Valves Mechanical Components Plugging Contribution
*1 x 10
*1 x 10 34
+1 x 10 p' . Control Circuit (local to Valve) .
w/ quarterly tests $6 x 10.33 s w/ monthly tests *2 x 10
, Piston Actuated Valves .
l . MOV-Mechanical Components +3 x 10.43 g . 50V-Mechanical Components *1 x 10
. Control Circuit (Note: Use MOV s**
Failure Rate if Valve is not Fall Safe)
- b. Pumps: (1 Pump) 3
. Mechanical Components *1 x 10
. Control Circuit (Local to Pump -
. applies to Electrical Pumps) .
w/ Quarterly tests -7 x 10.33 w/ Monthly tests 4 x 10
- c. Actuation toqic (Assumes at least 1 of 2 logic) +7 x 10'3/ train
Error factors of 3-10 (up and down) about such valves are not unexpected for basic data uncertainties.
**c represents a number so small in magnitude that it may be neglected for basis of this study.
8 E
~
0
.1 if e
A-5 e
*1 psi e +rea e
*
- 1 Table A.I.1 (cont. )
!!. TEST & MAINTENANCE CUTA0E CONTRIBUTIONS:
- a. Calculatioral Approacn ,,
- 1. Test Ovtage 7 Q g (ehrs/ test) (# tests / year) E TEST enrs/ year
- 2. Maintenance Outage Q
- 0.22 (ehrs/maint. act)
MAINT.' 120
- b. Data Tables for Test & Maint. Outages *
$UMMARY OF TEST ACT CURATION Calculated Mean Test Act b
U Range on Test Component Act Duration Time, hr Duration Time, t ' h' D T Pumps 0.25 - 4 1.4 Valves 0.25 - 2 0.86 - Diesels 0.25 - 4 1.4 Instrumentation 0.25 - 4 1.4 q l LOG NCRMAL MODELED MAINTENANCE ACT DURATION J
~1 Range On~ Mean Act i Duration Time, hr Duration Time, hr '
Component Pumps 1/2 - 24 . 7 1/2 - 72 19 Valves 1/2 - 24 7' -. Diesels 2 - 72 21 _. Dstrumentation 1/4 - 24 6 9 Note: These data tables were taken from the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400)II) for purposes of this AFW system assessment. Where the plant technical specifications placed limits on the outage duration (s) allowed for q AFW system trains, this tech spec limit was used to estimate the mean e duration times for maintenance ACPS. In general, it was found that J the outages allowed for maintenance dominated those contributions to
. AFW system unavailability from outages due to testing. (
d L I
]
l l A-6 l . _ _ . _ . . . _ , . . .
!"; A M M EEE C15 A CI33 r : G 'ZE I EER E""3 M Er4F8 E A C t
l Table A.I.1 (cbnt.) III. Human Acts & Errors - Failure Data: Estimated Human Error /Fallure Probab(11tles Modifying Factors & Situations With Valve Fosition With Local Walk-Around & W/0 Elther Indication in Control Room Double Check Procedures Point Value Est Est. on Point Value Est Est. on Point Value Est on Error Error Estimate Error i Factor Factor Factor
- a. Acts & Errors of A Pre-Accident Nature
- 1. Valves Mispositioned During Test /Maint i l
(a) Specific Single Valve Wrongly Selected out of A Population of Valves During Conduct of a Test or Maintenance Act (X No. 1 " 10-2 . g 3 10-2 " 1 10-23 of Valves in Population at Choice) 15 I 20 Y I 10 1 10 h (b) Inadvertently Leaves Correct -4 -3 -2 10 Valve in Wrong Position N5 x 10 20 MS x 10 10 N10 More than one valve is affected N1 x 10'# 20 N1 x 10' 10 N3 x 10'3 10
- 2. '
(coupled errors) ,
- 3. Mtscalibration of Sensors / Electrical Relays (a) One Sensor / Relay Affected - -
N5 x 10'3 10 M10'I 10 (b) More than one Sensor / Relay ,3 3 Affected - - N1 x 10 10 N3 x 20 10 i i 1
Table A.I.1 (cont.) Time Actuation Needed Estimated Failure Estimated Failure Overall Estimated Prob. for Primary Prob. of other Estimate Error Factor
, Operator to (Backup) Control of Failure on Overall Actuate AFWS Rs. Operator to Probability Probability
-
- Actuate AFWS
- b. Acts & Errors of a Post-Accident Nature ;
- 1. Manual Actuation of AFW system free Control Room ;
(a) Considering " Dedicated" .0perator N5 min. 10 ,I N2x10[f N0.5 (mod. dep.) N2x10'.f l to Actuate AFW system and Possible NIS min. N1 x 10 4 N.25 (Iow dep.) N5 34 10 - 10 10 Backup Actuation of AFWS N30 min. NS x 10 N10
! (a) Considering "Non-Dedicated" M5 min. - N5 x 10'2 10 Operator to Actuate AFW system N15 min.
N5x10f N0.5 (mod. dep.) 10 10 M1 x 10 3 NS 53 and Possible Backup N30 min. N5 x 10 N.25 (Iow dep.) N10 10 Acutation of AFW systes
.1 e
t Y
)
t i.
p . 4 m - Ir
)
Table A.I.2 -' Data Table From WASH 1400 (Ref. 2) F-
'l E Of Components Assessed Range railure Mode [3 7((,_ r Pumps (includes driver): Failure to start I ~
on Demand , O d 3x10 - 3x10~ /d 1x10~ /d 3 ra11ure to run, given start, ) , (normal environ-
~ ~4 monts): 3x10 -
3x10 /hr 3x10~ /hr 10 Failure to run, given start, 1, (extremo, post _
._ . . . accident environ- - - - - - - - - - ~= ~ ~ + - - ~ ~ ~ -
ments insido
~4 -2 ~3 containment): 1x10 -
1x10 /hr 1x10 /hr 10 Failure to run, given start, 1, (post accident, after environ-
~3 ~d mental recovery): 3x10 -5 -
3x10 /hr 3x10 /hr 10 Valves Motor
-- Operated: Failure to crerate, F1 3; Od (includes driver)IDI: 3x10 -3 ~3 3x10 /d 1x10 /d 3 p railure to remain 1; open, O d (Plug)(c): 3x10
-5
- 3x10 /d
~4 ~4 1x10 /d 3 sm 1x10"I -6 1,3 -
1x10 /hr 3x10 /hr 3
*I ~8 Rupture, 1,3 1x10 -
1x10 ~ /hr 1x10 /hr 10 I E M M 'T
$T 2
., A-9
~ , .
I
- e e i
6 Table A.I.2 (co ninu'd1 cceponents railure Itode Assessed Range U "" onal Err y,gtor ' Solenoid w Operated: Failure to operate, Od : x10 - 3x1d/d 1xMM , 3 Failure to remain
-5 open, O d(plug): 3x10 ,
3,gn-4/d 1x10'4/d 3 Rupture, 1,3 1x10 - 1x10'7/hr 1x10' /hr 10 Air-Fluid s Operated: Tailure to operate,
~4 Od : 1x10 - 1x10'3/d 3x10'4/d 3
_ Failure to remain
- open, od (plug): 3x10' - -- 3x10'4/d 1x10'4/d '3~'^-'
~7 ~7 1, 1x10 -
1x10/hr 3x10 /hr 3 Rupture, 1, 1x10 - 1x10'I/hr 1x10'8/hr 10 5 Check
- Valves: Failure to open,
-5 Od 3x10 -
3x10'4/d 1x10'4/d 3 Internal leak, 1 * (severe): 1x10' - 1x10'0/hr 3x10' /hr 3 1x10 *7 Rupture, 1,: - 1x10 /hr 1x10'8/hr 15 Vacuum Valves Failure to operate. *
-5 -5 Od 1x10 -
1x10'4/d 3x10 /d 3 I Mar.ual valves railure to remain 3x10 -5 ~4 open, ed (plug): - 3x10'4/d 1x10 /d 3 1x10 ~7 -t Rupture, 1,3 - 1x1,0 /hr 1x10 /hr 10 Relief valvesi.. Failure to epen, Od 3x10 6* - 3x10' /d -5 1x10 /d 3 Premature open. .
-6 -5 1, 3x10 - 3x10 /hr 1x10' /hr 3 =
3 l l
n
- l?
l 0 l
.. I b
l Table A.I.2 (continued) t, co porents railure Mode Assessed Tar.ge C* 'E 'C"'I Frrer , Ta 7<.st valves,
} Plov '1eters, 3
Orifices: railure to remain
~4 open, Od (plug): 1x10 - 1x10~ /d 3x10 /d 3 1x10 - 1x10 /hr ~8 Rupture, A,a 1x10 /hr 10 Pipes PipeC3" '
dia per sections Rupture / Plug,
~1I 1,, 3 ,8 3x10 -
3x10 /hr 1x10/hr 30 Pipe *3" _. dia per section Rupture / Plug. 1x10 ~10 /hr
= Age ~
1,, 3x10~ - 3x10 '/hr 30 Clutch, mechanical: Tailure to operate, 3 Od 's 1x10
~
1x10~ /d 3x10~ /d '3 Scraat Rods n (Single) : Tailure to insert 3x10 ~4
- 3x10 /d 1x10~ /d 3
' (a) Demand probabilitics are based on the presence of proper input control signals.
For turbine driven pu:.ps the effect of failures of valves, se.tsors and cther auxiliary hardware may result in significantly higher overall failure rates for turbine driven punp systems. , (b) Demand probabilitics are based on presence of proper inpet control signals. P J (c) Plu? probabilities are given in demar.d probability, and per hour rates, since phenonena are generally time dependent, but plugged condatior. nay only be detected upon a demand of the system. (d) Deatand probabilities are based on presence of proper input contro} signals. D . o O 9.\ A FI I A-11
j Table A.I.3 - Data Table From WASH 1400 (Ref. 2) Components Failure Mode Assessed Range Corapu onal Error 9' Clutch, I: g Electrical: Failure to operate, O(d I: 1x10'# - 1x10' /d 3x10'4/d 3 Premature dis- g engagement, 1, 1x10~ - 1x10' /hr 1x10/hr 10 Motors, Electric Failure to start, Qd a x - x / x10 /d 3 Failure to run, ~~']' _ given start, 1,, , , _ _ _ _ _ . . _ , . . . , _ , _ . , . _ , . . . . . ~ - ~ (normal environ- ! ment): 3x10 - 3x10-5/hr 1x10-5/hr 3 l Failure to run, given start, 1, , (extreme environ-ment) : 1x10'4 - 1x10-2/hr 1x10~3/hr 10 Relays: Failure to "
-5 energize, O d : 3kl0 - 3x10/d 1x10' /d 3 _.
Failure of NO contacts to close, given energized, 1x10' -6 1, - 1x10 /hr 3x10' /hr 3 Failure of FC , contacts by , - Opening, given not energized, 1, 3x10 - 3x10' /hr 1x10' /hr 3 Short across M0/NC contact, 1,3 1x10 - 1x10'7/hr 1x10/hr 10
~8
, Coil open, 1, 1x10 -
1x10 1x10' /hr 10 m coil short to power, 1 : 1x10 - 1x10' /hr 1x10'*/hr 10 5 3
.1 m I
, , , , , , .m , - * % *
- n -
a
- in 1
)
[d Table A.I.3 (Continu'd3 Fx *
'2t, Assessed Range computational Trror corponents Tailure Mode Median Factor Circuit w Breakers railure to transfer, O(d I:
3x10' - 3x10' /d 1x10 /d 3 I Premature transfer, 1 o: 3x10
- 3x10 , /hr 1x10, /hr 3 I Switches Limit Failure to operate, d
O: 1x - x /d 3x10 /d 3 d Torques Tailure to operate,
- - - - - ~ ~ --
Od 3x10
~
3x10'4/d 1x10'4/d 3~ Pressure: Failure to operate,
-5 Od 3x10 - 3x10'#/d 1x10'4/d 3 Manual: Failure to transfer,
-5 -5 o: 3x10 -6 -
3x10 /d 1x10 /d 3
, Switch Contacts: Failure of NO contacts to close given switch operation, 1,3 1x10'8 - 1x10'0/hr 1x10'7/1.r 10 Failure of NC by opening, given E no switch
*8 ri operation, A,e 3x10*8 - 3x10' /hr 3x10 10 short across NO/NC contact. 1, 1x10 - 1x10' /hr 1xio-8/hr 10 Battery Power Syste s (wet cell): Failure to provide
-6 proper output, A,: 1210' * - 1x10'$/hr 3x10 /hr 3 I
0 a - da i 1 t
'.?
l A-13 l
o .
.]
Table A. I. 3 (Continued > Comput nal Error Components Failure Mode Assessed Pange Transferrerr: Open Circuit [I primary or D
~ ~0 ~6 secondary, 1, 3x10 - 3x10 /hr 1x10 /hr 3 Short primary to ~0
~7 ~
secondary, 1,: 3x10 - 3x10 '/hr 1x10 /hr 3 ed Solid State Devices, Hi power Appli-cations (diodes,
-- trans'istors, '
--- . - ~ - - - . - _
~ ~ ' '
etc.): Tails to function -- ~0
~7 ~
3x10 /hr 10 1 ,3 3x10 - 3x10 /hr Fails shorted,
~7 -5 ~
1x10 '/hr 10 1,:' 1x10 - 1x10 /hr Solid State Devices, Low power Applications: Fails to function, ~$ ~0 1x10~ - 1x10 /hr 1x10 /hr 10 - 1,
~8 ~0 ~
10 Fails shorted: 1x10 - 1x10 /hr 1x10 /hr Diesels (Complete plant): Failure to start,
-2 -2 0:4 1x10 - 1x10"I/d 3x10 /d 3 I"
Failure to run, energency conditions, given start, M
~4 -2 ~3 3x10 - 3x10 /hr 3x10 /hr 10 1,
Diesels, i l (Engine only): Fatlure to run, emergei y con-ditions, given W
*$ ~3
- start, l s o
3x10 - 3x10 /hr 3x10[/hr lo I
]
I A-14
!?
ic Table A.I. 3 (continued) m f components railure Mode Assessed Range C #"P," n ractor Instrurrenta-tion - General (Includes I transmitter, aeplifier and output device): Tallure to operate, l
-5 -6 10 1,3 1x10' - 1x10 /hr 1x10 /hr shift in calibra-
~4 tion, 1, 3x10~ -
3x10 /hr 3x10-5/hr 10 ruses: Failure to open,
-5 Od 3x10 -
3x10 /d 1x10-5/d 3 Premature open, i
~7 -6 1, 3x10 - 3x10 /hr 1x10/hr 3
)
Wires y (Typical circuite,
== several
-6 -5 -6 joints): Open circuit, 1,: 1x10 , 3,3g 3x10 /hr 3 Short to ground,
-8 -6 ~7 e,
1, 3x10 - 3x10 /hr 3x10 /hr 10 short to power, l s o 1x10 - 1x10~ /hr 1x10"I/hr 10 Terminal L' Boards: Open connection,
~8 l s o 1x10 - 1x10"'/hr 1x10'7/hr 10 i Short to adjacent circuit, 1, 1x10"I - 1x10'I 1x10-8/hr 10 i
l B . (a) Demand probabilities are based on presence of proper ir.put control signals. 5 E 3 FT i A A-15 m
, s,, se -e-mem-m.-e eomwe
1 TABLE A II.1.1 . IlR1I G I AES Component Es timated Failure Rates fr.g2 ERL 2, l}Ata (1) Pump Est. No. Fail To Start Est. No. Fail Run Run Ty pe of Starts Start Failure of Runs to Failure Failure ,5 (Cause) Rate (Cause) Run Frac- Rate L Per tion Per Demand Hour 2 gap and 1,t3 Controla Turbine 2803 19(2) .0068 2745 13 .0047 5x10-4 Motor 3132 2 .00064 3067 5 .0016 2x10-4 Diesel 35 4 .11 25 5 .2 2x10-2 Anta Start Circuit ., I k Turbine 560 9ec*(3) .016 Motor 626 3(4) .0048 Diesel 7 1 .14 NOTES: 0 tb (1) Assumed one test per month per train plus 3 AFS requirements per E reactor year. (2) 3 Pumps fail to start during test. 1 pump had control problems and U 2 pumps had excessive tight packing. U (3) 3 pumps fail to autostart. Manual started 3 pumps 0.K. Fuses not installed. 7 days af ter initial criticality and before on-line. (4) 2 electric drive pump f ail to autostart due to def ective switches. Turbine drive pump started 0.K.
*cc - Common cause failure.
8 1 R A-16
/ 7 5 TABLE A 11.1.1 (cont'd) 3 FIRST . CHI AES Component Istimmted Failure Rates fids E 3. R. ara b) (1) Pump Est. No. Fail To Start Est. No. Fail Run Run Ty pe of Starts Start Failure of Runs to Failure Failure (Cause) Rate (Cause) Run Frac- Rate Per tion Per Demand Hour Miscelinneous ' I Turbine 2803 2 (e) (e) -
.00071 2745 4 (b)(b)
(2)(b)
.0015
- - ~ - - ~ ~ -" ~
(h)(g) Motor 3132 3 .00096 3067 7 .0023 (c)(d) (f)(b) (e) (2)(f) = (h)(2)
. (f)(h)
(3)(h)(3) Diesel 35 1(a) .029 25 0 >.04 Outage Causes (a) Inadequate procedure. (b) No. 3 SG FW reg bypass valve recirculating (Haddem Neck unique)..(c) pump motor breaker. (d) 480V bus breaker. (e) unknown. (f) air in suction header. (g) recir:ulator line and orifice redesign. (b) plugged strainer during plant startup. Notes (1) Assumed 1 test per month per train plus 3 AFS requirenents per reactor year. P5 (2) During startup. As pumps flow reduced due to startup-strainers plugged. 2 (3) During test. 2 motor-drive pumps lost suction due to air in the section header. 3 7s T A-17
. . . . . . . , , ,,,.,.we,. -=
)
TABLE A 11.1.1 (cont'd) FIRST E l AIS Comocnent Estimated Failure Rates II.QR E 1 RA1.A Ej (1) L Pup Est. No. Fail To Start Est. No. Fail Run Run Ty pe of Starts Start Failure of Runs to Failure Failure (Cause) Rate (Cause) Run Frac- Rate Per tion Per Demand Bour OPER ATOR ERROR Turbine . . . _ . . . control 2803 8 .0029 2745 0 Motor & its y control 3132 4 .0013 3067 0 (3) Diesel & its control 35 2 .057 25 0 Auto start turbine 560 1 .0018 cc*(2) Auto start M moter 626 0 >.0016 bl Auto start diesel 7 1 .14 Notes (1) Assumed 1 test per month per train plus 3 AFS requirements per reactor year. R (2) All paps f ail to auto start. manual start one pump 0.I.. Mislogged leads M in auto-start circuitry. (3) During monthly test. two electric drive pumps f ailed to start until . third manual attempt. Auxiliary oil pump not energized. .,
- Common cause failure.
A-18 s emeo -m
--_m- - - _ _ _
lI 7 g Table A II.2.1
,, TROJAN NUCLEAR POWER PLANT AZ1 EXPERIENCE H.QH OPERATIONAL REPORTS
?z G.
Pump Est. No. Fail To Start Est. No. Fail Run s Ty pe Starts Start Failure of Runs to Failure u Rate / Run Rate / Demand Demand Igag and h Controls Before g (Corrective Actions) W Diesel 51 6 .12 42 2 .048 Turbine 25 2 .08 25 2 .08
- - - -- ~ -- - .. , . _ _ , . . . . - - - - ~ . .
B Diesel 194 1 .0052 190 5 .026 f Turbine 159 .0063 1 157 ~1 .0064
, Anta Start Circuit Before Q Logic B 9 0 <.11 Logic A 9 0 <.11 After G 4
Logic B 28 1 .036 3 Logic A 28 0 <.036
.C
*cc = common cause 0
a n l J 2 u: A-19
. . j Table A 11.2.1 (Cont'd)
TROJAN NUCLEAR POWER PLANT AEji EXPERIENCE H.QH OPERATIONAL REPORTS (1) Pump Est. No. Fail To Start Est. No. Fail Run _ Ty pe Starts Start Failure of Runs to Failure ? Rate / Run Rate / El Demand Demand Deerator Error Before.CA Diesel 9 1 .11 Auto Start cc*(1) Turbine 9 1 .11 Auto Start cc*(1) 4 Diesel 28 .036 s Auto Start 1 ec (2) Turbine Auto Start 28 1 .036 ce(2) -. Af.tzr.CA Diesel & 194 1 .0052 190 0 .0052 Its controls Miscellanecgg before g4 Diesel 51 1(3) .020 Turbine 51 0 .020 After SA Diesel 194 0 .0052 190 0 .0052 '- Turbine 159 0 .0063 157 0 .0064 { I (1) Mislogged lifted leads (manual start 0.K.) m (2) Wiring error (Manual start 0.K.) ,
~
(3) Procedure inadequate. A-20
d-i
'7 Table A II.2.2 EVEJT
SUMMARY
(Cont'd) a
? Component Type: Diesel Driven AW Pump and its Controls J.,
31A1A limR in Restore Cause Failure Mode: IAil 12 start gg demand. mA 12/19/75 >20m. <5h Special sequence required af ter each engine shutdown to reset fuel racks and sontrol circuitry. 12/24/75 <20m Fail to reset fuel rocks.
~ '" ~
1/9/76
~ ~
Sh - - - - " Hisaligned governor. 1/23/76 <20m Low lube oil press. cold start. 2nd start 0.K. h 1/24/76 <20m Same J 1/24/76 <20m Same 2/29/76 2m Cold start, overspeed trip local manual start. (Turbine drive pump declared n inoperable 2 days before.) 12/75 - 2/.21 Deerational starter M plant startup M shutdowns.
.0T-5-1 '1 g i ggr month , -r J
2/29/76 - 3/21/76 Corrective Actions and Verification Tests (Docket 50344-250) 12/17/77 >20m. <5h Speed microswitch, out of adjustment. 9/3/ 80 >20m. <5h No details-fail to start during test. 3 1.2 1 _ 2 /J 1 operationni starts M plant startups g shutdowns.
..r m .tio. .at., M ,ez ,-1. m , 1 m .one D
U
'b l
1 A-21 e .%.w ..w - . * - * * * + -
. . 1 ry :
- i. ,
Table A II.2.2 EVENT
SUMMARY
w Component Type: Diesel Driven AIV Famp and its Controls { Rgg lia1 1g Restore h Failure Mode: fail ig Inn after startina. 12/24/75 >20m. <5h - - Fail to set current limiter on speed
~'^~~~ ~~ ~
I controller. 1/4/76 1.1h Speed signal lead vibrated loose. 2/14/76 >20m. <5h Jacket cooling water setpoint changed. 12/75-2/76 Operational Innu M alang startups g shutdowns. " POT-5-1 1 M 1 SRI Ennih 2/29/76 - 3/21/76 Corrective Actions and Verification Tests (Docket 50344-250) - 3/28/76 <20m Insufficient margin on overspeed setpoint. 9/2/76 >5h. ~7 days Loose adjustment spring in jacket tenp. sensing device. 9/9/76 Ssme Sane 3/24/77 145h Broken crank shaf L. 2/7/80 >20m.<5h Broken cooling water hose. ( 3/76-2/81 Onerationni Inggi ja alAng startups M shutdowns. L verification Testa r AR POT-5-12 M g 1 SCI Enn1h 3 I ! A-22
g lB i ,n fb Table A II.2-2 EVENT
SUMMARY
(Cont'd) Component Type: Diesel Driven AW Pump and its Controls J}arg line.tn Reatare .Canan Cenpon.en Type: AFJi ann s tart sva t em - Failure Modet f. Ail .t2 initiate A da start sinnal-1/16/76 <20m (>5h repair) Mislogged lifted leads in auto start circuitry. Both diesel and turbine pumps fail to start. Manually started one of the pumps (cc)*. 12/.12.- 2/16. Aula aearta2 2
~
2/29/76 - 3/25/76 No change indicated in auto start system
,. (Docket 50344-250) 9/3/76 <20m (<5h repair) Blown fuse in diesel pump auto start circuitry. Manual start 0.K.
y 10/3/80 <20m (>5h repair) Wiring error, both diesel and turbine pumps q fail to auto start. Assumed manual start d 0.K. (cc)*.
$ 10/11/80 <20m (Sh repair) Blown fuse in diesel pump auto start kl circuitry Assumed manual start 0.K.
3f.21 - 2/J1 A nn starts: 21
- Common cause.
4 b a,,
'h A-23 m -~+,e g
l - 1 Table A II.2-2 EVENT
SUMMARY
(Cont'd) D k Component Type: Diesel Driven AW Pump and its Controls Date Jjat.la Reatore h component Iy.pg;, mh 1 Failure h i Declared Inoperable 1/13/76 24.4 (16.0 repair) - - Turbine-stema leak ~~~~~~ ' ~ ' I 2/27/76 ~25 day s
- Turbine governor oil problem.
3/29/76 - 3/2/76 Corrective Actions and Verification Tests (Docket 50344-250) 12/17/77 >20m. <5h Turbine - could noe be reset for auto " start. limit switch failure. 12/28/78 >20m. <5h Diesel - fuel oil leak 4/15/79 >20m. <5h Diesel - fuel line crack component Type: M Isolation Valve Failure h 1 Stuck nartially m 11/17/77 >5 h AWIV between diesel pump and ~B" SG stuck R partially open (90%). Damaged sealing gasket M allowed water to leak into main operator.
*2 days later on 2/29/76 diesel pump pump f ail to auto start. Remote manual start failed. Local manual start OK af ter resetting overspeed trip. Started in about 2 minutes af ter initial f ailure.
I D 11 1 A-24
r r C - S 7
} Table A.III.1 m
v Fault Tree Dar Input d! J7 Failure
*2 Probability Event Per Demand Error No. Description (Per Hour) Factor
- Ref. Comments I. ___..________ _______......
El ESF Logic A f ail ;<1s 7.0E-3 3 1
"? W ;w< . .verride failure for 1.0E-2 10 1 control logic A E3 ESF Logic B failure 7.0E-3 3 1 E4 - Manual override failure for 1.0E-2 10 1
~
control logic B 4
~
ESA, 2 inch blowdown valves to 1.0E-4 3 1
. E6A SG-A fail to close U ESB. 2 inch blevdown valves to 1.0 E-4 3 1 l
E6B SG-B fail to close E5C. 2 inch blowdown valves to 1.0E-4 3 1 E6C SG-C fail to close ESD. 2 inch blowndown valves to 1.0E-4 3 1 E6D SG-D fail to close E7 6 inch blowdown valve to 4 SG's 1.0E-4 3 1 E8A Check valve (FWO37A) fails 1.0E-4 3 1 to close E8B Check valve (FWO37B) fails 1.0E-4 3 1 to close E8C Check valve (FWO37C) fails 1.0E-4 3 1 to close , E8D Check valve (FWO37D) fails 1.0E-4 3 1 to close j E9A Check valve (FWO9A) plugged 1.0E-4 3 1
,, E9B Check valve (FWO9B) plugged 1.0E-4 3 1 c.*
5
- Error Factor = Ratio of 95th to 50th percentile .
4. I A-25 w-,. * *.-=e- . - , . - + +
j Table A.III.1 Fault Tree Data Input Failure e Probability To Event Per Demand Error b No. Description (Per Hour) Factor
- Ref. Comments E9C Check valve (FWO9C) plugged 1.0 E-4 3 1
{ FI E9D Check valve (FWO9D) plugged 1.0E-4 3 1 E10A cheek valve (FWOO8A) fails 1.0E-4 3 1 to open E10B Check valve (FWOO8B) fails 1.0E-4 3 1 to open r E10C Check valve (FWOO8C) fails 1.0E-4 3 1 o to open E10D Check valve (FWOO8D) fails 1.0E-4 3 1 9 I to open Ella Flow controller (FC2A) f ailure (3.1E-5) 10 2 EllB Flow controller (FC2B) f ailure (3.1E-5) 10 2 E11C Flow controller (FC2C) failure (3.1E-5) 10 2 E11D Flow controller (FC2D) f ailure (3.1E-5) 10 2 o i.. E12A Air operated valve (FW510) (3.0E-4) 3 1 fails to open r-E125 Air operated valve (FW520) (3.0E-4) 3 1 L f ails to open e E12C Air operated valve (FkS30) (3.0E-4) 3 1 f ails to open E12D Air operated valve (FW540) (3.0E-4) 3 1 fails to open
- Error Factor = Ratio of 95th to 50th percentile.
I A-26 i
' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ' " ~ " ' ' " '
~
O [} Table A.III.1 (Continued) 7 -.-----------------.....--....--.............---------..------..---------.-- g Failure Probability Event Per Demand Error
}a No. Description (Per Hour) Factor
- Ref. Comments
, E13A Manual valve (WO55A) plugged 1.0E-4 3 1 E13B Manual valve (WO55B) plugged 1.0E-4 3 1 E13C Manual valve (WO550) plugged 1.0E-4 I 3 1 E13D Manual valve (WO55D) plugged 1.0E-4 3 1 E14 Manual reset for logic A f ailure 1.0E-2 10 1 EIS Manual reset for logic B f ailure 1.0E-2 10 1 E16A Train A check valve (AF014A) 1.0E-4 3 1 to SG-A fails to open j E16B Train A check valve (AF014B) 1.0E-4 3 1 to SG-B fails to open E16C Train A check valve (AF0140) 1.0E-4 3 1 1 to SG-C fails to open l E16D Train A check valve (AF014D) ' 1.0 E-4 3 1 to SG-D fails to open E17A Train A MOV (AF013A) to SG-A 1.0 E-4 3 1 Plugged E17B Train A MOV (AF013B) to SG-B 1.0E-4 3 1 plugged E17C Train A MOV (AF013C) to SG-C 1.0E-4 3 1 Plugged E17D Train A MOV (AF013D) to SG-D 1.0E-4 3 1 Plugged r
- Error Factor = Ratio of 95th to 50th percentile.
w a r4 Y A-27 e . . . . -
l I l l Table A.III.1 (Continued) Failure Probability Event Per Demand Error , No. Description (Per Hour) Factor
- Ref. Comments T.:
___..___ _____ .....____.. _______..__________________._____________.____.._ __ h-E18A Train A A0V (AF005A) to SG-A 1.0E-4 3 1 Plugged E18B Train A A0V (AF005B) to SG-B 1.0F-4 3 1 plugged i EISC Train A A07 (AF005C) to SG-C 1.0E-4 3 1 plugged
~~ '
E18D Train A A0V (AF005D) to SG-D 1.0E-4 _ _ _ 3 1 _.. ,,_ ._ . _ .... _ . , . _ plugged E19A Train A flow limiting orifice 3.0E-4 3 1 (AF011) to SG-A plugged l
'A E19B Train A flow limiting orifice 3.0E-4 3 1 g (AF013) to SG-B plugged E19C Train A flow limiting orifice 3.0E-4 3 1 (AF015) to SG-C plugged E19D Train A flow limiting orifice 3.0E-4 3 1 p{
(AF017) to SG-D plugged Q E20A Train B check valve (AF014E) 1.0E-4 3 1 r to SG-A fails to open f. 6 E20B Train B check valve (AF014F) 1.0E-4 3 1 to SG-B fails to open E20C Train B check valve (AF014G) 1.0E-4 3 1 to SG-C fails to open E20D Train B check valve (AF014H) 1.0E-4 3 1 to SG-D f ails to open
- Error Factor = Ratio of 95th to 50th percentile i
il I A-28 l
" ' ~ ~ ~ ^ ~
- A
,e 7
5 Table A.III.1 (Continued) 7 ___...........___.....______._______.____....__________________________________ d Failure Probability e Event Per Demand Error No. Description (Per Hour) Factor
- Ref. Comments E21A Train B MOV (AF013E) to SG-A 1.0E-4 3 1 plugged E21B Train B MOV (AF013F) to SG-B 1.0E-4 3 1 plugged E21C Train B MOV (AF013G) to SG-C 1.0E-4 3 1 Plugged
_ _ _ . E21D Train B MOV (AF013H) to SG-D 1.0E-4 . . . _ _ . . . 3 _ . .. 1 . . _ . - . . . . Plugged 4 E22A Train B A0V (AF005E) to SG-A 1.0E-4 3 1 plugged r k l W E22B Train B A0V (AF005F) to SG-B 1.0E-4 3 1 plugged
~
1 E22C Train B ADV (AF005G) to SG-C 1.0E-4 3 1 plugged E22D Train B A0V (AF005H) to SG-D 1.0E-4 3 1 plugged 7 E23A Train B flow limiting orifice 3.0E-4 3 2 j (AF012) to SG-A plugged E23B Train B flow limiting orifice 3.0E-4 3 2 (AF014) to SG-B plugged E23C Train B flow limiting orifice 3.0E-4 3 2 (AF016) to SG-C plugged E23D Train B flow limiting orifice 3.0E-4 3 2 (AF018) to SG-D plugged E24A Train C check valve (FWO36A) 1.0 E-4 3 1 to SG-A fails to open
)
" E24B Train C check valve (FWO36B) 1.0E-4 3 1 to SG-B fails to open
{,'
.2
- Error Factor = Ratio of 95th to 50th percentile d
.a '?
A-29
o . ' Table A.III.1 (Continued) Failure Probability Event Per Desand Error No. Description (Per Hour) Factor
- Ref. Comments 7
______....__._______________ .______________________________..________.________ y r l E24C Train C check valve (FWO36C) 1.0E-4 3 1 to SG-C fails to open p E24D Train C check valve (FWO36D) 1.0E-4 3 1
'9' to SG-D f ails to open E25A Train C A0V (FWO35A) to SG-A 3.0E-4 3 1 fails to operate E25B Train C A0V (FWO353) to SG-B 3.0E-4 3 1 fails to operate - - -- - --' -- ' - - - - - ~ ~~
r E25C Train C A07 (FWO35C) to SG-C 3.0E-4 3 1 fails to operate " E25D Train C A0V (FWO35D) to SG-D 3.0E-4 3 1 I fails to operate - E26A Train C flow controller (FC15A) (3.1E-5) 10 2 9 to SG-A fails ' E26B Train C flow controller (FC15B) (3.lE-5) 10 2 to SG-B fails N E26C Train C flow controller (FC15C) (3.1E-5) 10 2 to SG-C fails , I E26D Train C flow controller (FC15D) (3.1E-5) 10 2 to SG-D fails
]
a E27A Train C A0V (WO34A) to SG-A 3.0E-4 3 1 fails to operate E27B Train C A0V (WO34B) to SG-B 3.0E-4 3 1 fails to operate
,l E27C Train C A0V (FWO34C) to SG-C 3.0E-4 3 1 ' l fails to operate E27D Train C A0V (FWO34D) to SG-D 3.0E-4 3 1 fails to operate
- Error Factor = Ratio of 95th to 50th percentile '
I A_30 '
.. _ _. . - ~ .
['t Table A.III.1 (Continued)
't Failure d-Probability Event Per Danand Error u No. Description (Per Hour) Fa ctor
- Ref. Comments E28A Train C manual valve (W33A) 1.0E-4 3 1 to SG-A plugged E28B Train C manual valve (W33B) 1.0E-4 3 I to SG-B plugged i
E28C Train C manual valve (W33C) 1.0E-4 3 1 to SG-C plugged E28D Train C manual valve (W33D) 1.0E-4 _ 3 1 . _._ . to SG-D plugged E29 Train A discharge valve 1.0E-4 3 1 (AF004A) plugged I ! m! i E30 Train A check valve (AF003A) 1.0E-4 3 1 U fai14 to open l E31 Train A motor pump (AF10PA-1) 1.0E-3 3 1 fails to start E32 Train A motor pump local 4.0E-3 3 1
] control circuit f ails l y E33 Train A breaker (PCB1412) (1.0E-6) 3 2 l
inadvertently opened a E34 Loss of AC supply lines on 1.0E-3 10 - Engineering reactor trip judgment E35 Unit I diesel generator 1.0E-2 3 1 NRC Saf ety & l 3 ' (DG-1A) fails to start Licensing l Branch agreed. E36 ACB14B breaker fails to close 1.0E-3 3 2 E37 PCB1412 breaker fails to open 1.0E-3 3 2
- Error. Factor = Ratio of 95th to 50th percentile f .*
fs A r-A-31 A
I . y i
. . Table A.~III.1 (Continued)
Failure s Probability ' Event . Per Demand Error . No. Des:ription (Per Hour) Factor
- Ref. Comments ;
__.._____________,____._____..._____..______.______ ___________________._______ r; E38 Unit 2 diesel generator (DG2A) 1.0E-2 3 1 Same as E35 fails to' start E39 ACB2413 breaker fails to close 1.0E-3 3 2 E40 PCB2412 breaker fails to open 1.0E-3 3 2 E41 Operater f ails to manually 1.0E-2 10 1 transf er BUS 241 to 141 E42 ACE 2414 breaker fails to close 1.0E-3 3 2 F E43 ACB1414 breaker f ails to close 1.0E-3 3 2 . E44 ~ Manual valve (AF,002A) plugged 1.0 E-4 3 1 q
' E45 Cheek valve (AF001A)'faiin 1.0E-4 3 1 U
to,open -' ( E46 Recirculation orifice and ' (5.0E-4) 3 2 Not required 2. velves plugged on demand
. / y E47 MOV (AF007 A-1) f ails to open 1.0E-3 3 ,
1 L e E45 MOV (AF007 A-1) ' level control 6.0E-3 3~ 1 circuit fails y E49 NOV (AF000A-1) f ails to open 1.0E-3 3 .1 ._ E50.. 'HOV (AF006A-1) level control 6.0E-3 3 -- 1 d Leircuit fails -
~!
g : < E51 ESW recirculacien f ailure to 4. 8'E-3 3 RBD Not required j l switch (train A) on demand
.z '
EhN train A f ails E52 (1.0E-6) 3 2 E53 Trcin A discharge 7 valve 7.0E-6 , 3 162 Human error (AF0044) inadvertently cloned , 2 E54 Manual override for actor pund .1.0E-2 ; 10 1 (AF10PA-1) fails
~
/
*ErrolrFactorf: Ratio of'95th to 5'Oth; percentile .
N i-32 ' 9
w. a 7 j, Table A.III.1 (Continued) f Failure Probability Event Eer Demand Error T No. Description (Per Hour) Fac tor
- Ref. Comments a _____________.....___ ._____________________________________________________...
E55 Automatic ESW and recirculation 8.0 E-3 3 RBD Not required l transf er circuits on demand (for Train A) fail E56 Manual overrides for ESW supply 1.0E-2 10 1 , to Train A fail E57 Train A discharge valve 3.0E-4 3 1 (AF004A) fails to open E58 Train A discharge valve 2.0E-3 3 1 R (AF004A) local circuit fails
~
E59 Train A discharge valve 1.0E-2 10 1 l 3 (AF004A) manual override f ails i E60 Train B discharge valve 1.0E-4 3 1 (AF004B) plugged
,. E61 Train B check valve (AF003B) 1.0E-4 3 1 fails to open E62 Train B diesel pump (AF01PB-2) 1.0E-3 3 1 t fails to start i
E
; E63 Diesel pump local control 4.0E-3 3 1 l circuit fails i
E64 CST manual valve to Train B 1.0E-A 3 1 (AF0025) plugged E65 CSI check valve to Train B 1.0E-4 3 1 (AF0013) fails to open E66 CST recirculation orifice and 5.0E-4 3 2 Not required valves to Train B plugged on demand E67 ESW MOV (AF007B-2) to Train B 1.0E-3 3 1 fails to open E68 ESW MOV (AF007B-2) local 6.0E-3 3 1 A control circuit f ails i 2
- Error Factor = Ratio of 95th to 50th percentile A-33
, e e
l .
-, l Table A.III.1 (Continued) l Failure Probability .
Event Per Danand Error No. Description (Per Hour) Factor
- Ref. Comments [.;
_........_______. _______.....__....... _________ .____..___...._ ............. g; E69 ESW MOV (AF006B-2) to Train B 1.0E-3 3 1 fails to open 4 E70 " ESW MOV (AF006B-2) local 6.0E-3 3 1 control circuit f ails E71 ESW recirculation failure to 4.8E-3 3 RBD Not required switch (Train B) on demand E72 ESW Train B f ails (1.0E-6) 3 2 I E73 Discharge valve F004B) 7.0E-6 3 1&2 Human error g inadvertently closed y E74 Diesel pump manual override 1.0E-2 10 1 fails E75 Autematic ESW and recirculation 8.0E-3 3 RBD Not required transf er circuits to Train B on demand
~
fail E76 ESW (control logic) manual 1.0E-2 10 1 override (for Train B) f ails E77 Train B discharge valve 3.0E-4 3 1 (AF004B) fails to open E78 Discharge valve (AF004B) local 2.0E-3 3 1 circuit fails E79 Manual override for discharge 1.0E-2 10 1 valve (AF004B) fails E80 Condensate storage tank rupture 1.0E-6 3 2 E81 Condensate storage tank manual 1.0E-4 3 1 valve (CD022) plugged E82 Condensate storage check valve 1.0E-4 3 1 g (CD183) fails to opes M
- Error Factor = Ratio of 95th to 50th percentile A-34 l
. n . C C Table A.III.1 (Continued) 3 _________________________________ _.___.. ______.._____...____.._..___ ________ y Failure Probability y Event Per Demand Error y No. Description (Per Hour) Factor
- Ref. Comments a _______.... __________._______.__....____....... _____._____________.____ .....
E83 Condensate storage tank manual 1.0E-4 3 1 valve (CD149) plugged E84 Condensate storage tank manual 1.0E-4 3 i valve (CD091) plugged E85 condenser hotwell rupture 1.0E-6 3 2
) E86 Train C startup FW pump 1.0E-3 3 1 (FWO2P) fails to start ... - -.
j E87 Train C pump control cicruit 4.0E-3 3 1 fails E88 Operator f ails to manually 1.0E-2 3 1 L'. + start pump (Train C)
- E89 Train C pump recirculation 4.3E-4 3 RBD circuit and valves fail E90 Boiler feedvater pump meter 1.0E-6 3 Engineering 4 driven stop check valve judgement d (FW002A) fails to stay closed E91 Boiler feedvater pump check 1.0E-6 3
~
valve (FW001A) fails to stay closed E92 Boiler feedvater turbine driven 1.0E-4 3 1 stop check valve (FWO23) fails to close E93 Boiler feedwater check valve 1.0E-4 3 1 (FW4001B) fails to close E94 FWOO2C stop check valve f ails 1.0E-4 3 1 to close E95 FWOOIC check valve f ails to 1.0E-4 3 1 U close 7 2
- Error Factor = Ratio of 95th to 50th percentile A-35
b Table A.III.1 (Continued) Failure Probability - Event Per Demand Error No. Description (Per Hour) Factor
- Ref. Comments Ei
____ ......__.._______..______.________.... ________________ .. _..____________ h, E96 Condensate booster pump 1A (3.0E-5) 10 2 Running f ails to keep running failure E97 Condensate booster pump la (3.1E-5) 10 2 Running control circuit f ails failure E98 Pump 1A strainers plugged 1.0E-4 3 2 E99 Pump 1A recirculation circuit 6.0 E-4 3 RBD and valves fail - E100 Condensate pump 1B f ails to (3.0E-5) 10 2 Running g keep running failure M
~
E101 Pump IB control circuit f ails (3.1E-5) 10 2 to keep running l E102 Pump 1B strainers plugged 1.0E-4 3 1 E103 Pump 1B recirculation circuit 6.0E-4 3 RBD and valves fail E104 Condensate pump IC f ails te (3.0E-5) 10 2 Running keep running failure E105 Condensate pump 1C control (3.1E-5) 10 2 Running circuit f ails to keep failure running E106 Condensate pump IC strainers 1.0E-4 3 2 plugged E107 Condensate pump IC recircu- 6.0E-4 3 RBD istion circuit and valves fail
- Error Factor = Ratio of 95th to 50th percentile 1
1 A-36
. i
- l t ,
l C: d Table A.III.1 (Continued)
'/
S It- Failure Probability Event Per Demand Error No. Description (Per Hour) Fa ctor
- Ref. Comments l 0 ____ ._ ....... __________....._________..... ____ ......... _______________...
E108 condensate pump ID f ails to 1.0E-3 3 1 start E109 condensate pump ID control 4.0E-3 3 1 circuit fails E110 condensate pmap ID strainers 1.0E-4 3 2 plugged B E111 Condensate pump ID recircula- 6.0E - 3 RBD - -- - -- tion circuit and va!' es f ail Ell 2 Condensate pump ID auto and 1.0E-6 10 2 manual start circuit fails g QM Probability of equipment 5.8E-3 3 1 Maintenance f ailure due to maintenance outage Beta Factors B1 Intra-sy stem (valves. circuit .10 3 9 breakers, pumps) B2 Inter-system (valves. ESF .03 3 9 m signal. pumps) { .___.._____..................... ____...._______......________________........_ E l R. I E w (s h l e A-37
e e W 3 f [h R APPENDIX B i ru AFS RELIABILITY BLOCK DIAGRAM
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DASIIED LINE: MULTI-F UNCTION ITEM -
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. Ng- gurinmc FL - FAILED LOCKED NA - NORMALLY ACTIVE MS- = STOWED Fo - Fait ED oped
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BLOCKDIAGRAMSEQU NCE: AUTOMATIC D, STANDBY
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<a m APPENDIX C
- .'l T -
l MASTER FAULT IREE C
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t l 6 APPDIDIX F m. COMMON CAUSE FAILURES d! Hardware. Test and Maintenance. Human Errors - M
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i APPENDII F COMMON CAUSE FAILURES. , Hardware. Test and Maintenance. Human Errors - " V a F. Coen Cause Hardware. Test and Maintenance and Human Error Analysis N.~ Common cause analysis was performed both qualitatively and ; quantitatively. qualitatively to identify potential sources of common I cause f ailures and quantitacively to indicate the limited ef fect that increased redundancy can have on the reliability of a system. Qualitative Analysis - The identification of common or similar hardware. test. maintenance, human actions or physical links between redundant. trains was the first step in this analysis. Based on the logic R modeling (RBDs and FIs) the experience with other similar systems which ti use redundancy the testing and maintenance plans, the operator ~ ~ ~ interactions. the power supplies and service systems, the AFS Trains A and B can be classified as partly diverse as shown in Figure F.1. Train C is almost fully diverse from A and B. The major dependencies from the hardware viewpoint have been accounted for by considering the different ., initiating events which impact the power supplies for each train. The hardware dependencies are mostly outside the AFS components. These {. ' include check valves and blowdown valves on the steam generators. As a final qualite.tive check, the potential for common cause f ailures as discussed in reference 6 were reviewed and are addressed below. Ref erence 6. listed seven " common cause" f ailures that occurred in 1975 AFS experience. These failures are discussed below as to the effect if they were to occur in Byron /Braidwood AFS A. Operator failed to open the valve from the condensate storage tank to the Train A and B pumps. The two AFS pump loops f ailed to be available on demand as required by technical specifications. Docket 50317-516. This failure indicates th a t a " single" valve provided condensate to the Train A and B AFS pumps. This appears to be a " single" f ailure point. The Byron /Braidwood AFS has separate supply lines and valves to each of the g AFS pumps. Thus, a single valve closure vill not cause AFS f ailure. Only a common cause f ailure. that of a multiple redundant inadvertant valve Q closure, will simulate this condition in the Byron /Braidwood AFS Train A and B design. In the Byron /Braidwood design Train C comes from an ' independent source of condensate. Also, the Essential Service Water (ESW) System can " automatically" supply water to Train,s A and B should be condensate supply be unavailable. B. Filters (in parallel) on suction side of three pumps plugged up with foreign material which restricted flow. Docket 50305-354. Byron /Braidwood AFS pumps have startup suction filters. Train A and B ' pumps have full flow test procedures that will detect any restricted flow including valve plugging. F-2 1 _ - - - - - _ . . _ _ _ _ . - - J
- l. , .
5 g C. Condensate storage tank water level was intentionally drawn down belev technical s pecification limits to maintain maximum steam generator
- blowdown. Failure to maintain water supply to multiple AFS pumps within g specifications. Docket 50315-340. ,
Byron /Braidwood condensate storage tank for Trains A and B maintain a
,j maximum of 500.000 gallons and, when the volume decreases to 200.000 N gallone. the refill system can provide makeup water. The AFS requirement is 200.000 gallons. In addition. the other unit condensate storage tank 5 with a maximum capacity of 500.000 gs11ons can be manually transf erred to L the AFS. A backup water supply is also autcastically available from the essential service water system.
D. Condensate stor age tank water level was intentionally drawn down below technical specification limits because makeup water supply was dirty (high oxygen content). Failure to maintain water supply to multiple AWS pumps with specifications. Docket 50247-449. 1 2 In the B/B des'ign the multiple supplies of water reduce dependence on any q one supply. O E. Two AFS pumps f ailed to start because of def ective contol switches which p f ailed to close contacts. Docket 50305-350. IJ This could happen in any AFS. Since the Train B pump is an autcmatically
,, initiated diesel drive, the Train A pump is an automatically started electric drive, and Train C is a manually started electric drive; the
- i. control switching has elements of diversity. Thus, all AFS failure requires independent failures in diverse sy s t em s. Common switches and W breakers in the 2 out of 4 Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation logic for Trains A U and B eppear to have the greatest po tential for a common cause f ailure.
Manual override of the logic can minimize this potential common cause f ailure in the Byron /Braidwood designs. I F. A breaker accidentally opened and interrupted power to the turbine overspeed pro tection (which tripped the reactor). and also interrupted power to an AFS lube oil p.anp preventing start of the related AFS pump. Docket 50305-361. The Byron /Braidwood AFS lube oil pump is a direct mechanical drive from the diesel driven feed pump. Thus, this f ailure mode should have no ef fect on the Byron /Braidwood AFS reliability. a Two AFS valves were upgraded during the licensing process and were not G. seismically qualified because of oversight. Docket 50289-491.
@ All saf ety related valves on the Byron /Braidwood AFS are seismically 0 qualified.
';. Quantitative Analysis - The method known as the Bets Factor Method of 3
Reference 9 was used to quantitatively estimate the effect of common cause failures. Simply stated. the Beta f actor method asstanes that a fraction of the
; operationally independent f ailure probabilities of one loop of a redundant
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l system will result in the Icss of all the redundant loops in that system. The band calculations based on the point estimate uses a generic Beta Factor of
= 3x10-2 for inter train redundancies. This Beta Factor is a median value based on an assumed range of 10-1 to 10-3 An intra train Beta Factor of 0.1 was also used. The common cause f ailure probability. Qec. for a redundant .J ,
system can be approximated by the f ailure probability of one loop of a l redundant system. Q1 cop. times . The total failure rate is the sum of the r common cause failure contributions added to the independent failures in ' redundant Trains. Contributions to the Beta f actor include human error. E l manufacturing. design, maintenance, testing. quality assurance, and external events. The equations used to calculate the failure probability on demand were developed for each "AND" gate in the fault tr ee. The system failure g Probability Qf is determined from the following formulations g Qf
- Qindependent failures + Qcommon cause failures
- Qif + Qccf
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Qf (Qi(1- 6 )x Q2(1- 0 )2. .. Qu(1- 0)) + 0( )> where n in the number of redundant Trains Qindependent fsilure * (Q1(1-6 ) 2 (Q2(1- 6 )x. . Qu(1- S ))+o ther component failures i Qbl + Qb2+...Qbn ] l Qcer = s, ( Qal +oQa2+. . .Qan b)
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I gj (Qjl + Qi2+ n ..Qin) ;a g where a. b ... j are the common mode contributions from each redundant system within the system fault tree. Since 8 = 0.1 and 0.03 the contribution of (1-8) in the Qindependent failure probability has only a small impact on the numerical estimate and theref ore only slightly decreases the independent estimate. l For this analy sis. the following asaumptions were made:
- 1. The valves. ESF signal with manual override. electric pump and human error were redundant and were considered with the common cause Beta f actor.
- 2. The diesel drive and electric drive pump were diverse and thus subject to very' icv common cause Beta f actor.
- 3. The major ultra-train and inter-train common cause failures were considered separately for the three initiating events.
4. F-4 I
l-g The common cause failure probability contributions to the AFS vere (g. calculated with the FT analysis code per inputs of Table A.IV and added to the
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I d L APPENDIX G
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N . g. FAULT BEE ANALYSIS USING LOCUS AND STADIC I E E .. I k um P9 J us b E E E E
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APPENDII G G. Fault Tree Analysis Usine_ MOCUS and STADIC Fault tree analysis is particularly useful in providing a scheinatic view of how the f ailures of primary events could lead to the f ailure of the top 7 event. In this particular study, the top event is the f ailure to supply i sufficient auxiliary feedwater to two of four steam generators within 20 minutes of a LMW. LMW/ LOOP. LMW/LOAC events. To calculate the probabilities of these events, one can assign numerical probability values to the primary events in order to quantify the probability of faiure of the defined event. The analysis consists of two basic steps. First. the minimal cut sets from the f ault tree are determined. This is easily done with the MOCUS code (Ref. 10). An example of the cut. sats determined using MOCUS is shown in Table G-1. To reduce computer time for obtaining the minimal cut sets, the master g fault tree shown in Fig. C-1 was divided into independent sub tr ees. Separate 5
- MOCUS runs were performed to determine minimal cut sets for these subtrees.
The results were then combined manually following the Boolean Algebra logic. Thus, any event starting with A. shown in the list of cut sets, represents a set of minimal cut sets having one or more basic events (i.e.. all events starting with I). These cut sets represent those events which could lead to the failure of three out of four steam generators to receive water and l consequently . lead to the top event. From these cut sets one can formulate ! mathematical expressions which define the probability of the top event. The available f ailure rate data for the primary events have some degree of uncertainty and this should be accounted for in the quantification process. The STADIC code (Ref.11) provides a f ast and ef ficient method of doing this. STADIC uses a Monte Carlo simulation technique to generate a pseudo-r andom sample statistical distribution for a user-defined output function. For example. in this study. one output function is the probability of the top event given the loss of main feedwater. The independent variables for this output function are the f ailure frequency rates of each primary event found in the minimal cut sets. Each variable exhibits random statistical variations represented by a particular probability distribution. STADIC generates a statistical distribution for the cutput function by selecting at Q g r andom. values for each of the independent variables according to their assigned probability distributions and combining these distributions in accordance with the mathematical operations specified by the output function. A second set of randomly selected values for the independent variables is then chosen and a second evaluation of the function is made. This process is repeated several thousand times on the computer. The resulting values for the output function are then sorted and arranged in increasing order of magnitude. I Confidence limits of the output distribution may then be determined directly from the ordered array. As an illustration of the method we have in Tables g G-2 and G-3 a list of equations defining the relationship of basic eve =ts which Q lead to the top event. 1 G-2 l 1 I l
(( In the f ault tree quantification using STADIC. only those dominant events (in terms of high failure probability values) were considered. Thus. if one 7 looks at the equations developed for the LMFW initiating event (Table G-2. not b t all the events found in the list of minimal cut sets (Table G-1) are represented. I E E _ . .. . . -. P 1 l J K1 J 0 I [ n A r.: s G-3
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Table G Minimal Cut Sets for LMFW Initiating Event l s MnCUS - - VfRSION 3/T4 l ee ee ee e e e e e ee e ee ee e ee ee e s.e e ee..e.e e e e e.s e..e e ee.e e eee.e e e e e.e ee e e e ee ee ee ee e ee.s e e eee e ee ee.se ee e e.e e e e ee eee ee e e eee e e ee e ee ee ee.e eee e MINIMAL CUT %EIS FOR Gal [ G 2 := f/MApggg j /d/gRA7pg EMAoA FA/u/IES
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~
m m C3 C.J EE J E; + IE:s E"5 C1 ff.S '
C A G. N N E55 M E""1 F"T R ES EDI M M N A E G q. Table G-1 (cont.) MDCtl5 - - VFRSION 3/74 CUT 5F75 Wl?H = COPP0NEN75 248 f64 Al2R EEC T7 258 f6A [Fb F5r of 268 4124 Al29 TSD F7 , 278 Al2A [tB ISP E7 285 f6A Al2m f50 F7 215 [6A f60 f50 F7 Int Al2A Al2C f50 [7 Sli Al?A [6C F5D [7 328 I6A Al2C 05D (7 3?I [6A teC F5D E7 . Jul Al?u Al2C f50 E7 l 353 Al?B [fC F50 F7 369 f6R Al2C E50 f7
- 379 F6R E6C F5D E7 '
3P5 154 [*R Al2C [7 398 ISA ESB F6C E7 , 8 409 f54 f*B Al2D (7 til r54 E50 f6D E7 425 CSA (TC Al?D [7 415 [5A ESC E6D [7 448 FSB [5C Al?D E7 455 [59 [9C f6D E7 e 4t 8 412A t%s Al2C [7 978 A12A ESR F6C E7 TI 4*) f64 [?P Al2C [7 e Ln t9l f64 E58 E6C [7 SDe Al24 Egg Al'D T7 Sit al2A E%8 t6D E7 3 528 06A [?R 4820 E7 ' 538 F6A E*9 F60 [7 548 412A t*C 4820 f7 e 558 Al?A [5C ton I? 565 r68 ESC Al?D [7 578 [6A t%C F6D F7 i 588 A128 [?C Al2D E7 598 Al2B I?C [6P E7 698 F6R f%C Al?D [7 e bli r6R f*C [69 F7 . 629 [5A Al2R Al2C E7 , 638 (54 A32P F6C 07 i 645 FSA ten A32C (7 6%I f54 f68 F6C I? 668 ISA Al2P Al2D [7
. 678 [5A Al29 E6D E7 6PI ESA [6B Al?D [7 693 F5A (fR F6D F7
. 7D8 f5A Al2e Al2D E7 Ill CSA Al2C f6D I7
??l FSA [6C AlsD [7
. Til F5A C6C Ft0 (7 Tel r$D Al?r Al?p t7 758 TSR A32C f60 E7
'.] 768 778 TSR f5P f6C f6C Al2D f6n r?
(7 9
O e e e G e i f l t . b E B
- 0 I
l u e W i i N ens 4 e I> ; A Y C = t O N. y
- w J, :
I - l 0 *
- 5 h ,
et l
.O ed E*
i G-6 t t r, . l l
- L' C C U O U U U 'O O O E E N N E N Tcblo G-1 (cont.) .'
CUT StiS WifH 4 COMPONENTS 709 at?A [6e a37C t? Prl 41?A [6d f60 (? 818 F6A Alyn at?C [7 628 (6a Al2P f6c (? 938 F6a les al2C I? 948 (6A 16n [6r (7 458 48?A Al29 f60 t? 968 at?A ten al2D [7 878 Al24 [6B f69 ff OPS f64 Al2m Al?D [7 , 898 f64 Al2a F6n (7 g 908 E6A ten A820 (7 4 911 f64 ff9 f6D [7 ' 928 at?A A12C E6D E7
- 939 4374 L6C a120 [7 949 412A [6C EbD [7
- 958 the Al2C Al?D [7 968 [64 Al2C E6D [7 975 f6A ffC Al?D E7 8 9PI (64 E6C f60 (7 998 Al?B Al20 f60 (7 8003 Al2B E6C Al?D [7 I gg lull 417B [6C f60 E7 8 1078 [6B Al2C al2D E7 I 'd 10?B C64 412C f6P E7 I latt [6B L6C a12D E7 IJFI E6n (6C f60 [7 5I
, TOTAL NUM8tR OF CUT 5 tis rot 1ND W AS 109 CNLY CUT SLT5 WITH 4 OR tr55 COMPONf NTS HAVE REEN Of f fR*INf D. I Sti5 wiiH UP 10 6 COMPONENT 5 MAY (WI57. t t 0
. l t
Table G-1 (cont. ) McCUS - - vte%IDN 1/79 eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeosoeeeeeeeoeseeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeemoseeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeotee MINIMai CUT Siis FOR Gair r.12 A . A/AA seeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeo. e.o eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee,eeeeeeeeeeee...eeeee...ee....eeeeeeeeeeooseeeeeeee... CHI StIS WITH l COMPONEMi? NONT ful51. Lit! SEIS WiiH 2 COMP 0HENi% 18 (84 taa 78 (8A flue i il [84 Ella bl [8s [129 l l St F6s (13a I f. I TBa A?6 CUT Stis VI f te 3 CnNPONENis II 426 A2la a22a CUT SEIS WifH 4 COMP 0NENis Il r2ma tea a214 a22a 28 F2%s [*a a21A a22A e 3B F26A 194 agla a724 c3 A224 s el r274 (9a a2tA 0" %I [284 19A a2tA A22a e el 0244 [los 42ta 472A 78 [24A Clla a2ta A22a PI F244 [12a a214 a?2a e 98 (24A fl3e a214 a22a l'l r25a tina a214 a?2A Ill 025A [Ila A214 A22A e 12B F25A fl2a a21s a?2A Its [25a (134 a2IA ar2a 198 T2ha [lds aIIA a224 e l' 8 ~26a tila a25A a ?i a 168 E264 tl2a a2tA 4228 178 [264 EIJA a2tA A22A e IPI F27A flos a2ta A22A 198 r27A Ills a21A 472A 201 C274 [12a a25A A22A e 238 f274 Ilja A21A a22A 229 F294 F10a aria a224 218 F2*A tila a2tA a?2A i e 4 _ , . C3 i C.3 C.3 C CE. ' L_3 LJ LI3 CL D 1.J
r , E ', 3I! [' ii ,- !!:!I- >
- i t , !
l
. - F *
. = .
- 9
_
- 1 1
" N
. O R I 5 e 4 f - - v df - _
/ -
l _ S - U C O - M 7 1 I . 1 P- .
. 7 l
p
, E 1 N I
R t i 1 r D N L F [ P
] AA t
. 22 t
?7 A
[ AA H
- 5 21 .
3N T r S J_ . Ad t3 N O I N f 22 P [ AA sa "0 Y w0 A M P5 _. N5 s E t i N aa 2j 3l r uC i oL N f N t (F E i s 5C O o 1 P 7 )t . p M O r4 5 M O C
",noc -
( C 9 aA e9 22 CE T UH CT I 6 m F 0 1 h OS 1 I t I
- i 88 RE P G W 45 ES U 22 H 5 MT H o 1 UU NC I
l l f 5 L' b l a l aY 5 T l C' lL ON 1 E _ IO 5 O8e _. s
]. 9
. * . 9 ' s l * . S
'j;a.
Tc.blo G-1 (con t. ) , McCU$ - - Vr45 ION 1/14
. e . . e . e e e . . . . . . . e . . e e . . e . . . . . . . e . . . . . . . . e e e e . e . . . . s e . . e . e . . . e . . e e . . . . e e . e e . e . e e e . e . . . . . . .e e e . e e . . . e . . . . e . e . . . . . e e . . . . . . . . . . . . e . . . . .
MINIMAL CUT Sfi5 FOR Gair Gl ?B f A /1/3 e eee eee e ee e e ee e eee e ee es.e ee e e.ee e e e ee e e ee e e eee.e ee e eee se.e e ee e ee eee eeee ee ee eee ee ee eeee ee eee e e ee e ees e.e ee eee e e ees.ee e e ee e.e eee ee eee e CUT Sils WITH ! COMPONLN15 NONE FEIST. CUT Siis WITH 2 COMP 0fsfNit II E89 L9d 28 F89 E10M 98 ESP tlin el tR9 Ella 58 [8P ( I SP fI F4R a26 (UT 5[15 WITH 1 COMPohtNIS 18 ato a?la 1228 CUT SEIS wifH a COMPONENTS II F240 (9e a28P A22P 28 F250 (9R a218 a?29 ji la r268 L98 4218 a22P we el f2FD [93 a238 a22R CD r, l r290 (90 a218 a228
- aa C24H tlne a2le a?2p 75 r240 [Ilm allR a22n 48 (24D tl2R a238 a229 e *I F24H Ll3R P210 a?2R 108 TISR flum a238 422R Ill r255 (119 4218 a?2n
- 175 [ 2 '.R (129 a21B a?20 118 125H f l 3R 821H a?28 lei (26R Eton a21P a22R e 158 F240 film alls a?In . .
IAS r260 132' a2tP a228 til F2AB (139 s2tb a?2R
- IPI F27H (108 a218 4220 lel C278 til" P219 a22P 209 E270 fl2R 421p a?2R e 288 F270 Llla 4218 a22P 2?l r248 1104 a2tB A22P 215 r2aP film a2tp a?2P
- 268 F280 tl2p a218 a22#
2%8 [2ng gl3p a210 a229 e 10ial NuM9rR OF Cili Stis FOUNn Wa5 32 OhLT Cui Stis wiiH = OR LESS C09PONrq15 payr P[rg pritpwlettr. Sti5 dlTH UP 10 6 COMPChrNf5 May itI%i. 'i]
- .. ~ w a ;3 a a c3 C2. '
LJ Q *= C T' 1_: _ _ . .
I I ITT1 O P G N 1 C D ff71 C""1 E DD W- , Teble G-1 (cont.) . . , e 40CUS - - VFR5Ie4 3/74 4......e.....e..e.....ee..ee.e.e.eee.eee ..e.e.,eee.e.oe,eee....ee.,ee ......,,,,,,,...,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, MtNinst cui sris FOR Getr Cl ?C
- f f 2.C.
...................................e............e..................................................................................
t 4 9 9 9 9 O e e >a H e t e 9 0 e t e
,)
Table G -l (cont. ) MOCUS - - VTR510N 3/79 Cut S[f5 WlfH & CnMr0wtNT% NONE IsIST. CUT SEIS WITH 2 COMPONENi% Il ret 19C
?S E8C 110C
?l CSC til" el F8C Ll2C 51 tbr [130
- f. I TOC a?6 CUI SCIS Wlih 3 COMPONENit II als 's ? l t a2?C LUT Stis WITH 4 COMP 0HINIS Il F24C L9C a2tC a22C ,
il (250 [9C allt a?2r il 026C [9C allt a22C el F27C [9C a2lC a?20
'8 r2AC (*C $2IC a220 fl 02=C ElDe a2tc a52r il C29C [Ilc a21C a22C 89 T2=C [l20 a21C a22C gg 98 C24C [ISP a2tC a24C ,
e IPS C2%C fl0C a2tC a22C lj lit E25C tilt a2tc a22C e 128 [25C El2C a21C a22C = lil [25C El3r a21C a220 140 T26C E!UC a2tC a22C e l's T26C tilt a21C a22C . 163 r26C [12* 82tC a 22 C 171 [26C tt3C 82tC a?2C e Iml E2TC (10C salt a?2C 198 r2TC tilt a2tC a??C 200 02fC fl2r a2tC a22C e lit r2 FC fl3C a2tc a22C 221 r29C LIDC a21C a22C Fil E21C tilt a2tc a22C e 248 E29C El2C a2tC a22C 2*I F2mc [13C a2tC s??C e Totat NUMhre or CUT sris roUyp was 32 , OhtV CUT 5tih efiH 9 P8 LES% C0"PONrNIS stave PtCN DFTERMINtP. e
$L's5 WITH OP IC 6 CO"P0hrNf5 MaY EVI%f.
e
-- .. a - - O r,;,,,J r' J W O C3 C.3 cm M . . -
- O O *
,*.s y y 9 9 O O
'd' F e G P= e e
% 9 G M @ G in 9 9
#, E e e C e k - .a .
e . e # E* e O na * % e e
- e, e
,%, i G
" e b e G G
@ 6 6 3 e e u o e s O e 9 E e 9 9 G O 9 9 9 9 O O 9 9 9
, 6 e 4 9 9 9 9 9 O G G e R e O 9 9 I1' .
~ e .
" e e e g e G
9 N 9 a % O
< O
(. # q e e e G Q 4 e PW G e se e e C e 9 9 y # b G G > G G e S 9 C O
. e G 9 G e G O e e b e G %
e e6 6 4 > e G aus e O V 9
- G S 9 O LJ >
- =
O U O e 9 9 9 P' e .ed . e e e .E= e e 3 6 9 M S 9 E # 9 e p 6 9 9 9 l e G e G L .a 9 9 4 # G G G e M e G i I e e O O I e . 9 O G , G R . 1 .
~ .
G G e O e W g .O G O 9 9 e e , 4J .e g .e , O .e .G
- O +
- iw M e #
G G I @ 9 0 . .
. O e #
Q e ! H .e e p e e G d . G. E* *
- e 9 '
G-13 R .
Tcble G--l (cont.) . M9Cu5 - - VfR5 ION 3#19 Cut Stis Wlin I CnMroktwl' N0ht FMI51. CUT STIS WITH 2 CDMPOMf415 18 (80 L*D
?l fan [100
'l teD filp 40 FPD L12n El (DD !!3P 68 ren A?6 CUT SETS WITH 3 COMPONLMi%
ll A26 a?lp A220 Cui Stis WlIH 4 C D M PO N L tlI 5 18 [240 [*O 421D A22D 28 f250 F'O a210 a220
?l 026D [*D a2tD A22D 48 [27D [*D a21D 4220
?. I [290 [#D a21D A220
- Fl 0240 Einn 3210 422D 13 (240 (11D a210 A22D
'I E290 (12D a280 a?2D e 98 f29D filn a?ID 4220
$l 100 r250 flDD 4210 422D
>d ill 0250 flin 421D a220
#' ll?n a?ID a?2D a I?I (250 I?l (25D 1839 a210 A220 849 F260 llun artD A220 e 158 r260 tilp a21D A24D 168 r26D E129 a21D A?2D 171 F260 (13D atto a??D s' 189 El'D !!LD allD A22D 199 T2iD (110 421D A2;D 2DI (270 El2n a210 m220 e 218 r2fD tl30 a210 A220 229 [290 (107 4210 a220 238 F2PD tilp silD A220 l
- 248 r29D El2D A21D A220 2 '. I F283 (13D a230 422D e
iufAL NUMRFR 0F CUT 5 tit FOUNP WAS 32 , ONLT Cut Sti5 WifH # OR tr$5 COMPDNENTS 54 At t PtFN DFif R*lt f D. l SEIS .lTH UP 10 6 COMPONrNf5 May ful51. i . . l 9
- a C:;l. EZ3 C2 G.;3 W CE. ' L ;r.3 C:::3 C3 P 7 :' 4 - - -
______ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . .. -_ = _ __ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . m 7 O P f~'"3 C 1 T C E C E A E D ~ Tcble G-1 (cont.) . MOCU% - - VER5ICN 3/74
.........e...........................................................................**.*...**********....** ..*....* ..*.*****.***
MINIM 8L Ctll %ETS rna catr G26 2 420 e 9 e e W e tn e e e 4 I 9 9 P] s ',J
Tablo G-1 (cx)nt. ) , n0Cus - - vrestcN 3rie Cui stis vain i CemPONtNis ji ASA
?8 Ele
's ris en res
=i res 6: rs?
7: r. a s .
.: too Cui SETS WITH 2 COMP 0HEH15 il [90 (91
?l E92 Eal 38 [94 [95 CUT $[15 klfH 3 COMPOWENT%
NONC FRI$f. CUT SEe5 Wi1H 4 COMP 0NEWit MONE raIST. TCTAL Nb"Brp or CUT SEf5 roirgo was 33
- ChLY Cui Siis WiiH 4 0F LC$$ COMPONrNTS Havf #EEN DETER"INEP.
$ETS WITH llP TO 6 COMPONr NTS M AY EXIST.
. k.l -
Ch l 1 I e t t l 00 _ .. ._ J C;;;3 43 L; 3 Q C1 8 C C.J E3 I""3 C L" , _ _ _ m - _ _ _
- n CTl n r' t- i rr i ra ra rrl r 'n a m n .
Tcble G-1 (cont. ) nocus - - vrasic= sitt l l nieinst cut stes ron cair stia = Ax s A CUI SE15 WItu 1 Conr0NENit il Il6a
?S fi7a
!I !!9a es riga al r29 ,
fI [30 79 [31 al T3? CUT STIS u1IH 2 COMPO4tNf% 19 [I E54 28 F57 [*3
'l IS9 f%3
- 48 [44 te?
%I F44 (48 68 ftt f49 s 78 Ett [*O p PI r44 [ f. I e-. *0 (44 (*2 e M ltll F4% [47 0
8 9 O e
\
9 l
- 4
. /
~
'l s 1
g
- x. -
p- '
\
2, ,- , N . Table C-l (cont. )' , ~
; e
~ , -
.~
o
' 7 nocus - - vra51o= 3r:4 s 'Clif 5tli'w!TH 2 cnMPohtNt% ,
q. I s ( 4 6 - g 4 ill. , F4%" ' . (48, !, t i I? L E4% [49 2 138 Eg5 .t S O '
'x.. "'
'!
- l - .t45- t5t ,
148 r4% E42 - , 861 re6' (m7 ~~ .
'199 -(t' lbs
\ I P. 9 ~t46, [49 '
, !*3 (46 t %D, i 200 , f46 , ft1- ' s Jll T46 ' ($2 i 2?* Amt ' it7 '
I?L . 448 (se 249 att t te9 - 2 '. I att t'0 (58 - 5
, 2 t.,) te l --
' '2 ? S i 4*1 [52 '
CUT $t T 5 WIf e' 3 toMPGNINf3
- ll CI' ~ 't*3 E59 '\
28 (33 (15 ( 38 .
?l (44 t%5 t 56
+
' 41 L34 E95 E 14
$I Tl f45- .[55 F56
** Fl (46 f%5 F56 e 78 441 [55 (5A al E33 t?6 [ 14 98 [33 [?F t 39 e 195 E34 I 36 E 34 lla r34 (37 r 3g
" 125 (33 E15 f 39 .
,e til r33 F35 f40 140 F33 [35 Iml 159 C33 E55 F42
- IAI [33 [35 C47 175 f34 L?S E 3' 188 f3* [35 [40 e 100 r34 135 fel 293 F34 (3% F42 218 r34 f?5 f4*
- 223 F33 [?6 F 39 215 E33 t?6 Imp ,
248 r33 L36 rol
' 258 C33 t'6 (42 200 E33 [16 ret 279 (33 tif f 39
' 2P3 C33 L37 f49 298 E33 ['T F41 It'l 033 It? F42
- lit E33 L17 [43 528 r34 (36 r 39 333 r34 rts r=q
[.] 3el r34 t'A ret 349 F34 tt6 re?
. - . . .- d ". ;;;3 E;.:3 C.3 C3 CL 8 CJ L_J b~ C- C F
- e
+ e . ,
g. s 4 h s g s , m
.. E if g
O oo
- th E' -
w \ P
- U g' N
- i. 4 ee
'D u
O E-4- i
- I L4 bua q
1 M e
,_ j + '
E
>s 6e
- f. f '
4
.- 4 e
. L De w T. ',, ,2, W I R
s6 e= s ,% g Q
>a lu i
tad 2- mo g a e bmA E d
=D e. e P'9* M 2 *
- w en 2 **
g
- 9 C emsen, e= P. m c a
as w k w b w w es. 6 en T 4 O P 3 he
- W -
=> w C en g
f E en en
. e en uw e=
== 4 h f'= h ** k *= Q .J Z y e e m e p. p er 2 g w a end w A w en, e.# w a 2 m E E YO C
^ O O *= A
- a CL 4.a e E r r en o 6 - 4J.
c o c w W W *= O = = = = = = =1
- y m mmmmmme um
. wwwww -
- 2 e- 6 O
;; p.g Z en O en *
.Z= * == o=
l se en en ano an e en ese W g tal b Q *s
. eD > a e L == lis m-mmaa anJ 6 en e
L te @ Ias F> 3
@ a= ..*= 4 23 *=
H e., ena O 2u **
,- eA en E 3 ed
@ e. *= 4> tA y a =
u ma ~ O u e& O eaa en G-19
. . . . . . . . . . . = .
m > m-
l i i Table G-1 (cont.) MnCUS - - wrR$10N 3/74 seeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees,eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.e.eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee,e.....se,es.o.....ees.. e...e...e.e.....e..e..........e MINIMAL CUT SETS VOR G41r G210 /) 2Li E3 seeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee CUT 5[15 WiiH l COMPDPEPi% II F16R 25 fl7D ll ESPB 48 Fl*8
'l !29 61 r30 78 [3] i 53 I3?
EUI SFT5 WiiH 2 CnMPONENi% 19 El f54 20 [57 E53
'l f5R f53
- 45 ret f47
'l Ett Ett 65 F44 F49 e 78 (44 (%0
*I "" I*I C1 s el fee f'2 e
gj trl res (47 lit f45 t48 I?I Its Eso e 138 f45 teO 148 !45 (%1 158 [45 t'2 e i t. l [46 (*7 178 F46 (49 IFl [46 (49 e 19D f46 L%U 2P9 f46 L'l 218 [g6 (*2 e 228 441 (47 218 A41 [48 248 att (49
- 2'e l A41 E'D 2FI att tel .
275 441 L52 e i e
. . - - - . . w E:;3 ,, J r3 m EIE J L J:,.3 LEID E;;I EC3 La - --
i
- s- '
77 7 C Fe C C, ' 7c C uC D C T' C E i
- Table G-1 (cont.)
McCUS - - WFR% ION 3/74 C tli 5(15 WiiH 3 COMPWNINi% li rt t%3 f51 21 r33 (35 t 3R 36 E44 t%5 f56 48 (34 t'5 E 38 si re5 t%5 ISA El fe6 !!5 F56 78 agt ECS E56 48 r33 t'6 r 3a 90 r33 (37 F 3m Int f39 [16 E 3M lil [3* [17 f 3P l 128 r33 t?5 t 39 Its r33 t?S E40
- lei (33 I?5 rol l' 8 (33 (!5 t=2 169 F33 (35 ft?
- 179 F34 (?5 t39 189 [34 [35 t#"
los r34 [f5 [41
- 208 E3e (15 [*2 233 r34 (?5 ret 228 r33 [16 039 e C1 231 f33 (36 f40
[3 248 [33 (36 t41
>d 248 r33 (36 ft?
e 268 f33 f36 re3 278 .[33 (3F f 39 291 E33 (37 F40
- e 2tl (3! [?7 fel Scl r33 ['T r%2 339 [33 [37 fe?
3?l [34 t?6 ( 3* 338 F34 I?6 Ten 341 034 t'6 Eel
- 355 r34 ['6 E42 368 F39 L36 043 3Y8 E39 F37 E 3' .
- 399 r34 (37 ( 4 t1 I'l [34 [37 F41 408 [39 (37 (42 e 419 r34 [?? F43 Lui SE TS Wlite 4 COMr0NENIS .
e NONC [Ni51.
- TOIAL NUMBfN UF CUT SE T T 8 0HND Wa 5 76 0Nt v CUT 5 tis WITH 4 CR tr55 CompoNrhi5 Havr nrrN Drif04INrn.
. 5tf5 WITH llP IO 83 00MPONfNf5 M8Y C'IST. '. .1
at h 9 O O O e # 3 6 9 en e G
% e #
7 e 9 9 9 4 4 3 F e e e i O e e , H 9 9 y en 6 9 E O e 6 4 9 D G e ,g 9 9 0 9 O O O b, e e
. .e en 9 O D 4 9 Y e e C e e E 9 O 4 4 9 6 4 G 0 0 4 9 6 4 P e e 9 4 4 9 ib O 9
# 4 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 6 4 ,\ 4 9 V @
G eine G O O G e
- C *. P 9 e e
e {t g e { 6 U e 9 ** 9 9 N 9 7, e e e e e O k 4 L 9 o= 4 b e er e G L3 9 4 9 O G O O C O 4 h 9 9 6 0' 9 en 4 e >= 6 O W 6 4 et G
**W 9 e 9 em 4 $
e D e b e u e 4 9 9 J O e e e e E G G m 9 e Z G
@ ps @
e n- e e e e # 9 9 9 9 9 9 f 9 9 9 9 " 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 O 9 9 e # ' e 9 9 0 4 9 e # 4 9 9 9 9 9 ,
# 9 e e S G G G 6 6
+ !
.o 9 e
g 9 e O - e e e e
.o .
O 9 6 4 a .e .e 1 O .O
.O 9 0 0 i -Q e
p . 9 G @ G-22 i 3
-* . , g,a n O [Q O a . .. . IT t .1 O O C"? 7 Q F- m
- Table G-1 (con t. ) ,
ancuS - - vta5to= sert lui Sil5 witH 1 COMP 0kCNf% ll [16C - -
?> rirC l 38 EISC 48 fl9C 50 C24
- f. I F30 79 F31 el r32 CUT 5F 5 Wl?H 2 COMPONEhi%
18 El I'm 21 F57 [53 18 154 E'3 45 ret (47 ft f. 4 4 I48 68 C44 E49 75 f44 I ',0 el tat f%I o's ret I'2 IC S f=5 [47 lit f45 144 I?l f45 L49 e l'8 Its f%0 C1 Ita E45 (KI l {3 158 E45 L52 I i ta 168 re6 ter 179 F46 F48 IPI C46 E49 e 191 [46 C'O 200 f46 E51 218 E46 I?2 e 2?l att (47 239 att (48 241 att [49 e 2' l att [50 2 f. 8 A41 [51 178 a41 f52 ,
. EUI SETS with 3 COMPONENi$
ll Il L%3 F54
. 28 C33 [?5 t 34 il F44 t%5 F56 -
el E34 I'5 f 34
. *l Its f55 Tb6 -
68 E46 (*5 F56 , 79 441 E55 FS6
. el r33 (36 r 3a 98 (33 (?F F JP trl (34 (16 E 34
. Ill (34 f17 t la I?l F31 f35 I 59
!?1 131 f 95 f4a
',7
Table G-l (cont.) noCus - - vrR$10N 3/74 Cut 5 tis WITH 3 COMPON[Pis 148 [33 [35 fel l' 8 (31 t'5 f=2 168 (31 (35 tg1 178 F34 E?S I 39 188 r34 [35 ren
!"I (34 I'5 Ibl 208 r34 [15 F42 218 L34 t'5 fe' 2?I (33 I?6 t 39 238 [33 (36 f40 248 f33 tib Iel 2%I [31 [36 E42 268 E33 (?6 r=1 ,
l 278 (3? [17 E 30 I 2*8 (33 Et7 f40 I 2*I F33 [?F F41 308 F33 (17 I42 318 T33 Iit fel 328 F34 L'6 I 39 333 E34 I!6 [40 341 E34 !!6 [41
- 3*l f34 L?6 [42
- 369 F34 f36 f=3 C1 378 [34 (97 F39
[3 388 [34 (37 F40 e em 398 r39 (57 I41 408 (34 E37 F47 ell r34 [?F f=1 s CUT 5[15 WITH 4 COMPONEMi$ McNE rnIST. e TOT AL NUMBE R OF Cui Stil rottND WAS 76
- ONLy CUT SEIS WITH 4 OR Lf55 COMPohrNT5 HAVI 9[FN DriFP"INED.
Stis WITH UP 10 6 COMPnNrNTS MAV [wlsi. e 9 i m .
. -___ __ - __ _ _ n __ _ _ ____ u _ _ x _ .=
l l! l ,lI11l ,
! e .
e . e
~
4 e e.
- 7 e
/ e e.
1 e . e v e N e .
- O e q I e e. .
S e . R e E e V e . 3,. e . f - e e E - e . e . S e L U e e. C e . C 0 e M e e. e e . e e e . e . e . e . T - e f e. e .e e . l e . i e. . l I e e D . e A . I
- e. 2 .
e ) . e /
, e i, e - .
e .
- e 0 .
e 1 . e 2 M e e r I. e e r t a e G . e . e R e O e F . e . 5
- e. f s [ .
e $ . Y, e . e .
- , e T .
[ e U . e C . e e e L . e a .
- M
.e I
. N L e I e M .
l e e . E e. e . e . 3 e. e e L n. . e. e. e O e e e .I S e N e L 1 ) e . *l e .O
. e .P t e M 1
n e e .OC 0D0D o e 6f 999n12 c e e e 1 ll!l2i33 FE!ErtIF e . 7(1 e e e e H T I l 8 8 8 e: 3 8 G e e . W t27. se7F e S e e I l e . E I b e . S e . a e .
.I T e e .
U _ e .C J O8D
- * . . g e ' . e % I 9 . -
llIlllllI l:l
_ _ - _ - - _ _ - . - . .- . . _ _ - ~ ~. _ _- . Tcb:Le G--1 (cont.) MPCtts - - tra510N 3/74 (til SEIS Wlise 2 COMPONfNI5 Il fl t44 28 E57 r?3
?I E5P t?3 49 F#4 (47 54 F44 148 69 f44 fe9 78 [44 EfD
- PI F44 t'l 98 ret l'2 Int [45' Te7 lit E4' te6 123 f45 T49 135 045 (50 148 E45 I'l ISD F45 EM2 168 f46 Emi
- 179 [46 fee IPS *F46 te9 l*l E46 t'U
- 238 C46 t'l 2tl C46 (%2 228 a4l ret e 239 a48 tes C1 248 a#l tag da 258 att l'0 t Ch 28 I att [51 278 att t'2 CUT 5FIS WITH 3 COMPONENTS e
11 El E53 E59
?S f31 135 F 3R t Il ret E'S f56 48 [34 [35 r 34 58 [45 r%5 F56 8 68 I46 (?S F56 73 a41 ['S F56 88 [3? [16 I 34 e *I C33 t37 t 34 IPI [34 t '6 E 39 til [34 L37 E 39 e 121 F33 I'5 I 30 135 [33 L'S fan tel r33 E35 r48 I'l E33 t'5 ft?
164 E33 f?5 fe' 175 034 L'5 [ 3* e lei (34 f35 F49 les r34 ['S fel 203 [34 t?5 f4?
- dll r34 T'S f4F 228 E33 E36 r 19 218 r33 L'6 ft"
~] + 248 (33 f .' b F48
_ _ a C :a C;3 Q C.3 C.L .J U L"J c tQ C' 'L. 2 .-
>> m O C~'3 C~3 a. -e C ^t 7.1 Q W O T WI3 W Y Trble G-1 (cont.)
.I pnCUS - - VERSION 3/74 CUT Sfis WITH 3 COMPONENT' 248 [33 [?6 te?
I t. ) F33 f16 tot 279 T33 t37 I 39 288 E33 L37 f40 208 f33 [?7 Fel 398 F31 [37 Fe2 315 (33 [?T [43 328 [3e [36 f 39 338 [34 (?6 Can 3el (34 E36 Cet 359 Ele E36 r=2 Si l E39 136 Fe? 378 F3e F17 [3*
- 3RD F34 LIF f41 398 E34 (17 I41 4nt F3e I17 [42 ell C34 L37 Ett i CUT $[i5 WITH 4 COMPONL*lT$
e Noh[ TRIST. e 10iAt NUMRTH OF CUT ST15 FOUNM WAS 76 C1 Ohly CUT SEis WiiH 4 OR tr55 CU4PONENTS HAWF PETN DCi[R4INfD. ea
* '4 SETS WITH UP 50 6 COMP 0NTNf5 MAY EFIST.
l t h 9 e 9 e e 9 4 e o De l
Table G-1 (cont.) MOCUS - - WrR$10N 1/74 eseeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee MIhiwal CUT Sri $ FOR Gair G224 : /) 2. 2. A
.................e.....e.............e........e............e..........e.e..............ee..........e.................e.e.e....e.e..
CUT Sff5 with I COMPONENi% 18 f20A 28 (214 il r22a ei F23A
'. I A 4 de FI F 6 *l 75 06l Pl F62 el F63 CUT SEIS WITH 2 COMPONENis 13 [3 f74 F77 E73
?I i e il rFP (73 CUT 5ti$ W11H 3 COMPONINTS
- 18 C3 [73 [79 C1 e
PJ f W I e l i e 9 e e 1:3 O E.3 E. 2 C ;J *
- C'.1. C2 C3 LCS C C :f i - ,
D
sq
- e I
I
.w s a p
ve F', 71, 2 e c (. m S. 6 PiJ D
- 9 3
'W g e
3 u
, O E
t ' a 4".
')
d u e C P+ W e I re me
- F M
w e. Fi n O P . ens a.
,=.
6 D e 6
'w Z d
M e= e M == 2 > b d g me y G F mai en 3 eQ > m 3u e
'fe E
'e L to 3 en eA V 21. >
e= Q8 2 .
.T k 6 w & 2 m 3 vcC O 7 O *= db
- L 6a E
' " M E A O
- g C w >
b O 23 =G R Un t r. U . i > an. O
,] M = en Od >
em > I em. se a i.s & D 2 W 6 to m 3 N en w F> Z e= 3 33 em M w O 2W *= 4 e 2 3 O = es y en h 2 u
>J O3 se een
>0 en G-29
. . . . . . . . . . . . r,., .
Table G-1 (cont.) . McCUS -- VFRSION 3/79 eeeee.eeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.eeeeeeeee.eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee..eeeeeeee.eeeeee MINIM 8L Ctli SET 5 FOR G4tr CF73 A 2 2. S
.....................e...............e...........e.....................e.......................................................e...
CUT SE15 WIIH I COMPONENIS II [2"6 78 C218 35 r228 , el T2 30 ea age
- f. I F60 78 t e, I 88 C62 98 f63 CUT Siis 4'ITH 2 COMPOPENi$
18 E3 t?4 21 t77 E73
+ 33 079 (73 CUT $[I5 WITh 3 COMPON(NIS
- la E3 (73 F 79 a (UT 5ti$ WITH 4 COMPONENT 5 e
e
$ NONE EaI51.
- TOTAL NUMRFit OF CUT SETS F0t'Mr Wa5 It OALy Cui SETS WiiH 9 OP tr$5 CuMPONFNis HAVI PErh DrifRwlNte.
e 5115 WilH IIP 10 6 CO*P0hrNTS May tul51. e 0 e e
-- - - - -4 C3 m C3 C.2 C.3. -
' W C.3 CEl3 C3 r- ??
i
~
O 7 O O lE'"1 3 7 M M M S M M F Mi ~ Table G-1 (cont.) l MO(itt - - vtR% ION 3/74 l MINIMAL CUT Sti5 FOR GATT r2?C = [ 2.7. 6
........c .................................. ...................................................'...................................
CUF SEIS d!!h I C OMf'O NE N T S 1i F20C
?I E2tC li f22C 48 [21C as a44
- f. I [63 !
TO [61
- 89 f62 98 f6?
e G O e M D-* I e f I e 9 0 e e o e e
ill ,l jl ll llll,l. 1lI 1 e t f
/
3 N 0 1 5 R e F V a T U C i O M _ i
=
r 3 u a. L u e r n I i P w e t t i r D a r N = s [ F t t a A s H c 3i . 1h T F N S I 2 9 o v : i f 5M r [ c AO v WC 6 P5 N5 M S z f N t33i t77w t 3T 7 N S Ur OL F T N f m f Ef( t ([ 9 A h N N S0 C
)
0 P O P O P I C4 P M ; a t M M M S O ; n O C O C O C i C s o t4 uH 6 c 2 3i13 34 CT g [F[ [ I ( . W T F C 1 H H H S OS T T 1 T I T
- I l8 l 1 l I m EL P G W I2I W I W I r5 U e
5 5 5 t mi H . e 1 1 1 [ b o uu NC I l [ [ b 5 5 5 N t b
~.
a I U T U T U av 5 T ( C C ft 0h 1 t 1O 5 - l c9(AJ>
- - . ' t - , . . '
- ltl)i,
N P
~
t .. O O O C'M M M R [7 T7J'4 QXE M WB OP24 E A Tcblo G-1 (cont.) . M0CUS - - t[d5104 1/79 coee.eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees.eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.eeeeeeeeeeeeeeee MINIMAL Ctti 'ETS FOR Gair #122D :: h 2.2. 3
.e.. ee...e.e..e.....e ..e.e..e.....e e e e e e e e e e.e ee ee e e e e e..e.e.e.e e e e ee e e e e e e ee e ee e e.ee e e e ee e e e ee e e ee e .e .e e e..e e..... ...e..e e e e.e....
Cut 5fis WITH I COMPortf N is
!I [200
?l f2tD 18 (220 ml E233
%I att >
00 Eso 71 [6l
+
el F6? 95 to3 Cui 5ETS WITH 2 COMP 0NINi$ , Il r. 3 E74 28 r77 E73
- 18 FIS [73 CUT SETS WITH 3 COMP 0HENTS
- Il [3 E73 E 78 p tui 5fis WITH 4 COMPONLHIS w '
I W NONE CXIST. 8 TOTAL NUMBIR OF CUT SETS rouND Wa5 13 CNLY CUT $[ib WtiH 4 OR tr$$ C04PONTNTS HAVE PEFN DrTERMINEO. e SLT5 ofiH UP 10 6 COMPONrNTS May tw151. t I e 9 e
l
- l i
l Tcble G-1 (cont.) . McCUS - - vfR510N 3/f.
- e e e e e. .. e.e e e . .. e e . e e e e. o o e .e e e.o o e s e .e e e e e e e e e e e e . o.. e .e e e e e . e e ..e .e e e e e .. .e e .e e. e e * * *
- e * * * *
- e * * *
- e e e e e * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
- MINIM AL CUT Sff5 FOR Gair r,=t = AQf ee.e....e...............e.ee...e.ees......e..e.....ee..e..........e.e......e.......e....e.e.e.e... ...e.ee...e. e.e.e.e.eeee**e****
Citi SEIS WITH 1 COMPONENie
!I (8 (1
' l s { l 0 I O e W t
. t e
o e t 9 9 e .
- G M25 W IES EEN M WEE " C3 C3 N
- 3 EE3 M ' '
L
l jlll , 1 i l 1 1 9e e rv t i s o: N 0 m t s e r v s. r c - S U C e W m E F SE C , ' (t! 1 6 I , . i c r 1
- D i E N
i c ! w R E T a E D u., N 6 F E P E E V I A F H 5 5T . h f 3
' r 5 N l
"' O t t P E Sw A o Y WC a M
O$ N$ S M S I N 3sggI aeP nP 5 % 1 N Ur Ot F T N F t tr[EL E n h n N N %o o o O O f P
. P P P E= M O)tn M O
C C M O M O C S T O C o 2 t ?l 2 see83 g UH Ct 6 8 (c Irtf t T F i w 0 H H SH S E . 1 Us 1 t T tt I i
- i es5 l I ul X RE P G w I :3 eW Fu F tS a
U
$ 5 [$ E wT H
.. o r 1 ht N 0
uU NC T l t [ oE I W S 5 hS h ib t c t u t U t u eY it 5 T c ( C th i t iC S i Oe(Av
. . s e 9 . e e . . h e 4 9
)(l , Il ! ll!l '
Tcble G-l ( cN3nt. ) , nocus - - venslow si7e c.................................................................................................................................. MINIMAL CUT Sit $ rnR G4fr r44 2 d qf f} e.................................................................................................................................. tut sfis wir4 I componters Nour falst. Cut s[is WITH 2 COMPONtNI% 18 F64 (67 79 (64 E68 13 [64 E69 l
.I E64 f70 i ;
l - !) E64 [71 68 F64 [72 78 (65 (67 * ' - al I65 tes 93 F65 Et9 101 F65 [70
- Ill F65 E71 j i
125 E65 E72
!!I T66 [67
- 149 (66 L68
$1 159 (66 [f9
- La 168 (66 [70 e O' 173 f66 E71 1RI f66 I?2 198 A41 (67 e 2 r. 3 Att les 211 Att E69 ,
220 Att (70 0 238 Att [71 e 9
- A i
t 9 9 C: C3 05 E*5 M " '
- ;; g:3s :::::p c C3 tJ [ri -_ .1
I... % C""I EN l'""3 O G ffT; e i E "Tfl < SW EM M FTG G A F Teble G-1 (cont.) . MnCUS - - vrR510N 3/T4
- Cui SET % VITH 2 CnMPOktNi%
e 248 att f72 CUT 5[15 WITH 3 COMP 0NINis Il t64 (15 [16 78 E65 (75 F in il T66 E75 f in el 841 f75 f i6 (UT 5ti5 WITH 4 COMPONENTS hout t 151. . total AUMB[h 0F Cui S[i$ F0tlND WAS 26 t ONLY ful SETS mITH 4 OR LF55 C0pPONENTS H AVE PET N OFTER *INED.
$[15 WITH UP IO 6 COMPONENis MAY ExtST.
9 9 u o N e t 1 e
- 0 e
n
)
i
. t 9
Table G-1 (cont.) . McCUS - - VER5tnN 3/T4
..................................e............................................................................. ..................
MINIM 8L CUT SETS FOR G A T F G5 8 -s A 58' CUT Sti5 WITH I COMPOWENis NONE FMIST. CUT 5[15 WITH 2 COMPONEWi% , NONE FIIST. j CUT Sri $ WITH 3 COMPONENTS NONE f)tIST. Cui siis v1TH e COMPONENTS Il a6; a63 e64 A65 j
'
- TOTAL NUMark or CUT STTS F0HND was I ONLY CUT SCTS bifH 4 OR LES$ COMPONTNf5 HAVE *((N dei [RMINEP.
5[f5 WITH UP 10 6 COMPONFNf5 MaY ExtST. e. O s 0 00 1 8 4 e I f e t
- , y gl3 m g33 C3 O En _J C M 05 C C"1 M .-
~
C G Q ETS Q D 0~i 1 ff T, 7 M M f195 PT5 m try.3 esTg'; p n Tcble G-1 (cont.) . , nacus - - vraston site i MINIMAL Ctti %E TS FrtR Gatr G6 2 -r f (. L 0............................e.....6.............................................................................................. Cut SETS WITH I COMPONE**T5 il E96
.l f97 38 F9m 45 E99 t
4 9 9 C) e (A 1 D t I t 0 ' e
- 9 9
__u
l 4 r E [ W s M 2 O q m e a W y. 4
- U G
O K 0 I 11 e C w Z w F G N w Q 2
- w w
b d 3 e aw e E
- k e Z **
O N
& w Ve 5 4 0 >
2h e K CM Ze e e e e CL > w w w , Od E 2 3 3 k % 5 5 2 eG G O O O > a 8 & & & WS E M E O L O E O e O u g U U U
- O mz e O N "
- u-
* . . . 3
> *
- b O a z er er e se *
* == == =
- M Nm N H N MW L 0 3 w2 wm w we o e
e We Me W LW Z h
- Fw 2> Z 33 >
A w Os ou u zu ~ g e ze z+ z a e4 - - - => a p m w a w w o =s Oz w MO e G-40
. . . . . . . . . . . . g . - .. . _ _ _ _ _ 1
F t.- T, (""Il M M M M K 7 f"81 M EER M '2 B M A *A 9 Tcblo G-1 (cont.) , MnCuS - - wrR$1oN seit MINIMAL CUT $[T5 F OR GAIF G61 3 bb3 , CUT S[is WITH 1 COMFONINi% o it EXCO
.I EIO!
78 CIC2 eI F I'? 3 j CUT 5F15 WITH 2 COMPONENT 5 NONE Fulsi. CUT 5 tis WITH 3 COMPONENTS . I NONE IN]51.
- CUT SE15 WITH 4 COMPONENIS NONC FMIST.
e TCTAL NUMBER OF CUT 5FIS FOUND WAS 4
- ONLV CUT SEis WITH 4 OR LF55 COMFONfhf5 HAVE *((N dei [R"INED.
O A 8 Siis WITH UP 10 6 COPP0krNT5 MAY [WI5T. I g i t
- e
- e 9
9 9 9
e e e = l l G % *q G 9 9 O O E O M O G j s e + e e e 9 9 9 6 -T 2 S e e G O 6 . se S 9 , em 6 6 3 9 O W G G 3e e 9 9 O O O 9 5 9 O O G G e 9 en # 9 3 e e u o e C O e K 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 O O e e e G 9 O 6 9 9 6 4 4 4 4 e e O 9 9 9 9 9 e O G G 9 '-
.S :t-
. o
. x O O
. 1) +.
9 8 9 9 e # g, C 6 ,
- e. O
. 6, . g e em O W l 9 e G G G #
6 e G M e " 9 C 4 e b @ O 9 9 en O e ta e S taJ # 9 V- 9 9 @ G 9 O *= G e 3 e e u o 9 9 9 .J G e e e O E G *. G > G e 2 4 9 ** O S E 4 e e O O 9 9 9 9 4 9 4 4 9 e
.O O G G e 9 6 4 9 O G e t O O O O O G G e G 9 9 9 9 9 9 e O
- G e 9
- O 9 O
^ G G 9 9 9 y e
.e .
C . . O +
- y . .
9
- . '2 H
- . :. i g .
O 9 g 0
- 9
.O e. .e es e p e.
e e , G-42
. . . . . . . . . . . *
- m.
l l1I ' 1 M i. t b i t 3 a N O w I S . R F V 3< - s - S U C c M N E B W T i i b O 1 D Ef E N I f M f R [ i r D M N F E P S E V E C A H s 4i . N T 3 r N S I 0 W "E F [ s4 a0 Y WC A M DS NS 5 O S T N i N 5 f N i N UE OL F f N I E [ E E R N N N N N SO D 1 ) O O O C I P
" . P M
P M P M P M E4 S M O
" t O O O O C n C 45 7C C C T o 00n0 3
UH CT 6
; (
c I 11i12 FrtC 4 I
. . . W 2 - t T T F 0 H H sH SH 5 O5 1
- r. 1 f T iT IT I T
- i I 8 i 8 I mI MI R HC P G W I7s* W [ W FW T FS U B
5 s ES E$ C Mi H e i i NT OE Ni Oi N O Uu NC f l F t N i p b $ S NS NS w L n T U T U T U i u A T 5 T C C ( C T L ON i [ TO $ e i
.b
- r ' e 9 8 t t 4 . . 9 9 9
.I ll!ll
6 i Tcble G-1 (cont.) , MnCUS - - vrRS10N 3174 .
. e . . .. o . . e e .e e e . e. . o . c o . . . e e .. e . . s e . . . . . e . . . . o . . . . . e e . . . e e e e . . . e . e . e. o . . e e . ..e .c o. . e . e 4. e e . .. e. e . . . o . c o .. . . . . e . .. e e . . . . * . . . e e . . e e .
MINIM 8L CUT SET 5 FOR Gair e64 >MI
.....e.....e.. ..e....e.....ee.oe.ee.ee....e...........e....o.e............ee.co.........e........ee.e......e......................
CUT 5085 bliH 1 COMPONINTS II [108 78 [109
.t l filu el Ell!
SI Ell 2 g Cui STIS WITH 2 COMP 0aLNTS { i
- NONE FAIST. 4 CUT stis WITH 3 COMPONEN11 e NONE EntST.
e i8 s
. i k O e
I b , b i 9 t ' l j i 9 1 l.3 W W W M Q E J C D E @O b
1 1 9 b 7
/
3 - i N . n _ O P I _ R r O 3 v r - _ .N S -. U . C o n M D J i N 3 i r t
/ -
0 1 1 D j , E N I d M R [ i T - r O
'. N E
E E P F J 4 W L H S 5T . N i C s N i O t= O P v t aD Y WC A M D5 O S I N5 UF OL S T N M F E E R N S' %O O 1 ) O f P
. P t4 M t M S O 1, O C n C i o uH 6 6 (
c = CT I a . W T F 0 L1 - H T S I x OS T 1 I RL P G W E ES U B s r Mt H - o i N O Uu NC T 0 l f S N I d b L - c T U A T 5 T t L T . 7 C oh L TC $
; O b ,v
. 9 9 9 $ e t t t t e t e e 9 8
- Table G Unavailability Expressions (STADIC INPUT)
For LMFW Initiating Event 104 C ' 10S C LMFV DOMINANT EQUIP F AILURES FOR TRAIN A 100 C , 107 TRA-E29+E30+E3t+E32+(E33+E34)*IE3S+E30+E371* , 108 C (E30+E39+E40+E41+E42+E43) 109 C - s 110 C DOMINANT EQUIP FAILURES FOR TRAIN B 111 C .- 112 TRB-E60+E61+E62+E63 113 C 114 C DOMINANT EQUIP FAILURES FOR TRAIN C 115 C < , 116 TRC-E85+E86+E87+E88+E89 117 C 118 C SYSTEM FAILURES (NOT TRAIN SPECIFIC 1 119 PI-El*E2*E3*E4*(1 -82) 120 P2-4 *(((1 -821*E8)**3 1 l i a 121 P3-4 *((E6+E51**3 1*E7 L 122 P4-(E9+E10*(I -B21+ Ell +E12+E13)**3
- 123 P5-P2*P4
! 124 C 125 C COMMON CAUSE TRAIN N 120 CA1-Bl*E36 127 C 128 C COMMON CAUSE TRAIN C 129 CCI-Bl*(E96+E90+E141 130 C 131 C COMMON CAUSE TRAINS A/B 132 C2-82*(E18+E16+E19) 133 C 134.C SYSTEM COMMON CAUSE 135 C3-82*(E8+E1*E23 135 >
F I,., Ce m C-~E t""I tT1 EfB E 7 O C f!ES Cu N Fat E A M Table G-2 (continued) 136 C 137 C OUTPUT FUNCTIONS 138 C 139 C LMFW INDEPENDENT lia XY ( 11-TR A
- T R8* TRC +Pl +P3 +P5 j til C LMFW IND & COMMON CAUSF 142 XY(21-IITRA+ Call *1R8+C21*(TRC+CCll+C3+Pl+P3+P5 143 C l.MFW TRAIN A IN MAINTENANCE IINO3 144 XYt31-tTR8*TRC+Pl+P3+P51*0M 145 C LMFW TRAIN A IN MAINTENANCE (W/CC) i i
146 XY ti l- t TR8* t TRC+CC 11 +C3+Pl +P3+P51*0M 147 C LMFW TRAIN O IN MAINTENANCE IINDI 148 XY151-ITRA*TRC+Pl+P3+P51*0M 149 C LMFW TPAIN 8 IN MAINTENANCE IW/CCI 150 XY161-IITRA+ Call *tTRC+CCll+C3+82*E35+Pl+P3+P51*0M 151 C TRAIN C IN M\lNTENANCE 152 XYt71-(TRA*TRB+Pl+P2+P31*0M 153 C TRAIN C IN MAINTENANCE (W/CC)
? 154 XYt81-IITRA+ Call *TR8+C3+Pl+P2+P31*0M O 155 C LMFW TOTAL MAINTENANCE tlNDI ,
156 XYt91-XYt31+XY(51+XYt71 157 C LMFW TOTAL MAINTENANCE (W/CC) 158 XYtt01-XYt4)+XYt6)+XYl81 ' 159.C LMFW HARDWARE & MAINTENANCE IIND) 160 XYll11-XYlll+XYt9) 161 C LMFW HARDWARE & MAINTENANCE IW/CCI 162 XY(121-XYt2)+XY(10) 162 > 6 l 4 s
Tabie G Unavailability Expressions (STADIC INPUT) For LOOP and LOAC Initiating Events 104 C 105 C LOOP DOM EQUIP FAILURES FOR TRAIN A
- 106 TRA-E29+E30+ E3 t + E32+ IE 35 + E 3G+ E 37 J
- 107 C (E38+E39+E40+E41+E12+E431 L
, 100 C , 109 C LOOP DOM EQUIP FAILURES FOR TRAIN O 110 TRB-E60+E61+E62+E63 Ill C TRAIN C FAILED DUE TO LOOP 112 C ;
113 C , 114 C SYSTEM FAILURES GIVEN LOOP 115 C 116 P1-E1*E2*E3*E4*(1 -821 117 P2-4 *(((1 -821*E81**3 1 118 P3-4 *((E6+E51**3 1*E7 119 P4-lE9+E10*(1 -821+E11+E12+E13)**3 120 P5-P2*P4 121 C l ? 122 C COMMON CAUSE FAILURES
$ 123 C ,
124 CA1-Bl*E36+B2*E35 l l 125 CCI-Bl*(E96+E90+E141 126 C2-92*(E18+E16+E191 127 C3-82*(E8+E!*E21 128 C
'. 129-C FAILURES DUE TO MAINTENANCE i30 C 131 P6-(TR8+Pi+P2+P31*0M 132 P7-(TRB+C3+Pl+P2+P31*0M 133 P8-(TRA+Pl+P3+P21*0M 134 PO-(TRA+ cal +C3+Pl+P2+P31*0M 135 C 135.>
I 3 m m m 53 C=3 EL J EC EC2 m EE5 2""? E"
F, v. , O n M Q M m f?S- n & C CE ETS N A C5 3 A Fi O Table G-3 (continued) ' 104 C 105 C LOOP DOM EQUIP FAILURES FOR TRAIN A 106 TR A-E29+ E 30
- E 31 + E32+ (E 35 +E 36 + E 371 * ,
107 C ( E 30 +E 39 + E 10 + E 41 + E 42 + E 4 31 108 C 109 C LOOP UCM EQUIP FAILURES FOR TRAIN O 110 TRB-E60+E61+E62+E63 i 111 C I 112 C TRAIN C FAILEO OUE TO LOOP , 113 C t 114 C i I 115 C SYSTEM FAILURES GIVEN LOOP 116 C , 1 117 P1-E1*E2*E3*E4*tt -021 118 P2-4 *(t(1 -82)*E81**3 1 119 P3-4 *ItE6+E51**3 l*E7 120 P4-tE9+E10*ti -821+E11+E12+E13)**3 121 P5-P2*P4 P 122 C
$ 123 C COMMON CAUSE FAILURES 124 C
- 125 CA1-81*E36+B2*E35 126 CC1-81*(E96+E90+E141 127 C2-B2*tE18+E16+E191 1 120 C3-82*IE8+E1*E21 129 C 130 C FAILURES DUE TO MAINTENANCE 131 C 132 PO-(TRB+Pl+P2+P31*0M 133- P7-(TRB+C3+Pl+P2+P31*QM 134 P8-(TRA+Pl+P3+P2)*QM 135 P9-(TRA+CA1+C3+Pl+P2+P3)*QM ,
135 > 6
I Tchle G-3 (continued) 136 C 137 C OUTPUT FUNCTIONS 138 C 139 C LOOP HARDWARE IIND) 140 XYt11-TRA*TRB+Pl+P2+P3 141 C LOOP HARDWARE (W/CCI 142 XY121-1fTRA+ Call *TRBl+Pl+P2+P3+C3+C2 143 C LOOP MANTENANCE t!NDI 144 XYt31-P6 + PO g 145 C LOOP MAINTENANCE IW/CCI i 146 XYlil-P7+P9 147 C LOOP TOTAL HARDWARE & MAINTENANCE (IND) . 148 XY(51-XYlll+XY(3) 149 C LOOP TOTAL HARDWARE & MAINTENANCE IV/CC) 150 XYt61-XYt21+XYt4) 151 C 152 C ' 153 C LOAC TRAINS A AND C FAILED
? 154 C 8 155 C LOAC HARDWARE (IND) 156 XYl71-TRB+Pl+P2+P3 157 C LOAC IND AND COMMON CAUSE 158 XYt81-XYt71+C3 .
159 C LOAC MAINTENANCE (IND) 160 XYl91-QMt(I 0+Pl+P2+P3) 161 C LOAC MAINTENANCE (W/CCI 162 XY(101-XY(91+0M*C3 163 C LOAC TOTAL HARDWARE & MAINTENANCE (IND) 164 XY(lli-XYt7)+XYt91 165 C LOAC TOTAL HARDWARE & MAINTENANCE IV/CC) 166 XYt121-XY(81+XYt10) 166 > f N En-manf =.-
- O g
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7.: m
- f. APPENDII H
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