ML20052G912
| ML20052G912 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 05/14/1982 |
| From: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Fiedler P JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| TASK-03-03.A, TASK-3-3.A, TASK-RR LSO5-82-05-036, LSO5-82-5-36, NUDOCS 8205190148 | |
| Download: ML20052G912 (4) | |
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May 14, 1982 Docket No.
50-219 L S05-82-05-036 Mr. P. B. Fiedler Vice President and Director - Oyster Creek Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Post Office Box 388 Forked River, New Jersey 08731
Dear Mr. Fiedler:
SUBJECT:
SEP TOPIC III-3.A EFFECTS OF If GH WATER LEVEL ON STRUCTURES (0YSTER CREEK)
Enclosed is a copy of our final evaluation of SEP Tppic III-3.A. The evaluation is based on the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) you supplied on May 7,1981, and other information available on Docket No. 50-219.
The Evaluation concludes that inadequate information has been supplied and thus, it has not been shown that structures can adequately resist the increased groundwater loads. The evaluation is based on a PHH flood level elevation of 22.0' ms1 as given in your SAR. Appropriate flood levels for your site are determined in SEP Topic II-3.B.
Should the results of that topic evaluation indicate higher f1 cod levels, including wave effects, than assumed in this topic, the effects of the higher flood levels will be addressed in the integrated assessment. Also, this topic assumes that your emergency procedure No. 520 is acceptable and thus the plant will be shutdown.when flood levels reach elevation 6.0' ms1.
Your emergency procedures are being reviewed in SEP Topic II-3.B.1.
Should that topic conclude inadequacy of your emergency procedures, the effect on this topic will be addressed in the integrated assessment.
SEP Topic II-3.B discusses roof loadings caused by ponding on roofs with parapets; the structural capacity to withstand these roof loads is being 4
I addressed in SEP Topic III-7.B.
Our review of this topic is complete and will be a besic input to the integrated assessment of your facility. The evaluation may be modified if your facility design is changed or if NRC criteria are modified before the integeated assessment is completed.
gg Sincerely, 6k sp Dsu ast4(.rt) i l
Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief L-820519014e 820514 PDR ADDCK 05000219 i fperating Rea : tors Branch #5 P
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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY usoeo:inieese a
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Enclosure:
As stated cc w/ enclosure:
G. F. Trowbridge, Esquire Resident Inspector Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge c/o U.S. NRC 1800 M Street, N.W.
Post Office Box 445 Washington, D.C.
20036 Forked River, NJ 08731 J. B. Lieberman, Esquire Commissioner Berlack, Israels & Lieberman New Jersey Departnent of Energy 26 Broadway 101 Commerce Street New York, New York 10004 Newark, NJ 07102 Ronald C. thynes, Regional Administrator Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 J. Knubel BWR Licensing Manager GPU Nuclear 100 Interplace Parkway Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 Deputy Attorney General State of New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety 36 West State Street - CN 112 Trenton, New Jersey 08625 Mayor Lacey Township 818 Lacey Road Forked Piver, NJ 08731 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Region II' Office ATTN:
Regional Radiation Representative 26 Federal Plaza New Y rk, NY 10007 o
Licensing Supervisor
-0yster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Post Office Box 388 Forked River, NJ 08731 l
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_ SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM TOPlc III-3.A OYSTER CREEK TOPIC:
III-3.A. EFFECTS OF HIGH WATER LEVEL ON STRUCTURES I.
INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE In this review the effects of the loadings due to groundwater, high water and waves (if any) on seismic Category I structures was reviewed.
The purpose of this investigation was to assure that such effects will not jeopardize the structural integrity of any seismic Category I structures, and thus, that equipment located within these structures will be adequately protected.
II.
REVIEW CRITERIA
References:
1.
2.
Standard Review Plan, Sections 3.4 and 3.8.
3.
4.
Safety Analysis Report for SEP Topic III-3.A, Oyster Creek 5.
SEP Topic II-3.A II-3.B cnd II-3.C as described in a report entitled " Response to NRC Questions SEP Hydrologic Topic" prepared by Burns and Rowe and dated February, 1982.
III.
RELATED TOPICS AND INTERFACES 1.
SEP Topic II-3.B describes flooding potential and flood protection requirements for the Oyster Creek site.
2.
Inservice inspection requirements for water control structures are reviewed in SEP Topic III-3.C.
3.
Flood emergency procedures are reviewedin SEP Topic II-3.B.l.
4.
The ultimate heat sink is reviewed in SEP Topic II-3.C.
IV.
REVIEW GUIDELINES The flood effects on structures, as described in Reference 4 were compared to current NRC criteria as described in References 1, 2 and 3.
Questions concerning Reference 4 were discussed with the licensee in order to determine if significant deviations from current criteria exist.
References 4 and 5 contain the licensee's analysis of the flood effects on structures.
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' V.
EVALUATION Plant grade is at elevation 23 " feet above HSL, which is one foot above the 22 foot PMH flood level and thus only hydrostatic loads need be considered.
Plant structures were originally designed for hydrostatic loads up to 15 feet above MSL and horizontal seismic earth loading.
It is not clear how these loads were combined.
The licensee concludes t;1at the structures are adequate to withstand loads up to the 22 foot level although he does not adequately explain how he arrived at that conclusion. Also, floatation potential for Category I structures for flooding to 22 feet above MSL is not discussed.
Seepage is positively prevented by a waterproofing membrane up to 5 feet above MSL snd the licensee indicates that groundwater exists up to the 15 foot level with no seppage problems existing.
He therefore, concludes i
that seepage from groundwater up to the 22 foot level will not occur, especially since the walls of safety related structures are 3 to 4.5 feet thick below grade.
However, protection of flooding through openings below the 22 foot elevation is not considered to be adequately discussed.
The intake structure was structurally designed for flood water levels up to 4.5 feet above MSL and is protected from flooding up to 6 feet above MSL. Therefore, the licensee indicates, in his emergency procedure No.
520, that the plant will be shutdown when flooding exceeds 6 feet above MSL.
VI.
CONCLUSION The licensee has not provided adequate assurance that the plant Category I structures will withstand flooding up to the 22 foot level above MSL particularly with respect to potential floatation.
Such assurances, supported by objective evidence and conclusions should be provided.
However, since the plant will be shutdown when flooding exceeds 6 feet above MSL, structural failures which do not affect the ability to keep the plant safely shutdown, and do not increase offsite radiation hazards, could be tolerated.