ML20049A708
| ML20049A708 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1981 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUREG-0712, NUREG-0712-S03, NUREG-712, NUREG-712-S3, NUDOCS 8110010433 | |
| Download: ML20049A708 (40) | |
Text
__
~ fek AMC NUREG-0712 As to Supplement No. 3
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- CF-Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station,
' Units 2 and 3 Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362 Southern California Edison Company, et al.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
. September 1981 gaarc.
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NOTICE Availability of Reference Materials Cited in NRC Publications Most documents cited in NRC publications wWt be available from one of the following sources:
1.
The NRC Public Document Room,1717 H Street., N.W.
Washington, DC 20555 2.
The NRC/GPO Sales Program. U S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Washington, DC 20555 3.
The National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161 Although the insting that follows represents the majority of documents cited in NRC publications, it is not intended to be exhaustive.
Referenced documents available for inspection and copying for a fee from the NRC Public Document Room include NRC correspondence and internal NRC memoranda: NRC Office of Inspection and Enforce-ment bulletins, circulars, information notices, inspection and investigation notices; Licensee Event Reports; vendor reports and correspondence; Commission papers; and applicant and licensee documents
- and correspondence.
The following docurnents in the NUREG series are available for purchase from the NRC/GPO Sales Pro-gram: formal NRC staff and contractor reports, NRC-sponsored conference proceedings, and NRC booklets and brochures. Also available are Regulatory Guider NRC regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations, anc' Nuclear Regulatory Commission Issuances.
Documents available from the National Technical Information S ;rvice include NUREG series reports and technical reports prepared by other federal agencies and reports pre, '..e i by the Atomic Energy Commis-sion, forerunner agency to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Documents available from public and special technicallibraries include all open literature items, such as books, joumst and periodical articles, transactions, and codes and standards. Federal Register notices, federal and state legislation, and congressional reports c in usually be obtained from these libraries.
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Single copies of NRC draft reports are available free upon wntten request to the Division of Technical infor-mation a ad Document Control, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555.
GPO Printed copy price: $3.25
NUREG-0712 Supplement No. 3 Tz _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_T________-___
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Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362 Southern California Edison Cnmpany, et al.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm?ssion Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation September 1981 p.....,,
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9/16/81 r
L TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 1.
INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DISCUSSION............................
1-1 l
1.1 Introduction..............................................
1-1 3.
DESIGN CRITERIA - STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS....................................................
3-1 3.11 ' Environmental Design of Mechanical and Electrical i
Equipment................................................
3-1 l
13 CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS.........................................
13-1 13.3 Emergency Preparedness Evaluation.......................
13-1 13.3.1 Introduction....................................
13-1 13.3.2 Evaluation of Applicants' Emergency Plan........
13-1 13.3.3 Earthquake Considerations.......................
13-3 13.3.4. Evaluation of State and Local Plans.............
13-4 i
13.3.5 Conclusions.....................................
13-4 l
APPENDICES A.
CONTINUATION OF CHRONOLOGY....................................
A-1 l
B.
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED i
ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT...........................................
B-1 l
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.1. INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DISCUSSION 1.1 Introduction l-On December 31, 1980, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff issued a l'
partial Safety Evaluation Report (SER) covering the geology and seismology espects of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Units 2 and 3 (SONGS 2 and 3, lor San Onofre 2 and 3).
On February 6, 1981, the staff issued a complete SER covering all non-THI-related aspects of our safety review of San Onofre 2 and 3, including, for convenience, the previously issued geology and seismology sections.
On February 25, 1981, the staff issued Supplement No.~1 to the SER, which addressed the TMI-related aspects of our safety review.
On May 8, 1981, the staff issued Supplement No. 2 to the SER, which addressed a number of the open items identified in the SER and in Supplement No. 1 to-the'SER.
.In this supplement to the SER, we update the status of our review with regard to certain of the items that were left unresolved in Supplement No. 2 to the SER.
Appendix A to this report is a continuation of the chronology of the
. staff safety review.
Appendix 8 is a safety evaluation of the environmental qualification of. safety related electrical equipment for San Onofre 2 and 3.
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3 DESIGN CRITERIA - STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, EQUIPMENT, AND SYSTEMS 3.11 Environmental Design of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment In Section 3.11 of the SER, we stated that our review of environmental qualifications of electrical equipment at San Onofre 2 and 3 was still in progress, and that this issue would be addressed in a supplement to the SER.
Our Safety Evaluation of this subject is, given in Appendix B to this report.
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13 CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS 13.3 Emergency Preparedness Evaluation 13.3.1 Introduction The staff's review of tne applicants' emergency plans is documented in Section 13.3 of the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) dated February 6, 1981 (NUREG-0712), and in Section 22 of Supplement No.1 to the SER, dated February 25, 1981.
The Onsite Emergency Plan was reviewed against the require-ments of the sixteen planning standards of 10 CFR Part 50.47(b), Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and Part II of the " Criteria for. Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG-0654, Rev. 1, 1980." The Safety Evaluation Report concludes that the San Onofre Onsite Emergency Plan, when revised in accordance with the applicants' commitments, will provide an adequate planning basis for an accept-able state of emergency preparedness and will meet the requirements of 10 CFR l
Part 50 and Appendix E to thereto.
However, the SER also states that the onsite plan must be revised to address (1) the final criteria and implementation schedule for the Emergency Response Facilities and their function, (2) emergency manpower levels, (3) the metcorological progran., and (4) protective action determination and implementation after an earthquake.
The Emergency Response Facilities are also discussed in Section 22, Item III.A.1.2 of Supplement l
No. 1 to the SER.
The applicants submitted a revised ' : ite Emergency Plan dated April 1981, and furthee information in letters.
Our review of the j
recently submitted information is given in Section 13.3.2, below.
13.3.2 Evaluation of Applicants' Emergency Plan (2) Onsite Emergency Organization The applicants' plans for augmentaion of the on-shift capabilities after declaration of an emergency provide for meeting the minimum emergency staffing augmentation requirements specified in Table B-1 of NUREG-0654, l
Rev. 1 within 60 minutes.
The applicants state t!iat the call-in of i
personnel will be made immediately, and all required personnel will be present in 60 minutes.
With regard to the augmentation recommendations specified in Table B-1 within 30 minutes, qualified personnel necessary to perform the functions listed in Table B-1 under " Capability for 30 minutes" will be present in 30 minutes.
In the staff's view, this capability satisfies the intent of NUREG-0654.
Periodic, unanne.. iced call-in drills will be conducted to verify the staff augmentation times reported by the applicants.
The NRC staff has compared the-applicants' time estimates with the guidance contained in NUREG-0654 and on that basis we conclude that the applicants' plans for on-shift staff augmentation are acceptable. We consider this issue to be resolved.
13-1
Another area of concern is the celegation of authority and responsibility in the event of an emergency on shifts other than the day shift.
The applicants have stated that the Watch Engineer assumes the position of Emergency Coordinator until relieved of that responsibility by the arrival of. senior plant personnel, and he has immediate responsibility and written authority to direct the initial response to an emergency, including making recommendations to offsite authorities.
This arrangement is acceptable since it provides assurance that the Emergency Coordinator position will not be vacant in an emergency during off-shifts.
(8) Emergency Response Facilities and Equipment NRC acceptance criteria for emergency response facilities were published in February 1981, in NUREG-0696, " Functional Critsria for Emergency Response Facilities." The applicants have submitted detailed descriptions of their emergency response facilities in the Jeiy 1,1981 letter to the NRC staff.
Completion of the final facilities is not required prior to licensing.
The applicants' submittal is currently andi-r review and the results of our evaluation will be transmitted to the applicants in the near future.
The interim emergency response facilities, which are required prior to licensing, meet the criteria set forth in NUREG-0578 and NUREG-0654 Revision 1, as discussed in Supplement No. 1 to the SER.
The applicants have submitted a description of the present primary meteorological monitoring system and have stated that a backup tower is being engineered and constructed.
The backup tower is expected to be operational by July 1, 1982.
Appendix 2 to NUREG-06b4 requires an applicant to take compensating actions if only a primary or a backup system is in use.
The applicants have described the compensating actions they will take, including a calibration and inspection schadule, checks with the National Weather Service in Los Angeles and San Diego and an alternato source of data during system unavailability.
The NRC staff finds these compensating actions to be acceptat.le and consequently concludes that the methods, systems and equipment of the applicaats' meteorological program meet the criteira of milestones 1, 2 and 3 of Appendix 2 of NUREG-0654.
Based on the above-described information and commitments provided by the applicants, the s+aff finds that the final criteria and implementation schedule for the emergency centers and their functions are acceptable, as is the San Onofre 2 and 3 meteorological program.
(16) Responsibility for the Planning Effort:
Development, Periodic Review and Distribution of Emergency Plans In the revised Emergency Plan, the applicants have changed the frequency of the independent audit of the overall emergency preparedness program from biennially to annually to conform with the guidelines of NUREG-0654, Section P.9.
We find the revised frequency to be acceptable.
13-2
13.3.3 Earthquake Considerations By letter dated December 17, 1980, the NRC staff requested that the applicants evaluate the potential complicating factors which might be caused by earthquakes.
Further clarification was provided by the staff in its letter of May 13, 1981, in which several items were identified for consideration in the evaluation of th) effects of earthquakes of a magnitude equal to or less thaa that of the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) on emergency preparedness.
The items identified were (1) the applicants' ability to transport necessary personnel to the plant to cope with degraded modes of plant operation, (2) the ability to communicate between the plant and outside agencies, and (3) the ability to obtain offsite and onsite estimates of damage.
The applicants responded to these items by stating that, in the event that normal access to SONGS 2 and 3 should be restricted due to an earthquake, emergency personnel and equipment can be transported to the station via helicopter.
SCE maintains five helicopters and one twin engine fixed-wing aircraft capable of carrying sir. passengers.
The fleet is based at Chino Airport.
Provisions have been made for the dedicated use of two helicopters for the transport of emergency personnel and eouipment to SONGS; however, all of the aircraft could be dedicated to SONGS, based upon the particular need.
With regard to communication, Tables 7-1 and 7-2 of the Emergency Plan list the location, the system and the function of an extensive and diverse communi-cations system for both onsite and offsite communications.
The system is described on page 13-6 of the SER.
The NRC staf f judgment is that simultaneous failure of these diverse facilities is unlikely, even in the event of an earthquake.
With regard to post earthquake damage estimates onsite, the applicants have committed to assemble teams to survey the plant and its environs to assess damage. With regard to offsite damage estimates in the event of an earthquake, SCE can draw upon the civil / structural expertise within the company's engineering and construction department to inspect key highway bridges and overpasses.
The California Department of Transportation has organized respoase teams that are immediately assigned to assess any highway structural damage.
Information on road conditions will become available to the Emergency Coordinator from the CALTRANS response teams and the SCE teams.
Such information would be available for protective action recommendations.
In addition, the applicants have prepared Revision 2 to their evacuation analysis for the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone.
This analysis (1) identifies areas where potential problems may arise that would disrupt primary transporta-tion routes, e.o., bridge structural failures or unstable bluffs, (2) identifies alternate routes which bypass the potential problems areas, and (3) assesses the impact of potential transportation route disruption on evacuation time estimates.
The applicants' report c(ncludes that, under severe evacuation route disruption, evacuation of the 10-mile north sector would require up to 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br />, and much of this tirn would be spent waiting in queues.
The report provides additional information which could be used to make protective action recommendations af ter an earthquake.
We have reviewed the information presented by the applicants, and, for the reasons given above, conclude that the applicants have adequately considered the effects of earthquakes in their emergency plans.
13-3
13.3.4 Evaluation of State and Local Plans The current status of the review of State and I.a:al emergency plans is as follows.
A joint exercise was conducted on riay 13, 1981, to evaluate the offsite capabilities of the State and local jurisdictions to respond to a nuclear emergency'at the San Onofre station.
The exercise was evaluated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and a number of deficiencies
)
were identified in a FEMA letter to the NRC (J. Dickey to B. Grimes) dated June 3, 1981.
FEMA concluded at that time that State and local government radiological emergency response plans were minimally adequate, but that offsite capability for implementation of the plans was inadequate.
In a letter dated i
June 26, 1981, the applicants identified the corrective actions they plan to take, in conjunction with offsite authorities, to address the June 3,1981 FEMA determinations.
In a letter to the NRC dated July 14, 1981 (R. Jaske to B. Grimes), FEMA stated that the applicants' June 26, 1981 letter and its enclosure represent agreed positions concerning FEMA's major concerns, what needs to be done to correct them, and SCE's proposed actions to assist in correcting the deficiencies.
.13.3.5 Conclusions In the SER we stated that the San Onofre onsite emergency plan must be revised to address the final criteria and implementation schedule for the emergency response facilities and their functions, emergency manpower levels, the mete-orological program, and earthquakes.
As discussed in Sections 13.3.2 and 13.3.3, above, the applicants have addressed all these issues, and the staff has reviewed the applicants' submittals and found them acceptable.
Therefore,
+e conclude that the San Onofre onsite emergency plan provides an adequate
. planning basis for an acceptable state of eme-cancy preparedness, and meets the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 and Appendi
'. thereto, and conforms to the guidance contained in NUREG-0654.
Further, provided that the corrective actions discussed in Section 13.3.4, above, are carried out prior to full power operation, we conclude that the state of onsite and offsite emergency preparedness at San Onofre 2 and 3 provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.
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APPENDIX A CONTINUATION OF CHRON0 LOGY OF RADIOLOGICAL REVIEW May 4, 1981 Letter to applicants transmitting " Qualification of Nuclear Power Plant Inspection, Examination, and Testing Personnel," Regulatory Guide 1.58, Revision 1 and "Qualif'-
cation of Quality Assurance Program Audit Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants," Regulatory Guide 1.146.
May 5, 1981 Letter to applicants transmitting report on HB Robinson reactor coolant system leak May 5, 1981 Letter to applicants conerning natural circulation cooldown May 7, 1981 Letter from applicants transmitting responses to Reactor Systems Branch questions concerning the steam line break analysis May 7, 1981 Meeting with applicants to discuss emergency planning May 8, 1981 Issuance of Supplement No. 2 to Safety Evaluation Report May 8, 1981 Board Notification--Thermal Shock to PWR Reactur Pressure Vessels (BN 81-06)
May 13, 1981 Letter to applicants concerning emergency preparedness appraisal program May 13, 1981 Issuance of Order extending construction completion dates to October 15, 1981 and November 15, 1982, respectively May 13, 1981 Letter to applicants regarding c L rification of staff letter of December 17, 1980 regarding effect of s
earthquakes on emergency responses May 15, 1981 Submittal of (1) Amendment No. 24, consisting of responses to questions and revisions to FSAR Chapter 13 concerning the management and technical resources audit, (2) " Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) and Comparison with Appendix A of NRC Branch Technical Position 9.5-1, October 1977,"
Amendment No. 6, and (3) " Program Plan for Piping Verifi-cation Program (Thermal Expansion, Steady State Vibration
& Dynamic Effects)," Revision 7 May 29, 1981 Letter from applicants transmitting " Responses to NRC Concerns on Applicability of the CE-1 Correlation to the SONGS Fuel Design (CEN-165-(S)" (proprietary and nonproprietary versions)
A-1
June 3, 1981' Letter to applicants forwarding notice of meeting to be held July 7-10, 1981, to discuss environmental qualification of safety-related electrical equipment June 4,'.1981 Letter to applicants requesting that report by Institute of Nuclear Power Operations be submitted on docket for San Onofre June 5, 1981 Letter from applicants transmitting (1) " Report on Recent j
011 Exploration Drilling--Capistrano Embayment Area, Orange County, California" and (2) data from Well No. 1, Arriba de la Es+,rella, "J. W. Ficklin" No.1 and Well No. 2, Santa Fe Energy " Reed Krum" No. 1 (proprietary)
June 8, 1981 Letter from applicant transmitting "CETOP-D Code Structure and Modeling Methods for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3," dated May 1981 (proprietary and nonproprietary versions)
June-10, 1981 Meeting with applicants to discuss FEMA findings June 11, 1981 Board Notification--Emergency Planning (BN 81-08)
June 15, 1981 Letter to applicants regarding change in implementing schedule for submission and evaluation of upgraded emergency plans June 15, 1981 Letter from applicants forwarding revisions to Fire Hazards Analysis, Sec. I, and revised responses to questions concerning fire protection June 15, 1981-Letter to applicants regarding change in implementing schedule for submission and evaluation of upgraded emergency plans June 17, 1981 Letter from applicants concerning capioilities to mitigate station blackout event June 18, 1981 Board Notification--Geological Data (BN 81-12)
June 18, 1981 Board Notification--Emergency Plarining (BN 81-13)
July 1, 1981 Letter to applicants transmitting "AEOP Observations and Recommendation Concerning the Problem of Steam Generator Overfill and Combined Primary and Secondary Side Blowdown" July 6, 1981 Letter to applicants advising that arrangements have been made for handling INP0 evaluation reports from Regional l
Offices l
July 7, 1981 Letter from applicants forwarding " Evaluation of Heavy Load Handline Operations" A-2
I e
July 7, 1981 Letter to Combustion Engineering advising that proprietary data submitted by applicants on May 29 and June 8, 1981 will be withheld from public disclosure
. July 7, 1981 Letter to applicants concerning status of SER open items and requesting information on confirmatory items July 9, 1981 Letter. to applicants regarding privccy and proprietary material in emergency plans
- July-10, 1981 Letter from applicants advising.that applicants and other utilities will fund ~EPRI Safety and Relief Valve Test Program for its expansion July 13, 1981 Submittal of (1) Amendment No. 25, consisting of responses to staff questions, and other changes, and (2) " Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) and Comparison with Appendix A of NRC Branch _ Technical Position 9.5-1, October 1977" Amendment No. 7 July 13, 1981-Submittal of Amendment No. 25, which includes " Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA)_and Comparison with Appendix A of NRC i
Branch Technical Position 9.5-1, October, 1977," Amendment No. 7 JulyLIS, 1981 Letter from applicants transmitting Annual Reports July 21, 1981:
Meeting with applicants to discuss independent piping verification i
July 24, 1981
.Lettei from applicants forwarding proposed Appendix A Technical Specifications t
July 28, 1981
-Letter from applicants transmitting description of the conceptual design for seismic scram system, including implementation schedule
- July.31, 1981 Letter to applicants transmitting "AE00 Observations and Recommendations Concerning the Problem of Steam Generator Overfill and Combined Primary and Secondary Side Blowdown" July 31, 1981
_ Meeting with applicants to discuss water hammer August-7, 1981 Letter to applicants concerning simulator examinations l
August 7, 1981' Letter. from applicants forwarding " Comprehensive Vibration Assessment Program Final Report" and supporting procedures
\\ugust 10, 1981 Letter to applicants transmitting " Guidelines for Demonstra-tion of Operability of Deep Draft Pumps" l'
A-3
J August 13, 1981 Letter from applicants transmitting:
(1) " Phase II Software Verification Test Report,"
CEN-173(S)-P, (2) " SONGS-2 Cycle 1 CPC and CEAC Data Base Document,"
i CEN-175(S)-P, (3) "CPC/CEAC System, Phase I Software Verification Test Report," CEN-176(S)-P, (4) " Functional Design Specification for a Core Protection Calculator," CEN-147(S)-NP (5) " Functional Design Specification for a Control Element i
Assembly," CEN-148(S)-NP, (6) " SONGS-2 Cycle 1 Protection Calculator Time to Trip Analysis" August 14, 1981 Letter from applicants advising that they will comply with Regulatory Guides 1.58 and 1.146 by approximately November 1, 1981 August 19, 1981 Letter from applicants forwarding results of evaluation of the capability of the reactor to perform its safety functions throughout its design lifetime under all normal operational modes August 20, 1981 Meeting with applicants to discuss DNBR correlation and inadequate core cooling August 31, 1981 Letter from applicants transmitting final report on plant capabilities to mitigate station blackout event September 3, 1981 Letter from applicants transmitting (1) " Responses to Questions on Documents Supporting SONGS-2 Licensing Submittal,"
CEN 184(S) (proprietary and nonproprietary versions) concerning core protection calculator, and (2) other information concerning DNBR and CTOP-D reports September 16,.1981 Meetings with applicants to discuss safety valve modifications and steam generator feed ring repairs l
1.
A-4
i APPENDIX B ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT B-1
APPENDIX B
-CONTENTS Page 1
Introduction...............................................
B-3 2
Background.................................................
B-3 2.1 Purpose..............................................
B-4 2.2' Scope.................................................
B-4 3
St'aff Evaluation...........................................
B-4 3.1 Completeness of Safety-Related Equipment..............
B-4 3.2 Service Conditions...................................
B-5 3.3 Temperature, Pressure, and Humidity Conditions Inside Containment...............................
B-5
. 3. 4 Temperature, Pressure, and Humidity Conditions
~
Outside Containment...................................
B-6 3.5 Submergence............................
B-6 3.6 Chemical Spray........................................
B-6 3.7' Aging.................................................
B-7
- 3.,8 Radiation.............................................
B-7 4
Qualification of Equipment.................................
B-8 4.1. Equipment Requiring Immediate Corrective Action.......
B-8 4.2 Equipment Requiring Additional Information and/or Corrective Action...........................
B-8 4.3 Equipment Considered Acceptable or Conditionally Acceptable............................................
B-9 5
. Conclusions...............................................
B-10
-APPENDIX A Equipment Requiring Immediate Corrective Action B-12 APPENDIX B Equipment Requiring Additional Information and/or Corrective Action B-13 APPENDIX.C Equipment Considered Acceptable or Conditionally Acceptable B-34 APPENDIXLD Safety-Related Systems List B-37 I
1-i E
B-2
APPENDIX B SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION BRANCH FOR SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY SAN ONOFRE UNITS 2 and 3 DOCKET NO. 50-361, 362 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 1. INTRODUCTION l
General Design Criteria 1 and 4 specify that safety-related electrical equip-ment in nuclear facilities must be capable of performing its safety-related funct nn under environmental conditions associated with all normal, abnormal, and acc.ident plant op-
. ion.
In order to ensure compliance with the cri-teria, the NRC staff required all near-term Operating License (OL) applicants to reassess and evaluate their environmental qualification documentation for their safety-related electrical equipment.
2 BACKGROUND On February 8,1979, the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE) issued to all licensees of operating plants (except those included in the systematic evaluation program (SEP)) IE Bulletin IEB 79-01, " Environmental Qualification l
of Class IE Equipment." This bulletin, together with IE Circular 78-08 (issued i
on May 31, 1978), required the licensees to perform reviews to assess the adequacy of their environmental qualification programs.
By letters dated October 11, 1979 and February 19 and 21,1980, the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) requested Operating License applicants to review and evaluate the environmental qualification documentation for each item of safety-related electrical equipment and to identify the degree to i
which their qualification program complies with the staff's positions as described in NUREG-0588, " Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical. Equipment." The applicants were directed to provide a submittal reporting the results of this review.
Subsequently, Commission Metrorandum and Order CLI-80-21 (issued on May 23,
~1980) states that NUREG-0586 forms the requirements that licensees must meet
.regarding environmental qualification of safety-related electrical equipment in order to satisfy those aspects of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 4.
This order requires that the licensees have qualified safety-related equipment installed in their plants by June 30, 1982.
Supplements to IEB 79-018 were issued for further clarification and definition
.of the staff's needs.
These supplements were issued on February 29, September 30, and October 24, 1980, and were given to 0L applicants for con-sideration in their review.
.In response, to the staff request, the applicant provided equipment qualification
-information by a letter dated April 16, 1981.
B-3
2.1 Purpose The purpose of this SER is to identify equipment whose qualification program
- does not provide sufficient assurance that the equipment is capable of performing the design function in hostile environments.
The staff position relating to any identified deficiencies is provided in this report.
2.2 Scope The scope of this report is limited to an evaluation of the equipment which cust function in order to mitigate the consequences of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) or a high-energy-line-break (HELB) accident, inside or outside containment, rhile subjected to the hostile environments associated with these accidents.
3 STAFF EVALUATION The staff evaluation of the applicant's response includes an onsite inspection of selected Class IE equipment, audits of qualification documentation, and an examination'of the applicant's report for completeness and acceptability.
The criteria described in NUREG-0588 form the basis for the staff evaluation of the adequacy of the applicant's qualification program.
The NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE) will perform, in the near future, an onsite verification inspection of selected safety-related electrical equipment.
The inspection will verify proper installation of equipment, overall interface integrity, and manufacturer's nameplate data.
The manufacturer's name and model number from the nameplate data will be compared to information given in the Component Evaluation Work Sheets (CES) of the l
applicant's submittal.
t The staff performed an audit of the applicant's environmental qualification l
program on May 11-15, 1981.
The audit included detailed reviews of supporting documentation for eight equipment items.
No major deficiencies were noted.
However, the applicant should provide a revised submittal before fuel load.
The revision shoul.d include results of the aging review and analysis to extend qualification from 30 to 120 days after an accident.
The revision should reflect all modifications and additions to which the applicant committed during the audit.
The results of the audit are sommarized in an audit report dated June 1, 1981.
3.1 Completeness of Safety-Related Equipment In accordance with NUREG-0588, the applicant was directed to (1) establish a list of systems and equipment that are required to mitigate a LOCA and an HELB and (2) identify components needed to perform the function of safety-related display information, post-accident sampling and monitoring, and radiation monitoring.
The staff developed a generic master list based upon. review of plant safety analyses and emergency procedures.
The instrumentation selected includes parameters to monitor overall plant performance as well as to monitor the per-formance of the systems on the list.
The systems list was established on the B-4
o basis of the-functions that must be performed for accident mitigation (without
. regard to location'of equipment relative to hostile environments).
The list of safety-related systems provided by the applicant was reviewed against the itaff-developed master list.
- Based upon information in the applicant's submittal, the staff has verified
'and determined that the systems included in the applicant's submittal are those. required to achieve or support:
(1) emergency reactor shutdown, (2) containment isolation, (3). reactor core cooling, (4) containment heat removal, (5) core residual heat removal, and (6) prevention of significant. release of' radioactive ma% rial to the environment.
The staff therefore concludes that the systems ideetified by the applicant (listed in Appendix D) are acceptable.
Display instrumentation which provides-information for the reactor operators to aid them in the safe handling of the plant was identified by the applicant.
A complete list of all safety related display instrumentation was provided.
Justification for discrepancies between the staff's master list and the appli-cants list was provided.'
The discrepancies are the result of differences in design.
The applicant identified 103 items types of equipment which were assessed by the staff.
3.2 Service Conditions Commission Memorandum and Order CLI-80-21 requires that the "For Comment"
.NUREG-0588 are to be used as the criteria for establishing the adequacy of the safety-related electrical equipment environmental qualification program.
This document provides the option of establishing a bounding pressure and temperature condition based on plant-specific analysis identified in' the applicant's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) or based on generic profiles using the methods identified in these documents.
On this basis, the staff has assumed, unless otherwise noted, that the analysis for developing the environmental envelopes for San Onofre Units 2 and 3 relative to the temperature, pressure, and the containment spray caustics, has been performed in accordance with the requirements stated above. The staff has reviewed the. qualification documentation to ensure that the qualification specifications envelope the conditions established by the applicant.
Equipment submergence has also been addressed where the possibility exists that flooding of equipment may result from HELBs.
3.3 Temperature, Pressure, and Humidity Conditions Inside Containment The applicant has provided the results of accident analyses as follows:
Max Temp ( F)
MaxPress(psig!
Humidity (%)
LOCA 287 55.1 100 MSLB 405.6 54.2 100 B-5
/
The' applicants' specified temperature profile for cualification purposes envelopes caly the LOCA temperature profiles.
The applicant has provided an analysis to show that the equipment surface and/or equipment internal temperature during the MSLB_does not exceed the qualification temperature.
The staff can not accept the qualification based on the internal temperature unless'a detailed failure mode of the various components of the equipment
-(including gaskets and seals) is provided.
Hence, for those components which were qualified based on the' internal temperatore, the applicant should either provide the detailed failure mode of the various components of the equipment er should requalify the equipment based on the higher MSLB temperature.
Temperature, Pressure, and Hum dity Conditions Outside Containment i
3.4 The applicant has provided the temperature, pressure, humidity, and applicable environment associated with an HELB outside containment.
The following areas outside containment have been addressed:
(1) Main steam and feedwater line valve rooms (2) Auxiliary feedwater pump room (3) Charging pump roon The staff has verified that the parameters identified by the applicant for the HELB'are acceptable.
3.5 Submergence The maximum submergence levels have been established and assessed by the applicant.
Unless otherwise noted, the staff assumed for this review that the methodology employed by the applicant is in accordance with the appropriate criteria as established by Commission Memorandum and Order CLI-80-21.
The applicant's value for maximum submergence is 25 ft.
Equipment 5elow this level has been identified by the applicant, along with the proposed corrective action.
The applicant identified four types of safety related electrical components as having the potential for becoming submerged after a postulated event.
The containment emergency outlet valve operators and the' containment temperature sensor have been relocated above flood level.
An analysis is being perforiited to' exempt 'from qualification the excore detectors and preamplifiers.
Justifica-
' tion was provided for the valve operators and containment sump level transmitters.
These-items perform their functions before submergence, and their subsequent failure will not degrade the safety of the plant or mislead an operator.
3.6 Chemical Spray The applicant's FSAR value for the chemical concentration is 1720-2300 ppm boron and Na0H injection, resulting in a pH greater than 9.
The exact percen't used by the vendor for qualification testing should be verified by the applicant.
Therefore, for the purpose of this review, the effects of chemical spray will be considered unresolved.
The staff will review the applicant's response when it is submitted and discuss the resolution in a supplemental report.
i B-6
~
3.7 Agi..ng NUREG-0588 Category II delineates two aging program requirements.
Valve operators committed to IEEE Standard 3A2-1972 and motors committed to IEEE Standard 334-1971 most meet the Category I requirements of the NUREG.
This
, requires the establishment of a qualified life, with maintenance and replacement
}
j schedules based on the findings.
All other equipment must be subjected to an aging program which identifies aging-susceptible materials within the component.
Additionally, the staff requires that the applicant:
s i, s m (1) Establish an. ongoing program to review surveillance m maintenance record, to identify potential age-related degradatit....
(2) Establish c aponent maintenance and replacement schedules which include considerations of aging characteristics of the installed components.
e
- The applicant identified a number of equipment item; for which a specified unalified life was established (for examples, 5 years,15 years, or 40 years).
Itn-its assessment of theseisubmittals, the staff did not review the adequacy of the methodology nor the basis used to arrive at these values; the staff has assumed that the established values are based on state-of-the-art technology e
and are acceptable.
~
n l
For this review,,however, the staff requires that the applicant submit supple-mental informatim to serify and identify the degree of conformance to the above requirements.
The response should include all the equipment identified as required to maintain functional operability in harsh envircnments.
The applicant indicated that this phase of the response is outstanding and that the review is in progress.
The staff will review the applicant's response when it is submitted and discuss its evaluation in a supplemental report.
3.0 Radiation (Inside and Outside Containment)
The applicant has provided values for the radiation levels postulated to exist
~ '
following a LDCA.
The application and methodology employed to determine these values were presented to the applicant as part of the NRC staff criteria con-tained,in NUREG-0588 and in the guidance provided in IEB-79-018, Supplement 2.
o Therefore,'for this review, the staff has assumed that, unless otherwise
. 'noted, the values provided have been determined in accordance with the prescribed criteria.
The staff review determined that the values to which equipment was qualified e.tveloped the requirements identified by the applicant.
[/
The valoj 1 required by the applicant inside containment is an integrated dose of 2 x 108 rads, which envelopes the minimum requirements of NUREG-0588.
' A required value of 1 x 108 rads has been used by the applicant to specify
+
O limiting radiation levels for RHR equipment within the the auxiliary building.
~p l_ i
/..This value considdes the radiation levels influenced by the source term
[ i[ methodology associated 'with post-LOCA recircuLtion fluid lines and is acceptable.
~
n 7
n.
A B-7 v
I
.4 QUALIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT The following subsections present the staff's assessment, based on the applicant's submittal,.of the qualification status of safety-related electrical equipment.
The staff has :,eparated the safety-related equipment into three categories:
(1) equipment requiring immediate corrective action, (2) equipment requiring additional ciualificat.on information and/or corrective action, and (3) equip-
~
ment considered acceptable if the staff's concern identified in Section 3.7 is M 's'atisfactorily resolved.
a
.In_its~ assessment of the applicant's submittal, the NRC staff did not review th'e methodology employed to determine the values established by the applicant However, in reviewing the data sheets, the staff made a determination as to tfye stated conditions presented by the applicant.
Additionally, the staff has not completed its review of supporting documentation referenced by the applicant (for example, test reports).
It is expected that when the review of test reports is complete, the environmental qualification data bank established by g
the staff will provide the means to cross reference each supporting document to the referencing applicant If supporting documents are found to be unacceptable, the applicant will be required to take additional corrective actions to either establish qualifi-cation,or replace the item (s) of concern.
An appendix for each subsection of this report provides a list of equipment for which rdditional information and/or corrective action is required. Where appropriate, a reference is provided in the appendices to identify deficiencies.
.It should be noted, as in the Commission Memorandum and Order, that the deficien-
+
cies identified do not necessarily mean that equipment is unqualified.
- However, they are cause for concern and may require further case-by-case evaluation.
4.1 Equipment Requiring Immeoiate Corrective Action Appendix A* identifies equipment (if any) in this category.
The applicant was asked to review the facility's safety related electri:al equipment.
The applicant's review of this equipment has not identifitd any equipment requiring immediate corrective action; therefare, no deficiency reports were submitted.
In addition, in this review, the staff has not identified any safety related electrical equipment which is not able to perform its intended safety function
-during the time in which it must operate.
4.2 Equipment Requiring Additional Information and/or Corrective Action Appendix B* identifies equipment in this category, including a tabulation of deficiencies.
The deficiencies are noted by a letter relating to the legend (identified below), indicating that the information provided is not sufficient for the qualification parameter or condition.
Lb l~gend
-- radiation TA - temperature QT qualification time RT
-1 required time
- All references-within this appendix refer to sections within or appendices
,[.
to this appendix.
B-8 is 4
~'
.- ~
P pressure H
- humidity CS - chemical spray A
material-aging evaluation; replacement,cr..Jule; ongoing equipment surveillance S
- submergence l
M
- margin i
I
- HELB evaluation outside containment not completed QM qualification method
[
RPN equipment. relocation or replacement; adequate schedule not provided EXN exempted equipment justification inadequate SEN - separate-effects qualification justification inadequate l
QI qualification information being developed RPS - equipment relocation or replacement schedule provided i
As noted in Sectbn 4* these deficiencies do not necessarily mean that the equipment is unqualified.
However, the deficiencies are cause for concern and require further case-by-case evaluation.
The staff has determined that an acceptable basis to exempt equipment from qualification, in whole or part, can be established provided the following can be established and verified by the applicant:
(1) Equipment does not perform essential safety functions in the harsh environ-l ment,.and equipment failure in the harsh environment will not impact safety related functions or mislead an operator.
l l
(2a) Equipment oerforms its function before its exposure to the harsh environ-l ment, ar.d the adequacy for the time margin provided is adequately justified, and (2b) Subsequent failure of the equipment as a result of the harsh mvironment does not degrade other safety functions or mislead the operab (3) The safety-related function can be accomplished by some other designated l
equipment that has been adequately qualified and satisfies the L
single-failure criterion.
(4) Equipment will not be subjected to a harsh environment as a result of the postulated accident.
The applicant is, therefore, required to supplement the information presented for equipment in this category before full acceptance of this equipment can be established.
The staff will review the applicant's response, when it is sub-mitted, and discuss the resolution in a supplemental report.
4.3 Equipment Considered Acceptable or Conditionally Ac:eptable Based on the staff review of the applicant's submittal, the staff identified the equipment in Appendix C*as (1) acceptable on the basis that the qualifi-cation program adequately enveloped the specific environmental plant parameters, or (2) conditionally acceptable subject to the satisfactory resolution of the staff concern identified in Section 3.7*
- All references within this appendix refer to sections within or appendices to this appendix.
B-9
i for the equipment identified as conditionally acceptable, the staff determined that the applicant did not clearly (1) state that an equipment material evaluation was conducted to ensure that no known materials susceptible to degradation because of aging have been
- used, (2) establish a program to revies the plant surveillance and maintenance records in order to identify equipment degradation which may be age related, and/or (3) propose a maintenance program and replacement schedule for equipment identified in item 1 or equipment that is qualified for less than the life of the plant.
The applicant is, therefore, required to supplement the information presented for equipment in this category before full acceptance of this equipment can be established.
Th staff will review the applicant's response when it is sub-mitted and discuss the resolution in a supplemental report.
5 CONCLUSIONS The staff has determined that the.ipplicant's listing of safety-related systems and associated electrical equipment whose ability to function in a harsh environment following an accident is required to mitigate a LOCA or HELB is complete and acceptable, except as noted in Section 3*of this report.
The staff has also determined that the environmental service conditions to be met by the electrical equipment in the harsh accident environment are appropriate, except as noted in Section 3 of this report.
Outstanding information identified in Section 3 should be provided within 90 days of receipt of this SER.
The staf f has reviewed the qualification of safety-related e'ectrical equip-ment to the extent defined by this SER and has found no outs:anding items which would require immediate corrective action to ensure the safety of plant Operation.
However, the staff has determined that many items of safety-related electrical equipment identified by the applicant for this review do not have adequate documentation to ensure that they are capable of withstanding the harsh environmental service conditions.
This review was based on a comparison of the qualification values with the specified environmental values required by the design, which were provided in the applicant's summary sheets.
Subsection 4.2* identified deficiencies that must be resolved to establish the qualification of the equipment; the staff requires that the information lack-ing in this category be provided within 90 days of receipt of this SER.
Within this period, the applicant should either provide documentation of the missing qualification information which demonstrates that such equipment meets the requirements NUREG-0588 or commit to a corrective action (requalification, replacement, relocation, and so forth) consistent with the requirements to establish qualification by June 30, 1982.
If the latter option is chosen, the applicant must provide justification for operation until such corrective action is complete.
- All references within this appendix refer to sections within or appendices to this appendix.
B-10
i Subsection 4.3* identified acceptance and conditional acceptance based on noted deficiencies.
Where additional information is required, the applicant should respond within 90 days of receipt of this SER by providing assurance that l
these concerns will be satisfactorily resolved by June 30, 1982.
Based on these considerations, the staff concludes that conformance with the i
above requirements and satisfactory completion of the corrective actions by l
. June 30, 1982 will ensure cor.pliance with the Commission Memorandum and Order of May 23,' 1980.
The staff further concludes that there is reasonable assurance safe operation of this facility pending completion of these corrective actions.
This conclusion is based on the following:
l (1) there are no outstanding items which would require immediate correc-tive action to assure safety of plant operation (2) s Te of the items found deficient have been or are being replaced or relocated,'thus improving the facility's capability to function following a LOCA or HEL8 l
(3) -the harsh environmental conditions for which this equipment must be qualified result from low probability events; events which might reasonably be anticipated during this very limited period would lead to less demanding service conditions for this equipment.
l
- All references within this appendix refer to sections within or appendices to this appendix.
s-11
L APPENDIX A Equipment Requiring Immediate Corrective Action (Category 4.1)
\\
Item Equipment Manufacturer Model Deficiency i
None in this category.
i
(
l B-12
~
1I APPENDIX B Equipment Requiring Additional Information and/or Corrective Action (Category 4.2)
LEGEND:
Designation for Deficiency R - Radiation T - Temperature QT - Qualification Time RT - Required Time P - Pressure H - Humidity CS - Chemical spray A - Material aging evaluation, replacement schedule, ongoing equipment surveillance S - Submergence M - Margin I - HELB evaluation outside containment not completed QM - Qualification method RPN - Equipment relocation or replacement, adequate schedule not provided EXN - Exempted equipment justification inadequate SEN - Separate effects qualification justification inadequate QI - Qualification information being developed RPS - Equipment relocation or replacement schedule provided Equipment Manufacturer /
Description Model #
Component No.
Deficiency Circuit Breaker Panel Comsip-Delphi AC3BLP03 QT,A,QI Boards Circuit Breaker Panel Comsip-Delphi BC4BLP04 QT,A,QI Boards Circuit Breaker Panel Comsip-Delphi AC3BLP10 QT,A,QI Boards Circuit Breaker Panel Comsip-Delphi BC4BLP11 QT,A,QI Boards (A) Electrical Penetrations Westinghouse low voltage, QT,A power and control Electrical Penetrations Westinghouse low voltage, QT,A large conductor i
Electrical Penetrations Westinghouse coax and triax QT,A (A) Audited item B-13
APPENDIX B (Continued)
Equipment-Manufacturer /
. Description Model #
Component No.
Deficiency
~(A) Electrical Penetrations Westinghouse medium voltage QT,A 600V Control &
Raychem (Flamtrol)
M(R),QT,A Instrumentation Cable 600V Control &
Rockbestos M(R),QT, Instrumentation Cable (Firewall III)
A,QI 600V Control &
Rockbestos M(R), QT, Instrumentation Cable (Firewall III)
A,QI 600V Power Cables GE(Vulkene)
QT,A Special Purpose Cable Bendix T,P,H,R,A, QI M(P,R),
Cable and Wire Connector Amp. Inc. (PVF)
QT,A Heat Shrinkage Connection Raychem (MCK)
QT,A Kits M(R),QT, Heat Shrinkable Sleeves Raychem (WCSF-N)
A QT,A Environmental Seal Conax Assemblies Motor Reliance (447T)
AB5BE399 QT,A Motor Reliance (447T)
AB5BE400 QT,A Motor Reliance (447T)
AB5BE401 QT,A Motor Reliance (447T)
AB5BE402 QT,A Fan Motor Reliance (444T)
AB6BA071 QT,A Fan Motor Reliance (444T)
AB6BA072 QT,A Fan Motor Reliance (444T)
AB6BA073 QT,A i
Fan Motor Reliance (444T)
AB6BA074 QT,A Fan Motor Reliance (444T)
AB6BA075 QT,A (A) Audited Item B-14
APPENDIX B (Continued)
Equipment Manufacturer /
Description Model #
Component No.
Deficiency Pump Motor Siemens-Allis (AZ) AJ1P141 T,P,H,R,A, QI Pump Motor Siemens-Allis (AZ) BJ1AP504 T,P,H,R,A, QI Pump Motor Westinghouse ANIAP024 QT,A (5810L)
Pump Motor Westinghouse WN1AP025 QT,A (5810L)
Pump Motor Westinghouse BN1AP026 QT,A (5810L)
Motor Reliance (182T)
BN1BE445 A,QT Motor Reliance (182T)
AN1BE517 A,QT Motor Reliance (182T)
BN1BE455 QT,A Motor Reliance (182T)
BN1BE518 QT,A Motor Reliance (182T)
AN1BE454 QT,A Motor Reliance (182T)
AN1BE453 QT,A Motor Reliance (184T)
ANIBE41C QT,A Motor Reliance (182T)
BPIBE435 QT,A Motor Reliance (182T)
BPIBE436 QT,A Motor Reliance (182T)
APIBE437 QT,A Motor Reliance (IC2T)
APIBE438 QT,A Motor Reliance (213T)
ANIBE417 QT,A Motor Reliance (213T)
AJIBA394 M(P),QT,A Motor Reliance (213T) 8JIBA443 M(P),QT,A PRV Position Indication T,P,H,R,A, System QI Radiation Monitor General Atomics T,P,H,R,A, Instrumentation QI B-15
APPENDIX B (Continued)
Equipment Manufacturer /
Description Hodd #
Component No.
Deficiency H Recombiner Westinghouse AB5BE145 M(R),QT,A 2
H Recombiner Westinghouse BB5BE146 M(R),QT,A 2
H Recombiner Power Westinghouse AC3RL180 T,P,H,R,A, 2
Supply Panel QI Recombiner Power Westinghouse BC4RL181 T,P,H,R,A, H2 Supply Panel QI Pressure Transmitter Foxboro PT0353-1 T,P,H,R,A, QI Pressure Transmitter Foxboro PT0354-2 T,P,H,R,A, QI Level Transmitter GEMS (XM-36498)
LT9386-1 T,P,R,H,M, QT,A,QI Level Transmitter GEMS (XM-36498)
LT9389-2 T,P,R,H,M, QT,A,QI Level Transmitter GEMS (XM-36498)
LT9387-2 T,P,R,H,M, QT,A,QI Level Transmitter GEMS (XM-36498)
LT9388-1 T,P,R,H,M, QT.A,QI Level Transmitter GEMS (XM-36498)
LT5853-1 T,P,R,H,M, QT,A,QI Level Transmitter GEMS (XM-36498)
LT5853-2 T,P,R,H,M, QT,A,QI Limit Switch Magnetrol LSH9450-2 S,QT,A (FLS-X-MPX)
Limit Switch Magnetrol LSH9451-1 S,QT.A (FLS-X-MPX)
Limit Switch Magnetrol LSH9452-1 S,QT,A (FLS-X-MPX)
Limit Switch Magnetrol LSH9453-2 S,QT,A (FLS-X-MPX)
~ Limit Switch Magnetrol LSH9454-2 S,QT,A (FLS-X-MPX)
B-16 l
APPENDIX B (Contimied) l Equipment Manufacturer /
Description Model #
Component No.
Deficiency Limit Switch Magnetrol LSH9455-2 Q,QT,A (FLS-X-MPX)
Limit Switch Magnetrol LSti9456-2 S,QT,A (FLS-X-MPX)
Limit Switch Magne *.rol LSH9457-1 S,QT,A (FLS-X-MPX)
Limit Switch Magnetrol LSH9458-1 5,QT,A (FLS-X-MPX) c Limit Switch Magnetrol LSH9459-2 S,QT,A (FLS-X-MPX)
Limit Switch Magnetrol LSH9460-2 S,QT,A (FLS-X-MPX)
Limit Switch Magnetrol LSH9462-1 S,QT,A (FLS-X-MPX)
Limit Switch Magnetrol LSH9463-2 S,QT,A (FLS-X-MPX)
Limit Switch Magnetrol LSH9464-2 S,QT,A (FLS-X-MPX)
Limit Switch Magnetrol LSH9465-1 S,QT,/.
(FLS-X-MPX)
Limit Switch Magnetrol LSH9466-1 S,QT,A (FLS-X-MPX)
Limit Switch Mag.1etrol LSH9467-2 S,QT,A (FLS-X-MPX)
Limit Switch Magnetrol LSH9471-1 S,4T,A (FLS-X-MPX)
Solvenoid Valve ASCO HY9823 M(R),QT,A (NP831664E)
Solvenoid Valve ASCO HY9824 M(R),QT,A (NP831664E)
Solenoid Valve ASCO HY9204 T,P,H,tt,A, (HTX8320A185V)
RPS B-17
AI-PENDIX 8 (Continued)
~~
' Equipment Manufacturer /
' Description Model #
Component No.
Deficiency Solenoid Valve ASCO HY84198 T,P,H,R,A, (HT8316045)
RPS Solenoid Valve AC0 HY8419C T,P,H,R,A, (Hf8316045)
RPS Solenoid Valve ASCO HY84218 T,P,H,R,A, (HT8316045)
RPS s
Solenoid Valve ASCO HY8421C T,P,H,R,A, (HT8316D45)
RPS t.
Soleroid Valve ASCO (NP Series)
HY0509 QT,A Solenoid Valve Af.C0 (NP Series)
HY0511 lT,A Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP Series)
HY0513 QT,A Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP Series)
HY5804 QT,A Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP Series)
HY7513 QT,A Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP Series)
H/7911 QT,A Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP Series)
HY7259 QT,A Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP Series)
HY9920 QT,A Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP Series)
HY9921 OT,A Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP Series)
HY9948 QT,A Soienoid Valve ASCO (NP Series)
HY9951 QT,A Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP Series)
HY9821 QT,A Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP Series)
HY9825 QT,A Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP Series)
HY9218 QT,A Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP Series)
HY6212 QT,A Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP Series)
HY6213 QT,A B-18
)
APPENDIX B (Ccistinued)
Equipment Manufacturer /
Description Model #
Component No.
Deficiency Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP Series)
HY6218 QT,A Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP Series)
HY6219 QT,A
~
Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP Series)
HY6500 QT,A Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP Series)
HY6501 QT,A Solenoid Valve ASCO HY9200 T,P,H,R,A, (HTX8320A108V)
RPS Solenoid Valve ASCO HY9205 T,P,H.R,A, (HTX8320A105V)
RPS Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSH9204-2 QT,A Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-180)
ZSL9204-2 QT,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSH9823-1 QT,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-183)
ZSL9823-1 QT,A Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-180)
ZSH9824-2 QT,A Limit' Switch NAMC0 (EA-180) 75L9824-2 QT,A Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-180)
ZSH9971-2 QT,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSL9871-2 QT,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSH9340-2 QT,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSL9340-2 QT,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSH9350-1 QT,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSL9350-1 QT,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSH9360-1 QT,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSL9360-1 QT,A Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-180)
ZSH9370-2 QT,A Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-180)
ZSL9370-2 QT,A B-19 s <
j~
APPENDIX 8 (Continued)
Equipment Manufacturer /
-Description Model #
Component No.
Deficiency Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-180)
ZSH & ZSL0509-1 QT,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSH & ZSLO511-1 QT,A Limit' Switch NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSH & ZSLO513-1 QT,A Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-180)
ISH & ZSL0515-2 QT,A Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-180)
ZSH & ZSL5388-1 QT,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSH & Z5L543/-2 QT,A Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-180)
ZSH & ZSL5804-2 QT,A Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-180)
ZSH & ZSL7513-2 QT,A Limit Switch
=NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSH & ZSL7911-2 QT,A Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-180)
ZSH & ZSL7259-1 QT,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSH & ZSL9918-1 Q'T,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSH & ZSL9920-1 QT,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSH & ZSL9921-1 QT,A g
Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSH & ZSL9945-1 QT,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSH & ZSL9948-2 QT,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSH & ZSL9951-1 QT,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSH & ZSL9821-2 QT,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSH & ZSL9825-1 QT,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSH & ZSL9218-1 QT,A Limit' Switch NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSH & ZSL5434-2 QT,A Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-180)
ZSH & ZSL9200-1 QT,A Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-180)
ZSH & ZSL9205-1 QT,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSH & ZSL6212-2 QT,A B-20
Q APPENDIX B (Continued) f Equipment Manufacturer /
Description Model #
Component No.
Deficiency Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSL6212A1 QT,A
. Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-180)
ZSL621281 QT,A Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-180)
ZSH6213-2 QT,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSL6213-2 QT,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSL6213A2 QT,A Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-180)
ZSL621382 QT,A Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-180)
ZSH6218-1 QT,A Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-180)
ZSL6218-1 QT,A Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-180)
ZSL6218A1 QT,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSL6216B1 QT,A Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-180)
ZSL6219-2 QT,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSL6219A2 QT,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSL621982 QT,A Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-180)
ZSH6500-2 QT,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSL6500-2 QT,A Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSH6501-1 QT,A
' Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-180)
ZSL6501-1 QT,A Motor-0perated Valves Limitorque HV9900 M(T,R),QT, (SMB,SB)
A Motor-Operated Valves Limitorque HV9971 M(T,R),QT, (SMB,SB)
A Motor-0perated Valves Limitorque HV9917 M(T,R),QT, (SMB,SB)
A Motor-0perated Valves Limitorque HV9946 M(T,R),QT, (SMB,SB)
A B-21
I V
APPENDIX B (Continued)
Equipment Manufacturer /
Description Model #
Component No.
Deficiency Motor-Operated Valves Limitorque HV5803 M(T,R),QT, (SMB,SB)
A Motor-Operated Valves Limitorque HV7258 M(T,R),QT, (SMB,SB)
A Motor-0perated Valves Limitorque HV6223 M(T,R),QT, (SMB,SB)
A Motor-0perated Valves Limitorque HV6236 M(T,R),QT, k
(SMB,SB)
A I
Motor-Operated Valves Liraitorque HV7512 M(T,R),QT, (SMB,SB)
A Motor-Operated Valves Limitorque HV9304 M(T,R),QT, (SMB,SB)
A Motor-0perated Valves Limitorque HV9305 M(T,R),QT, (SMB,SB)
A Motor-0perated Valves Limitorque HV9334 M(T,R),QT, (SMB,SB)
A Motor-0perated Valves Limitorque HV9340 M(T,R),QT, (SMB,SB)
A
. Motor-0perated Valves Limitorque HV9350 M(T,R),QT, (SMB,SB)
A Motor-0perated Valves Limitorque HV9360 M(T,R),QT, (SMB,SB)
A
' Motor-0perated Valves Limitorque HV9370 M(T,R),QT, (SMB,SB)
A Motor-0perated Valves Limitorque HV9201 M(T,R),QT, (SMB,SB)
A Motor-0perated Valves Limitorque HV9267 M(T,R),QT, (SMB,SB)
A Motor-Operated Valves Limitorque HV9337 M(T,R),QT, (SMB,SB)
A B _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.l
m E
APPENDIX 8 (Continued)
-Equipment Manufacturer /
Description Model #
Component No.
Deficiency Motor-0perated Valves Limitorque HV9339 M(T,R),QT, (SMB,SB)
A Motor-Operated Valves Limitorque HV9377 M(T,R),QT, (SMB,SB)
A Motor-Operated Valves Limitorque HV9378 M(T,R),QT, (SMB,SB)
A Motor-Operated Valves Limitorque HV0508 M(T,R),QT, (SMB,SB)
A
-Motor-Operated Valves Limitorque HV0510 M(T.R),QT, (SMB,SB)
A Motor-Operated Valves Limitorque HV0512 M(T,R),QT, (SMB,SB)
A Motor-0perated Valves Limitorque HV0514 M(T,R),QT, (SMB,SB)
A Motor-Operated Valves Limitorque HV0516 M(T,R),QT, (SMB,SB)
A Motor-0perated-Valves Limitorque HV0517 M(T,R),QT, (SMB,SB)
A Motor-Operated Valves Limitorque HV9217 M(T,R),QT, (SMB,SB)
A Motor-0perated Valves' Limitorque HV5686 QT,A (SMB,SB)
Motor-Operated Valves Limitorque HV6366 QT,A (SMB,SB)
. Motor-Operated Valves Limitorque HV6367 QT,A (SMB,SB)
Motor-0perated Valves-Limitorque HV6368 QT,A (SMB,SB)
Motor-Operated Valses Limitorque HV6369 QT,A (SMB,SB)
Motor-0perated Valves Limitorque HV6370 QT,A (SMB,SB)
B-23
APPENDIX B (Continued)
Equipment Manufacturer /
Description Model #
Component No.
Deficiency Motor-0perated Valves Limitorque HV6371 QT,A (SMB,SB)
Motor-0perated Valves Limitorque HV6372 QT,A (SMB,SB)
Motor-0perated Valves Limitorque HV6373 QT,A 1
(SMB,SB)
Motor-0perated Valves Limitorque HV9336 QT,A (SMB,SB)
Motor-0perated Valves Limitorque HV9359 QT,A (SMB,SB)
Motor-Operated Valves Limitorque HV9379 QT,A (SMB,SB)
Motor-0perated Valves Limitorque HV9306 QT,A (SMB,SB)
Motor-Operated Va?ves Limitorque HV9307 QT,A (SMB,SB)
Motor-Operated Valves Limitorque HV9347 QT,A (SMB,SB)
Motor-0perated Valves Limitorque HV9348 QT,A (SMB,SB)
Solenoid Valve-Valcor HV0352(A-D)
QT,A (V52600-539)
Solenoid Valve Target Rock (75G)
HV0501 QT,A Solenoid Valve Target Rock (75G)
HV0503 QT,A Solenoid Valve Target Rock (75G)
HV7803 QT,A Solenoid Valve Target Rock (75G)
HV7810 QT,A Solenoid Valve Target Rock (75G)
HV7811 QT,A Solenoid Valve Target Rock (75G)
HV7816 QT,A i
B-24
APPENDIX B (Conttued)
Equipment Manufacturer /
Description Model #
Component No.
Deficiency Motor-0perated Valve Limitorque (SMB)
HV6211 QT,A Motor-Operated Valve Limitorque (SMB)
HV6216 QT,A Motor-0perated Valve Limitorque (SMB)
HV9353 QT,A Motor-0perated Valve Limitorque (SMB)
HV9302 QT,A Motor-0perated Valve Limitorque (SMB)
HV9303 OT,A Motor-0perated Valve Limitorque HV8150 QT,A (SMB-1-40)
Motor-0perated Valve Limitorque HV8151 QT,A (SMB-1-40)
Motor-Operated Valve Limitorque HV8152 QT,A (SMB-1-40)
Motor-0perated Valve Limitorque HV8153 QT,A (SMB-1-40)
Motor-3perated Valve Limitorque HV9949 QT,A (SMB-1-40)
Motor-0perated Valve Limitorque HV9950 QT,A (SMB-1-40)
Limit Switch limitorque HV8150 T,P,H,R,A, Assembly (SMB-0-40)
RPS Limit Switch Limitorque HV8151 T,P,H,R,A, Assembly (SMB-0-40)
RPS Limit Switch Limitorque HV8152 T,P,H,R,A, Assembly (SMB-0-40)
RPS Limit Switch Limitorque HV8153 T,P,H,R,A, Assembly (SMB-0-40)
RPS Limit Switch Limitorque HV9949 T,P,H,R,A, Assembly (SMB-0-40)
. Limit Switch Limitorque HV9950 T,P,H,R,A, Asse: ably (SMB-0-40)
RPS Main Stea:6 Marrotta H.8204 H,A Isolation Valve (MV238C)
B-25
APPENDIX B (Continued)
Equipment Manufacturer /
Description Model #
Component No.
Deficiency Relay Potter-Brumfield HV8205 H,A,RPS (MDR-5060)
Cable GE (Vulkene)
H,A (A) Thermocouple Weed TE9903-1 M(T,P),QT, (1000-512-0021)
A (A) Thermocouple Weed TE9911-2 M(T,P),QT, (1000-512-0021)
A Hydrogen Sensor GE (47E240610)
AET8100-1 P,CS,QT,ql, A
Hydrogen Sensor GE (47E240610)
AET8101-2 P,CS,QT,QI, A
Pressure Transducer CEC (CEC 1C00)
PT8112-2 H,CS,QT,QI, A
Pressure Transducer CEC (CEC 1000)
PT8111-1 H, C S,0,T, 'b A
(A) RTD R:semmant TE9178 (1-4)
M(T,R),QT, (104-tJC-1)
A (A) RTD Rosemount TE0112 (1-4)
M(T,R),QT, (104-AFC-1)
A (A) RTD Fosemount TE9179 (1-4)
M(T,R),QT, (104-AFC-1)
A (A) RTD Rasemount TE0122 (1-4)
M(T,R),QT, (104-AFC-1)
A (A) RTD Rosemount TE0111X1 M(T,R),QT, (104-AFV-1)
A (A) RTD Rosemount TE0111Y1 M(T,R),QT, (104-AFV-1)
A (A) RTD Rosemount TE0911X1 M(T,R),QT, (104-AFV-1)
A (A) <!TD Rosemount TE0911Y1 M(T,R),QT, (104-AFV-1)
A (A) Audited item B-26
L
~
APPENDIX B (Continued)
Equipment Manufacturer /
Description Model #
Component No.
Deficiency (A) RTD Rosemount TE0921X2 M(T,R),QT, (104-AFV-1)
A (A) RTD Rosemount TE0121X2 M(T,R),QT, (104-AFV-1)
A (A) RTD Rosemount TE0121Y2 M(T,R),QT, (104-AFV-1)
A (A) RTO Rosemount TE0921Y2 M(T,R),QT, (104-AFV-1)
A (A) RTD Rosemount TE0915-2 M(T,R),QT, (104-AFV-1)
A (A) RTO Rosemount TE0115-2 M(T,R),QT, (104-AFV-1)
A (A) RTD Rosemount TE0925-1 M(T,R),QT, (104-AFV-1)
A (A) RTD Rosemount TE0125-1 M(T,R),QT, (104-AFV-1)
A RCP Speed Signal Bentley-Nevada SE-0113 (1-4)
T,P,H,R,A, (21956)
QI Senscr and Transmitter Bentley-Nevada SE-123 (1-4)
T,P,H,R,A, (21956)
QI Sensor and Transmitter Bentley-Nevada SE-133 (1-4)
T,P,H,R,A, (21956)-
QI Sensor and Transmitter Centley-Nevada SE-143 (1-4)
T,P,H,R,A, (21956)
QI Sensor and Transmitter Bentley-Nevada ST-113 (1-4)
T,P,H,R,A, (21956)
QI Sensor and Transmitter Bentley-Nevada ST-123 (1-4)
T,P,H,R,A, (21956)
QI Sensor and Transmitter Bentley-Nevada ST-133 (1-4)
T,P,H,R,A, (21956)
QI
. Sensor and Transmitter Bentley-Nevada ST-143 (1-4)
T,P,H,R,A, (21956)
QI (A) Audited item B-27
p L,
APPENDIX B (Continued)
Equipment Manufacturer /
Description Model #
Component No.
Deficiency Pressure Transmitter Foxboro (E-11 GM)
PT0101 (1-4)
T,P,M,A,QI Pressure Transmitter Rosemount PT102 (1-4)
T,P,M,QT, (1153-GA9)
A,QI Pressure Transmitter Rosemount PT0102-1, 2 T,P,M,QT, (1153-GA9)
A,QI Differential Pressure Foxboro (E-13 DH)
LT-110 1, 2 T,P,M,QT, Transmitter A,QI Pressure Transmitter Foxboro (E-11 GM)
PT0103-1 T,P,M,A,QI Pressure Transmitter Foxboro (E-11 GM)
PT0105-3 T,P,M,A,QI Pressure Transmitter Rosemount PT-0104-2 T,P,M,A,QI (1153-GA9)
Pressure Transmitter Rosemount PT-0106-4 T,P,M,A,QI (1153-GA9)
Pressure-Transmitter Foxboro (E-11 GM)
PT 1013 (1-4)
T,P,M,A,QT, QI Pressure Transmitter Foxboro (E-11 GM)
PT 1023 (1-4)
T,P,M,A,QT, QI Pressure Transmitter Foxboro (E-11 GM)
PT 1013 1, 2 T,P,M,A,QT, QI Pressure Transmitter Foxboro (E-11 GM)
PT 1023 1, 2 T,P,M,A,QT, QI Differential Pressure Foxboro (E-13 DM)
LT-1113 (1-4)
T,P,M,A,QI Transmitter Differential Pressure Foxboro (E-13 DM)
LT-1123 (1-4)
T,P,M,A,QI Transmitter Differential-Pressure Rosemount LT1115 1, 2 T,P,M,A,QI Transmitter (1153 DA5)
Differential Pressure Rosemount LT1125 1, 2 T,P,M,A,QI
-Transmitter (1153 DA5)
Nuclear Instrument General Atomics /
None A,R,H,CS,QI Detector Assembly Reuter Stokes (EIE 304-5000-1)
B-28
APPENDIX B (Continued)
Equipment Manufacturer /
Descriptica Model #
Component No.
Deficiency Position Transmitter CE & Electro None P,R,H,A,CS, Mechanics QI Nuclear Instrument General Atomics /
None T,P,H,R,CS, Preamplifier / Filter Reuter Stokes QI, A Excore Detector System ITT None T,P,QM,R, Cable QI,QT,A RSPT Cable Anaconda None T,P,R,QM, QT,QI,A RTD Rosemount TE0303-1, 2 QT,A (104-AFC-1)
RTD Rosemount TE0351-1 QT,A (104-AFC-1)
RID Rosemount TE0352-2 QT,A (104-AFC-1)
Pressure Sensors Foxboro (E-11 GM)
PT0303-1, 2 QT,A,QI Pressure Sensors Foxboro (E-11 GM)
PT-0351 (1-4)
A,QI Pressure Sensors Foxboro (E-11 GM)
PT-0352 (1-4)
A,QI Flow Sensor.
FT0311-2 QT,A,QI Flow Sensor Foxboro (E13 DA)
FT0321-1 QT,A,QI Flow Sensor Foxboro (E13 DA)
FT0331-1 QT,A,QI Flow Sensor Foxboro (E13 DA)
FT0341-2 QT,A,QI Flow Sensar Foxboro (E13 DA)
FT9421-1 QT,A,QI Flow Sensor Foxboro (E13 DA)
FT9435-2 QT,A,QI Flow Sensor Foxboro (E13 DM)
FT0338-1 QT,A,QI Flow Sensor Foxboro (E13 DM)
FT0348-2 QT,A,QI Floe Transmitter Foxboro (E-96)
FT0318 T,P,R,H,A, RPS Flow Transmitter Foxboro (E-96)
FT0328 T,P,R,H,A, RPS B-29
APPENDIX B (Continued)
Equipment Manufacturer /
Description Model #
Component No.
Deficiency Flow Detector Foxboro (2801)
FE-0318 T,P,H,R,A, RPS Flow Detector Foxboro (2801)
FE-0328 T,P,H,1,A, RPS Level Transmitter Foxboro (E13-DMP)
LT-0348-1 T,P,H,R,A, RPS Level Transmitter Foxboro (E13-DMP)
LT-0349-2 T,P,H,R,A, RPS Flow Sensor Foxboro (E-13 DH)
FT-0212 T,P,H,R,A, RPS Pressure Transmitter Foxboro (E-11 GH)
PT-0212 T,P,H,R,A, RPS Solenoid Valve ASCO (HT831665)
HY9341 T,P,H,R,A, RPS Solenoid Valve ASCO (HT832665)
HY9351 T,P,H,R,A, RPS Solenoid Valve ASCO (H1831665)
HY9361 T,P,H,R,A, RPS Solenoid Valve ASCO (HT831665)
HY9371 T,P,H,R,A, RPS Solenoid Valve ASCO (HT831665)
HY9342 T,P,H,R,A, RPS Solenoid Valve ASCO (HT831665)
HY9352 T,P,H,R,A, RPS Solenoid Valve ASCO (HT831665)
HY9362 T,P,H,R,A, RPS Solenoid Valve ASCO (HT831665)
HY9372 T,P,H,R,A, RPS Solenoid Valve ASCO (HT831665)
HY9433 T,P,H,R,A, RPS Solenoid Valve ASCO (HT831665)
HY9437 T,P,H,R,A, RPS e
B-30
)
r.
APPENDlX 8 (Continued)
Equipment Manufacturer /
l-Description Model #
Ccmponent No.
Deficiency l
Solenoid Valve ASCO (HT831665)
TV-0221 T,P,H,R,A, RPS Solenoid Valve ASCO (HT8320A108)
FY0306 T,P,H,R,A, RPS Solenoid Valve ASCO (HT8320A108)
HY-9316 T,P,H,R,A, RPS Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-170)
ZSH & ZSL-TV-0221 T,P,H,R,A, RPS Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-170)
ZSH & ZSL-HV-9341 T,P,H,R,A, RPS Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-170)
ZSH & ZSL-HV-9351 T,P,H,R,A, RPS Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-170)
ZSH & ZSL-HV-9361 T,P,H,R,A, RPS Limit Rwitch NAMCO (EA-170)
ZSH & ZSL-HV-9371 T,P,H,R,A, RPS
' Limit Switch.
NAMC0 (EA-170)
ZSH & ZSL-HV-9342 T,P,H,R,A, RPS Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-170)
ZSH & ZSL-HV-9352 T,P,H,R,A, RPS Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-170)
ZSH & ZSL-HV-9362 T,P,H,R,A, RPS Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-170)
ZSH & ZSL-HV-9372 T,P,H,R,A, RPS Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-170)
HV-9433 T,P,H,R,A, RPS Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-170)
HV-9437 T,P,H,R,A, RPS Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-170)
ZSH & ZSL-FV0306 T,P,H,R,A, RPS Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-170)
ZSH & ZSL-HV-9316 T,P,H,R,A, RPS B-31
(-
t APPENDIX B (Continued)
Equipment Manufacturer /
Description Model #
Component No.
Deficiency Motor Operated Valve Limitorque HV-9332 QT,A (SMB-1-40)
Motor Operated Valve Limitorque HV-9325 QT,A (SMB-1-40)
Motor Operated Valve Limitorque HV-9328 QT,A (SMB-1-40)
Motor Operated Valve Limitorque
.V-9331 QT,A (SMB-1-40)
Motor Operated Valve Limitorque HV-9323 QT,A (SMB-00-10)
Motor Operated Valve Limitorque HV-9326 QT,A (SMB-00-10)
Motor Operated Valve Limitorque HV-9329 QT,A (SMB-00-10)
Motor Operated Valve Limitorque HV-9332 QT,A (SMB-00-10)
Motor Operated Valve Limitorque HV-9324 QT,A (SMB-00-10)
Motor Operated Valve Limitorque HV-9327 QT,A (SMB-00-10)
Motor Operated Valve Limitorque HV-9330 QT,A (SMB-00-10)
Motor Operated Valve Limitorque HV-9333 QT,A (SMB-00-10)
Motor Operated Valve Limitorque HV-9367 QT,A (SP9-00-10)
Motor Operated Valve Limitorque HV-9368 QT,A (SMB-00-10)
Motor Operated Valve Limitorque HV-9420 QT,A (SMB-00-10)
Motor Operated Valve Limicarque HV-9434 QT,A (SMB-00-10)
B-32
APPENDIX B (Continued)
Equipment Manufacturer /
Description Model #
Component No.
Deficiency Motor Operated Valve Limitorque LV-02278 QT,A (SMB-00-10)
Motor Westinghouse P-015 QT A (5808 P39)
Motor Westinghouse P-016 QT,A (5808 P39)
Motor Westinghouse P-017 M(T),QT,A (5809)
Motor Westinghouse P-018 M(T),QT,A (5809)
Motor Westinghouse P-019 M(T),QT,A (5809)
Motor Wastinghouse P-012 M(T),QT,A (5808 P39)
Motor Westinghouse P-013 M(T),QT, A (5808 P39)
Motor Seimens-Allic P-020 M(T),QT,A Motor Seimens-Allis P-021 M(T),QT,A Solenoid Valve Target Rock HV-7816 QT,A (808-001)
(A) Pump Motor Louis-Allis P190 M(T),QT,A (L-A Type)
(A) Pump Motor Louis-Allis P191 M(T),QT,A (L-A Type)
(A) Pump Motor Louis-Allis P192 M(T),QT,A (L-A Type)
(A) Hydro-Motor ITT General FV-0318 QT,A Operator (A) Hydro-Motor ITT General FV-0328 QT,A Operator (A) Audited Item B-33
h l
I l'
APPENDIX C Equipment Considered Acceptable or Conditional y Acceptable LEGEND:
Designation for Deficiency R - Radiation T - Temperature QT - Qualification Time RT - Required Time P - Pressure H - Humidity CS - Chemical spray A - Material aging evaluation, replacement schedule, ongoing equipment surveillance 5 - Submergence M - Margin I - HELB evaluation outside containment not completed QM - Qualification method RPN - Equipment relocation or replacement, adequate schedule not provided EXN - Exempted equipment justification inadequate SEN - Separate effects qualification justification inadequate QI - Qualification information being developed RPS - Equipment ralocation or replacement schedule provided i
Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency (A) Connector Amphenol A
t 8KV Power Cable Anaconda (EP)
A 8KV Cable Termination Kit Raychem (HVT)
A' Motor Connection Kit Raychem (HVMC-5)
A A
~
Heat Trace System Wire Thermon (TEK)
A (A) Heat Trace System-R!D Thermon A
Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP8320A187V) HY8200 A'
1 Solenoid Valve ASCO (IC2320A187V) HY8201 A
Solenoid Valve ASCO (NP8320A187V) HY8202 A
(A) Audited item i
B-34
)
a
r:
f y'
i i
l APPEN0lX C (Continued)
Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
De'iciency SolenoidVaJve ASCO (NP8320A187V) HY8203 A
E Solenoid Va've ASCO (NP8320A187V) HY4057 A
f 7
,(
ASCO (NP8320A187V) HY4058 A
y
^
r; L Limit Switch
\\-
NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSH-8200-2 A
. i s ],.
NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSH-8201-1 A
L,mit Switch
'NAMC0 (EA-180) 75H-8202-2 A
a
(
Liinit Switch
'l NAMCO (EA-180)
ZSH-8203-1 A
,,'{,.'LimitSwitch NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSL-8200-2 A
)-
Limit Switch i; ',
NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSL-8201-1 A
Y Limit Switch i
NAMCO (EA-180)
ZSL-8202-2 A
NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSL-8203-1 A
Limit Swi ch NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSH-8419-1 A
y.j Limit Switctt'-
NAMCO (EA-180)
ZSL-8421-2 A
Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-180)
ZSL-4057-2 A
NAMCO (EA-180)
ZSL-4058-1 A
Limit Switch NAMC0 (EA-180)
ZSH-4057-2 A
v Limit Switch NAMCO (EA-180)
ZSH-4058-1 A
i Solenoid Valve 4 Target Rock (75G) h.0500 A
y y
'larget Rock (75G)
HV0502 A
Solenoid Vrive-Target Rock (75G)
HV7801 A
.\\
p Solenoid Valve Target Rock (75G)
HV7802 A
i s
'30lenoiltFValve
~ Target Rock (75G)
HV7805 A
3'
~
. Solenoid)alve Target Rock (75G)
HV7806 A
yf Solenoid Valve Target Rock (75G)
HV9345 A
};.
s.
y*k
-@Y B-35
}_
V 1
s y y
~
L y u_
W *' G q
.o ;;+
w8.
y 1Rl T! $.
.(
' APPENDIX C-(Continued) g.
[P -
7
~~
~ Equipment Description' Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency cj;[~,
-Solenoid Valve-Target Rock (75G)-
HV9355 A
551enoidValve Target Rock (75G).
HV9365 A
Q
. Target Rock.(75G)
HV9375 A
Q(c
- ;c
- j.e Solenoid Valve-Target Rock (75G)
HV0296A A
SolendidValvel Target Rock (75G)
HV0296B A
u Os
. Target Rock (75G)
HV0297A A'
ES a Solenoid Valve.
Target Rock (75G)
HV0297B A
LTarget Rock (75G)
HV0298 A
1.
t o:'
~
i
'Solendid Valve
-Target Rock (75G1 HV0299.
A K.
..a -
. Target Rock (75G)
.HV8248 A
Target Rock (75C)
HV8249 A
Motor Operated Va!ve Limitorque HV4713 A
(SM-000-2)
Solenoid Valve-Valcor HV9398 A
(V-5260-573-1) u Solenoid, Valve Valcor HV9399 A
~?
(V-5260-573-1)
.o L-g' g
T I
- y
.k )
- y} '.
k-3 4
, ;s "
,.. C '
~
}-. f E'
A
.(. o '
B-36 c
77
=
v APPENDIX D i
Safety-Related Systems List t
Function System I
Emergency Reactor Shutdown Safety injection system Chemical and volume control system Auxiliary feedwater system Reactor protection system Engineered safety features actuation system Containment Isolation Containment isolation system Engineered sa.'ety features actuation system Reactor Core Cooling Safety injection system Containment Heat Remaval Containment spray system Containn.ent atmosphere emergency cooling Salt water cooling system Component cooling water system Engineered safety features actuation system l
Core Residual Heat Removal Salt water cooling system Component cooling water system Auxiliary fecdwater system Shutdown cooliag system Prevention of Significant Containmer.t spray system l
Release of Radioactive Containment isolation system Material to Environment Combustible gas control system l
Engineered safety features actuation system Radiation monitoring system Support Systems Emergency operation HVAC system Diesel Generator System Radiation monitoring system Post-accident monitoring system Reactor-coolant gas vent 2The NRC staff recognizes that there are differences in nomenclature of systems because of plant vintage and engineering acsign; consequently, some systems
. performing identical or similar functions may have different names.
In these instances, it was necessary to verify the function of the system (s) with the responsible IE regional reviewer and/or the licensee.
B-37
NRC aonu 335
,,,y U S. NUCLEAR REGUL ATORY COMMISSION
- 1. REPORT NUMBE R (AssPed by DOCl WMM2 BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET Supplement NO. 3 4 itT LE AND SUBTITLE (Add Volume No., ot apprmrostel 2 (Leave bimkl Safety Evaluation Report Relt.ted to the Operation of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 1 RECIPIEN T'S ACCESSION NO.
- 7. AUTHORlSI
- 5. DATE REPORT COMPLETED MON TH l TEAR September 1981 9 PE RFoRMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAILING ADORESS //nclude 2,0 Codel DATE REPORT ISSUED Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Se tember lh1 Washington, D.C.
.~0555
- 8. (Leave Nank) 12 SPONSORING ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAILING ADDRESS (lactude 1,0 Codel
- 10. PROJE CT/ TASK / WORK UNIT NO Same as 9. above
I'> SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14 (L eave o/m A /
Docket flos. 54361 and 50-362 _
- 16. ABSTR ACT (200 words or lesst Supplement No. 3 to the Safety Evaluation Report for the application filed by Southern California Edison Company, et al for licenses to operate the San Oncfre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 (Docket Nos. 54361 and 54362) located in San Diego County, California has been prepared by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This supplement updates the status of review with regard to certain items that were left unresolved in Supple-ment No. 2.
l 17 AE Y WORDS AND DOCUVENT AN ALYSIS 1 74 OE SC RiaT ORS 17e 6DE NTIFIE RS. OPE N E NDE D TE RMS 18 AV AIL ABILtTY ST A TE VE NT 19 SF uum TY CL ASS /Th,s voorn 21 NO OF P ALE S Unclassified Unlimited in" cia *sIlYfe I " #
N N RC F ORY 339 (7 ? M
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