ML20045J167
| ML20045J167 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 06/28/1993 |
| From: | Ebneter S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Skolds J SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20045J168 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9307230126 | |
| Download: ML20045J167 (51) | |
Text
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JUN 2 81993
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Docket No.: 50-395 M
License No.: NPF-12 01, q
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company ATTN: Mr. John L. Skolds Vice President, Nuclear Operations Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station P. O. Box 88 Jenkinsville, SC 29056 Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-395/93-07) r This refers to the NRC's Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP)
Report for your V. C. Summer Nuclear Station which was sent to you on April 30, 1993; our meeting.of May 12, 1993; and your written comments in a letter dated June 11, 1993.
In your letter you recommended clarification of-your corrective actions taken concerning the testing of circuit breakers, and the addition of the word
" adequate" to the Engineering / Technical Support area to clarify that the Summer Plant-had an operating cathodic protection system but that. it was not adequate. We agree that your comments in these areas described the plant conditions more accurately. Therefore, Enclosure 1 is an errata to the Initial Report and Enclosure 2 constitutes the Final Report.
Enclosures 3 through 5 consist of a meeting summary, the May 12, 1993 SALP slides, and your written comments.
Your comments in the Radiological Controls area concerning the methodology used to determine tritium background corrections for surface water indicates there was a communication problem during the inspretion. On June 23, 1993, there were additional discussions between Mr. G. Taylor and others of your staff and Mr. J. P. Stohr and others of the Region II staff, which amplified and further clarified the comments in your letter.
Based on these discussions, it is now our understanding that the method the Summer staff used to account for instrument background readings for surface water tritium samples was correct. Therefore, we have removed the statement in the SALP Report referring to a problem in this area. This will be further discussed by our inspector with your staff during our next inspection'in this area.
I was pleased to see many local officials in attendance at the SALP presentation and enjoyed our subsequent meeting with them to reaffirm the NRC's role as well as address any questions or items of mutual interest.
The performance of your V. C. Summer facility has continued to be excellent and I note your continued commitment to improve overall performance.
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JUN 2 81993 South Carolina Electric &
3 Gas Company bec w/encls:
G. F. Wunder, NRR F. Cantrell, RII S. Vias, RII Document Control Desk NRC Resident Inspector
+
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Route I, Box 64 Jenkinsville, SC 29065 The Chairman-K. C. Rogers, Commissioner J. R. Curtiss, Commissioner F. J. Remick, Commissioner E. G. de Planque, Commissioner J. M. Taylor, E00 H. L. Thompson, Jr., EDO L. R. Plisco, Regional Coordinator, EDO T. E. Murley, NRR S. Varga, NRR G. Lainas, NRR J. Mitchell, NRR F. Allenspach, SALP Coordinator, NRR Regional Administrators, RI, RIII RIV, and RV 2
K. Clark, RII, PA0 D. M. Verrelli, DRP, RII H. V. Sinkule, DRP, RII A. R. Herdt, DRP,
.,T I NRC Resident '.nspecter DRS and DRSS dranch Chiefs, and Sectic1 Chiefs Document Cor. trol Desk
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JUN 2 81993 South Carolina Electric &
2 Gas Company In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice", a copy of the letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
No reply to this letter is required. However, should you have any questions, I would be pleased to discuss them with you.
Sincerely, Original signed by:
Stewart D. Ebneter Stewart D. Ebneter Regional Administrator
Enclosures:
1.
Errata Sheet 2.
Final SALP Report 3.
Meeting Summary (5/12/93) 4.
SALP Slides (5/12/93) 5.
SCE&G Comments on Initial Report cc w/encls:
R. J. White Mr. R. M. Fowlkes, Manager Nuclear Coordinator Nuclear Licensing and Operating Experience South Carolina Electric & Gas Company S.C. Public Service Authority Virgil C. -Summer Nuclear Station Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station P. O. Box 88 P. O. Box 88 (Mail Code 802)
Jenkinsville, SC 29065 Jenkinsville, SC 29065 Heyward G. Shealy, Chief G. J. Taylor, General Manager Bureau of Radiological Health Nuclear Plant Operations S. C. Department of Health South Carolina Electric & Gas Co.
and Environmental Control Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station 2600 Bull Street P. O. Box 88 (Mail Code 300)
Columbia, SC 29201 Jenkinsville, SC 29065 INP0 J. B. Knotts, Jr., Esq.
700 Galleria Parkway Winston and Strawn Atlanta, GA 30339-5957 1400 L Street, NW Washington, D. C.
20005-3502 Chairman Fairfield County Council P. O. Drawer 60 Winnsboro, SC 29180 bec w/encls:
(See page 3)
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ENCLOSURE 1 ERRATA SHEETS Paae line Initial Report Reads Final Report Coversheet 2
INITIAL SALP REPORT FINAL SALP REPORT 6
42-44 Delete sentence Sentence deleted.
beginning "In this area, one problem was noted..."
45
...no exposure limits
...no exposure limits exceeded due to these
- exceeded, background inconsistencies 8
13-16 Prompt corrective Prompt corrective action action included included the subsequent inspection of the testing of all fourteen EDG underground breakers with no failures piping and identified. The EDG replacement of the underground piping molded case circuit inspections and the-breakers during the replacement of the molded subsequent refuel-case circuit breakers ing outage, were performed during the subsequent refueling outage.
15 2-3 Cathodic protection Adequate cathodic
......not provided.
protection.......
not provided.
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E ENCLOSURE INITIAL SALP REPORT U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C MISSION REGION II SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF CENSEE PERFORMANCE INSPECTION R ORT NUMBER 50- 5/93-07 SOUTH CAROLIf ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY VIRGIL
. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION SEPTEMBER, 1991 THROUGH FEBRUARY 27, 1993 b
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6 reactor vessel head shield; an electronic dosimetry sys surrogate video tour units. The licensee's collective dos during this assessment period was approximately 316 person-rem (th approximately 285 person-rem accumulated during the out e.
The collective dose appeared to be appropriate for the se e of work performed. Collective dose in the previous assessme
- period, which did not include a refueling outage, was 89 pe son-rem.
Licensee performance in contamination control coptinued to be excellent. Less than one percent, approximate}f 746 ft*, of the 2
total of over 133,000 ft of radiologically cphtrolled area was controlled as contaminated. Additionally, the number of personnel f
contamination events (PCEs) decreased from 122 during the previous assessment period to 98 this period.
The licensee's program to monitor and j(uantify radioactive effluents was good. There were no lanned or abnormal releases during this SALP period. The cali tion and maintenance of monitors was performed as require y the Technical Specifications (TSs). The Radiation Monitorin ystem was adequately maintained.
One problem in this area invol d two instances of failure to set the alarm and trip setpoints ffr the Turbine Building Sump radiation monitor in accordance with the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM). Although t f alarm and setpoints were higher than allowed by ODCM methodolo
, neither release limits nor regulatory exposure limits were ex eded during these two liquid effluent releases. The license successfully analyzed both the beta emitter radioisotope amples as well as all gamma nuclides provided to the fac ity by Region II as part of the NRC's Confirmatory Measu ements Program.
The licensee's piogram for monitoring primary and secondary chemistry was good. Primary chemistry parameters covered by TSs were maintai d within specified limits.
Secondary and other non-TS primary emistry parameters were generally maintained within the licen e's administrative limits.
In those few cases where the lattp parameters were exceeded, prompt corrective actions were t4 Ken to return them to acceptable levels.
The diological environmental monitoring program was completed in a
orough manner.
For this period, environmental results showed t t there were negligible radiological exposures attributable to t e operation of VC Summer due to airborne, waterborne, aquatic, ingestion, or direct exposure pathways.
In this area, one problem was noted for a failure to perform proper tritium background p
corrections, for surface waters, as defined in the ODCM. There were no exposure limits exceeded due to these background
[4 inconsistencies.
i No cited violations were identified during the assessment period.
4 2.
Performance Ratina Category:
1
[
L 8
number of inadvertent safety system actuations ssociated with maintenance and testing.
The licensee consis ntly used the J
correct parts and tools for maintenance.
Th lubrication program was effective in providing the correct lubr' cant for equipment.
The overall findings of the EDSFI were g erally positive, reflecting good maintenance, testing, a equipment material condition.
However, several items of oncern were noted.
Examples included the failure to prop rly maintain the cathodic protection system to provide the int nded protection for the emergency diesel generator (EDG) u erground fuel oil tanks and piping, and overcurrent trip test' g not being performed on important molded case circuit br akers used as feeders for the 125 VDC load center buses.
Prompt orrective action included inspection of the EDG undergro nd piping and replacement of the i
molded case circuit breakers uring the subsequent refueling outage.
1 Several deficiencies were noted this period in the area of procedural adequacy and, rocedural compliance.
Examples included:
i (1) Two procedural defitiencies were identified for the integrated i
safeguards test.
(2) rocedural instructions were not followed during the change ou of the main lube oil duplex strainer -
elements for an EDG (3) A mispositioned switch was identified on a local control p el for the containment hydrogen analyzer even.
though the appli ble test procedure provided three opportunities I
to ensure the s tch was correctly positioned.
An additional area of relative weakness impacting maintenance and surveillanc was plant labeling.
Inconsistency between equipment designatio in procedures and labeling of equipment in the field led to pe sonnel errors this period. An example of this involved a missed S surveillance requirement for testing the local manual i
shunt t ip for the reactor trip bypass. breakers. A problem was also i entificd with inconsistent labeling between switches on the loca)iatedwiththeseswitches.EDG control panels and the field labeling of the e ass c This contributed to an air start re eiver being overpressurized during a maintenance activity due t confusion over the correct position for a switch. Additionally t was noted that plant personnel have occasionally " penciled in" corrections on, or adjacent to, the permanent plant label.
Q During this assessment period there was one reactor trip due to
[4 maintenance activities.
The maintenance activity involved jy replacement of the high voltage power supply for one of the nuclear instruments.
I&C technicians incorrectly assumed a
$g capacitor in the nuclear instrument drawer was isolated by removing fuses in the front of the drawer.
When the capacitor was y%
discharged a spike occurred which resulted in a reactor trip. The technical manual for the nuclear instrumentation provided instructions for power supply replacement which would have prevented this trip.
The technical manual was not referenced in
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9 this procedure. Management oversight and pr job briefings improved. As a result, I&C maintenance ac vities showed substantial improvement.
Subsequently, s eral maintenance activities in the 7300 series process ra ks were identified as strengths.
The licensee continued in developing Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) program.
The ana ysis of 55 systems was completed. The RCM program will e compass approximately 90 systems upon completion.
The surveillance test schedul'ng was performed well with the-exception of two missed TS s rveillances. One case involved a-computer malfunction which esulted in a missed surveillance for axial flux difference. Tp other case involved a missed explosive gas sample due to person el error.
Overall implementation of surveillance activities was good.
Efforts by the test gfoup to provide consistency for testing methodology and datp review have resulted in a strong surveillance program. Test equfpment used for surveillances were within their calibration due d tes and appropriate for the task.
An exception to this involve a strip chart recorder with a non-isolated input amplifier whic was connected to a pressurizer level channel during an acc ulator check valve test.
The strip chart recorder developed an internal ground, and due to it being non-isolated, a ground loop feedback into the pressurizer level circuitry was introduce.
This ground loop feedback resulted in false indicati of pressurizer level, which resulted in a RCS drain down fa her than planned for the surveillance test procedure (STP).
Partial voiding in the reactor vessel head resulted from the e cessive drain down.
Thr e violations were cited in the Maintenance / Surveillance area i
d ing the assessment period.
2.
Performance Ratina
+
Category:
1 (Declining)
Board Recommendations Q
Management attention should focus on the negative trend indicated
@dy by several reactor trips, forced outages,' and the partial draining of the reactor vessel all of which were related to maintenance or surveillance activities, or other equipment performance issues.
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15 following a modification to the service water sy tem was not identified.
(3) Cathodic protection against c rosion of underground diesel fuel oil tanks and piping as not provided, lhcre were several other problems identifi which were due to untimely or deficient engineering actions The most significant of these was associated with the license s failure to correct the acceptance criteria for Motor Driven Em rgency Feedwater (MDEFW) pump discharge pressure, despite long-tanding information that the criteria was non-conservative.
The licensee's efforts to develop program to diagnostically test motor operated valves pursuant to Generic Letter (GL) 89-10 continued this assessment perio.
NRC review of the program during this assessment period > rified a satisf actory initial program with knowledgeable en ineers and a good training facility.
However, an NRC inspection 1 te in the assessment period revealed examples of inadequate acc tance criteria in Motor Operated Valve (MOV) test procedures, la of Motor Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance (M0 VATS) tr ining for signature analysis of MOV test data, and little progre s since an NRC inspection one year before.
An effective initial icensing training program for licensed operators was demon rated this SALP period by the number of licensee personnel who successfully passed the Generic fundamentals exa. nation (GFES) and initial licensing examination.
The GFES was ad, nistered to twelve candidates and 92 percent of the candidates assed.
The average score on the GFES examination was 91 percen.
Initial licensing examinations were administrated to eighteen pplicants and 100 percent of the candidates passed.
The averag score on the initial examination was 88 percent.
The simu ator was used effectively for training. The licensee's simulat r instructors were knowledgeable of the simulator and plant perations. The simulator adequately simulated each scen io event, and no simulator problems were noted.
Se en violations and one deviation were cited during the sessment period.
2.
Performance Ratina Category:
2 Board Recommendations Management attention should be directed towards improving the thoroughness and timeliness of engineering response to issues U/
requiring technical support.
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9 L
f 5
ENCLOSURE 2 FINAL SALP REPORT U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 4
REGION 11 SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE INSPECTION REPORT NUMBER 50-395/93-07
[
SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY-VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION SEPTEMBER I, 1991 THROUGH FEBRUARY 27, 1993 4
i m..
t TABLE OF CONTENTS t
PAGE i
I.
INTRODUCTION.........................................
1 II.
SUMMARY
OF RESULTS...................................
2 III.
CRITERIA.............................................
2 IV.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS.................................
3 A.
Plant Operations...............................
3 8.
Rad i ol og i cal Control s..........................
5 C.
Maintenance /Surveill ance.......................
7 D.
Emergency Preparedness.........................
9 E.
3ecurity.......................................
12 F.
Engineering / Technical Support..................
13 G.
Safety Assessment / Quality Verification.........
15 V.
SUPPORTING DATA AND SUMMARIES........................
18 A.
Licensee Activities............................
18 B.
Direct Inspection and Review Activities........
18 C.
Escal ated Enforcement Action...................
18 D.
Management Conferences.........................
18 E.
Confi rmhtion of Action Letters.................
19 i
F.
Reactor Trips..................................
19 G.
Review of Licensee Event Reports...............
19 H.
Licensing Activities...........................
20 I.
Enforcement Activity...........................
20 i
k
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I.
INTRODUCTION The Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) program is an integrated NRC staff effort to collect available observations and data on a periodic basis and to evaluate licensee performance on the basis of this information. Tiie program is supplemental to normal regulatory processes used to ensure compliance with NRC rules and regulations.
It is intended to be sufficiently diagnostic to provide a rational basis for allocation of NRC resources and to provide meaningful feedback to licensee management regarding the NRC's assessment of their performance in each functional area.
An NRC SALP Board, composed of the staff members listed below, met on April 14, 1993, to review the observations and data on performance and to assess licensee performance in accordance with Manual Chapter NRC-0516,
" Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance." The Board's findings and recommendations were forwarded to the NRC Regional Administrator for approval and issuance.
This report is the NRC's assessment of the licensee's safety performance at the Virgil C. Summer facility, for the period September 1, 1991, through February 27, 1993.
The SALP Board for V.C. Summer was composed of:
J. P. Stohr, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards, Region II.(RII), Chairperson J. R. Johnson, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP), RII A. F. Gibson, Director, Division of Reactor Safety, RII D. M. Verrelli, Chief, Reactcr Projects Branch 1, DRP, RII R. C. Haag, Senior Resident Inspector, V.C. Summer, DRP, RII G. C. Lainas, Assistant Director for Region 11 Reactors, Office of i
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
G. F. Wunder, Project Manager, Project Directorate II-1, NRR Attendees at SALP Board meeting:
F. S. Cantrell, Chief, Reactor Projects Section IB, DRP, RII L. A. Keller, Resident Inspector, V.C. Summer, DRP, RII R. W. Wright, Project Engineer, Project Section IB, DRP, RII J. A. Mitchell, Acting Director, Project Directorate II-1, NRR E
2 II.
SUMMARY
OF RESULTS During the assessment period, V.C. Summer was operated in an overall safe manner. The performance of V.C. Summer was assessed as being superior in the functional areas of Plant Operations, Radiological Controls, Maintenance / Surveillance, Security, and Safety Assessment / Quality Verification.
Both Emergency Preparedness and Engineering / Technical Support received successive good ratings with Emergency Preparedness performance demonstrating an improving trend.
Engineering / Technical Support.
attention should be focused on the thoroughness and timeliness of corrective actions.
The number of trips and forced outages related to equipment failures increased this assessment period. These equipment failures, procedural and labeling deficiencies, and the reactor vessel partial draindown incident caused by a surveillance test, contributed to a declining trend in the Maintenance / Surveillance area.
Performance ratings for the last rating period and the current period are shown below.
Last Period This Period Functional Area 5/1/90 - 8/31/91 9/1/91 - 2/27/93 Plant Operations 1
I Radiological Controls 1
1 Maintenance / Surveillance 1
1 Declining Emergency Preparedness 2
2 Improving Security 1
1 Engineering / Technical 2
2 Support Safety Assessment / Quality 1
1 Verification Ill. CRITERIA The evaluation criteria which were used to assess each functional area are described in detail in NRC Manual Chapter 0516, which can be found in the Public Document Room. Therefore, these criteria are not repeated here, but will be presented in detail at the public meeting to be held with licensee management on May 12, 1993.
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3 IV.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS A.
Plant Operations 1.
Anal.ysi s This functional area addresses the control and performance of activities directly related to operating the unit, as well as fire protection.
Plant operations continued to be performed in a safe and conservative manner. The low number of plant transients were the result of effective and careful plant operations. The 1992 yearly unit capacity factor of 96 percent was the highest ever achieved by the plant. There was one reactor trip due to a maintenance activity, and two trips due to equipment failure.
In addition, there were two forced outages.
Management involvement was viewed as a key element in the successful operation of the plant. During outages and shutdowns, management support was noteworthy in minimizing challenges to the plant and promoting safe operations. The management support for the reactor trip and natural circulation flow event was provided by manning the technical support center (TSC) in a manner similar to the structured TSC organization specified by the emergency plan.
Control of this potentially significant event was enhanced in part by management's ability to assess the condition of the plant, and respond appropriately.
Evolutions such as plant shutdowns and start-ups, reduced reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory operations and complex testing also received increased management involvement.
This was provided by management presence on backshifts, prejob briefings and dissemination of expectations to all involved personnel.
Operators continued to demonstrate a high level of performance during both routine plant operations and in response to transients.
Excellent communication skills, which routinely included repeat-backs for message acknowledgement, helped minimize operator errors.
During the reactor trip and natural circulation flow event, the operators took prompt action to verify plant parameters and to maintain the plant in a safe and stable condition.
Similar excellent performance was observed during the loss of one offsite power supply event, and during another event when prompt operator action to correct decreasing deaerated water tank level prevented a reactor trip. Shift turnovers were routinely attended by representatives from support organizations and management personnel.
Effective communication of the plant status and upcoming activities for operators and support groups during the shift turnovers contributed to successful plant operation.
J
4 Operation's staffing levels consistently exceeded the regulatory requirement of seven crew members and routinely exceeded the minimum level of ten established by the licensee. The average crew size was 13 members. Adequate staffing levels were provided for additional r
I operator functions such as fire brigade manning. During the assessment period, 14 operators received their reactor operator's license. This permitted the movement of licensed operators into support groups, i.e., procedure writing, scheduling and training, while still maintaining ample staff on the operating crews.
The addition of two new shift engineers from the training and operations departments increased the knowledge level of shift engineering and allowed the movement of experienced shift engineers to other departments. Shift engineering continued to provide an effective interface between operations and maintenance while satisfying the requirement for the shift technical advisor position.
Configuration control problems identified during the previous SALP period did not recur in this SALP period with the exception of a few isolated examples associated with a lack of attention to detail.
Examples included hanging a Danger Tag on the wrong valve during an emergency diesel generator tagout, opening a containment isolation valve when a technical specification (TS) action statement required the valve to remain closed, and an incorrect line up of an emergency diesel generator airstart system that resulted in overpressurization of an air receiver tank.
While the individual significance of each instance was relatively minor, the number indicates this is an area where there is still room for improvement. The licensee's i
corrective actions effectively addressed each separate event.
Corrective actions appeared to be appropriate.
The fire protection program was considered a strength in terms of programmatic controls and implementation of program requirements.
The inspection of fire barriers was effective in routinely identifying degraded barriers that were promptly resolved.
Fire drills were performed well with the drill critiques effective in identifying improvement areas. The position of fire protection officer provided the overall coordination for implementing the fire protection program and was a key element of the program's success.
One cited violation was identified during the assessment period.
2.
Performance Ratina Category:
1 3.
Board Recommendations None.
l I
5 B.
Radiolooical Controls 1.
Analysis This functional area addresses those activities related to radiation safety, radiological effluent control and monitoring, and primary / secondary chemistry control.
Overall, the radiation protection program continued to effectively control personnel exposure to radioactive materials and protect the health and safety of plant personnel and the public.
Management involvement in radiation protection was observed to be strong. This was evidenced by appropriate staffing levels with experienced radiation protection personnel, a strong ALARA awareness program, and management support for proactive dose reduction initiatives and goals. The combination of Health Physics and Radiological Wastes under a single Manager resulted in more effective overall management. The licensee had an effective audit program and acted with responsive and timely corrective actions to audit findings.
The training program for the health physics staff, including radwaste and transportation training, continued to be effective this SALP period. Also during this SALP period, the licensee implemented appropriate procedural revisions to ensure that a formal training and retraining program for the Chemistry and Health Physics non-licensed unit staff was established and documented. The effective implementation of this training program corrected a weakness which was identified during the previous period with the licensee's program for training non-licensed staff.
The external and internal dosimetry programs and the respiratory protection program were well implemented. One relative weakness was identified regarding several examples a lack of timely follow-up in assessing internal exposures. The safety significance of the internal exposures was minimal, and the licensee implemented procedural revisions which improved guidance regarding making timely assessments. As part of the effort to prepare for the reduced individual exposure limits of the revised 10 CFR Part 20, the licensee has procured face shields (to be used in lieu of respirators), shielding packages, and remote video cameras. The licensee plans to use these during certain high dose outage job evolutions in an effort to reduce external exposures.
Efforts in ALARA during both routine operations and a refueling outage were strong. Successful efforts during this assessment period included: implementation of a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) fine mesh filter program, which resulted in an estimated 25 percent decrease in cobalt activity in the RCS; a permanent reactor vessel head shield; an electronic dosimetry system; and surrogate video
6 tour urits. The licensee's collective dose during this assessment period was approximately 316 person-rem with approximately 285 person-rem accumulated during the outage. The collective dose appeared to be appropriate for the scope of work performed.
Collective dose in the previous assessment period, which did not include a refueling outage, was 89 person-rem.
Licensee performance in contamination control continued to be excellent.
Less than one percent, approximately 746 fta, of the 2
total of over 133,000 ft of radiologically controlled area was controlled as contaminated. Additionally, the number of personnel contamination events (PCEs) decreased from 122 during the previous e
assessment period to 98 this period.
The licensee's program to monitor and quantify radioactive effluents was good. There were no unplanned or abnormal releases during this SALP period. The calibration and maintenance of monitors was performed as required by the Technical Specifications (TSs). The Radiation Monitoring System was adequately maintained. One problem in this area involved two instances of failure to set the alarm and trip setpoints for the Turbine Building Sump radiation monitor in accordance with the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (0DCM).
Although the alarm and setpoints were higher than allowed by ODCM methodology, neither release limits nor regulatory exposure limits were exceeded during these two liquid effluent releases. The licensee successfully analyzed both the beta emitter radioisotope samples as well as all gamma nuclides provided to the facility by Region II as part of the NRC's Confirmatory Measurements Program.
The licensee's program for monitoring primary and secondary chemistry was good.
Primary chemistry parameters covered by TSs were maintained within specified limits.
Secondary and other non-TS primary chemistry parameters were generally maintained within the licensee's administrative limits.
In those few cases where the latter parameters were exceeded, prompt corrective actions were taken to return them to acceptable levels.
The radiological environmental monitoring program was completed in a-thorough manner. For this period, environmental results showed that there were negligible radiological exposures attributable to the operation of VC Summer due to airborne, waterborne, aquatic, ingestion, or direct exposure pathways. There were no exposure limits exceeded.
j No cited violations were identified during the assessment period.
2.
Performance Ratina
]
Category:
1
l 7
l 3.
Board Recommendations None.
i C.
Maintenance / Surveillance 1.
Analysis This functional area addresses those activities related to equipment condition, maintenance, surveillance performance, and equipment testing.
In addition to the routine inspections in this area, an Electrical Distribution System Functional Inspection (EDSFI) was conducted during this assessment period.
The plant maintained a high capacity factor and safety system availability due in part to effective maintenance and testing.
Diagnostic programs such as lube oil analysis, vibration monitoring, and thermography were considered strengths and contributed to the successful operation of the plant. The overall material condition of the plant continued to be a strength. However, there was one reactor trip due to a maintenance activity, and two trips and two forced outages due to equipment failure during this assessment period. This was a decline in this area of performance from the previous assessment period which had no reactor trips or forced outages due to maintenance activities or equipment problems.
Licensee management was actively involved in the maintenance process. Management was frequently in the plant and provided i
oversight during key maintenance and testing activities. The maintenance organization was adequately staffed and trained to support plant operations.
The licensee was appropriately sensitive to the risks associated with maintenance and surveillance activities. The prioritization and scheduling of maintenance activities reflected the safety significance of the item. The licensee consistently held prejob briefings prior to infrequently performed surveillances or complex tasks. These briefings were attendM by a management representative l
who ensured the participants understcod their duties and emphasized the safety implications of the task.
These briefings were considered a strength and contributed to the low number of inadvertent safety system actuations associated with maintenance and testing.
The licensee consistently used the correct parts and tools for maintenance.
The lubrication program was effective in providing the correct lubricant for equipment.
The overall findings of the EDSFI were generally positive, reflecting good maintenance, testing, and equipment material condition.
However, several items of concern were noted.
Examples included the failure to properly maintain the cathodic protection system to provide the intended protection for the amergency diesel generator (EDG) undergrcund fuel oil tanks and piping, and L
8 overcurrent trip testing not ' eing performed on important molded o
case circuit breakers used as feeders for the 125 VDC load center buses.
Prompt corrective action included the subsequent testing of all fourteen breakers with no failures identified. The EDG underground piping inspections and the replacement of the molded case circuit breakers were performed during the subsequent refueling outage.
Several deficiencies were noted this period in the area of procedural adequacy and procedural compliance.
Examples included:
(1) Two procedural deficiencies were identified for the integrated safeguards test.
(2) Procedural instructions were. not followed during the change out of the main lube oil duplex strainer elements for an EDG.
(3) A mispositioned switch was identified on a local control panel for the containment hydrogen analyzer even though the applicable test procedure provided three opportunities to ensure the switch was correctly positioned.
An additional area of relative weakness impacting maintenance and surveillance was plant labeling.
Inconsistency between equipment designations in procedures and labeling of equipment in the field led to personnel errors this period. An example of this involved a missed TS surveillance requirement for testing the local manual shunt trip for the reactor trip bypass breakers. A problem was also
)
identified with inconsistent labeling between switches on the local i
EDG control panels and the field labeling of the equipment associated with these switches. This contributed to an air start receiver being overpressurized during a maintenance activity due to confusion over the correct position for a switch. Additionally it was noted that plant personnel have occasionally " penciled in" corrections on, or adjacent to, the permanent plant label.
During this assessment period there was one reactor trip due to maintenance activities.
The maintenance activity involved replacement of the high voltage power supply for one of the nuclear instruments.
I&C technicians incorrectly assumed a capacitor in the nuclear instrument drawer was isolated by removing fuses in the front of the drawer. When the capacitor was discharged a spike occurred which resulted in a reactor trip. The technical manual for the nuclear instrumentation provided instructions for power supply replacement which would have prevented this trip. The technical manual was not referenced in this procedure. Management oversight and prejob briefings improved. As a result, I&C maintenance activities showed substantial improvement.
Subsequently, several maintenance activities in the 7300 series process racks were identified as strengths.
The licensee continued in developing a Reliability Centered i
Maintenance (RCM) program. The analysis of 55 systems was completed. The RCH program will encompass approximately 90 systems Upon completion.
j i
t i
9 The surveillance test scheduling was performed well with the exception of two missed TS surveillances. One case involved a computer malfunction which resulted in a missed surveillance for axial flux difference. The other case involved a missed explosive gas sample due to personnel error.
Overall implementation of surveillance activities was good.
Efforts by the test group to provide consistency for testing methodology and data review have resulted in a strong surveillance program, Test equipment used for surveillances were within their calibration due dates and appropriate for the task. An exception to this involved a strip chart recorder with a non-isolated input amplifier which was connected to a pressurizer level channel during an accumulator check valve test. The strip chart recorder developed an internal ground, and due to it being non-isolated, a ground loop feedback into the pressurizer level circuitry was introduced. This ground loop feedback resulted in false indication of pressurizer level, which resulted in a RCS drain down farther than planned for the surveillance test procedure (STP).
Partial voiding in the reactor vessel head resulted from the excessive drain down.
Three violations were cited in the Maintenance / Surveillance area during the assessment period.
2.
Performance Ratina Category:
1 (Declining) 3.
Board Recommendations Management attention should focus on the negative trend indicated by several reactor trips, forced outages, and the partial draining of the reactor vessel all of which were related to maintenance or surveillance activities, or other equipment performance issues.
D.
Analysis This functional area addresses activities related to the implementation of the Emergency Plan and procedures, training of I
onsite and offsite emergency response organizations, licensee performance during emergency exercises, maintenance of facilities, and staffing, The Emergency Preparedness (EP) program continued to receive 1
adequate management support to ensure a state of readiness for responding to emergencies. Specifically, the licensee took actions to improve training for the Control Room staff via quarterly i
simulator drills. The licensee's Emergency Preparedness and Operations staff evaluated the drills in the areas of plant
]
operations, event classification, notification, and completeness of 1
'1
10 notification forms. Also, management's involvement in the installation and modification of the Early Warning Siren System (EWSS) was successful in resolving previous problems associated with spurious activations.
The emergency resporne facilities (ERFs) and equipment, were generaly maintained in good condition and in a state of readiness.
However, equipment maintenance problems were identified with air sampling equipment. Two portable air samplers assigned to offsite monitoring team kits exceeded the calibration frequency due dates.
Also, the adequacy of acceptance criteria for audibility testing of the plant alarm system was a concern. The weekly alarm (fire, evacuation, and radiation) audibility tests were considered acceptable based solely on alarm audibility within the Control Room.
Other plant locations, particularly high-noise areas, were not checked for audibility.
Modifications were made to the emergency planning zone (EPZ) warning system to resolve previous operability problems. The annual operability for 1991 was 88.9%.
Following the system upgrade, which included a computer controlled activation and polling system for monitoring each siren status, the operability increased to 96.3%
for 1992.
The licensee's performance during an off-hours annual exercise and a backup Emergency Operations Facility (BE0F) drill, demonstrated that staffing was adequate for responding to simulated emergencies. With one exception, the facilities were activated in a timely manner.
The one exception involved approximately 13 minutes in excess of the stated goal for activation of the BE0F.
In response to problems identified during the previous SALP period, improvements were made in the emergency preparedness training area to prevent personnel with expired training from being assigned to the emergency response organization (ER0). A computer based tracking system combined with a manual system was effectively implemented for tracking ERO training to ensure that personnel training was current. Other training enhancements included a job task analysis of key EOF positions and performance of drills or exercises in excess of those required by the Emergency Plan.
Training for Emergency Communicators however was not adequate during this period. As part of the NRC's exercise inspection activities, interviews were conducted with individuals designated as Emergency Communicators regarding ERO pager activation during off-hours.
Interviewees provided incorrect or incomplete information. As a further indication of inadequate training, during the exercise (discussed below) additional Communicator problems were noted.
The licensee's performance during the annual exercise, an NRC observed simulator drill, and interviews with response personnel, demonstrated the overall capability of implementing the Emergency
l 11 Plan and other procedures that provide for the health and safety of the public during a radiological emergency. The emergency 1
classification procedures were effectively used to promptly and correctly classify the scenario accident. The licensee's protective action recommendations (PARS) were in accordance with procedural requirements and were provided to offsite authorities in a timely manner.
During the exercise two aspects of communication problems resulted in exercise weaknesses. One weakness resulted when the Control Room Communicator failed to provide correct information to offsite authorities, during the initial follow-up message, regarding the incident status and plant conditions and inadequate information was provided regarding the location and status of a simulated accident victim requiring offsite medical support. A second weakness resulted from intra-plant communications performance. Key accident assessment personnel in the Technical Support Center (TSC) delayed the flow of information between the TSC and the Emergengy Operations Center (E0F) regarding conditions for incident upgrade.
Consequently, the delay resulted in the event upgrade from an Alert to a Site Area Emergency approximately 16 minutes after the emergency action level was met.
The engineering accident assessment team functioned effectively in analyzing the plant status. Good recommendations regarding mitigating actions to reduce damage to plant equipment, to prevent release of radioactive material, and to terminate the emergency condition, were provided.
During the assessment period, the licensee initiated a self assessment program that was analytical and objective, and served as an enhancement to the independent audit performed by the Quality Assurance Group. The licensee's interface with the offsite authorities in the areas of training, and Emergency Plan changes were considered a program strength. The licensee submitted one proposed change requesting review and approval by NRC prior to implementation, and two Emergency Plan Revisions. The revisions were deemed acceptable and were submitted in a timely manner.
Two exercise weaknesses and no cited violations were identified during the assessment period.
2.
Performance Ratina Category: 2 (Improving) 3.
Board Recommendations None.
12 E.
Security 1.
Analysis This functional area addresses those security activities related to protection provided for the station's vital systems and equipment, special nuclear material, and the Fitness for Duty Program.
During the assessment period, the licensee implemented and managed an effective security program.
Strong security support by management was evident, in part, by many program improvements implemented since the last assessment.
Examples of these improvements included enhanced assessment capabilities and improved access control and perimeter detection equipment.
The licensee upgraded their protected area perimeter microwave detection equipment. This improved the effectiveness and efficiency of the security personnel by eliminating most of the nuisance and i
false alarms initiated by the older equipment. The installation of this equipment and the continued excellent testing and maintenance support provided by the Security Maintenance Section has resulted in improving the equipment availability time. The security equipment events have also been greatly reduced for the same reason.
The licensee effectively staffed, equipped, and trained the security force for their assigned duties.
The licensee's security training staff was dedicated and knowledgeable. The security tactical response team recently placed 5th out of 29 participates in a national competition evaluating marksmanship. The security force had a low turn-over rate during this period helping to maintain a well qualified staff.
Other areas of the licensee's security program were enhanced during this period.
For example, the licensee replaced the vacuum tube closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras with. solid state color cameras and installed 21" color monitors in the alarm stations. The primary and alternate access portals were reconfigured to enhance control of packages, personnel and vehicles entering the protected area. Upgrading the x-ray equipment with larger off-the-shelf monitors greatly enhanced the detection capabilities'of this equipment. Additionally, improved metal detectors were installed.
These enhancements of the protected area detection system, access control detection equipment and the alarm stations' assessment capabilities typified management's efforts to provide a strong security program.
Capable and knowledgeable personnel operated the security equipment associated with the alarm stations.
The licensee's audits of the security program were thorough and productive.
b 13 Non-reportable safeguards logged events were reduced by approximately 50% over the last assessment period, indicating improved performance.
The licensee's three Physical Security, and two Training and Qualification Plan revisions submitted during this period were consistent with 10 CFR 50.54(p), and were timely and adequately coordinated with the NRC.
No cited violations were identified during the assessment period.
2.
Performance Ratina Category:
1 3.
Board Recommendations None.
F.
Enaineerina/ Technical Support 1.
Analysis This functional area addresses activities associated with the design of plant modifications, and technical support for operations, outages, maintenance, and licensed operator training.
The licensee's performance in providing engineering and technical support was satisfactory during this assessment period.
Engineering management was actively involved in the day-to-day resolution of technical problems. Aggressive engineering involvement in major issues continued.
Examples included the resolution of emergency core cooling system (ECCS) flow balancing problems, steam generator replacement planning, and a strong 50.59 program.. Diagnostic programs such as lube oil analysis, vibration analysis, and thermography were identified as strengths and contributed to the successful operation of the plant.
System engineers' knowledge level and ownership of their systems improved during the assessment period. However, during the period some problems occurred due to lack of timely and thorough engineering evaluations.
Engineering efforts to maintain control of the design of the plant were generally good. The licensee has taken an initiative to implement a Design Basis Documents (DBD) program.
Inspections in the area of electrical design revealed that the electrical distribution system had the capacity to perform its intended safety functions and that associated engir.eering and technical support were adequate for this system.
Examples of strengths in this area included the availability of a computer program to analyze the DC system, a generally good fuse control program, good monitoring of fuel oil quality, and knowledgeable engineering personnel.
Examples of NRC identified concerns in this area included (1) deficiencies in
~
14 the control of drawings, design calculations, and databases; and (2) undersized thermal overload protection for safety-related motors.
The licensee has initiated corrective actions in these areas.
Engineering resolution of emergency core cooling system flow problems identified by Westinghouse was thorough in addressing the issues, and the system was tested to verify that the desired results were achieved.
Engineering support for this issue was thorough and effective.
The licensee's 10 CFR 50.59 programmatic activities were reviewed during this assessment period and found to be a strength.
Formal procedures were established and were found to be adequate to ensure compliance with 10 CFR 50.59. No programmatic weaknesses were identified and the associated qualification / training programs were identified as strengths.
Strong engineering and management support of refueling outage activities was demonstrated during this assessment period. Outage activities were well planned and completed with few associated problems.
Problems encountered during the outage were dealt with effectively by engineering. An example of good engineering support during the outage was the modification of a circuit card in one of the load sequencers, to eliminate spurious transients due to circuit noise.
A particular area of concern during this assessment period was_the thoroughness and timeliness of corrective actions by engineering and technical support groups. Examples here included: (1) The resolution of repeated emergency diesel generator warning lights failures was not performed in a timely manner and resulted in an inoperable EDG.
(2) The full scope of a required hydrostatic test following a modification to the service water system was not identified.
(3) Adequate cathodic protection against corrosion of underground diesel fuel oil tanks and piping was not provided.
There were several other problems identified which were due to untimely or deficient engineering actions. The most significant of these was associated with the licensee's failure to correct the acceptance criteria for Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater (MDEFW) pump discharge pressure, despite long-standing information that the criteria was non-conservative.
The licensee's efforts to develop a program to diagnostically test motor operated valves pursuant to Generic letter (GL) 89-10 continued this assessment period. NRC review of the program during this assessment period verified a satisfactory initial program with knowledgeable engineers and a good training facility. However, an NRC inspection late in the assessment period revealed examples of inadequate acceptance criteria in Motor Operated Valve (!!0V) test procedures, lack of Motor Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance
15 t
(M0 VATS) training for signature analysis of MOV test data, and little progress since an NRC inspection one year before.
An effective initial licensing training program for licensed operators vias demonstrated this SALP period by the number of licensee personnel who successfully passed the Generic Fundamentals examination (GFES) and initial licensing examination. The GFES was administered to twelve candidates and 92 percent of the candidates passed. The average score on the GFES examination was 91 percent.
Initial licensing examinations were administrated to eighteen applicants and 100 percent of the candidates passed. The average score on the initial examination was 88 percent.
The simulator was used effectively for training. The licensee's simulator instructors were knowledgeable of the simulator and plant operations. The simulator adequately simulated each scenario event, and no simulator problems were noted.
Seven violations and one deviation were cited during the assessment period.
2.
Performance Ratina Category:
2 3.
Board Recommendations l
Management attention should be directed towards improving the thoroughness and timeliness of engineering response to issues requiring technical support.
G.
Safety Assessment /0uality Verification 1.
Analysis This functional area addresses those activities related to licensee implementation of safety policies related to license amendments, exemptions and relief requests; responses to Generic Letters, Bulletins and Information Notices; resolution of safety issues; reviews of plant modifications performed under 10 CFR 50.59; safety committee activities; and the use of feedback from self-assessment programs and activities.
A conservative approach to the resolution of problems and to the daily operation of the plant was demonstrated. Management was actively involved in promoting this conservative approach for both safety issues and items that were outside the scope of regulatory requirements.
Examples of conservative judgement were the rescheduling of a motor operated valve dynamic flow test due to questionable test pressure data, and the precautions taken for troubleshooting a secondary plant protective circuit which had the potential to initiate a turbine trip.
16 At management's direction two programs were initiated during this assessment period to provide improvements to plant safety and operations. These included a plant walkdown inspection program headed by duty shift engineers. The walkdown inspections covered the six major plant buildings and were performed on a weekly rotating basis. Additionally, a management observation program was initiated to directly involve management / supervisors with field activities. This program allowed managers the opportunity to observe and evaluate activities of nersonnel from different disciplines. Approximately 250 ob.vations were performed.
Management also placed additional emphasis on prejob briefings and use of the simulator for practicing infrequently performed activities.
Several organizational changes were made during this assessment period for groups that directly impact this functional area.
Technical Oversight, which was comprised of the Independent Safety Engineering Group (ISEG) and Operating Experience, was disbanded.
The Operating Experience group was merged with the licensing organization, and ISEG was placed in the Quality Systems organization along with Quality Assurance (QA) and Quality Control (QC). These groups maintained the effectiveness of their technical oversight during this organizational change.
ISEG activities included an updated system review for the service water system, and outage schedule safety reviews.
In the outage schedule reviews, shutdown safety issues such as available power supplies and flowpaths for injecting water into the RCS were the major areas of focus.
The licensee's 10 CFR 50.59 programmatic activities were reviewed during this assessment period and found to be a strength.
Formal procedures were established and were found to be adequate to ensure compliance with 10 CFR 50.59. No programmatic weaknesses were identified and the associated qualification / training programs were identified as strengths.
The Plant Safety Review Committee and the Nuclear Safety Review Committee continued to review and audit prescribed activities.
In observed committee meetings, the active participation of members during discussions indicated that members had adequately reviewed the agenda items prior to the meetings and were prepared to discuss and review issues at hand.
QC personnel generally provided valuable oversight for safety-related activities. A strength was identified with QC involvement in resolution of a circuit breaker deficiency. However, two examples were noted with QC involvement which involved questionable signoff practices. During a maintenance activity, it was noted that individual signoffs required for the reinstallation and second verification of lifted electrical leads had not been made when the
e 17 work was complete. This practice had not been questioned by the QC inspector that observed the work. The second example involved signoffs being made prior to the work actually being completed during a safety-related circuit breaker maintenance activity. The QC inspector overseeing this activity also completed the signoffs prior to the work being completed.
For both examples licensee management indicated that their expectations were not being met regarding signoffs, and the importance 'of strict procedural compliance regarding signoffs was re-emphasized to station personnel.
The amendment requests received from the licensee during this evaluation period were good.
Requests were, in general, adequately supported by analyses which required little or no additional information in order to complete the technical review.
The licensee's high degree of involvement in performing safety analyses and their oversight of contractor personnel were noted as strengths.
Significant licensing actions that required SCE&G to coordinate their own resources and those of a contractor included a request to use leak-before-break, a request to increase the steam generator tube plugging limit to 18%, and a request to use interim plugging criteria.
The quality of amendment requests improved since the last rating period.
Although in general the quality of relief requests improved, some problems were noted. One relief request regarding the inspection of reactor vessel nozzles contained statements that were not adequately supported, and significant additional information was necessary.
The licensee's written responses to Generic Letters and Bullentins were timely and complete. An exception to the licensee's aggressive pursuit of generic issues was noted in their response to Supplement 4 to Generic Letter 88-20 for which the licensee had not made sufficient efforts to meet the schedule suggested by the Generic Letter and its supplements.
The LER's received during this rating period were clear and accurate.
The licensee responded well to headquarters inquiries into the plant trip caused by the loss of the unit auxiliary transformer.
No cited violations were identified during the assessment period.
2.
Performance Ratina Category:
1 3.
Board Recommendations None.
18 i
V.
SUPPORTING DATA AND SUMMARIES A.
Licensee Activities During March 1992, several management changes occurred.
These changes included: Mr. G. J. Taylor, previous Operations Manager, assumed the position of General Manager Nuclear Plant Operations.
Mr. B. C. Williams, previous Manager of Outage Planning, assumed the position of Operations Manager. Mr. D. A. Lavigne, previous Manager of Materials and Procurement, was assigned as General Manager of Nuclear Safety. On July 18, 1992, Mr. R. M. Fowlkes, previous Associate Manager of Shift Engineering, assumed the position Manager of Licensing.
Early in the assessment period, the plant completed a scheduled refueling outage. The duration of the outage was 60 days. Major activities performed during this outage included: electrical invertor replacements, steam generator inspections / plugging /
sleeving, M0V actuator refurbishments, and low pressure turbine inspections / repairs. On May 12, 1992, the unit was shutdown to repair a steam generator secondary manway leak. Subsequently, the plant operated at or near full power until January 12, 1993, when a reactor trip occurred due to a main generator load rejection.
Power to the Balance of Plant (B0P) was lost for approximately two hours 4
which resulted in natural circulation flow for the RCS during this time period.
B.
Direct Inspection and Review Activities In addition to the 34 routine NRC inspections performed at Summer, 2 special inspections were conducted as follows:
January 27-31, 1992 Motor Operated Valve inspection.
March 2-April 3, 1992 Electrical Distribution System Functional Inspection (EDSFI)
C.
Escalated Enforcement Action 1.
Orders None 2.
Civil Penalties (CP)
None D.
Significant Management Conferences Held During The Appraisal Period 11/14/91 Summer Site - Meeting to present SALP results.
19 1/9/92 NRC Headquarters Office - Steam Generator replacement project presentation and discussion.
2/7/92 NRC Headquarters Office - Meeting between NRC Chairman and licensee management to discuss plant status and industry issues.
1/11/93 NRC Headquarters Office - Discussion of proposed safety injection pump run-out test to determine acceptability of increasing the run-out limit by 10 percent.
E.
Confirmation of Action Letters None.
F.
Reactor Trips Three automatic trips and no manual trips occurred:
May 20, 1992: Automatic reactor scram from 3 percent power due to personnel error while repairing the power range instrumentation.
May 21, 1992: Automatic reactor scram from 12 percent power caused by low steam generator level due to closure of a feedwater isolation valve.
January 12, 1993: Automatic reactor trip due to a main generator load rejection which resulted in a high flux rate trip signal.
G.
Review of Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
During the assessment period, 12 LERs were analyzed. The distribution of these events by cause, as determined by the NRC staff, was as follows:
Cause Total Component Failure 4
Design 2
Construction / Fabrication Installation Personnel
-Operating Activity 3
-Maintenance Activity 1
-Testing / Calibration Activity
-Procedure 1
-Other 1
Total 12
20 Notes:
1.
With regard to the area of personnel, the NRC considers lack of procedures, inadequate procedures, and erroneous procedures to be classified as personnel error.
2.
The above information was derived from a review of LERs performed by the NRC staff and may not completely coincide with the licensee's cause assignments.
H.
Licensing Activities In addition to quality assurance and security plan submittals, there were approximately 11 licensing actions issued during the assessment period for V.C. Summer.
During this assessment period there were 7 relief requests granted and no requests denied.
I.
Enforcement Activity FUNCTIONAL NO. OF VIOLATIONS IN SEVERITY LEVEL AREA' DEV.
V IV III II I
UNIT 1
- Plant Operations 1
- Radiological Controls
- Main / Surveillance 3
- Emergency Preparedness-
- Security
- Engineering / Technical 1
7
- Safety Assessment /
Quality Verification TOTAL 1
11
)
'I f
ENCLOSURE 3 MEETING
SUMMARY
j I.
A meeting was held on May 12, 1993 at the V..C.
Summer. Nuclear Station to discuss the facility SALP Report.
II.
Licensee Attendees L. M. Gressette SCANA Chairman / President & CEO B. D. Kenyon SCE&G President & CEO J. L. Skolds Vice President, Nuclear Operations K. W. Nettles General Manager, Station Support G. J. Taylor General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations M. D. Quinton General Manager, Engineering Services D. A. Lavigne General Manager, Nuclear Safety W. B. Timmerman Senior Vice President, CF0 & Controller of SCARA Corporation-III. South Carolina Public Service Authority Attendees 3
A. C. Gossett Chairman, Nuclear Oversight Committee R. J. White Nuclear Coordinator IV.
Local Government Officals Attendees T. P. Barber Newberry County Disaster Preparedness R. Duggleby SC Emergency Preparedness Division D. Owens SC Emergency Preparedness Division' H. G. Shealy SC Dept. of Health &'Evironmental Control N. W. Ellis Lexington County Emergency Prepar.edness M. S. Kirkland Fairfield County Disaster Preparedness' i
C. S. Bell Fairfield Co. Public Information Officer-i W. Frick Fairfield County Administrator i
B. Reavis Richland County Emergency. Preparedness J
S. Threatt Dept. of Health & Evironmental Control' V.
NRC Attendees S. D. Ebneter Regional Administrator, Region II (RII)
J. P. Stohr Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards, RII, Chairperson K. M. Clark Senior Public Affairs Officer, RII F. S. Cantrell Chief, Reactor Projects Section IB, Divison of. Reactor Projects (DRP), RII L. A. Keller Resident Inspector, V. C. Summer, DRP, RII G. C. Lainas Assistant Director for,RII Reactors, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRR G. F. Wunder Project Manager, V. C. Summer, NRR i
)
h ENCLOSURE 4 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
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x SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE (SALP)
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V. C. SUMMER SALP BOARD MEETING (MAY 12,1993)
i.
SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY-SALP CYCLEL10 SEPTEMBER 1,1991 THROUGH FEBRUARY 27,1993
' f V. C. SUMMER NUCLEAR POWER PLANT MAY 12,.1993 I
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- l SAJ PROG 9AM OBJEC' VES
- 1. IDENTIFY TRENDS IN LICENSEE PERFORMANCE l
- 2. PROVIDE A BASIS FOR j
ALLOCATION OF 1
NRC RESOURCES
- 3. IMPROVE NRC REGULATORY PROGRAM h
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4 REGION ll ORGANIZATIC'N OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR ADMINISTRATOR S. EBNETER i
DEPUTY L.REYES I
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J DIVIS4CN OF DIVISION OF DIVISION OF.
RADIATION SAFETY i
REACTOR PROJECTS REACTOR SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS DIR. E. MERSCHOFF DIR.
A. GIBSON DIR.
J. STOHR DEPUTY J. JOHNSON DEPUTY J. JAUDON DEPUTY B. MALLETT Ril ORG.CH3
~
DIVISION 0 REACTOR PROJECTS ORGANIZAT ON DIVISION OF REACTOR PROJECTS DIRECTOR E. MERSCHOFF DEPUTY J. JOHNSON REACTOR PROJECTS BR Af1CH f40.1 CHIEF D.VERRELLI i
PROJECTS SECTION PROJECTS SECTION NO.1A NO.2B CHIEF CHIEF H. C HRISTEN SEN F. C ANTRELL BR UNSWIC K FARLEY HARRIS GRAND GULF ROBINSON V. C. SUMMER - SRI R. HAAG ER20RG.CH3
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i NRR ORGANIZATION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR R EG U LATIO N DIRECTOR T. MURLEY ASSOC. DIRECTOR FOR ADVANCED ASSOC. DIRECTOR ASSOC. DIRECTOR FOR PROJECTS FOR INSPECTION AND REACTORS AND J. PARTLOW TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT LICENSE RENEWAL DIVISION OF REACTOR PROJECTS l.11 S VARGA. DIR.1/11 G. LAINAS, ASST, DIR,11 E. ADENS AM, DIR.,11-1 1
G. WUNDER, PROJ. MGR.,
V. C. SUMMER 1
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N H A 09 3 [_ e4 )
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1 PERFORMANCE ' ANALYSIS AREAS FOR OPERATING REACTORS l
A. PLANT OPERATIONS B. RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS C. MAINTENANCE / SURVEILLANCE D. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS E. SECURITY F. ENGINEERING / TECHNICAL SUPPORT G. SAFETY ASSESSMENT / QUALITY VERIFICATION A
AREA PERFORMANCE CATEGORY 1 LICENSEE MANAGEMENT ATTENTION TO AND INVOLVE 4 BENT IN NUCLEAR SAFETY OR SAFEGUARDS ACTIVITIES RESULTED 1
IN A SUPERIOR LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE.
NRC WILL CONSIDER REDUCED LEVELS OF INSPECTION EFFORT.
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AREA PER':ORMANCE j
CATEGORY 2 LICENSEE MANAGEMENT ATTENTION TO AND INVOLVEMENT IN NUCLEAR SAFETY OR SAFEGUARDS ACTIVITIES RESULTED IN A GOOD LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE.
NRC WILL CONSIDER MAINTAINING NORMAL LEVELS OF INSPECTION EFFORT.
4
i AREA PERFORMANCE CATEGORY 3 l
LICENSEE MANAGEMENT ATTENTION TO AND INVOLVEMENT IN NUCLEAR SAFETY OR SAFEGUARDS ACTIVITIES RESULTED j
i IN AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE; HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THE NRC'S CONCERN THAT A DECREASE IN PERFORMANCE MAY APPROACH OR REACH AN UNACCEPTABLE LEVEL, NRC WILL CONSIDER INCREASED l
LEVELS OF INSPECTION EFFORT.
t EVALJA710N CRITERIA )
t
- l
- 1. MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT AND CONTROL IN ASSURING QUALITY
- 2. APPROACH TO IDENTIFICATION AND l
RESOLUTION OF TECHNICAL ISSUES FROM A SAFETY STANDPOINT I
- 3. ENFORCEMENT HISTORY l
- 4. REPORTING, ANALYSIS AND CORRECTIVE ACTION OF REPORTABLE EVENTS
- 5. STAFFING (INCLUDING MANAGEMENT) i
- 6. TRAINING EFFECTIVENESS AND QUALIFICATION
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j PLANT OPERATION!l l
(CATEGORY 1) 1 i
STRENGTHS LOW NUMBER OF PLANT TRANSIENTS MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT AND PRESENCE '
OPERATOR PERFORMANCE AND FORMALITY I
OPERATIONS STAFFING AND EXPERIENCE OPERATIONS - SUPPORT STAFF INTERFACES FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATit.
CHALLENGES REDUCE / ELIMINATE TAGGING PROBLEMS IMPROVE INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION
.3 RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL:.
(C ATEGORY 1)
P STRENGTHS l
MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT i
TRAINING PROGRAM FOR HEALTH PHYSICS STAFF ALARA CONTAMINATION' CONTROL P
CONFIRMATORY MEASUREMENTS l
PROGRAMS CHALLENGES ATTENTION TO DETAILS OF PROCEDUR!;
1
l; MAINTENANCE /
SURVEILLANCE (CATEGORY 1 - DECLINING)
STRENGTHS SAFETY SYSTEM AVAILABILITY DIAGNOSTIC PROGRAM EQUIPMENT MATERIAL CONDITION e
SURVEILLANCE TEST SCHEDULING PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT CHALLENGES CONSISTENCY OF EQUIPMENT LABELING ADEQUACY OF MAINTENANCE AND SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES AND PROCEDURAL COMPLIANCE
~
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (CATEGORY 2 - IMPROVING)
_ STRENGTHS NTE ACE W TH FFSITE AUTHORITIES o
EWSS ACTIVATION AND POLLING CAPABILITY o
CHALLENGES IMPROVE COMMUNICATION PERFORMANCE o
TESTING OF PLANT PAGE SYSTEM o
l j
o SECURITY (CATEGORY 1)
STRENGTHS MANAGEMENT SUPPORT ENHANCED ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY
+
UPGRADED PROTECTED AREA EQUIPMEt AND DETECTION EQUIPMENT i
DEDICATED MAINTENANCE SUPPORT FOR EQUIPMENT l
CAPABLE AND KNOWLEDGEABLE S ECU RITY. PERSON NEL-CHALLENGE l
MAINTAIN HIGH PERFORMANCE LEVEL j
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i ENGINEERING /
TECHNICAL SUPPOR' (CATEGORY 2) i STRENGTHS OUTAGE SUPPORT j
10 CFR 50.59 ACTIVITIES
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MAINTENANCE SUPPORT OPERATOR TRAINING CH ALLEN GE IMPROVE TIMELINESS AND THOROUGHNEE l OF ENGINEERING EVALUATIONS 3
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BAFETY ASSESSMENT /
QUALITY VERIFICATION (CATEGORY 1)
STRENGTHS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH TO DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS ROTATING WALKDOWN PROGRAM MANAGEMENT FIELD WORK OBSERVATION PROGRAM LICENSING SAFETY ANALYSIS CHALLENGES ENSURE CONSISTENT VALID QC SIGNOFFS 4
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