ML20043E587
| ML20043E587 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/11/1987 |
| From: | Joseph Kelly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20043E518 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-89-540 NUDOCS 9006130170 | |
| Download: ML20043E587 (14) | |
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, TESTIMDh? 0F JAMit A. F. ECLLY
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THE SUSCtem1 Tit! CN CEMERAL OVER5IGHT AND INVEST! GAT 10N$
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COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIR $
g U.S. HOUSE OF REPRistNTATIVts Oh 1
JL'NE 11, 1987 l
My name is James A. F. Kelly.
During the last senen years I have been a Senier Security Ir.spector for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cornission (NRC) in Region IV. Dallas. Texas.
I am responsible for coordinating the $ccurity Inspection Program for the NRC licensed f.uclear activitles within the 13 state region of the United States.
The purpose of the Security inspection Program is to protect against security re!ated incisients *$ hat could result in a 4
radiological release thereby threatening public safety. This involves threats from both insiders and external saboteurs. As the senior security inspector, y duties include traveling to and overseeing a)) the nuclear power reactors within NRC's Region IV.
1 have peen in the security and law enforcement profession for 30 years.
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P hr.ve a Masters Degree in Criminology and have taught criminology at the university level.
I have held a number of wnagerial positions. As Assistant h
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Director for the international Association of Chief of Police, ! developed j
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l Government, corporate and esecutive protectior, programs against terrorists attacks, and established a counter terrorist information service for law enforcement and security officialt.
I co founded the Naticral tomb Data i
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Center which is currently run by the FBI.
I am also a Licensed Polygraph j
l Examiner, the first such to attend a polygraph school as an NRC inspecter. 1 was previously Assistant Chief of Police for Charlotte, North Carolina, and have entensive esperience as a police officer ard an investigator for the State of Florida.
I have authored several books and articles on law enforce-ment end security efficer training and supervision.
l Although ! did not volunteer to appear 65 fore this Subconunittee, I did not
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object to answering the questions of your staff, nor do I now shrink from the l
responsibility of describing what I consider to be a significant problem j
1 affecting the safety of nuclear power plants in this country.
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'l it relates to the matter of drug and alcohol abuse on the part of a small, but l
significant, percentage of teployees who have access to the power reactors.
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The WRC has left to the nuclear industry the responsibility for insuring that personal problems of drug and alcohol abuse do not impact personnel who j
operate and maintain nuclear power plants, or who otherwise have access to the vital areas of these plants. A few have vigorously and courageously addressed the problem, but for the most part, the utilities are not up to the task.
My observations are that the industry usually does not seek to identify these t
kinds of problems, of ten f ails to investigate those problems brought to its attention, often fails to report such problems to the NRC, and does not always j
cecperate with the NRC when t,be NRC occasionally decides to investigata. The hRC, for its part, has rarely investigated allegations of drug pad alcoho) problems. My esperience reflects that for the most part, the utilities have i
demonstrated their unwillingness or inability to pursue the allegations.
i in my job, I have enceuMered many examples of drug and alenhol abuse at nuclear power plants. One case in particular provides a comprehensive example of what can go wrong when the industry is lef t to its own devices. As an MRC l
inspector, I performed a review of allegations of drug and alcohol related l
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1 problems at the Ccoper heclear Station in Nebraska. Fcr a two month period, I surfaced allegations of numerovt security violations to include a nueer of tacidents indicating drug or alcohol use at the utility site. These included:
1 evidence of the smoking of marijuar.a by two security officials in the pinner controlled arest a security guard unconscious, drunk or druged in the Security ready room; a licensed operator reporting to work drunk; the smoking of earijuana inside the protected area of the plant, to include the diele) generator room which contains vital equipment. These allegations may well represent the tip of the it.eberg. They were discovered by random inspection cver a short tirw frame. Fone of these incidents were reported by the utility. There wel limited, if any, action taken by the utility to investi.
gate or correct try of the identified problems. $1nce the NRC has no regulatory standards applicable to alcohol and drug problems, the matters were turned over to the utility for action. The MC took no regulatory action of any type, even after these incidents were brought to its attention. The INtc right consider simply referring these allegations to the utility to be en -
effective regulatory action. The results reflect that they were not.
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I was at the Jooper site when these incidents were brought to my attention, biben 1 became aware of what had occurred I netified wy Regional Office, geeking investigative help.
I was directed to refer all the allegations to the utility, and to turn my investigative leads over to them. As instructed, I turned over all my material to the utility's District Investigator, in fact, its only investi$ator. This individual was later assigr,ed responsibility for developing the utility's Fitness for Outy Program. Nothing ever came of any investigation of drug and alcohol abuse which might have been carried out. A year and a half af ter the investigative referral was made, the District investigator, who was then also manager of their troubled Fitness for Duty tregram, was himself arrested for possession of drugs and being under the influence of drugs. He negotiated a pies bargain under which he plead guilty to a lesser charge in a hebraska cr(minal court. The utility tried to shield that infossation from the NRC and when challenged later, the utility spokesmen stated that they were having problems with the District Investigator and had removed him from the job prior to his arrest. Thus they insisted, it was not a matter for the NRC.
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l We also disccvered that prior to my becming aware of the evidence of drug j.
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use, the utility bad removed from its filet, inciderot eeports of drug se and i
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other security violations. Clearly, those reports would have reflected adversely upon the effectiveness of heir security program and should have i
been reported to NRC. The stated reason for removing these documents from the I
I files was to prevent the NRC from finding the inforration contained in these That was admitted to NRC investigators by an ex-official of the L
reports.
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In a separate incident, also at Cooper, a temporary utility employee was attebpting to direct traffic in t nearby contwnity with a road block, claiming that a radiological accident had occurred at the plant, thus requiring an evacuation. The employee appeared to be severely intoxicated and was apprehended by the county sheriff. After assuring the local Sheriff that it was a hoax, plant security picked up the employee.
This employee, who worked alone as an electrician at the plant, had access to
' vital parts of the plant, including those particularly vulnerable to sabotage.
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He weg 4110wed unelCorted access to the tite for ten days following this incident. When the NRC questioned the plant management staff about this I
wereported incident, the then plant maeager claimed it was not a regulatory satter. At that peint the electrician was fired rather than being provided with counseling as would have been appropriate.
l 1 was not informe of this event at the utility.
I had to find this out from l
the local Sheriff. In f act, it was never reported to the hRC by the utility.
l Even af ter the NRC was aware of the incident, and of the fact that the
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l er.ployee had experienced episodes of this nature every three to six months.
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l the NRC took no conclusive regulatory action. The hPC's rationale was that the alcohol induced event occurred off site.
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f The Subconnittee staff has asked me whether the Cooper plant now has an adequate Fitness for Duty Program.
In an ironic sequel to the course of events that took place at Cooper, the NRC has recently asked its inspectors, vp to 50 in number who visit the Cooper site, to voluntarily take Cooper's l
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degg test. This would result in the industry testing, even regulating, the h*C.
1 find this difficult to attept.
By 'rw means is the drug and alcohol problem urique to the Cooper Nuclear plant. The Subcommittee staff has also questioned me regarding Fort St.
Vrain. Drug and alcohol problems at this colorado reactor are of interest. if for no other reason then it is the only commercial plant in the country that uses bomb grade material.
The hpC was confronted with a number of serious security 411eg6tions regarding risconduct at the plant, but never pursued them to my knowledge. Let me acknowledge, up front, that the individual who made the initial allegations was an em. employee who had experienced personal problems at the plant'.
F.ewever, the allegations still deserved investigation. At least some of the allegations were later corroborated. The NRC chose not to perform even an initial investigation, since it has no specific regulations governing the actions alleged.
In fact, the NRC directed its security inspectors not to pursue it in any stey, l
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l It was alleged that a weighing scale had been stolen and was being used for drug related activities, and that rarijuana was being smoked onsite, it was also alleged that security officers were having sea while on duty, making it I
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difficult for them to be attentive to their security responsibilities.
As ! indicated earlier, the NRC chose not to investigate any of these l
allegations. The agency elected to turn all responsibility for pursuing the l
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allegations ever to the utility. The utility did little, if anything, to J
follow up. The individuals to whor. the NRC referred the allegations, the plant wecager er.o the Vice Presteent for huclear Power, were later indicted and convictec for taking kickbacks. Further, based on my experience and professional judgment, I might reasonably wonder if the plant manager and vice president were taking kickbacks for some material to be used in the plant, what would stop them from taking kickbacks concerning safety related estarial?
To the best of y knowledge, this aspect of management effectiveness was never i
investigated.
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1 10 It was also alleged that a Leed 5ecurity Officer was unfit for duty due to I
alcoholism.
The Regional office received repeated reports of this drinking problem. Nevertheless, the utility's corporate safety people intisted to the h?C that the Leae Security Officer did not have an alcohol abuse problem.
Just a few weeks ago, the man's family came to the utility asking that he be admitted into an alconc1 rehabilitation program.
It appears that the utility was not going to inform the NRC; however, an NRC security inspector happened l
cn the scene and was filled in by a member of the utility staff who believes, l
l-incorrectly, that the NRC already knew.
I To my knowledge, this case has not been referred to the NRC's Of Mce of Investigations.
I cannot believe that an investigation, as it relates to integrity in ruclear mana'gement, is not warranted.
l More recently, an operator at Fort St. Vrain, who is responsible for maintain-ing safety systems, was reported to havr been under the influence of dr:sgs, This matter was taken out of the hands of the NRC's Security Personnel and i
.aga n re erred for action to the utility. This is partievlarly shocking to me i
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'l in light of the utility's failure to investigate or to take any other con.
Structive action concerning the earlier allegations.
Ilor am 1 aware of any action taken by the utility on the latest set of allegations.
There is another problem in the Fitness for Duty area that is slightly different but no less serious than what I have just described.
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When a plant is under constre,ction the NRC lacks Jurisdiction over security matters reg
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ing those working on the plant.
A case in point concerns, the South Texas Project, which is currently under construction and located in a deep rural V
setting between Corpus Christi and Houston.
It is located on the route to the -
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It is a big drug traffic area.
There have been numerous L
p reports of serious drug abuse at the construction site.
The NRC presently has nothing in its_ regulations which would permit regulatory action or allow it to I
address this problem.
The maior contractor on site recognized the problem and 1
independently initiated aggressive actions; then the utility followed suit
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The problems facing the South Teams pro, ject are not isolated esemples. It is cannon to hear reports of drug problems at nuclear power plant corstruction sites. The NRC shculd not rely on isolated esemplary actions in addressing.
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the problem of drug and alcohol ebuse et construction sites.
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The safety cencerns prompted by this situation are obvious. The possibility that critical components of a highly vulnerable facilh; might have been built, maintained or inspected by someone under the influence of drugs or alcohol is unsettling.
Once a plant is operatiofal. It will shut down approximately every 18 months for about four months. This enables outage workers to.se.rvice and overhaul the plants. Efforts are under way in the industry to allow for a relaxation of security requirements-at plants during the outage phase. This proposal I
would revert the plants back to the same positions of vulnerability to l
Sabotage as-during the construction phase, but now with even greater risk due L
to the presence of irradiated fuel. Reports of drug and alcohol abuse by 'the outage inorkers have been relatively connon. Under those circumstances, the r.
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g 13 public lafety may well be in the hands of persons under the influence of drugs and alcohol. One such example of.curre
- at the Cooper Plant when cocaine was offered for sale on site. The WPC referred this matter to the utility to handle. The utility was inexperienced in handling such matters. They exposed the inform a t, and her 1tfe was threatened. She lef t the site and went into hiding. The NRC did not pursue the matter citing the lack of a regulatory basis.
9 1 do not intend to paint a toto 11y bleak picture. There are a number of utilities that are doing sound cMscientious. jobs in establishing and imple-menting Fitness for Duty pr.ogram. Also, my management'at Region IV has been supportive of my efforts to encourage the utiitties to implement such preven.
tive programs voluntarily.
I bstlieve that our Refien is in the forefront in these matters However, for the most part, it is my experience that the NRC's decision to rely on the utilities to police the* 41ves in the area of drug and alcohol abuse has not been effective.
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The utilities lack the investigative espertise to des) with the failures of the Fitness for Duty program. My sources within the industry tell me that the utilities sinP y do not went drug and alcohol problems svrfaced publicly.
l This should not come as a surprise.
Absent clear regulatory standards the agency has made it difficult for its inspectors to assist utilities in establishin; prevention programs. to identify violations. indeed to even define violations of drug and alcohol m
abuse.
In sum. few if any of the utilities have comprehensive programs to deal effectively with drug and alcohol abuse. For the most part. they are not capable of self-policing, nor do they report problems to the NRC. The NRC typically choses not to pursue these matters, even referring problems to utilities that have demonstrated their unreliability.
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