ML20042F254
| ML20042F254 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 04/26/1990 |
| From: | Aiello R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20042F250 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-90-05, 50-424-90-5, 50-425-90-05, 50-425-90-5, NUDOCS 9005080054 | |
| Download: ML20042F254 (21) | |
See also: IR 05000424/1990005
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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MEHION 11
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- 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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ATL ANTA, GEORGI A 30323 '
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iReport Nos.:
50-424/90-05 and 50-425/90-05
Licensee:
Georgia Power Company
P.O. Bot 1295
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Birmingham, AL 35201
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Docket Nos.:
50-424.and 50-425
License Nos.: NPF-68 and NPF-81
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Facility Name: Vogtle Nuclear Station Units 1 and ?
Inspection Conducted: February 17 - March 30, 1990
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Inspectors:
Y7N/d /
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F. Aiello, Acting 5enior Resident Inspector
A) ate / Signed
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" R.*D. Starkey, Res) dent Inspector
/Date/ Signed
Accompanied By: Milt Hunt and Leigh Trocine
Approved By:
Y ,76-90
K./E. BrocR,n
dction Chief.
Date Signed
Division of'3 sin, J' tor Projects
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SUMMARY
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Scope:
This routine inspection entailed resident inspection-in the
following areas:
plant operations,
radiological
controls,
maintenance, surveillance, security, and . quality programs and-
administrative controls affecting quality,
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Results: One cited ~ violation and three non-cited violations were identified.
The cited- violation was in the area of operations. for failure to -
mechanically secure valve 1-1208-U4-176 during Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown)
as required by~ TS 3.4.1.4.2.C (paragraph 2.a).
Two of the non-cited
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violations were in the: area of operations for failure to properly
review and approve a revision to refueling procedure 93271-C
(paragraph 3.b.(1)(g)) and failure to incorporate adequate cautions
in SSPS . procedures regarding simultaneous loss of both SRNIs when
placing .both SRNIs in inhibit error inhibit (paragraph '2.a). . The
third non-cited violation was in the area of maintenance-for-failure.
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of. persons performing maintenance activities ~to notify QC as required
by administrative procedure 00201-C para
4.5.2 when QC'
holdpoints were reached (paragraph 3.b.(1)(graph
e)).
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One weakness was identified in the area of refueling concerning
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inatt& tion to detail.
See paragraph'2.b.(8) for details.
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90050s0004 900426
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DETAILS
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Persons Contacteo
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Licensee Employees
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- J. Aufdenkampe, Manager Technical Support
- G. Bockhold, Jr., General Manager Nuclear Plant
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C. Coursey, Maintenance Superintendent
- G. Frederick, Safety Audit and Engineering Group Supervisor
- H. Handfinger, Manager Maintenance
- W. Kitchens, Assistant General Manager Plant Operations
- R. LeGrand, Manager Health Physics and Chemistry-
G. McCarley, Independent Safety Engineering Group Supervisor
- A. Mosbaugh, Assistant General. Manager Plant Support
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R. Odom, Nuclear-Safety and Compliance Manager.
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- J. Swartzwelder~, Manager Operations
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, supervisors,
engineers, operators, maintenance personnel, quality control inspectors,
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and office personnel.
- Attended Exit Interview
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An alphabetical list of acronyms and initialisms is located in the last-
paragraph of this inspection report.
2.
Operational Safety Verification'- (71707)(93702)
The facility began this inspection period with Unit 1 at 96% power and
coasting down in' preparation for 1R2 and Unit 2'at 100% power.
Unit 1:
On February 23, 1990, at 5:55 p.m. EST, with the unit at 88% power, a NUE
was declared due .to the discovery by the licensee of missing _ core clamp
bolts on seismically qualified switchgear and the subsequent deenergizing
of a containment isolation valve (paragraph 3.b.(1)(c)).
To1 comply .with
the TS action statement, the licensee began a shutdown of the unit and
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although the bolts were _ replaced and the CIV was reenergized before the
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' shutdown was completed, plant management elected to complete the shutdown
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and enter into a planned refueling outage.
The reactor was manually
tripped from approximately 15% power on - February 23, 1990, at'
8:58 p.m. EST, and the unit entered refueling outage 1R2.
On March 13, 1990, at approximately 12:00 a.m. EST, an ESF actuation
occurred when the standby _ train of the Fuel Handling Building Post
accident HVAC auto started.
One train was already in service to support
refueling activities.
No alarm of the actuation was received in the
control room. The cause of the actuation is under investigation.
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On March 20, 1990, at 9:20 a.m. EST, with the unit in Mode 6 (Refueling),
a truck backed into an insulator support for .the
"A" Reserve Aur.111ary
Transformer subsequently causing a loss of power to the "A" 4160 VAC
emergency bus.
Thirty-six minutes later, on the third start attempt, the
1A DG was started and supplied power to the "A" emergency bus.
During
this event, the "B" Reserve Aux 111:ry Transformer and the IB DG were down
for maintenance.
Power was still being supplied to the non-vital buses
through the main transformers backfeeding to the Unit Auxiliary
Transformers.
The "B" emergency bus was being fed from the "A" RAT through an alternate
supply breaker.
When the undervoltage was sensed at the "A"
emergency
bus, DG.1A started anc' sequenced the loads to the "A" Bus.
Eighty seconds
after the DG output breaker closed, DG 1A tripped.
DG 1A did not restart
due to a starting logic lock up which required the sequencer to be
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manually reset before a restart could be attempted.
Operators were dispatched to DG 1A and the sequencer. When.the sequencer
was *eset the engine started and the required loads sequenced onto the
bus.
After 70 seconds, the engine tripped again and did not restart due
to another starting logic lock up.
Fifteen minutes after the second trip,
the DG was started from the engine control panel using the emergency start
push button.
It was subsequently manually loaded and continued to run
until the "B" RAT was energized to supply power to the 4160 volt IE bus.
Because there was a loss of power to both Unit 1 vital buses for more than
15 minutes, a Site Area Emergency was declared at 9:40 a.m.,
EST on
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March 20, 1990.
On March 21, 1990, an AIT from NRC was dispatched to the
site to review the events surrounding the SAE.
On March 25, 1993, the AIT
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was upgraded to an Iri.
The IIT will issue a report, NUREG-1410, upon
completion of their investigation.
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A region based inspector arrived on site on March 27, 1990, to assist the
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IIT in observation of the Unit 1 DG testing.
The inspector witnessed the
air leakage testing of the sensors for DG 1B.
The purpose of this test
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was performed to verify the operability of the pneumatic controls for the
engine.
All test's were successfully completed.
? UV test was performed,
the engine started, the loads sequenced onto the generator, and the
generator remained loaded to ensure that the controls were functioning
properly.
An operational surveillance was then performed and DG1B was
' declared operational. This permitted DG 1A to be removed from service for
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testing.
The IIT requested that a UV test be performed on DG 1A to
~ determine the cause for its failure on March 20, 1990.
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The pneumatic logic for the engine control system was then reexamined by
the licensee and representatives of the diesel manufacturer.
This
exam nation also included an air leakage test of the sensing elements
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which measure the various operating parameters of the engine. During this
test, two jacket water temperature sensors were found to be either out of
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calibration or defective and were rep; aced. On March 20, 1990, fc11owing
restoration of "B" RAT, the licensee replaced the three lube oil pressure
sensors after finding one defective er out of calibration. The engine was
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then successfully started and loadeC three times.
The logic testing
witnessed by the inspector included five starts and was concluded with
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another UV start.
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The licensee then had the sensor vendor representative review the
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calibration methods used by the licensee to determine if the cause of the
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sensor failures.was due to either calibration practices or a problem with
the sensors themselves.
The licensee also contracted with an independent
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testing firm to conduct test on the defective sensors.
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Details of the testing program and its results will be incorporated in the
IIT inspection report.
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Unit 2:
On March 20, 1990, the unit tripped and entered Mode 3 (Hot Standby).
T'ris was due to an electrical transient being sensed during the event.on
Unit 1 (see above).
Troubleshooting and repairs continued for the
following two days.
The final resolution of the trip was an improperly
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set differential overcurrent relay.
On March 22, the unit entered Mode 2
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(Startup), tied to the grid, and entered Mode 1 (Power Operations).
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onit remained at 100% power until the end of this inspection period.
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a.
Control Room Activities
Control Rocn. tours and observations were performed to verify that
facility operations were being safely conducted within regulatory.
requirements.
These inspections consisted of one or more of the
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following attributes as appropriate at the time of the inspection.
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- Proper Control Room staffing
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- Control Room access and operator behavior
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- Adherence to approved procedures for activities in progress
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- Adherence to Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for-
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Operations
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- Observance of instruments and recorder traces of safety related and
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important to safety systems for abnormalities
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- Review of annunciators alarmed and action in progress to correct
- Control Board walkdowns
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- Safety parameter display and the plant safety monitoring system
operability status
- Discussions and interviews with the Shift Superintendent,
Shift Supervisor, Reactor Operators, and the Shift Technical
Advisor (when stationed) to determine the plant status, plans, and
to assess operator knowledge
- Review of the operator logs, unit logs, and shift turnover sheets
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On February 26, 1990, while Unit I was in Mode 5 with RCS level at
195 feet, 5 in<;hes, the inspector discovered that RMWST discharge
valve,1-1208-ti4-176, was closed but was not mechanically secured, as
required by TS 3.4.1.4.2.c.
Instead of a chain and lock, the valve
had a clearance hold tag which provided only administrative control
to preclude valve operation.
The licensee stated that pror.edure 10'119-C, Control of Safety Related
Locked Valves Rev. 5 step 5.1.4, perm'ts use of a hold tag in cases
where it is not feasible te physic:.lly iock an apparatus.
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1-1208-U4-176 has a small dhmeter, solid wheel type valve handle and
cannot be mechanically secund with a typical chain and lock.
Howaver, the valve handle does have two small holes drilled into it
through which a wire or cable csn be routed to secure the valve.
Following notification that the valve was unsecured, the licensee
routed and crimped a steel cabM through the drilled holes which
mechanically secured the valve as required by TS, -The licensee was
encouraged to reevaluate their lacPed valve orogram and determine if
there are other required locked valves that fit in this same
category.
Failure to mechanically tecure valve 1-1208-U4-176 is a
violation of TS 3.4.1.4.2.c.
This item is identified as:
VIO 50-424/90-05-01, " Failure Te Mechanically Secure Valve
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1-1208 4 4-176 During Mode 5 As Revuired By TS 3.4.1.4.2.c."
On March 22, 1990, with Unit 1 in WJe 5, during performance of _
procedure 24831-1, Reactor Trip co 1:SF Logic Response Time Test, the
source range Nis, NI-31 and NI-72, were rendered inoperable when both
trains of SSPS were' selected to the Inhibit Error. Inhibit position.
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A similar event occurred
o'. March 27, 1990, while. performing
T-ENG-90-12, B-Train Under',oltage Tett.
In both cases, the operators
quickly identified the problem and tte SRNIs were restored to service
within approximately 30 sec3nds,
heither procedure 24831-1 nor
T-ENG-90-12 contained a caution to a'ert operators that placing both
SSPS. switches to Inhibit Error Inhib.it would cause both Nls to be
Furthermore, T-ENG-90-1;! did not contain any steps to
restore SSPS to its normal configuration.
Failure to establish,
implement and maintain an adequate e1gineering procedure for nuclear
instrumentation is a violation of TS '6.7.1.a.
The licensee has initiated corrective action by requiring that all
SSPS procedures which use the Inhibit Error Inhibit switches be
reviewed for adequacy.
A memorandum concerning these events was
placed in the Operations Required Reiding Book in the conti ' room.
Licensed operator requalification training on SSPS will be updated to
reflect these events concerning SSPS.
This licensee' identified
violation is not being cited because criteria specified in Section
V.G.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
In order to
track this item, the following is established.
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NCV 50-424/90-05-02, "Faiiare To Incorporate Adequate Cautions
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In SSPS Procedures Regarding Simultaneous Loss Of Both Source
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Range N!s When Placing Both SRNis in Inhib-jt Error Iphibit."
b.
Facility Activities
Facility tours and observations were perfbrmed to assess . the
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effectiveness 'of the administrative controls established by direct
observation of plant activities, interviews and discussions with.
licensee personnel, independent verification of safety systems status
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- and LCOs, licensee meetings and facility records.
During these
inspections the following objectives were achieved:'
(1) Safety System Status
(71710)
Confirmation of system
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operability was, olitained by verification that flowpath valve
aligr. ment, control and power supply . alignments, component
conditions, and support systems for the accessible portions of
the ESF trains were proper.
The inaccessible portions are
confirmed as availability pennits.
(2) Plant Housekeeping Conditions
Storage of material and
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components and cleanliness conditions of various areas
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throughout the facility were observed to determine whether
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safety and/or fire hazards existed.
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On March 15, 1990, an inspector toured the Unit I containment
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building with the Manager-Health Physics and Chemistry and the
Manager-Maintenance.
Topics
of--discussion
included
housekeeping, HP practices, and maintenance activitits-
In
particular, the method by which HP ~ will decontaminate the
containment pool when the pool water level is lowered in
preparation for reinstallation of the reactor vessel head was
discussed.
Alsn observed was the installation of the reactor
vessel level sight gages which are to replace the existing tygon
tube and will-be used for reactor vessel indication in Mode 5
and Mode 6 during RCS drain down to mid-loop operation.
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Manager - Maintenance also answered questions concerning the
snubber reduction effort and, in particular, the seismic
snubbers which have been removed from the SGs during the current
refueling outage.
No deficiencies were noted by the inspector.
(3)
Fire Protection - Fire protection activit-les, staffing, and
equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was
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appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment.
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actuating controls,
fire fighting equipment, emergency
equipment, and fire barriers were operable.
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On February 22, 1990, the inspectors observed an announced fire
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drill.
The simulated fire occurred in the Unit 2 AFW sump pump
room.
Fire team members responded quickly and appropriately
during the drill.
Other plant staff were on hand to assist the
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fire team in ~ laying but hoses and staging other support -
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equipment.
The inspectors noted that, as in previous fire
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drills, the fire team was not permitted to charge the fire. hoses
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to simulate actual hose handling conditions.
Consequently, the
hoses, once .inside the building,. were looped and bent into
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positions which would not have been possible if the hoses had
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been fully charged with water.
The inspectors were informed by
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the fire protection system engineer that plant management has
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forbidden the charging of fire hoses during drills.
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Plant management has subsequently revised its position and has
directed that the training objectives of drills be rewritten to
include grading criteria to evaluate the fire team's placement
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and simulated charging of fire hoses.
Additionally, a fire
drill scenario has been developed for use in one of the site
support. buildings which will include actual charging of the
hoses.
~ The licensee's response adequately addressed the
inspector's concern.
(4) Radiation Protection
Radiation protection activities,
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stafiing, and equipment were observed to verify proper program
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implementation.
The inspection included review of the plant
program effectiveness.
Radiation work permits and personnel
compliance were reviewed during the _ daily plant tours.
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Radiation Control Areas were observed to verify proper
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identification and implementation.
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(5) Security
_ Security controls were observed to verify that
security barriers were intact, guard forces were on duty, and
access to the Protected Area- was controlled in accordance with
the facility security plan.. Personnel- were observed to . verify
proper display of badges and -that personnel requiring escort
were properly escorted.
Personnel within Vital Areas were
observed to ensure proper authorization for the area.
Equipment'
operability or proper compensatory activities were verified on a.
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periodic basis.
After a recent housekeeping tour of Unit I and Unit 2 auxiliary
buildings, the inspector observed that signs posted on inactive
card readers can be confusing to the user and cause unnecessary
phone calls to either Security or Health Physics.
For example,
the posting on a Unit 1 charging pump room- door inactive card
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reader stated, " Card Reader Inoperable - Call Security / Health
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Physics."
Numerous other inactive card readers had signs which
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read, " Card Reader Not In Use - Call HP (4016) for Access." The
Manager Health Physics and Chemistry stated that he was not
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aware of- a need or requirement for these postings.
He stated
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that he would work with the Manager-Security to pruperly-
identify inactive card readers.
As a result of their
initiative, inactive card-readers in the auxiliary buildings and
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control building have been reposted with signs which simply
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state "NOT IN. SERV *CE."
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(6) Surveillance (61726)(61700)
> Surveillance tests were observed
to verify that approved procedures were being used, qualified
personnel were conducting- the tests; tests were adequate to
verify equipment operability, calibrated equipment was utilized,
and TS requirements were followed.
The inspectors observed
portions of the following surveillances and/or reviewed
completed data against acceptance criteria:
Surveillance No.
Title
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14805-1, Rev. 9
RHR Pump And Check Valve IST
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14825-2, Rev. 4
Quarterly Inservice Valve
Test
24805-1, Rev. 4
Steam Pressure Loop 4
(Protection IV) IP-546 ACOT
and Channel Calibration
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24831-1, Rev. ST
Reactor Trip And ESF Logic
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Response Time Test
54065-1, Rev. 5
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T-ENG-90-11/12, Rev. 1/1
A/B Trein Undervoltage Test
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On March 29, 1990, the - Resident inspector examined the
integrated leak rate test data acquisition process under the
guidance of the Manager - Maintenance. The inspector noted that
the electrical test equipment was supplied by non safety related
125V inverters and all process equipment (precision manometers
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and data acquisition systems) were connected to mitigate single
point failures from rendering the ILRT invalid.
The inspector
had no further comments.
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(7) Maintenance Activities
(62703)
. An inspector observed
maintenance activities to- verify that correct equipment
clearances were in effect, work requests and fire prevention
work permits, as required, were issued and being followed,
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quality control personnel were available for ' inspection
activities as required, retesting and return of systems to
service was prompt and correct, and TS requirements were being
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followed.
The Maintenance Work Order backlog was reviewed.
Maintenance was observed and/or work packages were reviewed for
the following maintenance activities-
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MWO No.
Work Description
18801635
Repair SG Blowdown.HX Flange Leak And
Pressure Test Tubes'For Leaks
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18903586
Inspect Worm Gear For Casting Porosity
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On 1-HV-11605'
18905202
Perform Motor Control Center (MCC INBJ)
Maintenance
19000222
Installation Of DCP 89-VCN0115 Which
Installs And Feeds Disconnect Switches
In Containment
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19000840
Main Steam Supply To TDAFW Pump HV-3019
Exceeded Its Maximum Stroke Time
19001511
DG 1B Calibration Of Lube Oil High
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Temperature Trip Switch
(8) Refueling Activities (60705) (60710) - New fuel receipt, core
alterations, and fuel shuffle evolutions were observed to-verify
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program effectiveness, approved arocedures.were being used, and
personnel were qualified.
The
nspector observed portions of
the following evolutions:
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93300-C, Rev. 5, Conduct of Refueling Ope ~ rations
93330-C, Rev. 4. Development and Implementation of the Fuel
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Shuffle Sequence Plan
93010-C, Rev. 5. Unloading, Inspection and Storage of New Fuel
93020-C, Rev. 4, Technical Inspection of New Fuel
While observing core alterations in the containment building and
fuel shuffling in the spent fuel pool, one weakness', inattention-
to detail, was identified due to the following incidents:
On March 2,1990, the fuel handling system transfer tube
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access plug clearance, required per procedure 93300-C, was
not hung prior to spent fuel movement through the transfer
tube.
On March 3,1990, spent fuel storage rack location U-3 was
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damaged due to a misalignment while conducting core
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alterations.
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On March 4,1990, fuel bundle SC36 was loaded into spent
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fuel pit location Y8 instead of location Y9.
On March 6,1990, new fuel assembly G-7, in lieu of G-5,
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was placed in the spent fuel pool by error.
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Prompt corrective action addressing these fuel handling problems
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was noted by the inspector. They included the following:
All fuel. handling crews were counseled on the importance of
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procedural compliance associated with fuel handling
activities.
Three of the individuals involved were removed from fuel
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handling activities.
Additional Quality Assurance coverage has been added.
Four
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hours coverage will be provided in each 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
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Additional Supervisory surveillance has been added to
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ensure procedural compliance.
Additionally, Outage
Management attention has been increased.
To reduce fatigue as a contributing factor, shifts have
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been changed from 10, 10, 13, to three 9's.
A fuel pool map will be made prior to commencing fuel load
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to ensure the pool is in accordance with the shuffle
sheets.
As the fuel is transferred from the Fuel Handling Building
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to the Containment, a serial number check will be made
while the fuel is in the upender as a final verification.
The bundles associated with the bent fuel rack have been
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inspected by camera.
Results were reviewed by onsite
personnel and sent to the Westinghouse fuels group 1or
review. No problems have been identified.
The licensee's- preparation -and execution of placing the unit
into mid-loop operation was accomplished in a safe and
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pre-planned manner.
The - inservice testing of the steam
generators proceeded in an effective manner.
The plugging of
four tubes was indicative of good chemistry practices. Only one
of these tubes actually exceeded the plugging limit (40% of
nominal tube wall tha.kness) and was required to be plugged.
The other three tubes did not exceed the plugging limit, but
were plugged as a precautionary measure.
The Unit 1 snubber
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inspections went satisfactorily.
Of the 188 snubbers tested,
only 10 failed. All 10 failures were previous failures from 1R1
and did not require a scope increase.
Scheduling and
coordination meetings were conducted on a frequent basis with
appropriate levels of management in attendance.
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Oa March 20. Unit 1 experienced a loss of all AC to the safety
related 4.16ky buses which re:.1ted in elevated temperature
occurring in the RCS while in a mid-loop status.
See
paragraph 2 for details.
(9) Calibration (56700) - The inspector reviewed the licensee's
implementation of the Analog . Channel Operdtional Test and
Calibration surveillance program to ensure conformance with
license requirements,
technical
specifications,
licensee
commitments, and industry guides and standards.
The inspector
examined selected surveillance procedures for technical content,
verified that calibration frequency met TS requirements,
reviewed completed surveillances, and witnessed the performance
of two surveillances.
-The inspector also reviewed the
licensee's program for surveilling non-technical specification
componeats associated with safety-related systems or functions.
The licensee utilized the Surveillance' Tracking System for
tracking both the TS required surveillances and those
non-tehnical specification surveillances associated with
safet: related systems or functions.
The inspector reviewed the following surveillance procedures for
technical content and verified that their calibration frequency
meets TS requirements.
The inspector also reviewed the most
recently completed of each of these surveillances te verify that
the acceptance criteria had been met, that the proper a> proved
test procedure had been used, and that procedural steps l1ad been
signed off and all necessary values entered.
24493-1, Rev. 2
Pressurizer Level Control L-459 Channel
Calibration
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24571-1, Rev. 3
oontainment Wide Range Pressure IP-10942
Channel Calibration
24750-1, Rev. 4
SG Level (Narrow Range) Protection Channel'
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II, IL-519 Analog Channel Operability Test
And Channel Calibration
24782-1, Rev. 8
Reactor Coolant Flow Loop 1 Protection
Channel I. IF-414 Analog Channel Operability
Test And Channel Calibration
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Eight additional procedures in the areas of reactor protection,
ECCS, and plant auxiliary systems were reviewed to ensure TS
required testing frequency was correctly stated. The inspector
also observed performance of portions of the following
surveillances:
24805-1, Rev. 4
Steam Pressure Loop 4 (Protection IV) 1P-546
ACOT And Channel Calibration
24831-1, Rev. ST
Reactor Trip And ESF Logic Response Time
Test
During these observations, the inspector questioned the
{
technicians concerning their experience and qualifications and
4
was satisfied that they met industry standards.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
ReviewofLicenseeReports(90712)(90713)(92700)
a.
In-Office Review of Periodic and Special Reports
This inspection consisted of reviewing the below listed reports to
determine whether the information reported by the licensee was
technically adequate and consistent with the inspector knowledge of
the material contained within the report.
Selected material within
the reports was questioned randomly to verify accuracy and to provide
a reasonable assurance that other NRC personnel have an appropriate
document for their activities.
Monthly Operating Report - The report dated larch 12, 1990, was
reviewed. The inspector had no comments.
Annual Report - The 1989 annual report dated February 26, 1990, wc3
reviewed.
Part 2 of this report will be submitted by May 1, 1990.
The inspector had no comments.
Sp9cial Report - The following special reports were reviewed.
(a)
1-90-02, "SG Tubet Plugged During 11R2."
This special
report dated March 22, 1990, regarding the number of SG
tubes plugged during 1R2 was reviewed.
The inspector had
no comments.
(b) 2-90-02, " Valid Diesel Generator Failures." The inspector
questioned the licensee regarding a sentence i4 this report
which stated that both diesel generators were out of
service simultaneously for a period of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 56
a
minutes. After a review by the inspector and the licensee,
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it was determined that this statement was totally in error._
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This Special Report was revised by the licensee on
March 12, 1990 to state that "at no time were both diesels
out of service simultaneously,
a
b.
' Deficiency Cards and Licensee Event Reports
Deficiency Cards and Licensee Event Reports were reviewed for
potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether
corrective actions appeared appropriate.
Events which were reported
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72, were reviewed following occurrence to
determine. if the tetanical specifications and other regulatory
requirements were satisfied.
In-office review of LERs may result in
further followup to verify that the stated corrective actions have
been completed, or to identify violations in addition to those
described in the LER.
Each LER was reviewed for enforcement action
in accordance with 10 CFR Part 2. Appendix C, and where the violation
was not cited the criteria specified in Section V.G of the Enforce-
ment Policy were satisfied.
Review of DCs was performed to maintain
a realtime status of deficiencies, determine regulatory compliance,
'
follow the licensee corrective actions, and assist as a. basis for
closure of the LER when reviewed.
Due to the numerous DCs processed
only those DCs which result in enforcement action or further
inspector followup with the licensee at the en.1 of'the inspection are
listed below.
The DCs and LERs denoted with an asterisk indicates
i
that reactive inspection occurred following the event and prior to
receipt of the written report.
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(1) The following Deficiency Cards were reviewed:
(a) DC 1-90-0030, " Train A And B Sequencer Loss Of Power Relay
Was Not Properly Tested."
i
On February 15, 1990, the licensee identified that the
Train A And B Sequencer Loss of Power Relay was not
properly testta in accordance with TS.
No surveillance
,
test has verified that the relay operation will result in a
Train
"C"
AFW actuation.
This item will be further
followed up when submitted as an LER.
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(b) DC 1-90-0031
"DG Surveillance Requirement Was Not
Completely Satisfied During IR1."
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On February 16, 1990, the licensee discovered that a DG
surveillance reu.irement had not been completely satisfied
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during the first Unit I refueling outage.-.
The DG
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electrical trips that are automatically bypassed upon -loss
of voltage on the emergency bus concurrent with an SI
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signal were not verified to actually be bypassed.
This-
item will be further followed up when submitted as an LER.
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(c) *DC 1-90-0034 " Missing Seismic Bolts On Transformers Leads
To TS Required Unit Shutdown."
On February 23, 1990, a system engineer found core clamp
bolts missing on seismically qualified switchgear.
The
switchgear was deenergized as was one o/ its loads, a
Containment Isolation Valve.
After the four hour time
>
period - had expired for reenergizing the valve, unit
,
shutdown was initiated as required by Technical
'
Specifications.- Although the bolts were replaced and the
CIV was reenergized before shutdown was completed, plant
management elected to complete the shutdown and enter into
,
a planned refueling outage approximately four hours early.
Two related DC's, 1-90-0035 and 2-90-0021, concerning steel
hold down wedges on seismically qualified switchgear were
also written.
Based on GE type test results, the licenset
concluded that the transformers without the upper support
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wedges meet the operability requirements at Vogtle and are
safe for continued operation.
(d) DC 1-90-0050, " Source Range Monitor Inoperable At Time Of
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Entry Into Mode 6."
On March 1, 1990, the licensee was in a refueling. outage on
.
Unit 1.
Mode 6 was re-entered with the commencement of
fuel reload.
At the tima of the Mode 6 entry, one of the
required two SkNIs was under an LC0 fn performance of an
,
I&C surveillance.
The SRNI was in test and a channel
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calibration was in progress.
This item will be further
,
followed up when submitted as_an LER.
(e) DC 1-90-0081, " Missed QC Holdpoints."
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During the performance of MWO 19001152, a QC holdpoint to
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inspect the
"B" RHR pump motor rotor. was inadvertently
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missed.
The cause was due to QC and maintenance personnel
not being cognizant of the holdpoints as work was being
performed.
A similar event occurred on March 11, 1990,
when safety related leads on MCC 1880(67) were relanded
without QC notification (DC 1-90-0094).
This' licensee
identified violation is not being cited - because the
criteria specified in section V.G.1 of the NRC enforcement
policy were satisfied.
In order to track this item, the
following is established.
NCV 50-424/90-05-03, " Failure Of Persons Performing
Maintenance Activities To Notify QC As Required By
Administrative Procedure 00201-C Paragraph 4.5.2 When
QC Holdpoints Were Reached."
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(f) *DC 1-90-0102, " inadvertent Actuation Of Fuel Handling
Building Post Accident HVAC Train B."
On March 13, 1990, the standby train of the Fuel Handling
Building' Post Accident HVAC auto started.
One train was
already in cervice to support refueling activities.
No
alarm of the actuation was received in the control room.
The cause of the actuation was believed to have been caused
by a low negative pressure signal.
This item W il be
further followed up when submitted as an LER.
(g) OC 1-90-0103, " Failure To Properly Review And Approve A
Revision To Refueling Procedure 93271-C."
On March 14, 1990, the licensee discovered that procedure
93271-C. Sigma Refueling Machine Programming Instructions,
was revised from Rev. O to Rev. I without the approval of
the General Manager, or review by the PRB, as required by
procedure 00051-C, Procedure Review and Approvel, Rev. 12.
1
Technical Specification 6.4.1.6.a. requires that the PRB be
responsible for review cf fuel handling procedures.
Furthermore, Tables 1 and 2 of procedure 00051-C, require
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General Manager approval PRB review of all feel handling
procedure revisions.
The licensee initined prompt
corrective action on March. 14, 1900,- by having procedure
93271-C properly reviewed and approved.
Therefore, this
licenseq identified violation is- not being cited because
criteria specified in Section V.G.1 on the NRC Enforcement
t
Policy were satisfied.
In order to track t.11s item, the
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following is established.
NCV 50-424/90-05-04 and 50-425/90-05-01, " Failure To
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Properly Review And Approve a Revision To Refueling
Procedure 93271-C."
(h) *DC 1-90-0123 " Loss Of All Offsite And Onsite A.C. Power To
The Unit i Vital Buses For More Than 15 Minutes."
This event, which occurred on March 20, 1990, is discussed
e
under paragraph 2 and will be followed up when the LER is
issued.
(1) DC 1-90-0126, " Liquid Waste Discharge Made While Radiation
Konitor(1RE-0018) Inoperable"
On March 17, 1990, with the liquid raawaste effluent line
!
radiation monitor- (1RE-0018) isolated under a work order
clearance, a liquid waste release was made.
The release
was authorized under a release permit without complying-
with TS 3.3.3.9, Action 37.
This item will be further
followed up when submitted as an LER.
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(j) DC 2-90-0022. " Surveillance Not Completely Performed On
Containment Integrity Valves Outside Containment."
On January 3, 1990, and February 1,1990, a partial
surveillance was performed on containment integrity valves
outside containment.
All but two of the required valves
were "NA'd" on the surveillance data sheets.
There was no
record in the surveillance that the remaining valves were
verified closed as required by the surveillance
requirement.
This item will be further followed up when
submitted as an LER.
(k) *DC 2-90-0026, " Unplanned Reactor Trip Due To Electrical
Transient As A Result Of A Loss Of Power Event On Unit 1."
This event, which occurred on March 20, 1990, is discussed
under paragraph 2 and will be followed up when the LER is
issued.
(2) The following LER was reviewed and closed.
(a) *50-424/90-01, Rev. O,
" Reactor Trip Due To Inndvertent
1
Closure Of Main Steam Isolation Valve."
'
On January 24, 1990, partial stroke testing of a P in Steam
Isolation Valve was in progress.
During a previous test,
the valve had failed to reopen automatically at the 10%
closed position as designed.. Is a result, plant personnel
were prepared to install a jumper to reopen the valve if it
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failed to reopen automatically.
The test began and an
indicator illuminated at approximately 10% closed; however,
unknown to the personnel involved, there were two limit
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switches which were not adjusted = to actuate concurrently.
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Consequently, when the indicator illuminated, the other
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limit switch had not yet actuated and it appeared that the
valve would not reopen automatically.
The jumper was
installed to initiate valve reopening; however, position
indication was lost and the MSIV went fully closed.
closure resulted in a rapid decrease in water level in
Steam Generator #4 to the low-low level setpoint and an
automatic reactor trip occurred.
The MSIV closed when its
actuator fuses blew.
Although a simulation of the event
failed to duplicate the blown fuses and MSIV closure, an
engineering judgement has determined that the Georgia Power
Company electricians inadvertently created a momentary
electrical short which led to the fuses blowing.
This
apparent cognitive personnel error was not the result of
failing to follow approved procedures or the result of any
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unusual characteristics ' of the work location.
Corrective
actions include: a) fuse replacement, b) procedure revision
to include a caution that the indicator may light prior to
the valve receiving the reopen signal, c) limit switch
adjustment to obtain concurrent actuation and d)-
counselling of the electricians involved regarding the
necessity of exercising. caution when testing circuits
having the potential for causing reactor trip.
The
inspector has no further comments.
4.
Actions on Previous Inspection Findings - (92701)(92702)
a.
Part 21 Reports
(1)
(Closed) 50-424/P21-89-03, " Deficiencies In Control Room
Emergency Filtration System And Isolation Of The Normal Control
Room HVAC System."
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Corrective actions taken included the addition of backdraft
dampers to eliminate the potential for system backflow .
j
identified on July 2,1987, and the deactivation of two outside
air intake dampers to preclude postulated spurious damper
actuation on July 4,1987.
The inspector has no further
comments.
(2)
(Closed) 50-424 & 50/425/P21-89-04, "American Air Filter Seismic
Door Tabs Found To Be Missing.From ESF Unit Coolers.
Without
Tabs, Access Doors May Not Operate During Seismic Event Ano
Could-Negate Function Of Coolers."
Without the seismic retaining tabs, the access doors of.the unit
a
coolers may fail open during a seismic event.
Under this
circumstance, the return air may bypass the cooling coils and,
depending on which access door opened, could negate the cooling
function of the ' coolers.
The resulting increase in the room
temperature could adversely affect the safe shutdown of the
plant.
The lack of retaining tabs on the access doors could
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lead to the inoperability of the coolers in the event of an
The licensee has reinstalled the seismic tabs (or
used a lock and hasp) on both units.
The inspector has no
further comments.
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(3)
(Closed) 50-424 & 50-425/P21 89-16, " Cooper-Bessemer Standby DG
~
At Susquehanna Had A Cranketse Explosion Which Originated From
The Thrust Side Of The Number Seven Left Piston Skirt."
The engine in qmtion is a KSV-16-T.
KSV DGs are not used at
Plant Vogtle.
therefore, this part 21 is not applicable.
The
inspector has no further questions.
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(4)
(Closed) 50-424 & 50-425/P21-89-18 "PT21 From Limitorque RE SMB
,
Actuators Found To Have Melamine Torque Switches That Undergo
Post Mold Shrinkage And Causes Cam Binding.
Melamine-Torque
Switch Found Not To Be Qualified."
The licensee't review regarding Limitorgue SMB actuations for
Unit 2 has now been completed and identified 22 effected
motor-operated valves,
These valves are part of the M0V Ter,t
Program and will require Movat tests to establish new baseline
data after the required maintenance.
The licensee's review for
the effected valves' on Unit 1. is still in process.
The
,
inspector has no further comments.
(5)
(Closed) 50-424 & 50/425/P21-89-19
"PT21 From Dresser
Industries RE Pressure Reducing Sleeves Manufactured By Pacific
>
Pumps, Part Of The Dresser Pump Division, May Have A Brittle
Crack Failure Upon Start Due To Sleeves Being Through Hardened
Vice Surface Hardened."
Pacific Nmps stated that some pressure reducing sleeves were
'
"through hardened "vice" surface hardened" which could result in a
brittle crack failure within one hour after operation.
Pacific
Pumps has identified the following three Georgia Power Company
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orders on which these "through hardened" sleeves may have been
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provided:
G 0,
AT-70093,
Customer
Order No.
PAV-27380,
CN2,
,
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Charging / Safety Injection Pump.
Three sleeves were provided,
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two each on Item 036 and one as part of an internal assembly,
Item 057,
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G.0, AT-70135, Customer Order No. PAV-27380, CN13, Safety
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Injection Pump. Two sleeves were provided on Item 083.
,
G.0. AT-70345, Customer Order No. PAV-28100, CN69, Safety
Injection Pump Sleeve provided as part of an internal assembly.
Pacific Pumps has stated that there is no concern if the sleeves
have been installed on an operating pump, since failure, if it
was to occur, would happen within the first hour of operation.
Pacific Pumps later advised Westinghouse that the above
identified sleeves provided to Georgia Power Company are
ecceptable and there are no further actions required.
The
inspector has no further comments.
(6)
(Closed) 50-424 & 50-425/P21-89-20
"PT21 From Cooper-Bessemer
Concerning The EDG Intake Rocker Arm Assembly.
Potential
Interference Between TI.e Connector Push Rod AW The End Socket
Of The Rocker Arm.
Submittal References A Similar Notification
From Gulf States Utilities On October 31, 1989."
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Ry9 Bessemer stated 'that there is a potential interference
bew.:en the connector push rod and the end socket of the rocker
,
arm.- Cooper's investigation showed results similar to those
identified in the investigation by GSU.. Any interference would
show up in assembly or during maintenance start-up runs.
This
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is significant when the engine is still in a. maintenance or
assembly mode. and not yet operational.
This is a ' replacement
,
parts ; concern, since equipment installed on engines that have
,
,
been operated or tested (site or factory) have demonstrated that
no interference exists and are, therefore, not affected.
Vogtle's parts issues history has been reviewed and it was
determined that the waehouse has not issued these items for
maintenance.
The as.emblies'. in question were placed on
warehouse hold January 25
1990, pending QC inspection.
The
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inspector has no further comments.
5.
Release from CAL
On April 9,1990, GPC management briefed the Regional Administrator and
.
the regional staff concerning 'the event review which the licensee had
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conducted after the March 20, 1990, Site Area Emergency event.
The
short-term corrective actions which the site had implementedf were
considered to be adequate to allow the plant to start up.
This released
them from Item #1 of CAL-50-424/90-01.
Long-term corrective actions will
be presented to the Region no later than May 15, 1990.
6.
Exit Interviews - (30703)
'
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 29, 1990, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspectors described
>
the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results.
No
dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did not
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identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by
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the inspector during this inspection.
Region based NRC exit interviews
i
were attended during tne inspection period by a resident inspector.
This
inspection closed six 10 CFR Part 21 Reports, and one Licensee Event
Report. The items identified during this inspection were:
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VIO 50-424/90-05-01
" Failure . To Mechanically - Secure Valve-
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1-1208-U4-176 Durir.g Mode 5 As Required By TS 3.4.1.4.2.c"
- paragraph 2.a.
NCV 50-424/90-05-02, " Failure To Incorporate Adequate Cautions In
SSPS Procedures Regarding Simultaneous Loss Of Both Source Range NIs
When Placing Both SRNIs In Inhibit Error Inhibit" - paragraph 2.a..
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NCV 50-424/90-05-03
" Failure Of Persons Performing Maintenance
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Activities To Notify QC As Required By Administrative Procedure
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00201-C Paragraph 4.5.2_When QC Holdpoints Were Reached" - paragraph
3.b.(1)(e).
.
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NCV 50-424/90-05-04 and 50-425/90-05-01, " Failure To Properly Review
And App (rove a Revision To Refueling Procedure 93271-C" - paragraph.
3.b.(1)g).
7.
Acronyms And Initialisms
ACOT
Analog Channel.0 pet ability Test
Auxiliary Feedwater System
Augmented Inspection Team
CFR
Code of Federal Regulations
Containment Isolation Valve
Deficiency Cards
Design Change Package
Diese1' Generator
'
Engineered Safety Features
Engineering Safety Features Actuation System
EST
Eastern Standard Time
GSU
Gulf Station Utilities
lip
Health Physics
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(!V
High Voltage
Heat Exchanger
Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning
Incident Investigation Team
Inservice Testing
KSV
(trade name)
LC0
Limiting Conditions for Operations
!
LER
Licensee Event Report
!
Motor Control Center
Motor Operated Valve
4
i
MWO
Maintenance Work Order
Non-cited Violation
NI
Nuclear Instrumentation
i clear Power Facility
NPF
!
NRC
huclear Regulatory Comission
Notice of Unusual Event
Plant Review Board
Quality Control
Reserve Auxiliary Transformer
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Rev
Revision
Residual Heat Removal System-
RMWST.
Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tank
Site Area Emergency
SI .
Safety Injection System
SMB
(prefix- to melamine torque switenes)
SRN!
Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation
. SSPS
. Solid State Protection System:
~ TDAFW
Turbine Driven-AFW Pump
TS
' Technical . Specification
UAf
Unit Auxiliary Transformer-
Under Voltage.
VAC.
Voltage-Alternating Current-
Violation-
1R1
Unit 1 First Refueling Outage
IR2
Unit 1 Second Refueling Outege
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