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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20217H2061999-10-12012 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 106 to License DPR-22 ML20210Q0521999-08-0404 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Approving Relief Request 10 to License DPR-22 Per 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(i).Inservice Exam for Relief Request 10,Parts A,B,C,D & E Impractical & Reasonable Assurance of Structural Integrity Provided ML20205N0861999-04-12012 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Re Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20205C1651999-03-19019 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 105 to License DPR-22 ML20204H4951999-03-18018 March 1999 SER Concluding That Licensee Established Acceptable Program to Verify Periodically design-basis Capability of safety-related MOVs at Monticello.Therefore Staff Concludes Licensee Adequately Addressed Action Required in GL 96-05 ML20199E4871999-01-0606 January 1999 SER Accepting Licensee 951116,960214 & 0524 Responses to NRC Bulletin 95-002, Unexpected Clogging of Residual Heat Removal Pump Strainer While Operating in Suppression Pool Cooling Mode ML20198P0691998-12-28028 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Concluding That NSP Proposed Alternative to Paragraph III-3411 of App III to 1986 Edition of Section XI of ASME Code Provides Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety.Alternative Authorized ML20198M8221998-12-24024 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 104 to License DPR-22 ML20198M6901998-12-23023 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 103 to License DPR-22 ML20198D0751998-12-10010 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting NSP Proposed Change to EOPs to Use 2/3 Core Height as Potential Entry Condition Into Containment Flooding ML20195E3691998-11-12012 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Licensee USI A-46 Implementation Has Met Purpose & Intent of Criteria in GIP-2 & Staff Sser 2 for Resolution of USI A-46 ML20151T0981998-08-28028 August 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 101 to License DPR-22 ML20217E9611998-04-20020 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 100 to License DPR-22 ML20199G7051997-11-19019 November 1997 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Relief Request 8 of Third 10 Yr Inservice Insp Interval ML20198R3761997-10-29029 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 99 to License DPR-22 ML20216H9171997-08-18018 August 1997 Safety Evaluation Denying Licensee 970818 Request for Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR50,App E, Section IV.F.2.c to Exercise Plant Offsite EP Plans W/State & Local Govt Authorities within Plant Planning Zone ML20137S5561997-04-0101 April 1997 Safety Evaluation Approving License Request for Transfer of Licenses for Monticello & Prairie Island,Units 1 & 2 Nuclear Generating Plants & Prairie Island ISFSI ML20117N5921996-09-17017 September 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 97 to License DPR-22 ML20101Q1181996-04-0909 April 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 96 to License DPR-22 ML20086J8171995-07-12012 July 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 93 to License DPR-22 ML20073A1261994-09-15015 September 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 92 to License DPR-22 ML20072U0761994-09-0909 September 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 91 to License DPR-22 ML20072S6791994-09-0707 September 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 90 to License DPR-22 ML20071F4501994-06-30030 June 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 88 to License DPR-22 ML20065L4461994-04-15015 April 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 87 to License DPR-22 ML20059C4051993-10-25025 October 1993 Safety Evaluation Re Inservice Testing Program Relief Requests GR-7 & RCIC-6 for Plant.Proposed Alternative to OM-1 Safety & Valve Relief Valve Requirements Authorized Based on Alternative Providing Acceptable Level of Quality ML20056D0921993-07-12012 July 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 86 to License DPR-22 ML20045F8811993-06-29029 June 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 85 to License DPR-22 ML20128E9991993-01-27027 January 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 84 to License DPR-22, Respectively ML20096A9121992-04-16016 April 1992 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 81 to License DPR-22 ML20076E5071991-08-12012 August 1991 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 80 to License DPR-22 ML20065U4491990-12-19019 December 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 76 to License DPR-22 ML20062B1891990-10-12012 October 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 75 to License DPR-22 ML20043F1101990-06-0505 June 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 74 to License DPR-22 ML20042F1951990-05-0101 May 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 73 to License DPR-22 ML19327B9951989-11-0202 November 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 72 to License DPR-22 ML20042F1651989-10-19019 October 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 71 to License DPR-22 ML20248C3201989-09-28028 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 70 to License DPR-22, Modifying Specs Having cycle-specific Parameter Limits by Replacing Values of Limits W/Ref to Core Operating Limits Rept ML20247P7271989-09-12012 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 69 to License DPR-22 ML20247L5491989-07-14014 July 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 68 to License DPR-22 ML20245G3481989-06-19019 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 67 to License DPR-22 ML20246L7191989-05-10010 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 64 to License DPR-22 ML20245F7281989-04-18018 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 63 to License DPR-22 ML20248G0001989-03-29029 March 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 61 to License DPR-22 ML20235X4781989-02-28028 February 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 60 to License DPR-22 ML20235S0851989-02-16016 February 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 59 to License DPR-22 ML20237C1761987-12-11011 December 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 56 to License DPR-22 ML20236V2721987-11-25025 November 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 54 to License DPR-22 ML20236V3151987-11-25025 November 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 55 to License DPR-22 ML20236V4571987-11-19019 November 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 53 to License DPR-22 1999-08-04
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217H2061999-10-12012 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 106 to License DPR-22 ML20217D1261999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.With ML20216E7031999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.With ML20210Q0521999-08-0404 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Approving Relief Request 10 to License DPR-22 Per 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(i).Inservice Exam for Relief Request 10,Parts A,B,C,D & E Impractical & Reasonable Assurance of Structural Integrity Provided ML20210Q6611999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.With 05000263/LER-1999-007, :on 990610,HPCI Test Return Valve Was Unable to Close Against Max Expected Differential Pressure.Caused by Failure to Accurately Predict Valve Performance.Procedure Revised.With1999-07-0909 July 1999
- on 990610,HPCI Test Return Valve Was Unable to Close Against Max Expected Differential Pressure.Caused by Failure to Accurately Predict Valve Performance.Procedure Revised.With
05000263/LER-1999-006-01, :on 990602,during Quarterly Surveillance Hcpi Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Drain Pot Alarm.Revised HPCI Surveillance Test Procedure.With1999-07-0202 July 1999
- on 990602,during Quarterly Surveillance Hcpi Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Drain Pot Alarm.Revised HPCI Surveillance Test Procedure.With
ML20209F7901999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.With 05000263/LER-1999-005, :on 990508,personnel Inserted Manual Scram When Pressure Transient Closed Air Ejector Suction Isolation Valves & Tripped off-gas Sys.Caused by Recombiner Catalyst Migration.Catalyst Was Removed.With1999-06-0707 June 1999
- on 990508,personnel Inserted Manual Scram When Pressure Transient Closed Air Ejector Suction Isolation Valves & Tripped off-gas Sys.Caused by Recombiner Catalyst Migration.Catalyst Was Removed.With
ML20195H0351999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Monticello Nuclear Generatintg Plant.With 05000263/LER-1999-004-01, :on 990422,low Reactor Water Level Scram,Group 2 & 3 Isolations & Subsequent HPCI Became Inoperable.Caused by Feedwater Controller Power Supply Failure.Three Power Supplies Replaced & Connections Cleaned.With1999-05-24024 May 1999
- on 990422,low Reactor Water Level Scram,Group 2 & 3 Isolations & Subsequent HPCI Became Inoperable.Caused by Feedwater Controller Power Supply Failure.Three Power Supplies Replaced & Connections Cleaned.With
05000263/LER-1999-003-01, :on 990412,HPCI & Division 1 ECCS Equipment Were Declared Inoperable Due to Svc Water Pump Failure.Pump Shaft Was Mechanically Freed,Check Valve Was Repaired & Pump Was Successfully Tested.With1999-05-12012 May 1999
- on 990412,HPCI & Division 1 ECCS Equipment Were Declared Inoperable Due to Svc Water Pump Failure.Pump Shaft Was Mechanically Freed,Check Valve Was Repaired & Pump Was Successfully Tested.With
05000263/LER-1999-002-01, :on 990329,event Sequence That Results in Available ECCS Being Reduced to Less than That Assumed in Current Safety Analysis.Caused by Failure of Edg.Plant Operating Procedures Revised.With1999-05-11011 May 1999
- on 990329,event Sequence That Results in Available ECCS Being Reduced to Less than That Assumed in Current Safety Analysis.Caused by Failure of Edg.Plant Operating Procedures Revised.With
ML20206N1721999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.With ML20205N0861999-04-12012 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Re Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20205P5701999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.With ML20205C1651999-03-19019 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 105 to License DPR-22 ML20204H4951999-03-18018 March 1999 SER Concluding That Licensee Established Acceptable Program to Verify Periodically design-basis Capability of safety-related MOVs at Monticello.Therefore Staff Concludes Licensee Adequately Addressed Action Required in GL 96-05 05000263/LER-1999-001-02, :on 990215,HPCI High Steam Flow Isolation During Quarterly Surveillance Test Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Surveillance Procedure.Revised Surveillance Procedure.With1999-03-17017 March 1999
- on 990215,HPCI High Steam Flow Isolation During Quarterly Surveillance Test Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Surveillance Procedure.Revised Surveillance Procedure.With
ML20205G7391999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.With ML20202F7901999-01-25025 January 1999 1999 Four Year Simulator Certification Rept for MNGP Simulation Facility ML20199E4871999-01-0606 January 1999 SER Accepting Licensee 951116,960214 & 0524 Responses to NRC Bulletin 95-002, Unexpected Clogging of Residual Heat Removal Pump Strainer While Operating in Suppression Pool Cooling Mode ML20205H0561998-12-31031 December 1998 Northern States Power Co 1998 Annual Rept. with ML20199F6211998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Mngp.With ML20198P0691998-12-28028 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Concluding That NSP Proposed Alternative to Paragraph III-3411 of App III to 1986 Edition of Section XI of ASME Code Provides Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety.Alternative Authorized ML20198M8221998-12-24024 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 104 to License DPR-22 ML20198M6901998-12-23023 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 103 to License DPR-22 ML20198D0751998-12-10010 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting NSP Proposed Change to EOPs to Use 2/3 Core Height as Potential Entry Condition Into Containment Flooding ML20198B2531998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.With ML20195E3691998-11-12012 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Licensee USI A-46 Implementation Has Met Purpose & Intent of Criteria in GIP-2 & Staff Sser 2 for Resolution of USI A-46 ML20195D2381998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.With ML20198J4451998-10-22022 October 1998 Rev 2 to SIR-97-003, Review of Test Results of Two Surveillance Capsules & Recommendations for Matls Properties & Pressure-Temp Curves to Be Used for Monticello Rpv 05000263/LER-1998-005-01, :on 980921,HPCI Was Removed from Service to Repair Steam Leak in Drain Trap by Pass.Caused by Localized Erosion of Valve Body.Valve Was Declared Inoperable & Was Replaced with Manual Valve1998-10-21021 October 1998
- on 980921,HPCI Was Removed from Service to Repair Steam Leak in Drain Trap by Pass.Caused by Localized Erosion of Valve Body.Valve Was Declared Inoperable & Was Replaced with Manual Valve
05000263/LER-1998-004-02, :on 980909,manual Scram Was Inserted Following Pressure Transient Closed Air Ejector Suction Isolation Valves & Trips Offgas Recombiners,Occurred.Caused by Seat Leakage.Leaking Valve Seat Was Reworked1998-10-0909 October 1998
- on 980909,manual Scram Was Inserted Following Pressure Transient Closed Air Ejector Suction Isolation Valves & Trips Offgas Recombiners,Occurred.Caused by Seat Leakage.Leaking Valve Seat Was Reworked
ML20154L3471998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.With ML20153F0511998-09-21021 September 1998 Rev 2 to MNGP Colr,Cycle 19 ML20153E9361998-09-0808 September 1998 Rev 1 to MNGP Colr,Cycle 19 ML20153B0861998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.With ML20151T0981998-08-28028 August 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 101 to License DPR-22 ML20237B8461998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1998 for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ML20236W5041998-07-21021 July 1998 ISI Exam Summary Rept - Refueling Outage 19 ML20236R1941998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1998 for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ML20249A5861998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant 05000263/LER-1998-003-01, :on 980417,transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking Was Identified in Control Rod Drive Lines.Caused by chloride-induced Transgranular stress-corrosion Cracking. Affected Sections of Two Lines Replaced1998-05-14014 May 1998
- on 980417,transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking Was Identified in Control Rod Drive Lines.Caused by chloride-induced Transgranular stress-corrosion Cracking. Affected Sections of Two Lines Replaced
05000263/LER-1998-002-02, :on 980415,main Steam Isolation Valve Position Setpoint Outside Allowed Range,Was Found.Caused by Previous Testing Technique & Use of Particular Switch Model.Eight New Position Switches W/Less Deadband Installed1998-05-14014 May 1998
- on 980415,main Steam Isolation Valve Position Setpoint Outside Allowed Range,Was Found.Caused by Previous Testing Technique & Use of Particular Switch Model.Eight New Position Switches W/Less Deadband Installed
ML20247K3971998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1998 for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant 05000263/LER-1998-001-02, :on 980323,discovered Containment Isolation Valve Leakage Exceeded TS Limit.Caused by Foreign Matl Found on Valve Seat.Repaired Subject Valves & Developed Process to Ensure Cleanliness of Testing Equipment1998-04-22022 April 1998
- on 980323,discovered Containment Isolation Valve Leakage Exceeded TS Limit.Caused by Foreign Matl Found on Valve Seat.Repaired Subject Valves & Developed Process to Ensure Cleanliness of Testing Equipment
ML20217E9611998-04-20020 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 100 to License DPR-22 ML20217D8731998-04-13013 April 1998 Rev 0 to MNGP Colr,Cycle 19 ML20217F6431998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1998 for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant 1999-09-30
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umTe3 STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
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i SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REAUTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 73 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-22 i
NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY i
MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATINS PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-263 j
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated December 18, 1989, theNorthernStatesPowerCompany(the licensee) requested an amendment to the Technical Specifications appended to Facility Operating License No. DPR-22 for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant. The proposed amendment would revise Section 6.0 " Administrative Controls" of the facilit Technical Advisor (STA) y Technical Specifications to permit the Shift function to be performed by one of the two on-shift SeniorReactorOperators(SR0s).
This would eliminate the requirement for a dedicated STA to be on-site when one of the shift SR0s is qualified as an STA.
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A discussion of the proposed changes and the NRC staff's evaluation are presented below.
2.0 DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION
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l The present requirements for minimum normal operating shift manning at Monticello, are specified by Table 6.1.1 of the Technical Specifications.
The table specifies, that during reactor operation, a minimum of six operators must be on duty. Of the six, at least four must be licensed and two of the four licensed operators must hold SRO licenses.
In addition to the six operators, a i
Shif t Technical Advisor is also required by the table. The table does not provide for the STA and one of the SR0s to be the same individual.
The STA position was implemented as described in the licensee's letters dated i
December 31, 1979, and May 7, 1982. This position is filled by plant staff engineers on a rotating 24-hour basis.
In addition to the operators and STA required by Table 6.1.1 of the Technical Specifications, the shift also includes a licensed " Lead Operator" who normally, but not necessarily, holds an SRO license. Also, a Shift Emergency Comunicator (SEC) is on-call and available-within approximately two minutes. The SEC will be on-site or just off-site at the training center.
As stated in the May 7,1982, letter it has been the licensee's intention, sinceimplementationoftheSTArequIrement,thattheSTApositionwould eventually (when sufficiently qualified, degreed operators are available) be filled by one of the on-shift SR0s. This intention is consistent with " Option 1" of the Commission's February 13, 1986, " Policy Statement on Engineering Expertise on Shif t" (Generic Letter 86-04).
In its license amendment applica-tion dated December 18, 1989, the licensee indicates that, through programs to 9005070368 900501 l'
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obtain bachelor's degrees for operations personnel it is now possible to eliminate the separate STA position with no reduction of on-shift engineering expertise. Accordingly, the application proposes to modify the Technical Specifications to accommodate what has been its own, and the Commission's, long-stated intention.
The elimination of the separate STA would reduce, by one, the number of personnel making up the minimum required shift complement.
The staff review of the licensee's a) plication addressed two concerns: compliance with the S
)lan, Section 13.1.2, positions on n(uclear 1) plant operating organizations and (2) special concerns regarding the ability of the minimum on-site operating shif t crew / emergency response organization to cope with emergency plan requirements until augmented by the arrival of additional off-duty personnel.
The second concern is based on observations at the July 1988. Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) Inspection (50-263/88-200),
during which it was observed that the STA contributed significantly to the successful implementation of E0Ps. Personnel who observed the E0P inspection voiced concerns about the proposed amendment (Refs: Memorandum from P. Hartmann, Senior Resident Inspector, Monticello, to W. Axelson, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2, Region 3; and Note from S. Guthrie, NRR/RSIB to P. Hartmann, SRI, Monticello).
With respect to concern #1; SRP 13.1.2 specifies that single unit sites, with one unit in operation, have four licensed operators of whom two must be senior aparators.
The minimum manning level under the proposed Technical Specifications would satisfy this requirement. SRP 13.1.2 also specifies that an STA holding a bachelor's degree or equivalent in a scientific or engineering discipline, and having specific training, be included in the on-site operating organization.
Because the combined SR0/STA position will be filled by operators who are appropriately degreed and trained, the engineering expertise on-shift requirement will be satisfied.
1 To address concern #2, the staff reviewer advised the licensee that a control room or simulator demonstration of E0P implementation, without the separate STA, was desired and that an appropriate opportunity for such a demonstration would be during the March 1990, operator requalification examinations.
Requalification examinations had been previously conducted with a separate STA.
On March 27, 1990, during the simulator scenarios conducted as part of the requalification program, the reviewer and the three requalification examiners j
observed the scenarios being conducted with the licensee's proposed level of i
shift manning with the STA position being filled by the Shif t Manager (i.e., one
)
person less than for previous shift crew examinations).
It was the conclusion i
of the reviewer and examiner's that, based on the performance and observed workload, the level of shift manning, with the support of an SEC, would be adequate to implement E0Ps and Emergency Plan requirements during the initial phases of an accident (prior to augmentation by additional personnel from off-site).
The proposed amendment would also add a Note 5 to Table 6.1.1.
Note 5 would (1) cross-reference a related TS, and (2) allow the licensee to revert to use of a separate STA and Licensed Senior Operator in the event a shift crew lacks j
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-3 an individual meeting the qualifications of buth positions.
Item (1) clarifies STA requirerents specified in Technical Specification 6.1.D, is consistent with the Coms.ission's Policy Statement, FR 43623 (October 28,1985),andis acceptable.
Item (2)isconsistentwiththefacility'scurrentpracticeand is also acceptable.
Based on the staff review as described above, the proposed amendment is acceptable.
300 FNVIRONQE,N,TA,L,,CONSIDERAT_lg This amendment involves a change in a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 or changes an inspection or surveillance requirement. We have determined that the an.endment involves no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the types, of any i
effluents that may be released offsite, arid that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
The Cone.ission has previously published a proposed finding that this amendn.ent 1
involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public corrent on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environn. ental impact statement or environmental assess.
ment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment, j
4.0 CONCMSION We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above that(1)there is reasorable assurance that the health and safet ofthepub1Icwillnotbe endangered by creration in the proposed manner, (y) such activitics will be 2
conducted in compliarce with the Cor.miission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of this amendn.ent will rct be inimical to the cormon defense ar.d security or to the health and safety of the public.
1 Principal Reviewer: H. Long Dated:
May 1, 1990 J
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