ML20040E132

Proposed Tech Spec Change Substituting Revised Pages 3/4 9-4 & B 3/4 9-1,providing Alternate Method of Meeting Source Range Monitor Operability Requirements

ML20040E132
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	01/22/1982
From:	GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20040E130	List: ML20040E129 ML20040E132
References
TAC-47893, NUDOCS 8202030156
Download: ML20040E132 (3)

Text

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l ATTACHENT 2 NRC DOCKET 50-366 OPERATING LICENSE tPF-5 EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 PROPOSED CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS The proposed change to Technical Specifications (Appendix A to Operating License tPF-5) would be incorporated as follows:

Remove Page Insert Page 3/4 9-4 3/4 9-4 B 3/4 9-1 B 3/4 9-1 8202030156 820122

~ ~ ' ~

PDR ADOCK 05000366 P PDR

INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

b. Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST:

1. Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to the start of CORE ALTERATIONS, and

'2. At least once per 7 days.

c. Verifying that the channel count rate is at least 3 cps at least' once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> during CORE ALTERATIONS, and at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, except:

1. The 3 cps is not required during core alterations involving only fuel unloading provided the SRMs were confirmed to read at least 3 cps initially and were checked for neutron response.

2. The 3 cps is not required initially on a full core reload. Prior to the reload, two diagonally adjacent fuel assemblies will be loaded into their previous core positions next to each of the 4 SRMs to obtain the required count rate.

d. Verifying that the RPS circuitry " shorting links" have been removed and that the RPS circuitry is in a non-coincidence trip mode within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> prior to starting CORE ALTERATIONS or shutdown margin demonstrations.

HATCH - UNIT 2 3/4 9-4

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3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.1 REACTOR MODE SWITCH Locking the OPERABLE reactor mode switch in the refuel position ensures that the restrictions on rod withdrawal and refueling platform movement during the refueling operations are properly activated. These conditions reinforce the refueling procedures and reduce the probability of inadvertent criticality, damage to reactor internals or fuel assemblies, and exposure of personnel to excessive radioactivity.

3/4.9.2 INSTRlNENTATION The OPERABILITY of at least two source range monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core. During the unloading, it is not necessary to maintain 3 cps because core alterations will involve only reactivity removal and will not result in criticality. The loading of diagonally adjacent bundles around the SRMs before attaining the 3 cps is permissible because these bundles were in subcritical configuration when they were removed and therefore will remain subcritical when placed back in the previous positions.

3/4.9.3 CONTROL ROD POSITION The requirement that all control rods be inserted during CORE ALTERATI0t6 ensures that fuel will not be loaded into a cell without a control rod and prevents two positive reactivity changes from occurring simultaneously.

3/4.9.4 DECAY TIME Ge minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to fuel movement ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.9.5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT Secondary containment is designed to minimize any ground level release of radioactive material which may result from an accident. The reactor building provides secondary containment during normal operation when the drywell is sealed and in service. When the reactor is shutdown or during refueling, the drywell may be open and the reactor building then becomes the primary containment. The refueling floor is maintained under the secondary containment integrity of Hatch-Unit 1.

Establishing and maintaining a vacuum in the building with the standby gas treatment system once per 18 months, along with the surveillance of the doors, hatches and dampers, is adequate to ensure that there are no violations of the integrity of the secondary containment. Only one closed damper in each penetration line is required to maintain the integrity of the secondary containment.

HATCH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 9-1 l