ML20038A851
| ML20038A851 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Black Fox |
| Issue date: | 11/20/1981 |
| From: | Thessin J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20038A852 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8111240272 | |
| Download: ML20038A851 (44) | |
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I UNITED STATES OF At1 ERICA f
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0l1 MISSION OV2 31981w ".
BEFORE THE AT0t11C SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD -
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In tbs itatter of X
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ASSOCIATED ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.
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PUBLIC SERVICE C0f1PANY OF OKLAHOMA,
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Docket Hos. STil 56 AND 4
WESTERN FART 1ERS ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.
(Black Fox Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
i RESPONSE OF NRC STAFF TO INTERVEN0RS' MOTION TO RE0 PEN THE RADIOLOGICAL AND SAFETY HEARINGS AND TO INTERVENORS' PROPOSED CONTENTIONS FOR THE RE0PENED HEARINGS j
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I.
INTRODUCTION On November 5,1981, as provided in the Licensing Board's scheduling Order of October 14,1981,1/ Citizens' Action for Safe Energy, Lawrence Burrell, and Ilene Younghein ("Intervenors") filed a motion to reopen the record _/ and proposed new contentions for consideration in this 2
proceeding.3_/
In this response the NRC Staff opposes the notion to reopen on the question of financial qualifications and on the question 1/
Order (Granting as flodified, Joint !!otion to Establish Hearing Schedule), October 14, 1981.
4 2f Intervenors' Motion to Reopen the Radiological and Safety Hearings, filed November 5, 1981.
3/
Intervenors' Proposed Contentions for the Continued Radiological an'd Safety Hearing, filed November 5,1981.
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' e of the change in containment design.
The Staff also contends that to the extent noted the contentions advanced by the Intervenors should be rejected.
j II. BACKGROUND The accident at Three tiile Island, Unit 2, occurred on March 28, 1979, shortly af ter the hearing record was closed in this proceeding, but before a partial initial decision could be issued. On August 11, 1979, the Applicants moved to reopen the record and establish a schedule of 4
hearings to "be held for the purpose of generally exploring those aspects of the TMI-2 accident that are partinent to this proceeding."O IntervenorsE and the State of Oklahoma,E while not objecting to reopening the record, opposed establishing a hearing schedule until after the issuance of the Long Term Recommendations of the TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force and of the final reports of the Kemeny Commission and the Rogovin Special Inquiry Group. Staff responded that it would soon issue a generic letter setting ' orth the requirements to be net after the y
Request for Hearing and Motion to Establish Hearing Schedule, August 11, 1979.
5]
Intervenors' Response to Applicant's Request for Hearing and Motion to Establish Hearing Schedule, August 27, 1979.
p Response of Interested State of Oklahona to Applicant's Request for Hearing and Motion to Establish Hearing Schedule, August 27, 1979.
s 3-T!!I-2 accident by construction permit applicants.E In response, in an Order of October 25, 1979, the Licensing Board deferred setting a hearing schedule, but apparently reopened the record to explore those aspects of the THI-2 accident that are pertinent to the proceeding.E The Board stated that "the parties shall confer in an effort to agree upon the
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scope of the reopened hearings, and to agree upon a schedule for such proceedings to be keyed to the issuance of Supplement No. 3 to the Safety Evaluation Report."U Subsequently, the parties agreed, and the Board j
ordered, that contentions concerning Applicants' compliance witn Tl11-rep ted and emergency planning requirements should be filed on November 5,1981.E i
t On November 5,1981, Intervenors filed a motion to reopen the record on the issues of Applicants' financial qualifications and a proposed design changa to the containment structure.E In addition, Intervenors submitted fifteen contentions,E many of which address matters 7f NRC Staff Answer to Applicants' Request for Hearing and Supplemental Answer to State of Oklahona's Motion for Stay and Intervenors' 110 tion to Reopen, October 9,1979.
8]
Order (October 25,1979).
9/
Id. at 2-3, emphasis added, i
i
-10/ Order (Granting, As flodified, Joint flotion To Establish Hearing Schedule), dated October 14, 1981.
H/ Intervenors' Motion to Reopen the Radiological and Safety Hearings, November 5, 1981.
12f Intervenors' Proposed Contentions for the Continued Radiological and, Safety Hearings, November 5,1981.
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-4 concerning compliance with the emergency planning and pending Ti1I-related requirements for construction permit applicants.N Intervenors in filing these contentions are apparently assuning that the record has already been reopened on such matters. E In responding to the Intervenors' proposed contentions, the Staff has assumed that the record in this proceeding has been recpened, but only to the extent that the Licensing Board eventually accepts as valid contentions concerning the Applicants' compliance with emergency planning and Ti1I-related requirements.EI As a result, Staff has not provided an i
analysis of the compliance of the proposed Ti1I-related contentions with the standardsEl for reopening closed records.
Because the evidentiary
-13/ Letter to Construction Penait Applicants from D. G. Eisenhut, dated July 14, 1981.
-14/ Applicants in " Applicants' Motion to Reopen the Record", dated November 5,1981, take no position on whether the record has already been reopened on the _ question of Till-related requirements. Staff, for the purpose of its filing, "Itotion of NRC Staff to Reopen the Record for the Purpose of Receiving into Evidence a Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report", dated November 5,1981, considered it prudent to assume that the evidentiary record has not yet been reopened.
-15/ If the record is reopened in a proceeding, the scope of the reopened hearing should be limited to matters directly relevant to the reasons for reopening, see Pacific Gas 2.nd Electric Co. (Diablo 4
Canyon, Units 1 and 2), CLI-81-5,13 NRC 361 (1981).
,16/ See discussion in-the following section.
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record at best has been reopened for a limited purpose regarding Applicants' compliance with T!!I-related and emergency planning requirenents, contentions addressing other issues must be analyzed against these standards for reopening closed records, as the Staff has done below.
If the Licensing Board in its Order of October 29, 1979, did not intend to reopen the record closed on February 28,1979,El then Intervenors' contentions must be summarily rejected, unless and until '. hey make the required showing for reopening the record. The Commission has made clear that a party wishing to tcopen on Tril-related issues must make a particularized shcwing, producing new evidence that is not included in the previous record and that materially affects the decision.El The standards for reopening are discussed more fully in the succeeding section.
It suffices to say that Intervenors have not attempted to produce any new evidence on their Ti1I-related assertions, whose significance would affect the outcome of this proceeding.
III.
DISCUSSION A.
Motions to Reopen As noted above, a party who moves to reopen a closed evidentiary record before an initial decision has been rendered bears a heavy burden.
Several standards must be met before such a motion is granted:
E/ Tr. 8600.
18,/ Diablo Canyon, supra, at 362 et seq.
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1.
the basis for a motion to reopen must be newly discovered information or information whose significance could not earlier have been anticipated;E 2.
the matters addressed by this information must be of major significance to the licensing of the plant;E and 3.
the newly discovered infonnation must be such that it might affect the outcone of the proceeding where no initial decision has been rendered,E or that it would change the outcome where such a decision has been rendered or where a previously uncontested Staff conclusion has already been made. E To support a motion to reopen, a party either must bring forward new information which on its face raises a serious issue or must set forth by
-19/ Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vemont Yankee), ALAB-124, 6 AEC 358, 364-365 (1973); subsequent opinions in ALAB-126, 6 AEC 394; ALAB-138, 6 AEC 520, 523; and ALAB-167, 6 AEC 1151 (1973).
In this proceeding, this standard of "new information" would require that the information relied upon must have come to light subsequent to the close of the record on February 28, 1979. Both the Applicants and the Staff had agreed not to assert that Intervenors should have filed any motions to reopen at a date earlier than November 5,1981.
See Order, October 14, 1981, supra, at 3.
20/ Vemont Yankee, ALAB-124, _Id., at 364.
-21/
E.., Public Service Co. of Oklahoma (Black Fox, Units 1 and 2),
LA -573,10 NRC 775, 804 (1979).
-22/ Kansas Gas and Electric Co. (Wolf Creek, Unit 1). ALAB-462. 7 NRC 320(1978).
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affidavit of a competent expert how the new material raises a serious 23/ Bare allegations or the simple submission of new concern.
contentions is not sufficient.S$/
The Intervenors have moved to reopen the record directly on two issues, financial qualifications and the changes of containment design,SE/ and indirectly on hvo others, environmental qualification and documentation of Applicants' deviations from the Commission's Standard Review Plan.26/ As the Staff discusses below, Intervenors have made an insufficient showing to justify reopening the record on any cf these na tters.
1.
Financial Qualifications Intervenors moved to reopen the record to reconsider the issue of whether Applicants "have funds, or have reasonable assurance of obtaining the funds necessary to safely construct a nuclear power plant."22/
In
---23/ Vermont Yankee, ALAB-124, supra, at 364. An affidavit would not be required if a party could point to admissions and statements from the Applicants or the NRC Staff found in official NRC documents or elsewhere, Diablo Canyon, supra, at 363.
24/ Diablo Canyon, supra, at 363.
2j5/ Intervenors' liotion to Reopen the Radiological and Safety Record, served on November 5,1981, at 2 and 8.
---26/ Intervenors' Proposed Contentions for the Continued Radiological and Safety Hearings, filed November 5,1981, Proposed Contentions 1 and 10, a t 2, 6-7.
2]/ Intervenors' Motion, supra, at 2, 8.
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8-support of their motion, Intervenors present several arguments.
- First, in Intervenors' view, the Staff's initial determination of financial qualifications was based on data now outmoded. According to Intervenors, the economic and financial conditions affecting the nuclear industry overall and the Applicants in particular have changed dramatically.E As a result, the projections issued as the basis for the original Staff determination have changed, particularly the total estimated cost for constructing the two units. E Second, the Intervenors contend that a recent report by Touche P,os.,
and Company,E erformed for the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, p
28/
Id., at 4.
-29/ Intervenors flotion, supra, at 4-5.
These arguments are not new.
Both the Intervenors and the State of Oklahoma in 1979 had attempted to reopen the record on the issue of financial qualifications because of the inadequacy of the data in the record on the issue, "due to inflation, construction delays" and the effect of the Tl11-2 accident.
Increases in the plant's construction costs and the derating of utilities' debt securities were also cited. The Licensing Board properly rejected these argunents and refused at that time to reopen the record on the issue of financial qualifications.
Order (June 13, 1979). See tiotion of the State of Oklahoma for an Indefinite Stay in the Issuance of an Initial Decision in the above-captioned proceeding, dated April 19, 1979.
Intervenors' Response to llotion of the State of Oklahoma for an Indefinite Stay in the Issuance of an Initial Decision in the Above-Captioned Proceeding, dated April 27, 1979.
g Touche Ross and Co., " Economic Viability Study", Black Fox Station, August 1981. See attachment to letter to Licensing Board from Joseph Gallo, dated September 8,1981.
O "shows that the reasonable assurance standard can no longer be net by these Applicants for a construction pennit for Black Fox Station."Sl/
Intervenors point to the report's finding that a coal-fired facility is economically more attractive than the Black Fox nuclear facility.32/
They place particular saphasis on one of the report's conclusion that "although PS0 is currently rated Aa, [ Touche Ross'] review of the historical and prospective financial condition of the company indicates that significant difficulties exist with respect to the ability to meet certain minimum financial integrity parameters and to ensure continued capital market access at reasonable cost."SS/
Finally, Intervenors assert that the issue of financial qualifications is directly related to safety. They support this conclusion with a reference found in the Statement of Considerations which accompanied the promulgation in 1968 of Appendix C to 10 C.F.R. Part 50 and with the a.rgument of the dissent in Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook, Units 1 and 2).2 /
31/ Intervenors' Motion, supra, at 4.
32/
Id.
33/ Touche Ross and Co., supra, at 113. See Intervenors' tiotion, jurra, at 5.
34/ ALAB-422,6NRC33(1977), dissent at 109.
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Although their arguments may have superficial appeal, Intervenors have failed to make the required showing for raopening the record on the issue of Applicants' financial qualifications.
Intervenors have failed to show how the information presented would affect the conclusion that "each of the applicants has reasonable assurance of obtaining the funds... necessary to design and construct the facility including related fuel cycle costs as required by Section 50.33(f) of and Appendix C to 10 C.F.R. Part 50."3_5/
i The requirenent of the regulation, f 50.33(f), is that an applicant "has reasonable assurance of obtaining the necessary funds" to cover construction and fuel cycle costs.
This does not require that an applicant demonstrate near certainty that it will never be pressed for funds in the course of construction.3p/ n fact, it is to be expected I
that variables--such as interest rates, the stock and bond narkets and the regulatory climate--will change from time to time during construction.3Z/ ven a drop in an applicant's bond rating with a E
~~~35/ Safety Evaluation Report, Black Fox Station, Supplement No.1, NUREG-0190, Supp. No. 2, September 5, 1978, at p. 20-8.
---36/ Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook, Units 1 and 2),
CLI-78-1, 7 NRC 1, 18 (1978), affd. sub nom. New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v. NRC, 582 F.2d 87 (1st Cir.1981).
32/
Ij!., at 19.
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1 consequent increase in the cost of its capital is not a fatal
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impediment to a finding of " reasonable assurance of obtaining the necessary funds", unless it can be shown that this change would prevent an applicant fran actually raising the requisite funds.28/
Intervenors have failed to show how the evidence they cite supports a conclusion that the Applicants no longer have a reasonable assurance of obtaining the necessary funds.
Even Intervenors' most conpelling statement--that for the Applicant Public Service of Oklahoma "significant difficulties exist with respect to the ability to meet certain minimum I
financial integrity parameters and to ensure continued capital market access at reasonable cost"2E/--fails to support their t.esis.
It is apparent from a close reading of the section of the report supporting this conclusion that the " financial integrity parameters" and " continued market access at reasonable cost" refer to the parameters necessary to maintain PS0's current.Aa bond rating and the reasonable interest rates available to utility with this high quality investment rating.SE/
38/
Id., at 20.
39/ Touche Ross and Co., supra, at 113; cited at Intervenors' Motion,
- p. 5.
---40/ See, Touche Ross, Id., at 76-77.
The Commission noted in its Seabrook opinion, ale 20, that twelve utilities licensed by the NRC possessed appreciably lower bond ratings of Baa. The Commission noted that the evidence presented indicated that the Seabrook applicant, with its Baa bond rating, would be able to sell its bonds and raise the funds necessary to build the plant.
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9 To meet the standards for reopening a closed evidentiary record on the question of financial qualifications, it is not enough for Intervenors to present evidence that a coal-fired plant may present a more astute investment for the Applicants.
Nor is it enough to show that one of the Applicants is in danger at some point of seeing its high quality bond rating diminished. What a notion to reopan the record on financial qualification requires--and what Intervenors have failed to show--is new information which might affect the outcome of ', nether the Applicants have reasonable assurance of obtaining necessary funds.
Without such a showing, the issue of financial qualifications should not be reopened.
2.
Change in Containment Design Intervenors also moved to reopen the record to consider a change in containment design.
Intervenors " submit that the change could have significant impact on safety,"S3/ pointing to what they see as a failure to provide sufficient preliminary design information an the change.
Because Intervenors have failed to nake any showing of how the matters they raise are of major significance to plant safety or how the new information might affect the outcome of the previous hearing on 41/ Intervenors' Motion, supra, pp. 8-9, emphasis added.
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Intervenors' Contention 16, their notion to reopen the record on this issue should be denied.
As noted above, once an evidentiary record has been closed, a party who wishes to reopen the record must do more than merely make bare allegations or submit new contentions.32/ If the information provided to support a notion to reopen does not on its face raise a serious safety question, then the moving party must provide the affidavit of a competent expert to point out how the matter sought to be raised is both serious and relevant.33/ Because Intervenors have done no more than baldly assert that a significant safety problem "could" be present, and because the information concerning the design change both in the Intervenors' motion to reopen and in their statenent of proposed Con-tention 12 does not on its face raise a serious safety concern, Intervenors have failed to comply with the standards for reopening a closed evidentiary record on this matter.
3.
Environment Qualification Intervenors have proposed a contention on the issue of environmental qualification of safety equipment.SS/ Because this contention does not 42/ Diablo Canyon, supra, at 363.
43/ Vermont Yankee, ALAB-124, supra, at 364.
---44/ Intervenors' Contention 1.
"The Applicant has not demonstrated that it will be in compliance with NUREG-0588 and Generic Technical Activity A-24 for existing safety related equipment and equipnent added as a result of post-TMI requirements."
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allege noncompliance with requirements arising from the accident at THI-2, it must be treated as a notion to reopen the record.
Intervenors have failed to show how the infomation upon which this assertion is based either is new or would materially affect the outcome of the pro-ceeding.$ Therefore, the contention does not satisfy the standards for reopening a closed evidentiary record.
In fact, this assertion would even lack the requisite specificity to qualify as a contention; it fails to identify which equipment is unqualified or which requirenents are unmet.
As such, the assertion fails to put the parties on notice of the issue to belitigated.$
It has been an NRC requirement of long-standing that safety structures, systems and components be compatible with environmental conditions under both routine and accident conditions. $ During the
@ Vemont Yankee, ALAB-124, supra, 364-365; Black Fox, ALAB-573, supra, 804.
-46/ Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-216, 9 AEC 13, 20 (1974).
-47/ Appendix A,10 C.F.R. Part 50, General Design Crit
- ion 4 Environmental and missile design bases. Structures, systens, and components important to safety shall be designed to accomnodate the effects of and to be compatible with the environmental conditions associated with nomal operation, naintenance, testing, and postulated accidents, including loss-of-coolant accidents. These structures, systens, and conponents shall be appropriately protected against dynamic effects, including the effects of missiles, pipe whipping, and discharging fluids, that nay result from equipment failures and from events and conditions outside the nuclear power unit.
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previous hearing, the NRC Staff discussed how it was reviewing compliance with this requirement as part of Task Action Plan A-24.4E/ Thus Intervenors are not able to contend that concern with environmental qualifications is a matter whose signficance has been discovered for the first time since the close of the record in this matter.
Nor can Intervenors claim that NUREG-0588 grew out of the THI-2 accident. The version of NUREG-0588 cited by Intervenors indicates clearly that the positions contained in it "were developed prior to the Staff completion of the THI-2 event evaluation and any additional requirenents or modifications to these positions as a result of this evaluation will be identified later."SE/ The most recent version of this guidance also does not include any nodifications or clarifications resulting from the THI-2 accident.EE/ Thus, the document cited by Intervenors, by its own terms, is not the result of the THI-2 accident and 4p/ Testimony of Aycock, Crocker and Thomas, at TAP-28 et. seq., see Tr. 8310.
---49/ NUREG-0588 For Comment, Interin Staff Position on Environ, ental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipnent, December 1979, Introduction, p. 1.
j 50/ NUREG-0588, Revision 1, July 1981, p. 1.
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Contention 1, for which this document is the basis, cannot be considered aT!!I-relatedissue.El/
Furthernore, Intervenors' assertion, viewed as a proposed contention, lacks specificity.
Intervenors' efforts to justify reopening a record nust do nore than merely list the nanes of newly published staff guidarte l
with which compliance is alleged to be lacking.j2/ Without more, Intervenors have failed to show how the information referenced in Contention 1 is either new or materially affects the outcone of the proceeding.
Thus, the record should not be reopened to consider the issue Intervenors attempt to raise.
4.
Documentation of Deviations Although Intervenors have advanced their proposed Contention 10, concerning documentation of deviations from the Standard Review Plan as i
~~~51/This conclusion is not altered by the fact that Intervenors include in this assertion " equipment added as a result of post-T!11 requirements."
If the proposed contention does not involve the adequacy of Applicants' response to Ti1I-related requirements, its consideration requires that the record first be reopened.
The Intervenors must show how the issue warrants reopening the closed i
record, just as thef have attenpted to do with respect to financial qualifications and to the change in containment design.
52/ See Gulf States Utilities Company (River Bend, Units 1 and 2),
ALAB-444, 6 NRC 760, 771 (1977).
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though it concerned an issue arising out of the Tit!-2 accident, this proposed contention must be properly addressed as a notion to reopen the i
record.
Because Intervenors have failed to meet the standards for such i
reopening, their proposed contention should be rejected.
Intervenors have confused the question of deviations fran the 1
I Standard Review Plan--for which documentation has never been a regulatory requirement--with deviations from the regulations.
It has always been a requirement that applicants be in compliance with all regulations,p3/
unless a specific exemption from a regulation has been granted.ES/
Several reasons support rejection of this contention.
First, the issue of whether or not deviations from the 3tandard Review Plan should 4
be documented is not a new concern arising out of the accident at Tit!-2.
As Intervenors correctly note, this issue has been under active consideration since at least Septenber 20, 1976, long before the Ti1I-2
'I accident. liere references to post-accident documents--which at most indicate that the issue is still under active consideration--are insufficient to show either that the questicn is newly discovered or that the issue has assumed an importance which otherwise could not earlier have been understood.EE/ Thus, Intervenors have failed to meet the standard that the information supporting reopening a closed record aust be " newly discovered."
33/ 10 C.F.R. 5 50.50.
j4/ 10 C.F.R. 9 50.12.
1 jjf Vermont Yankee, ALAB-124, supra, at 364.
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- Second, Intervenors fail to show how this issue--even if it were assumed to be one newly discovered since the Tl11-2 accident--raises a major concern for the plant safety of Black Fox nuclear plant.55/
Intervenors fail to identify any specific deficiency in the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report, where a deviation exists, is not documented, and consequently raises a major issue of plant safety. The Licensing Board is left with no supporting basis, or even colorable allegations, for how the outcome of this proceeding could be affected by a consideration of this question. Thus Intervenors have failed to meet the significance test for reopening a closed evidentiary record.
Third, Intervenors' assertion of a failure to document deviations lacks the requisite specificity.
If the Licensing Board were to accept this assertion as an issue in any subsequent hearing, the parties would be forced to embark on an enormous fishing expedition to find deviations--
if any--from the multitude of items in the Standard Review Plan. This lack of specificity would be fatally defective if Intervenors' assertion were judged by the standards governing contentions;j7/ the same failure is equally fatal under the higher standards for reopening a closed record.
l 56/ Id.
---57/ 10 C.F.R. @ 2.714(b); e.g., Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend, Units 1 and 2), ALAS-444, 6 NRC 760, 772 et seq.
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B.
Intervenors' Proposed Contentions As a general matter, in order for proposed contentions to be found admissible, they must fall within the scope of the issues set forth in the Notice of Hearing initiating the proceeding, and comply with the requirements of 10 C.F.R. @ 2.714(b) and applicable Commission case law.
1 10 C.F.R. 9 2.714(b) requires that a list of contentions which are intervenor seeks to have litigated be filed along with the bases for those contentior.3 set forth with reasonable specificity. The purpose of the requirement of 10 C.F.R. 5 2.714 for a basis is to a) assure that the contention in question does not suffer from any infirmities,5_8/
i b) to establish a sufficient foundation to warrant further inquiry into the subject matter addressed by the assertion, and c) to put the other parties l
sufficiently on notice "so that they will know at least generally what they will have to defend against or oppose."E 5_8/ A contention must be rejected where:
(a) it constitutes an attack on applicable statutory requirements; (b) it challenges the basic structure of Commission's regulatory process or is an attack on the regulations; (c) it is nothing more than a generalization regarJing he intervenor's view of what applicable policies ought to be; i
(d) it seeks to raise an issue which is not proper for adjudication in the proceeding or does not apply to the facility in question; or (e) it seeks to raise an issue which is not concrete or I
litigable.
Philadelphia Electric Co. Peach Bottom, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-216, 8 AEC 13, 20-21 (1974).
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J In analyzing the Tril-related contentions which Intervenors have proposed, Staff has-assumed the validity of the guidance articulated in fiUREG-0718, Rev.15S/ and in the pending rule covering near-term construction penait applicants.51/ This approach is consistent with the Connission's authorization to the Staff to apply the position asserted in these directives to pending construction permit applications.j2/
lie will, of course, advise the Board and the parties of any changes in the status of the pending rules which have a bearing on this proceeding.
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Intervenors' Contention 1: Environmental Qualification This contention has been discussed above as a notion to reopen the record.
Intervenors' Contention 2:
- "The Applicant has not demonstrated that it will meet the requirenents of
{0/ " Licensing Requirements for Pending Applications for Construction Pernits and flanufacturing License", published June 1981.
---61/ Attachment to Letter to Construction Permit applicants from D. G.
Eisenhut, dated July 14, 1981.
_6_2./ Id.
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10 C.F.R. 50.34(e)(2)[ xvii] and (xix) b and Reg. Guide 1.97 Rev. 2 in the following areas:
a.
The Applicant has not provided sufficient preliminary design information to show that it can provide an on-line nonitor capable of continuous sampling of halogens and provide a timely indication of actual releases of radioactive halogens and particulate from all potential accident release points,
- b. The Applicant has failed to provide sufficient preliminary design information with respect to instrunentation for monitoring accident conditions.
They have not provided conceptual design infomation or justifications for alternatives to items in Reg. Guide 1.97, Rev. 2 as required by 10 C.F.R. 50.34(e)(2)(xvii) and [xix].
c.
The Applicant has not provided sufficient prelininary design infomation to show how it will meet the environmental qualifications requirements described in Reg. Guide 1.97, Rev. 2, for post-accident monitoring instruments."
This contention should be rejected because it lacks specificity. All Intervenors state in this contention is that Applicants' have failed to neet the proposed requirements because of insufficient infomation or lack of justification for alternatives.
Intervenors provide no specfic indication of how Applicants' infomation is inadequate.
In the face of the information 63/ The cited portions of proposed rule 50.34(e)(2) read as follows:
(e)(2)
To satisfy the following requirement, the application shall provide sufficient infomation to demonstrate that the required actions will be satisfactorily completed by the operating license stage.
This infomation is of the type customarily required to satisfy 10 C.F.R. 50.35(a)(2) or to address unresolved generic safety issues.
hii)
Provide instrumentation to measure, record and readout in the control roon: (A) containment pressure, (B) ccntainment water level, (C) containment hydrogen concentration, (D) containment radiation intensity (high level) and (E) noble gas effluents at all potential accident release wints.
Provide for continuous sampling of radioactive iodines and particulates in gaseous effluents fron all potential accident release points, and for onsite capability to i
analyze and measure these samples... (xix)
Provide instrumentation adequate for monitoring plant conditions following an accident that includes core danage.
supplied by the Applicants $ and their commitment to meet the requirements of Reg. Guide 1.97, Revision 2 on instrumentation for post accident nonitoring, a more specific allegation is required to put the parties and the Licensing Board on notice of the issue they must address. SI Intervenors' Contention 3: ECCS f10DELS "The Applicant has not adequately deno rated compliance with 10 C.F.R. 50.34(e)(1)(iii), (v), (viii) and (xi) because it has not fully resolved
-64/ PSAR Amendment 17, Addendum II, pp. 140-144, 149-151. Of course, Staff's reference to the Applicants' PSAR is not offered for the truth of the statenent so referenced.
It is well established that a Licensing Board should not consider the merits of a contention in deciding its admissibility; 11ouston Lighting and Power Company ( Allens Creek), ALAB-590,1 flRC 545, 546, ej. seq.
Instead the PSAR amendment is referenced to show how the Intervenors' failure to provide any supporting basis for their assertion provides the other parties and the Board with no notice as to the issues in controversy. Peach Bottom, supra, at 20.
65/ Peach Bottom, supra, at 20.
M/ The cited portions of proposed rule 50.34(e)(1) read as follows:
(e)(1) To satisfy the following requirenents, the applicant shall provide sufficient infonnation to describe the nature of the studies, how they are to be conducted, estimated submittal dates, and a program to ensure that the results of such studies are factored into the final design.
(iii)
Perform an evaluation of the potential for an impact of reactor coolant pump seal danage following a snall-break LOCA with loss of offsite power.
If damage cannot be precluded, provide an analysis of the limiting small-break Loss of Coolant Accident with subsequent reactor coolant punp seal damage.
(N Perform an evaluation of the safety effectiveness of providing for separation of High Pressue Core Spray (HPCS) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system intiation levels so that the RCIC system initiates at a higher water level than the HPCS system, and of providing that both systems restart on low water level.
(viii)
Perform a study of the effect on all core-cooling nodes under accident conditions of designing the core spray and low pressure coolant injection systems to ensure that the systens will automatically restart on loss of water level, after having been manually stopped, if an initiation signal is still present.
(xi)
Provide an evaluation of depressurization methods, other than by full actuation of the automatic depress"rization system, that would c
reduce the possiblity of exceeding vessel integrity linits during cooldown.
i
deficiencies in its computer models for ECCS and Fuel perfomance as 2
identified in flVREG-0630."
Staff believes that this contention should be rejected as lacking basis.
Intervenors have failed to specify how deficiencies in the computer models for ECCS and fuel performance have any relevance to the I
standards of proposed rule 50.34(e)(1)(iii), (v), (vii) or (xi).
The basis of fered by Intervenors for this contention is flVREG-0630, entitled " Cladding Swelling and Rupture 11odels for LOCA Analysis," dated I
April 1980.
In relevant part, this analysis reviewed the GE model of cladding behavior under conditions associated with loss of coolant accidentsE and found certain deficiencies.E Ilodels of this type estinate the degree of swelling and rupturing of the fuel cladding during assumed LOCA conditions.E This information is then used in complex computer codes required by 10 C.F.R. E 50.46 and Appendix K to Part 50 to calculate various l
othercorevariables.E j
Thus while f1VREG-0630 nay provide some basis for an assertion of deficiencies in LOCA computations, Intervenors have nade no showing of how these models--and any defects in these models--have relevance to the cited proposed rules concerning reactor cooling pump seal damage,E 67/ flVREG-0630, at 2.
68/ jd. at 61, 68-71.
8 69/ jd.,at1.
9 l
70/ Id.
H/ Proposed rule 50.34(e)(1)(iii).
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separation of spray systen'initation levels E restart of the core spray and low pressure coolant injection systems,E and the need for evalua' ting depressurization methods.E Without such a nexus, Intervenors have failed to provide a basis for their proposed contention.
Intervenors' Contention 4: Control Room /Hunan FactorsE "The Applicant has not performed an independent human factors review of the control room design concepts utilized in the proposed Black Fox control room, nor has it applied the evaluation criteria in NUREG-0700
[ Guidelines for Control Roon Design Reviews, September 1981]."
1 l
This contention should be rejected for failure to meet the specificity requirements of 2.714(b).
In view of Applicants' commitment to perfonn a control roon evaluation plan which will meet the guidance in NUREG-0700,E something more is needed than the simple assertion that 3
R/ Proposed rule 50.34(e)(1)(v).
l H/ Proposed rule 50.34(e)(1)(viii).
74f Proposed rule 50.34(e)(1)(xi).
75/ Proposed rule 50.34(e)(2)(iii) reads as follows:
(e)(2) To satisfy the following requirement, the applicant shall provide sufficient information to demonstrate that the required actions will be satisfactorily completed by the operating license stage.
This information is of the type customarily required to satisfy 10 C.F.R. 50.35(a)(2) or to address unresolved generic safety issues.
(iii)
Provide, for Commission review, a control room design that reflects state-of-the-art human factor principles prior to committing to fabrication or revision of fabricated control room panels and layouts.
76/ PSAR, supra, Addendum II at p. 48.
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Applicants have failed to meet sone undefined requirenent.
Further, although Applicants' PSAR provides an extended discussion of how the control room review is to be perforned, Intervenors fail to indicate with any specificity either how this review fails to take account of the evaluation criteria in NUREG-07000 or why it must be performed prior to obtaining a construction permit.
Intervenors' Contention 5: Plant Shielding "The Applicant has failed to perform adequate radiation and shielding design reviews to,4)sess the need for shielding as required by 10 C.F.R. 50.34(e)(2)(vii).m Nor have they demonstrated that the possible design changes are technically feasible and that there exists reasonable assurance that the requirenents will be properly implemented."
^
22/ Proposed rule 50.34(e)(2)(vii) reads as follows:
(e)(2) To satisfy the following requirement, the application shall provide sufficient information to demonstrate that the required actions will be satisfactorily completed by the operating license stage. This information is of the type customarily required to satisfy 10 C.F.R. 50.35(a)(2) or to address unresolved generic safety issues... (vii)
Perform radiation and shielding design reviews of spaces around systens that may, as a result of an accident, contain TID 14844 source tena radio-active materials, and design as necessary to pennit adequate access to important areas and to protect safety equipment fran the radiation envi ronment.
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This contention should be. rejected because it lacks specificity.
In the light of Applicants' commitment to perfom the required design reviews,E ntervenors must do more than nerely as-t that Applicants I
have failed to meet the requirements of proposed rule 50.34(e)(2)(vii).
Intervenors' contention appears to assert that the review must be completed at the construction permit stage. There is an insufficient basis to support this position in the face of the standard found in the proposed regulation, which Intervenors cite with approval, that such reviews need not be completed until a later date.
In addition, Intervenors have failed to specify how Applicants' proposed options are not feasible or are incapable of implementation.
In view of the information Applicants have cited on these options in the PSAR,E something more is needed than the simple negative assertion that the design options listed are not technically feasible.
Intervenors' Contention 6: Degraded Core-Reliability Analysis "The Applicant has failed to submit a program plan that demonstrates how
~
assessnentasrequiredby10C.F.R.50(e)(1)(1),ggbabilisticrisk-it will conduct an adequate site / plant-specific i
because they have 78/ PSAR, supra Addendun II, p. 104.
79/ Id., at 107 - 108.
8_0/ Proposed rule 50.34(e)(1)(1) reads as follows:
requirement the applicant shall (e)(1) To satisfy the folle.
N provide sufficient infor:'t' mn
".o # scribe the nature of the studies, how they are '.6 W cm ucted, estimated submittal dates and
. alts of such studies are factored a program to ensure tLl i.s into the final design of the f acf !ity.
(i)
Perfom a plant /s N-specific probabilistic risk assessment, the aim of which is to seek such improvements in the reliability of core and containment heat removal systems as are significant and practical and do not impact excessively on the olant.
~
failed to include accidents more severe than those listed in PSAR Chapter 15; because they have not included an extended Liquid Pathway Study including the effects of the underclay layer on the Liquid Pathway; and because they have not established acceptance criteria for judging the acceptability of the results."
The p]rtions of this contention concerning accident sequences and the Liquid Pathway Study should be rejected for lack of basis.
- First, Intervenors fail to provide any reason for asserting that Applicants have failed to include accidents more severe than those identified in PSAR Chapter 15, when Applicants indicate that their assessment will consider "LOCA (small, intermediate and large), loss of feedwater, turbine trip and loss of offsite power, together with the accidents and transients identified in the PSAR Chapter 15 and those applicable accidents in WASH-1400."El/
Second, Intervenor s do not provide any basis to show how the performance of a liquid pathway study would lead to significant and practicable improvements in core and containment heat removal systems, the goal articulated in proposed rule 50.34(ef(1)(i), citad with approval by Intervenors.
On the other hand, Intervenors' assertion concerning the lack of acceptance criteria addresses the issue of whether the Applicants' proposed assessment will be capable of satisfying the goal of the proposed i
requirement. This part of the contention should be accepted as a valid contention.
31/ PSAR Amendment 17, Addendum II, supra at 2.
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Intervenors' Contention 7: Safety / Relief Valve Testing
" Applicant has failed to comply with 10 C.F.R. 50.34(e)(2)(x)S/ ecause b
it has not committed to demonstrate the applicability of the generic valve tests described in the PSAR to the plant-specific valve and piping design of Black Fox or to modify their design on the basis of plant-specific testing. Also, the tests have not been conducted over ATWS conditions and thus" are not adequate to assure safety."
This contention should be rejected.
Intervenors have failed to provide a basis for asserting that Applicants have not connitted to demon-strate the applicability of the generic tests to the plant design, when g/ Proposed rule 50.34(e)(2)(x) reads as follows:
(e)(2) To satisfy the following requirament, the application shall provide sufficient infomation to demonstrate that the required actions will be satisfactorily completed by the operating license stage.
This infomation is of the type customarily required to satisfy 10 C.F.R. 50.35(a)(2) or to address unresolved generic safety issues.
(x)
Provide a test progran and associated model development and conduct tests to qualify reactor coolant system relief and safety valves and, for PWR's PORV block valves, for all fluid conditions expected under operating conditions, transients and accidents.
Consideration of Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS) conditions shall be included in the test program. Actual testing under ATWS conditions need not be carried out until subsequent phases of the test program are developed.
I l
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- the Applicant states that it will " document the applicability of the results [of generic tests] to Black Fox Station."E In its second part, the Contention appears to be an assertion that thes tests must be completed at the construction pemit stage. There is an insufficient basis to support this assertion in the face of the standard found in the proposed regulation, which Intervenors cite with approval, that such tests need not be carried out until a later date.
Intervenors' Contention 8: Detection Of ' Inadequate Core Cooling
" Applicant has failed to provide reliminary design infomation required by 10 C.F.R. 50.34(e)(2)(xviii),8gI at a level consistent with that nomally required at the construction pemit stage of review with respect to the design of their system for monitoring conditions leading to inadequate core cooling, including in-core themocouples. Nor have they demonstrated that their design concept is technically feasible and within the state of the art or that there exists reasonable assurance that the requirements will be implemented properly."
83/ PSAR, klendment 17, Addendun II, supra, at 121.
84_/ Proposed rule 50.34(e)(2)(xviii) reads as follows:
(e)(2) To satisfy the following requirement, the application shall provide sufficient infomation to demonstrate that the required actions will be satisfactorily completed by the operating license stage. This infomation is of the type custonarily required to satisfy 10 C.F.R. 50.35(a)(2) or to address unresolved generic safety issues...
(xviii)
Provide instruments that provide in the control rocm an unambiguous indication of inadequate core cooling, such as primary coolant saturation neters in PWR's, and a suitable combination of signals from indicators of coolant level in the reactor vessel and in-core themocouples in PWR's and BWR's.
I
30 -
This contention should be rejected because it lacks basis.
Intervenors have not specified in what way the Applicants have fail to provide adequate design information, when Applicants have provided design infornation in PSAR anendment 17, Addendun II, at pp. 145-148; As such, this contention is insufficient to put the parties on notice of what' they will have to defend against or oppose.SE/
Intervenors' Contention 9: Water Level fleasurenent 50.34(e)(2)(xviii)8gpt demonstrated compliance with 10 C.F.R.
"The Applicant has
'i
-- and the requirenent for an unambiguous indication of inadequate core cooling because it relies mainly on several vessel water level ceasurements which may be misleading because they do not have a common reference level. The Applicant has failed to provide sufficient preliminary design infornation to show that its design will provide an unambiguous indication of water level under all transient and accident conditions."
The first sentence of this contention provides a basis and is specific.
The second sentence, however, goes beyond the proposed regulation which Intervenors have cited with approval. The contention calls not for an
" unambiguous indication of inadequate core cooling", as required in proposed j
rule 50.34(e)(2)(xviii), but for an " unambiguous indication of water level under all... conditions".
Intervenors have provided no basis for such a change in the requirements that Applicants must meet.
1 I
35/ Peach Bottom, supra, at 20.
~~86/ See discussion of Intervenors' contention 8 for a statement-of the proposed role.
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Intervenor's Contention 10:
This contention has been discussed above as a motion to _ reopen the record.
Intervenors' Contention 11:
Contrary to the principles of the River Rend decision (ALAB-444), the Applicant has failed to include in its PSAR an adequate action plan for BFS with respect to the following unresolved safety issues which the Staff identified as a result of investigations of the Tf11-2 accident
[NUREG-0705: " Identification of New Unresolved Safety Issues' Relating to l
Nuclear Power Plants," flarch 1981]:
1.
Shutdown Decay Heat Removal Requirements, Task A-45.
2.
Safety Implications of Control Systems. Task A-47.
3.
Hydrogen Control fleasures and Effects of Hydrogen Burns on Safety Equipment, Task A-48.
This contention should be rejected'because it lacks the required specificity.
In its River Bend decision, the Appeal Board upheld the requirement that a contention to be valid must establish a nexus between the general discussions in the specified Task Action Plans and particular deficiencies in the application.E/ As the Appeal Board noted, "there is no necessary connection between the safety of a facility and any particular
[ Task Action Plan] item or regulatory guide.
Some connecting link must therefore be supplied."El To establish the required nexus between the license application and a Task Action Plan, it must generally appear both (1) that the undertaken or contemplated project has safety significance insofar as the reactor under review is cencerned; and (2) that the fashion in which the application deals with the matter in question is unsatisfactory, that because of the failure to consider a particular iten there has been an i
-87/ Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-444, 6 NRC 760, 771 (1977).
i 88/ Id., at 773.
insufficient assessment of a specified type of risk for the reactor, or that the short-tena solution offered in application to a problem under staff studyisinadequate.b Intervenors have specified no such nexus.
It is _ insufficient nerely-to assert that the PSAR does not include "an adequGe action plan" for the three listeo unresolved issues.- As the River Bend decision makes clear, a Task Action Plan standing alone does not imply that some " action plan" is required prior to licensing the plant in question.N Consequently, this contention should be rejected.
Intervenors' Contention 12: Containment Design Change This contention has been discussed as a notion to reopen the record.
Intervenors' Contention 13:
Energency Response Plan Before addressing the specific emergency planning contentions proposed by the Intervenors, a brief summary of the history cf the Commission's current regulations regarding emergency planning is appropriate. This will provide a context in which to consider the propriety of the proposed contentions.
On October 23, 1979, the Coamission published its Policy Statement on the Planning Basis for Emergency Responses to fluclear Power Reactor l
Accidents (44 Fed. Reg. 61123).
The Commission stated that it " concurs in and endorses for use the guidance contained in the NRC-EPA task force report,"b NUREG-0396--in particular, that two Emergency Planning I
l 89/ Id.
90/ See Id., eg., a t 772.
-91/ Planning Basis for the Developnent of State and Local Government Radiological Energency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG-0396, EPA 520/1-78-016, December 1978).
I l
33 -
Zones (EPZs) should be established around light water nuclear power plants. The EPZ for airborne exposure has a radius of about 10 miles; the EPZ for contaminated food has a radius of about 50 miles.
Predetenlined protective action plans are needed for the EPZs. The exact size and shape of each EPZ will be decided by emergency planning.
officials after they consider the specific conditions at each site.
These distances are considered large enough to provide a response base which would support activity outside the planning zone should this ever be needed. The Canmission further stated that, following its Proposed Rulemaking concerning additional regulations on emergency planning, it would provide additional guidance which would:
consider how local conditions such as demography, land use, and neteorology can influence the size and shape of the EPZs and... address other issues, such as evacuation planning.
As a result of that Proposed Rulemaking, the Commission promulgated the current final rule 'on emergency planning.92/ With respect to construction pennit applications, the Commission rule requires that each applicant describe, generally, in its PSAR its " preliminary plans for coping with energencies."
10 C.F.R. 9 50.34(a)(10) and Appendix E, I and II.
The Commission cited with approval in Appendix E, the use, inter alia, of 23/ to provide guidance in developing plans for coping with NUREG-0654 92/ 45 Fed. Reg. 55402 (August 19,1980), effective November 3, 1980.
93/ Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants for Interim Use and Comment, January 1980 (now revised as NUREG-0654,FEf1A-REP-1,Rev.1).
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emergencies and NUREG-039N for establishing emergency planning zones (EPZ's).
As far as EPZs are concerned, the Commission's final rule provides:
Generally, the plune exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power plants shall consist of an area about 10 miles (16 km) in radius and the ingestion pathway EPZ shall consist of an area about 50 miles (80 km) in radius. The exact size and configuration of the EP7.s surrounding a particular nuclear power reactor shall be detemined in relation. to local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries.
10 C.F.R. 6 50.47(c)(2).
With this background in nind, we now address the Intervenors' specific energency planning contentions.
- 13. The Applicants and Staff have failed to account properly for local emergency response needs and capabilities in establishing boundaries for the plume exposure pathway and ingestion pathway Emergency Planning Zones for BFS, as required by 10 CFR 50.34(a) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.
Specifically, Applicants and Staff have failed to consider adequately or to account properly for the ef fect of the followi!g factors specific to BFS on local emergency response needs and capabilities, and, hence, on the appropriate size and configuration of the c5 EPZ's:
(a) The proximity of the proposed plant site to the Vergigris River and the ground water conditions and the soil composition including the underclay layers on said site, with their resulting implications for travel of radionuclides through a liquid pathway in the event of a reactor meltdown accident at BFS; 11/
-11/ See, NUREG/CR-1596, "The Consequences from Liquid Pathways on a Reactor Meltdown Accident,"
June, 1981.
(
94/ See note 91, supra.
4 i
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' 4 (b)
The number, location, and capacity of local sheltering facilities and the degree of protection fraa radionuclides afforded thereby; (c) The heightened sensitivity to radiation (over that of the average healthy adult male) of children and pregnant women.
(d) Local. meteorological conditions, including the distribution of wind directions and speeds and the frequency of tornados; (e)
Radionuclides which will be significant contributors. to dominant exposure modes for prompt and latent effects in the event of a BNR-1, -2 and -3 accidental release as described in the NRC's Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400),
or its equivalent, at BFS.12/
(f) The consequences of a BWR-1, -2 and -3 i
accidental release at BFS, or its equivalent, at harvest time.
---12/ NUREG-0396 and NUREG-0654, arriving at their generic guidance on the size of EPZ's, rely on the potential consequences of a spectrun of accidents, such as the BWR-1, -2 and -3 accidents described in WASH-1400.
See NUREG-0396, pp. 4-6; NUREG-0654, pp. 5-7.
The BFS fission prcduct inventory, however, exceeds the ii ventory of the 3200-megawatt thermal reactor used as the nodel for WASH-1400;s estinates of accident consequences. And the BFS average fuel burn-up w(thermal) per metric ton ill likely exceed the 17,600 megawatt-days assumed in WASH-1400. Thus, the generic guidance of NUREG-0396 and NUREG-0654 is based on estimates of accident consequences which fail to account for radionuclides which will be significant contributors to dominant exposure modes for prompt and latent effects in the event of a BUR-1 & -2 & -3 release at BFS.
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To the extent that subpart (a) raises the adequacy of preliminary plans for coping with ingestion pathway protection out to 50 miles from the facility, the contention is not at odds with the requirement of the Conaission regulations, but it specifies no connection between the asserted soil characteristics and preliminary planning requirements.
Thus, the Staff believes that subpart (a) should be rejected.
With respect to subparts (b) and (c), the Staff believes they should be rejected. As discussed earlier, an applicant for a construction pennit is required by 10 C.F.R. G 50.34(a)(10) and Appendix E to describe preliminary plans for coping with emergencies.
Subparts (b) and (c) appear to relate to detailed energency planning, a matter for the operating license stage.
Intervenors provide no indication of hew such matters affect the adequacy of the proposed preliminary plans.
'breover, Intervenors provide no connection between the itens mentioned in (b) and (c) and the configuration of the EPZ.
Subpart (d) similarly is lacking in specificity and, furthernore, goes beyond the requirement with respect to the determination of the EPZs. As stated above, the exact size and configuration of the EPZ surrounding a particular reactor shall be determined "... [taking into consideration] such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries."
10 C.F.R. Q 50.47(c)(2).
Intervenors have not provided any nexus between meteorological conditions and the determinat.on of the EPZs.
- Thus, subpart (d) should be rejected.
Subparts (e) and (f) suggest the need to consider specific accident sequences in deteraining the EPZs for Black Fox.
Contrary to Intervenors' suggestion and as more fully discussed in connection with Contention 14, infra, consideration of specific accidents was specifically rejected in developing the planning guidance set forth in lWREG-0654/FEliA-REP-1, Rev.1.
(See pages 6-7 thereof).
Furthermore, specific accident sequences are not among the factors identified in the regulations which are to be taken into consideration in deternining the configuration of the EPZs.
10 C.F.R. 6 50.47(c)(2). Acco rdi r. gly, consideration of these matters is foreclosed, and these subparts should be rejected.
See 10 C.F.R. 5 2.758.
Contention 14 The Applicants' PSAR fails to conply with the requirement of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, and 10 C.F.R. 50.34(a) that it "contain sufficient information to ensure the conpatibility of proposed emergency plans for both onsite areas and the EPZ's, with facility design features, site layout, and site location..." because there is therein insufficient evidence of the feasibility of protective action in the event of a BWR-1,
-2 and -3 accidental release, or its equivalent, at BFS. This is true for the following reasons:
(a) The PSAR contains no evidence of plant-specific probabilities of BWR-1, -2 or -3 releases.
(b) The PSAR contains no evidence of site-specific consequences in the event of BUR-1, -2 or -3 releases.
(c) WASH-1400's estinates of accident probabilities and consequences are not sufficient evidence of the probabilities and consequences in the case of BFS because:
1.
WASH-1400 provides insufficient evidence of accident consequences where evacuation is restricted, as may be the case under the current emergency plans for BFS, to a ten-mile radius.
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2.
WASH-1400 provides insufficient evidence of the consequences resulting fron releases through liquid pathways in the event of a reactor meltdown accident, which cmission is particularly critical in the case of BFS given the proximity of the proposed plant site to Verdigris River and the groundwater conditions and soil composition on the site.
3.
The PSAR contains insufficient evidence that WASH-1400's assumptions regarding medical treatment are applicable to BFS.
4.
There is a large degree of uncertainty associated with WASH-1400's estinaces of accident probabilities.
5.
Tne assumptions upon which WASH-1400's estinates of accident probabilities and consequences are based are not conservative for dFS and are inconsistent with the following factors specific to BFS:
(i)
BFS fission product inventory; (ii)
BFS fuel burn-up; (iii)
The heightened sensitivity to radiation (over that of the average healthy adult male) of children and pregnant wonen.
(iv) lieteorological conditions specific to BFS site, including the distribution of wind directions and speeds and the frequency of tornados.
6.
Tlie PSAR contains insufficient information to assure that the assumptions upon which WASH-1400's estinates of accident probabilities and consequences are based are consistent with the following factors specific to BFS.
(1)
The degree of protection afforded by the protective action of sheltering in the event of an accident at BFS.
(ii) The latent consequences of a BWR-1,
-2, and -3 accidental release at BFS, or its equivalent, at harvest time.
(iii) The difficulty in restricting liiestock feeding on contaminated feed, confiscating contaminated cattle and confiscating and destroying contaminated milk and crops.
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(d) Because of the large degree of-uncertainty associated with l
WASH-1400's estimates of accident probabilities, the probabilities of exposures exceeding Protective Action Guides (PAG's) set forth in flUREG-0396 may be seriously understated for BFS.
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(e) The evacuation time estimates contained in the PSAR have been limited to a geographical area detenlined without reference to local emergency response needs and capabilities.
(See Section 13 above.)
(f) The evacuation time estimates contained in the PSAR have not j
been properly calculated so as to estinate accurately the time required to evacuate the population within the plume exposure pathways EPZ proposed by the Applicants.
Specifically, those evacuation t'me estimates fail to:
1.
Account for the full public transportation-dependent population; 2.
Account properly for notification, preparation and mobilization time; 3.
Account fully and properly for the effect on evacuation times of adverse weather conditions, including tornados; 4.
Account for the possibility that multiple-car families will evacuate in more than one car; 5.
Use real.istic assumptions with respect to the information available to evacuees when choosing evacuation routes.
(g) The evacuation time estimates contained in the PSAR Amendment 16 underestimate actual evacuation times because they fail to adequately account for any of the following rossibilities:
1.
vehicles breaking down or running out of fuel; 2.
traffic accidents; 3.
abandoned vehicles; i
4.
disregard of traffic control devices; and i
5.
evacuees using inbound traffic lanes for outbound travel.,
(h) The evacuation time estimates contained in the PSAR and those calculated by Oklahoma State University for PS0 are sufficiently high to i
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warrant the conduct of a full plant-specific accident probabilitics and site-specific accident consequences analysis and consideration of design modifications and other preventive and mitigative measures. This has not been done for BFS.
(i)
The PSAR contains insufficient evidence of the availability and adequacy of local sheltering facilities to assure the feasibility of sheltering as a protective action in the event of a BWR-1, -2 and -3 release at BFS.
(j) The PSA contains insufficient assurance of prompt p.otective action decision-making and notification. The PSAR contains no letters of agretment providing for pronpt (15 minute) protective action decision-naking on a 24-hour basis by off-site agencies.
(k) There are no established quantitative or qualitative standards i
by which one can assess the feasibility of protective action in the event of a BUR-1, -2 or -3 release at BFS.
The thrust of this contention is that specific accident scenarios, BWR-1,
-2, and -3, have not been appropriately factored into the BFS energency plans. Although Intervenors make many allegations why they believe this to be true, each subpar t is fundamentally and erroneously premised on the failure to account for these specific scenarios and accordingly, the Staff will address them collectively, except to the extent otherwise discussed.
l After extensive reexamination over a considerable perioo of time, and after consideration of emergency planning matters arising out of the Three liile Island accident, the Commission revised its energency planning regulations in light of the need to give consideration to a wiou spectrum of accidents, including both design basis and core melt accident sequences.EE/
i 95/ Policy Statement, supra; see also NUREG-0396 at 15-17 and Appendix I, and '4UREG-0654 at 6-7.
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- 41 The regulations provide a detailed list of information required of applicants for operating licenses.
For construction permits, the Commission required not detailed plans but rather generally described preliminary plans for coping with emergencies, the details of which need not be considered until the operating license stage of the proceeding.
10 C.F.R. 5 50.34(a); 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E.
The permissible scope of this proceeding is therefore limited by Commission rule to whether Applicants have subnitted sufficient information to demonstrate that there will be an adequate. onergency plan at the operating license stage of the proceeding. To that end, the Commission has delineated in Appendix E, 9 II, the infonnation which is required as part of the Applicants' PSAR.
Nothing therein even remotely suggests that, as contended by the Intervenors, Applicants need to exanine such things as plant-specific effects of BWR-1 to BWR-3 events. To the contrary, one of the very purposes of the rulemaking proceeding concerning emergency planning was to specify by general rule, after full consideration of a wide spectra of accidents, the character of emergency plans required for nuclear power reactors, thereby eliminating the need for protracted and complex litigation in each proceeding to reach a balance on the wide range of natters considered in developing the rule.
The Commission's revised requirements were derived from an extensive reexanination of emergency planning needs, which started before the Tf11 accident, and which is reflected in an NRC-EPA staff study, NUREG-0396.
NUREG-0396 had concluded that it was not possible to develop emergency plans based on a single specific accident sequence, but that an adequate planning basis had to include a wide spectra of accidents, including both design basis i
j
accidents and Class 9 sequences (core melt sequences) studied in the Reactor Safety Study, UASH-1400.25/
The Commission, in its Policy Statement, also recognized the importance of considering a wide spectra of accidents and adopted this conclusion of NUREG-396.
The Intervenors' contention, however, seeks to have the Licensing Board assess the prelininary emergency plans for BFS not against the Commission's energency planning regulations but against those con-siderations which formed the basis for the regulations; i.e., the 4
Intervenors would have this Board go behind the general rule of requiring preliminary plans at the construction permit stage and weigh dji novo all the various elements which went into determining the factors appropriately considered, including site-specific consequences of BWR-1 to BWR-3 events.
Inherent in such a reassessment is a challenge to the Commission's judgment that, as a generic matter, the consequences of specific accident scenarios need not be evaluated. In short, this contention amounts to an impermissible challenge to the Commission's regulations, and therefore it should be rejected.
10 C.F.R. 5 2.758(a).
Furthermore, with respect to subpart (e), Intervenors provide no reason why evacuation time estimates are related to BWR-1 to BUR-3 accident scenarios referenced in the base contention. The subpart also lacks speci fici ty.
For both reasons, this subpart should be rejected.
Subparts (f) and (g), in addition to suffering the same infirmities noted 96/ See NUREG-0396 at 15-17 and Appendix I, and NUREG-0654 at 6-7.
-... -.~.
l '
with respect to 'subpart (e), seek to raise detailed emergency planning elements not appropriately addressed at the construction permit stage, 10 C.F.R. 6 50.34(a)(10) and Appendix E, II, and, sonsequently, should be rejected.
Intervenors' Contention 15: TSC AND E0F INADEQUACIES "a.
The TSC Location does not meet the requirements for rapid access from the control roon (i.e., 2 minutes as required in NUREG-0696), nor is it designed to withstand tornado force winds, b.
The E0F is not designed to withstand tornado force winds and the backup E0F is beyond the 20 mile siting re'quirement of NUREG-0696."
The Staff believes that Subpart a. should be accepted in part.
However, Intervenors' assertion that the technical support center must be designed to withstand tornado force winds should be stricken because intervenors have failed to state a basis for assertion.
In fact NUREG-0696, on which intervenors rely, expressly states that this complex be able to withstand "high winds (other than tornadoes)."El The Staff believes that Subpart b. should also be accepted in part.
However, Intervenors' assertion that the emergency operations facility must be designed to withstand tornado force winds should be stricken because intervenors have failed to state a basis for this assertion.
In fact, NUREG-0696, on which intervenes rely, expressly states that this facility must be able to " withstand adverse conditions of high winds (other than tornadoes.)"SI E/ NUREG-0696, Functional Critiera for Emergency Response Facilities, February 1981, at 10.
98/ _Id, a t 18, n o te 2.
a l
IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated, Intervenors' notion to reopen the record should be denied and Intervenors' proposed contentions should be accepted in part and rejected in part, as described above.
Respectfully submitted,
"'y MLfd J
James H. Thessin Counsel for NRC Staff Dated at Bethesda,11arland this 20th day of Nove,ber,1981
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