ML20038A406
| ML20038A406 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/16/1981 |
| From: | Malsch NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20037D485 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-92-436, TASK-RIA, TASK-SE 2.206, DD-81-03, DD-81-3, SECY-81-241, NUDOCS 8110280688 | |
| Download: ML20038A406 (53) | |
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RULEMAKING ISSUE (Affirmation) 4 The Commission For:
Martin G. Malsch, Deputy General Counsel From:
REVIEW OF DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER
Subject:
10 CFR 2.206, DD-81-3 (MATTER OF PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC CO.)
Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Facility:
Units 1 and 2 Review Time Exoiress May 4, 1981 To inform the commission of a recent
Purpose:
Director's Decision, concerning the need to supplemens the Diablo Canyon F to Cg I
consider. Class 9 acciderits,.whic ~we
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recommend Discussion:
The Commission is f amiliar with the ef forts of various persons, intervenors and outside groups, to compel the supple-mentation of the Diablo Canyon FES to evaluate fully the consequences of contact:
Mark E. Chopko, GC X-43224 Ir. 0:c.;'it.1 ir, 0.:: in:rd v :s d:'id in accordance with the Fr edom of Information Act, exemptions p
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" Class 9" accidents.1 This was the central merits issue in the Friends of the Earth v. NRC lawsuit in District 1/
In May 1979, the Joint Intervenors moved the Licensing Board l
to reopen and supplement the environmental record on Class 9 accidents in light of the THI-2 accident, the Lewis Report, and other indications that Class 9 accidents should be con-In June, on the staf f's motion, the Board deferred sidered.
consideration of the Intervenors' motion until the staff evaluated fully the TMI-2 accident and filed a report with l
the Board and the parties on the impact of the accident for I
That motion is still pending.
In October Diablo Canyon.
1979, the Friends of the Earth (FOE) (not a party to the
(
l Licensing Board proceeding) asked, under 10 CFR 2.206, for a l
supplerental FES on Class 9 accidents for the same reasons When no action was imme-advanced by Joint Intervenors.
diately forthcoming, F0E sued URC and Pacific Gas and Electric in federal district court to compel preparation of the supplement.
FOE v. NRC, 1,(. D. Cal. No. C-80-0234-SW (filed January 30, 1980).
The NRC moved to dismiss.
In June, the Director denied relief both because the _ issue.was i
pending in the Diablo. Canyon lice ~nsing proceedi6g and be-cause there were no 'special circumstances. that warranted. Arizona Public~
l additional environmental analysis.
Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2,
and 3), et al.,
DD-8 0-2 2, 11 NRC 919 (1980), citing Statement of Interim Policy, " Accident Considerations Under [NEPA], " 4 5 Fed. Reg. 40101 (June 13, 1980).
On a divided vote, the Commission declined to review the decision.
In oral argu-ment in the district court on August 27, we specifically advised the court that the decision to decline review had no legal effect and that it expressed no Commission view on the merits.
11 Environmental Rptr. (BNA) 1035 (1980), slip op.
In this paper, we are not seeking any Commission at 4.
decision on the merits but only on the procedural question of which forum -- the Licensing Board or a Director --
i should set conditions for an initial license in a contested case.
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Court last year.
See SECY-A-80-19, A-80-125 and supplements.2/
In that j
l litigation, we took the position that whether the Diablo Canyon FES should bc supplemented should be decided by the presiding Licensing Board in the first instance which had (and still has) pending before it the same issue on the I
same legal theory.
Judicial review of that determination should follow in a i
court of appeals in the context of the decision whether and on what conditions to license Diablo Canyon.
The District Court agreed and dismissed the FOE complaint.
11 Environmental Rptr.. (BNA) 1035 (1980), slip op, at 2-3.
See text of the court's September 29 opinion in SECY-A-80-125A.2/
2/
The merits issue on FES supplementation in these circum-stances, before a final license but after the FES has I
i s su ed, is presented in the Black Fox case in the D.C.
Circuit, Citizens Action for Safe Energy v. NRC, D.C. Cir.
No. 80-1566 (filed May 26, 1980).
That lawsuit has been briefed and awaits argument.
EI The District Court stated, slip op, at 2-33 finds compelling arises. from the/. fact.
the court What the very issues underlying plaintif f's con.cerns in -
that uw o this case, the issues which plaintiffs ~ argue des'erve further study and analysis, are in f act presently being subjected to intensive, structural investigation by the federal defendants, complete with the opportunity for public comment and criticism as well as subsequent judicial review.
The court is referring, of course, to the currently ongoing Diablo Canyon licensing pro-ceedings.
In fact, the same question of whether a supple-mental EIS should be prepared has been placed before the ASLB.
An appeal of the dismissal was filed with the Ninth Circuit (No. 80-4564, filed riovember 26, 1980); no petition for review was ever filed on the 2.206 denial.
4 On October 17, the Joint Intervenors j
filed their request for 2.206 relief on the same grounds as had been asserted j
Petitioners here -- Joint i
before.
Intervenors in the Diablo Canyon licens-ing proceeding -- argue that the recent Statement of Interim Policy (supra n.1) and comments by CEQ on the NRC s class 9 accident 11CPA policy, together with the 1
TMI-2 accident and the publication of.
the Lewis Report require the supple-In mentation of the Diablo Canyon FES.
addition, supported by an affidavit from Richard Hubbard of MHB, petitioners
~
argue, as they did to the Licensing Board in 1979, that the proximity of the facility to the Hosgri fault and the plant's seismic capability are "special circumstances" which warrant additional consideration of Class 9 accidents.
The staff denied relief on March 26, 1981.
D D-81-3, 13 NRC (Attach-ment 2).
The Director's Decision denies all re-lief requested in three parts:
(1) the decision whether to supplement the
.FES should be made in the context of the Licensing Board proceeding where the issue is pending; (2) the Diablo Canyon site and f acility ~ present no "special circumstances"; and (3) the Hubbard
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af fidavit demonstrates no reason to change implementation of the various THI-2 re7uirements and studies at Diablo Canyon.
e A/
The petition for relief under 10 CFR 2.206 seeks only the
- Petition, supplementation of the environmental record.
pp. 3-4 (Attachment 1).
The Hubbard affidavit goes further because of the "s pecial (seismic) circum-and indicates that stances," certain THI-2-related safety and reliability assessments should be performed at Diablo' Canyon prior to We do not view these safety issues as any operation.
presented by the petition; the Director's Decision does, however, deal in part with them.
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Recommendations
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Martin G.-Malsch Deputy General' Counsel.
s Attachments:
1.
Joint Intervenors ' Request.
for Relief (10/17/80) 2.
Director's Decision, DD-81-3 3.
Proposed Memo & Order l
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9 Commissioners' comments or consent should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by c.o.b. Friday, April 24, 1981.
4 Commission Staff Office comments, i any, should be submitted to the Commissioners NLT April 22, 1981, with an information copy to the Office i
of the Secretary.
If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional time for analytical review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected.
This paper is tentatively scheduled for affirmation at an Open Meeting J
1 during the week of April 27, 1981.
Please refer to the appropriate weekly Commission Schedule, when published, for a specific date and time.
f DISTRIBUTION:
Commissioners Commission Staff Offices 1
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T E L C PMO N E 202634CC70 DAVID 5. FLEISCH AKER i
AT7C ANCY AT LAW 173s cYc STRcET
- W WAS HINGTON, D ;,, s. C.,
svava voo October 17, 1980 Dr. Harold Denton Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Dr. Denton:
I am writing on behalf of the Joint Intervenors to the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant operating license proceeding to request that the Commission prepare a supplemental environmental impact j
statement which will consider the serious environmental consequences of a Class 9 accident at the Diablo Canyon nuclear facility.
Although the Commission has refused to require that the Diablo Canyon impact statement consider the potential effects of a Ciass 9 accident, the need for such a study is plainly manifested b/ the recent shift in Commission policy on the Class 9 is. sue.and tho August 14, 1980' recommendation of the President's Council on"
)
Environmental Quality ("CEQ") to Commission Chairman Ahcarne that i
supplemental impact statements " occur to the, maximum e.xtent possi'brd
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while there'is still time to correct earlier decisions based on the Commission's 'fcrmer erroneous positien on Class 9 accidents' (45 Fed. Eeg. 40103)."
(Letter of CEQ Chairman Speth, August 14, 1980).
Joint Intervenors concur in that recommendation.
We believe it is critical that this supplemental study be completed prior to the issuance of any operating license, for either low or full power, in order.to assure that radioactive contamination of the reactor will not preclude necessary modification of plant design or install-ation of additional safety features,.substantially increase their cost, or foreclose the full and impartial consideration of disputed issues still to be decided by the Commission in connection with the pending license application.
( Ob
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- n10 210
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i Dr. Harold Denton
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i October 17, 1980 Page Two
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Consistent with the basic purpose of the National Environ-mental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C.
554341 et seq., to fully inform the public and the decisionmaking agencies of the potential i
consequences of federal proposals, CEQ has promulgated regulations specifically requiring an agency to prepare supplements to either draf t or final impact statements if "[t]here are significant new circumstances'or information relevent to environmental concerns, bearing on the proposed action or its impacts."
l 40 C.F.R. 51502.9(c).
These regulations are entitled to sub-i stantial deference in the application of NEPA.
Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 358, 99 S. Ct. 2335 (1979).
l I
Last year CEO initiated a study of the Commission's reguia-ti~ons and policy regarding the consideration of Class 9 accidents and their environmental consequences in its environmental impact statements.
In a March 20, 1980 letter to Commission Chairman Ahearne, CEO Chairman Speth described the Council's "very disturbing" findings that "[t]he discussion in these statements of potential accidents and their environmental consequences was... largely perfunctory, remarkably standardized, j
and uninformative to the public, (containing) essentially identical, boilerplate language written in an unvarying format."
The Council noted that Class 9. accidents, "which have the potential i
for greatest environmental harm and'which have led to the greatest public concern," are not even considered,,and it j
recommended that the Commission adopt a new policy'" based on tne sensible approach of discussing the environmental ano other consequences of the f ull range of accidents that might occur at nuclear reactors, including accidents classified as class 9."
l On August 14, 1980, the CEO Chairman again wrote the Commission Chairman applauding the Commission's announcement of Interim Policy on June 13, 1980 which adopted the position i
that imgact statements "shall include coordination of the sito-specific environmental impacts attributable to accident sequences that lead to releases of radiation and/or radioactive materials, including sequences that can result in inadequate cooling ~of f
reactor fuel and to melting' of the reactor core."
45 Fed. Reg.
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40101.
CEQ Chairman Speth indicated, however, the Council's strong disapproval of the Commission majority's statement that 3
such new NEPA reviews "will lead to conclusions regarding the environmental risks of accidents similar to thosetthat would be reached by a continuation of current practices...."
l 9
l
Dr. Harold Centon October 17, 1980 Page Three i
This statement, Speth continued, "in-
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i appropriately prejudges the NEPA analysis yet to be performed j
on a site-by-site basis by staf f land is) contrary to the purposes of the NEPA to provide information which serves as a i
guide to the decisionmaker..."
The foregoing CEO recommendations and the June 13, 1980 l
. repudiation by the Commission of its " prior erroneous position" l
on Class 9 accidents demonstrate beyond question that the Diablo Canyon environmental impact statement is deficient and, therefore, under 40 C.F.R.
51502.9(c) of CE0's regulations, must be supplemented.
This conclusion is mandated by such significant 'new developments as the Class 9 accident at the Three Mile Island Muclear Power Plant in March 1979 and the l
Commission's discovery that the accident probability estimates utilized. in WASH-1400 on which it. had previously based its Class 9 policy were n't well founded.
At least as compelling, o
however, are the special circumstances surrounding the Diablo Canyon facility itself.
As appears in detail in the attached affidavit of Richard Hubbard, construction was already underway when the existence of the Hosgri f ault of f shore and running l
within four miles of the plant was confirmed.
The exceptional nature of these circumstances was' recognized by the Appeal Board l
in ALA1-519 (Jan. 23', 1979):
We have here a nuclear plant designed and largely built on ene set of seismic assump-tions, an intervening discovery that those assumptions underestimated the magnitude of potential earthquakes, a re-analysis of the plant to take the new estimates into account, and a post hoc conclusion that the plant is essentially satisf actory as is -- but on the-oretical bases partly untested and previously uhused for these purposes.
We do not have to reach the merits of those findings to conclude that the circumstances surrounding the need to make them are exceptional in every sense of that word.
(Id. at 12)
(emphasis added)
The Commission has a continuing obligations under the Atomic Energy Act and under NEPA to review information which may indicate a need to reconsider or modify a construction i
i permit or an operating license.
42 U.S.C. 52232(a); C.F.R.
S1502.9(c); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc.
v.
Atomic Energv Commission, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
l Dr. Harold Denton October 17, 1980 l
i Page Four i
I ce't. denied, 404 U.S.
942 (1972); Public Service Co. of New r
l Hampshire v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 582 F.2d 77 (1st l
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1046 (1979); Ft. Pierce Utilities Authority of the City of Ft. Pierce v.
United States j
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Nos. 77-1925, 77-2101, Slip Op. at 19-20 (D.C. Cir. March 23, 1979).
Recognizing the Commission's responsibility 'and the significiance of the new circumstances and information discussed above, Joint Intervenors l
request that prior to the issuance of any operating license for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant, the Commission prepare a supplemental impact statement to consider.the environmental consequences of a Class 9 accident at the facili.y.
l 1
l Very truly yours, 1
ssi w% T Lw. G.%.. lq s
I David S.
Fleischake r, Esq.
1735 Eye Street, N.W.
Suite 709 l
Washington, D.C.
20006 (202) 638-6070 Joel Reynolds, Esq.
John Phillips, Esq.
CENTER FOR LAW IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 10203 Santa Monica Boulevard Fifth Floor Los Angeles, California 90067 (213) 879-5588 Attorneys For Joint Intervenors SCENIC SHORELINE PRESERVATION CONFERENCE, INC.
SAN LUIS OBISPO MOTHERS FOR PEACE ECOLOGY ACTION CLUB SANDRA A. SILVER l
GORDON SILVER JOHN J'.
FORSTER ELIZABETH APFELBERG
RECElVED SEP 18 000 UNITED STAIES OT AMERICA
(
NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0fD!ISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD l
In The Matter Of:
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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY )
Docket Nos. 50-275 OL
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(Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power 50-323 OL
)
Plant, Units 1 and 2)
)
AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD SURTON HUBBARD i
CONCERNING I
THE NEED FOR CLASS NINE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS l
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
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(
COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA )
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RICEARD B. HUBBARD, ~being of legal age and' duly sworn',
deposes and says as follcws:
1.
INTRODUCTION 1.
I am a Professional Quality Engineer, technical consultant, and a founder in 1976 and vice-president of MH3 Technical Associates, technical consul tants on energy and the environment, with offices at 1723 Hamilton Avenue, Suite K, l
San Jose, California.
I have participated as an exper vit-ness in licensing proceedings before the U.S. Nbclear Regulatory Y
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Cocmission (NRC) including the Diablo Canyon scismic hearings; 7
have testified at the request of the NRC's Advisory Ca.= ttee on Reactor Safeguards; have appeared before various committees of the U.S. Congress; and have testified in various state li-censing and regulatory proceedings.
I am thoroughly familiar with the safety analyses of the Diablo Canyon lirense Appli-(Pacific Gas and Electric Company) and the Nuclear S team cant t
Supply System supplier (Westinghouse) as a result of my service,
as a consultant since the fall of 1976 to the Center for Law in the Public Interes t, attorneys for the Joint Intervenors in the Diablo Canyon Operating License proceeding.
I received a B.S. in electrical engineering from the University of Arizona in 1960 and an M3A from the University of Santa Clara in 1969.
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From 1964 to yebruary 1976 I was e= ployed in the Nuclear Power Division of the General. Ele-~tric Com'pany, with.the final eleven c
of the twelve years.w.or'qing in incr~e~as.ingly responsible can,.
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age =ent positions.
2.
Sa=ples of my recently c ompleted projects directly related to various aspects of nuclear plant risk assessment are as follows:
a.
Criticue of WASM-1400:
The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) pre '
pared a critioue of the U.S. Reac tor Safety S tudy (WASH-1400), f/
The UCS Critique 2/ vas released in November,1977. and va r the :ul=ir.c tiu. v v,cr a year's effort by about a dozen technical people.
L _ _______ - _____- _ _
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The UCS Critique was edited by FW3 partners Gregorv Minor and me, and I also con tribu ted to a numb : :#
the chap ters.
Further, I presented sections of c.,e su==ary of the UCS Critique to the NRC's Risk As-sessment Review Group.
b.
Swedish Reactor Safetv'Studv:
As a part of Sweden's re-evaluation of the role of nuclear power, MH3 was contracted by-the Swedish Energy Commission to do a $200,000 -risk study of a Swedish nuclear plant (Barsebsck).
This s tudy was completed Lin January of.1978, and the re-sults were presented by me Parliament in April, 1978.17nd others to the Swedish Subsequently, I con-ducted a. follow-up L study for the Swedish Nuclear Pow-er Inspectorate.
The study addressed uncertainties in risk assessment- (follow-up to the NRC's Risk As-sessment Review Group Report).
i Italian Reactor Safetv-Study:
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MH3 recently completed a site-specific risk l
assess =ent for reactor accidents at an Italian. re-actor site (Caorso) utilizing the WASH-1400 tech-niques.
Accident consequences were ca.'culated with-(
a modified and upda ted version of the 'JASH-1400 con-sequence model--the CRAC-Code.
Preliminary results of the FEB.s;udy were. presented by me-to the Italian.
government at a meeting in Venice on January 25 to 27, 1980.
The final. reper.t was presented by Dale t
Bridenbaugh'ahd me in a~ forum in Rome on May 16, j
1980.
My qualifications and experience are further described in de-
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tail in the testimony I presented during the Diablo Canyon seismic hearings in 1979.
II.
STATEMENT OF ISSUIS 3.
Neither the Applicant nor the NRC has conducted a plant-specific and site-specific Class Nine accident analysis O.
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for the Diablo Canyon nuclear s ta tion.
The purpose of this 1
affidavit is to identify present s ta t' -of-the-art safe ty e
1 features which have not been evaluated for Diablo Canyon l
and which have the potential" for significant risk reduc-tion.
These additional safe ty fea tures, both preventive and mitigative, include such fea tures as filtered vented con tain=en t, molten core retention, hydrogen control sys-tems, and groundwater interdiction.
In addition, as des-cribed in this affidavit, the Applicant has not conducted a, plant-specific sys tem reliability analysis using event-tree and fault-tree logic techniques, the methodology utilized in WASH-1400 for a generic plant risk assessment, l
to identify design weaknesses and possible sys tem modifica-I tions that shculd be L=plemented at the.Diablo Canyon sta-tion to i= prove the capability and reliability of reactor systems under various transient and LOCA events, includi..g seiscically induced accidents.
Further, this affidavit 1-dentifies the need to conduct the Class Nine and reliabili-ty analyses prior to the granting of an Operating License either low power or full power, in order to assure that radioactive contamination of the reactor will not preclude the installation of additional safe ty features or increase substantially their economic and health costs.
j III.
BACKGROUMD 4.
Following the enac tment of the Na tional Environ-mental Policy ACT (NEPA), the NRC issued guidance on the treatment of accidents in environmental reports of light water i
reactors in the form of a proposed Annex to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix D.
In that guidance (36 FR 2285, December 1,1971) i it is.no ted that consequences of accidents beyond the design basis (called Class Nine accidents) could be severe, but that the probability of their occurrence is so small that their environmental risk is extremely low.LI 5.
The Annex stated that the consequences of Class Nine accidents need not be analyzed and, accordingly, the NRC's NEPA environ = ental reviews have not included calculations of r
the consequences of Class Nine accidents. ~ Ra$her,NRCEn-vironmental S ta tements have discussed these accidents only 'in a qualitative sense by restating the conclusions in the pro-posed Annex and by briefly referencing the existence of a more quantita tive analysis in 'JASH-1400.
The basis for the NRC's failure to consider the risk to the public of Class Nine acci-dents for Diablo Canyon is discussed in Section 7 of the Diablo Environmen tal S ta temen t1/ and on page ii* of the Addendum to the Final Envirorcental Statement.bI Employee risk, on the i
- The NRC concluded tha t '"the risk of accidental radia tion expo-sure has been addressed in depth in the Commission's Reactor Safe ty Study (WASH-1400, NUREG-75/014) ably low."
and found to be accept-I
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basis of occupa tional radiation exposure for the t-so-uni:
station, was es:imated to be 450 man-r' ems per year p II Finally, background information describing Cla er unit t
ss Nine Acci-dent analyses and past NRC practices, is sumari zed in the
" Description of Problem" portion of NRC Task Action Pl an A-33.8#
6.
A recent and thorough critical review of WASH-1400 was conducted for the NRC by the Risk Assessment Re i (RARG).EI v ew Group In light of the criticisms and limitations of WASH 1400 revealed by the RARG.,
the NRC Commissioners concluded, in
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- part, tha t ".... the Commission does not regard as reliable the Reactor Safe ty Study's numerical estimate of th of reactor accidents."
e overall risk (Page 3 of NRC State =ent on Risk As-sessment and the Reactor Safety Study Report in Light of the Fisk Assessment Review Group-Report )} Thus, khe NRC has little or no the6'retical basis to exclude Ih tionofClassFineacc((ibtsforDiabloC e,co6sidera-T
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anyon.
In addition, the NRC Staff has concluded that Class Nine accident, the accident at M-2 wa::
a even though the release of radioactive material to the off-side population was very small10
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7.'
The Council on Environmental Quality (Council or CEQ) is direc ted by NEPA ".... to review and appr i a se the various programs and activities of the federal government
....for the purpose of determining the. extent to which such progra
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ms and
.g activities are contributing to. the achievem of NEPA.... "
ent of the policy Last year, as part of the Council's over ll fort to mee t a
ef-this responsibility, the Council initiated a-s tudy of the NRC's regulations and policy on th
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analysis of possible nuclear accidents e environmental i
events, under NEPA.
including Class Nine documented in a MarchThe re'sults of the Cou 20, 1980, letter to are presented in an Attachment the NRC Chairman, to this affidavit.
concluded in part that:
The Council "The results of our review of impact st are very disturbing. prepared-by the NRC for nuclear powe a temen ts vironmental impacts was found to be larg functory, remarkably s tandardized en-i' e y per-
/
ative to the public.
i
, and uninform-and location of the nuclearDespite the broa of size. design reactors license,d by years, virtually ever. the Co= mission over the identical, 'boilerplate ' lang~u~ag~e vfi tte'n Jin any EIS unvarying format.
sider or analyze the possibilitThe typical EIS -does not con-cident even thcush it is these 'y of a tajor ac.
environmen tal harm and wdents which have the poten
' Class 9' acci-ea tes t 1
greatest public concern.hich have' led to the Moreover, for those j
accidents which are typically discussed ithe
- EIS, 4
n an and the environment are presented in a cu and inadequate manner with little attentio rsory publ,1c understanding.
n to i
Each EIS relies on the' NRC accident analy i
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policy, which has remained essentially uncha i
s s' and in interim form since 1971 l
' correct manufactu nged quality assurance're, design, o,peration andasserting that of protection' agains. twill provide 'a high degree the occurrence of e
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i postula ted accidents.
A limited range of accidents i
8 with varying consequences are discussed.
Esti-mates of ma terials released from'such accidents or ' release fractions,' are provided.
- However, based on the conclusion that it-is highly -impro-i able that serious accidents will occur, the policy prohibits the di'scussion of certain severe accidents, the Class 9 events."
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1 8.
The Council recommended a new NRC policy on Class Nine events as follows:
"We believe that the new policy should'be based on the sensi' ole approach of discussing'the environ-i mental and other consequences of the full rang'e of-ac.cid.ents _ that might occur at nuclear reac tors,-~in-cluding accidents now classified as Class 9.
This should include core melt events.
In addition, EIS's i
should present ' he bes t est mates of-the' likelihood t
of such events.
In order to comply with the disclo-sure requirements of NEPA, the NRC should include in the-analyses the likely range of environmental' and other consequences from. severe and other' accidents.
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In describing. reactor accidents and their possible effects in impact s ta temen ts, the closely the relevant. provisions-o. NRC should follow f the Council's.NE?A regulations, includ.ing the~ provision on fuorst case'-
analysis.
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a We aise urge the Co=:ission to brcaden its range of variables (e.g., radia tion pa thways) in' de termining accident impacts, and expand its discussions in EIS's of the impacts of nuclear accidents on human health, the natural environment and local economies.
Site specific treat =ent of data should be substituted -for -
'boilerplate' assessment of accident initiating events and potential impacts, and EIS's should be comprehensible to non-technical members of. the public."
9.
Subsequently, the NRC Cc=missioners, in a June 13 l
1980, policy statement adoped a statement of interim policy which withdrew the proposed Annex to Appendix p and temporarily 7
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suspended the rule-making which was initia ted in g
1971 (45 Fed. Reg. 40101).
The Interim Policy ' indica tes tha t consid-eration of the environmental consequences of severe reactor accidents might warrant f
the deed "for additional fea tures or other actions which would prevent or mitigate the consequences of serious acciden ts."
(45 Fed. Reg. at 40103).
Considern-
. tion of such information might indicate, among other things, the need to modify plant design, imple=ent e=ergency prepared-negg measures, or reconsider a cons truction permit altoge ther.
In this regard, the CEQ in an Augus t 14, 1980, letter stated that:
".... the Council s trongly disapproves of the Com-mission majority's statement that such new NEPA reviews will lead to conclusions regarding the environmental risks of accidents similar to those
(
tha t weuld be reached by a continua tion of cur-ren t prac tices... 45 Fed. Reg. at 40103. _. Two mem-bers of the Co==ission disa5:eed with the majority on this point and concluded that that position'is- _.
" absolutely inconsistent with an even-handed re-appraisal of the fer=er erroneous position on Class 9 accident 45 Fed. Reg. at 40103.
The Council agrees."s.11/
10.
In su= mary, the NRC's NEPA environmental reviews have not included an evaluation of the consequences of Class Nine accidents either generically or for Diablo Canyon.
As a result of the Class Nine accident at TMI-2, and the RARG's conclusion that estimates of the absolute probabilities of ac-cidents in WASH-1400 are not reliable, the NRC has no a
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theore tical or prac tical basis to continue to jus tify exclud-t ing the safe ty and environmen tal assessmen t of-Class ;..r.e accidents for Diablo Canyon.
IV.
DISCUSSION OF ISSUES 11.
The special circumstances required to justify a Class Nine environmental and safety analysis and a sys tem re-l liability analysis are present at Diablo ' Canyon.
l Cons truc-tion of both units was underway when the existence of the l
Hosgri fault offshore add running within four miles of Diablo-
[
Canyon was confirmed.
Further, the ability of nuclear power plants to withstand earthquake damage is undeniably crucidl in California, where seismic phenomena are not unknown.12/
l
- g As concluded by the Appeal Board-in ALA3-519
"We.have here a nuclear plant design 4d and largely ' built 'on one se t 'of seis-
~
^
l mic assump tions, an [ntervening discovery that those~aEsu=p-tions unde $es tima ted the magnitude of po tential ear thquakes a re-analysis of the plant to take the new es tima tes in to ac-count, and a post hoc conclusion that the plant is essentially satisfactory as is -- but on theoretical bases partly -untested and previously unused for these purposes.
We do not have to reach the merits of those findings to conclude that the cir-cums tances surrounding the need to make them are excentional in every sense of that word." (emphasis added)12.I 4
6.
I
(
12.
The accident at Three !!ile Island Unit 2 (T:!I-2) demons tra ted tha t serious reactor cer'e damage accidents are a possibility and tha t considera tion of core degradation and melting beyond the design basis accident should be conducted.14/
Such an evalua tion has not been conducted for Diablo Canyon Fur ther, the issuance of an Operating License may foreclose or precludd th'e modification of the Diablo Canyon facility to ac-coccoda te the additional safe ty fea tures, both preventive and mitigative, which have t;he potential for significant risk re-duction.
These additional safety features include items such as filtered vented contain=ent, molten core retention, hydro-gen control sys tems, and groundwa ter interdic tion.
13.
A current in-depth safe ty re-review of two opera-tional nuclear s ta tions, Indian Point 2 and 3 and Zion 1 and 2, has been initiated by the NRC.
The review'inciddes~,"in p~ art, the considera tion of severe accident =itiga tion fea tures s ch u
as filtered con tainment venting, core re ten tion sys te=s full-pressure residual heat removal sys tem, bunkered emergency de-
~
cay-heat removal sys tem, and hydrogen con trol ceasures.
The Licensea is examining and performing conceptual design s tudies to determine if any of these features or a combination of them could be employed in these plants to mitiga te the effects of core degradation and core melt accidents.
)
In parallel to the I
Licehsee effort, the NRC is studying and examining these
. l
I features in order to establish design criteria and bases, as i
well as performance or reliability recuirements.15/
i 16 In addition, in response to the studies of the
~
TMI-2 accident', the NRC is planning to initia te a long-ter:
{
t rulemaking on consideration of degraded or melted cores.
The schedule for the rule =aking and the application to Diablo Canyon are yet to be de termined.
The rulemaking will include i
censideration of (a) the use of filtered-vented containment systems to citiga te the consequences of core-degraded and core-
)
celt accidents, (b) hydrogen control measures to deal with ac-cident conditions involving large amounts of hydrogen genera-tion, (c) core-re tention devices, (d) reexamination of design criteria for decay heat removal, radwaste and other related sys-tems, such as the cakeup and purification systems, so that they can perform their functions under degraded-core cohdi'tions, (e) i plans and other prepara tion for postaccident recovery. (f) cri-teria for loca ting highly radioactive sys te=s (e.g., should they be in isolated buildings), and (g) effects of an accident i
in a reactor plant on an adjacent plant in a cultiple reactor site.
Ih addition a number of other TMI-related studies will l
be coordinated, and, as appropria te, fac tored into this long-term rulemaking ac tivity.
These other studies are (a) evalua-tion of radwaste system design features to aid in accident re-covery and decon tamina tion, (b) provision of a ventilation i i
1
. [
sys tey. outside the con tainment s truc ture,. (c) large-volume noble-gas recovery or delay systems, and (d), liquid-pathway radiological control.16/
Because of the special circu=scances of Diablo Canyon, I b'elieve. 'tha t the plant-specific evalua-i tions discussed in Items 13 and 14 should immediately; be initi-
{
ated by the Staff and Applicant for Diablo Canyon.
.. 3' 15.
',t In any melt-through accident at Diablo Canyon, massive quantities of radioactive materials may leach into the groundwater and eventually migra te in to the. ocean.
Models to-assess the consequen'ces of.the possible massive contamination i
of water by radioactive releases on health, water supplies, costs, or interdiction techniques have not been adequately ad-('
dressed in WASH-1400 or by the Diablo Canyon Applicant.
This may be a significant omission.
I.ittle. or no prepara tions have been made to interdict the ficw of con ta:ina ced, groundwa ter from beneath the reactor containment buildings should a. celt-down occur.
A description of potential interdic tion sys tems and the p,otential safety improve =ents should be developed for Diablo Canyon.
16.
Timing of the i=plementation of the safety features i
resulting from the preceding evaluations is a significant con-sidera tion.
Radioactive contamination of the reactor system may preclude the modification or addition of equipment within 9
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core.
Likewise, radioac tive conta=ina tion will increase che worker occupa tional exposures resulting from modifications to j
the reactor sys tem.
The add'itional security measures ins titu t-ed once fuel is loaded will also increase the time and costs of any pos t fuel-load construction (time delay is also very ex-pensive).
Thus, modifications or additions of' safe ty fea tures installed after the granting of an Operating License may be pre-cluded or vill result in an increase in the economic costs and health risks associated with the implementation.
17.
The need for plant-specific assessment of accident probabilities, including Class Nine events, a t all U.S. reactors has been recognized following the TMI-2 accident by a nu=ber of groups, including the NRC's Advisory Com=ittee on Reactor Safe-guards (ACRS).17/
In response, the' Ih'cegra ted ' Relibbility
~
~
Evaluation Program (IRIP) has now been instituted by the Prob-abilistic Analysis Staff of the NRC.
IREP has as its charter the evaluation of the probabilities of accident sequences leading to core meltdown and (to a limited extent) the as-sessment of the consequences associated with the specific sequences for each U.S. operating reac tor.
Techniques developed i
in WASH-1400 (i.e., even t-tree and f ault-tree technique s, ac-i cident radioac tive release categorization), are being used on the individual plants in conjunction with data compiled in 1
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secy-si-z+1 Armcanew 1 i
WASH-1400 and in data collection projects begun since ~its -
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relsase.
To date, the IREP study has concendrated on one re-J ector, Crys tal River, Unit 3 by the Babcock & Wilcox: Company.*
- i l
A E
i 18.
Because of the special circums tances,. the'Diablo
. Canyon Applicant should perform simplified' system reliability i
- analysis for the following-systems
subcriticality systems, em9rgency feedwater sys tems,'. ECCS ' injection and! recirculation 4
~ syscams, shutdown cooling syscem, containmant cooling =and' spray.
e safety features actuation systems, and auxiliary sys-i systems,
)
tems upoti which these depend (alternating and' direct current,
. ccmpressed air, essential service water or cooling = systems, r and heating, ventilating and air conditioning - sys tems).
These:
ennlyses'should use event-tree and'. fault-tree logic technicues-l
! to identify design weaknesses ard possible system modifications I,that would be made to improve the capability and' reliability of th2 above systems under various transient and LOCA events.
Particular emphasis should be given to determining potential-failures that could result from human errors, common causes,
- -single point vulnerabilities, and test and maintenance outages.
Tha results of such studies should be factored into the final q
design of Diablo' Canyon prior to the granting of an' operating
' LicGnse.
- ' Zion / Indian Point risk s tudies are also being condueted ~ at this'
. time by the Licensees -along the ~ lines of WASH-1400.withL a nu=ber of refinements.
Significant aspects of this ' study -include re-fined modeling for. plume trajectory; a. more extensive containment sysnt-tree and modeling,.' utilization of plant data. and considera-tion' of external' events.
For addit'cu l det-ils the raada b
referred to' the mee ting. summary of' a June 25, 1980.- presentation en this subject to. the NRC by S. Israel of the NRC..
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19.
.@C' In su:=ary, the accident a t TMI-2 demons tra ted
[g the reality of the risk, previously only theoretically as sessed, of accidents that result in substantial degradation and melting of the core.
~
V.
CONCLUSIONS e
20.
Based on the foregoing discussion and background information, I conclude that a Class Nine accident analysis and system reliability analysis of the Diablo Canyon plant should be performed by the Applicant and reviewed by the NRC.
The Class Nine and reliability analyses should be performed prior to the Branting of any Operating Licen,se for Diablo Canyon, either low power or full power, because radioactive contamination of the reactor will either foreclose or in-i crease the econcmic costs and health risks associated with such engineering safety features as filtered vented contain-molten core retention, hydrogen control systems, and
- ment, groundwater interdiction that have the potential for pre-venting or mitigating accidents.
21.
All of the matters herein are known to me of my
.s personal knowledge or of my personal opinion based on my education and experience.
If called as a witness, I am com-patent and would testify thereto.
\\
l i'(b>
r n-RICHARD B. HUBBARD Subscribed and sworn to before
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me this im dav of September, 1980 c-'
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t LlST OF REFERENCES 1/
WASH-1400 (NURIG-75/014), Reac ter Saf e ty Studv - An Assess-ment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Fower Plants, U.S. Nuclear Regula tory Commission. Washing ton, D.C.,
October, 1975.
draft report as " WASH-1400".We refer hereinaf ter to the study and the 2/
Kendall, Henry W.,
et al The Risks of Nuclear Power Re-actors:
(NUREG-75/016A Review of the NRC Reac tor Saf e ty S cuoy WASH-1400
), Union of Concerned Scientists, Camoricge, Massachuse t ts, Augus t, 1977.
3/
DsI 1978:
1, Swedish Reactor Safe ty Studv:
Barseb3ck
~
Risk Assessment, preoared f or the Swedish Energy Commis-sion by MBB Technical Associates, San Jose, California, January, 1978.
4/
SECY-78-137, Memorandu= to the NRC Cec =issioners on Assess-
~
cents of Relative Differences in Class Nine Accident Risks in Evaluations of Alternatives to Sites with High Population Densities, March 7, 1978.
5/
Final Environmen tal S ta temen t U.S. Ato=ic Energy Cocsission, Washingtc0,- Diablo Canven. Units 1 and D.C., May, 19.73.
6/
Addendum to the Final Environ = ental S ta tement for the Coe tion of tne Diablo Canven Nuclear Plant. Units 1 ano 2 U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., May, 1976.
7/
Ibid 6, page 14-1.
S/
NUREG-0371, Task Ac tion Plans for Generic Activitics -
~
Ca teeory A, U.S. Nuclear Regula tory Com= ssion, Washing ton, D.C.,
Nove=ber, 1978, pages A-33/1 and A-33/2.
9/
NUREG/CR-0400, Risk Assessment Review Groue Recore to the U.S.
~
Nuclear Reculatory Commission, mis sion, Washing ton, D.C., Sep tember, 1978.U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com-10/
Docket No. 50-272, Salem Unit 1, "NRC Staff Response to
~~
Board Question No. 4 Regarding the Occurrence of a C1 css Nine Accident at TMI," by B.H. Smith, August 24, 1979.
4 0
' i
f 11/
Le e ter, Gus Spe th, CEQ Chair =an, to Jchn Ahearne, NRC Chai: nan, Augus t 14, 1980, NRC Public Docuraent Roon.
{
Washington, D.C., cercents on proposed rule PR 50 !.*
j l_2_/
ALA3-519 January 23, 1979, page 8.
M/
Ibid 12.
14~/
NUREG-0660, NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the
{
TMI-2 Accident, Vol. 1 U.S. Nuclear Re Washing ton, D.C., Hay, 1980, Page ' II-1. gula tory Cocais sion.
.l5/
Ibid 14, page II.B-8 i
1_6/
Ibid 14, pages II.B-11 and II.B-12.
6 j
17/
Letter, Plesset, Milton S.,
s.CRS Chairman, to Ahearne. John i
F., NRC Chairman, en, titled "ACRS Report on Near Term Cp-erating License Items from Draf t 3 of NUREG-0660," dated March 11, 1980, NRC News Release 80-56.
LIST OF ATTACHMENTS i
A t ta cbaen t i
De s crip tion
- \\
l A
Le :ter, Spe th.to Ahearne, March 20,1980. -
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AII A[I..'C ' r}
l EX ECUTlvE Crr,C E Cr TH E nn E s;DcN T COUNC4 CN tsv,aesvgse a, ev.,,;,
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March 20. j95,*.
The honorabl e John, Ahearne Chairman Muclear Reg uJ a:e ry Cenris sion Vashington, D.C.
20555 Dea'r Chairman,Ahearne:
Section 20a(3) of the National Envirennental Tolicy Act (NT.?A) directs the Council on Envire cental Quality "to revie. and appraise and activities of the Tederal Government the varicus pret;a s for the purpese of deterni,r.ing the extent to which such programs and activities are contributing to :he achievement of the policy (<of NEpA}...." Last year, as part of the-Council overall effort te teet,this responsibility, the Counct) initiated a study of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's regulations and policy on the environnent analysis of pessible nuclear accidents under NE?A.
Tnis letter contains the cenclusions of our study.
Ve vere assisted in this reviev by the Environnental Lav Institute, which has prepared for us a report entitled "NRC's Environ ental Analyris of Noelear Accidents:
Is It Comr.2 ssion vi:h this le:t er.
. adequate?", which 1 ar ;rovid.ng to the The Ceuncil believes the report cons:frutes e,n
- (
accurate and f=portant assessment anaJysis of nuclear. accidents in envircr. ment alof the SRC 's r egula t,1,ces a n,d po depaet.s: ate.en:s.
he results cf our review of 1.t.;act l
power reactors !are cvary. disturbing. The discussion in these sist e ents ofstatere perfunc t ory, re a rts >1y s t a nda rdiz ed, potential accidents and th and uninf o rma tive to'the pub ic.
Despite the broad diversity of size, design, and Joca tson of the nuclear reactors Ifeensed by the Co= mission over the years, virtually every EIS contrins essentially identical, "boilerplate" language vritten in an unvarying fornat a
The typical EIS does not consider or analyze the pessibill:y of a major accident even though it is these " Class 9" accidents which have the pntential for greatest environmer.tal ha rm and which have led to the great est
.Moreovera for those accidents which are typically discussed in an EIS, the public concern.
potential impacts on human health and the environment 'are presented in a cursory and inadequate manner with little attention to public unders:anding.
Iach EIS relies on the NRC accident analysis polf ey, which has remained essentially unchanEed and in interim form since 1971, arserting that manuf acture, design, operation and quality assurance vill prov:de "a high "c o r r e c t degree of protection" against the occurrence of pestu3at ed accidents.
i limited range of accidents with varying consequences are discussed.
A of materials re] eased f rom such accident s, or "reles.se t Estimates rac tions," are provided.
Novever, based on the conclusion that it is highly improbable that serious accidents vill occur, the policy prohibit s the discussion of cer tain
(,
severe accidents, :he Class 9 events.
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I The acciden: analysis in he I 5 f::
~
T. e e 'n e.r:tnd Sae: a i:a:::n,
- .e Uni:s 1 a:s (TMI),
ene:pi;!!es :he ceficien::es of su:h a nar:-v 4;;::::h
- tj e: ace!!an:s.
N:: a si. gl e a:inarie f:: a O.'trs i ac::ser.:
s p::-
..ded i
- he TX: I:s, ye: as a::es:ed to by C::r.itsi:n s:4!!, a Cla:s 9 4::iden: c:::::ed 4: TM1 en MA:ch !!,157 S.
The re):::ed reletses of radt:-
ac:iv;;y f:c: this acciden: have Saen icv, but the ra:ge of pessibili:les suggested by the the TMI IIS fai.'ed :o ec: rider a ::: d e r. :.
Ty;i:a.*ly, public c:::ests, including :h:se of other f eieral 4;en:f es, c:
1 ait:2acies cf accides:
taalyses 1: :: aft the sin;1y reitera:e :he 1571 "i3:4:i2" accider.:I Es re:eive NAC res;::ses urich policy.
7:r e::t=;;e, t h e :.7 C res;:nse :o a ;4;4: ne:: of I::erior c:=:ent en :he TMI I13 vas as follevs:
"The :::erier Oeps: re:: sut;ests :ht: a specif c s: iy cf :he
- ste,uan:es of a Class C ac:ide:: at Three X le is.* and, Coi:
No. 2 up:
- he suscuchanta Rive: should be zade.
The [KXC) staf f disagr e es vi:h-:his viev.
9 accidents has been gives i:
A general discussien of C:tss the Reactor Saf ety S:udy.
The staff believes, is viev of the re:ste pessibili:7 of oc:ur-re:: ef a Class 9 even:, tha:
is ac:eptably Ic *, and tha::he er.virc::en:al rish of such L: evtat even:s are a d equa:e. "
ge:eric d15: ssi:n of :hese The ;as: f ai!.re :e discus s the
- ns*;uenc es oi accdien:s and their effec:s uad --ines the *:tsi :ne full tage of potential Invir:r.nen:a1 ?:!i:y Ac:
- = ini:r:
- ury
- ses ei -he S4:ic:41.,,
the ;eten:ial c: sequences of f eiefil ;::; sals and :::he pub'ic and c:her att$ciis fu infer:ad decisions.
C.e:
- vide a tas.s f
repeatedly re:;.ested the fes:s the pub;i: and fadatti agtncies tave..
nuclear ac:idents in the cent extthe A2C and :.7C :o ' cess 3 der the savefe (cidsequeh of" cf the C:: issic:'s er.vire: e::
revievs.
These tequests for full diselesure have beca ::nsis:e :*y rej 41 licensing
.during this peried, this Ce==is si::'s Se;;tch e:
ec::d 7:ver 5_s_ e:s het:g a censpicuous a:d escoura gi:g excepti 14, 1979, decisi:s it Cffshere
_7 in::tasing public c:::er:
on.
Give: the
~
l regt: ding nuclet C:::ission to de;st:public confidence is nuclear regulation, ve believe th 4;;;:a:h stressing full and candid discussion ofsharply f := the L herited p ev for the accident risks.
Th e C:ur.c 1's a s s e s r: e s t of the C:::ission's sta:
i fully :he e:vtre=: ectal effects of r.uclear accides:s2:or7 o'oliga-ions :o dis::::
accidents, is set forth in the attachment
, iscluding Cits: 9 to this letter.
Iased c:
se do not believe that 11: :ing the discussion of ouclear accide:ts and their consequ our re.iev, rely aay acnger sus:a.<nabl e, asse ist it evar vas.
sce: in I:ss i:
7er both legal and policy ressens, ve helieve : hat quickly to revise 1:s policy on ac:1 dent
- he Cis-istic: : s: ::ve analy s is i: 11!s.
A c::;2e:ely new oolicy, pref erably invelving a :ejec:ica of :he sys tem, shculd *:e adep t ed.
For :hese :tasc::,
exis: :g ac:td.:: classifica:!an the i: pct act steps i: has rac e..:1y :aken :eva rdevising i:s ;clicy 1:we censend :he C:
- his 9
9
- l. -
area, espec: ally your decision in Cf f sbere ?:ver Syste s to he:d a pu;'ic i
rule akir g and te ree.sa-ine NRC policy on the inclus;on i,l a
... :.~cnts in II5s.
Ve a re al so p2 eased to ne:e t ha t in the prescils to ::s prc:esed NE?A p;ocedures t he Corr iss2on has incicat ed that "this recons:ceraticr. of policy r.ay result in adeotion of different prac tic es vith rega rd t o ' worst case' accidents at nuclea r pov.e r reac tors."
45 Ted. Reg. 13739, 13742 (P.a ch 3, 1980).
- e believe that the new policy should be based on the sensib!e apprcach of discussing the envirer. mental and other consecuences of the full rante of
{
accidents that rr.i g h t occur at nuclear reacters, including accidents nov j
classified as Cla'ss 9.
This should include core melt events.
In additien, EISs should present the best esti: nates of the likelihood of such events.
In order to ce:rly vich the disclosure requirer.ents of NT.?A, the NTsc shcuid include in the analyses the likely range of environcent al and other cease-
{
quences f rom severe and other accidents.
In describing reactor accidents and their possible effectf in 1: pact statements, the NRC should fellov j
closely the relevant provisions of the Council's NEPA regulations, includ:nr the following provision on "vorst case" analysis:
l "If... the information relevant to adverse ircacts is f r.por t a n t t o the decision and the means to obtain it are not k n os?. (e.r.., the means for obtaining it are beyond the state of the art), the agency shall veich the need for i
the action against the risk and severity of pessib:e
(
adverse l
ir acts vere the action te proceec in the face of uncertainty.
If the agency proceeds, it shall inci.de a verst case analysis and an ind2carion of the prorad: 11-ty or irpretability of its occurrence." 40 C.T.R. 5 1302.22(b)(lo 79).
Tne enclosed repert suggests eight possible accident scenaries, v:th cer:2:n caveats, f or censidera tion by the Cer:-ission for use in its IISs.
They have been selec t ed because they " span the range of likely consequences" of sewre nuclear events.
Ve believe that the use of such analyses could inpreve the Comissien's siting, design, If eensing and ernergency planning decistens.
Ve also urge the Commission to broaden its range of variables (e.g., radir.-
tion pathways) in determining accident ir. pacts, and e>.pand its discussicr.s in Elss6of the impacts of nuclear accidents on hu=an health, the natural environment and local econormies.
Site specific treatment of da:4 should be substituted for "boilerplate" assessment of accident initiating events and potential impacts, and E15s should be comprehensible to non-technical mee.bers of the public.
Finally, the Cor.nission s.hould pursue the approach described here vigorcesly in order to fulfill to the fullest l
grsible the requires.ents of Nt?A extent and the lee tinate public interest in full disclosure of nuclear plant ha:ards.
f The Co :-i s s i on a t a minimum should apply the arpreach described here to pro-ceedings where 1.7 p a c t statements have not yet been issued.
Ve also encourage the Comission to consider preparing suprierent al accident anal. ses f or p!.;nt :
currently lice f 4 ':- :;c r.:.on, par t a cua a r ty f or those loca t ed near high population cent ers and those with unique features suggesting nigl er risk.
i l
4 g
I '.ould be -l ea s ed t e discuss t he Ceuncil's vie.s vi:F ye. a:
a.-. : re.
?! ease 2e: pe kno hoe ve can be of assis tanc e to you in. moving f...at:
in this i pertan; area.
I l
Sincerely, 1
0 k b[
CUS 5?ITH Ch a t.m.a r.
Inclosure e
cc: ):e.be s e f :he C:=is sion
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[pe a r c y,*'o, UNITED $ TATES
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'j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
. p WASHINGTON. o. C. 20455 8.,
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k WAR 2 6 1981 Docket Nos.:
50-275/323 (00-81-3 )
David S. Fleischaker, Esq.
1735 Eye Street, N. W.
Washington, DC 20006
Dear Mr. Fleischaker:
This letter is in response to your petition supported by Mr. Hubbard's affidavit '
dated October 17, 1980, requesting that the Commission prepare a supplemental environmental impact statement concerning the impact of Class 9 accidents at the Diablo Canyon nuclear plant.
Your request has been considered under the provi-sions of 10 CFR 2.2.06 of the Commission's regulations.
For the reasons stated in the enclosed decision, your request has been denied.
A copy of the Notice of Issuance of the Director's Decision which is being filed with the Office of Federal Register for publication is also enclosed.
Copies of this decision will be placed in the Commission's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20555 and-in the local public document room for'the Diablo Canyon nuclear plant.
A copy will also be filed with the Secretary for the Commission's review in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c).
Sincerely, Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 4
Enclosures:
1.
Director's Decision' 2.
Notice of Issuance l
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[7590-Olj UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0W115510N j
l (Docket Nos. 50-275, 50-323)
PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
(Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2)
ISSUANCE OF DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 CFR 2.206 (0D-81-3 )
By petition dated October 17, 1980, David S. Fleischaker, Esq. requested on behalf of the Joint Intervenors in the Didlo Canyon operating license proceeding pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pre-pare supplemental environmental impact statements concerning the impact of Class 9 nuclear accidents and take other actions before any operating license j
is issued for the Diablo Canyon nuclear plant.
This petition was supported by the affidavit of Mr. Richard B. Hubbard.
Notice was published in the Federal Register, 45 FR 78317 (Nov. 25,1980), that the petition was under consideration.
Upon consideration of the, petition, I have determined not to take the actions requested in the petition.
Copies of the " Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206" which fully discusses the reasons for this decision are available for inspection in the Commission's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, N.
W., Washington, D. C. 20555 and in the local public document room at the San Luis Obispo County Free Library, 888 Morro Street, San Luis Obispo, California 93406.
Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 26th day of Mar.,1981.
l FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISS10'N
/ MO k Harold R. Denton, Director.
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l
00-811 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR. REACTOR REGULATION HAROLD R. DENTON, DIRECTOR In the Matter of
)
)
PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY
)
Docket Nos.:
50-275 (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power
)
50-323 Plant, Units 1 & 2)
)
DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 CFR 2.206 By petition dated October 17, 1980, David S. Fleischaker on behalf of the Joint Intervenors to the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant operating license proceeding requested that the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation take action pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 to require preparation of supplemental environmental impact statements on Class 9 accidents at the Diablo Canyon nuclear plant.
The petition was supported by the'affida'vit of Mr. Richar'd B. Hubbard. _ Notice'
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of receipt of the petition was pub.lished in ;the Federal Jtegister, 45 Fed. Reg. 78317 (November 25, 1980).
Counsel 'for the Pacific Gas and Electric Company I
(PG&E), the applicant for the Diablo Canyon plant, submitted on January 8,1981, a response opposing the petition. The petition is similar to a petition filed by the Friends of the Earth in 1979, which was denied in June 1980.
00-80-22, l
l 11 NRC 919 (1980).
l The petition requests relief with respect to the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, which are being constructed at the PGAE site in California and for which PG&E has applied for operating licenses.
The petition, supported by Mr. Hubbard's affidavit, asks that the Commission prepare supple-mental environmental impact statements to consider the environmental consequences l
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of Class 9 accidents, e.aluate a number of safety features to prevent severe accidents or miticate their consequences, and prepare a simplified n
.i reliability analysis of seseral systems in the Diablo Canyon plant.
The petition requests that these actions be taken bifore the Commission issues either the low power or the full term operating licenses for the Diablo Canyon plant.
The petition provides the following bases for taking these actions:
1.
The environmental impact statcments summarily discuss consideration of Class 9 accidents, based on early estimates of reactor accident probabilities and on the Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400, which has since been repudiated by the Commission; a
2.
The accident at Three Bile Island, which the NRC concedes constituted 1
a Class 9 accident, emphasized the need to evaluate the possible impact of a serious (Class 9) accident and to prepare to meet the possible j
consequences, 3.
Seismic conditions at the Diablo Canyon site constitute "specia' circumstances" which would regt. ire consideration of environmental consequences of Class 9 accidents under the Commission's policy; and 4.
Analyses of Class 9 accidents, additional safety features and system reliability should be performed prior to the granting of any operating license for Diablo Canyon, either low or full power, because radioac-tive contamination' of the reactor will either foreclose or increase the economic costs and health risks associated with additional engineering safety features that may be required as a result of such analyses.
For the reasons stated in this decision, the petition is denied.
I.
PROCEEDINGS RELATED TO THE PETITION In the June 1980 denial of the Friends of the Earth's petition, the NRC staff has effectively dealt with those portions of the petition which requrst a supplemental environeental analysis of Class 9 accidents for Diablo Canyon.
See 00-80-22, 11 NRC 919 (1980).
In its petition the Friends of the Earth, like the petitioners here, raised the occurrence of the accident at Three Mile Island and the Commission's " repudiation" of the WASH-1400 study.
The Director'.
3 decision denying the friends of the Earth's petition applied the Commission's interim policy to the three sites, including Diablo Canyon, for which e apple-mental environmental statement was sought and found that a supplemental environ-mental statement for any of the three sites was not mandated under the policy.1 The Commission did not overturn the Director's decision.
In the October 1980 petition, the petitioners have not presented any new information which would lead the staff to reconsider the conclusions reached in'the decision on the Friends of the Earth's petition.
Part, II of this decision repeats the analysis provided in 00-80-22 and responds to the petitioners' contention that the' site's seismic characteristics comprise "special circumstances" within the meaning of the Commission's new interim policy on severe accident considerations.
Apart from the recent denial of a substantially similar petition under 10 CFR 2.206, it should be noted that the petitioners here are parties to the operating license proceeding for Diablo Canyon and have a motion to reopen the proceeding to consider Class 9 accidents pending before the Licensing Board.
1#The Commission's statement of interim policy indicates that the Three Mile Island accident was one of the reasons for withdrawing the proposed Annex to Appendix D of 10 CFR Part 50 and substituting a new interim policy on accident considerations in the Annex's place.
See Nuclear Power Plant Accident Considerations Under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 45 Fed. Reg. 40101 et seg. (June 13, 1980).
The Director rejected the sn-t called repudiation of WASH-1400 as a basis for preparing supplemental environ-i mental impact statements.
See 00-80-22,11 NRC at 931-32, citing 45 Fed.
Reg. 40102 and Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-79-29, 10 NRC 586, 589 (179).
See also Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1-4), CL1-79-10, 10 NRC 675 (1979).
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The Bcard has determined that it will defer consideration of this motier. "r.til the Appeal Board has ruled on the seismic issues before it relating to Diablo Canyon.
Prehearing Conference Order, at 3, 26-27 (Feb.13,1981).
Thus, the petition here attempts to raise under 10 CFR 2.206 the precise issues that await the Board's consideration in the operating license proceeding.
As a general rule of practice, the Commission has stated that " parties must be pre-vented from using 10 CFR 2.206 procedures as a vehicle for reconsideration of issues previously decided, or for avoiding an existing forum in which they a
more logically should be presented." Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point, Units 1-3), CLI-75-8, 2 NRC 173,177 (1975); see also Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), 00-79-21, 10 NRC 717, 724 (1979).
That policy is particularly appropriate in this instance, where the petitioners are in effect asking tne Director of NRR to establish certain conditions prior to licensing the Diablo Canyon. plant - i matter currently before the Board.
The provisions of 10 CFR 2.206 are essentially a mechanism for request-ing that the Commission take enforcement action by instituting a proceedinti to modify, suspend, revoke, or take other action with respect to a license.
The rule contemplates requests to institute proceedings in connection with licenses that are already in force, not requests to institute proceedings to consider whether a license should be granted in the first instance.
The initial grant or denial of licenses should be considered in accordance with the procedural requirements of section 189a. of the Atomic Energy Act and Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 2.
These considerations have particular applicability here, and in themselves serve as a basis for denying the petition.
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II.
COMMISSION POLICY ON ACCIDENT CONSIDERATIONS The June 1980 Director's decision describes the evolution of the una..is-sion's policy on severe accident considerations under NEPA 00-80-22, 11 NRC at 921-24.
The term " Class 9 accident" was employed in a Commission rulemaking which had been proposed in December 1971:
" Consideration of Accidents in Implementation of th'e National Environmental Policy act of 1969", 36 Fed.
Reg. 22851 (1971).
The proposed rulemaking would have added an Annex to Appendix 0 of 10 CFR Part 50 to set forth the manner in which various i
categories of accidents should be taken into account in the environmental review for a nuclear power plantI In September 1979, the Commission announced in Offshore Power Systems (Floating Nuclear Power Plants), CLI-79-9, 10 NRC 257 (1979), that it intended to complete the rulemaking begun by the Annex and to re examine the Commission's policy regarding accident considerations.S On May 16, 1980, the Commission issued a statement of interim policy in which it withdrew the proposed Annex and suspended the rulemaking that began in 1971 with the publication of the proposed Annex.
Nuclear Power Plant Accident Considera-a, tions under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 45 Fed. Reg. 40101 (June 13, 1980).
The Commission also provided guidance on accident considera-tions in on going NEPA reviews in licensing proccedings where a Final Environ-mental Statement has not yet been issued.
Under the Commission's new guidance, l
$# n Offshore Power Systems, the Commission determined that consideration of I
a Class 9 accident in the environmental review for floating nuclear power plant. was appropriate.
10 NRC at 260-61.
The Commission did not use the proceeding to resolve the generic issue of consideration of Class 9 accidents at land-based reactors, but noted that "such a generic action is more properly and effectively done through rulemaking proceedings in which all interested persons may participate."
.I_d. at 262.
See also Public Service Co. of Okla.
(Black Fox Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-80-8,11 NRC 433 (1980).
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environmental impact staterrents for on going and future NEPA reviews will gi"e 1
1 consideration to a broader spectrum of accidents, including severe accidents that may have been designated " Class 9'1 under the Annex.
With respect to plants for which Final Environmental Statements have been issued, the Commission stated in its new interim policy that:
"It is expected that these revised treatments will lead to conclusions regarding the environmental risks of accidents similar to those that would
'be reached by a continuation of current practices, particularly for cases involving special circumstances where Class 9 risks have been considered j
by the staff....
Thus, this change in policy is not to be construed as i
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any lack of confidence in conclusions regarding the environmental risks of accidents expressed in a6y previously issued Statements, nor, absent a showingofsimilarspecialcircumstances,asabasispropening, reopen-ing or expanding any previous or on going proceeding.
" E ommissioners Gilinsky and Bradford disagree with the inclusion of the C
preceding two sentences.
They feel that they are absolutely incon',istent with an even-handed reappraisal of the former, erroneous position on Class 9 accidents." 45. Fed. Reg. at 40203.
As the Commission noted in its new sta$erhend o'f fritehim policy, lhe' staf f has identified special circumstances in the past which would warrant more extensive consideration of Class 9 accidents.
The special circum-stances fell within three categories:
(1) high population density around the proposed site; (2) a novel reactor design (a type of power reactor other than a light water reactor); or (3) a combination of a unique design and a i
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unique siting mode.$
In Public Service Company of Oklahoma, which was < jar.ided before the Commission stated its new interim policy, the Commission noteu in addition to these three criteria that proximity of a plant to a " man-made or natural hazard" might also represent "the type of exceptional case that might l-1 2/ ee 45 Fed. Reg, 40102 (June 13, 1980)';
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S Public Service Elec. & Gas Co.'(Salem
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Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2), D0-80-17,11. NRC 595, 615 n. 21 (April 1980).
In the first category fe.11.the;Perryman site, for, which the staf.f
-s performed an informal assessment in' the"eAflp site revteV 'o'f ~the relative differences in Class 9 accident consequences among the alternative sites.
The Clinch River Breeder Reactor, a liquid metal cooled fast breeder reactor which is different from the more conventional light water reactor, fell within the second category, novel reactor design, and the staf f included a discussion in the final environmental statement (NUREG-0139, Feb.1977) of its consideration of Class 9 accidents.
The Floating Nuclear Power Plants represented the third category of special circumstances, a combination of unique design and a unique siting mode.
Because the plants would be mounted on a floating barge, there would be no soil structure to retard the release and dispersal of activity beneath the plant following a core melt accident as would be the case for land-based plants.
The staf f concluded that the most likely exposure to the population from the liquid pathway for a floating nuclear plant is significantly greater than for a land-based plant.
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warrantadditionalconsideration."N In DD-80-22, the staf f presenter ';.
following results of their review for "special circumstances" for Diablo Canyon.
As described in Sec. 4 of the Safety Evaluation Report 5 and Sec. 1.3 of the Final Safety Analysis Report 5# the Nuclear Steam Supply System for each unit of the Diablo Canyon plant is a Westinghouse pressurized water reactor using a four-loop coolant system.
The reactor design is basically l
similar to that of several other Westinghouse reactor designs (Trojan, Zion 1 p
i and 2, and D. C. Cook plants).
The Diablo Canyon plant is, therefore, a l
typical light water reactor faciHty and the design is not novel.
The Diablo Canyon plant is located in a remote, undeveloped and relatively uninhabited region of San Luis Obispo County. Within 10 miles of the plant, l
the 1970 resident population density was about 20 persons per square mile.
MCLI-80-8, 11 NRC 433, 434 (Mar. 1980).
The four criteria identified in the text have been applied to seven reactor sites in decisions under 10 CFR 2.206. On no occasion did the Commission disturb the Director's findings.
t See Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, ' Units 1 & 2), 00-81-1 (Docket Nos. 50-413 & 50-414, Jan. 9,1981 & Addendum, Feb. 6,1981); Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), DD-80-33 (Docket No. 50-389. Nov. 28, 1980); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2) et al., 00-80-22,11 NRC 919 (June 1980) (also addressing Palo Verde and Rancho Seco plants); _Public Service Electric & Gas Co. (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2),
00-80-17,11 NRC 596 (Apr.1980); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), DD-80-6, 11 NRC 371 (Feo. 1980).
E/ afety Evaluation Report for Diablo Canyon Station, Units 1 & 2 (Oct. 1977).
S 6/
- Final Safety Analysis Report for the Diablo Canyon Station, Units 1 & 2.
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l Within radii of 20 and 30 miles, the densities were 55 and 40 resie r's rar I
square mile, respectively.
The population densities were projected to approxi-mately double by the year 2000, thus remaining well within the guidelines of
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Regulatory Guide 4.7 and 10 CFR Part 100.
Therefore, population distribution i
near th'e Diablo Canyon plant is not a "special circumstance" within the meaning
]
of the Commission's policy statement.
i The Diablo Canyon plant also does not represent a " combination of a unique design and a unique siting mode." The Diablo Canyon site is' located adjacent to the Pacific Ocean, which is the only surface water body which could be affected by liquid releases from a Class 9 accident.
Ground water near the site is limited to the streambed of Diablo Canyon Creek, an intermittent
)
stream which empties into the ocean.
The sandstone bedrock underlying station i
foundations is, at most, partially saturated (i.e., no water table) for a con-siderable vertical distance.
Its low permeability, combined with the lack of a near surface water table, would preclude 'laterai^ movement of contaniinated water from the station toward the ocean at more'than ' E bxtrimdly sloS rate.
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s a minimum, many years would be available to' interdict ary such flow.
Therefore, there are no unusual hydrogeologic features of the site which would warrant special consideration of the environmental consequences of Class 9 accidents at the Diablo Canyon site.
1 The staff analyzed 'the site characteristics and other nearby features to assure the potential for impairment of safety-related portions of station facili-ties due to natural or man-made hazards occurring nearby. The Safety Evaluation
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4 9
Report states the staff's conclusion that there are nn industrial, transpo,ti-tion, or military f acilities in the area of the site which have pote-to adversely af'ect plarit safety systems'.
The staff's review specifically j
l ensures that station design is adequats to accommodate other natural character-istics of the site environs. The staff's review has not identified any unusual circumstances with respect to external hazards that would warrant reopening or j
expanding proceedings on Diablo Canyon.
3 i
The petitioners point to the seismic characteristics of the Diablo Canyon i
site as a "special circumstance" that would warrant consideration of C1 9
j accidents.
The petitioners base this characterization on a quotation from ALAB-519-in which The Appeal Board described the circumstances surrounding the need to make additional findings regarding the plants' seismic design capability as"exceptionalineverysenseofthatword."1 The Appeal Board was not consider-ing, of course, in that decision whether the seismic characteristics of the site constituted "special circumstances" warranting consideration of Class 9
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accidents under the Commission's policy.
The Appeal Board only addressed whether a sufficient showing had been made to warrant issuance of a subpecna totwoACRSconsultants.N 1/ acific Gas & Elec. Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plants, Units 1 & 2),
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ALAB-519, 9 NRC 42, 46 (1979), quoted in Fleischaker letter at 3 and Hubbard's affidavit at 10.
8/
- The policy in effect at the time was the proposed Annex.
S!This showing is necessary because under 10 CFR 2.720 NRC personnel are not amenable to subpoena except "upon a showing of exceptional circumstances."
11 -
As set forth in its testimony in the operating license proceeding.
L. i staff believes that the Diablo Canyon plant meets the Commission's criteria for seismic design of nuclear facilities. The staff does not believe, therefore.
that the seismic characteristics of the Diablo Canyon site constitute "special circumstances" which would warrant special consideration of Class 9 accident.
The staff recognizes, however, that site seismicity and the related design capability of the plants have been subject of additional hearings', most recently in October 1980 before the Appeal Board, in the operating license proceeding.
j The Appeal Board has not yet rendered a decision on the reopened seismic record.
Should the Appeal Board decide that the plants do not meet the Commission's I
criteria, the staff would reconsider its view 'that the seismic conditions do l
not constitute "special circumstances." Any such inquiry will be conducted, however, in the operating license proceeding, not in the context of 10 CFR 2.206. As noted earlier in this decision, the Licensing Board has deferred l
consideration of the petit 5cners' motion to consider Class. 9 accidents until after the Appeal Board Ea'kes its decision.
l III. ADDITIONAL SAFETY ANALY5ES REQUESTED BY PETITIONERS i
In support of the petition, Mr. Fleischaker submitted the affidavit of Richard B. Hubbard.
Mr. Hubbard points to a number of safety features and l
reviews which are discussed in NUREG-0660, NRC Action Plans Developed cs a Result of the THI-2 Accident, and then asks that these features be analyzed and the reviews performed prior to the licensing of Diablo Canyon for low power m.
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testing or full power operation.
In a revised statement of policy on Wactor licensing, the Commission has discussed the purpose of the NRC's Acti.: Plan:
"The Action Plan was developed to provide a comprehensive and integrated plan for the actions judged appropriate by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to lorrect or improve the regula-tion and operation of nuclear facilities based on the experience from the accident at TMI-2 and the official studies and investi-gations of the accident.
In developing the Action Plan, the various recommendations and possible actions of all the principal investigatio,ns were assessed and either rejected, adopted or
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modified. A detailed summary of the development and review process for the Action Plan was initially provided in NUREG-0694,
'TMI-Related Requirements For New Operating Licenses,' and can now be found, as changed, in NUREG-0737, ' Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements.'" Further Commission Guidance for Power Reactor Operating Licenses-Revised Statement of Policy, 45 Fed. Reg. 852.ib (Dec. 8,1980). (footnotes omitted).
In this revised statement of policy, the Commission discussed the require-ments for new operating licenses and the schedule for implementing the actions proposed in the Action Plan:
" In approving the schedules for developing and implementing changes in requirements, the Commission's primary considerations were the safety significance of the issues and the immediacy of the need for corrective actions.
As oiscussed above, many actions were taken to improve safety immediately or soon after the accident.
These actions were generally considered to be interim improvements. :In scheduling the remaining ~
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improvements, the availability of both NRC and industry resources was considered, as well as the safety significance of the actions.
Thus, the Action Plan approved by the Commission presents a sequence of actions that will result in a gradually increasing improvement in safety as individual act, ions are completed ar.d the initial immediate actions are replaced or supplemented by longer term improvements....
" Based upon its extensive review and consideration of the issues arising as a result of t he Three Mile Island accident a review that is still continuing - tl. Commission has concluded that the list of TMI-related requirements for new operating licenses found in NUREG-0737 can pruvide a basis for responding to the TMI-2 accident.
The Commission has decided that current operating license applications should be measured by the NRC staff against the regulations, as augmented by these requirements In general, the remaining items of the Action Plan should be addressed through the normal process. for development and adoption of new requirc-ments rather than through immediate imposition on pending applications."
45 Fed. Reg, at 85238.
E ee Hubbard affidavit at 11-15.
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Litigation of TMI-related requirements should be conducted in accor.'ince l
with this policy and the Commission's procedural requirements before the Licensing Board, not within the contex,t of 10 CFR 2.206.
Several remarks should be made regarding the specific actions which the petitioners culled from NUREG-0660 and urged should be fed into the Diablo Canyon licensing process at this time.
The petitioners point to the safety reanalysis of the Indian Point and Zion facilities and ask that such an analysis be instituted for Diablo Canyon.
The reanalysis includes considera-tion of mitigation features for severe accidents.
The Indian Point - Zion study, as well as a study of the Limerick site, were initiated specifically because these plants are located in areas of high population density.
The Diablo Canyon site does not share this population characteristic with these other sites such that a special study is warranted.
Moreover, the features which Mr. Hubbard identifies as part of the Indian Point-Zion study are also under consideration i
for all plants as part of a p'r'oposed rulemaking on consideration of degraded '
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tc-or melted cores -in safely re,gulation. 'S_ee" Advanced Notfce' of' Proposed Ra1 binding. ~ ~
45 Fed. Reg. 65474 (Oct. 2, 1980).
The Commission has also proposed interim requirements related to hydrogen control and certain degraded core consideration:.
See 45 Fed. Reg. 65465 (Oct. 2, 1980).
Mr. Hubbard's affidavit also urges consideration of groundwater interdiction methods to control radioactive contamination of water.
As discussed above, the ground water characteristics of the site do not compromise "special circum-stances" re' quiring consideration of Class 9 accidents.
Special action for Diablo Canyon is not required at this time. The NRC staff proposed a further detailed study of the hydrologic features of all reactor sites in the Action l
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Plan.
The liquid pathway interdiction study is designated Task Action III 0.2.
Based on currently available data, there is a small likelihood of any I./ rologit d
problems at the Diablo Canyon' site.
In the event that significant possible impacts are identified in the study, methods of interdiction and mitigation will be specified.
A number of mitigation methods are available, including pump-ing and construction of slurry walls.
Mr. W rrd also notes the Integrated Reliability Evaluation Program (IREP)
.iat a similar simplified system reliability analysis De performed and 5
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for a number of systems. See Hubbard affidavit at 15.
The IREP is described in NUREG-0660 (Task II.C. at pp.'II.C-2 to II.C-5).
The IREP is a pilot program
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at present and does not consider seismic or other natural phenomena sequence 1
initiators. NUREG-0660 describes a gradual implementation of IREP and studies l
for operating reactors.
No special reason exists for changing this schedule 1
to apply IREP directly to Diablo Canyon at this time.
It should be noted that a study of systems interaction for seismically induced events has been conrjucted-
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for Diablo Canyon.
S_ee NUREG-0660', Task II.C.3. ' This" study has been completed
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and any necessary plant modifications for each unit will be made before any license is issued that authorizes full power operation.
Finally, Mr. Hubbard points to possible radioactive contamination of the plant as a basis for instituting the analyses listed in his affidavit. Again, the question of whether PG&E is entitled to either a low power or full power license is before the Licensing Board for ? tsolution in light of the Commission's l
policy on issuance of operating licenses and the schedule for completing requirerj actions before full power licenses may be issued.
It should be noted in this regard that the health or economic costs of installing additional engineered safety features are not significantly affected by low power tests, because the
15
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fission product inventory for such operation would be less than 0.10 of one percent of the inventory generated by the plant during one year of operat i en at full power.
IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated in this decision, the staff does not believe that "special circumstances" exist for the Diablo Canyon plant that would warrant consideration of Class 9 accidents. To the extent that the petitioners raise matters that should be considered as conditions for issuance of the Diablo
. Canyon operating licenses, those matters should be addressed in the operating license proceeding and not resolved under 10 CFR 2.206.
The petition is, therefore, denied.
A copy of this decision will also be filed with the Secretary for the Commission's review in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c) of the Commission's regulations.
As provided in 10 CFR 2.206(c), this decision will constitute the final action of the Commission twenty-five (25) days after the date of issuance, unless the.Comg3sion on its own motion institutes the review of this decision within that time.
Nk Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 26 day of March, 1981
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DISTRIBUTION:
Docket File 50-275/323 PDR LPDR NSIC TERA LBf3 File i
EDO Rdg.
HRDenton EGCase DGEisenhut i
RPurple l
FJMiraglia
[
KNJabbour l
JLee Attorney, OELD GErtter(#09800)
SCavanaugh(#09800)
EHughes A/D:L Secy.
i BPaul Cotter, ASLB i
IE (3) 1 SECY (3) (#?)
l PPAS BGrimes HShapar SHanauer i
1 Dross 1
TMurley l
FSchroeder BSnyder RVollmer WDircks CMiles, PA Schilk, SECY (5)*
CStephens, SECY*
urra,
i ARosenthal, ASLAB JBuchanan, NSIC ACRS(16)
AShepard (DRR) (3)
- BLUE BAGGED IMMEDIATELY (by S. Cavanaugh) r aucy
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ATTACHMENT 3 J
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