ML20036B313
| ML20036B313 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 06/23/1991 |
| From: | Wenzinger E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20036A053 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-92-162 NUDOCS 9305190093 | |
| Download: ML20036B313 (39) | |
Text
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e s;:s This letter refers to concerns that you previded to us on May 22nd, 2Eth, and 29th, and June 3rd, 4th, and 5th, 1991, alleging:
(1) !iortheast Utilities failed to prorptly enter a technical on a radiation nonitcr; (2) specification action statenent 3 Accuculater inadequate calibration procedures for the Unit level transritter; (3) an inadequate ENF ray have resulted in the ingestion of radicactive raterial by a worker: (4) inadequate superviscry training for technicians serving as jcb supervis:rs:
(5) inadequate work control which resulted in the Unit 2 vent stack ronitor being off-line for 10-15 ninutes: (6) no Instracent and Centrol Technician E-Plan coverage f ron the r.crning cf "sy 30th through the norning of May 31st, 1991; (7) lack of attenticr to detail whic. resulted in an irprcper valve line up while refilling the 'lelure Control Tank reference leg: (E) work being assigned without verification cf equiprent c;ndition: and 9
apparent repetitive failures of the
'l nit 2
- lent Stack High Eange Radiaticn Menitor.
'rie have initiated action to have the !;ortheast Utilities staff review the concerns listed above.
Attached are the issues as
-c e intend to characterize then to the licensee.
- e
_11 infer. ycu cf their rev;ew findings.
Sheuld you have any further questions, or if I can be of further assistance in these regards, please call re ::llect at (2;i, 22T-1 l
3225.
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I Issue 113 On May 20, 1991, an operator observed an abnormal indication on the Unit 2 stack radiation monitor (RM 8168).
The
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abnormal indication was no variation on the meter.
The operators' secured and immediately reinstated power to the j
monitor and the meter response was noted to have returned.
On May 21, operators again observed no variation in the monitor output.
A trouble report was initiated ar.d the technical specification action statement was entered ~for an inoperable monitor.
The one day delay is an example of' l
operators failing to promptly initiate a corrective action i
i l
request and failing to enter the technical specification action statements when required.
i Request 113_
Please discuss the validity of the above assertions.
If any deficiencies are identified, please provide us with the corrective actions you have taken to prevent recurrence and l
assess the significance with regard to safety of the f
identified deficiencies.
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TED RIBUT N-PUBL ISCLOSURE t
i Issue 114-1 (Unit 3)
On May 22, 1991 during the MP-3 refuel outage a calibration error of the accumulator tank level transmitters was identified.
The error was in the range of 25% due to static fluid between the transmitter and the instrument taps.
The l
calibration procedure did not address the error due to the level instrumentation piping configuration; therefore, the l
l procedure was inadequate.
Further, if the present instrument indication is correct, then it was achieved by using zero span adjustments without adhering to the i
calibration procedure.
Request 114-1 (Unit 3)
Please discuss the validity of the above assertions.
If any deficiencies in calibration procedures or procedural compliance are identified, please provide us with the i
corrective actions you have taken to prevent recurrence, Please provide us with an assessment of the significance with regard to safety of any identified deficiencies.
[
t Isnue 114-2 (Unit 1)
On May 22, 1991 during the installation of the IRM cable detector assemblies under the reactor vessel, the RWP/HP controls were inadequate and resulted in the possible j
ingestion of radioactive material by a worker.
The cable was identified as "5K smearable" on May 22, 1991 and the RWP required workers to wear respirators.
However, on May 21, i
1991, the RWP did not require respirators to do the same job.
f Request 114-2 (Unit 1)
Please discuss the validity of the above assertions.
If any r
deficiencies are identified, please provide us with the corrective actions you have taken to prevent recurrence.
l' Please provide us with an assessment of the significance i
with regard to safety of any identified deficiencies, I
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Issue 116 Recently, a tagging error occurred during preparations for maintenance on the Clean Liquid Radioactive Waste Effluent Monitor (RM 9049).
The solenoid valve isolation valves that i
needed to be tagged in accordance with prerequisites for the J
job were not tagged.
Specifically, the valves designated to l
be traced by procedures IC2404AA and IC 2404AC were not traced because the operations tag form was used to verify the tagging.
The root cr.use of the error can be attributed to the I&C technician (who verified the tagging) not being trained and qualified as a " job" supervisor".
Although there was a qualified job supervisor associated with the work, i
this individual was allowed to leave the work area while an i
unqualified individual continued the job.
Request 116 Please discuss the validity of the above assertions.
If any deficiencies in work control are identified, please provide us with the corrective actions you have taken to prevent recurrence and assess the significance of-the deficiencies with respect to safety.
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MITED DISTRIBUTION - NOT R PU C DI OSUhE-f Issue'122 On or about May 29, 1991 workmen were dispatched to troubleshoot a flow problem with the plant vent stack monitor (RM 8032AB).
At the time, the "A" sample pump was
[
running, pump "B" was off and flow was as expected.
The f
pumps were switched to permit the workers to investigate the i
flow problem.
Pump "A" was stopped, but "B" did not start i
due to a preventive maintenance action that was still in progress.
As a result, the stack monitor was out of service i
for 10-15 minutes.
Request 122 Please discuss the validity of the above assertions.
If any deficiencies in work control are identified, please provide i
us with the corrective actions you have taken to prevent recurrence and assess the significance of the deficiencies l
with respect to safety.
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Issue 128 On June 1, 1991 a worker learned that he had been assigned duty as the on-call I&C technician (Unit 2 Emergency plan) for a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period from the morning of May 30 through the morning of May 31, 1991.
The worker was unaware of this assignment on May 29 when he informed his supervisor that'he would not be at work on May 30 for personal reasons.
The I
worker did not pick up the department radio paging device and no one else was assigned as his replacement.
Lapses in on-call coverage such as this example occur on a routine j
frequency.
i Request 128 Please discuss the validity of the above assertions.
If any l
deficiencies in the on-call coverage for energency planning are identified, please provide us with the corrective i
i actions you have taken to prevent recurrence.. In addition, please assess the frequency and significance with respect to I
safety of lapses in on-call coverage by the Instrument and Controls and Maintenance technical staffs.
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I Issue:129 On June 3, 1991, the periodic evolution of refilling the volume control tank (VCT) level instrument' reference. leg was performed in accordance with procedure IC-2428F.
During.the.
l reference leg fill, a worker noted an unexpected increase in-VCT level.
Because of this unexpected increase, it was i
scspected that the evolution actually drained the VCT reference leg.
This observation was reported to supervision. Pressure in the primary makeup water supply was checked, and it was discovered that valve 2CH-195 in the i
supply path was red tagged closed instead of being in the l
open position as specified by step 6.2 of procedure IC-2428F.
The valve alignment check had been performed by a Plant Equipment Operator.
At that time the PEO did not l
perform a hands-on position check of valve 2CH-195 and f
failed to notice the red tag indicating the valve was closed.
There was a conflict between the work procedure IC-2~28F, which required valve 2CH-195 to be open, and the 3quirement to prevent boron dilution during reactor
- shutdown, which required the valve to be closed.
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l Request 129 Please discuss the validity of the above assertions.
If any i
deficiencies in work control, attention to detail, or work procedures are identified, please provide us with the corrective actions you have taken to prevent recurrence and provide an assessment of the significance of the deficiency
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with respect to safety.
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Issue 130 On May 31, 1991, during the replacement of a local pressure indication gage PI8167 in the condensate recovery system a worker was issued the wrong part (diaphragm isolated liquid filled gage) to replace a conventional gage that was already in service.
Instrument and Controls supervision is responsible to verify plant and equipment conditions, such as replacement part suitability before authorizing work on a system.
Request 130 Please discuss the validity of the above assertions.
If any deficiencies are identified, pleare provide us with the corrective actions you have taken t' prevent recurrence and provide an assessment with respect to safety of the deficiency.
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r Issue:136 From June 3 to June 5, 1991 repetitive failures were noted in the control room indication for the Unit 2 vent stack high range radiation monitor RM8168A/3.
On June 3 the
" failure" lamp was lit, and on June 5, 1991 a " Trouble Tag" was found to be in place.
The required technical specification action statements were not complied with during these repetitive failures.
Request 136 Please the validity of the above" assertions.
If any deficiencies in equipment availability or procedure compliance are identified, please provide us with the corrective actions you have taken to prevent recurrence and provide an assessment of the significance of the i
deficiencies with respect to safety.
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l This letter refers to concerns that you pr:vided to us on "a}
f 22nd, 25th, and 29th, and June 3rd, 4th, and 5th, 1991, alleg:ng:
4 (1) I;ortheast Utilities failed to prerptly enter a technic 31 on a radiation roniter; (2) specification action statenent l
3 Accunulater inadequate calibration procedures for the Unitinajequate PJ.<F ray have re
.n tha j
1evel transrit*er; (3) anraterial h) a
- r::er: (4) inadeq:. ate ingestion of fadicactive superv;scrs!
supervisory training fcr technicians ser.;ng as jcb whicn resulted in the Unit 2 vent (5) inadequate work control for 10-15 n:nutes: (6) no Instr; rent stack enitor teir.g cff-line fror the r.crning of " 2) and Centrol Technician E-Flan coverage l'91; (t) lack of attent r
30th through the norning of May 31st, to detail which resulted in an irproper valve line up while l
refilling the Vclure Centrcl Tank reference leg: (2) work teing
.erification cf equiprent c;ndition; and Ei assigned witheu*
- 'le nt Stack H;gr F ange repetitive failures of the Unit app 3 rent Radiation Monitor.
Utilities s aff initiated action to have the :;ortheast We have Attached are the issues as ce the cen: erns listed above.
review W e
.t 11 inf:rr f:u intend to characterize then to the licensee.
of their review findings.
Or f 1 an he Of I;rther Sheuld you have any further questions, assistance in these regards, please call e ::11ect at (2:5) 22 -
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MI 15TRIBUT OT FOR OSURE Issue 113 On May 20, 1991, an operator observed an abnormal indication on the Unit 2 stack radiation monitor (RM 8168).
The abnormal indication was no variation on the meter.
The operators secured and immediately reinstated power to the monitor and the meter response was noted to have returned.
On M&y 21, operators again observed no variation in the monitor output.
A trouble report was initiated and the technical specification action statement was entered for an inoperable monitor.
The one day delay is an example of operators failing to promptly initiate a corrective action request and failing to enter the technical specification action statements when required.
l l
Request 113 Please discuss the validity of the above assertions.
If any l
deficiencies are identified, please provide us with the l
and corrective actions you have taken to prevent recurrence assess the significance with regard to safety of the identified deficiencies.
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FOR P LIC DISCLOSURE JJ)4 T TP i
l Issue 114-1 (Unit 3) 1991 during the MP-3 refuel outage a calibration On May 22, i
I error of the accumulator tank level transmitters was The error was in the range of 25% due to static identified.
fluid between the transmitter and the instrument taps.
The calibration procedure did not address the error due to the the 1evel instrumentation piping configuration; therefore, l
procedure was inadequate.
Further, if the present instrument indication is correct, then it was achieved by using zero span adjustments without adhering to the i
calibration procedure.
114-1 (Unit 3)
RequestPlease discuss the validity of the above assertions.
If any deficiencies in calibration procedures or procedural compliance are identified, please provide us with the l
corrective actions you have taken to prevent recurrence.
Please provide us with an assessment of the significance with regard to safety of any identified deficiencies.
Issue 114-2 (Unit 1)
On May 22, 1991 during the installation of the IRM cable detector assemblies under the reactor vessel, the RWP/HP i
controls were inadequate and resulted in the possible The cable ingestion of radioactive material by a worker.
was identified as "5K smearable" on May 22, 1991 and the RWP However, on May 21, required workers to wear respirators.
1991, the RWP did not require respirators to do the same job.
114-2 (Unit 1)
RequestPlease discuss the validity of the above assertions.
If any deficiencies are identified, please provide us with the corrective actions you have taken to prevent recurrence.
Please provide us with an assessment of the significance j
with regard to safety of any identified deficiencies.
LIC DISCLOSURT,
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CD LOS E
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Issue 116 Recently, a tagging error occurred during preparations for maintenance on the Clean Liquid Radioactive Waste Effluent Monitor (RM 9049).
The solenoid valve isolation valves that needed to be tagged in accordance with prerequisites for the l
job were not tagged.
Specifically, the valves designated to i
be traced by procedures IC2404AA and IC 2404AC were not traced because the operations tag form was used to verify the tagging.
The root cause of the error can be attributed to the I&C technician (who verified the tagging) not being trained and qualified as a " job supervisor".
Although there was a qualified job supervisor associated with the work, this individual was allowed to leave the work area while an unqualified individual continued the job.
J Request 116 Please discuss the validity of the above assertions.
If any I
deficiencies in work control are identified, please provide l
us with the corrective actions you have taken to prevent recurrence and assess the significance of the deficiencies with respect to safety, i
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Issue 122 On or about May 29, 1991 workmen were dispatched to troubleshoot a flow problem with the plant vent stack monitor (RM 8032AB).
At the time, the "A" sample pump was running, pump "B" was off and flow was as expected.
The pumps were switched to permit the workers to investigate the flow problem.
Pump "A" was stopped, but "B" did not start due to a preventive maintenance action that was still in progress.
As a result, the stack monitor was out of service for 10-15 minutes.
122 RequestPlease discuss the validity of the above assertions.
If any deficiencies in work control are identified, please provide us with the corrective actions you have taken to prevent recurrence and assess the significar.ce of the deficiencies with respect to safety.
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PUBL DISCLOSQRE y
i Issue 128 On June 1, 1991 a worker learned that he had been assigned duty as the on-call I&C technician. (Unit 2 Emergency plan) for a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period from the morning of May 30 through the morning of May 31, 1991.
The worker was unaware of this assignment on May 29 when he informed his supervisor that he would not be at work on May 30 for personal reasons.
The worker did not pick up the department radio paging device and no one else was assigned as his replacement.
Lapses in on-call coverage such as this example occur on a routine frequency.
Request 128 Please discuss the validity of the above assertions.
If any deficiencies in the on-call coverage for emergency planning are identified, please provide us with the corrective actions you have taken to prevent recurrence.
In addition, please assess the frequency and significance with respect to safety of lapses in on-call coverage by the Instrument and Controls and Maintenance technical staffs.
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T C DIS SURE l
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Issue 129 On June 3, 1991, the periodic evolution of refilling the volume control tank (VCT) level instrument reference leg was performed in accordance with procedure IC-2428F.
During the i
reference leg fill, a worker noted an unexpected increase in
~
d VCT level.
Because of this unexpected increase, it was suspected that the evolution actually drained the VCT reference leg.
This observation was reported to supervision. Pressure in the primary makeup water supply was and it was discovered that valve 2CH-195 in the
- checked, supply path was red tagged closed instead of being in the 3
j open position as specified by step 6.2 of procedure IC-2428F.
The valve alignment check had been performed by a Plant Equipment Operator.
At that time the PEO did not i
perform a hands-on position check of valve 2CH-195 and failed to notice the red tag indicating the valve was closed.
There was a conflict between the work procedure IC-2428F, which required valve 2CH-195 to be open, and the requirement to prevent boron dilution during reactor shutdown, which required the valve to be closed.
129 RequestPlease discuss the validity of the above assertions.
If any deficiencies in work control, attention to detail, or work procedures are identified, please provide us with the corrective actions you have taken to prevent recurrence and prov_de an ass 2ssment of the significance cf the deficiency w;:h respect to safety.
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LIMITED DISTRIBUT O
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t Issue 130 i
On May 31, 1991, during the replacement of a local pressure indication gage PI8167 in the condensate recovery system a l
worker was issued the wrong part (diaphragm isolated liquid filled gage) to. replace a conventional gage that was already j
5 in service.
Instrument and Controls supervision is responsible to verify plant and equipment conditions, such as replacement part suitability oefore authorizing work.on a i
system.
y a,
J Request 130 Please discuss the validity of the above assertions.
If.any i
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deficiencies are identified, please provide us with the 4
corrective actions you have taken to prevent recurrence and i
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provide an assessment with respect to safety of the deficiency.
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RE Issue 136 From June 3 to June 5, 1991 repetitive failures were noted in the control room indication for the Unit 2 vent stack On June 3 the high range radiation monitor RM8168A/B.
" failure" lamp was lit, and on June 5, 1991 a " Trouble Tag" was found to be in place.
The required technical specification action statements were not complied with during these repetitive failures.
Request 136 Please the validity of the above assertions.
If any deficiencies in equipment availability or procedure compliance are identified, please provide us with the corrective actions you have taken to prevent recurrence and provide an assessment of the significance of the deficiencies with respect to safety.
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h Issue 113 an operator observed an abnormal indication l
On May 20, 1991, on the Unit 2 stack radiation monitor (RM 8168).
The l
The abnormal indication was no variation on the meter.
operators secured and immediately reinstated power to the j
l monitor and the meter response was notea to have returned.
!i 3
operators again observed no variation in the On May 21, A trouble report was initiated and the monitor output.
j technical specification action statement was entered for an inoperable monitor.
The one day delay is an example of l
operators failing to promptly initiate a corrective action request and failing to enter the technical specification i
}
action statements when required.
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113 Please discuss the validity of the above assertions.
If'any l
Request deficiencies are identified, please provide us with the and corrective actions you have taken to prevent recurrence assess the significance with regard to safety of the i
j identified deficiencies.
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j Issue 114-1 (Unit 3) l 1991 during the MP-3 refuel outage a calibration On May 22, error of the accumulator tank level transmitters was
(
The error was in the range of 25% due to static f
l identified.
The l
fluid between the transmitter and the-instrument-taps.
calibration procedure did not address the error due to the the level instrumentation piping configuration; therefore, Further, if-the present f
i procedure was inadequate.
then it was achieved by i
instrument indication is correct, l
using zero span adjustments without adhering to the calibration procedure.
Request 114-1 (Unit 3)
If any
[
~
Please discuss the validity of the above assertions.
l deficiencies in calibration procedures or procedural compliance are identified, please provide us with the l
corrective actions you have taken to prevent recurrence.
f Please provide us with an assessment of the significance t
with regard to safety of any identified deficiencies.
I f
(
Issue 114-2 (Unit 1) 1991 during the installation of the IRM cable j
On May 22, detector assemalies under the reactor vessel, the RWP/HP controls were inadequate and resulted in the possible The cable j
ingestion of radioactive caterial by a worker.
1991 and the RWP was identified as "5K snearable" on May 22, However, on May 21, l
i required workers to wear respirators.
1991, the RWP did not require respirators to dc the sane l
job.
I l
(Unit 1)
Request 114-2 Please discuss the validity of the above assertions.
If any deficiencies are identified, please provide us with the i
corrective actions you have taken to prevent recurrence.
l Please provide us with an assessment of the significance l
with regard to safety of any identified deficiencies.
l 1
LIM T STRI TI NOT PUBL DIS OSU Issue 116 Recently, a tagging error occurred during preparations for l
maintenance on the Clean Liquid Radioactive Waste Effluent The solenoid valve isolation valves that l
Monitor (RM 9049).
t needed to be tagged in accordance with prerequisites for the job were not tagged.
Specifically, the valves designated to be traced by procedures IC2404AA and IC 2404AC were not traced because the operations tag form was used to verify The root cause of the error can be attributed l
5 the tagging.
not being to the I&C technician (who verified the tagging)
Although there trained and qualified as a " job supervisor".
f was a qualified job supervisor associated with the work, i
this individual was allowed to leave the work area while an unqualified individual continued the job.
i 116 If any RequestPlease discuss the validity of the above assertio.is.
deficiencies in work control are identified, please provide us with the corrective actions you have taken to prevent recurrence and assess the significance of the deficiencies with respect to safety.
i b
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5 i
i UTION OR P LIC LOSU
1 V"R CLOSU Issue 122 On or about May 29, 1991 workmen were dispatched to troubleshoot a flow problem with the plant vent stack monitor (RM 8032AB).
At the time, the "A" sample pump was running, punp "B" was off and flow was as expected.
The pumps were switched to permit the workers to investigate the flow problem.
Pump "A" was stopped, but "B" did not start due to a preventive maintenance action that was still in progress.
As a result, the stack monitor was out of service for 10-15 minutes.
Request 122 Please discuss the validity of the above assertions.
If any deficiencies in work control are identified, please provide us with the corrective actions you have taken to prevent recurrence and assess the significance of the deficiencies with respect to safety.
L ITED DIS IBU ON -
T RP
.C 0SURE
&d ITED DISTRIBUTI Issue 128 on June 1, 1991 a worker learned that he had been assigned duty as the on call I&C technician (Unit 2. Emergency plan) for a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period from the morning of May 30 through the morning of May 31, 1991.
The worker was unaware of this assignment on May 29 when he informed his supcrvisor that he would not be at work on May 30 for personal reasons.
The worker did not pick up the department radio paging device and no one else was assigned as his replacement.
Lapses in on-call coverage such as this example occur on a routine frequency.
Request 128 Please discuss the validity of the above assertions.
If any deficiencies in the on-call coverage for emergency planning are identified, please provide us with the corrective actions you have taken to prevent recurrence.
In addition, please assess the frequency and significance with. respect to safety of lapses in on-call coverage by the Instrument and Controls and Maintenance technical staffs.
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DI TRIBUTI T FOR LI IS URE l
OT F PUBLIC L T.
> DI BUTI Issue 129 On June 3, 1991, the periodic evolution of refilling the volume control tank (VCT) level instrument reference leg was performed in accordance with procedure IC-2428F.
During the reference leg fill, a worker noted an unexpected increase in VCT level.
Because of this unexpected increase, it was suspected that the evolution actually drained the VCT reference leg.
This observation was reported to supervision. Pressure in the primary makeup water supply was checked, and it was discovered that valve 2CH-195 in the supply path was red tagged closed instead of being in the open position as specified by step 6.2 of procedure IC-2428F.
The valve alignment check had been performed by a Plant Equipment Operator.
At that time the PEO did not perform a hands-on position check of valve 2CH-195 and failed to notice the red tag indicating the valve was closed.
There was a conflict between the work procedure IC-2428F, which required valve 2CH-195 to be open, and the requirement to prevent boron dilution during reactor shutdown, which required the valve to be closed.
Request 129 Please discuss the validity of the above assertions.
If any deficiencies in work control, attention to detail, or work procedures are identified, please provide us with the corrective actions you have taken to prevent recurrence and provide an assessment of the significance of the deficiency with respect tc safety.
l I
LI DI RIB IO NOT OR BLI DISC l
Irnue 130 On May 31, 1991, during the replacement of a local pressure
~
indication gage PIS167 in the condensate recovery system a worker was issued the wrong part (diaphragm isolated liquid filled gage) to replace a conventional gage that was already l
in service.
Instrument and Controls supervision is l
such i
responsible to verify plant and equipment conditions, i
as replacement part suitability before authorizing work on a system.
l
[
Request 130 Please discuss the validity of the above assertions.
If any deficiencies are identified, please provide us with the corrective actions you have taken to prevent recurrence and provide an assessment with respect to safety of the l
deficiency.
I i
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. TRIBd'TI ' - NO PUBLI DIS OSURE I
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I Issue 136 From June 3 to June 5, 1991 repetitive failures were noted in the control room indication for the Unit 2 vent stack On June 3 the high range radiation monitor RM8168A/B.
" failure" lamp was lit, and on June 5, 1991 a " Trouble Tag" was found to be in place.
The required technical specification action statements were not complied with during these repetitive failures.
t t
[
Request 136 Please the validity of the above assertions.
If any
~
deficiencies in equipment availability or procedure
~
compliance are identified, please provide us with the j
corrective actions you have taken to prevent recurrence and i
provide an assessment of the significance of the l
deficiencies with respect to safety.
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UNIT E0 51 AT ES l
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- n +,,t NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMYISSION g
,i REGION I
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g KievG OF FRUSSIA PE%5YLV ANI A 9406 0,
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JUti 2 Y:3; This letter refers to concerns that ycu prcvided to us on May 28th, and 29th, and June 3rd, 4th, and 5th, 1991, alleging:
22nd,!;ortheast Utilities f ailed to prorptly enter a technical (1) on a radiatien ronitor; (2) specification action statenent 3 Accunulater l
inadequate calibration procedures for the Uni inadequate EWP ray have resulted in the level transnitter; (3) an (4) inadequate i
ingestion of rad:cactive raterial by a worker; l
as job supervisers; supervisory training for technicians serving 2 vent i
inadequate work control which resulted ir the Unit (5;
stack nonitor being of f-line for 10-15 minutes: (6) no Instrunen; f ron the corning cf :*.ay l
and Centrol Technician E-Plan coverage1991: (7) lack of attenticn 30th through the rerning of May 31st, f
to detail which resulted in an improper valve line up while j
refilling the Volu e Control Tank reference 'eg; (8) work being i
i assigned without.erification cf equipnent ndition: and (9) l l
repetitive f ailures of the Unit 2 'le n s t a c:.. Hion p.ance apparent
~
Radiation Monitor.
I l
Utilities staff We have initiated action to have the !;ortheas:
I review the concerns listed above.
Attached are the issues as
.c e We will infer. f:.:
intend to characterir e the. to the licensee.
cf their review find:ngs.
Should you nave any further questions, or if can be of further assistance :n these regards, please call e ::llect at 12:5, 22 -
5225.
S:- ere;j,
/
/
NYY L;bar: nehZ nger, in;df Ee3000r prC3eOts $ rang. *
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in acccdance with tha freefom of Information At!. ext:Pticas __ b 7 C FO!A. _j@gg_-z occ:
j Allegation files (a), RI-91-A-113*11'.
- 116,12 2,12 8,12 9, 3 3 )' 3 y 1
J.
Stewart l
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Shedicsky E.
Kelly
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DIS ON -
OR ISC SURE
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t Issue 113 j
On May 20, 1991, an operator observed an abnormal indication The l
on Vie Unit 2 stack radiation monitor (RM 8168).
The i
abnormal indication was no variation on the meter.
operators secured and immediately reinstated power to the monitor and the meter response was noted to have returned.
On May 21, operators again observed no variation in the A trouble report'was initiated and the l
monitor output.
technical specification action statement was entered for an inoperable monitor.
The one day delay is an example of l
operators failing to promptly initiate a corrective action request and failing to enter the technical specification action statements when required.
t i
Request 113 Please discuss the validity of the above assertions.
If any l
deficiencies are identified, please provide us with the and corrective actions you have taken to prevent recurrence i
assess the significance with regard-to safety of the identified deficiencies.
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i TE STRIBU ON -
T FOR PUBLIC DI OSURE i
L L
_.ArMITED BUTION OT FO C DIS Q l
3 i
Issue 114-1 (Unit 3)
On May 22, 1991 during the MP-3 refuel outage a calibration error of the accumulator tank level transmitters was identified.
The error was in the range of 25% due to static l
The l
fluid between the transmitter and the instrument' taps.
calibration procedure did not address the error due to the e
level instrumentation piping configuration; therefore, the procedure was inadequate.
Further, if the present instrument indication is correct, then it was achieved by using zero span adjustments without adhering to the calibration procedure.
l 114-1 (Unit 3)
Request Please discuss the validity of the above assertions.
If any l
deficiencies in calibration procedures or procedural compliance are identified, please provide us with the corrective actions you have taken to prevent recurrence.
Please provide us with an assessment of the significance with regard to safety of any identified deficiencies.
l t
l i
Issue 114-2 (Unit 1)
On May 22, 1991 during the installation of the IRM cable detector assemblies under the reactor vessel, the RWP/HP controls were inadequate and resulted in the possible ingestion of radioactive material by a worker.
The cable was identified as "5K smearable" on May 22, 1991 and the RWP i
required workers to wear respirators.
However, on May 21, 1991, the RWP did not require respirators to do the same job.
i Request 114-2 (Unit 1)
Please discuss the validity of the above assertions.
If any deficiencies are identified, please provide us with the corrective actions you have taken to prevent recurrence.
Please provide us with an assessment of the significance l
with regard to safety of any identified deficiencies.
l 1
l 1
l a.#C C 2
I i.
I; L
TED D iIBUTION - NOT FO BLIC DI L
URE l
\\
l Issue 116 l
Recently, a tagging error occurred during preparations for maintenance on the Clean Liquid Radioactive Waste Effluent Monitor (RM 9049).
The solenoid valve isolation valves that needed to be tagged in accordance with prerequisites for the job were not tagged.
Specifically, the valves designated to be traced by procedures IC2404AA and IC 2404AC were not traced because the operations tag form was used to verify f
the tagging.
The root cause of the error can be attributed to the I&C technician (who verified the tagging) not being l
trained and qualified as a " job supervisor".
Although there was a qualified job supervisor associated with the work, this individual was allowed to leave the work area while an l
unqualified individual continued the job.
1 116 RequestPlease discuss the validity of the above assertions.
If any
[
deficiencies in work control are identified, please provide us with the corrective actions you have taken to prevent recurrence and assess the significance of the deficiencies with respect to safety.
l i
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1 IMITED DISTRIBUTION P
PUBL DISCLOSURE l
L
4 l
9 s
i LI@
i E
Issue 122 On or about May 29, 1991 workmen were dispatched to troubleshoot a flow problem with the plant vent stack monitor (RM 8032AB).
At the time, the "A" sample pump was The running, pump "B" was off and flow was as expected.
pumps were switched to permit the workers to investigate the flow problem.
Pump "A" was stopped, but "B" did not start due to a preventive maintenance action that was still in i
progress.
As a result, the stack monitor was out of service z
for 10-15 minutes, Request 122 Please discuss the validity of the above assertions.
If any deficiencies in work control are identified, please provide l
us with the corrective actions you have taken to prevent i
recurrence and assess the significance of the deficiencies l
l with respect to safety.
i I
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s
i
)
L ITE ISTR UTI
- NOT PUB IC D SCL UR l
Issue 128 on June 1, 1991 a worker learned that he had been assigned duty as the on-call I&C technician (Unit 2 Emergency plan) for a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period from the morning of May 30 through the morning of May 31, 1991.
The worker was unaware of this assignment on May 29 when he informed his supervisor that he would not be at work on May 30 for personal reasons.
The I
worker did not pick up the department radio paging device and no one else was assigned as his replacement.
Lapses in on-call coverage such as this example occur on a routine frequency.
Request 128 Please discuss the validity of the above assertions.
If any deficiencies in the on-call coverage for emergency planning are identified, please provide us with the corrective l
actions you have taken to prevent recurrence.
In addition, l
please assess the frequency and significance with respect to I
safety of lapses in on-call coverage by the Instrument and Controls and Maintenance technical staffs.
l
,LIK{TEp DIS.
- NDT R PUBLI LOSUR l
E l
IT DISTRIB ON - N I
DIS RE
[
i Issue 129 On June 3, 1991, the periodic evolution of refilling the volume control tank (VCT) level instrument reference leg was performed in accordance with procedure IC-2428F.
During the i
reference leg fill, a worker noted an unexpected increase in VCT level.
Because of this unexpected increase, it was 1
suspected that the evolution actually drained the VCT reference leg.
This observation was reported to I
supervision. Pressure in the primary makeup water supply was
(
checked, and it was discovered that valve 2CH-195 in the supply path was red tagged closed instead of being in the
[
i open position as specified by step 6.2 of procedure IC-2428F.
The valve alignment check had been performed by a Plant Equipment Operator.
At that time the PEO did not perform a hands-on position check of valve 2CH-195 and failed to notice the red tag indicating the valve was i
closed.
There was a conflict between the work procedure IC-2428F, which required valve 2CH-195 to be open, and the i
requirement to prevent boron dilution during reactor shutdown, which required the valve to be closed.
Request 129 Please discuss the validity of the above' assertions.
If any i
deficiencies in work control, attention to detail, or work l
procedures are identified, please provide us with the I
corrective actions you have taken to prevent recurrence and provide an assessment of the significance of the deficiency with respect to safety.
I i
E
l' IMITED DISTRI ION -
T FOR PUB DI OSU E l
\\
Issue 130 I
on May 31, 1991, during the replacement of a local pressure indication gage PI8167 in the condensate recovery system a worker was issued the wrong part (diaphragm isolated liquid filled gage) to. replace a conventional gage that was already in service.
Instrument and Controls supervision is responsible to verify plant and equipment conditions, such l
as replacement part suitability before authorizing work on a system.
Request 130 Please discuss the validity of the above assertions.
If any deficiencies are identified, please provide us with the corrective actions you have taken to prevent recurrence and provide an assessment with respect to safety of the deficiency.
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i LI5I DISTR UTIO T
OR I
SUR Y
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t LIM N.
r l
From June 3 to June 5, 1991 repetitive failures were noted
[
Issue 136 i
in the control room indication for the Unit 2 vent stack l
On June 3 the high range radiation monitor RM8168A/B.
" failure" lamp was lit, and on June 5, 1991 a " Trouble Tag" l
~
was found to be in place.
The required technical specification action statements were not complied with j
t during these repetitive failures.
Request 136 Please'the validity of'the above assertions.
If any deficiencies in equipment availability or procedure compliance are identified, please provide us with the corrective acticns you have taken to prevent recurrence and provide an assessment of the significance of the deficiencies with respect to safety.
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i ITE STRIB N-RP DISC URE i
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ALLECATION RECEIPT REPORT Zws 3,199 i /o30nn A11egation No.
$l~ 0
- lR 0 e
(leave blant)
F.
t tt Confidentiality:
Vas it re:: vested?
Yes No y Va s it initially granted?
Yes No Was it finally granted by the allegation panel Yes No Does a confidentiality agreerrent need to be sent to alleger?
Yes No Fas a confidentiality agreement been signed?
Yes No P.emo cocumenting why it was granted is attached?
Yes No
'/WC(oh e
Fosition/
Title:
1 Fa cii t ty: nnL9mwC riurr 2 Docket No.: <@ - 13 (,
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1 (A11egatten Summary (trief descriptien of concern (s):TNE//6 esMS A/O
[r16/2GDvCY &MN/WC 0W CDLL CoyfnpC6 5770r1 TNA
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- [/10l'1 TH6Mo/1 W!"C Cf Mny 30 7Nnoacy TA/B MOAW! *C OF MAf 3lf f)9 f Number of Concerns: _
g Eeployee Receiving Allegation: 87 NAS /tNon57 ETEvrotorA. /
(first two initials a15d last nane)
Type of Regulated Activity (a)J Reactor (d)
Safeguards (br.
Vender (e) _ Other:
l (c) __ Materials (Specify)
Materials License No. (if appifcable):
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(f) Onsite Health and Safety (c) Safeguards (g) Offsite Health and Safety (d) Transportation (h) Other:
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