ML20036B291
| ML20036B291 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 07/01/1991 |
| From: | Wenzinger E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20036A053 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-92-162 NUDOCS 9305180465 | |
| Download: ML20036B291 (7) | |
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_% 0 3 E1 Dear This letter refers to concerns that you provided to us on June a lapse in. control of work on safety-17, 1991, alleging: (1) the control wir ng diagram for one related equipment; and (2) agree with plant as-safety-related valve motor operator does not built conditions.
We have initiated action to have the Northeast Utilities staff intend Attached are the issues as we review the above concerns.
We will inform you of to characterize them to the licensee.
their review findings.
f or if I can be of further Should you have any further questions,please call me collect at (215) 33<-
j assistance in these regards, 5225
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sincerely, I
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Edward Wenzinger, Chief
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ENCLOSURE Issue On June 14, 1991, while attempting to replace the "SealTite" flexible electrical conduit and the position indicator window for No. 1 Steam Generator Main Steam Isolation Bypass Valve motor operator (2-MS-65A), it was found that the work had been done previously under AWO M2-89-01828 on March 13, 1989.
However, the prints had not been updated.
Request Please discuss the validity of the above assertions.
If deficiencies in work control or drawing control are found, please inform us of the corrective actions you have taken to Please provide us with an assessment of prevent recurrence.
the significance with regard to safety of any identified deficiencies.
Issue On June 14, 1991, differences between a' control wiring diagram and actual plant conditions was found.
The wiring diagram (Drawing 25203-32020) for the No. 1 Steam Generator Main Steam Bypass Valve (2-MS-65A) Motor Operator indicates the presence of an amber light to signify when the unit has tripped on overload.
This light is not installed.
Also, Contact 49, shown on Drawing 25203-32031, sht. 42 does not exist.
Request Please discuss the validity of the above assertions.
If deficiencies are found in plant drawings, please notify us.
of the corrective actions taken to prevent recurrence.
Please prcvide us with an assessment of the significance with regard to safety of any identified deficiencies.
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6.0 PERSONNEL SAFETY TAG CONTROL FOR ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT WORK Clark Kido
-Allegation No. RI-91-A-137 RI-91-A-138 RI-91-A-139 RI-91-A-140 RI-91-A-142 RI-91-A-147 RI-91-A-149 Several concerns have been expressed regarding the safe work practices when handling electrical equipment at Millstone Unit 2.
The equipment included solenoid valve 2-BAE-26 limit switches.
"B" EHC motor heater, motor breaker preventive maintenance for the Condensate Polishing Facility (CPF) acid feed pump, the "D" Condensate Demineralizer inlet valve (2-CND-170) motor, the "B" turbine room chiller, 4160V bus 24A, and SG1 MSIV bypass valve 2-MS-65A.
These issues are descrited in the licensee's letter to the NRC dated August 16, 1991.
l Assessment The safety tag issues were turned over to the licensee via NRC letter dated June 24, 1991. The licensee's response to the issues was provided in a letter dated August 16, 1991. In addition to the letter, the inspector looked at the station procedures governing safety tags and the general guidance given to all employees per the general employee training and the utility accident prevention manual.
The in ector also held discussions with the training epartment to determine the type o technical training was required for the era ts.
I The inspector verified that all personnel get the same basic general employee training and safety indoctrination, plant olicies, and guidance from the employee safety manual.
The permanent emp oyees, temporaries, and contract personnel all receive the same basic safety training. In part, the employees are instructed to not touch or operate any equipment, unless authorized.
All electrical connections are assumed to be live unless confirmed otherwise, such as by safety. tagging or an equipment grounds check.
The station procedure for tagging, ACP-QA-2.06 Station Tagging, provides general guidance for all personnel who perform work on equipment at the station. The j ob supervisor is responsible for walking down the equipment to verify tagg ng is proper. The job supervisor is another person, who is familiar with the equ and who serves as check for safe conditions prior to beginning the job. puent The effectiveness of this practice was cited in the licensee's response. There was one case, Condensate Polishing Facility (CPF) acid feed pumE motor, where the operator creating the safety tag clearance made an error.
The job supervisor detected and ccrrected the error (wrong equipment label). The operator was later l
counseled on his mistake.
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Tht inspector held discussions with station technical trainers to clarify instructions for ensuring quipment was properly grounded. The trainers stated that on occasion where vor instructions were unclear the crafts have held up work to ask the job supervisor or technical trainers to confirm the equipment configuration as safe.
The trainers stated that procedures were specified for 4160V breakers, where the 4160V lines could be grounded. The inspector looked at procedure MP-772.2, High Voltage Grounding 4160 Switchgear, which included precautions:
3.2 Verify that the shift supervisor has selected and placed proper tags for personnel safety, and prepared the system / component for work.
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3.3 Ensure that the job supervisor has verified that equipment isolation and taggin5 at the work site represents safe workin5 conditions.
4.6 Ensure that the electrical components that are required to be tagged are deenergized and tagged prior to starting work.
1 The trainers stated that there was no single overall procedure which covered electrical grounds for all 480V equipment. The instructions for grounding were specific to the component and were included in the procedures, lesson plans, and hands-on training.
The 480V breakers were typically not grounded to perform work. For example, when a 480V breaker was racked out of an electrical panel, the electrician understood from previous training and work experience that the exposed conductors at the back of the panel were still live. The breaker served as a physical barrier separatirg the technician from the live leads. Safety tags and flagging would be placed to warn other personnel in the area of the racked out breaker, signifying that there were open 480V leads at the rear of the panel.
The inspector looked at several lesson plans for the electricians, and found that all lessons included precautions for handling electrical equipment.
Specific reference was made to the station tagging procedures.
The electricians were trained in the classroom and in the mockup laboratory on the proper use of diagnostic equipment to check for line voltages, or equipment grounds, before racking out the breakers.
The trainers stated that the training for the other crafts, mechanics and I&C technicians, does not include the same diagnostic tools to confirm that a component or cable is deenergized.
The safety of the mechanic relies on the disciplined use of safety tags that are typically hung by the electricians. The trainers stated that the students were continually reminded of the importance of proper safety tags and work control. Also, equipment boundaries and jurisdic-tions are covered in t.he classes to prevent personnel from handling equipment without proper authorization.
The trainers gave an example, where an I&C technician can trace a problem back to the power supply breaker, but he is instructed to stop his work at that point to allow a qualified electrician to continue from there.
Contractor personnel are required to be trained and qualified to the same standards as plant employees. The trainers indicated that plans are being considered to formalize a schedule for required refresher training, say every three to five years.
Conclusion The proper use of safety ta5s in handling electrical equipment is evident in the station administrative policies and procedures, technical training, and work control.
The inspector did not find any indication, where worker safety was compromised. In one case an error was clearly made and was properly identified by the job leader. The licensee's response satisfactorily addressed the safety issues presented in the NRC letter.
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i RECORD OF ALLEGATION PANEL DECTSTONS l
SITE:
/h su stoaE 2-.
PANEL ATTENDEES:
ALLEGATION NO.:
R T-9 /- A - O/f0 Chairman - w i 6 s w.s DATE: 6 -/9'-T /
(Mtg.@2345)
Branch Chief -
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Section Chief ( A0C) - KELLEy PRIORITY:
High Medium EA s oc.<'
f No h Others - mATA(e.s SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: Yes
. s ha cf v d % c. R A y m,s D; l
DD h SC CONCURRENCE TO CLOSEOUT:
CONFIDENTIALITY GRANTED: Yes @
S HE o L o r & 9 A 6 [c nog s7-
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(See Allegation Receipt Report) 15 THEIR A 00L FINDING:
es No l
IS ; HILLING EFFECT ETTER WARRANTED:
Yes No HAS CHILLI FFECT LETTER EEEN SENT:
Yes No l
l HAS L? :NSEE RESPONDED TO CHILLING EFFECT LETTER:
Yes No l
i ACTION:
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NOTES:
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Y MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES ALLEGATION NUMBER RI-91-A-0150 4
The data base presently carries the NEXT ACTION NEEDED for 91-150 as WFR LIC NU
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(Waiting for Response from NU).
I recommend that 91-150 status be changed to Closed and reference our letter of October 16, 1991 for the following reasons 1.
The July 1,1991 letter to Northeast Utilities (copy attached) told they to refer to RI-91-A-0148 in their response letter.
2.
The second issue in the enclosure to that letter to NU is allegation 91-150. I have attached a copy of the allegation for information.
i 3.
Our acknowledgement letter of July 1,1991 and our closeout letter of October 28, i
1991 (copies attached) included both allegations91-148 and 91-150.
4 RECOMMEND close RI-91-A-0150 and update the data base to reflect that it was closed out by the October 28,1991 letter. File a copy of this memo and the attached letters i
in the RI-91-A-0150 folder Y(
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concurrences:
RI:DRP RI:DRP RI:DRP Barkley Kelly Wenzinger
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