ML20036A032
| ML20036A032 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200001 |
| Issue date: | 04/30/1993 |
| From: | For J GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Poslusny C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9305070263 | |
| Download: ML20036A032 (56) | |
Text
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($'
e GE Nuclear Energy l
General Eintnt Compey i
175 Canner Avenue, Sen Jose CA 95125 i
i i
April 30,1993 Docket No. STN 52-001 4
t Chet Poslusny, Senior Project Manager j
Standardization Project Directorate
. Associate Directorate for Advanced Reactors and License Renewal Office of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation l
Subject; Submittal Supporting Accelerated ABWR Review Schedule - DFSER Chapter 7 Outstanding Item
Dear Chet:
.l
~
Enclosed are SSAR markups addressing the following outstanding items:
Onen Item Confirmatory Items 7.2.6-1 7.2.1-3 7.2.6-2 7.2.2.2-1
- i 7.2.6-4 7.2.2.5-1 7.2-87I 7.2.8-2 j
2 7.7.1.15-2 7.2.8-3 72.8-5 7.3.2. '[
- 7.4.1.4-1 ~
.i Please provide a copy of this transmittal to Jim Stewart.
]
i Sincerely, y-
.da ed Reactor Programs w
cc: ~ Norman Fletcher (DOE)
' Barry Simon (GE);
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9305070263~930430-
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CLOSURE OF ABWR Draft FSER OPEN AND CONFIRMATORY ITEMS i
The following DFSER open item, No. 7.1.3.3-1, while not on the list ofitems to be included in this submittal, has been added because it is referenced as the source of closure documentation in several of the other DFSER open and confirmatory items.
DFSER No. 7.1.3.3-1 (OPEN)
ISSUE
- a. Development and review of generic ITAAC and DAC, including computer (software development and setpoint methodology).
- b. One channel SSLC prototype,
- c. SSI.C Tier 1 design des:ription, ITAAC/DAC.
- c. Comraitment to RG 1.152 and ANSI /IEEE ANS-7-4.3.2 not suflicient CLOSURE A new document, Tier 1 Design Certification Material for Instrumentation and Control,ITAAC Section 3A, has been prepared. The outline of the basic structure of this document was submitted to the NRC for placement on the docket on March 26, 1993. Completed sections on equipment qualification (EQ) and setpoint methodology were submitted the latter part of April. A complete version of the total document will be submitted by the latter part of May.
This document takes an integrated software and harchvare approach to safety-related I&C development and also discusses non-safety-related aspects of software development. The document combines material previously developed for ITAAC and DAC (SSLC, software development, and electromagnetic compatibility) with new sections covering setpoint methodology and equipment qualification. The Tier 1 material for software development, setpoint methodology and EQis supported by Tier 2 commitments to specific methods and standards (incorporated into the SSAR as Appendix 7B).
DFSER No. 7.2.1-3 (CNFM)
ISSUE Revise SSAR text and figures to indicate that turbine inputs to SSLC are not multiplexed.
CLOSURE
- a. SSAR Section 7.2 revised (see attachment).
' b. Marked-up figures are attached: Figures 7.2-2, 7.2-9a, 7.2-9b. Additional changes shown are hardwired MSIV position switches and deletion of seismic acceleration sensors (not applicable to domestic ABWR design). 1
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DFSER No. 7.2.2.2-1 (CNFM)
ISSUE
- a. Revise Figure 7.A.2-1 in Appendix 7A to show direct hardwired inputs into DTM.
- b. Revise SSAR to reflect accurate listing of sensors that use EMS.
y CLOSURE
- a. Revised Figure 7.A.2-1 is attached, showing hardwired inputs.
- b. Revised listing of EMS sensors (April 1993) is attached.
i DFSER No. 7.2.2.5-1 (CNFM)
ISSUE
- a. All STS equipment will be qualified as part of SSLC.
- b. STS for all safety systems other than SSLC must also be Class 1E.
CLOSURE j
The shaded paragraph after the following paragraph in SSAR Section 7A.7 is added:
All programmable digital equipment utilized for safety-related functions are qualified in accordance with safety criteria and with the safety system design basis with which they interface.
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LhstdwareidRseftGsreisel con ~sidered an in'tegral iar.tfof~the, des 3gn and$s'suchlafeM J
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DFSER No. 7.2fwl (OPEN)
ISSUE
- a. Common-mode failure potential of ABWR software.
- b. GE to complete review of LLNL diversity study.
j CLOSURE t
GE's position continues to be that the very low common-mode failure probability of the simple ABWR protection system software, in conjunction with a design basis accident, is adequately backed up by system level diversity inherent in the plant design. GE believes that the hardware and software development, t'est, and qualification methodologies and acceptance criteria presented in the I&C Design.
t Certification Material (see reply to DFSER No.' 7.1.3.3-1) will result in a highly reliable protection system. Specifically for RPS, however, there are several alternate diverse or hardwired methods of scram outside of the software logic, including ARI, manual scram, and ATWS mitigation, as presently discussed in the SSAR.
. See the following item, DFSER No. 7.2.42, for the specific closure of this issue.
i
1 DFSER No. 7.2.6-2 (OPEN)'
l ISSUE l
Diversity and defense-in-depth (lack of design details).
a.
- b. Chapter 15 analyses completed by GE; stated that GE design has adequate defense-l in-depth and diversity; staff should consider probability of events and allow credit j
for use of RSS.
CLOSURE 4
GE's initial analysis of Chapter 15 accidents took credit for feedwater control being available to the operator for makeup after complete common-mode failure of SSLC or the essential multiplexing system. A succeeding analysis was prepared at NRC l
request taking credit only for availability of CRD flow and one condensate pump for operator action. Following submittal of this analysis on February 26,1993, additional studies were requested by NRC stafT to bound the time available for operator response to each of the accident conditions considered previously, also assuming the same equipment availability. These studies are in process and will be submitted in early May. The results of these studies will close this issue.
1 DFSER No. 7.2M (OPEN)
ISSUE Simplicity of SSLC and EMS software; GE to provide supporting analyses.
-l CLOSURE At this stage of safety-related I&C development there will always be a question of software reliability no matter how simple the proposed software is shown to be, j
mainly because of the common-mode failure issue. However, as a result of the LLNL common-mode failure study and other discussions with NRC staff, GE has committed-to the following plan:
- a. Produce an integrated hardware / software development program as' described i
in the 1&C Design Certification Material submittal (DFSER No. 7.1.3.3-1)
A
- b. Commit to provide a set of hardwired displays and controls (DFSER No. 7.2.6.-3)
- c. Complete the common-mode failure analyses (DFSER No. 7.2.6-2), which support the inherent diversity provided by both the safety-related and non-t safety-related systems.
Thus, GE believes that additional analyses of software simplicity are no longer relevant and will be of no benefit in closing this issue; the DFSER items mentioned above will close tlus issue.
DFSER No. 7.2.8-1 ISSUE
- a. ~ Software metrics to be used to track error rates during software development (COL).
- b. Software metric commitment to be included in Tier 1 ITAAC (CNFM).
I
- c.. Commitment to software safety hazards analysis, sneak circuit analysis, timing.
analyses' (OPEN).
f -
i
i CLOSURE i
- a. COL action item for software metrics to be included as Section 7A.8 in Appendix
.i 7A of SSAR.
- b. Confirmatory commitment for sofnvare metrics included in I&C Design Certification Material discussed in DFSER No. 7.1.3.3-1. Tier 2 material for SSAR i
(Appendix 7B) also submitted.
l
- c. These commitments should also be a COL action item for the same reasons as item a.; i.e., technology in these areas will change over dme and must be specified
-i by the final software vendor at the time of software design. These items will be included in Section 7A.8 of Appendix A. A general commitment to special l
analyses for safety-critical software is made in the Tier 11&C Design Certification Material discussed in DFSER No. 7.1.3.3-1.
i DFSER No. 7.2.8-2 (CNFM)
ISSUE Commercial dedication of software in safety systems l
CLOSURE This issue is resolved in the SSAR in Appendix 7B, the Tier 2 material developed to l
support the I&C DCM (see DFSER No. 7.1.3.3-1) by a commitment to the proposed -
ANSI /IEEE standard P 7-4.3.2, " Standard Criteria for Digital Computers Used in Safety Systems of Nuclear _ Power Generation Stations," that will replace ANSI /IEEE-ANS i 4.3.2-1982, " Application Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems for Nuclear Facilities." The proposed standard covers commercial dedication of third-party software and the use of commercial software tools for safety-related applications.
i As stated in the proposed standard, the dedication process requires the inclusion of the requirements that the commercial software shall meet in the verification and validation (V&V) and configuration management plans. The requirements shall address the similarity of the nuclear and non nucicar applications. Additionally, the j
requirements shall describe the aspects of the commercial software which demonstrated that the software has the high quality required. Both complete software 3
designs and partial designs (operating systems) are covered by the dedication process.
l Also as stated in the proposed standard, commercial software development tools
{
become part of the software configuration management process, and are controlled by, but are not formally certified through, the V&V program. These tools can include, but :
are not limited to, compilers, debuggers, software documentation _ programs, and testing tools. The software tools are not required to be verified and validated as safety software. A tool will be indirectly verified, first by prior knowledge ofits extensive usage in operational industrial applications, and, second, through the formal verification process, where the results of code generation are checked by an j
independent team of reviewers against design requirements and performance specifications at each. stage of software development. Eventually, testing of the integrated software and hardware combination is performed as part of the final validation process.
j
- e I
5
- DFSER No.' 7.2.R-3 (CNFM) 1 ISSUE Report errors in commercial tools to end user (to be included in ITAAC/DAC).
l i
CLOSURE Commitment has been included in 1&C DCM discussed in DFSER No. 7.1.3.3-1.
DFSER No. 7.2.8-5 (CNFM) 5 ISSUE
- a. Commit to maintain temperature rise of 15 C (27 F) in SSLC equipment.
- b. State qualification temperature margin for SSLC equipment in SSAR.
CLOSURE
"... a thermal analysis will be performed at the circuit board, instrument and panel i
design stages. The heat release by internal panel components shall not raise the 1
internal temperature of a panel to greater than 15 C (27. F) above external ambient temperature of the equipment room for electronic components within a chassis or within any printed circuit card file structure. Convective cooling..."
(see item a. above), GE believes that, for equipment qualification, only a -
t
. commitment to the temperature margin required by IEEE-323 is requ. ired in the SSAR. While GE has shown that its safety-related, microprocessor-based equipment is tested at temperatures far beyond the guaranteed maximum operating 7
temperature, the exact requirement should be determined after analyses are -
performed at the time of actual design and after the equipment to be used has been selected. GE has already committed in the SSAR to perform thermal analyses at the circuit board, instrument, and panel level, and to take other steps as necessary to ensure proper equipment operation at the stated maximum temperature of 50. C (122 F). Note that we have also committed to the use oflow power semiconductor technologies and low stress design techniques. The possible occurrence, stated in -
the DFSER, oflocal hot spots in new digital chip designs is a concern of the vendor who must design and qualify the design to the functional specifications. The integration and validation testing and the equipment qualification program-described in the I&C Design Certification Material (see DFSER No. 7.1.3.3-1) is.
i designed to uncover such design problems.
The response to RAI 420.92 (SSAR Amendment 9, page 20.3-242) is revised as follows-
... shall include adequate margin to ensure that this condition'can'be met under extreme conditions. The minimum margin shall be as stated.in IEEE-323, Section-6.3.1.5. Additional margin will be determined by thermal analysis of the installed.
equipment area."
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i DFSER No. 712-1 (CNFM) 1 ISSUE i
Resolve discrepancy between use of term auxiliary supporting features for part of the safety system logic unit (SLU) function shown in Figure 1 of the EMS /SSLC Interface j
Requirements Specification and the use of only the term SLU in the SSAR and Tier 1.
-l descriptions.
t CLOSURE An early alternative considered for SSLC design was the strict separation of primary l
ESF functions (i.e., ECCS and LDS) and auxiliary supporting features (e.g., Diesel Generator, Flammability Control System, Reactor Senice Water) by using separate instrument channels within a division. However, because there are interfaces between the primary systems and auxiliary supporting systems, a different allocation
+
of system functions was applied in the final design, where functions are primarily separated by whether they are used to support high pressure or low pressure injection j
features of ECCS. The term SLU is used correctly in the SSAR and Tier 1 descriptions.
The figure and text of EMS /SSLC Interface Requirements Specification,23A6327 (MPL A32-4080) will be changed at the next revision to climinate all uses of the terms auxiliary supporting features (ASF) and auxiliary supporting features logic unit (ALU).
l DFSER No. 7.4.1.4-1 (CNFM) l ISSUE i
Clarify in SSAR that Remote Shutdown System is totally separate and independent i
from SSLC and the Essential Multiplexing System (EMS).
l CLOSURE j
Section 7.4.1.4.4 (1 ) of the SSAR is revised as follows:
.. Actuation of the transfer devices interrupts the connection to the RMUs and j
transfers control to the remote shutdown system. Transfer of control completely isolates all functions of SSLC and EMS from RSS. The analog, hardwired.
1 instrument loops of RSS directly operate the actuated devices under manual control-of the operator at the RSS panels. Displays at the RSS also give direct hardwired indication to the operator from the sensors. All necessary power supply circuits..."
DFSER No. 7.7.1.15-2 ISSUE EMI sensidvity of safety computer systems to plant communications equipment to be in ITAAC.
t CLOSURE:
i A commitment to a test program for checking sensitivity of safety-related computer components to communication. transmitters and receivers is included in the I&C -
j DCM discussed in DFSER No. 7.1.3.3-l' The SSAR, in Section'7A.2 of Appendix 7A, contains a commitment to use ANSI /IEEE C37.90.2-1987, "IEEE Trial-Use Standard,-
Withstand Capability of Relay Systems to Radiated Electromagnetic Interference from i
Transceivers," to develop this test program.
j l
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R
/Es %N.sE To DFSEA 2 2.I*3 r
ABWR Standard Safety Analysis Report 7.2.1.1.4 RPS Equipment Design The RPS is designed to provide reliable single-failure-proof capability to automatically or manuallv mitiate a reactor scram while maintaining protection against unnecessarv scrams resulting from single failures.This is accomplished through the combination of fail-safe equipment design and redundant two-out-of-four and one-out-of-two-twice scram logic arrangement. All equipment within the RPS is designed to fail into a trip initiaung state on loss of power or input signal. In conjunction with this, trip initiating logic signals to and within the RPS are asserted low whereas trip bypass logic signals and trip bypass permissive logic signals are asserted high.
7.2.1.1.4.1 General RPS Equipment The RPS equipment is divided into four redundant divisions of sensor (instrument) channels, trip logics and trip actuators, and two divisions of manual scram controls and scram logic circuitrv. The sensor channels, divisions of trip logics, divisions of uip actuators and associated portions of the divisions of scram logic circuitry together constitute the RPS scram and air header dump (back-up scram) automatic initiation logic. The divisions of manual scram controls and associated portions of the divisions of scram logic circuitry together constitute the RPS scram and air header dump manual initiation logic. The automatic and manual scram initiation logics are independent of each other. RPS equipment arrangement is shown in Figure 7.2-2.
(1) Sensor Channels Equipmen t within a sensor channel includes primarily sensors (transducers or switches), multiplexers and digital trip modules (DTM's). The sensors within each channel monitor plant variables discussed in Section 7.2.1.1.4.2 and send either analog or discrete output to remote multiplexer units (RMS's) within the associated division of essential multiplexing system (EMS). Each division of EMS performs analog to digital conversion on analog signals and sends the digital or digitized analog output values of all monitored variables to the DTM within the associated RPS sensor channel. The DTM in each sensor channel compares individual monitoredmariable valuesvith tripTetpoinrvalues and
-eactrxanabTeNa separate, discrete (trip /no trip) output signal toAN four divisions of trip logics. decuse a[ /4 /oon o[ g pnasm s~ semsor pQ m.G46/ e6uedl NJ1 e_qu_ipment within a sensor channelis powered from the same di ision of
,/
class 1E power source. However, different pieces of equipmentinay be powered from separate DC power supplies. Within a sensor channel sensors themselves may belong to the RPS or may be components of another system.
Signal conditioning and distribution performed by the RMU's is a function of the EMS and is discussed in Section 7A.2.
Reactor Protectron (Trip) System-(RPS) instrumentation and Controls 7.22
i d
ACWR s=nd:td satery Anarysis nepots (2) liigh Rextor Pressure (3) Low Reactor Water Level (Level 3)
(4) High Drnvell Pressure (5) Main Steam Line Isolation (6) Low Control Rod Drive Charging Header Pressure (7) High 31ain Steam Line Radiation M3r-High-Seismic--Anivi[
(9) Turbine Stop Valve Closed (10) Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure p
(11) Operator initiated Manual Scram
@b The sptems and equipment that provide trip and scram initiating inputs to the for g) these condition _s are discussed in the following subsections. With the exception o e
g Yf Jw NMS and PRRMbil of these systems provide sensor outputs through the EMS Analog g,pM to digital conversion of these sensor output values is done by EMS equipment. NMS and Se~sn-sQs -fr'~ p+L T& &&y go the RPS by NMS and PRRM trip logic PRRM tdp sipals are rovided directl m lain,/ da
- f. +g um4, (1) Neutron Monitoring System (NMS)
Each of the four divisions of neutron monitoring system (NMS) equipment provides separate, isolated, bistable source range monitor (SRN31) trip and average power range monitor (APRM) tdp signals to all four divisions of RPS trip logics (Figure 7.2-5).
(a) SRNM Trip Signals The SRNM's of the NMS provide trip signals to the RPS to cover the range of plant operation from source range through start-up range to about ten percent of reactor rated power. Three conditions monitored as a function of the NMS compdse the SRNM trip logic output to the RPS. These conditions are upscale, short pedod and SRNM inoperative.
The specific condition within the NMS that caused the SRN31 tdp.
output is not detectable within the RPS.
(b) APRM Trip Signals The APRM's of the NMS provide trip signals to the RPS to cover the range of plant operation from a few percent to greater than reactor Reactor Protection (Trip) System-- tRPS) Instrumentstion and Controls 7.2-5
ABWR standard sakry Anatvsis neport
~
rated power. Four conditions monitored as a function the N.\\lS comprise the APD1 trip logic output to the RPS. These conditions are high neutron flux, high simulated thermal power. APDi inoperative and reactor internal pump trip. The specific condition within the.WIS that caused the APDi trip output is not detectable within the RPS.
(2) Nuclear Boiler Svstem (SB) (Figure 7.2-6)
(a) Reactor Pressure Reactor pressure is measured at four phvsically separated locations by locally mounted pressure transducers. Each transducer is on a' separate -
instrument line and provides analog equivalent output through the dis to the DTM in one of four RPS sensor channels.The pressure transducers and instrument lines are components of the NB.
j (b) Reactor Water Level Reactor water level is measured at four physically sepanted locations by 1
locally mounted level (differential pressure) transducers. Each
-)
transducer is on a separate pair ofinstrument lines and provides analog
.)
equivalent output through the EMS to the DTM in one of the four RPS sensor channels. The level transducen and instrument lines are I
components of the NB.
i (c) Drvwell Pressure Drywell pressure is measured at four physically separated locations by locally mounted pressure transducers. Each transducer is on a separate instrument line and provides analog equivalent output through the EMS to the DTM in one of the four RPS sensor channels of the NB.
(d). Main Steam Line Isolation (Figure 7.2-4)
I Each of the four main steam lines can be isolated by closing either the inboard or the outboard isolation valve. Separate position switches on f the main steam lines provide
. both of the is n
bistable outputy..vugh i 15 the DTM in one of the four RPS.
sensor channels.'FIch rriiiri sidam line is associated with a different RPS -
sensor channel. The main steam line isolation valves and position switches are components of the NB.'
(3) Control Rod Drive (CRD) System (Figure 7.2-6)
(a)
CRD Charging Header Pressure CRD charging header pressure is measured at four physically separated locations by locally mounted yrs Reactor Protection (Tripi System-(RPS} instrumentation and Controle
i ACWR smdardsaetyAn tysisnonet I
f pressure transducers. Each transducer is on a separate instrument line.
and provides analog equivalent output through the EMS to the DTM in one of the four RPS sensor channels. The pressure transducers and instmment lines are components of the CRD system.
(4) Process Radiation Monitoring System (PRRM) (Figure 7.2-6) _
,l (a) Main Steam Line Radiation Main steam line radiation is measured by four separate radiation =
monitors. Each monitoris positioned to measure gamma radiation in all four main steam lines. The PRRM then prosides a separate bistable 1
output to the DDI in each of the four RPS sensor channels. The radiation monitors and associated equipment that determine whether j
or not main steam line radiation is within acceptable limits are l
components of the PRRM.
3 N
(5P Other Systems t
,/
(a) Seismic'Acti ity (Figure 7.2-7) _
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Seismic activity is(tected by four separate sets of,thredcceleration switches. Each set of switches provides rgactort'uilding bonom j
horizontal acceleration, bott6m)verocal acceleration and top ho l
acceleration bistable.outpliIthro gh4he EMS to the DTM in one of four N
annels RPS sendsor l
(6) Reactor Protection System (Figure 7.2-3) 1 (a) - Turbine Stop Valve Cosure I
Turbine stop valve closure is detected by separate valve stem position i
switches on each of thp b
es. Each position switch :
f provides bistable output-Ju uupMl/m td the DTM in one of the four
[
RPS sensor channels. The turbine stopyahies are components of main -
-l turbine, however the position switches are components of the RPS.
j
.t (b) Turbine ControlValve Fast Oosure
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a Two separate conditions monitored by the RPS are indicative of turbine j
control valve fast closure. These conditions are fast acting solenoid valve "l
closure and low hydraulic trip system oil pressureJrt wip4 solenoid l
p ht valves.
valve closure is detected by separate switches 4n yach g/~ to th Each position switch provides bistable outpt!t thrOg.. um J DTM in one of the four RPS sensor channels) Low hy_draulicIrip system f
oil pressure is detected by separate pressure switches on each of the four '
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7.2-7 Reactor Protection (Trip) Sprem--(RPSI Instrumenterion and Controbe
- l
ABWR standant sarery Anar sis Report r
turbine control olve hydra ac N Each pressure switch provides bistable output hup dic EMSrto he DTS1 in one of the four RPS sensor channels.The fastuctingsole oid valves and turbine control valve hydraulic mechanisms are components of the main turbine, however the position and pressure switches are components of the RPS.
(c) Manual Scram Two manual scram switches and the reactor mode switch provide the means to manually initiate a reactor scram independent of conditions within the sensor channels, divisions of trip logics and divisions of tnp actuators. Each manual scram switch is associated with one of the two p
divisions of actuated load power.
In addition to the scram initiating variables monitored by the RPS, one bypass initiating variable is also monitored.
(d) Turbine First Stage Pressure Turbine first stage pressure is measured at four phvsically separated locations by locally mounted p ssure transducers. Each pressure 7
transducer is on,afeparat ins t line and provides analog equivalent outphtth S th the DTM in one of the four sensor channelsbWithin the RPS divi!Iions of trip logics this variable forms a bypass component of the turbine stop valve and turbine control valve closure trip logic.
7.2.1.1.4.3 RPS Logic The combination of division trip, scram, reset and bypass logic that make up the overall RPS logic is shown in Figure 21.7.2 2. Each division trip logic receives trip inputs from all four sensor channels and NMS divisions and provides a sealed-in trip output to the scram logic when the same trip condition exists in any two or more sensor channels or NMS diviiiions. At the division trip logic level various trips and trip initiating conditions can be bypassed as described in the following subsections. The scram logic will initiate a reactor scram when a trip condition exists in any two or more division trip logics. At the scram logic level no bypasses are possible.
L (1) Channel Senson Bypass i
A separate, manual, keylock switch in each of the four divisions provides means to bypass the collective trip outputs of the associated sensor channel.
The effect of the channel senson bypass is to reduce all four division trips to
(
a coincidence of rwo out of three tripped sensor channels. Interlocks between the four divisions of trip logic prevent bypass of any two or more sensor 7.2-8 Reactor Protection (Trip) System-.4RPS) Instrurnentation and Controls
ACWR s=2d:rd s:tery Anstysis R:p:tr A high reactor pressure nip will occur in each dhision of trip logic when reactor pressuie is above the trip serpoint in any two or more unbvpassed sensor channels. There are no operating bvpasses associated with this trip function.
Low Reactor Water Level Trip (Figure 7.2-6)
A low reactor water level trip will occur in each division of trip logic when reactor water level is below the trip serpoint in any two or more unbvpassed sensor channels. There are no operating bypasses associated with this trip function.
High Drywell Pressure Trip (Figure 7.2-6)
A high dgwell pressure trip will occur in each division of trip logic when dqwell pressure is above the trip setpoint in any two or more unbypassed sensor channels. There are no operating bypasses associated with this trip function.
High Main Steam Line Radiation Trip (Figure 7.2-6)
A high main steam line radiation trip will occur in each dhision of trip logic when a mam steam line radiation trip condition exists in any two or more unbypassed sensor channels. There are no operating bypasses associated with this trip function.
Reactor Building'High,Scismic Activity Trip (Figure 7.2-7 f A high seismic activity tripwill occurpch on of trip logic when either c-1 re ctor building bottom horizpoor vertical acceleration or building top
,/
horizontal acceleration-istIgh in any two or morewsbypassed sensor channels.Jhere are no operating bypasses associated with this trip function. )
1
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k (5) Manual Scram A sealed-in manual scram of all HCU's and associated control rods will occur when both manual scram pushbuttons are armed and depressed or when the reactor mode switch is placed in the shutdown position. Depressing only one armed scram pushbutton will result in a scaled-in half scram (de energization 4
of one division of actuated loads). The scram initiating input received from the mode switch shutdown contacts is automatically bypassed after a sufficient time delay (10 sec) to allow for scrum seal-in and full insertion of all control j
rods.
72 11 Reactor Protection (Tripi Sprem-(RPSI Instrurnentation end Controls J
~1 4
ABWR senadard smieryanalysis aeport l
i A separate. manual, pushbutton switch in each of the four dhisions provides l
means to manually uip all trip actuators in that division. This sealed-in division i
manual trip is equivalent to a sealed-in automatic uip from the same division f
of trip logic. An alternative manual scram can be accomplished by depressing i
any two or more of the four division manual uip pushbuttons.
~
I (6) Reset Logic i
A single, manual, three position, toggle switch provides means to reset the manual scram seal-in circuitrv in both divisions of manual scram controls. If either of the manual scram pushbuttons is still depressed wheM reset is attempted, the reset will not have any effect.
A separate, manual pushbutton associated with each division of trip actuators provides means to reset the scal-in at the input of all uip actuators in the same division. If the conditions that caused the division uip have not cleared when a reset is attempted, the reset will not have any effect. After a single division trip, reset is possible immediately; however,if a full scram has occu2Ted, reset is inhibited for 10 seconds to allow sufficient time for scram completion.
As a consequence of a full scram the CRD charging header pressure will drop below the uip setpoint resulting in a trip initiating input to all four divisions of trip logic. While this condition exists reset of the manual scram circuitry is possible; however, the four divisions of uip logic cannot be reset until the CRD charging pressure trip is manually bypassed in all four dhisions and all other trip initiating conditions have cleared.
7.2.1.1.4.4 Redundancy and Diversity Instnament sensing lines from the reactor vessel are routed through the dnwell and ~
terminate inside the containment. Instruments mounted on instrument racks in the four quadrants of the reactor building sense reactor vessel pressure and water level from this piping. Valve position switches are mounted on valves from which position information is required. The sensors for RPS signals from equipment in the turbine building are mounted locally.The four battery-powered inverters and divisional 120-4y n e MT VAC power suppliers for the SSLC and RPS are located in an area where they p
serviced during reactor operation. Sensor signals (via the multiplex networ,and power cables are routed to four SSLC cabinets (in which RPS components are located) p in the divisional electrical compartments. One logic cabinet is used for each division.
g The redundancy portions of the RPS have physically separated sensor taps, sensing lines, sensors, sensor rack locations, cable routing, and termination in four separate Q panels in the control room. By the use of four or more separate redundant sensors for each RPS variable with separate redundant logic and wiring. the RPS system has been
!i 7.2 12 Reactor Prorection (Tripi System-(RPS) Instrumentation and Controis
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Amendment 22 7.2-32
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/ W ae E w n.2. u m,1,y Standard Plant nu n 7A.2 MULTIPLEXING SYSTEMS Testing shall include instrument loop checks, calibration verification tests and response time NRC Recuest (1): Provide a complete list of verification tests as described in ANSI /IEEE components (pumps, valves, etc.) whose actuation, Standard 338. If possible, the entire instrument loop interlock, or status indication is dependent on the shall be tested from sensor to output device (s),
proper operation of each Class 1E multiplexer.
Otherwise, suitab!c input devices shall be used to simulate process inputs and the system outputs Resnonse (1): The list (as of February 1989) is verified to be acceptable.
provided as Table 7A.21. It was obtained by extraction from the multiplexer I/O database which In addition to the testing described above, tests shall reflects information available on the current system be developed to verify system redundancy and P&ID and IBD drawings.
electricalindependence.
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NRC Recuest (2): For ve, NRC Reauest (4): Describe the test and/or describe the means of remote or local control (other hardware features employed to demonstrate fault than by cutting wires or jumpering) that may be tolerance to electromagnetic interference.
employed should the multiplexer fall.
Response (4): One major deterrence to Response (2): All Class-1E multiplex hardware is electromagnetic interference (EMI) in the designed to meet the single failure criteria. Systems multiplexing system is the use of fiber optic data links which employ such hardware have redundant as the transmis$ ion medium. Optical fiber, being a channels such that no single failure of any MUX unit non-electrical medium, has the inherent properties of could jeopardize any safety system action. In immunity to electrical noise (EMI, RFI, and addition, local control is provided, via the remote lightning), point-to-point electricalisolation, and the shutdown system, to bring the reactor to shutdown absence of conventional transmission line effects.
conditions in event of multiple safety system failures Fiber optic multiplexing is also unaffected by the or evacuation of the control room. The remote radiated noise from high voltage conductors, by high shutdown system is hard-wired and therefore frequency motor control drives, and by transient provides diversity to the MUX interfaces, switching pulses from electromagnetic contactors or other switching devices.
NRC Reouest (3): Describe the multiplexer However, the electrical-to-optical interface at the pre-operational test program.
transmitting and receiving cads must still bc.
addressed to ensure complete immunity to EMI. The Response (3): The pre-operational test program will control equipment containing the electrical circuitry test thc multiplexers concurrently witb use standard techniques for shielding, grounding, and instrumentation and control functional loop checks.
filtering and are mounted in grounded equipment As each input to a remote multiplexing unit 'RMU) panels provided with separate instrument ground is simulated using a suitable input det the busses. Panel location, particularly in local areas, is required outputs shall be verified c s
m this carefully chosen to minimize noise effects from manner all hardware and software are confirmed adjacent sources. The use of fiber optic cables concurrently.
ensures that current-carrying ground loops will not exist between the control room and local areas.
Equipment verifications of the individual multiplexing units are performed at the factory and The use of redundancy provides the other major typically include detailed component level tests which deterrence to EMI effects. The safety-related require special test apparatus and technical multiplexing system uses redundant optical channels -
expertise. Any malfunctions not found during within each separated electrical division. The factory testing will be detected during pre-operational tests of instrument loops.
Amendment 22 7A.2-1
R upeass % DFSEp. 7 L L 2.-j e
Gansral Electric Comneny Page 1 i
LIST OF EQUIPMENT INTERFACE WITH ESSENTIAL MUX SIGNALS (In order of device
- reading top to bottom)
DEVICE DIV DESCRIPTION DEVICE DIV DESCRIPTION 821 F003A 1
A0 CHECK VALVE B21 F019 1
No GLOBE VALVE B21-8003B 2
A0 CHECK VALVE B21 F020 1
No GLOBE VALVE B21-F008A 1
No GLOBE VALVE (MS!v) 821 F516 1
M0 GLOBE VALVE B21 F008A 2
No GLOBE VALVE (MSIV)
B21 LT001A 1 LEVEL TRANSMITTER B21-70088 1
No GLOBE VALVE (MSIV) 821-LT0018 2 LEVEL TRANSMITTER 821.F008B 2
No GLOBE VALVE (MSIV)
B21 LT001C 3 LEVEL TRANSMITTER 821 F008C 1
No GLOBE VALVE (MSIV) 521 LT0010 4 LEVEL TRANSMITTER B21-F008C 2
No GLOBE VALVE (MSIV) 821 LT002A 1 LEVEL TRANSMITTER l
521 F0080 1
No GLOBE VALVE (M5tv) 821 LT0028 2 LEVEL TRANSMITTER B21 F008D 2
No GLOBE VALVE (MS!v) 521 LT002C - 3 LEVEL TRANSMITTER 821-F009A 1
No GLOBE VALVE (MSIV) 821 LT003A 1 LEVEL TRAN$MITTER B21 F009A 2
No GLOBE VALVE (MS!V) 821 LT0038 2 LEVEL TRANSMITTER 521 F0098 1
No GLOBE VALVE (Mstv)
B21 LT003C 3 LEVEL TRANSMITTER B21 F009B 2
No GLOBE VALVE (MSIV) 821-LT0030 4 LEVEL TRANSMITTER 521-7009C 1
No GLOBE VALVE (MsIV) 821-LT003E 1
LEVEL TRANSMITTER 521 F009C 2
No GLOBE VALVE (MSIV) 821 LT003F 2 LEVEL TRANSMITTER 821-F0090 1
No GLOBE VALVE (MSIV) 821-LT003G 3 LEVEL TRANSMITTER 821 F0090 2
No GLOBE VALVE (Msiv) 521 LT003M 4 LEVEL TRANSMITTER 821 F010A 1
sRV/ ads VALVE B21-LT006A 1
LEVEL TRAN5MITTER B21-F010A 2
SRV/ ADS VALVE B21 LT0068 2 LEVEL TRANSMITTER B21-F010A 3
stv/A05 VALVE B21 PCM31 1
POSITION SWITCM B21 F0108 3
SAFETY RELIEF VALVE B21-P05A30 i posit 10N SWITCM' B21-F010C 1
$RV/ ADS VALVE B21 P05B11 2 POSITION SWITCM B21-F010C 2
SRV/ ADS VALVE B21 PO$510 2 Po$1 TION $WITCM B21 F0100 1
SAFETY RELIEF VALVE B21 Poss21 2 POSITION SWITCH B21-F010E 2
SAFETY RELIEF VALVE B21 PosB20 2 Pos! TION SWITCM B21 F010F 1
SRV/ ADS VALVE B21 Post 31 2 PO$1T10N SWITCM B21 F0107 2
SRv/ ADS VALVE B21 PosB30 2 PostTION SWITCH B21-7010G 1
SAFETY RELIEF VALVE B21 P0BC11 3 POSITION SWITCM B21 7010N 1
SRV/ ADS VALVE B21 PosC10 3 posit 10W' sW!TCH B21 F010N 2
sRV/ ADS VALVE B21 POSC2] 3 P051 TION $d!TCM B21 F010N 3
SRV/ ADS VALVE B21 PDBC20 3 POSITION SWITCH I
B21 F010J 2
5AFETY RELIEF VALVE B21 P0BC31 3 POSITION SWITCM' B21 F010K 1
SAFETY RELIEF VALVE B21 P0BC30 3 POSIT 10N SWITCM i
521 F010L 1
SRV/ADB VALVE B21-POBD11 4
POSITION SWITCM l
521 F010L 2
SRV/ ADS VALVE B21 Pos010 4 POSITION SWITCN
)
821 F010L 3
SRV/ ADS VALVE B21 PosD21 4 POSITION SWITCM' B21 F010m 3
SAFETY RELIEF VALVE B21 P09020, 4 POSITION SWITCH B21-F010W i
SRV/ ADS VALVE B21 P0B031 4 Pos!T!os SWITCM l
B21 F010N 2
SRV/ ADS VALVE B21 P00030 4 POSITION SWITCM I
B21-7010P 1
SAFETY RELIEF VALVE B21 P0f011A 3 POSIT 10N TRANSMITTER B21 F010R 1
SRV/ ADS VALVE B21 POT 0118 3 POSITION' TRANSMITTER-
[
B21 F010R 2
SRV/ ADS VALVE B21 POT 011C 2 POSITION TRANSMITTER' B21-70108 2
SAFETY RELIEF VALVE B21 P0f0110 1 Postfl0N TRANSMITTER B21 7010T 1
SRV/ ADS VALVE B21 POT 011E 2 Postflou TRANSMITTER B21 F010T 2
SRV/ ADS VALVE B21-P07011F 1 POSITION TRANSMITTER B21 F0100 3
SAFETY RELIEF VALVE B21 PCT 0114 1 POBITION TRANSMITTER 821 7011 1
M0 GATE VALVE B21 POT 011N 3 POSIT 10N TRANSMITTER B21 7012 2
M0 GATE VALVE B21 POT 011J 2 POSITION TRANSMITTER B21 7018 1
M0 GLOBE VALVE B21 POT 011K 1 POSITION TRANSMITTER l
1 r
General Electric Company Page 2 LIST OF EQUIPMENT INTERFACE WITH ESSENTIAL MUX SIGNALS (In order of device reading top to bottom)
DEVICE DIV DESCRIPTION DEVICE DIV DESCRIPTION 821 pot 011L 3 POSITION TRANSMITTER C12-D005001 2 facto 34-63 A ouAD 821-PCT 011M 3 POSITION TRANSMITTER C12 0005002 1 FmeaD 54 59 A QUAD B21 pct 011N 2 PcSITION TRANSMITTER C12-D00$002 2 FmetD 54 59 A QUAD B21 POT 011P 1 PCSITION TRAkSMITTER C12 D005003 1 FucRD 38 19 C ove 821 pct 011a 2 POSITION TRANSMITTER C12 0005003 2 FuctD 38 19 C ouAD B21-pot 0115 2 Pos!T10N TaANSMITTER C12 D005004 1 FucaD 50 59 A QUAD 521 POT 011T 1 PCSIT10N TRANSMITTER C12-D005004 2 FMCR0 50-59 A cuAD 821 POT 011u 3 PostTION TRANSMITTER C12-0005005 1 FMCR0 38 35 A ovo B21-PT007A 1
PRESS TRANSMITTER C12 D005005 2 FmCR0 38 35 A ouAD B21-PT007B 2
PRESS TRANSMITTER C12 D005006 i Fucto 54 35 C ove 821 PT007C 3 PRESS TRANSMITTER C12 0005006 2 Fuca0 54 35 C ouAD 821-PT007D 4
PRESS TRANSMITTER C12-0005007 1 FucaD 34-23 C QUAD S21 PT008A 1 PRESS TRANSMITTER C12 D005007 2 FMCt3 34 23 C ove 821-PT0088 2 PRESS TRANSMITTER C12-D005008 1 Fucto 50-55 A cuAD B21-PT008c 3 PRESS TRANSMITTER C12 D005008 2 FucRD 50-55 A ouc B21 PT009 1
PRESS TRANSMITTER C12-D005009 1 FucaD 62 47 A ouAD B21-PT025A 1
PaESS TRANSMITTER C12 0005009 2 rmcto 62 47 A ouAD B21 PT0258 2 PRESS TRANSMITTER C12-0005010 1 FucaD 38 31 C ou c B21 PTC25C 3 PRESS TRANSMITTER C12 D005010 2 FucaD 38 31 C ouAD 821 PT0250 4 PRESS TRANSMITTER C12-D005011 1 FactD 58 35 C ouAD 821-PT02&A 1
PRESS TRANSMITTER C12-0005011 2 FactD 58-35 C ouAD 821 PT0288 2 PRESS TRANSMITTER C12 0005012 1 FmCR0 58 47 A ove 821 PT028C 3 PRESS TRANSMITTER C12-D005012 2 FmCRD 58 47 A cuAD 821-PT0210 4 PRESS TRANSMITTER C12 0005013 1 FmcRD 42-27 C ouc i
821 PT301A 1 PRESS TRANSMITTER C12-D005013 2 FmCt0 42 27 C ouAD B21 PT3018 2 PRESS TRANSMITTER C12-D005014 1 F#CRD 54-47 A ouAD B21-Pf301C 3 PRESS TRANSMITTER C12 0005014 2 FmctD 54 47 A ouc 821-PT301D 4 PRESS TRANSMITTER C12 0005015 1 FMCa0 46-63 A otAD 821 TE012A 1 TEMP ELEMENT C12-D005015 2 Facto 46-63 Aouc 821 TE0128 2 TEMP ELEMENT C12-D005016 1 FMcaD $0 51 A ouAD 821 TE012C 3 TEMP ELEMENT C12-0005016 2 FMcto 50 51 A ouAD 821-TE013A 1
TEMP ELEMENT C12 0005017 1 FucRD 46 A occ 821 TE0138 2 TEW ELEMENT C12 D005017 2 Facto 46 59 A cuAD 821 TE013C 3 TEMP ELEE NT C12-D005018 1 FucaD 42 23 C ouc l
B21-TE014A 1
TEMP ELEE NT C12-0005018 2 FMcRD 42 23 C ove 821 TE0145 2 TEW ELEE NT C12-D005019 1 FMCa0 38 27 C ouAD 821 TE014C 3 TEMP ELEMENT C12 D005019 2 FMcao 38 27 C ouAD
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B21-TE0194 1 TEMP ELEMENT C12 0005020 1 FucaD 38-55 A ouAD 821 TE0198 2 TEW ELEE NT C12 0005020 2 FMcaD 38 55 A ouAD B21 TEC20A 1 TEW ELEMENT C12 0005021 1 Fucao 34-67 A ouAD 821-TE020s 2 TEMP ELEMENT C12-0005021 2 FMCR0 34-67 Aouc B21 TE021A 1 TEMP ELEENT C12 D005022 1 FMCa0 26 07 8 ouAD i
B21 TE0218 2 TEMP ELEMENT C12-D005022 2 Fucao 26 07 e ouAD 821 TE022A 1 TEMP ELEMENT C12 0005023 1 FMCa0 38 03 C ouAD l
821 TE0228 2 TEMP ELEMENT C12-0005023 2 FMCRD 38-03 C ouAD 521 TE023A 1 TEMP ELEMENT C12-D005024 1 FMCRD 10 43 D ouAD 821 TE0238 2 TEMP ELEMENT C12-0005024 2 FmCR0 10 43 0 ouAD n
821 TE024A 1 TEMP ELEMENT C12 D005025 1 FMcaD 42-35 A ouAD 821 TE0248 2 TEMP ELEMENT C12 D005025 2 Fuca0 42 35 A QUAD C12 D005001 1 FmCR0 34 63 A QUAD C12-D005026 1 FMCaD 14 11 8 ouc E
Cansral Electric Commeny
.Pags 3 LIST OF EQUIPMENT INTERFACE WITH ESSENTIAL MUX SIGNALS (In order of device
- reading top to bottom)
DEVICE DIV DESCRIPTION DEVICE DIV DESCRIPTION c12 0005026 2 FucaD 14 11 8 QUAD C12 0005051 2 Faced 26 15_
s occ c12-000$C27 1 FucaD 54-51 A ouAD c12-0005052 1 Faced 54-19 C ouAD c12 0005027 2 FucaD 54 51 A ouAD c12 D005052 2 FucaD 54-19 C ouAD c12-0005028 1 FucaD 34 39 0 QUAD C12 D005053 1 Facao 50 23 C cuAD C12 0005028 2 FucaD 34 39 D ouAD c12-D005053 2 FucaD 50 23 C otAD C12-0005029 1 Facao 34-19 c ouAD C12 D005054 1 F= cad 66 35 C ouAD l
c12 D005029 2 Fucao 34-19 c ouAD c12 0005054 2 Fmcao 66-35 -c ouaD C12 0005030 1 Faced 10 19 e ouAD C12-0005055 1 Fmcao 06-39 0 ouAD c12 D005030 2 FucaD 10 19 e ouAD c12-0005055 2 FucaD 06-39 D ouAD C12 0005031 1 FucaD 30-23 s ouAD c12 D005056 1 FucaD 66 39 A ouAD C12-0005031 2 FmcaD 30 23 8 ouAD c12-D005056 2 FucaD 66-39 A ouAD c12 D005032 1 FMCRD 22-47 0 ouAD C12-0005057 1 Fucao 06 31 8 ouAD c12 0005032 2 FMcao 22 47 0 QUAD C12-0005057 2 Fucao 06 31 e ouAD C12-0005033 1 Fatto 54 31 c ouAD C12 0005058 1 FucaD 58 51 A ouAD c12 0005033 2 FMCa0 54 31 C ouAD c12 0005058 2 FucaD 58 51 A ocAD c12-0005034 1 FucaD 06-67 D ouAD C12 0005059 1 FucaD 58 23 C otAD c12 0005034 2 FucaD 06-47 0 ouAD c12-D005059 2 FucaD 58 23
'C ouAD c12 0005035 1 FmenD 22-19 s ouAD C12-D005060 1 raced 34 27 C ouAD c12 0005035 2 Fucao 22 19 s ouAD c12 0005060 2 Fmcao 34 27 c ouAD c12 0005036 1 FMCa0 34-43 0 ouAD C12 D005061 1 Fmcao 22 27 s ouAD c12-D005036 2 F e 34-43 0 ouAD C12-0005061 2 FucaD 22 27 e otAD c12-D005037 1 Fmcao 50 31 C ouAD c12 D005062 1 Fmcao 50 43 A otAD C12 D005037 2 FucaD 50 31 c ouAD c12-0005062 2 Fuca0 50 43 A occ C12-D005038 1 FMCa0 42-19 C ouAD c12 0005063 1 Facto 38 51 A otAD C12-D005038 2 FmcaD 42-19 C ouAD c12-0005063 2 facto 38 51 A cuAD C12-D005039 1 FucaD 30 19 s ouAD c12-D005064 1 Facao 58 31 c ouAD C
c12 0005039 2 FucaD 30 19 e ouAD c12 0005064 2-Facto 58 31 C ouAD c12 0005040 1 Fucao 38-67 A ouAD C12-D005065 1 FucaD 14 27 e ouAD C12 0005040 2 Fucao 38-67 A QUAD C12-0005065 2 faced 14 27 ' s ouAD C12 D005041 1 Facao 46 47 A ouAD -
C12 0005066 1 Fa 50-47 A ouAD C12-D005041 2 Fucap 4 47 A ouAD C12-0005066 2 Fucao 50 47-A otAD C12-0005042 1 Fuca0 42-59 A 0u40 C12 D005067 1 Fucap 38-47 A cuAD C12-D005042 2 FmCR0 42 59 A ouAD c12 D005067 2 FucaD 38 47 A QUAD C12 D005043 1 FMCa0 26 39 0 ouAD c12-D005068 1 FMCaD 46 55 A ouAD-c12 0005043 2 FucaD 26 39 0 ouAD C12 0005068 2 Fucao 46 55 A ouAD C12 0005044 1 FucaD 42 11 C ouAD C12-D005069 1 FmCao 26-27 s ouAD c12 0005044 2 Fucap 42 11 C ouAD C12 0005069 2 F e 26 27 s ouAD C12-0005045 1 FMCRD 415 C ouAD C12-D005070 1 F e 58 5$ A QUAD c12-0005045 2 Fucap 46 15 C ou4D c12-D005070 2 F M 58 55 A ouAD C12 0005046 1 FMCRD 34 31 C ouAD c12 D005071 1 Fucao 58 39 A QUAD C12-D005046 2 FMCa0 34 31 C ouAD C12 D005071 2 Fmcao 58 39 A ouAD C12-D005047 1 Fucao 10 15 e ouAD C12 0005072 1 Fmcao 38 11 C QUAD c12-D005047 2 Fmcao 10 15 8 ouac C12-D005072 2 FmCa0 38 11 C ouAD c12 D005048 1 FMCRO 4 35 A ouAD c12 0005073 1 FMCao 42 31 C ouAD.
c12-D005048_ 2 FMCap 4 35 A ouAD C12-D005073 2 FucaD 42 31 C ouAD C12-0005049 1
'Fmcao 4 19 C ouAD c12 0005074 1 Facao 26 11 e ouAD C12-D005049 2 Fmca0 4 19 c ouAD C12 D005074 2-Fmca0 26 11 s ouAD C12 D005050 1 FmCao 54 27 C auAD C12-0005075 1 FucRD 50 15 c ouAD C12 D005050 2 Fmca0 58 27 'c ouAD C12 D005075 2 Fucao 50 15 C ouAD C12 0005051 1 Fmcap 26 15 s ouAD C12 D005076 1-FucaD 34 15 s ouAD t
General Electric Company Page 4 LIST OF EQUIPMENT INTERFACE WITH ESSENTIAL MUX SIGNALS (In order of device -
reading top to bottom)
DEVICE DIV DESCRIPTION DEVICE DIV DESCRIPTION C12 D005076 2 FucRD 34-15 8 ouAD C12 D005101 2 Fmcao 62-23 C ouAD C12-0005077 1 Fucto 38 43 A QUAD C12-D005102 1 FucRD 10 51 D ouAD c12 D005077 2 FactD 38-43 A ouAD c12 0005102 2 Fmeto 10 51 o cuaD C12 0005078 1 Facto 22-43 0 ouAD C12-D005103 1 Fmeto 34-51 0 ouAD c12 0005078 2 FucRD 22 43 0 ouAD c12-0005103 2 Fmcto 34-51 D ouAD l
c12-0005079 1 Fmcto 58 43 A ouAD C12-0005104 1 FucRD 14-47 0 ouc c12-0005079 2 FucaD 58 43 A ouAD C12-0005104 2 FucaD 14-47 0 ouAD c12 D005080 1 FucaD 14-59 0 ouAD C12 0005105 1 Facto 62-27 C ouAD C12 0005080 2 Futto 14 59 0 ouAD C12 0005105 2 FmCaD 62 27 C ouAD j
C12-D005081 1 FMCa0 42 15 C ouAD C12 D005106 1 FucRD 26 55 0 ouAD j
C12 D005081 2 FutRD 42 15 C ouAD C12-0005106 2 FucaD 26 55 0 ovo C12-D005082 1 FucaD 18-23 8 ouAD C12 0005107 1 FutRD 30-03 a Que C12-0005082 2 Faced 18 23 8 QUAD C12 D005107 2 FucaD 30 03 s QLAD C12 D005083 1 Facao 42-43 A ouAD C12-0005108 1 FucRD 10-47 0 ouAD C12 D005083 2 Fucao 42-43 A ouAD C12-0005108 2 FucaD 10-47 o ouAD C12-0005084 1 FMCRD 06-35 0 ouAD C12 0005109 1 Fmcto 10 39 0 ouAD C12 0005084 2 FucaD 06-35 0 Quad C12 0005109 2 FucaD 10 39
) ouAD C12-0005085 1 Fmcto 42 51 A ouAD C12 0005110 1 FmCR0 26-35 e ouAD C12 D005085 2 FucaD 42-51 A ouAD C12 D005110 2 Fact 0 26 35 s ouAD C12 0005086 1 FacR0 18-59 0 ouAD C12 0005111 1 FucaD 22 07 e otAD C12-D005086 2 FucaD 18-59 0 ouAD C12 0005111 2 Fmcap 22 07 e ouAD C12 0005087 1 FucaD 42-07 C ouAD C12 0005112 1 FMCa0 46 39 A QUAD C12-D005087 2 FMcao 42-07 C ouAD C12-0005112 2 Facto 46 39 A ouAD C12-D005088 1 FmctD 14-43 D ouAD C12-0005113 1 FucRD 38 63 A ouAD C12 D005088 2 FMceD 14 43 0 ouAD C12-0005113 2 F u 38 63 A ouAD l
C12 0005089 1 FucaD 18 35 o ouAD C12-0005114 1 FucRD 34 59 A ouAD C12-0005089 2 FucaD 18 35 0 ouAD C12 0005114 2 Fmcao 34 59 A ouc C12-D005090 1 FucaD 26 31 s ouAD C12 D005115 1 Facao 30 43 D ouAD l
C12 D005090 2 Facto 26-31 s ouAD C12-0005115 2 Fucao 30-43 D ouac C12-0005091 1 F u 4 51 A sua0 C12-0005116 1 Facao 62 35 C ouAD C12-0005091 2 Facto 46-51 A oueD C12 0005116 2 TmCap 62 35 C QUAD l
C12 0005092 1 FactD 22 11 s ouAD C12-0005117 1 Futto 22-39 D ouAD C12-D005092 2 FucaD 22 11 8 ouAD C12 0005117 2 FMCap 22 39 0 ouAD l
C12-D005093 1 FMCm 22 55 0 cua0 C12-0005118 1 Fucao 42 63 A ouAD C12 D005093 2 FmCao 22 55 0 ouAD C12-D005118 2 Fe 42 63 A ouAD C12 0005094 1 FmCe 22 59 0 cua0 C12 0005119 1 FMCao 46 11 C ouAD C12-D005094 2 FmCW 22 59 D oua0 C12-D005119'2 FmCR0 4-11 C ouAD l
C12-D005095 1 FmCe 26 63 0 ouAD C12 D005120 1 Fucao 4 27 C ouAD l
C12-D005095 2 FmCnD 26 63 D ouAD C12 0005120 2 FmCR0 46 27 C ouAD C12 0005096 1 FmCaD 14 23 s ouAD C12 D005121 1 FucaD 30 35 8 ouAD.
I f
C12-D005096 2 FmCao 14 23 8 ouAD C12-0005121 2 Fuca0 30 35 B ouAD C12-0005097 1 FmCR0 22 35 B ouaD C12-D005122 1 Fucao 38-07 C ouAD l
C12-0005097 2 Fucao 22 35 e ouAD C12 D005122 2 Fucao 38 07 C ouAD C12 0005098 1 FucaD 30 27 8 ouaD C12 D005123 1 FucaD 18 27 -e ouAD-C12-D005098 2-Fuca0 30-27 s cua0 C12 0005123 2-FmCap 18 27 s auc C12-0005099 1 FMCa0 34 11 e ouAD C12 0005124 1 Futac 42 47.
A ouAD C12 D005099 2 Fatto 34 11 B ouaD C12 0005124 2 FmCao 42 47 A cuAD C12-D005100 1 Fuca0 18 47 0 cuaD C12 0005125 1 FucaD 34 07 s ouc C12 D005100 2 FMCR0 18 47 0 ouAD C12 0005125 2 Fucao 34 07 e ouAD I
C12-D005101 1 Facao 62 23 C ouAD C12 D005126 1'
Fucao 62 31 C ouAD.
I
f Canaral Electric Comocnv Page 5 LIST OF EQUIPMENT INTERFACE WITH ESSENTIAL MUX SIGNALS (In order of device - reading top to bottorn)
DEVICE DIV DESCRIPTION DEVICE DIV DESCRIPTION c12 0005126 2 FucaD 62 31 c cuAD C12 D005151 2 Facto 26 51 o ouAD c12 D005127 1 FucnD 06 23 e ouAD C12 D005152 1 Fmcto 10 35 0 ouAD l
c12 D005127 2 ructo 06 23 s ouAD C12 0005152 2 Fueno 10-35 o ouAD C12-0005128 1 FucaD 46 31 C ouAD c12 D005153 1 FucaD 30-07 s ouAD c12 0005128 2 Fmeto 46-31 C ouAD c12 0005153 2 Fuca0 30 07 s ouAD c12 D005129 1 Facto 10 31 e ouAD C12 0005154 1 FucaD 30 31 e ouAD c12-0005129 2 FucRD 10-31 e ouAD C12-0005154 2 Fucao 30-31 s ouAD c12-D005130 1 FucaD 62-43 A ouAD C12 0005155 1
- metD 18 51 0 ouAD C12 0005130 2 Futto 62-43 A ouAD C12 0005155 2 rutaD 18 51 0 ouAD c12 0005131 1 FuceD 30 55 D ouAD C12 0005156 1 FucaD 18 39 D ouAD-C12-D005131 2 FMcao 30 55 D QUAD C12-D005156 2 Fmcao 18 39 0 ouAD i
c12 0005132 1 FucaD 26-43 0 ouAD C12 D005157 1 Fuca0 14 55 o ouAD c12-D005132 2 Fuca0 26-43 D ouAD C12-D005157 2 FMcaD 14-55 0 ouAD C12 D005133 1 FucaD 14-35 0 QUAD C12 0005158 1 FucaD 30 39 0 ouAD C12 0005133 2 FMceD 14 35 0 ouAD C12-0005158 2 Fucao 30 39 0 ouAD C12-0005134 1 FucaD 30 47 0 ouAD C12 0005159 i FucaD 30-11 s ouAD c12-0005134 2 FucaD 30-47 0 ouAD C12 0005159 2 FMCa0 30 11 e ouAD C12 0005135 i Fmca0 14-15 s ouAD C12 D005160 1 factD 26 23 s ouAD c12-0005135 2 Facto 14-15 s ouAD C12 D005160 2 Facao 26-23 e ouAD C12-D005136 1 FucaD 18 31 e ouAD C12 D005161 1 F> cad 18 55 0 ouAD C12 0005136 2 FucaD 18 31 e cuao C12-0005161 2 Faced 18 55 0 ouAD C12 D005137 1 Fuca0 30 51 0 ouAD C12-D005162 i Fuca0 18-11 e ouAD C12 0005137 2 FMcRD 30-51 0 ouAD C12 D005162 2 Fuca0 18 11 e ouAD C12 0005138 1 Fucap 66-31 C ouAD C12-D005163 1 Facto 14 51 0 ouAD f
C12 0005138 2 Fmcto 66 31 C ouAD C12 0005163 2 FucaD 14 51 0 ouAD C12 D005139 1 FucaD 30 15 8 ouAD C12-0005164 1 Facao 18 19 s ouAD C12-0005139 2 FucRD 30 15 s ouAD C12 D005164 2 Facto 18 19 e ouAD C12-0005140 1 Fuca0 50-19 C ouAD C12-0005165 1 Fuca0 10 23 e ouAD C12 D005140 2 FMcaD 50-19 C ouAD C12 0005165 2 FmcaD 10 23 s auc C12 D005141 1 Fmca0 02 35 o ouAD C12-0005166 i FucaD 02 31 8 ouAD C12-Dn05141 2 FucaD 02 35 0 ouAD C12 D005166 2 FmCa0 02 31 e ouAD C12 0005142 i FmCa0 46-43 A ouAD C12 0005167 1 FMCa0 34 35 s auc C12-D005142 2 Fucap 46 43 A ouAD C12-D005167 2 FucaD 34 35 s auc C12-D005143 1 FMCa0 26 19 s ouAD C12-0005168 1 FucaD 54 43 A ouAD C12-D005143 2 FMCap 26-19 s cua0 C12 0005168 2 FucaD 54 43 A cuAD C12-D005144 1 FMCAD 18 15 8 Quad C12 D005169 1 FmCa0 06 27 e ouAD c12 0005144 2 FMCaB 18 15 s ouAD C12 0005169 2 F a 06-27 s ouAD C12-D005145 1 FMCAD 06 43 D ouAD C12 D005170 1 F a 54 39 A ouAD C12 D005145 2 Fucap 06 43 o ouAD C12 0005170 2 F e 54-39 A ouAD C12 0005146 1 FMCa0 30 59 D ouAD C12-0005171 1 Fe 10 55 0 ouAD C12 0005146 2 FacAD 30 59 0 ouAD C12 0005171 2 FmCaD 10-55 D ouAD C12 D005147 1 FmCa0 18 43 D ouAD C12 D005172 1
~ F M 38 23 C ouAD C12-D005147 2 FmCaD 18 43 D ouAD C12 0005172 2 FucaD 34 23 C e)AD C12-0005148 1 FucaD 38-59 A ouAD C12 D005173 1 Fmcto 22-63 DN4 C12-0005148 2 FucaD 38 59 A sua0 C12-0005173 2 FucaD 22-63 D ouAD C12-0005149 1 FmCaD 22*15 e ouAD C12 D005174 1 FM 42 39 A ouADl C12 0005149 2 FucaD 22 15 e ouAD C12 D005174 2 FMCa0 42 39 A ouAD C12-0005150 1 FmcaD 54 27 C ouAD c12 D005175 1 Fuca0 34 03 s ouAD I
C12 D005150 2 Fucao 54-27 C ouAD C12 0005175 2 FucaD 34 03 e ouAD C12 D005151 1 FucaD 26 51-D ouAD C12 0005176 1 FucaD 10-27 s ouAD i
Canaral Electric Company Page 6 LIST OF EQUIPMENT INTERFACE WITH ESSENTIAL MUX SIGNALS (In order of device reading top to bottom)
DEVICE DIV DESCRIPTION DEVICE DIV DESCRIPTION c12 D005176 2 FNCRD 10 27 8 ouAD C12-D005201 2 Fucto 58 15 C ouAD C12 0005177 i FMcRD 30-67 0 otAD C12 0005202 1 FMctD 50 27 C cuAD c12 D005177 2 FacnD 30 67 0 ouc C12 0005202 2 Facao 50 27 C ouAD C12-D005178 1 FactD 46-23 C ouc C12 0005203 1 FucaD 14-19 e oLAD c12 D005178 2 fucRD 46 23 C QUAD C12 D005203 2 Fuca0 14-19 s ouAD C12 0005179 1 FMcRD 02-39 0 ouAD C12 0005204 1 Facto 54 55 A ouAD C12 D005179 2 FMcao 02 39 0 ouAD C12-0005204 2 Fucto 54-55 A ouAD C12 0005180 1 FMCR0 14 31 e ouAD C12-0005205 1 FucaD 30 63 0 ouAD c12-0005180 2 FucRD 14-31 s ouAD C12-0005205 2 FMCRD 30 63 0 ouAD C12 0005181 1 FucRD 14 39 0 ouAD C12-F041 1
SO VALVE C12 D005181 2 FucaD 14 39 0 ouAD C12-7042 2
50 VALVE C12 0005182 1 Fucto 22 31 O ouAD C12 F043 2
Ao VALVE C12 D005182 2 FmCR0 22 31 B ouAD C12-F044 2
Ao VALVE C12 D005183 1 FucaD 62 39 A ouAD C12 F047 1
Ao VALVE C12-0005183 2 FmCRD 62 39 A ouAD C12 F0484 1
Ao VALVE c12 D005184 1 FucaD 34-47 D ouAD C12-F048s 2
Ao VALVE C12 0005184 2 FucaD 34-47 0 ouAD C12-F049A 1
A0 VALVE C12 D005185 1 Facao 58 19 C ouAD C12 F049s 2
Ao VALVE C12 D005185 2 FmCRD 58 19 C ouAD C12 PT011A 1 PaE5s TRANSMITTER C12 0005186 1 FmCao 22 51 D ouAD C12 PT0118 2 press TRANSMITTER C12-D005186 2 FMCa0 22-51 D ouAD C12-PT011C 3 PRESS TRAksm!TTER C12-0005187 1 FmCnD $0 35 C ouAD C12 PT0110 4 PRESS TRANSMITTER C12-D005187 2 FucRD 50 35 C ouAD E11 C001A 1
RMR PUMP C12 0005188 1 Fucao 54 11 C ouAD E11-C001B 2
RNe Pump C12 0005188 2 FucaD $4 11 C ouAD E11 C001C 3
Rwa Pump C12-0005189 1 FMCa0 38 15 C ouAD E11-C002A 1
SEAL WATER Pump C12-D005189 2 FacRD 38 15 C ouAD E11 C0028 2
SEAL wAT[a PUMP C12 0005190 1 FmCR0 42 55 A ouAD E11 C002C 3
SEAL WATER Pump C12 0005190 2 FucaD 42 55 A ouAD E11 7001A 1
M0 GATE VALVE C12 0005191 1 FmCR0 38 39 A ouAD E11-70018 2'
M0 GATE VALVE C12 D005191 2 FMCR0 38 39 A ouAD E11 F001c 3
no GATE VALVE C12 0005192 1 FMCRD 54 23 C QUAD E11 F004A 1
M0 GLOBE VALVE C12 D005192 2 FMCa0 54 23 C QUAD E11 F0048 2
M0 GLOSE VALVE C12-0005193 1 FMCR0 50 39 A GuAD E11 F006C 3
M0 GLOBE VALVE C12 D005193 2 FmCRD 50 39 A cuAD E11 F005A 1
no GATE VALVE C12 D005194 1 FucaD 26 47 0 Qua0 E11 F0050 2
No GATE VALVE ~
C12-0005194 2 FMCRD 26 47 D Quad E11 F005C 3
no GATE VALVE C12 D005195 1 FMCAD 46 07 C GUAD E11 F006A 1
A0 CHECK VALVE f
C12-0005195 2 FucaD 46-07 C Wua0 E11 F0068 2
A0 CNECK VALVE
{
C12 D005196 1 FucaD 22 23 e ouAD E11-F006C 3
[
C12 00051% 2 FMCAD 22 23 8 ouAD E11 F00?B 2
MAN OPER GATE VALVE C12+D005197 1 FucaD 54 15 C cuAD E11 7007C 3
mAm OPER GATE VALVE C12 D005197_ 2 FuCRD 54 15 C ouAD E11-F000A-1 M0 GATE VALVE C12 0005196 1 FMCRD 34 55 A ouAD E11 F000s 2
M0 GATE VALVE -
C12-0005196 2 FmCRD 34 55 A ouAD E11 F000C 3
M0 GATE VALVE C12-D005199 1 FmCa0 50 11 C oumD E11 F009A 1
mAm OPER GATE VALVE C12-D005199 2 FMCa0 50-11 C QUAD E11 70095 2
MAN QPER GATE VALVE C12 D005200 1 FMCa0 26 59 0 QUAD E11-F009C 3
MAN OPER GATE VALVE C12-0005200 2 FMCa0 26 59 0 euAD E11 F010A 1
M0 GATE VALVE i
C12-D005201 1 FMCRD 58 15 C ouAD E11 F0108 2
M0 GATE VALVE J
l i
i
Consral Electric Company Page ~
LIST OF EQUIPMENT INTERFACE WITH ESSENTIAL MUX SIGNALS (In order of device reading top to bottom)
DEVICE DIV DESCRIPTION DEVICE DIV DESCRIPTION E11-F010C 3
MO GATE VALVE E11 POT 3034 1 POSIT!0N TRANSMITTER E11 F011A 2
MO CATE VALVE (RNR ISCL)
E11 POT 3038 2 Posti!ON TRANSMITTER E11-F011s 3
40 GATE VALVE (RNR isOL)
E11-POT 303C 3 Pos! TION TRANSMITTER E11 F011C 1
M0 GATE VALVE (RNR ISCL)
E11 PT004A 1 PRE $$ TRANSMITTER E11-F012A 1
40 GATE VALVE E11-PT0048 2
PRESS TRANSMITTER' E11-F0125 2
No GATE VALVE E11 PT004C 3 PRE 5s TRANSMITTER E11-F012C 1
M0 GATE VALVE E11-PT004E 1
PRESS TRANSMITTER E11-F013A 1
No GLosE VALVE E11 PT004F 2 prest TRANSMITTER E11 F0138 2
40 GLost VALVE E11-PT0040 3 press TRANSMITTER-E11 7013C 3
M0 GLOSE VALVE E11-rT005A 1*
press TRANSMITTER E11 F0148 2
M0 GATE VALVE E11 PT0058 2*
press TRANSMITTER E11-F014C 3
MO GATE VALVE E11-PT005C 3*
PRES 5 TRANSMITTER E11-F0158 2
Mo CATE VALVE E11-PT009A 1
PRESS TRANSMITTER E11-F015C 3
Mo GATE VALVE E11-PT0095 2 press TRANSMITTER E11 F0173 2
No GLOSE VALVE E11 PT009C 3 PRESS TRANSMITTER l
E11 F017C 3
MO CLnst VALVE E22-C0018 2
PUMP E11-F0188 2
M0 ChfE VALVE E22 C001C 3
PwP E11-F018C 3
M0 CATE VALVE E22 F0018 2
M0 CATE VALVE E11-F019s 2
Mo GATE VALVE E22 7001C 3
Mo GATE VALVE E11 F019C 3
M0 GATE VALVE E22-F0038 2
M0 CATE VALVE E11 F021A 1
MO GATE VALVE E22 F003C 3
Mo GATE VALVE E11 F0215 2
M0 CATE VALVE E22 F004B 2
AIR OP CHECK VALVE f
E11-F021C 3
M0 GATE VALVE E22 F004C 3
AIR OP CHECK VALVE E11 F029A 1
M0 GLOSE VALVE E22 F0058 2
MAN OPER GATE VALVE E11 F029s 2
M0 GLOSE VALVE E22 F005C 3
MAN OPER CATE VALVE E11-F029C 3
M0 GLost VALVE E22 F0068 2
Mo GLOSE VALVE
.[
E11-7030A 1
M0 GATE VALVE E22 F006C 3
M0 GLOSE VALVE E11-7030s 2
M0 GATE VALVE E22 F0008 2
Mo GLost VALVE l
E11 F030C 3
M0 GATE. VALVE E22 7000C 3
M0 GLOSE VALVE E11-F031A 1
M0 GLOBE VALVE E22 F009s 2
M0 GLosE VALVE I
E11-F031B 2
MO CLOSE VALVE E22 F009C 3
M0 GLOSE VALVE E11 F031C 3
No GLOSE VALVE E22 F010B 2
M0 GTE VALVE E11 F036A 1
A0 GLOSE VALVE E22 F010C 3
M0 CATE VALVE E11 F0368 2
A0 GLOSE VALVE E22 F0198 2
EQUAL 121NG VALVE
{
E11 7036C 3
A0 GLOBE VALVE E22-F019C 3
touAL12tNG VALVE E11-F043A 1
90 VALVE E22 FT00051 2 FLOW TRANSMITTER E11 F0438 2
30 VALVE E22 FT00082 2 FLOW TRANSMITTER E11 F043C 3
to VALVE E22 FT00ect 3 FLOW TRANSMITTER E11 F044A 1
30 VALVE E22 Ff000C2 3 FLOW TRANSMITTER E11-F0448 2
SO VALVE E22 P10038 2 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER E11 F044C 3
30 VALVE E22 PTO W 3 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER E11-7045A 1
MD GL0ef VALVE E22 PT006A 2 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER E11-F046A 1
M0 GAT! VALVE E22 PT006C-3 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER E11 FT008A1 1 FLOW TRANSMITTER E22 PT006F 2 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER E11 FT008A2 1 FLOW TRANSMITTER E22 PT006G 3 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER E11 FT00881 2 FLOW TRANSMITTER E22 PT0075 2 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER l
E11-FT00882 2 FLOW TRANSMITTER E22 PT007C 3 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER E11 FT008C1 3 FLOW TRANSMITTER E31 0PT0064 1 O!FF prest TRANSMITTER E11 FT008C2 3 FLOW TRANSMITTER E31 0PT0068 2 O!FF press TRANSMITTER E11 FT0125 2*
FLOW TRANSMITTER E31 0PT006C 3 O!FF press TRANSMITTER b
M esoTe5 choge hem prescos yers len
Canaral Electric Company Page B LIST OF EQUIPMENT INTERFACE WITH ESSENTIAL MUX SIGNALS (In order of device reading top to botto:n)
DEVICE DIV DESCRIPTION DEVICE DIV DESCRIPTION E31-cPT0060 4 O!FF PRESS TRANSMITTER E31-TEOD&C 2 TEMP ELEMENT E31-OPTC134 1 DIFF PRESS TRANSMITTER E31-TE008L 3 TEMP ELEMENT E31 CPT0138 2 O!FF mRESS TRANSMITTER E31-TE008M 4 TEMP ELEMENT E31 0PT013C 3 DIFF PRESS TRANSMITTER E31 TE009A 1 TEMP ELEMENT E31 0PT0130 4 O!FF PRESS TRANSMITTER E31-TE0096 2 TEMP ELEMENT E31-OPT 014A 1 O!FF PRESS TRANSMITTER E31-TE009C 3 TEMP ELEMENT E31-OPT 0148 2 O!FF PRESS TRANSMITTER E31-TE0090 4 TEMP ELEMENT E31 0PT014C 3 O!FF PRESS TRANSMITTER E31-TE009E 1
TEMP ELEMENT E31 CPT0140 4 OlFF PRESS TRANSMITTER E31-TE009F 2 TEMP ELEMENT E31-0PT015A 1 OlFF PRESS TRANSMITTER E31 TE009G 3 TEMP ELEMENT E31-0PTC;58 2 O!FF PRESS TRANSMITTER E31 TED09N 4 TEMP ELEMENT E31 DPT015C 3 DIFF PRESS TRANSMITTER E31-TE009J 1
TEMP ELEMENT E31 CPT0150 4 DIFF PRESS TRANSMITTER E31 TE009C 2 TEMP ELEMENT E31 0PT016A 1 O!FF PRESS TRANS E31-TE009L 3 TEMP ELEMENT E31 OPT 0168 2 DIFF PRESS TRANS E31 TE009M 4 TEMP ELEMENT E31 0PT016C 3 DIFF PRESS TRANS E31-TE010A 1 TEMP ELEMENT E31 0P70160 4 DIFF PRESS TRANS E31 TE0105 2 TEMP ELEMENT E31-0PT016E 1 DIFF PRESS TRANS E31 TE010C 3 TEMP ELEMENT E31 0PT016F 2 Ol*F PRESS TRANS E31 TE0100 4
TEMP ELEMENT E31 0PT016G 3 O!FF PRESS TRANS E31 TE011A 1 TEMP ELEMENT E31 0PT016N 4 DIFF PRESS TRANS E31-TE0118 2 TEMP ELEMENT E31-0PT016J 1 DIFF PRESS TRANS E31 TE011C 3 TEMP ELENCNT E31-0PT016C 2 0177 PRESS TRANS E31 TE0110 4 TEMP ELEMENT E31-0PT016L 3 DIFF PRESS TRANS E31-TE012A 1 TEMP ELEMENT E31 0PT016M 4 DIFF PRESS TRANS E31-TE012s 2 TEMP ELEMENT E31 OPT 016N 1 DIFF PRESS TRANS E31 TE012C 3 TEMP ELEMENT E31 0PT016# 2 OlFF PRESS TRANS E31 TE012D 4 TEMP ELEMENT E31-0PT016R 3 DIFF PRESS TRANS E31 TE018A 1 TEMP ELEMENT -
E31-0PT0165 4 DIFF PRESS TRANS E31 TE019A 1 TEMP ELEMENT E31 F002 1
A 0 SOLEM0lO VALVE (08)
E31 TE0204 1 TEMP ELEMENT E31-F003 2
A 0 $0LEM01D VALVE (IB)
E31-TE0208 2 TEMP ELEMENT E31 F004 2
A 0 SOLEMOID VALVE E31 TE020C 3 TEMP ELEMENT E31 F005 i
A 0 $0LENCID VALVE E31 TE0200 4 TEMP ELEMENT E31 PTD07A 1 PRESS TRANSMITTER E31 TE0214 1 MSL TEMP SENSORS E31 PT0075 2 press itAmeMITTER E31*TE021B 2 MSL TEMP SENSORS E31-PT007C 3 PRESS TRAN9MITTER E31 TED21C 3 MSL TEMP SENSORS E31 PT007D 4 PRESS TRAN9MITTER E31 TE0210 4 MSL TEMP SENSORS E31 TE005A 1 TEMP ELEMENT E31 TE022A 1 TEMP ELEMENT E31 TED055 2 TEMP ELEMENT E31-TE0228 2 TEMP ELEMENT E31 TED05C 3 TEMP ELEMENT E31 TE022C 3 TEMP ELEMENT E31-TE005D 4 TEMP ELEMENT E31 TE022D 4
-TEMP ELEMENT E31-TE DG8A 1
TEMP ELEMENT E31 TE023A 1 TEMP ELEMENT E31-TEDD88 2 TEMP ELEMENT E31*TE0238 2 TEMP ELEMENT E31 TED08C 3 TEMP ELEMENT E31 TE023C 3 TEMP ELEMENT E31 TED08D 4 TEMP ELEMENT E31 TE023D 4 TEMP ELEMENT E31 TE008E 1
TEMP ELEMENT E31 TE024A 1 TEMP ELEMENT E31 TE008F 2 TEMP ELEMENT E31 TE0245 2 TEMP ELEMENT T
E31 TEOD8G 3 TEMP ELEMENT E31 TE024C 3 TEMP ELEMENT E31-TED08N 4 TEMP ELEMENT E31-TE024D 4 TEMP ELEMENT E31 TE008J 1 TEMP ELEMENT E31-TE025A 1 TEMP ELEMENT h
. ~
General Electric Company Page 9 LIST OF EQUIPMENT INTERFACE WITH ESSENTIAL MUX SIGNALS (In order of device reading top to boCrom)
DEVICE DIV DESCRIPTION DEVICE
.DIV DESCRIPTION E31 TE0258 2 TEMP ELEMENT E51-F041 1
A0 GLOSE VALVE E31-TEC25C 3 TEMP ELEMENT E51 F045 1
M0 GLOBE VALVE E31 TE0250 4
TEMP ELEMENT E51 F047 1
M0 GATE VALVE E31 tE026A 1 TEMP ELEMENT E51 F048 1
No GLost VALVE E31-TE0264 2 TEMP ELEMENT E51-F058 i
A0 GLosE VALVE E31 TEC26C 3 TEMP ELEMENT E51 FT007 1 1 Flow TRANSMITTER-E31-TE0260 4 TEMP ELEMENT E51 FT007 2 1 Flow TRANSMITTER E31 TE027A 1 TEMP ELEMENT E51 L5011 1
LEVEL SWITCN E31 TEC275 2 TEMP ELEMENT E51 POT 901 i
POSITION TRANSMITTER E31 TE027C 3 TEMP ELEMENT E51 PT001 1
PRESS TRANSMITTER E31-TE027D 4
TEMP ELEMENT E51 PT002 1
PaE5s TRANSMITTER E31 TE028A 1 TEMP ELEMENT E51 Pt005 1
- Patss TRANSMITTER E31-TE0288 2
TEMP ELEMENT E51 PT008 1
PRESS TRANSMITTER E31 TE02BC 3 TEMP ELEMENT E51 PT009 1
PRESS TRAN$MITTER E31-TE02 2 4 TEMP ELEMENT E51 PT013A 1 PRESS TRANSMITTER E31-TE029A 1
TEMP ELEMENT E51 Pf013E 1
PRESS TRANSMITTER t
E31-TE0298 2 TEMP ELEMENT E51-Pf014A 1 PaEss TaANsMITTER E31 TE029C 3 TEMP ELEMENT E51-PTD148 2 Pat $$ TRANSMITTER E31-TE0290 4 TEMP ELEMENT E51-Pf014E 1
Patts TRANSMITTER E31-TE031A 1
TEMP ELEMENT E51 Pf0147 2 Pet $$ TRANSPITTER E31 TE031E 1 TEMP ELEMENT E51 SE997*
1 SPEED ELEMENT E31-TEC31J 1 TEMP ELEMENT G31*F002 2
MO GATE VALVE E31 TE032A 1 TEMP ELEMENT G31 F003 1
.M0 GATE VALVE l
E31 TE032E 1 TEMP ELEMENT G31 7013 2
MO GAtt VALVE E31 TE032J 1 TEMP ELEMENT G31 F030 1
M0 VALVE E31 TE033A 1 TEMP ELEMENT G31 F031 1
MO VALVE E31 TE033E 1 TEMP ELEMENT G31 F065 2
A0 VALVE E31 TE033J 1 TEMP ELEMENT G31 F066 1
A0 VALVE E31-TE034A 1 TEMP ELEMENT G31 TE006 1*
TEMP ELEMENT E31-tE034E i TEMP ELEMENT G41 C001A 1
PLMP E31-TE034J 1 TEMP ELEMENT G41 C0018 2
PLMP E51 C002 1
TURSINE G41 F005A-1*
M0 GATE VALVE E51-C901*
1 VACLue PLMP G41 F0058 2*
M0 GATE VALVE f
E51 C902*
1 CONDENSATE PtmP G41-7013 1
M0 GATE VALVE E51-7001 1
No GATE VALVE G41 F0214 1
M0 GLost VALVE E51-F004 1
MD GATE VALVE G41 70215 2
MO GLOSE VALVE j
E51-F005 1-A0 CNECK VALVE G41 7038 1*
M0 GLOSE VALVE E51 F006 1
MO GATE VALVE G41 FT006A 1 YLOW TRANSMITTER f
E51-F008 i
MD GLOBE VALVE G41 FT0060 2 FLOW TRAN9MITTER
.E51-F009 1
MO GLoef VALVE G41 LT0204 1*
LEVEL TRAmtMITTER E51 F011 1
No GLOSE VALVE G41 LT0205
.2*
LEVEL TRANsMIffER E51 F012 1
M0 GLoeE VALVE G41-Pf003A 1 Petst TRAusMITTER r
E51-F026 1
A0 Gloaf VALVE G41 PT0038 2 PRESS TRANSMITTER.
f E51-F031 1
so DIAPMRAM VALVE
-G51 C001 11 PUMP.
l E51 F032 1
50 O!APMRAM VALVE G51-7001 2
MO GATE VALVE E51-F035 1
MD GATE VALVE G51 8004 1
Ao VALVE _
E51 F036 2
M0 GATE VALVE G51-F006 2
MO GATE VALVE E51 7037 1
M0 GLost VALVE G51 F007 1
MO GATE VALVE
[
E51 F039 1
M0 CATE VALVE G51-F020 1-MD GATE VALVE f
E51 F040 1
A0 GLosE VALVE K11-C001A 1
LCW PLMP - DRfWELL S W i
l'l
General Electric Company Page 10 LIST OF EQUIPMENT INTERFACE WITH ESSENTIAL MUX SIGNAI.S (In Order of device -
reading top to bot:Om) j DEVICE DIV DESCRIPTION DEVICE DIV DESCRIPTION
]
j K11-C0018 2
LCW PUMP CRYWELL SUMP P21 F018A 1*
M0 GLOSE VALVE
'l I
K11 C101A 1
NCW PUMP ORYWELL SUMP P21 F0188 2*
M0 GLOSE VALVE K11 C1018 2
acW PUMP - ctVWELL sump P21 F018C 3*
M0 GLost VALVE (11-C102A 1
- 6CW PUMP FOR SUMP (A)
P21 F025A 1
M0 GLost VALVE (11-C1023 2
MCW PUMP FOR SUMP (8)
P21 F0258 2
MO GLOSE VALVE j
(11-C102C 3
MCW PUMP FOR SUMP (C)
P21 F025C 3
M0 GLOSE VALVE K11-C1020 1
MCW PUMP FOR sump (D)
P21 7025E 1
M0 GLOSE VALVE K11 C102E 2
NCW PUMP FOR SUMP (E) 821-F0257 2
MO GLOSE VALVE (11-C1027 1
- CW PUMP Fot sump (A)
P21 7025G 3
MO GLOSE VALVE E11 C102G 2
NCW PUMP FOR SUMP (8)
P21 F055A 1
M0 GATE VALVE j
K11-C102M 3
McW PUMP Fot sump (C)
P21 F0558 2
M0 GATE VALVE K11 C1021 1
aCW PUMP FOR sump (D)
P21-F055C 3
M0 GATE VALVE i
(11 C102J 2
MCW PtmP FOR SUMP (E)
P21 F055E 1
MO GATE VALVE t
P13 LT001A 1*
COND ST0tAGE POOL LEVEL
- P21-F055F 2
M0 GATE VALVE P13 LT0018 2*
Cou0 sTotAGE POOL LEVEL' P21-F055G 3
M0 GA'fE VALVE P13 LT001C 3*
COND stotAGE POOL LEVEL
- P21-F072A 1
A0 VALVE P13 LT0010 4*
Cou0 ST0tAGE POOL LEVEL
- P21-F0728 2
Ao VALVE P21-C001A 1
PUMP P21-7072C 3
40 VALVE P21 C0018 2
PUMP P21-F072E 1
A0 VALVE P21 C001C 3
PUMP P21-F072F 2
A0 VALVE P21-C001E 1
PUMP P21 7072G 3
A0 VALVE P21 C001F 2
PUMP P21-F074A 1
M0 GATE VALVE i
P21 C001G 3
PUMP P21 F0748 2
M0 GATE VALVE P21 DPs033A 1 DIFF PRESS SWITCM P21 F074C 3
M0 GATE VALVE i
P21 DP$0338 2 DIFF PRESS SWITCM P21-F075A
'1 M0 GATE VALVE P21 DP5033C 3 DIFF PREtt SWITCM P21 F0758 1
MO GATE VALVE P21-DPs034A 1 DIFF PRESS SWITCM P21 F0804 2
M0 GATE VALVE P21 Des 0348 2 D!FF PRESS SWITCN P21 F0808 2
M0 GATE VALVE P21 DP$034C 3 DIFF Petst SWITCH P21 F081A 1
No GATE VALVE l
P21-E/P605A 1 E/P CONVERTER P21 F0818 1
MO GATE VALVE-P21-E/P6058 2 E/P CONVERTER P21 7082A 1
M0 GATE VALVE ~
P21 E/P605C 3 t/P CONVESTER P21-70828 2
Mc GATE VALVE P21 F004A 1
MO GATE VALVE P21 F082C 3
M0 GATE VALVE P21 F0048 2
M0 GATE VALVE P21-F084A 1
MAN OPER GATE VALVE P21 F004C 3
MO GATE VALVE P21 F0848 2
MAN OPER GATE VALVE P21 F004E-1 MO GATE VALyt P21 FT006A 1 FLOW TRANSMITTER P21 F004F 2
MO GATE VALVE P21 FT0068 2 FLOW TRANSMITTER f
P21 F004G 3
MO GATE VALVE P21-FT006C 3 FLOW TRANSMITTER
[
P21 F004J 1
2 GATE VALVE P21 FT008A - 1 FLOW TRANSMITTER
(
P21 F004E 2
m GATE VALVE P21 FT0088 2 FLOW TRANSMITTER I
P21-F004L 3
MO GATE VALyt P21-FT000C-3 FLOW TRANSMITTER P21 7006A 1
TEMP CONTROL VALVE P21 FT042A 1 FLOW TRANSMITTER P21 F0068 2
TE W CONTROL VALVE F21-FT0428 2-FLOW TRANSMITTER,
.P21*F006C 3
. TEMP CONTROL VALVE P21 FT042C 3 FLOW TRANSMITTER P21-F010A 1
TEMP couitoL VALVE P21-LS015A 1
' LEVEL'SWITCN
[
P21 F0108 2
TEMP CONTROL VALVE P21 L50158 2 LEVEL SWITCM f
P21-F010C 3
TEMP CONTROL VALVE P21 LS015C 3 LEVEL SWITCH P21 F013A 1
MO GLOBE VALVE P21-LT013A 1 LEVEL TRANSMITTER
[
P21 F0138 2
M0 GLost VALVE P21-LT0138 2 LEVEL TRANSMITTER P21-7013C 3
M0 GLost VALVE
.P21 LT013C 3 LEVEL TRANSMITTER l
i; 6
I
Gansral Electric Compeny Page il 1
LIST OF EQUIPMENT INTERFACE k'ITH ESSENTIAL MUX SIGNALS (In order of device reading top to bottom)
DEVICE DIV DESCRIPTION DEVICE DIV DESCRIPTION P21 LT014A 1
LEVEL TRAhSMITTER P25 Fis003A 1 FLOW IND SWITCM P21 LT0148 2 LEVEL TRANSMITTER P25 Fis0038 2 FLOW IMO S4!TCM P21-LT014C 3
LEVEL TRAksMITTER P25-Fis003C 3 FLOW IND SWITCH P21-LT014E 1
LEVEL TRANSMITTER P25 FIS003E 1 FLOW the SWITCM P21 LT014F 2
LEVEL TRANSMITTER P25 Fis003F 2 FLOW luo sWITCM P21-LT014G 3
LEVEL TRANSMITTER P25-Fis003G 3 FLOW 1hD SWITCH P21-LT014J 1
LEVEL TRANSMITTER P25 TE005A 1 TEMP ELEMENT P21 LTD14C 2 LEVEL TRANSMITTER P25 TE0050 2 TEMP ELEMENT P21 LT014L 3 LEVEL TRAhSMITTER P25 TE005C 3 TEMP ELEMENT P21-PT004A 1
press TRAksMITTER P41 8001A 1
RCW MT EXCMANGER P21-PT0048 2
PRESS TRAmsMITTER P41-80015 2
RCW MT EXCMAhGER P21-PT004C 3
PRESS TRANSMITTER P41 8001C 3
RCW MT EXCMANGER P21-TE005A 1
TEMP ELEMENT P41 80010 1
RCW MT EXCMANGER P21 TE0050 2 TEMP ELEMENT P41-8001E 2
RCW MT EXCMANGER P21 TE005C 3 TEMP ELEMENT P41-80017 3
RCW MT EXCMANGER P21-TE009A 1
TEMP ELEMENT P41-C001A 1
RsW PUMP P21 TE0096 2 TEMP ELEMENT P41 C0018 2
Rsw PUMP P21-TE009C 3 TEMP ELEMENT P41 C001C 3
Rsw PUMP P24 F053 1
No GATE VALVE P41 C0010 1
RSW PUMP P24-F141 2
No CATE VALVE P41-C001E 2
R$W PUMP P24-F142 1
no GATE VALVE P41-C0017 3
R$W PUMP P25 F016A 1
TEMP CONTROL VALVE P41 D001A 1
SE WATER $TRAlhER P25-C001A 1
MECW PUMP P41-D0018 2
SE WATER STRA!hER P25 C0015 2
MECW PUMP P41-0001C 3
SE WATER STRAluER P25 C001C 3
MECW PUMP P41 0001D 1
sE WATER STRAINER P25 C001E 1
MECW PUMP P41 0001E 2
SE WATER STRAthER P25 C001F 2
MECW PUMP P41-D0017 3
$E bATER STRAlhER P25 C001G 3
NECW PUMP P41-DP1005A 1.
DIFF press INDICATCR P25 0001A 1
REFRIGERATOR P41-DP10058 2 DIFF press INDICATCR P25 00015 2
REFRIGERATOR P41 DPID05C 3 DIFF press luDICATCR P25-0001C 3
REFRIGERATOR P41 DP10050 1 DIFF PRE 55 IkDICATCR P25 0001E 1
REFRIGERATOR P41-DP1005E 2 DIFF PRES $ luDICATCR P25 0001F 2
REFRIGERATOR P41-DP100$F 3 DIFF PRES $ INolCATC#
P25-0001G 3
REFRIGERATOR P41 DPS006A 1-DIFF PRESS SWITCM l
P25-DPT007A 1 DIFF PRESS TRAM 9MITTER P41 DPS0068 2 DIFF PRE $$ $ WITCH P25 DPT0073 2 DIFF PeESS TRANSEITTER P41-DPS006C 3 DIFF PRES $ SWITCM P25-DPT007C 3 DIFF PRESS TRANSNITTER P41-DPt0060 1 DIFF PRESS SWITCM P25 F0058 2
TEMP CONTROL VALVE P41-DPs006E 2 DIFF PRESS $WITCM P25 F005C 3
TEMP CouTROL VALVE P41-DP5006F 3 DIFF PRESS SWITCM P25 F012A 1
PRES $uRE CONTROL VALVE P41-DPT004A 1'
DIFF PRESS TRANS i
P25 F0128 2
P# Essure CONTROL VALVE P41-DPT0048 2 DIFF PaESS TRANS P25 F012C 3
PRESSURE CouTROL VALVE P41 DPT004C 3 DIFF PRESS TRAK 5 P25 F0168 2
TEMP CONTROL VALVE P41 DPT0040 1 DIFF PRESS TRANs' P25 F016C 3
TEMP CONTROL VALVE P41-DPT004E 2 DIFF PRESS TRAkt P25 F022A 1
TEMP couTROL VALVE P41-DPT004F 3 DIFF press TRAhs j
P25 F0225 2
TEMP couTROL VALVE P41 F0034 1
M0 suTTERFLT VLV P25-F022C 3
TEMP CONTROL VALVE P41 F0038 2
M0 BUTTERFLT VLV P25-F040A 1
A0 VALVE P41 F003C 3
MO BUTTERFLT VLV-P25 F0400 2
A0 VALVE P41 7003D 1
No suTTERFLT VLV e
P25 F040C 3
A0 VALVE P41 F003E 2
MO suTTERFLT Vtv 1
i
)
.1
General' Electric Commenv' Page R LIST OF EQUIPMENT INTERFACE WITH ESSENTIAL KUX SIGNALS (In Order of device - reading top t0 b0tt0m)
DEVICE DIV DESCRIPTION DEVICE DIV DESCRIPTION P41 7003F 3
No BUTTERFLY VLV R24 MCC C12 1 MOTOR C0hTROL CEhTER P41-F004A 1
M0 BUTTERFLY VLv R24 MCC C13 1 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER P41-F0048 2
MO SUTTERFLY VLV R24 MCC C14 1 MOTOR CONTROL CENTFR P41 7004C 3
Mo BUTTERFLY VLv R24 MCC C17 1 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER P41 F0040 1
MO BUTTERFLY VLV R24 MCC D10 2 MOTOR CONTROL CEmTER P41-F004E 2
Mo BUTTERFLY VLV R24 MCC 011 2 MOTOR CONTROL CEhTER P41-F004F 3
Mo BUTTERFLY VLv R24 MCC D12 2 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER P41-F005A 1
M0 BUTTERFLY VLV R24 MCC D14 2 m3T0R CONTROL CEkTER P41-F0055 2
M0 SUTTERFLY VLV R24 MCC 017 2 MOTOR CONTROL CEkTER P41 F005C 3
M0 suTTERFLY VLv R24 MCC E10 3 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER P41-F0050 1
M0 suTTERFLY VLV R24 MCC E11 3 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER t
P41 F005E 2
No suTTERFLY VLV R24 MCC E14 3 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER P41-7005F 3
MO suTTERFLY VLV R24 MCC E17 3 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER.
P41-7006A 1
M0 BUTTERFLY VLV R42 P005A 1
125 VDC NORM CHARCER P41 F0064 2
40 BUTTERFLY VLv R42 P0058 2
125 VDC h0RM CHARCER P41-F006C 3
M0 suTTERFLY VLV R42 P005C 3
125 VDC n0RM CnARCER P41-F0060 1
M0 SUTTERFLY VLV R42 P005D 4
125 VDC WORM CMARCER P41 F006E 2
Mo BUTTERFLY VLV R42 P006A 1
125 VDC NORM CMAROER P41 7006F 3
MO BUTTERFLY VLV R42 P0064 2
125 VDC NORM CHARGER P41 F009A 1
A0 GLOSE VALVE R42 P006C 3
125 VDC NORM CHARCER P41 F009s 2
Ao CLOSE VALVE R42-P0060 4
125 VDC NORM CwARCER P41 F009C 3
A0 CLost VALVE R42 P007A 1
125 VDC CNTR Dist 60 P41 F0090 1
A0 GLOSE VALVE R42 P007B 2
125 VDC CNTR Dist at P41 7009E 2
A0 GLOBE VALVE R42 P007C 3
125 VDC CNTR D!si sc P41 70097 3
A0 GLOSE VALVE R42 P0073 4
125 VDC CnTR DIsf so P41 F011A 1
A0 GLOSE VALVE R42 P006A 1,2 125 VDC STav CHARCER P41 F0118 2
A0 GLost VALVE R42 P008s 1,3-125 VDC sisY CHARCER P41 F011C 3
A0 GLOSE VALVE R43-C201A*
1' COMPRESS 0R P41-F0110 1
A0 GLOSE VALVE R43-C201B*
2 COMPRE$$0R P41 7011E 2
A0 GLOSE VALVE R43 C201C' 3 COMPRE$$0R P41 F011F 3
A0 GLOBE VALVE R43-C202A' 1
COMPRE$$0R P41-F014A 1
M0 BUTTERFLY YLV R43-C2028*
2 C3ePRE550R P41 F0148 2
M0 BUTTERFLY YLV R43*C202C' 3
COMPRESSOR l
P41 F014C 3
Mo BUTTERFLY VLv R43 C401A*
1 Lutt DIL PunP P41-PT003A 1
press TRANSMITTER R43 C401s* 2 Lust DIL PUMP P41 PT0038 2 press TRAmsMITTER R43 C401C*
3 LUBE O!L PUMP P41 PT003C 3 PREtt TRAmsNITTER R43-DPSO91A* 1-DIFF PRESS SWITCM P54 7007 1
No GLost VALVE R43 DPs091t* 2-DIFF PRESS SWITCM P54 F018A' 1
MD GL00E VALVE R43 DPE091C* 3 DIFF PRESS SWITCH P54 F0188 2
MD GLost VALVE R43 J001A 1
DIESEL GENERATOR
~
P54-F024A 1
No Glost VALVE R43 J0018 2
DIESEL GENERATOR P54*F0248 2
MD GLfAE VALVE R43-J001C 3
DIESEL GENERATOR -
i P54 7027A 1
MO GLOSE VALVE R43 Lis191A* 1 LEVEL IND SWITCH P54-F0275 2
MO Glott VALVE R43-LIS191B* 2 LEVEL the SWITCH P54 Pts 005A 1 PRESS l e SWITCR R43 LIS191C* 3, LEVEL IND SWITCM P54 Pis0058 2 PRESS IND SWITCH R43 L5142A* -1 LEVEL SWITCH P54 PT006A 1 PRESS TRANSMITTER R43-LS1420* 2 LEVEL SWITCH-P54-PT0068 2
press TRAmsMITTER R43-LS142C* 3 LEVEL SWITCM R24 MCC C10 1 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER R43 Ls395A* 1 LEVEL SWITCH R24 MCC C11 1 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER R43 L53958' 2 LEVEL SWITCM
Censral Electric Co=peny Paga 13 LIST OF EQUIPMENT INTERFACE WITH ESSENTIAL MUX SIGNALS I
(In order of device reading top to botto:n)
DEVICE DIV DESCRIPTION DEVICE DIV DESCRIPTION R43 LS395C' 3 LEVEL SWITCH T22 LS019A 1 LEVEL SWITCH R43 P001A' 1
DC(A) CONTROL PNL (A)
T22 L50199 2 LEVEL SWITCH
- 43-P0018*
2 OC(B) Comitot PNL ( A)
T22 ME011A 1 MOISTutE ELEMENT a43 P001C*
3 DG(C) CONTROL PNL (A)
T22 ME0118 2 MCIstutt ELEMENT e43-P002A*
1 DG(A) SCT PANEL T22 ME011C 3 M0!$7umE ELEMENT e43-P002B' 2
DC(B) SCT PANEL T22 ME0110 4 MolsfutE ELEMENT e43 P002C' 3
DC(C) SCT PANEL T22 MT011A 1 MollfueE TRANSMITTER R43 P003A*
1 DC(A) CONTa0L PNL (B)
T22 MT0118 2 MOISTuat TRANSMITTER R43 P0030*
2 DG(B) CONTROL PNL (B) 722 MT011C 3 MolsiuaE TRANSMITTER R43 P003C*
3 DC(C) CONTROL PNL (B)
T22 MT0110 4 MotStunt TaANSMITTEa a 4-J002A1 1
VITAL Disf PNL A1 T22 POE001A 1 POSITION ELEMNT R 4-J002B1 2
v!TAL DIST PNL B1 722 P0E001B 2 P051 TION ELEMENT R 4-J002C1 3
VITAL DIST PNL C1 T22 TE002A 1 TEMP ELEMENT R 4-J002D1 4
VITAL DIST PNL 01 T22 TE0028 2 TE W ELEMENT R 4-P001A 1
WITAL CVCF A T22 TE010A 1 TEMP ELEMENT R 4-P0018 2
VITAL CVCF B T22 TE0108 2 TEMP ELEE NT R4-P001C 3
VITAL CVCF C T22 TE013A 1 TEMP ELEM NT R 4 P0010 4
VITAL CVCF D T22 TE0138 2 TEMP ELEMENT T22 C001A 1
EXNAUST FAN (A)
T22 TE01A4 1 TEMP ELEMENT T22-C0013 2
EXNAUST FAN (B)
T22 TE0148 2 TEMP ELEMENT
~
T22 C002A 1
PRE SPACE MTR & FAN ( A)
T22-TE016A 1 TEMP ELEMENT T22-C002s 2
PRE SPACE NTt. & FAN (B)
T22-TE0165 2 TEMP ELEMENT T22-C003A 1
AFTER Wit. & FAN (A)
T22-TS0054 1 TEMP SWITCM T22-C0038 2
AFTER Mit. & FAN (B) 722 75005B 2 TEMP SWITCM T22 D001A 1
DtTER UNIT (A)
T22 TS009A 1 TEMP SWITCM T22 00015 2
DATER UNIT (B) 722 T5009s 2 TEMP SWITCM s
I T22 DPT021A 1 OlFF PRESS TRANSMITTER T22-TS013A 1*
TEMP SWITCM T22 DPTC21B 2 DIFF PRESS TRANSMITTER T22 T50138 2 TEMP SWITCM T22 DPT021C 1 DIFF PRESS TRANSMITTER T22 TS015A 1 TEMP ELEMENT T22-DPT0210 2 DIFF PRESS TRANSMITTER T22 T50158 2 TEMP ELEMENT T22-F001A 1
Ao suTTERFLY VALVE T31 F001 1
A0 VALVE T22 F0018 2
A0 BUTTERFLY VALVE T31 F002 2
A0 VALVE T22 F002A 1
MO tuTTERFLY VALyt T31 7003 2
Ao VALVE T22 F0028 2
M0 tuTTERFLY VALVE T31 F006 2
A0 VALVE T22 7004A 1
MD suTTERFLY VALVE T31 F005 2
A0 VALVE T22-F0048 2
MD suTTERFLY VALVE T31 F006 2
A0 VALVE T22 F005A' 1
M0 auTTERFLY VALVE T31 F007 2
A0 VALVE T22 F005B' 2
se IUTTERFLY VALVE T31 F008 1
Ao VALVE T22 FTG184 1 FLOW TRANSIITTER T31 F009 1
~A0 VALVE T22-FT0185 2 FL(Rd TRAN91tTTER T31 F025 1
40 VALVE T22-H001A1 1
PRE SPACE NEATER T31 F039 1
A0 VALVE T22 N001A2 1 Pat SPACE MEATER T31 7060 2
A0 VALVE T22 N001A3 1 AFTER SPACE NEATER T31 F061 2
A0 VALVE T22-N001A4 1
AFTER SPACE MEATER T31 77204 2
So VALVE T22 N00181 2 Pet SPACE MEATER T31 77208 2
SO VALVE T22 N00182 2 PtE SPACE MEATER T31-7731 1
$0 VALVE T22 N00183 2 AFTER SPACE HEATER T31-F733A 1
S0 VALVE T22 N00184 2 AFTER SPACE NEATER T31.F733s 1
50 VALVE T22 L5004A 1 LEVEL SWITCM T31 F735A 1
to VALVE T22-tS0048 2 LEVEL SWITCM T31 F7358 2
to VALVE
Con 2ral Electric CompenY Page le LIST OF EQUIPMENT INTERFACE WITH ESSENTIAL MUX SIGNALS (In order of device reading top to bottorn)
DEVICE DIV DESCRIPTION DEVICE DIV DESCRIPTION 131-F735C 3
$0 VALVE T49 7010A 3
M0 GLOSE VALVE T31 77350 4
50 VALVE T49-F0108 2
M0 GLOSE VALVE T31 F737A i
SO VALVE T49 F013A 3
MAN OPER GATE VALVE T31 F7373 1
50 VALVE T49 F0138 2
MAN OPER GATE VALVE T31*F739A 1
'SO VALVE T49 F014A 3
MAN OPER GATE VALVE T31 77398 2
$0 VALVE T49 F0145 2
MAN OPER GATE VALVE T31 FT39C 3
50 VALVE T49-FT002A 3 FLCW TRANSMITTER T31 F7390 4
so VALVE T49 FT0025 2 FLod TRANSMITTER 731.F741A 1
SO VALVE T49-FT004A 3
FLOW TRANSMITTER T31-F7418 2
50 VALVE T49 FT0048 2 FLOW TRANSMITTER T31 F741C 3
So VALVE T49 PT003A 3 PREtt TRANSMITTER T31-FT410 4
50 VALVE T49 PT0038 2 PRESS TRANSMITTER T31-7743A 1
So VALVE T49 TE001A 3 TEMP ELEMENT T31-F7434 2
so VALVE T49 TE0018 2 TEMP ELEMENT T31 F745A 1
50 VALVE T49-TE005A 3 TEMP ELEMENT T31 F7458 2
SO VALVE T49-TE0058 2 TE p ELEMENT T31 F801A 1
SO VALVE T49 TE006A** 3 TE M ELEMENT T31 F8015 2
50 VALVE T49-TE0068" 2 TEMP ELEMENT T31-F803A 1
$0 VALVE T49-TE007A" 3 TEMP ELEMENT T31-F8038 2
50 VALVE T49-TE0075" 2 TEMP ELEMENT T31 78054 1
so VALVE T49 TE008A" 3 TEMP ELEMENT T31 F8058 2
$0 VALVE T49 TE0088** 2 TEMP ELEM NT T31 LT058A 1 LEVEL TRANSMITTER T49 TE009A" 3 TEMP ELEMENT T31-LT0588 2 LEVEL TRANSMITTER T49-TE0095" 2 TEMP ELEMENT T31-LT058C. 3 LEVEL TRANSMITTER T49 TE010A" 3 TEMP ELEMENT T31 LT0580 4 LEVEL TRANSMITTER T49 TE0108" 2 TEMP ELEMENT T31 LT059A 1 LEVEL TRANSMITTER T49 TE011A 3 TEMP ELEMNT T31-LT0595 2 LEVEL TRANSMITTER T49 TE0115 2 TEMP ELEMENT T31 LT100A 1 LEVEL TRANSMITTER T53 TE001A 1*
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT T31 LT1006 2 LEVEL TRANSMITTER T53 TE0018 2*
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT e
T49-C001A 3
BLOWER T53 TE001E 1*
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT T49 C001s 2
BLOWR 753-TE001F 2*
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT T49 D002A*
3 NEATER T53 TE001J 1*
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT T49-00028*
2 MATER T53 TE001K 2*
TEMPERATURE ELEMNT -
T49-F001A 3
No GATE VALVE T53 TE001N.
1*
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT r
T49-F001B 2
MD GATE VALVE T53 TE001P 2*.
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT.
T49-F002A 3
' MD GATE VALVE T53 TE002A 1*
TEW ERATURE ELEMENT T49-F0028 2
IW GATE VALVE T53 TE002s 2*
TEwtRATURE ELEMENT T49 7003A. 3 MD OLOSE VALVE T53 TE002E
.1 * -
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT T49-F0038 2
MD GLOBE VALVE T53 TE002F 2*
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT T49 F004A 3
No GLOBE VALVE T53 TE002J 1*
' TEMPERATURE ELEMENT T49 70048 2
-M0 GLOBE VALVE T53 TE002K
'2*
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT T49-F0064 3
M0 GATE VALVE T53 TE002N 1*
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT T49 F0068 2
No GATE VALVE 753 TE002P' 2*
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT-i T49-7007A 3
M0 GATE VALVE T53 TE003A 1
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT f
.T49-F0075 2
M0 GATE VALVE T53 TE0038 2*
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT T49 F008A 1*
M0 GATE VALVE T53 TE003E 1*
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT T49 70008 2*
M0 GATE VALVE T53 TE003F 2*
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT i
T49 F009A 3
MAN QPER GLOSE VALVE T53 TE003J 1*
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT T49 F009B 2
MAN OPER GLOSE VALVE T53 TE003C 2*
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT i
=_
Gen 2ral Elcetric Co peny.
Page 15 LIST OF EQUIPMENT INTERFACE WITH ESSENTIAL MUX SIGNALS reading top to botto:n)
(In order of device DEVICE DIV DESCRIPTION DEVICE DIV DESCRIPTION T53-TE003N 1*
TEMPERATURE. ELEMENT U41 C6020 2
MCA EXMausi FAN (B)
T53 !E003P 2*
TEMPERATURE ELEMEk'T V41-C602C 3
MCR EXMAUST FAN (C) 753 TE004A 1*
TEMPERATU*E ELEMEsif U41-C602F 2
MCR EXMAUST FAN (F) l 753 TE0048 2*
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT 041-C602G 3
MCR EXMAust FAN (G) 7 T53-TE004E 1*
TEMPERATURE ELEAENT 041-C6038
. 2 MCR RECIRC SUPP FAN (B) l T53-TE004F 2*-
' TEMPERATURE ELEMENT 041 C603C 3
.MCR RECIRC SUPP FAN (C)
T53 TE004J 1*
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT U41-C603F, 2
MCR RECIRC SUPP FAN (F)
T53 TE004K 2*
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT U41-C603G 3
T53 TE004N 1*
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT U41-C606A 1
EMER EQ FAN (A) ZONE (A) 753 TE004P 2*
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT
- U41 C604E 1
EMER EQ FAN (S) ZONE (A) 753-TE005A 1*
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT 041-C605A 1
T53-TE0058 2*
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT U41-C605E 1
T53-TE005E 1*
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT U41 C6068 2
EMER Ee FAN (A) ZONE (3) 753 TE005F 2*
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT U41-C606F 2
EMER EQ FAN (B) ZONE (B)
T53 TE00$J 1*
TEMPERATURE ELF. MENT U41-C60?B 2
EM E0 EX FAN (4) ZONE (B)-
153 TE005C 2*
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT U41-C607F 2
EN EO EX FAN (B) ZONE (B) i T53 TE005#
1*
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT U61*C600C 3
EMER EQ FAN (A) ZONE (C)
T53-TE005P 2*
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT U41-C6084 3
EMER EO FAN (5) ZONE (C) l T53 TE006A 1*
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT U61-C609C 3
EN E0 EX FAN (A) ZONE (C)
T53 TE0068 2*
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT U61 C609G 3
T53-TE006E 1*
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT U41-0101 1
RCIC PUMP ROOM MVM T53-TE006F 2*
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT U41-0102 3
MPCF PUMP (C) ROOM myn T53 TE006J 1*
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT U41 D103
. 1
. RNR PUMP (A) ROOM WVN T53 TE006C 2*
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT U41 0106 3
RNR PUMP (C) ROOM Mvu
.{
T53 TE00m 1*
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT U61 0105-2 Rnt PUMP (B) ROOM uvn
- f T53 TE006P 2*
TEMPERATURE ELEMENT.
U61-0106 2
MPCF PUMP (B) ROOM uvw U61 C201A 1
DG(A) SUPPLY FAN (A)
U41 0107' 3
FCs ROOM (A) MvM 041 C2018 1
DG(A) SUPPLY FAN (B)
U61 0108 2
FCS ROOM (s) MVN U41 C202A 1
DG(A) EMMAUST FM (A)
U41 0109 1
FPC PUMP (A) ROOM MVM S
U41 C2028 1
DG(A) EXNAUST FAN (B)
U41 0110 2
FPC PLMP (B) R004 MvM U41-C203A 1
DG(A) EIER SUPP FAN (A)
U61-0111 1
$GTS ROEM MVM (A) l V41-C2038 1
DG(A) EIER SUPP FAN (B) 061 0112 2
SGTS ROEM MVN (B)
U41-C204A 2
DC(E) SUPPLY FAN (A)
U41 D113 1
CAMS (A) ROOM NVM U61-C2048 2
DG(3) SUPPLY FAN (B)
U61 0114 2
CAM $ (B) ROON MVM i
U41 C2054 2
DG(B) ExNAMBY FAN (A) 961 7001A 1
A0 VLV J R/A SUP 150 VLv l
041 C2058 2
De(s) EzNAMBT PAN (B)
U61 F0018 2
A0 VLV R/A SUP 150 vtv U61 C206A 2
' De(O) BIER RPP FAN (A)
U61 F002A 1-A0 VLV R/A EXM ISO (A)
U41 C2068 2
Os(S) BER SpP FAN (B) u61 F0023-2
~ Ao VLV - R/A EXM 150 (S)
~l U61 C207A 3
De(C) EPPLY FAN (A)
U61 F0034' 1
40 VALVE.
U61 C2075 3
-06(C) SUPPLY FAN (s) -
U61-70038-2 A0 VALVE U61 C200A 3
DG(C) EMNAMBT FAN (A)
U61 F006A 1-A0 VALVE 041 C2005 3
DG(C) ERNAUIR FAN (5)
U61 F0065-2 A0 VALVE.
l' 041 C209A 3
DG(C) EIER BUPP FAN (A)
U61 7005A 1
'A0 VALVE 061 C2005 3
- DG(C) EIER SUPP FAN (B)
U61 F0058 2
A0 VALVE U41 C503A'
.1 ELEC Et SUPPLY FAN (A)
U61 F090A*
1 40 VLV - CAMS RM EXN' U61 C5038-2 ELEC E0 SUPPLY FAN (B)
U61 F090B' 2
A0 VLV
- CAMS RM EXM
'l U61 C6018 2
MCR SUPPLY FAN (8)
U61 F091A*
1 A0 VLV CAMS RM SUPPL 1 061 C401C 3
MCR SUPPLY FAN (C) 041 70910*
2 40 VLV - CAME RM SUPPLT U61 C601F 2
NCR SUPPLY FAN (F)
~ 041 TE052 1
TEMP ELEMENT U61 C601G 3
NCR SUPPLT FAN (G)
U41 TE056 2
. TEMP ELEMENT "F
Y' w
Csnoral Cisceric Company-Peg 2 16 LIST OF EQUIPMENT INTERFACE VITH ESSENTIAL MUX SIGNALS (In order of device -
reading top to bottom)
DEVICE DIV DESCRIPTION DEVICE DIV DESCRIPTION U41-TE060 3
TEMP ELEMENT U41-TE1048 2 TEMP ELEMENT U41-TE071A~ 1 TEMP ELEMENT U41 TE104F 2 TEMP ELEMENT V41-TE0718 2
TEMP ELEMENT U41 TE111 1
TEMP ELEMENT j
041-TE071C 3
TEMP ELEMENT U41-TE114 2
TEMP ELEMENT V41-TE072A 1
TEMP ELEMENT U41 TE117 3
TEMP ELEMENT V41 TE0728 2-TEMP ELEMENT V41 715:52 3 TEMP IND Sid EMER ExM U41 TE072C 3 TEMP ELEMENT U41-T!sC53 2 TEMP IND SW EMER ExM U41-TE103C 3 TEMP ELEMENT V41 TISC54 1 TEMP IND SW EMER Exn U41 TE103G 3 TEMP ELEMENT P
R L
5 t
I 8
P 6
b S
. /lESpoNSE To OfSEA. 7LW I EMS SSLC RPS / MSIV-N==
- 1. THIS SIMPLIFED DIAGRAM SHOWS THE BASC L CAL AREA CONMOL ROOM ~
@D yst N sg Nes
$"EETA"e'xEo.*p"tET7aNc"IxE**
i/L'P3l SysTru. usno sTOnenenocnAu coupVTsas t= amr
- ==
isoi,,.d e.
PDwEn
@h 8"Ngfrr f*
from DTMs en SOURCE TO DETERMINE THE DECISION FOR SAFETY
- 2. EE uunewsing syn.m. wmen n indee.nd.m d
.I
""*' 8'***"' /Lm 3 v #
j O
"'*5 i
mor m.shown for nEFEnENCE ONLY and SSLc, is RPS I MStV
/ see Nest, 7 smw WULTIPLEX UNITS on. posste ame,-anon. As an ma**-
Multi exma oC>
m.,,,,,o,,,m
%pd*MEL_*k Tou a e6#r.<sonat dos r.dundam reg a sumre.d.
r o,n,im *[$3
[fG+
RMu Z
Sy m
+
Tm system can automancany reconngure anor a
=
M-n nod. or cabi. imiur. = maimain avaiisony w x
~T.
l r maining vunsens.
u4 i
- 3. Ruus snown ar. typical; actual quantey of RMus TYv 1 mum l a
g*
gr
,4 Isolated trips to s
and nuntx,r of inpurs and cutputs p.r nMU wm be l cog 7 pot <
y bmass.d d.termin.d during derailad desiget stag TLUs m other g pas, y
dn# sions
- 4. DTM, SLU and TLU functbas shown am perform.d 6
by meroproc.ssors und.r sofNram pmgram ecewel;.
m
+
RMu DYPASS
}
{-
- 'y g,,
g CONTROL m
m th..wact.numter and location of th.s. fumsion,.s wilf g
g~
- an,, %
e.d.,,r der m or - T f
?
,_unctens shown repros.nt th.,reanimum separaison d 7y and Noh syswm av and ess..ns
~
r d.ec.
p 2
,+
nes i To prov6de taunweranc., th. Ltstccs sLU rrey
?a g
-/ "' yn <
'Y -
- Y ietrr.
a3 LosIEccs
- /6 %
Q Fx/, _ o _SL' _Pi. ao...c i i,'.".P.
3 d
- d. mad. r dundar, por, manT*. d,imi wei 22, ecc a tx1+
RMu 3C_ ~l m
- s. nes.and usiv.c.uws am snown n,ans md = ih.
1
- o.
.m_,,
A or wth 23
-.e mad r n W
4 'MEoM W l4tw a load -
.- or.r.
--n.
3 3 wated vos m wated ups m, f-
_WP interort 8 it 3
o 2
_______4
--ssag inTw)y is 1.a. two or
- becamen 1
ii.
,noce
,-r mny high enue we low for we
- ww
@3
- 7. 44 c,onew.sene tre.ws'aasaf. 34*:
a4 stus in other from OTus in SMNUAL RIIR A t
5 y*
!E d****
O'h*'d*'5*n' CON ".
y tw== Dm. sir and MU normany Ngh outpur to wo low. Thre. or mor, ben A
inputs maimam a tugh cuipur..
, Press-e sor RMu Z
];
2 d** *id MP entrism P "'N T WN'
- CT W
Same equipment, as Div. I
" c"o "#c"os-os sy3g 8
C : " "' " ', g g p ME
[
Qt w w SURVEtLLANCE TEST m
a 8
a except no SLU is reqmred.
nypic.rk"b-
- f n,,,,n i,,,> {+""nuna.-> And
- *d (No ESF in Div. IV.)
_m :
-~ "*
=_
Div. IV : Div. I l
.. = - " a ag,,,,
i.
..................................g,...........................................................................s Div. II = Div. III cioss.,y:
DTM - Digital Trip Module Same equipment as Div. I.
=
esr engineereo satety reatures except ECCS trip outputs are:
PMCS - Performance Monitoring C ""a system
~ ilPCF B Same equipment as Div. I RMu - nema. uumexing unit
~ fjg }B except ECCS trip outputs are:
E : 7,'4,'"tj"'C,' 9'c una R
Y
-IIPCF L and LDS trip outputs are:
- RilR C
- RCIC isolation l_
and LDS trip outputs are:
L
- RIIR B isolation
-LUW isolation
-RIIR C isolation
- PCV isolation
' Figure 7A.2-1 SAFETY SYSTEM. LOGIC AND CONTROL (SSLC)
L.
I
ABBBEY1ADQM3 CRD a CONTROL ROD DRIVE HCU = HYORAutic CONTROL UNIT MSN = MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE MANUAL CONTROLS FROM RC&lS = ROD CONTROL & INFORM ATION SYSTEM OPERATOR CONTROL CONSOLE m
CRD PROCESSSENSOR HCus OR q_J TRIPLOGICSIGNALS 3 7 3 g3 g
NEUTRON Scram Pilot Valve MONITORING
?
PROCESSING 0FSAfETYl0Glc Solenoid Load Drivers SYSTEM TRIP OECISIONS REACTOR TRIP Actuators for Scram Air m
PROCESS Header Dump Valves RADIATION '
MONITORING
(
] Initiate Scram-Following(Control R SYSTEM DIRECT j
INPUTSIGNALS REACTOR QQl CONTAINMENT vv L.Q T
N' v
ISOLATION SYSTE MSIV Pilot Valve SAFETY SYSTEM
~
- "*'d'****"'
~~
NUCLEAR LOGIC AND CONTROL BOILER SYSTEM typical for one of four divisions PCV isolation Valves gygygpggygg ENGINEERED
' INPUTSIGNALS EMERGENCY SAFETY FEA TURES CORE C00uNG FINAL CONTROL ELEMENTS OF LEAK
?
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES DETECHON AND s
ACTUADON SYSTEM ISOLATION SYSTEM TRIP, INITIATION, OR STATUS OUTPUTS 2
TO CONTROI. LOGIC OF INTERFACING EMERGENCY SYSTEMS
+
CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 1 f1 P1 f Interdivisional Signal Transfer AU UR SF d
Coi cidence Logic l
1 f SUPPRESSION POOL kDDIrienAs. /LE3#*es3E 7e TEMPERATURE '
d MONITORING SYSTEM CONTROL LOGIC OF NON-SAFETY-RELATED CONTROL
/)f3Eg, 7,1,2.,t
[ yfyw,y g.,
l AND INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS Ol/tECT detttpWIAZD 1AlfUT3
/WTo 55 g c,
- ~jgyj 3 possA g
3*4C acM.
Figure 3.4a Safety System LOGIC and Control (SSLC) Interface Diagram
KANu2L s:tNUAL ew. tr err. in ow. a DeV. t 1 ov Vrrr.L sc isoy vrrat Ac Hardwired Outputs ISOLATION TRIP MANUAL
-h SCRAM WAMUAL MULTIPLEXEO tNPUT (not multiplexed) y ppg scRau C TO ANNUNC!ATORS. -
DATA INTERF ACE 4
-+
OUTPUT a
A e
l DtSPLAYS OR hVn DTus
'uNir j
PROCESS COMPUTER n rury TLu.
e b
, SENSORS T
ff
'D g
non-pP c
d nMU CMU UTM TLU d
} UN
.T_,
7 s
ppSySpy 374 LE l2/4l pp
=
pp 4 - t 7 -o*
g I aP uP 1
m output y
tooic U
I l OfVfSION-OF-SENSORS I DwlSIONCUTCF.SERVCE I P[O RA M
O i
i I
eVPASS CONTROL l SVPASS CONTROL l
non-pP VALVE VALVE i
1-MULTIPLEXED OUTPUT SOLENotDS SOLENOfDS l l DATA INTERFACE g
TRIPS To To usiv Petot i
8 orY n m sw..
i YALVE SOLENOIC SENSORS I l g
3 y p
toad DiaVERs
' I HMU *~*
I DTM i+
SLU 1 CMU RMU
--tn5-- -o- =P
- ~ - '
ESF f 2/4
+--+
+----*
W uP uP T:tps ow. n - -
- %f I SENSORS-l FROM Ow m g
DTME DfV IV " "
I CMU RMU j.
HARDWHED INPUTS h
]
up
- P M
{
. CONTROL OUTPUTS l
TO ACTUATING e---__-
-l,
TRIPS TO DEvacES Dw nra sLus
.nTERtocg mPuis y
FRou tmT swic4s OR ucccoNTActs OTM 4+
SLU 3 CMU RMU T
~*
0 ESF 2
=
+---+
+----+
2/4 IL uP uP 4 -.-
y 1L 6 TRIPS DIV H - - -"' "$y rRoM om m -
DATA ACQUISITION OTW Su rv "
-** slo 4 CMU RMU Z EMS 2/4
+ - - - - +
4_
uP uP 4,,_,,,_
,p t.
t i
m m i
SENSOR TRIP DECISON SYSTEM TRIP DECISON CONTROL OUTPUTS SSLC EMS
>< m
- 1. EMS ARRANGEMENT SHOWN IS A SIMPLIFIED S. - - - - -em. FIBER OPTC CABLE EXAMPLE FOR ONE DIVISION. ACTUAL QUANTITY m.
METEC OR FEER OPTC CA&E AND NTERCONNECTONS OF PMUs AND CMUs W!LL BE DETERMINED WITHN SCOPE OF EMS DESON.
- 4. ARBREYLATIONS
[OMMOA/ML /f 63/*PJ36 7'*O THERE ARE NO SLUs.CMUs.OR RMUs b DIV. lv.
CMU CONTROL ROOM MULTFLEXNG UNIT MSIV. MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE h$fd N 2 d,'2,. "[ JNMN 6-OTM - DGITAL TRIP MODULE RMU - REMOTE MULTIPLEXtNG UNIT
- 2. NOT SHOWN FOR SSLC:
EMS + ESSENTIAL MULTIPLEX 1NG SYSTEM RPS - REACTOR PROTECTON SYSTEM A
P TS SS M R
- 8. CON &^wTC7NPuTS.
SLU. SAFETY SYSTEM LOGC UNIT D//f.E"c7 NArt.0w/MO /A/PC /erro ESF - ENGINE R D SAFETY FEATURES p
E.' M SPRC)C
'C SOR '
3 SI C * (( b/4 6 [M89N h b M C M e C. NPUTS FROM OTHER INTERFACING SYSTEMS
. Figure 3.4b SAFETY SYSTEM LOGIC & CONTROL BLOCK DIAGRAM,
.a -
" d ABWR ummar Standard Plant no n 7A.7 RESPONSES TO SUBSECTIONS 7A.5 &
generally found to be not applicable to the 7A.6; COMPUTER llARDWARE AND SO!TWARE BWR/ABWR reactor design philosophy.
Items 7A 5(11 and 7A.5(2):
The NUREG discusses a " core protection calculator system (CPCS)* which is designed to Criteria and guide 1ines stated in provide reactor protection for two conditions: (1)
ANSI /IEEE.ANS-7.4.3.2, as endorsed by Regulatory low local departure from nucleate boiling ratio Guide 1.152, have been used as a basis for design (DNBR), and (2) high local linear power density.
procedures established for programmable digital equipment.
For condition (1), "DNBR* is associated with PWRs and is not applicable to BWRs. For condition i
All programmable digital equipment utilized for (2), power density is determined via the neutron safety-related functions are qualified in accordance monitoring system (NMS), similar to methods used with safety criteria and with the safety system design in operating BWRs. (See Subsection 7.6.1.1 for basis with which they interface.
discussion of the NMS.)
/~O A structured, engineered approach to the The ABWR design of the reactor protection development of both hardware and software is system utilizes microprocessor technology for logic implemented to assure tlw the design proceeds decisions based on analog input from various along the lines of the requir nent specifications and sensors. This philosophy is much the same as that of has traceable documentation.
GESSAR II and the Clinton BWR, except in those l
designs, solid-state CMOS accepted digital signais l
Verification and validation (V&V) includes the from analog trip modules (ATM). In the ABWR establishment of test and evaluation criteria. the design, the microprocessors perform the functions of development of test and evaluation procedures, the both the CMOS and the ATM.
testing of the integrated hardware and software, and the installation of the hardware and software in the The important distinction is that the ABWR uses a l
field.
modern form of digital computer device (i.e.,
microprocessors) for the same reasons relays and in accordance with the step-by-step verification solid-state devices were used in earlier designs (i.e.,
process, design reviews are performed at the system making simple logic decisions); not for making functional and performance requirements complex calculations for which protective action is specification / task analysis and allocation of functions dependent.
level, the hardware design and the software design level, the test and evaluation criteria and procedures Items 7A.5(4) and 7A.6(4):
level, and the personnel requirements and operating / maintenance plan level. Such reviews are The guidelines of NUREG-0493 have been used conducted by knowledgeable and experienced system to perform analysis of several possible different engineers, software engineers, hardware engineers, configurations of the safety system logic and control gy etc., who are not directly responsible for the design, (SSLC) network. Analyses have been performed at but who may be from the same organization.
the system design level to assure adequate defense-in-depth and/or diversity principles were Figure 7A.7-1 illustrates the structure utilized for incorporated at acceptable cost. It is recognized that ABWR control and instrumentation system design such requirements are in addition to positions on which incorporates subject guidelines.
safety-related protection systems (such as the single failure criterion) taken previously in other Regulatory Guides.
Items 7A.5(3) ana 7A.6(2):
In order to reduce plant construction costs and NUREG-0308, " Safety Evaluation Report -
simplify maintenance operation, the ABWR Arkansas Nuclear 1, Unit 2' was reviewed and protection sytems are designed with a " shared Seff-!cii ~ SN$N' W%u / -f$4s
=
y 4 n a,L n w -
^~=
s.L nm, m mwh ;.d J& f A y
k k nies & w g44J h Chu /E shids.
- 55AwSE ra BFSM 72.T4 2-r Standard Plant nev n Output Voltage - 2 kV to 16.5 kV Polarity-positive Energy Storage Capacitor - 150 pF plus or minus 10%
Discharge Resistor - 150 ohms plus or minus 5%
Charging Resistor - 100 Megohms plus or minus 10%
Rise time of discharge current - 5 ns plus or minus 30% at 4 KV Operating Modes - (1) up to 20 discharges per second for approximately 5 seconds per test; (2) also single pulses with at least I see between succesive discharges.
Acceptance citerion shall be no misoperation during or after test.
QUDiTION 420.92 Tbc application of high technology semiconductor materials and related technologies to computing devices has resulted in high current densides in some portions of equipment used in non-nuclear applications. This type of equipment may be used for the ABWR.
Identify how these higher current densities, which can result in localized high heat spots, sill be considered in the design described by Section 7.0, (7)
RESPONSE 420.92 Computing devices used for ABWR instrumentation are designed to utilize the lowest power components available for the task. Technologies such as CMOS and low power Schottky, including high speed and advanced versions, will be the standard device types used for all functions, including the microprocessor. The emphasis is on low stress design; when these components are operated within their voltage and current ratings and at their specified clock frequency, no unusual heat stresses will occur within the semiconductor materials. As much as possible, all components shall be of the high reliability type or adequately screened and burned-in to ensure high reliability.
The only likely areas of high current density will be in the power semiconductors of solid-state load drivers.
The effects of these localized high spots will be mitigated by proper heat Mins and ventilation of the local area, following the component vendor's recommendations. High power devices will be physically separated as much as possible from lower power circuitry.
To ensure that adequate compensation for heat rise is incorporated into the design. a therrnal analysis will be performed at the circuit board, instrument and panel design stages / Convective cooling is assumed; coo fans, particularly for safety-related equipment, are not recommended for mounting within instruments or panels.
However, if fans are used to increase reliability of equipment located in high density panels or high temperature areas, no credit shall be taken for forced-air cooling in the thermal analyses. Since it is intended that all computerized instrumentation will be installed in the Main Control Room or in other areas with similar emironmental conditions, adequate HVAC will generally be available for proper heat transfer. In case ofloss of HVAC, the instrumentation is designed for operation to an ambient temperature of 122 degrees F (50 degrees C). Environmental qualification testing of safety-related equipment shall include adequate margin to e,ns',e that this condition can be met under extreme condidons. 7h h wy. M M a d
+
ZEEE-37.L SL S S 3.l5~.
wr$ ~ 'ElA 4 N fYksY ofha Esbbe)
Y 5
3,'l1&C designs shall meet the environmental criteria stated in the following ABWR requirements -
P documents listed in Section 1.13:
(1) BWR Requirements - Equipment EmironmentalInterface Data, (2) Emironmental Quality Requirements for Safety Grade Equipmen
, W w4 wLse A id e d peal f A Y O S A
p l'
5 *C (Z7 7) WA Amendment 9
~
A-oy hr$d&ifa diky W ~
)
Q Q w< den ftf_ J R ec y J; & ~ c h ri n ach~ q '
de-dm. -
l
/EsfoNSE To DFS&t 7.4.1.4 -1 i
i ABWR sununt sarery Analysis nepour i
l:i 4
(4)~ Manual operation of the relief vahes will cool the reactor and reduce its I
pressure at a controlled rate until reactor pressure becomes so it.w that HPCF system operation is discontinued.
(5) The RHR system will then be operated in the shutdown cooling mode using j
the RHR system heat exchanger in the reactor water circuit to bring the reactor to the cold low pressure condition.
l i
7.4.1.4.4 Remote Shutdown Capability Controls and instrumentation-Equipment, Panels, i
and Displays
'j (1) Main Control Room-Remote Shutdown Capability Interconnection Design Considerations Some of the existing systems used for normal reactor shutdown operations are also utilized in the remote shutdown capability to shut down the reactor from outside the main control room. The functions needed for remote shutdown control are provided with manual transfer devices which override controls from the main control room and transfer the controls to the remote shutdown control. Control and process sensor signals are interrupted by the transfer -
j devices at the hardwired, analog loop. Sensor signals which interface with the ;
j remote shutdown system are routed from the sensor, through the transfer-l devices on the remote shutdown panels, and then to the' multiplexing system l
remote multiplexing units (RMUs) for transmission to the main control room.
i Similag, control signals from the mam control room are routed from the RMUs, through the remote shutdown transfer devices, and then to the gjy d interfacing system equipment. Actuation of the transfer devices interrupts the
]
' 39b connection to the RMUs and transfen control to the remote shutdown system.
W; necessary power supply circuits are also transferred to other sources.
J/ f
- ,"f Remote shutdown controlis not possible without actuation of the transfer.
d 6M #
devices. Operation of the transfer devices causes an alarm in the main control g
,apom. The remote shutdown control panels are located outside the main bb pM
-Q il5bntrol room. Access to this point is administratively and procedunlly s
^
'l Tontrolled.
QS of $2SS V i
r
.fl,
. J ' Instrumentation and controls located on the remote shutdown control panels j
g t#
e shown in instrument and electrical diagram Figure 21.7.4-2a.
1
&~Y g J-La o
- 9;,7 hss t JLtd l p#EfpsJf,4 g
o 9 /
7.4-U
. Systems Required for Safe Shutdown
'7 fesr& T. OFSM. 7 2.2-t & 1.2.7-3 1
-Tier 2 Material to be added as Appendix 7B of SSAR Chapter 7 i
l 18.
Implementation Requirements for Hardware / Software Development
)
This section defines the requirements to be met by the haruware and software j
development implementation activities that are to be made available for review by the NRC. The hardware and software development-related acceptance criteria '
which are established through rule-making (refer to section SA, Instrumentation and Control, of the Tier 1 design certification material for the GE ABWR design) are defined such that there exists a direct correspondence between the acceptance'-
criteria entries and requirements imposed herein on those design activides whose results are to be made available for the NRC conformance reviews. Those l
3 requirements presented in Table 7B.1 which correspond to individual Tier 1 acceptance criteria are specifically identified. Therefore, satisfaction of those specific requirements shall result in full compliance with the Design Commitment -
g and the corresponding Acceptance Criteria presented in theTier 1 (rule-making),
design certification material established for Ins *rumentation and Control.
i i
.. j t
9 i
I I
l a
b b
i
-l i
i e
df
Tabie 78.1 Software Development A. Software Management Plan (Satisfaction of the requirements presented herein shall result in the creation of a Software Management Plan which is in full compliance with the Acceptance Criteria fbr Item 5 presented in Table 3.4 of the Tier 1 design certification material for the GE AIMR design.)
- 1. The Software Management Plan shall define:
a, the organization and responsibilities for development of the software design; the procedures to be used in the software development; the interrelationships between software design activities; and the methods for conducting software safety analyses.
Within the defined scope and content of the Software Management Plan, accepted methods and procedures for the above activities are presented in the following documents:
(i) 1EEE 730-1984, Standard for Software Quality. Assurance Plans, Section 3.4 (ii)
ASME NQA2a, Part 2.7, Quality Assurance Requirements of Computer Software for Nuclear Facility Application (iii)
ANSI /IEEE-ANS-7-4.3.2-1982, Application Criteria for Dicital Comnmen 6 S,G w syucms for Nuclear Facilitiesf(to be ppgjt t/o. 7 7J'2"greplaced by the issued version of P 7-4.3.2, " Standar Digital Computers Used in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power GenerationgSta 'nnst (iv)
IEC 880:11186, Software for computers in the safety systems of nuclear power stations, Section 3.1 (v)
IEEE (draft H)-1992 Standard for Software Safety Plans (vi)
IEEE 1012-1986, Standard for Sofiware Verification and Validation Plans, Section 3.5 (vii)
IEEE 830-1984, Guide to Software Requirements Specifications, Section 5 (viii) IEEE 1042-1987, Guide to Software Configuration Management Note that within the set of documents listed above, differences may exist regarding specific methods and criteria applicable to the Sofiware Management Plan. In situations where such differences exist, all of the methods and criteria presented within those documents are considered to be equally appropriate and valid and, therefore, any of the above listed documents may be selected as the basis for elements of the SMP.
l
- b. that the software safety analyses to be conducted for safety-related software applications shall:
(i) identify software requirements having safety-related implications
E 1
/. : -
-i s
)
i
)
1 (ii) document th identified safety-critical software requirements in j
the software requirements specification for the design (iii) incorporate in to the software design the safety-critical software i
functions specified in the software requirements specification -
(iv) identifyin the coding and test of the developed software, those software modules which are safety-critical (v) evaluate the performance of the developed safety-critical software i
modules when operated within the constraints imposed by the
{
established system requirements, software design, and computer.
i hardware requirements 1
~
(vi) evaluate software interfaces of safety-critical software modules.
}
(vii) perform equipment integration and validation testing that demonstrate that safety-related functions identified in the design input requirements are operational.
the software engineering process, which is composed of the following c.
liftycle phases:
(i)
Planning f
(ii)
Design Definition i
(iii) Software Design j
(iv) Software Coding (v)
Integration
]
(vi) Validation (vii) Change control 9
- d. the Planning phase design activities, which shall address the following _
l system design requirements and software development plans-i (i)
Software Management Plan (ii)
Software Configuration Management Plan 4
(iii) Verification and Validation Plan j
(iv) Equipment design requirements j
(v)
Safety analysis of design requirements (vi) disposition of design and/or documentation nonconformances
.i identified during this phase 5
the Design Definition phase design activities, which shall address the e.
development of the following implementing equipment design and
[
configuration requirements.
.t ii) equipment schematic i
(ii) equipment hardware and software performance specification
.j (iii) equipment user's manual
[
(iv) data communications protocol (v) safety analysis of the developed design definition
.j (vi) disposition of design and/or documentation nonconformances identified during this phase j
l
-6 h
(.:
f.
the Software Design phase, which shall address the design of the software architecture and program structure elements, and the definition of software module functions:
(i)
Software Design Specification (ii) safety analysis of the software design (iii) disposition of design and/or documentation nonconformances identified during this phase
- g. the Software Coding phase, which shall address the following software -
coding and testing activities ofindisidual software modules:
(i) software source code (ii) software module test reports (iii) safety analysis of the software coding (iv) disposition of nonconformances identified in this phase's design documentation and test results
- h. the Integration phase, which shall address the following equipment testing acthities that evaluates the performance of the software when installed in hardware prototypical of that defined in the Design Definition phase:
(i) integration test reports (ii) safety analysis of the integration test results (iii) disposition of nonconformances identified in this phase's design documentation and test results
- i. the Validation phase, which comprises the development and implementation of the following documented test plans and procedures:
i (i) validation test plans and procedures (ii) validation test reports (iii) description of avtested software j
(iv) safety analysis of the validation test results j
.(v) disposition of nonconformances identified in this phase's design documentation and test results l
(vi) software change control procedures, and j
1
- j. the Change Control phase, which begins with the completion of M
validation testing, and addresses changes to previously validated i
software and the implementation of the established software change control procedures.
1.I I
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B. Configuration Management Plan (Sadsfaction of the requirements presented herein shall result in the creation of a Software Management Plan which is in full compliance with the Acceptance Criteria for Item 6 presented in Table 3.4 of the Tier 1 design certification material for the GE ABWR design.)
- 1. The Configuration Management Plan shall define:
the specific product or system scope to which it is applicable, the a.
organizational responsibilities fbr software configuration management, and methods to be applied to:
(i) identify design interfaces (ii) produce software design documentation (iii) process changes to design interface documentation and software desien documentation (iv) process corrective actions to resolve deviations identified in g,. 7.1 T'3 software design and design documentation, including notification Ng to end user of errors discovered in software development tools or other software (v) mamtain status of d'esignTnterface documentation and developed software design documentation (vi) designate and control software revision status. Such methods shall require that software code listings present direct indication of the software code revision status Within the defined scope and content of the Configuration Management Plan, accepted methods and procedures for the above activities are presented in the fbilowing documents:
(i)
IEEE 1042-1987, Guide to Software Configuration Management (ii)
IEEE 828-1983, Standard for Software Configuration Management Plans (iii)
ANSI /IEEE-ANS-7-4.3.2-1982, Application Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems for Nuclear Facilities (to be replaced by the issued version of P 7-4.3.2, " Standard Criteria for Digital Computers Used in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Generation Stations")
(iv)
IEC 880-1986, Software for computers in the safety systems of nuclear power stations Note that within the set of documents listed above, differences may exist regarding specific methods and criteria applicable to the Configuration Management Plan. In situations that such differences exist, all of the methods and criteria presented within those documents are considered to be equally appropriate and valid and, therefore, any of the above listed documents may be selected as the basis for elements of the CMP.
- b. methods for, and the sequencing of, reviews to evaluate the compliance of software design activities with the requirements of the CMP.
- c. the configuration management of501s (such as compilers) and D
DF36 A fj,%'
sofnvare development procedures.
7,1. f -1 q d. methods for the dedication of commerical software for safety-related Qusage _
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- c. methods for tracking error rates during software development, such as 4
72 7'l the use of software metrics
)
- f. the methods for design record collection and retention.
C. Verification and Validation Plan (Satisfaction of the requirements presented herein shall result in the creation of a Verification and Validation Plan which is in full compliance witn the Acceptance Criteria for Item 7 presented in Table 3.4 of the Tier 1 design certification material for the GE ABWR design.)
- 1. The Verification and Validation Plan shall define:
- a. that baseline reviews of the software development process are to be conducted during each phase of the software development life cycle and the scope and methods to be used in the baseline reviews to evaluate the implemented design, design documentation, and compliance with the requirements of the Software Management Plan and Configuration Management Plan.
Within the defined scope and content of the Verification and Validation Plan, accepted methods and procedures for the above activities are presented in the following documents:
(i)
IEEE 1012-1986, Standard for Software Verification and Validation Plans 3
(ii)
ANSI /IEEE-ANS-7-4.3.2-1982, Application Criteria for Digital Computers in Safuy Systems for Nuclear Facilities (to be replaced by the issued version of P 7-4.3.2, " Standard Criteria for Digital Computers Used in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Generation Stations")
(iii)
IEC 880-1986, Software for computers in the safety systems of nuclear power stations Note that within the set of documents listed above, differences may exist regarding specific methods and criteria applicable to the Verification and Validation Plan. In situations that such differences exist, all of the methods and criteria presented within those documents are considered.
f
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4 to be equally appropriate and valid and, therefore, any of the above -
listed documents may be selected as the basis for elements of the V&VP.
- b. that verification shall be performed as a controlled and documented evaluation of the conformity of the developed design to the documented design requirements at each phase of baseline review.
[)f5EA M* -
that the use of commercial sofiware and commercial development tools c.
for safety-related applications is a controlled and documented
. $1 8 " 1 procedure
- d. that validation shall be performed through controlled and documented testing of the developed software that demonstrates compliance of the software with the software requirements specifications.
that for safety-related sofiware., verification reviews and validation testing c.
are to be conducted by personnel who are knowledgeable in the technologies and methods used in the design, but who did not develop the software design to be reviewed and tested.
f.
that for safety-related software, design verification reviews shall be conducted as part of the baseline reviews of the design material developed during the Planning through Integration phases of the software development life-cycle (as defined in Criterion 1b, above), and :
that validation ~ testing shall be conducted as part of the baseline review-of the Validation phase of the software development. life-cycle.
_ g. that validation testing shall be conducted per a documented test plan and procedure.
- h. that for non-safety-related software development, verification and validation shall be performed through design reviews. conducted as part of the baseline reviews completed at the end of the phases in the software development life cycle. These design reviews shall be performed by personnel knowledgeable in the technologies and -
methods used in the design development,
- i. the products which shall result from the baseline reviews conducted at each phase of the software development life-cycle; and that the defined _.
products of the baseline reviews and the V&V Plan shall be documented and maintained under configuration management.
- j. the methods for identification, closure, and documentation'of design and/or design documentation nonconformances.
'k.
that the software development is not complete until the specified verification and validation activities are complete and design documentation is consistent with the developed software.
~
4 s
t D. Completion of Software Development (Satisfaction of the requirements presented herein shall result in the documented completion of the software development proces3 which is in full compliance with the Acceptance Criteria for Item 8 presented in Table 3.4 of the Tier 1 design certification material for the GE AllWR design.)
Software development has been completed as defined in the SMP, CMP, and V&VP.
i 9
s b
i i
I f}lG ATTACHED SHEET 3 FfoM THE.
ZsC 0 ESI6 AJ C EA.71FICATI 0^) M ATEAJ!lL-a DESC&l8>ED/W N h1ArQLED To ILE FEK.Erice THE O FSEA. *MdBA-Fo/L WHtCH THE K2 5@NSE IS G l W /L/
l b
P i
e f
Y 4
- l
.i 4
- r
Table 3.4:
Instrumentation and Control Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria Hardware / Software Development 5.
A Software Management Plan (SMP)
- 5. The Software Management Plan shall be
- 5. The Software Management Plan shall shall be instituted which establishes reviewed.
define:
that software for embedded control hardware shall be developed, a.
the organization and responsibilities for designed, evaluated, and documented
. development of the software design; per a design development process that the procedures to be used in the addresses, for safety-related sof tware, software development; the software safety issues at each defined interrelationships between software phase of the software development.
desion activities; adthe methods foD conducting sortware safety analyses.
The SMP shall state that the output of
-that the software safety analyses to be b
.~
g each defined phase shall be b.
documents that define the current state conducted for safety-related software of that design phase and the design
)
applications shall:
input for the next design phase.
(i) identify software requirements j
having safety-related implications (ii) document the identified safety-critical software requirements in f'l the software requirements D gg. N ' 41, specification for the design (iii) incorporate in to the software design the safety-critical software functions specified in the software I
requirements specification (iv) identify in the coding and test of the developed software, those software modules which are safety-critical (v) evaluate the performance of the I
developed safety-critical sof tware modules when operated within the 5
t m
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.~.4
..,_..s
Tabla 3.4:
Instrumentation and Control Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria Hardware / Software Development
- 5. (continued) 5.
(continued) 5.
- b. (continued) constraints imposed by the established system requirements, software design, and computer hardware requirements (vi) evaluate software intedaces of o ppj DF 5#-
s fety-critical software modules (vii) perform equipment integration and validation testing that demonstrate that safety-related functions identified in the design input requirements are
]
c.
the software engineering process, which is composed of the following life-cycle phases:
(i)
Planning (ii) Design Definition (iii) Software Design (iv) Software Coding (v) Integration (vi) Validation (vii) Change control
- d. the Planning phase design activities, which shali address the following system des.gn requirements and software development plans:
Table 3.4:
Instrumentation and Control Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria Hardware / Software Development 6.
A Configuration Management Plan (CMP)
- 6. The Configuration Management Plan shall
- 6. The Configuration Management Plan shall shall be instituted which establishes the be reviewed.
define:
methods for maintaining, throughout the sof tware design process, the design a.
the specific product or system scope to documentation, procedures, evaluated which it is applicab!e.
software, and the resultant as-installed software.
- b. the organizational responsibilities for software configuration management.
c.
methods to be applied to:
(i) identify design interfaces (ii) produce software design documentation (iii) process changes to design interface documentation and software design documentation I
(iv) process corrective actions to resolve deviations identified in l
software design and design t
documentation, including p g/[. flo' 2* ~g,3 notification to end user of errors -
discovered in software l
development tools or other I
software ~
(v) maintaTn status of design interface documentation and developed software design documentation l
Tcbla 3.4:
Instrum::ntrtion end Control
. Inspections, Tests, Analyses _ and--Acceptance Criteria w
Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria Hardware / Software Development
- 6. (continued) -
6.
(continued)
- 6. c. (continued)
(vi) designate and control software revision et$as. Such methods shit require tl 3t software code i
iistings present c1irect indication of the software cod 1 revision status.
'~
- d. methods for, and the wquencing of, reviews to evaluate the compliance of ~
software design activities with the requirements of the CMP.
k the configuration management of tools)
(such as compilers) and software -
p pSE/L ll*. 1.L 1-L ^,
development procedures.
l f.
methods for the dedication of I:
commercial software for safety-related usage.
)
methods for tracking error rates dun Opygft 4,1,1,g-j -
software development, such as the use j of software metrics
- h. the methods for design record collection and retention.
wy v"we,"w 9pC4-h-Vgw-9-Ep-rww
-gi34 w gV w-g%tw
a Tcblo 3.4:..instrum:ntation cnd Control Inspections,' Tests, Analyses'. and Acceptance Criteria Design' Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance _ Criteria Hardware / Software Development
~
- 7. ' A Verification and Validation Plan (V&VP) 7.
The Verification and Validation Plan shall be
- 7. The Verification and Validation Plan shall!
shall be developed which establishes that reviewed.
define:
' developed software shall be subjected to structured and documented verification a.
that baseline reviews of the software reviews and validation testing, including development process are to be.
testing of the software integrated into the conducted during each phase of the -
target hardware.
- software development life cycle.
- b. the scope and methods to be used in the baseline reviews to evaluate the
. implemented design, design documentation, and compliance with.
the requirements of the Software Management Plan and Configuration -
Management Plan.
c.
the requirements for use of commercial i
software and commercial development D I g M* Ng tools for safety-related applications and.
that such use is a controlled and documented procedure-
- d. that verification shall be performed as a controlled and documented evaluation of the conformity of the developed design to the documented design requirements at each phase of baseline review.
i
... ~....
Table 3.4:
Instrumentation and Control inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria Electromagnetic Compatibility 9.
(continued) 9.
(continued) 9.
(continued)
- d. Test results that show the component or system is qualified for its application and remains qualified after being subjected to the range of normal and abnormal test conditions specified above.
The plan establishes separate test regimes for each element of EMC, using the following approaches:
a.
EMI and RFI Protection. An EMC compliance plan for each component or system identified in the design commitment includes tests to ensure that equipment performs its functions in the presence of the specified EMI/RFI electrical noise environment, including the low range of the EMI spectrum, without equipment damage, spurious actuation, or inhibition of functions.
As part of the pre-operational test program, the EMC compliance plan calls for each system to be subjected to f
EMl/RFI testing. Tests cover potential EMI and RFI susceptibility over four l
different paths:
(1) Power feed lines (2) Input signallines pF55^ g,,,7 7g (3) Output signal lines l
(4) Radiation
}
Tablo 3.4:
Instrumentation and Control inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria Electromagnetic Compatibility 9.
(continued) 9.
(continued) 9.
(continued)
The test program includes sensitivity of)
I components identified in the design p 7g,/L Alo. 7. f. l.17-1 commitment to radiation trom plant communication transmitters and
( receivers b.
ESD Protection. An EMC compliance plan for each component or system identified in the design commitment includes tests to ensure that equipment performs its functions in the presence of the specified ESD environment without equipment damage, spurious actuation, or l
inhibition of functions.
The plan is structured on the basis that ESD protection is confirmed by factory tests that determine the susceptibility of instrumentation and control equipment to electrostatic discharges.
The EMC compliance plan includes standards, conventions, design considerations, and test procedures to ensure ESD protection of the plant instrumentation and con:rol equipment.
The plan requires test documentation confirming that, for each component tested, the following conditions have been met:
l
._