ML20035D412
| ML20035D412 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 02/19/1993 |
| From: | Hirsch D, Leventhal P COMMITTEE TO BRIDGE THE GAP, NUCLEAR CONTROL INSTITUTE |
| To: | Selin I, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20035C639 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9304130187 | |
| Download: ML20035D412 (3) | |
Text
I l
..?
/ry
/
s
-m
~
m Nt' CLEAR CONTROL fiM INSTITITE F'
W C,' O c -: w il l
toco(owicncn wi Ns wm 6, 4 CHI % TON DE 200% 202922%+, Fu20>h MN CCC C f?
i/
hVA
<./
-g,
\\f l D O, -
Q February 19,1993 Commissioner Ivan Selin Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington. D.C. 20555 Request to Reonen Petition for Rulemakinc and Reauest for Action
Dear Chairman Selin:
We are writing to you with regard to the recent breach of security at Three Mile Island-l on February 7,1993 and to urge that the Commission take appropriate action to upgrade security and evaluate safety systems at nuclear power plants in order to avoid or to mitigate the radiological consequences of more serious incidents in the future.
Concern over the possibility of vehicular intrusions was a major factor prompting the Nuclear Control Institute and the Committee to Bridge the Gap to submit a Petition for Rulemaking on January 11,1991 (PRM-73-9) (Tab A), seeking an upgrade of the design basis tnreat for radiological sabotage of nuclear reactors. That petition was denied on June
- 11. 1991 (56 Fed. Reg. 26782) (Tab B). Continuing to believe that some meaningful action was needed. we subsequently filed a Request for Action pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Section 2.206 on September 4,1991, supplemented on September 20,1991, seeking an Individual Plant Examination (IPE) program requiring nuclear power plant licensees to evaluate their plants' ability to withstand safeguards events beyond the design basis (Tab C). On December 31,1991, that Request also was denied (DD-91-08) (Tab D).
We believe that the TM1 intrusion demonstrates (1) the danger of continuing to assume that serious threats-such as those that might be initiated by a well-organized and well-armed group-can be identified in advance and (2) the wisdom of undertaking the upgrade and evaluation initiatives we have requested.
@g Rather than rely on advance warning, the NRC should seek to prevent future JgQ breaches of security at potential targets by increasing protection requirements. These have h@
not been upgraded since the 1970s. We regard as inadequate the current regulations that require protection against no more than three external attackers, on foot, acting as a single team and employing no more than hand-held weapons. At the same time, we stress that g
attacks by deranged and fanatical individuals can be deadly and can come entirely without oc warning---as the recent attack at the entrance to CIA headquarters and the 1983 truck E
bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut amply illustrate.
e OE t')Q 5trateprsfor stopping abr spread a=nd rarrnng tbr gmud of nudear arsvu O*D.tk Paul L Incruhd Prmim. Peter A. liradford. Dmd Cohen. Vntor GAnk. Denn A Hayet Juhan Koen.p Shuon Tanzer. Roger Ruhrer. Dr. Throhte b L 1or 3
BO ARD OF DIRLC10R5
t Further, rather than assume the adequacy of present safety systems, the NRC should obtain the individual plant examinations needed to determine whether these systems must be upgraded to withstand the explosive force of a successful vehicle-bomb attack without major radiological releases. Because of differences in design, the ability of these systems to withstand such a shock varies from plant to plant. The TMI incident is proof positive that the possibility of vehicular intrusion at nuclear power plants is not merely hypothetical and that the NRC frankly does not know what the consequences would have been had the vehicle that crashed into the plant been laden with explosives. The possibility of vehicular intrusion and the potential consequences of a successful attack must now be dealt with in a i
vigorous and forthright fashion.
1 We thus request that the Commission take formal action to reopen proceedings both under the Petition for Rulemaking and the Request for Action cited above and that it i
reconsider its prior rulings in these matters.
In addition, we urge you to ensure that the Commission conduct a vigorous inquiry into the TMI intrusion. The NRC investigation, as described in the Commission's February i
l 9 press release. omits at least two important questions: (1) What would the consequences have been for the plant if the car that struck it had been a vehicle bomb? (2) Why was the plant not shut down during the incident, given the initial uncertainty as to whether the vehicle contained a bomb and the serious damage the intruder might have caused inside the plant during the four hours before he was apprehended?
[
The apparent lack of adequate security at nuclear power plants against vehicular intrusion and the potential vulnerability of their safety systems to vehicle bombs must be addressed credibly if you are to ensure public health and safety and to build public i
confidence in the nuclear power industry. We urge you to respond favorably to our request to reopen the proceedings and reconsider the earlier determinations in these matters. The TMl incident is a wake-up call and provides you an opportunity to act before tragedy i
strikes.
We would appreciate a prompt response to this request.
l Sincerely, l
J
/
l Paul Leventhal Daniel Hirsch President President Nuclear Control Institute Committee to Bridge the Gap Attachments l
cc: See next page.
l i
i l
cc:
Senator John Glenn Chairman, Committee on Governmental Affairs Senator Joseph Lieberman Chairman, Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation Senator John Kerry Chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and Internationa! Operations Representative George hiiller Chairman, Committee on Natural Resources Representative Richard Lehman Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and hiineral Resources Representative John Dingell Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce Representative Philip Sharp Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Power Representative Edward hiarkey Chairman, Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance Representative hiike Synar Chairman, Subcommittee on Environment, Energy and Natural Resources Vice-President Albert Gore, Jr.
Daniel Poneman National Security Council Robert Gallucci Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-hiilitary Affairs Ashton Carter Assistant Secretary of Defense-Designate for Nuclear Security and Counter Proliferation Edward Fei Director, Office of Non-Proliferation Policy, Department of Energy
OC s
o\\p V
4
(.2
,g RECDVED Before the UNITED STATES NUCLEAR y
Rockville, Maryland 20555 C
'IMi 11 1991 REGULATORY COMMISSION
.J 1
Othcc ci the e
Secre18ry p,
In the Matter of
)
(
)
\\.S T
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 10 C.F.R.
)
DOCKET NO.
j PART 73 (Upgrading The Design
)
i Basis Threat For Radiological
)
4p Sabotage Of Nuclear Reactors)
)
S,
)
/ T PETITION FOR RULEMAKING AND REOUEST FOR EMERGENCY ACTION J
Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. I 553(e) and 10 C.F.R. 5 2.801, the Nuclear Control Institute ("NCI") and the Committee to Bridge the Gap ("CBG") petition the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Corsission (the "Corsission") to amend its regulations at 10 C.F.R.
I 73.1 to upgrade the " design basis threat" for radiological sabotage of I
nuclear reactors, that is, to redefine the potential threat against which reactors must be prepared to defend, and to provide concomitant enhanced protective measures of power plant security under 10 C.F.R. Part 73.
More specifically, Petitioners seek a revision of the threat assessment to include (a) explosives-laden surface vehicles (" truck and boat bombs")' and (b) a larger number of attackers using more sophisticated weapons than presently contemplated.
Current trends in terrorism indicate that the present design basis threat is not realistic.
A terrorist attack which
'There is also a potential threat from an airplane bomb, but the complexities involved in establishing protection against such a threat are such that Petitioners do not seek its inclusion in the threat definition at this tize.
$Ap A nd thW "..pU PC- /..
l l
l
' overwhelmed plant defenses could not only wreck a billion dollar facility but also cause the release of radioactivity comparable to that in a severe nuclear accident, causing thousands of l
fatalities, tens of thousands of latent cancers and genetic effects, and billions of dollars in property damage.
Increased threats, however, can be countered by measures which can be 1
implemented for very modest cost but which will protect against events with such potentially catastrophic consequences.
The requested action is therefore necessary under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
5 201i, et Eeg. (the "Act"),
to assure the common defense and security and protect the health and safety of the public by deterring attacks on nuclear reactors I
and reducing their consequences.
Petitioners urge the Commission to adopt the requested measures on an expedited basis.
Because of the imminent possibility of war with Iraq and the risk that President Saddam Hussein might be prepared to unleash terrorist attacks against domestic U.S.
targets, Petitioners also request the Commission to take immediate action to ensure that existing licensee contingency plans for truck bombs are fully and promptly implemented.
All such plans should be operational not later than January 15, 1991.
Thereafter, they should promptly be reviewed by the Commission for adequacy and upgraded as necessary.
I.
The Interests of Petitioners i
NCI is a non-profit corporation, organized and existing under the laws of the District of Columbia, with its principal i
S
_3_
place of business at 1000 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.,
Suite 704, Washington, D.C.
20036.
NCI is an independent policy research center that was established in 1981 to monitor nuclear programs in the United States and other countries.
It develops strategies for preventing the spread and reversing the growth of nuclear armaments.
In particular, it seeks to increase understanding by policymakers and the public of risks associated with introducing into civilian nuclear programs the materials essential to building nuclear weapons.
Also, NCI explores approaches to reducing the existing nuclear arsenals that are helpful to prevention of nuclear proliferation and terrorism.
In 1985, r
along with the State University of New York Institute for Studies l
in International Terrorism, NCI sponsored a multi-disciplinary, internationally-attended Conference on nuclear terrorism and thereafter created an International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, comprised of 26 experts.from nine countries.
These initiatives resulted in two books:
Leventhal and Alexander, eds., Nuclear Terrorism: Definino the Threat (Pergamon, 1986) (hereinaf ter " Nuclear Terrorism"), and Leventhal and Alexander, eds., Preventino Nuclear Terrorism (Lexington, 1987) (hereinafter "Preventino Nuclear Terrorism").
Among other matters, the 150 participants in the Conference and the 26 Task Force rembers identified deficiencies and urged improvement in protections against sabotage at nuclear facilities.
CBG is a non-profit corporation, organized and existing under the laws of the State of California, with its principal
\\
i i
i 1
i i
-4 I
i i
place of business at 1637 Butler Avenue, Suite 203, Los Angeles, 3
California 90025.
CBG engages in public policy advocacy and l
l research, and it is particularly concerned with nuclear safety j
and the threat of nuclear terrorism.
As an intervenor in a i
Commission proceeding (Docket No. 50-142), CBG successfully challenged the relicensing of one reactor based in part on i
weaknesses in site security.
As one result of CBG's efforts to l
enhance security, barriers to vehicular access were temporarily t
l installed at the site during a period of particular tension.
CBG i
has continued to seek' improve =ents in reactor safety and l
security, including, in particular, the elimination of unnecessary use of weapons-grade reactor fuel.
Both Petitioners have the strongest interest in seeking to ensure that nuclear facilities are adequately protected against terrorist threats.
Because of their prior activities and expertise, they believe that they can be of substantial l
3 assistance to the Commission in formulating rules to address such threats.
II.
. Basis For The Recuest A.
The Current Reculatory Recite The Commission's current regulations related to radiological sabotage of nuclear facilities are set forth at 10 C.F.R. Part 73.
10 C.F.R. 5 73.1 establishes the " design basis threat" and, as interpreted by the Commission, provides, inter alia, that nuclear reactors need not protect against radiological sabotage attempts by (i) a group or individual using weapons of greater k'
.,_,,.,m
l I
l sophistication than hand-held automatic weapons or explosives, l
thus excluding attack by explosives-laden vehicles, or (ii) more than three (3) external attackers or attackers capable of l
operating as more than one team, i.e.,
capable of e= ploying i
" effective team maneuvering tactics."
10 C.F.R. 5 73.1(a) (1),
i See cenerally Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-82-19, 16 NRC 53 (1982).
10 C.F.R. 5 73.1 was adopted in 1979, prior to terrorist incidents which have demonstrated the ability and willingness of terrorists i
to mount sophisticated attacks capable of causing substantial
)
physical destruction, in particular through the use of. truck l
bombs.
The ongoing Persian Gulf crisis has produced indications that Iraq may seek to generate terrorist incidents in the United States either prior to or in the event of war in the Middle East.
- See, e.c.,
Wall Street Journal, August 20, 1990, at 1; New York Tires, September 14, 1 9 9,0, at A10; Washinoton Post, January 9, 1991, at A14.
This immediate threat, coupled with the growth of State-sponsored terrorism and changes in terrorist tactics, indicates that the current regulatory standards, which exclude the truck bomb threat and sophisticated, large group attacks supported by substantial firepower, are neither realistic nor a sufficient guarantor of the public health and safety and the common defense and security under the Act.
Petitioners submit that Congressman Gejdenson, then Chairman of the Subcommittee on General Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, was entirely correct when he noted 1
. in 1988 oversight hearings that " prudence and common sense" compel a fundamental upgrading of 10 C.F.R. 5 73.1 and related i
protective measures.
Eeg Statement of Congressman Sam Gejdenson 1
in Hearinas on the Threat of Sabotace and Terrorism to Commercial I
Nuclear Poverolants before the Subcommittee on General Oversicht and Investications of the House Committee on Interior and Insular i
Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (March 9, 1988) (hereinafter "Oversicht Hearinas").
B.
The Chancina Terrorist Threat Since the adoption of the Commission's current standards for I
protection against radiological sabotage of nuclear reactors, the i
terrorist threat has changed in three important ways:
it is bloodier; it is more cophisticated and better-armed; and it is j
often State-supported.2 Because the nature of the threat has changed, it is incumbent on the Commission to revise its regulations to meet the potentially more severe challenges of the 1990s.
When the Commission proposed the current design basis threat, it indicated that it knew of no groups "having the 2The Commission's regulations exempt licensees from protecting against "the effects of attacks and destructive acts, including 4
sabotage, directed against the facility by an enemy of the United States, whether a foreign government or other persons.
" 10 C.F.R. 5 50.13.
- However, Petitioners understand that the Commission does not consider this exclusion to extend to terrorist groups which operate independently, even though they may have strong links to and the support of foreign governments.
As the Commission Chairman testified in 1988, the exclusion only applies to "a foreign government or other foreign entity engaging in a hostile attack against the United States." statement of Lando Zech in Oversicht Hearinas at 16.
- ~
. combination of motivation, skill, and resources to attack either a fuel facility or nuclear power reactor," 42 Fed. Pec. 10836, col. 3 (February 24, 1977), and it considered that moral and political restraints militated against terrorists taking a large number of lives.
See Hirsch, Murphy and Ramberg, " Nuclear Terrorism:
A Growing Threat", presented to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, May 7, 1985, at 14.3 These premises are no longer valid.
Whereas in the early 1970s terrorists concentrated attacks on property, in the 1980s they directed half their attacks against people.
The result has been a substantial increase of incidents with fatalities, from approximately 20 per year in the late 1960s to more than three times that number today, while the annual number of fatalities has likewise risen correspondingly, from 10-20 in 1968 to 200-700 annually in the 1980s.
Eee Testimony of Daniel Hirsch in oversicht Hearinas at 51-52.
The psychological restraints against terrorists killing hundreds or even thousands of people have eroded substantially.
Eeg cenerally Jerrold Post,
" Prospects For Nuclear Terrorism:
Psychological Motivations and Constraints", in Preventina Nuclear Terrorism at 91-103.
Finally, heightened security implemented to prevent such typical 3The Commission also stated that the " defense in depth" concept of nuclear reactor design "make[s]
the releasing of radioactivity by acts of sabotage difficult" and that the consequences of sabotage would be less severe than the " successful detonation of an illicit explosive device." 42 Fed. Rec. at 10836, col.
3.
As discussed infra in Section C, these considerations do not appear valid today in the judgment of the Commission's own staff and outside experts.
. terrorist operations as hijackings and embassy takeovers, and diminishing public reaction to these events, may force terrorist groups to more dramatic and more deadly attacks.
deLeon and Hoffman, The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism:
A Peexamination 12-13 l
(Rand, January, 1988).
At the same time, the level of terrorist sophistication and firepower has risen substantially.
Terrorist groups have acquired sizable conventional military arsenals, including anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, rocket launchers and truck-mounted flame throwers.
The hijacking of the Achille Lauro and the mid-air destruction of the Air India and Pan Am airliners demonstrate not only logistical and technical expertise, but cold-blooded resolve as well.
Egg cenerally Office of the Vice President, Terrorist Group Profiles (November, 1988).
Finally, the increased growth and bloodiness of terrorism are due in no small measure to the increased financial, technical, logistical and intelligence support provided by naticnal governments.
The rise of State-sponsored terrorism is well-documented.
Een Office of the Vice President, Terrorist Group Profiles (Novehber, 1988).
Eeg also Eugene Mastrangelo,
" Terrorist Activities By Region", in Preventino Nuclear Terrorism at 134, 141-142.
The Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism indeed recently reported a 170 percent increase in the number of State-sponsored incidents in just one year -- from 70 attacks in 1986 to 189 the following year.
See Office of the Vice President, Terrorist Group Profiles, supra, at lii.
What is
-9 particularly ominous, moreover, is its incipient focus on nuclear power plants as an object of attack.'
For example, on June 9, 1987, according to an Associated Press report on a Radio Teheran 1
broadcast monitored in Nicosia, the Iranian government responded to the possibility of U.S.
strikes against its Silkworm missile batteries by warning that "U.S.
centers and nuclear reactors can be more vulnerable than the missile bases of the Islamic Republic of Iran."
Sgg " Iran-US", AP-WX-06-10-87 1006 EDT, reorinted in Oversicht Hearinos at 236.
Egg also NCI correspondence with the Commission and the National Security Council concerning this report, reorinted in Oversicht Hearinos at 97-106.
Currently, U.S.
counterterrorism officials are preparing for the possibility of terrorist bombings of domestic U.S. targets in the event of a var in the Persian Gulf.
James Schlesinger, a former defense secretary and director of central intelligence, has warned that "there may be a number of intermittent attacks in this country."
Wall Street Journal, January 8, 1991, at A4.
The Abu Nidal i
organization and the Palestine Liberation Front, named as credible potential threats to U.S.
nuclear facilities in a 1986 Rand Corporation report, are viewed now as the most likely terrorist perpetrators of an attack in the U.S..
See Hoffman and deLeon, A Reassessment of Potential Adversaries to U.S.
Nuclear
'A 1988 Rand Corporation study reports that State-sponsorship could provide the wherewithal "for ambitious acts of nuclear terrorism."
deLeon and Hof fman, The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism:
A Reexamination 12 (Rand, January, 1988).
Procrans 24 (Rand, March, 1986); Wall Street Journal, January 8, 1991, at A4.5 The combination of these developments makes nuclear terrorism a far more likely prospect today than it was ten years ago.6 Indeed, NCI's Task Force members unanimously concluded that "a reactor accident brought about by terrorists, even one releasing significant amounts of radioactivity, is by no means implausible and is technically feasible."
Nuclear Terrorism at 12.
C.
Uporadina The Desion Basis Threat To Anticipate A Vehicle Bonb Attack In view of the changes in the terrorist threat discussed above, Petitioners submit that it is essential to upgrade the i
design basis threat to protect against vehicle bomb attacks at nuclear reactors, particularly truck bombs.7 The use of truck SThere has already been at least one unconfirmed threat of an Iraqi-sponsored attack on a U.S. nuclear facility. Eeg Commission, Preliminary Notification of Threat or Unusual Occurrence,- PNO-I-90-108 (December 26, 1990) (noting asserted Iraqi bomb threat to the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant).
'It should also be noted that the number of " safeguards events" has been increasing in the late 1980s, a disturbing trend indicating that the thought of sabotage is in currency, if not actually realized yet.
Egg Commission, Safeguards Sumnary Event List (NUREG-0525, Rev.16) (December 31, 1989); Testimony of Daniel Hirsch in Oversicht Hearinos at 52 and Figures 5 and 6.
Hirsch noted that as of 1988 " safeguards events, including bomb hoaxes, I
[had] increased five-fold since the last revision to the design basis threat regulations.
Id.
IWhile this Petition focuses primarily on truck bombs, it is also essential to protect against boat bombs.
Many nuclear power plants are located adjacent to water and are thus at risk from attack by boat.
. l bombs has become a tactic of choice for terrorists.
The tactic is a grave threat to civilian power plants.
See cenerally Daniel Hirsch, "The Truck Bomb and Insider Threats To Nuclear Facilities", in Preventine Nuclear Terrorism at 207-222.
- Indeed, in Western Europe, nuclear power plants are protected against truck bombs by reinforced fences and walls.
Eee Rossnagel,
" Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Materials in the Federal Republic of Germany", in Preventina Nuclear Terrorism at 223-230.
Although the Commission has been aware of this threat at least since 1983, nonetheless it has not responded sufficiently to date.8 The devastating effects of truck bombs were more than demonstrated in Beirut in 1983.
Th'ere, in the space of approximately six months, truck bombs first killed 63 people at the U.S. Embassy on April 18, and then, on October 23, 241 marines at their barracks.
As early as 1984, the Commission staff recommended modification of the design basis threat to include the use of truck bombs by an adversary, noting, "The use of a vehicle bomb "While there has not been an identified international terrorist threat as yet against domestic licensed
- reactors, terrorists have been responsible for more than one-third of non-U.S.
reactor incidents in the period 1970-1984.
Hoffman and deLeon, A Peassessment of Potential Adversaries to U.S.
Nuclear Procram 9, Table 2 (Rand, March,1986). As was demonstrated by the arrest in 1988 of several individuals associated with the Syrian Socialist National Party while attempting to smuggle explosives into the United States, g_eg Oversicht Hearinas at 240, the e
existence of an undetected, international terrorist threat in the United States today is a possibility which cannot be discounted.
. against a nuclear facility is a feasible form of attack."
See j
i Memorandum from George W.
McCorkle to Robert F.
Burnett, " Semi-Annual Design Basis Threat Review No.
4," dated January 19, 1984, reprinted in Oversicht Hearinas at 189.
In fact, in early 1984, the Commission staff set out arguments for the Commission on the need to protect against vehicle-bomb attack that have never been refuted:
o
"[N]uclear activities.
might be a desirable target of a truck bomb due to the high visibility such an attack would receive.
It therefore seems prudent to be prepared to (i) recognize such a threat and (ii) to defend against it within the framework of the plant's physical security and safeguards contingency plans."
o Licensed reactors should be responsible for protecting against truck bombs despite the facts that (1) licensees are exempted from protecting against enemies of the United States and (2) most vehicle-bomb attacks have been of national origin, because "there is always the possibility that sub-national terrorists groups will pick up on this scenario.
This would be the licensee's responsibility."
o Despite the absence of a specific threat to a licensed commercial nuclear facility, "the
[ Commission] believes that the possibility of an attack by motor vehicle cannot be discounted and a prudent response is desirable for several reasons.
- First, vehicle bomb attacks have occurred recent1j overseas and have been successful.
Second terrorist groups have demonstrated a capability to export their acts of violence to other countries."
Commission Staff, "Q's and A's In Anticipation of Inquiries Regarding Notice on Potential Threat" (January / February, 1984).
i
. The vulnerability of licensed reactors to attack by explosives-laden vehicles was confir=ed in 1984 in a classified study prepared for the Commission by Sandia National Laboratories.
See Chapman and Bennett, " Analysis of Truck Bomb Threat for Nuclear Facilities" (February 21, 1984).
According to
)
an unclassified staff summary, this study concluded that ".
unacceptable damage to vital reactor systems could occur from a relatively small charge at close distances and also from larger but still reasonable size charges at large setback distances (greater than the protected area for most plants)."
Egg " Weekly I
Information Report to NRC Commissioners," April 20, 1984.
A peer review conducted for the Commission by the Naval Ordinance Laboratory found-that the Sandia report was " generally correct with a moderate level of conservatism in the consequence predictions."
See Memorandum for John G.
Davis from Robert F.
Burnett, " Truck Bomb Threat," dated August 14, 1984, reprinted in Oversicht Hearings at 195.
In short, the expert analysis prepared for the Commission itself more than six years ago showed the truck bomb threat to be extraordinarily severe.
The " unacceptable damage", noted by Sandia National Laboratories and potentially associated with a successful truck bomb attack, maximally means the meltdown of a nuclear reactor core, releasing massive amounts of radioactivity, comparable to what would occur in a severe accident.
The Commission has estimated, in the case of one reactor, that a severe accident could result in up to 130,000 acute fatalities, 300,000 latent
4
- 14 cancers, and 600,000 genetic effects, while necessitating off-site mitigation estimated to cost $35 billion.
See Commission, Supplerent to Draft Environmental Impact Statement, San Onofre Units 2 and 3 (NUREG-0490, January, 1981).
See cenerally Daniel i
Hirsch, "The Truck Bomb and Insider Threats to Nuclear Facilities", in Preventina Nuclear Terrorism at 206, 215-216.
l These conclusions were generally supported by NCI's experts in papers prepared for its Task Force.
In his paper, Gerald L.
Pollack, Professor of Physics at Michigan State University, described the possibilities of severe consequences, even after a
" scram", from damage caused by terrorists to multiple reactor j
systems -- possibilities which could well be associated with a truck bomb incident which destroyed a control room and some of the essential plumbing at a nuclear power plant.
Gerald Pollack,
" Severe Accidents and Terrorist Threats at Nuclear Reactors," in Preventina Nuclear Terrorism at 66-77.
Robert Mullen, a safeguards and security consultant, stressed that a truck bomb could precipitate off-site radiation releases.
Robert Mullen,
" Nuclear Violence," in Preventine Nuclear Terrorism at 240.
The NCI Task Force agreed that truck bombs "can cause sufficient damage to essential systems to lead possibly to radioactive releases in the event of a core melt."
Id. at 23.
The Task Force thus recommended:
" Power reactors should be protected against vehicular threats."
Id. at 22.
Its June, 1986 report states as follows:
i The size of exclusion zones at nuclear power reactor sites should be reexamined to ensure i
4
. that the zones are large enough to neutralize the possible catastrophic consequences of a truck bomb set off at the perimeter fence.
All reactor sites should be modified promptly with barriers to shield critical areas of the plant against potential consequences of truck bombs set off on-site.
This may require revising the design-basis threat to include protection against vehicular access -- a requirement not included in U.S.
licensing regulations.
14 The Commission's response to the recognized truck bomb threat has been wecfully deficient.
While a Commission 1984 survey of the Defense Department, the Secret Service, the State Department, and the Department of Energy found that "[ajll four agencies believe that the ' truck bomb' threat in the U.S.
is sufficient to promp't action" and had " implemented measures to counter the threat", ggs Commission, " Comparison of Agency Response to ' Truck Bomb' Threat in the U.S."
(May 9 1984),
reprinted in Oversicht Hearinas at 193, the Commission only determined at that time to study the issue and delay action.
Initial staff plans to ".
develop an immediately effective rule which revises the design basis threat for both radiological sabotage and theft to include the introduction by an adversary of explosives and other equipment by vehicle on to a facility," ggg Memorandum from Robert F. Burnett to George W. McCorkle, dated January 27, 1984, reorinted in Oversicht Hearinas at 190, were shelved in April, 1984, when Burnett instructed his staff "to defer action pending the results of research initiated to this general subject."
Egg Memorandum from Robert F. Burnett to
. George W.
McCorkle, " Design Basis Threat", dated April 26, 1984, reprinted in Oversicht Hearinos at 192.
The Commission met in 1985 to consider SECY-85-24,
" Consideration of Modification of NRC Design Basis Threat I
Statement," and, in 1986, it met again to consider SECY-86-101, j
" Design Basis Threat -- Options for Consideration", reorinted in Oversicht Hearinos at 202.
In neither case did the Commission act to upgrade the design basis threat to cover truck bombs.
l i
Instead, in 1986, the Commission determined to wait for further
" policy guidance" from the Executive Branch and call for l
licensees simply to develop " security response plans."
See Memorandum from Samuel Chilk to Victor Stello, "SECY-86-101 -
j
~
Design Basis Threat - Options for Consideration," reprinted in Oversicht Hearinos at 218.
l Some six years after identification of the threat, on April 28, 1989, the Commission finally responded by doing no more than issuing a " Generic Letter" (No. 89-07) which calls for licensees to develop " contingency plans" to deal with the truck bomb threat, based upon a contractor report (James, gi gl., A Methodolocv To Assist In Contincency Plannino For Protection Of Nuclear Power Plants Acainst Land Vehicle Bombs (NUREG/CR-5246)
(April, 1989)).
The Generic Letter does not require licensees to plan any permanent measures against vehicle bombs, even though it is far from clear whether licensees will have sufficient warning time of a particular terrorist action to implement effective contingency plans.
The Generic Letter, moreover, does not l
i
- provide for any Commission follow-up, and the Commission has not sought to measure the effectiveness of the plans developed.
i There is no certainty,-therefore, whether the plans can be implemented on short notice or, even if they can be, whether they can adequately protect a facility against a truck bomb attack.
The contingency plans themselves are, in any event, short range expedients, and no long-term measures, i.e.,
permanent barriers, l
are required.
The Commission's failure to protect against truck bombs at l
pcwer plants stands in contrast to its spproach for protecting fuel facilities.
Almost three years ago, the Commission determined it was appropriate to alter the design basis threat
'for theft "to include use of land vehicles by potential adversaries attempting to commit a theft
" and the Commission's notice of proposed rulemaking went on to explain, "The NRC considers this change in design basis threat to be a necessary measure reflecting possible use of land vehicles by potential adversaries.
[and) will require modification of 1
barriers at or near the protected area boundary for vehicle denial purposes."
In addition, "The change would recognize the possible use of land vehicles for breaching of perimeter barriers
" Egg 52 Fed. Esg. 49418, 49420, col. 2 (December 31, 1987).
The final rule adopted by the Commission reflects implementation of these judgments.
Egg 53 Fed. Egg. 45477 (November 10, 1988).
However, no equivalent upgrade has been proposed or adopted for physical protection at power reactor sites or in the design basis
l l
t 18 -
threat for radiological sabotage of reactors.
Such asym =etry is nonsensical:
logicslly the Commission cannot acknowledge "the l
possible use of land vehicles for breaching of perimeter l
l barriers" -- precisely the nodus operandi of a potential truck-l l
bomb attacker -- without acknowledging the possibility of such an l
l attack at licensed reactors.
The truck bomb threat is not likely to disappear.
Short-tern expedients, such as those reflected in Generic Letter No.
89-07, simply do not adequately address this threat, either for the near or longer term.
Petitioners submit that the only effective approach for the Commission, consistent with its duty to assure the common defense and security and protect public health and safety under the Act, is to revise the design basis threat for radiological sabotage of nuclear reactors expressly to I
account for truck bombs and to specify effective regulatory measures against such a threat.
Such protections can be achieved at relatively low cost.
The Commission estimated in 1986, for example, that a vehicle denial system for roadway access would cost only about $100,000 - $200,000 per facility to install and
$10,000 - $20,000 annually to maintain, while a perimeter access denial system would only cost $500,000 - $1,000,000 per facility to install and $25,000 - $50,000 annually to maintain.
SECY 101, Enclosure 2, reprinted in Oversicht Hearinos at 209-210.
The upgrade of 10 C.F.R. 5 73.1 thus appears not only wise but also cost effective.
Indeed, the price of protection seems small and well worth it, considering the catastrophic consequences that
- could be associated with successful sabotage, including significant offsite radioactive releases and the crippling of a 1
power plant.
D.
Uperadine The Desian Basis Threat To Anticipate Attacks a
Bv More Sophisticated. Larcer And Better-Arred Groups It is equally important to upgrade the design basis threat to anticipate attacks by more sophisticated, larger and better-armed groups.
There are essentially two co=ponents to this upgrade:
(1) a larger number of attackers, with the capability to act in several coordinated teams; and (2) heavier firepower.'
The current design basis threat for sabotage, as noted above, assumes an attack by no more than a discrete, very limited number of attackers operating as a single unit or team.
- However, at least one incident, the attempted sabotage of Arizona Nuclear Power Project, Palo Verde Units 1, 2,
and 3, on May 14, 1986, appears to have exceeded this assumption.
In that incident, offsite power to Palo Verde was deliberately interrupted at three I
out of four widely separated transmission lines.
The three power disruptions occurred within minutes of each other, yet they were miles apart.
In each case, the saboteurs had to climb more than
'The current standard is somewhat ambiguous because it does not specifically include a reference to vehicular support, i,e.,
i attackers arriving by means other than foot.
Chairman Zech stated during the 1988 oversight hearings:
"NRC's design basis threat includes any mode of transportation -- any mode of transportation -
- to get to the site, or through the perimeter barrier. Our design basis threat assumes any mode that could get through the barrier -
- car, boat, truck or another method of transportation." Statement of Lando Zech in Oversicht Hearinos at 17.
See also id. at 27.
Plainly the design basis threat itself should explicitly recognize this prospect.
s
. 100 feet above ground and execute an extremely dangerous maneuver to short circuit the power lines.
Ef2 NRC Preliminary Notification, PNS-V-86-03, " Suspected Sabotage: Loss of Three of Four offsite Power Sources" (May 15, 1986) and related documents, reprinted in Oversicht Hearinas at 231-235.
The complexity of the attack and the distances involved clearly indicate that several independent yet well-coordinated teams were involved, and it seems plausible that each team may have been composed of several attackers.
This incident plainly reveals that current assumptions concerning numbers of attackers are outdated and not supportable.
In Latin America and Europe large group attacks on nuclear facilities have been documented, vir., the March 2$, 1973, attack by fifteen terrorists on the Atucha Atomic Power Station in Argentina.
See Konrad Kellen, "The Potential For Nuclear Terrorism: A Discussion", in Preventino Nuclear Terrorism at 104, i
122.
Moreover, even within the United States, there has been substantial expert testimony in Commission licensings that large i
l group attacks are plausible.
Een Pacific Gas and Electric Co.
(Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plants, Units 1 and 2), CLI-82-19, 16 NRC 53, 71-74 (1982) (noting testimony that "the PLO would be capable of assembling a force of twelve design basis intruders to 4
attack (the plant)").
Simply put, "[A)dversaries determine group size for a given action upon their perception of the number required to optimize the chance of success, consistent with security requirements and payoff."
Stewart, 11 al., Generic 1
i l Adversary Characteristics Surrary Report 42 (NUREG-0459, March, 1
1979).
There is, in sum, every reason to conclude that a larger l
- group, i.e.,
of up to twenty persons, operating in teams, might l
well be a logical terrorist choice if the goal is to overcome a i
l reactor's security defenses and cause civilian panic and/or l
widespread death and destruction.
See cenerally deLeon, Jenkins, Kellen, and Krofcheck, Attributes of Potential Criminal Adversaries of U.S.
Nuclear Procrans (Rand, January, 1978).
l At the came time, it is logical to expect such a group of attackers to be well-equipped with weaponry.
The current design basis threat assumes that attackers would be equipped with nothing more threatening than hand-held automatic weapons or l
hand-carried explosives.
With the widespread availability today of much heavier firepower, including rocket launchers and heat-seeking missiles, anti-tank weapons and small calibre anti-i aircraft guns, and with the prospect of weapons being obtained illegally from military arsenals, the assumption is no longer warranted.
See office of the Vice President, Terrorist Grouc l
Profiles (November, 1988).
For example, the ETA, a Basque separatist terrorist group in Spain, launched nearly 100 attacks against two nuclear plants under construction, using powerful remote-detonated bombs, plastic explosives, hand grenade launchers and anti-tank rockets.
The attacks resulted in more than $7 million in damage.
Eeg Konrad Kellen, "The Potential For Nuclear Terrorism:
A Discussion," in Preventino Nuclear Terrorism at 104, 124-132.
l l
i
III.
Specific Reculatory Action Recuested In light of the considerations outlined above, the design i
basis threat for radiological sabotage in nuclear reactors contained in 10 C.F.R. 5 73.1(a) (1) should be amended to read as follows (1)
Radiolocical sabotace. (i) A determined violent external assault, attack by stealth, or deceptive actions, of several [ add:) un to twentv persons [ Add:) operatina as two or nore tears with the following attributes, assistance and equipment:
(A) Well-trained (including military training and skills) and dedicated individuals, (B) inside assistance which may include a knowledgeable individual l
vho atterpts to participate in a passive role (e.o. provide information), an active role (e.a. facilitate entrance and exit, disable alarms and co=nunications, participate in violent attack), or both, (C) suitable weapons [ delete:.uo to and includino hand-held autonatic weacons, eauioned with silencers and) having effective long range accuracy, (D) (delete: hand-carried) e quipment, including incapacitating agents and explosives for use as tools of entry or for otherwise destroying reactor, facility, transporter, or container integrity or features of the safeguards system, [ add:] iD cuantities transcortable by vehicle, and The Commission should further take such other action as may be necessary to ensure that the specific protective reasures set forth in 10 C.F.R.
part 73 are sufficient to respond to such increased threat and indeed provide the "high assurance" required under 10 C.F.R. 5 73.55(a) that the threat of sabotage will be effectively countered.
e
,e,-
se,,-,-
--s
--n~=-
1 i
l l
r l
IV.
Time For Commission Action On The Desian Basis Threat Ucarade Petitioners believe that the rule changes sought by this i
Petition are vitally important to reduce grave risks to the public health and safety and the common defense and security.
i They are based on data and information generally known and r
i available to the Commission.
Prompt action is required.
Petitioners consequently request that the Commission make a t
determination on the Petition, in accordance with 10 C.F.R. 5 r
2.803, not later than 30 days from the date of its receipt, and j
that it thereafter proceed immediately to promulgate the l
requested revision to its design basis threat and specification of protective measures, waiving notice and public comment under 10 C.F.R. 5 2.804 (d) (2).
i V.
Recuest For Eneroency Action Related To Irelementation Of Truck Bomb Contincency Plans However quickly the Commission proceeds to upgrade the design basis threat, it is unlikely to be soon enough to respond to the immediate possibility of terrorist attacks against domestic nuclear facilities which might be attendant upon the j
outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East.
As noted above, this possibility is far from implausible, especially as a logical J
retaliatory action if the U.S.
should attack Iraqi nuclear I
l facilities.
Consequently, Petitioners request the Commission, on
]
j an emergency basis, forthwith to require that existing licensee l
4 i
I l
contingency plans against truck bombs, as developed under Generic j
i "J
Letter No. 89-07, be put into effect at once.
All plans should i
be operational not later than January 15, 1991, the date i
I i
i
._.._....,_..._...w
24 established by the United Nations for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.
Immediately thereafter, the Commission should undertake an evaluation of the adequacy of the plans and require such i
Improvements therein, on a plant-by-plant basis, as it deems l
necessary to ensure their adequacy.
The action requested by i
Petitioners is essential because there can be no assurance that a truck bomb threat against a nuclear power plant or plants could i
be identified before-the-fact and, even if it were, licensees may i
be unable to effectuate the plans within the twelve-hour warning time contemplated under Generic Letter No. 89-07.
CONCLUSION i
i The design basis threat, which defines power plant security requirements', must exceed by some margin any real threat that is i
likely to be encountered.
With respect to terrorist action, the a
]
contrary situation appears closer to reality: events appear to
)
have overtaken the anticipated threat level.
In any event, the l
Commission's current regulatory approach, which is premised on
. 1
]
"likely threats" rather than " maximum credible threats",
l unjustifiably discounts larger threats.
Since it is impossible l
reliably to predict deliberate, malevolent human acts such as l
sabotage and thus impossible to rule out such events occurring
]
with maximum destructive intent and effect, the commission's approach puts civilian nuclear reactors at unjustifiable risk.
The Commission recognized in proposing the current standard that a time might come when events would require a revision of the design basis threat:
.~-
.r,r.
,.,m,.y~
c,,,,
,,,.__.wg._m,.,
,.,,,,.g.
7.,c--wwe_.,mm.,,.
m 9 fi v.,,y,,,3.,i
4 i
i i
I i
l f i l
The kind and degree of threat and vulnerabilities to such threats will continue j
to be reviewed by the Commission.
Should such reviews show changes that would dictate l
different levels of protection the Commission I
would consider changes to meet the changing conditions.
l See 42 Ind. Eeg. 10836, col. 3 (February 24, 1977).
For the I
1 reasons discussed above, Petitioners submit that such a time has 1
j come, and that the Commission should revise the design basis f
threat to accommodate the increased potential for a terrorist f
4 l
attack against licensed nuclear reactors and take concomitant
{
action to specify necessary protective countermeasures to be i
implemented by licensees.
Petitioners request that the Commission inform them within i
f 30 days concerning the action it intends to take with respect to i
i j
the rulemaking sought by this Petition.
Petitioners further i
f request that the Commission advise them promptly with respect to
)
its decision concerning emergency implementation of truck bomb l
d contingency plans.
2 t
Respectfully submittqd, f
\\/
1 Eldon V.C. Greeg erg Galloway & G #enberg 1835 K Street, N.W.
Suite 801 i
Washington, D.C.
20006
]
(202) 833-9084 Attorney for Petitioners Nuclear Control Institute and Committee to Bridae the gad Dated:
January 11, 1991 Washington, D.C.
I m..
1632 Federal Regirter / Vol. 56. No.112 / Tuesday. June 11, 1991 / Proposed Rules 4
i i
i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISGiON 10 CFR Part 73 IDoc*et No. PRM-73-91 Nuclear Cc,ntrolInstitute, et al., Dental of PetJhen for Rulemaking i
a Actwcv: fucleer Rep.latoS Comnussion.
Aciron: Denial of pctt:on for rulercskmg suwwany: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)is deny.ng a petition for rulemakmg subrnitted by Eldon V C.
Greenberg on behalf of the Nucient Controlinsutute and the Committee to i
B-id e the Cap (PRM-73-9).The F
petuoners requested that the Com=:ssion revise its regulation, to upg ade the design basis thtcat for rad:olopcal sabotaFe of nuclear power reactors The pettionen beheve that the design bas:s threat must be revised to include exploore-laden vehicles. such as truck and boat bombs. and to ref.ect i
the poss:bihty of an attack by a larger number of attackers usme more soph:stcated weapons The pettron is denred based on a Commission dete:r.:naten thct there has been no change e tne demestic threat smcc the design bas:s threat was adopted that would just:'y a chan;c in the ces:; n baus threat.
ADDRESSES: Copies of the petition for rulemak:ng. the pubhc comments received. and the NRC's letter to the rettoner are ava:iable for pubhc inspection or copymg m the NRC Pubhc Document Room. 2120 L Street NW (Lower isve!). We sh:::pton. DC.
Fon ru=TutR woRasarnow cowTA T:
Carl B Saw7 er. Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Sales::ards. U.S.
Nuclear Reg.ilatory Cornmission.
M ashtngton, DC 205n. telephone (302) 492-03 %
SUPPLEMENTARY 9WFoRetaTiott 1.The Peuuon II. Pe'at.or.ers' Basis for Request i
III Requested Repdato*y Action IV. Pabbt Cortments on the Petttion j
s
.- ~
l Federal Registzr / Vol. 53. No. II: / Tuesday. June it.1991 / Proposed Rules 26783 i
V NRC Staff Esahistion of the petuon ne pettone s state that i 73.1. as Ifl. Requested Regulatory Action VL Sta cmer.1cf Der.al interp eted by the Commission. does not I.The Pecon requre nuclear reactor bcensees to The petitioners requested that the Dy letter dated January pr tect aramst radiolopcal sabotare design basis ticeat for radiolopcal short!v befem the comme'11.1991, auempts by a poup or an mdindual sabotage ccntamed m 10 CTR nce=ent of 73.1(a)(1)(i) be amended to read as set Opera't:en Desert Storm. E! don V.C.
usirur weapons of greater sophistcation forth below. Note that text to be added Greenters cn behalf of the Nuclear than hand. held automate weapons or is set off by arrows and text to be Cont. clInstnite end the Cor;mittee to expl sives. thereby exdudmg an attack removed is set off in brackets.
was I RY.be Sec' ion 711hrpose cndScope t nee ex ernal a t c e o e a r e
non was docketed as FRM-73-9.The enackus operatmg as mon than one (a) * *
- petit:oners requested that the NRC teem and empioymg team maneuvenng
"(1)Radiologicalsebc:ge. (i) A rensed its reculatens m 10 CFR 73.1 to tacuts.
determined vio!cnt external assault.
upc ade the cesign basrs threat for The petitioners beheve that terronst attack by stealth, or deceptne actions of raicloacal sabotage of nudear power incidents which have occurred since the several >up to twentyg persons reactors IFadioloocal sabotate refe s design basis th* eat was adopted
>operstmg as two or more teams e to any cel. berate act directed agabst demonstate the abih*y and willingness with the followmg attnbutes, assistance.
I, nuc2 car rnatenal or a nuclear facility of terronsts to mount sophisticated and eqwpment (A) Well-tramed l
that could endanger the pubhc health attacks capable of causira substantial (induding mihtary traming anri skills) j and safety tiy esposure to radiaton.)
physical destruenon, partederly and dedicated mdinduals. (E) inside The ;ennoners be beve that the throuch the use of truck bombs. Because assistance wbch may mdude a reir.:!aton must be rensed to include of the' Persian Gdf cnsis. the pewth of knowledgeable indindual who attempta j
es;1osne-!acen vebcles, such as t'ucks and boats, &nd to retlect the possibihty State-sponso ed teronsm. and chan;;es to parucipate in a passive role (e g.
of a !ata b) a larre number of attackers in te=0nste tactcc. We pet'icntes pronde t-fer=ation), es actte roie (e g.
beheve that cut ent regulatory facihtate entrance and exit disable us:na mere sophisticated weapons.
The petinocers contend that the standards do not prende a realistic or alar =s and communicanons, parncipate present desum basis threat is not sufficient guarantee of public health and in mlent attack). or both. (C) su. table reatsuc m new cf the clauned current safety or commen defense and secunty.
weapcns L t;p to and indudmg hand-trenos m terrenscu The pennoners state ne petitioners state that the terrorist held automabc weapons, eqwpped with that a successful terrenst attack could threat has become blooier more silencers and] havmg effecove icng cause the release of radioactnty sophisttated and better armed and range accuracy. (D) [ band-carned]
comparable to a severe oudear frequently State-supported. As a result.
equipment. indu6ng incapacitatmg acc: dent, end result in siz:nhcant health the pettoners bebeve that the 8Fena and explosives for use as tools of and safety consequences and property possibility of nudear terronsm, resulting entry or for otherwise destroymg damage. The petuoners beheve that the in a substantial number of casualties. is reactor, facihty, transporter, or increased threats may be countered by far more Lkely today than it was in 1979, contaberintegnty or features lo the rneasures wbch could be t=p!esented when current regulanons were safeguards system. >in quanttes for a cocest cost but would protect promdgated.
transportable by webde e. and" against events with potentally He pettioners bebeve that it is castestrephic consequencea essental to uppade the design basis The pebboners requested that the The petiuon desenbes the Nudear
"* ""**'"#I '
threat to protect aFamst vebde bomb Centro! Inst!ute as a non-profit attacks wtuch they beheve pose a grave corporatort that monitors nudear me s m
1 ft 73 threat to cwtban nuclear power plants.
prog a s e the Uruted States and otner he pettoners cite the devastatme are sufficient to respond to the countnes, dese; ops strateg.es to prevent effects of the truck bomb attacks in increased design basis threat and and reverse the growth of nudest Beirut in 1983.The petiboners state that provide the high assurance required armaments and explores strategies for under i 73.55(s) that the threat of studies have indicated the vulnerability sabotage will be effectvely countered.
fxp os v a
k by t
he gor ent na r
Eecause the petitioners believe th the suggested amendments are vitah,at lad proi.feranon and terron:m Tte petition destnbes tne Ccmmruttee to Bndge the potentally devastatng consequences of y
important to redace nske to the pubhc Cap as an ogan::aton concerned with health and safe *y and the common nuc! ear safety and the threat of nudear ne retu ne s beheve thatit is defense and security. the petitioners ter onsm.
essental to change the design baus requested that the Comt:ussion make a threat to antcipate attatis by tecte determinston on the petibon within 30 II. Petitiocers' Baris for Request soph:stcated. !arger. and better-armed days from the date of receipt and that it The NRC has establshed reFulations groups.He pettoners state that there proceed immediately to premulgate a in 10 CTR part 73 gevenuna the physical are two cor ponents to this threat (1) A final rule. without issumg a proposed prctection cf plants and citenals, larFer number of attackers with the rule. that would adopt the requested These terulations mdude measures capabihty to act in several coordinated arnendmenta.
related to the protecton of nuclear teama. and (2) beaner firepower.The The Comtrdssion evaluated the facshues against raiological sabotage.
pettoners c:te documented Ir6rge group petitoners' request for expe&ted action.
Section 73.1. amena other thinas, attacks en nu.: ear facihties in Latm The Commission detenzuned that the estabhshes the design basis tseat to be Amenca and Europe and the petition should be processed in used to design safeguards systems to widespread availabihty of advanced accordance with its standard procedures protect nudear power reactors against weaponry as indcatons that the current for processir.g a pet 2 tion for rulemaking acts of ra6olopcal sabotage.
design basis threat is no longer realistic. in i 2 80:(e), but expedited by h:rutmg 1
Fct'eral Ecgister / Vol. r No.11"' / Tueday ] me II.1931 / Proposed Rules 26734 the comment per:cd tc 30 da3 s/lhat
-Ac;e s contrch fcr penonnt! cnd reactors as te:rcrist teegri 2:.1 determmation wcs c=tamtd in is schicles.with senches and positive informed and respected Americans hase
- Notice of rece:pt ci petition for identification. and warned cf possible terronst attcck ru!emakmg" that was puthshed in the
-Capabihty to e ecute saferutrdt wi1;n the US: and that tenorist actmi Federal Register on Janucry 29.19F1 (50 contmgency p!ans fer deshng with mqht reasonably include repnsels FR 3:291. Interested pctsons were threats. inclu6ng truck bomb threats.
spinst U.S. reacters.
invited to submit wntien commer.ts or in edition. nuclear power p; ant
- 2. A.nothcr common theme was suggestions concemmg the pettien by hecnsees also have estabhshed dctciled rejection of the hT(C siew that the February :A 19tt.
secunty related penennct programs, design basis thrcat cu rently set forth h TV. Publ.c Comments on the Petition which melude; NRC n Fulations ccr.tir.ucs to bc
-Esekg ound inve: tis:ctions with I'Ej adequate.These ccmr enters argue that i
l As of March 15.19M. the NT,C had enmmal history checks.
events in the Eddle East are a docketed 35 letters of ccmment: n frem
-Psycholorcal testme sufficient basis for escalatmg the design l
in6viduals. 3 from pubhc interest
-Drug aud alcohol Liness for du:y basis threat to the lesds celled for in the groups, and the n rnsinin;: 22 frcm determmanone: and Pctition.
industry or mdustrial rept e:entativ"
-Special supervisory train.ng for
- 3. Scveral commenters beheve that organizat ons. In addition the NRC behavioral observanon.
Power reactors are vulnerable to l
received three letters from Mso. through the NRC's reculatory raio:ogical sabotage specificaliy.
j Cong-essmen While the comments were effccta eness review progsm. ir.dividur.1 bamers raay be casily breached and carefuhy considered by be NRC none power reactor sites are es aluated for vital rystems may be sabotaged.
contamed s:gmficant new miomation secunty vulnerabihties and the:r abihty
- 4. Some commenters put forth the which would warrant a change in the to counter the design basis threat.
fo!!owmg cost argument: The design bas:s threat. In the summuy that
- 4. Nuclear power plant des:gn is consequence (and hence the cost) of follows. the view s pnsented cre those based on the defense m dtpth successful radiolegical sabotage of a phdosophy in proviing adequate pablic reacter is high in ic extrerne while tne j
A. Comments Opposmg the retnicn protection. Massive contamment cost of protecuon a relatis ely modes:. It i
structures. thici wall pipmg and is therefore prudent for the NRC to Twentpone commenters cpposed the petition. The rnam reasons cited bv equipment with redundant safety and require the measuns recommended by these commenters in support of thia shut-down systems are constructed to the pctiuoners.
curent regulations were:
Permit the f acihty to withstand the
- 5. One comrcenters put forward the 1.The NRC staff. in concert with the impact of earSquabs.hmcanes, argum.edat barnen are alnah in intelbgence community and other t inados. floods, and airplane crashes.
place to protect reactors in Europe and Federal agencies. contmually rnonitors Detaded tra:neg and plant-s;iec!!ic Japan and the conclusion that only i
world events for potental threats simu!at a provide added assurance.
minor structural modificat: ens would be associated wtth commercial nuclear Emergency p,.anning and pubhc needed to protect U.S. reacters against facibtes.These agencies base unique n ufication systems add yet cnother truck bombs.
Icyer i capabihty designed to protect e One commenter surgested thr the access to mfo= anon, incluin[,
the pubhc health and safety.The primary thnat to secunty is, deranged sens.uve or class:f:ed informat on net nomally avadable to the general public. approved plans ar6 perio6cally persons who might use trucas or suicidal
- 2. Nuclear power pla.t beensees are evaluated dunng exercises.
air attack.The commenter concluded in close communicaton with locallaw 5 The penneners have not precented that upgrading teactor protection a!ang enforcement agencies and the NRC to any new micrmation relatt d :o the the Imes of the petition seems cost eHuta ensure that any secunty threat m local cu red sauaucn: dey have smply areas is prempt:y idenufied and restated old opmions.none of whica The above concerns ra sed by the l
commun:cated The response to th, provides a bcsis for ahenng ine oesign commenten are addressed in tne NTsC current %dd:e East situation shou!J basis inat in 6,s couay.
stan nakete of ie petme futuu have (and has) herchtened awareness
- 6. Several cf the commen;en opposmg V of this Federal Register not.m and sensitvity on the pa 1 of bcensee the peuuon tocx issue,with the V.NRC Staff Evaluation of the Petition penannel and Fecerah State. and local peutioners view that tne protection law enforcement ofi2eers.
measuns proposed by the petitioners The NRC staff believes that a decisica
- 3. Nut!c ar pow er plant bcensees have could be put into place et modest cost.
on the petition can be base d on One comr-enter. a power reactor response to a smgle pivotalissue: Has estabhshed detaded sectety measures' licensee. esb=ated the cost at 51 milhon the threat of ra6olepeal sLbotage of as required by the NRCin to CFR 73'55 t 53 mahon per year at Ls facu.ty, domesuc nuclear react rr che :gcd to en (b) through (h'). to counter the desun bj ]
basis threat. These measures inclu'dr R. Comments Suppo.-t:rg tie Peut""
t]ec r nt es
-Physical protection barriers end Seventeen kttt s supported the petineners beheve dat the threat to illuminated isolation rones; pennon.These Ictters a e summan:t !
do=est.c nuclear reacters has
-Survedlance and patrols of the as follows:
intensified in two w sys: (1) The possible penmeter fence:
1.The rnost commen concern use cf large truck bonbs er boat bombs
-Intrusion detecuan aids and alarm stemmed from the %ddle East s:tuation to cause radiological sabetage and (2) l devices:
that existed dunng the pubhc comment the possible use of a latter number of
-A tactical reaction force:
penod (the comment period lasted frcm attackers armed with hravier wcapons
-Bullet-resistant barriers for cntical Janua y 29 until February 2P 1991).
The nature of terrorism was the arcar These commenters pointed out that Iraq subject of detailed analysis before the
-A well trained untd forte capable of had issued a "terronst call to armsf NRC published its design basis thrcat F
i I
carrying out the provis:ons of an NRC-that the U.S mihtery had attacked Iraqi
(( 73.1), and it continues to re: nam the approved secunty plen:
reactors. and thereby legitmized U.S.
focus of staff rcview. NRC efforts in
Federal Register / Vol. 56. No. 212 / Tuesday, June St. 2991 / Propoced Rulec 263 5 createn the desi:n basis thnet and the th est of a land vehide bomb.whic.h external assault, attack by stealth. or actions taken by the NRC smce the itself was only a remote possabihty.
decepuve actions. of several persons publ.cnnon cf I 73.1 to assure its Accordmgly dere is httle basis fer with the fo!!cwmg attnbutes, ass: stance centewna vahdity remam a key further considenrg the waterborne and eqwpmect (A) Well-tramed co=ponent m the NRC safeguards bomb threat at this ume.
(indudna mmtary trammg and siills) progra=.
The petteners also believe itis and dedicated inomduals. (B) maide Thousands of acts of terrenst violence important to uppade the design basis assistance which may inchide a werldwide.ran;nns ficm simple attacks breat to anterpate attacks by more knowledgeable indinchzal who atte= pts I
on preperry to the sophisucated. deadly sophirtcated, larger and better armed to partic:pate in a passa e role (e.g.
bemt a cf cini airlmes, are exa=med grcups. specsEcalf y (1) a larcer curnber proude mformaton), an acta e roie (e,g.
and ana!y:ed by the NRC.The NRC cf attaciers with the capabdity to act in facilitate entrance and eiut. d.sabic l
usc: a wise vanety of snior=ation, several coordmated teams, and ( )
alar =s and cc:r.mu:ucat ons. parncipate rang =; f om that repcrted d.rectly frcm heavier Erepower.
in nolent ettack). er both. (C) suitable
!he sane of tne inc; dent to that included ne NRC is aware that, an desenbcd weapons. up to and indud=g hand-held m a fin:shed anal, sis provided by the by tse petiuoners. larFer terronst groups autornate weapons. equipped with eteli cence ccmmun.ry. Throughout this mth heaner firepower than sdencers and hanns effectve long range encei 2 cady analys;s.the stafilocuses cente= plated in the cu rent design basis
~
.. uracy. (D) hand-camed eq:.:pment.
)
a its erf art r n renewmg reabste. not th eat hcre carned o t onerations in induing mespacitanng agen s and j
hgetheucal acsersary charactenstics, foreicn countnes. The NRC is also explosives for use as tools of entry or for i
mducma weaponry poup s:ze tacucs, aware of one incident desenbed by the othe-wise des *mymt: reactor. iecity.
esplosnes and targets.The NRC then petitieners invoinns three coordmated-transpor er or conta.ner miegr:*y or compares what has occurred or is near a:multaneous acts of sabotase on features cf 6e safegua-ds system, and 4
cr-cible to the artnbutes ecumerated m, tmprotected power transmission hnes (i0 an WeM 6% of n Mn l
the c'esien bas:s theat.,
seneg but some miles fmm.the includme an emplovec f m e.ny unh respect !o t uen and boat bombs Anzona nuclear Power Project. : alo
)
of the sire esnmated m NRC studies as Verde Un:ts L 2. and 3. The acts I
I bem; ccpable of caurmg sicmncant constituted no thmat to the safe When the des;p bas:s threat waJ da= ace to domest;c power reactors, the operation or safe shutdown of the develcped, there was to cre6ble threat NRC staff notes the fol'cwmg:
reactors. No violente was involved tarEetzg power reactor m this country.
-There has been ene such truck bomb against the reactors or reactor sites. The ne NRC bebeves that this contmues to in the U.S. (Math Lab. Wisconsm, most recent of the above events is be the case, notwithstanding the l
19 01 clmest five yes s old at the time of this statements made in the peuten and
-There have been no othen m the v.nting. They have been considered at suggested by so=e commenters. In Western Hemisphere, length and evaluated by the NRC.The particular although chances a e
-There have been no others outside of terronst acnons in foreip countries and occumng worldwide, the NRC has not an area of civd unrest.
the transmission ime s botage events detected. to data. any sismficant change
-There have been ncne directed egainst are remote, both spatially and by the to the & eat ennmn=entJnchaing a nudear acovity worldwide, nature of the events, from const*uting a
-There have been no boat bombs direct peril to a domestic power reactor.
WeaponTY. group size. state' sponsorship.
directed at any actmty, nudear or The NRC centinues to beheve that, to r tarcenng. that warrants a etherw:se. we'rldmde.
date. there has been no sigmficant moahcation of the desip basis threat for NRC bcensed nudear faclities and
-Centarency plann::s to protect change in weaponry. group size. state aramst truck becbs has been spcnsorsh:p. or targetng that warrants a matenals. A!60 ugh the adequay of de ccc pleted for all domeste power mocificaton of the desip basis threat design basis threat was questiened in reactors.
requi e=ents for NRC licensed nudear the pention and by some com= enters.
the saferuards system developed from Based on the fo ero:ss facts. on power reactors, discussions mth appropnate elements The followmg d:scussion presents a the current cesip basis threat is of the Lecutive Branth, and on NRC's detai'ed NRC analysis and response to deemed adequate and apptrpriate by independent assess =ent ci the domestic the sig uncant excerpts from the the Ccm=ission. nis system indudes a threat enuren=cet. the NRC condudes Petinen-physical secunty orgamzaton, physical barners. access centre!s. detection aids, that the 1.ichnood of nudear te:rorism 1.ncerpt * *
- cucjcar reactors ceed not invche; the use of large truck bombs protect ega.nst rad.o:ogical sabetage com*numcahons, testi:g ar.d aga.nst nudear power reactors in the.
attempts by til a group or meiudcal usmg mamte:ance provisions, respens e United States is extremely low, that a wen:: ens of g-eater sophisticat:en tr.an hand-prov:sions, ar=ed responses and charge m the design basis threat for held actcmane weapons or er;ioswes. thus provisions fcr cffsite law enfer:cment radiological sabotinge is unwarranted, endair's st*ad ty exploswes-laden response. It is i=por*att to ncte that the vehicles. er (ii) m re than three Isl external effecti eness of this system is not and that contmgency planning ts v
attaders or attack ers capsble of operatt:g as limited to the design bas:s threat. In g
The NRC renewed issues related to ch r particular. in the face of a threat greater t s g
the waterberne vehicle bomb in 1989 tactn.s. (p. 418 than the design basis threat the system and condaded that no acton was Response. It 14 important to remember would not cc!! apse, but would centinue requ: red at that tt=e. The NRC has that the current desip basis threat for to provide a level of protection that may recently reuewed these issues again power reactors is a hypothetical threat well be adequate. In addition, power and concluded that there have been no statement. ne statement is set forth in reactors are required to have sigmficant changes. These conclusions the regulations in positive rather than continaency plans to address the truck are based. in part, on a review cf negouve terms and is given in bomb threat. Should the domestic threat worldwide terronst events,where the i nt(s)(1) a s follows: "(1) Rcdlological environ =ent change sig:ufir.antly. NRC threat of waterborne vehicle bomb sebotcKe. (i) A determined vtolent intelligence speciabsts. in cocidination attack agamst a power reactor was with other government entties. would found to be much lesa likely thaa the i Petioon page met.cr cont tama the encerpi.
propose apprepnate changes to the
JCBG Federal Regi*ter / Vol. 56. No.11:! / Tuesday, hre M.1091 / Proposad Rules desien bas:s threat based upon the process. In its contmuing review. the warranta a moibcanon of the desien specifics of t e threat enntenment NRC considers demonstrated attnbutes
- b. sis threat statements for NRC h
2 Eirems in s acimeist. threat firig te determ7e whether or not they exceed brensed nuclear pnwer reactors m
entzetar L wri tr.e raw 2 of Staie.sponsered cunent se:ncards performan:e Nor.etheless. the NEC cottmues. on a te rcnsm and chanaes tr. te-ronst tactirs objectres When an attnbute does daily basis and w:S oncomg vy: lance.
indicates that tne cur ent reculaton exceed tho*e checuves. it incn becomes to review mformi. ton on inreats and standards. which esckdc the truci bomb the focus cf 6dit40nal and timdv incidents to assure that the desip hasa threat and sc;histicated la ye troup at:stka exammation. Includtg d sct.ssion with threat statements remtiin adequate.
supponed by substanual f.repower. are the intelhptnce commun:ty or special prudent, and reasonable.
nes:rer reehrte nor a scff cient cuaranto* of 3
i the pid he heahh and saforv and the ecm-en sdy regardmr that specific attnbute. to i
deferse arid secunty under'the Act (p F) estabhsh in a factual manner a 3.Eacepts It is equally important to upgrade the desip basts' threat to antic:pate Smce me s:i.vt.en of ine (.c=ssio. s comp *thensive charactentation.
a!!acks b) more sophisticated. lo ge* a.d current cantards for protect 2on epamst mcluamg the motivation, dedication, better.anred roups.There ere resent:al!y F
j radao:og:tal sebotage of c.iclear reactors, the and method of operation of the two compor ents to this upcrade:(1) a lepar ter onst th est has onanced m thres adversary. Importantly, the NRC cumber of attacie n. wan the capeb.hi to importz.: ways: as Llocien it is more exammes and nicludes the act m several coordmated teams. and (2i acphaucated and be* er.armes. and it is circumstances or context surroc.ing a beener f2repower. (p.191 specific te rorist incident m its in Latin Amenca and E.urope large roup he t r hs er i eu en re dc%crabon.
anacks on nuclear facdaas base been Comm:ssien to rense its rega!r.nens to meet the ;otent:a2y more sesere c!.ahenges of tr:e For example, the conditions present in documented. ur.. the March :5.19 3. attaa 1990s. (p, f }
the civil sinfe of Beirut. LeDanon. that by idtren ter onsts on the Atuda Atc.mg j
resulted in vehicle bomb attacks, are not Power Ststion m Arsentma. (p. 2)
Respense. T.he nature of terronsm was easily rephcated in the Umted States.
- *
- the ETA. a Basque sapustirt ter or.st the subject of detadeo analysis Notwithstandmg stetements made in the g oup in Spairt is:.nched necr!y toc attacks l
preceing pubhcaton of the NRC design petiton and supported by some agamst two nuclear p; ants under batis threat and remains the focus cf
,:ommenters. the NEC wou;d arrue connruction usm; pcwe-fJ remote.
continum; staff review. NhC effons in agamst the hkehhood of such vehicle detonated bombs. p;as:2c espiosh es. band creatng the des:p basis threat bomb attacks domestcally.
grenade launchers ar.d anS-tank rockets The reqmrements. and actions emte their The hkehhood thr.1 terronsts wot.ld anads resulted mincre than r muca m pubhcanon to assure the:r continumg attempt to perpetrate an act of nt. clear damage (p.211 6ty, re=am key components in the te ronsm is of concern to the NRC and Response. The NRC agrees that v
s of ac7s the Federal government Based on i*a terrorist g*oups larger than and with Tho sa erronst vio!ence wn analyt2c activities and workmF beavier firepower than contemplated in worldwide, ran:+-g from stmple att on preperty to the sergsucated an,acks closely w:th cier agencies. the NRC the desip basis threat have carried out monitors the threat environment for operations in fortip nations. The deadly be. mg of civil airlmes, are indicauons that the hkehbood of nuclear operations were camed out m nattuns exammed and analyze $ation that is d Tne NRC uses i
' *"n * * * * *' * * *i= 8&"Y "E #*
I*
experiencmg armed civil unrest. a l
a wide venety of infor oft e id or clu e m i s ed
[a s ag e ri i
analys:s provided by the mtelbrence overseas rece:re contmued attenuc$ees
' '"I" a
- E community. Throughout tha ongomg On this partetJar point. the NRC ag datly analysis. the NRC focuses its effort with a statement made by commenters on revieweg reahstm rot hypothet: cal who oppose the petitom That the NRC adsena y cnaractenster-meluing has access to relevant sens:t.ve c-
)
weaponry. Froup s:ze. tactes.
classified in!cr=ation not normalfy Power reactors. If such a change wtre to explosnes and tagets-end compares a ~' 'lable * "~ t *~c Ea" t+de-wh' ether a[atrbt a r$clea.ria~ctiIiy cN' ot.
- ""'"**U""#'
the et end that have occurred or informat:en that is creible to the is clostlv exantned in the context cf the attnbutes enumerated m the des:p des;g.: b'as:s threat to assess its := pact, t Ece ;t The Co=ssior/s rera!anons basis threat statemenic Because cf the increased number cf exen pt Lcensees f om protectmg agmst te On occasion. NRC effert focuses en a events occu r:ng concurrently with the effects of snans and decrutuu sca partcular facet of te roram or on
%ddle East ensis. NRC has meressed including nabotage. d.rected spamst the info maton that sq;ests a trend may data avat:able to base ns deter = mat on facib'y by en enury of tne Uruted Sta'es.
be oevelopmg. For examp e. the ute ci of any sip:ficant chang m the dreat "h'*"
- I '"A 'm" "t Ww n n.
vehicle bcmbs in Lebanon as d.scussed ennronment. w:th partcular foct.s on pemns
- 10 Pew an underand ttat i e Co= men below. was closely examined. 5:milarly.
any meressed threat of nuclear d**""d"'** ' '"'
'?
the use cf hang ghders. bo.ts. the degree te ransm. Decision-makers are bemg
" N ' "
"'**"d' of sephisticaton exhibited. and state briefed. some on a daily schedule-even thogh they may ha 6e strer.g bk a to spcnsors.g:p ht.ve ansa conunue to merit regard:rg threats and terrorist meidents and the support of fortp premments (p 6) close eummation-worldwide. and staff planmng mt.lt' des The NRC's purpose is not to catales response eptons evaileble to ed& css Response. The NRC agrees with this every demonstrated or hypothetcal evoinng threats worldwide and statement.Th: information on threats ter onst attnbute for subsequent domestically.
and incidents routnely reviewed by the inclusion in the desip basis threat Although changes are occumng NRC and considered in threat statements NRC staff expenence, worldwide. the NRC has not detected. to assessments as datussed m the analysis and judcment. as well as the date. any significant change to the threat foregoing responses. includes cctivibes views of other Federal egencies. ere environment. meludmg weapon y. group of tertonst Fmups which operate applied in the threat assessment size. state. sponsorship. or targetmg. that independently. but may have strong
-,--i-g c-g-v,
--g--y-m 9,
-www-,.,.--g-m-e..y.
Pp w.w----rm-wg
---y.w.d-
Federal Res:ister / Vol. 56. No.112 / Tuesday, }une 12. 1991 / Proposed Rules 26787 hnks to and the support cf foreign matenal resu!!ing from a truck bomb, attack on a U S nuc;ent facittv. 5ee governments.
irrespective of stand-off distance.
Comm:ssion. Prehmecry Noufication of 5 Lacerr:s ne Commwsion aho stated Acceptance of 330.000 acute Threat or Unusas! Occurrence-P.W-I-w that t?.e defer:se m depth" cer. cept af fata1it'es.8 which t's the worst case 108 IU'c"me' 28 2'd iI" ' PR. **'erted Iraqi nuclear -rector cesisn "makes sl the presented m the document cited, implies p
,p gg re! asma of reemac mty by acs of sabetcge acceptance cf each of the ic!!owing it should also be noted that the number of d 'ficOt" and that the consecuences of propositions as true:
" safeguards events" has been mcreasir:s m sabotere would be less sesere theo the (1)Th:t a terronst group favors the late 19 ace a 6sturbmg trend mdicants "succc ssful detonation c f c9 ill cit nuclear nuclear reactor sabotage over oder that the thou tht of sabotare is in currency. if e nrics.ve certe " n Frl at tDs36. col. 3. As targets that exist m the U.S.:
not actually res!. ed yet. dee Com:ussion.
d-scussed Mro m sect.:n C. ti est p)Thct they censtruct a very large Scfaguards Lmmary Even List (NL' RIG.
cc::sdranc s co cet spreat vand today in truck bomb undetectei 05:1 Rev.16) (Dete:r.ber 31.1989) Tesmnony t]e 1 ce en: cf tr.e Comfr es.on e own staff (3).] hat inicators from terrorist of Dan el Rrsch in Oversight Hearrgs at 52 an:t T gures 5 and 8 Hirscn noted that as of i
e ac a e a ase."ne:ed hy echvity wcrldwide do not tngger 19as 'lsak uards events. includ.ng bomb Sanc a Nation.! Laoors:or.cs and potentially impicmcatatmn of truck bomb
[e' a: scc.a:ed m:*. a suc:esshJ tmtk bornb contm;enry plans:
th atta:t man:mchv meant ce mel:d:mm of a (g)T;:;;t the t uck bcm,o is succenfd,y inuhor a * * *. tp.1u)
- n. car toc r cre. re ared car,:Ve ezrpieced at a reacter and deton:. tad; stao; r's of r:duatt ury com;: arable to what Ui) That blast istance and sue are Resp nse. The referenced Prehrninary wci...! ccc.r m a sesere ccadent. it.e suffiaent to ecuse sienificant da nage:
Net:hcation (F.NO-I-90-1W1. December Cc-.m:ven cas es=.teo. m tr.e case of one (6)That the resctcr h s bten 28,1990) concerned en anonymous operateg at power fcr some t:n e; ph:me call to the Governor-elect of t
a eft :
te t can:e s _M /C GM genetic effects. wiJe (7)Thct the reacter a red.'ndant safe-
\\ er=cnt stat.cc dat Iraqi troops were rece 6 :., sa c:fwe md puon esumated to shutdown systems e!e a!! d.sf.ed; geing to bomb Verment Yankee Nuclcar ccst s b.i..cn tp 1:1 (8) That co-~~t a *ve!y Pere! P! ant. All of the appropne'e law res; case The NRC contmues to breached; enio: cement e;encies were noufied of behue that. m pncrai. the (9)That large quantities of the call. including the Federal Burea _ of radicnuc ides are released to the Investgation. On the basis of oder l
conseo;;encea of sabMare would be less severe than the consequences frcm atmesphere; information available at the time. the successful detonation of ani!!icit (10) That the wind and other
- aller's information was deemed to be nuclear explosa e devict. An ilhcit meterdogical conditions are favorable non-cre&ble. Incidentally, there were a nuclear es;!csive device wedd be to the worst case consequences:
number of other sabotage and attack portab:e and codd be 6tected against a (11)That there is a large city nearby threats to hcensees during the penod cf heaWy populated area or te 6te'eted in e dcwnwind direction: and the recent Persian Gulf cnsis. A listing aga:nst a se.t of gcVer. ment and (12) That the local population, even of all such events for the period August detonated at a time selected for that part nearest the reactor, elects to 2.1990, to February 21.1991,is provided maiemum explosive effect. Alllicensed recain in place for seven days with no (see appendir). Ahhough there were a power reacters are faed Moreoser,as mitiestica =casures.
substental number reported. none were discussed heiow. the NRC does not The NhC considers the feregoing set considered to be sigmhcant.
beheve Uat the consccuenr.es referred f csn mptions to be unlikely m the The NRC has renewed the assertion to in the pet.t.cn would apprepnately extreme and not an sporopnate basis that safeguards events. mcluding bomb sene as a pnma y basis for formulation i r safeguards rulemaking.
hoa xes. have increa sed "five-fo!d" since ci a destrn basis threat.
- 6. Excer;:s. indeed '5CI s Task For e the "last revisien to the design basis c
The term "unacceptab:e damage", as c2 embers unatucci. sly conc! tad that a threat regulations." A number of factors used in reports of the Sania ctedy upon nactor acc. dent broudt about y te ronsts.
substantially account for this inc ase, I"' '". uni which the petztmner s truck bomb
"'""" M'8'#8'T "I
I* h " wm mn"""lde and Fir:t NR" reponmg requ:rements, i c.,
arr : rents are based, refers to the blast
'*d**"*Y'lessible. > tal the types of events that are requ: red to is tectmcah effects on a concret: wcll panel and is be reported by NRC hcensees. have in the sectica of the reports that Ac8Ponse. The NRC has accepted the been cxpanded. As the nucleari-dustry discus.ed redehrg cf structural notion that reactor sabotage, with has implemented " Fitness for Duty" respci.s:s to far fMd blast waves. It is radiological releases, is technically programs.more drug and alcohn!.rchied not t. rad m the reports m the sense of feasible for many years. Measu es are events have been reported. regard lns of pred.cnna en offsne releare.
erricyed ct potver reactors to protect whether or not any additional nsk to the Whie one can conckde that using the agamst r.re6ble radiological sabotage safe operation cf the facihty was sterleff 6stences caulotedin this scenarics. In the unlikely event of invoh ei Second, more f: rearms ha.e repcrt we !d ensure safety from a rudelegical sabotcge, da.nage control been detected dunng required rout.ne pctential truck vomb trest the report and at:.ident mitigation measures would entry searches. ahhough. typicall. no
/
cres not : ppo-t the corollary likely lurut the amount ofladioactivity malevolent intont towards facility wea concLuen. i e.. that a truck bomb.
released.
identr.c1 Third. the numbe r el p!dLtd closcr to the reactor, wo;id 7.faremt.There has already been at lenae operatirg reactors has increased daring necessarily result in a substantial one une.mf.rmed threat of an irapspon.ored the past ten years. and thus, the number radicimcal release. The rnassive of safcguards.related events has structures. r:dundant scfety systema
.ni.erimate.. repried m supplernent io head Mr.g & me ped and damase mitig. tion features of rheti r.nworane ntat st iement. s.n onof, weiear The inf!wnce of event data repcried currently 1. censer.t reactors each provide Generstma stauos Unns 2 and 3 IN'L'PICWsM.
In the Safepards Summary Event Lst a certam although unquar.t2fied d*'ed lanhary 19st The cPre8 Pond.ns esumste (NUREG-C525) on the design tasis meesure of protection against an eepo.ned m the Fmal Emironmental ste ement san threat staternents merits careful on,,wei,.r cenmims siatioit unn z nd a uncontro!!able release of radioactive (NUM.C-evo). dated April 1Dat was 30.000.
examination. Clehrly, the numler of
i I
Federal Register / Vol 56. No.1r / Tre<dav. June 11. 2991 / Proposed Rules h6 88 a
esents alone inerted m the hst caes not motneten to ca rv out a truck (or boat) based uoan a enntreeter reert Trr Genem i
1,un om not rewae hcan to Han ans suc?>t a 57n6 cant chen/c has bomb cetonation suffic:entiv near a Per=nnent measun aca:nst w.ck boma occuned in me threat enuror. ment. Tne power tearte-ech reu!d crew hTC consdcrs a vanety of fattors the spicent de-ace ASoupb tb
{
'[
,e j
rnost impurtant bem; ccmonstr.ted lachnoed of a truck bcmb event n a parnetur terronst action t:: tmNnent i
ads ersary charactenstics. in cons:dcred to be too iew to warrant a effectwe contingenev sna (p 1N dete=inmc tne status of the desy:n chance m the ces:gn bas:s threat fer The truck bomb inreet
- nct hir4 n.
bas:= tvest sietement for rasolorral raioiorca! sabotage. ecntmpency plan $
csappear.Sho*t term empedients Surt a sabotcge. Tne events identihed in the were put m place as a p udent response. those rer ected m Genenc Leuer **u 8 'r hst typcaEy represent rmen, i c.. non.
The hichhood of a boat bomb 13 simph do not acequately adnrco this thre.a creiNe in eats. or ads ersn 3 conncered to be rnuch less tr.an th61 cf either for the near or longer tenr-IP 1N charactensucs inst fall well with.n the c truck bemo. which uself n only a Response. hTC's desp basis th* eats bounds of the current desp bam remote posub:hty. Acccrdedy. a serve three pa-poses.They are used to threat statemer.t for raiological requi ement fenprotectar n acamst boat develop reNdorv recut ements, th0
~
sabotsgt Thereixe. an meresse in the bombs :s censioe ed unpst.fied provide a standard with which to number of repo*ted esents by itself does to Lcer;". * *
- in Westem L. rope.
measure changes m tne real threat riot wa:* ant a cha pe to tr.e des?gn basis nucl ear pnwer plarMs c7 protected opnst ennronrnent, and they provice a i
th eats.
truck benbs t) re:rbced fences and ws!!*
standard for evaluation of tmpiemented (p.111 systems.The IW bornbmss m the
)
s Ece c:. Whde toe e has not been an identied ciemauend te ronst threat as 3et Respense The NTO participates as a Midd;e East were clearly beyond the I
acamst domest.c bcansad reactors. terronvs me:nber of the mteragency U.S. Physical capabihties attnbuted to tne des:;~1 have been resconsit4 far mn e than r ne.
protection Renew Team which conducts basis thrects. and th:s recognition thttd of non-U.S. reactor incidents m tre technical c Ahances o pohcies, practices trigsered hTC staff action.
pened 19731%4 As w as der.onsneyd by and p*ocedures for pb sichl protection A first step was to determme the i
of nuclear matenal an'd facihties with effects oflarge scale explop e attach ssoc ed = ee ea t atsonal forep gas ernments that receive U.S.
on hcensed f acihties melucmc pow er Party wnde atte=pung to s:ngste emplosives ong:n nuclear rnaterial The mformation reactors. Before the results of the study into the Umred 5:ves tne eusience of an undetected. mtemat ona; te ronst threat in denved from exchanges a classified were known. but with general the Uruted States today is a possibary mtuch (foreicn government restncted awareness of the damage high cannot be 6scounted. [;t 11) inf ormation). Accordmgy, the hTsC explosives can cause to structures, the Respor:se: The feet sentence refers to cannot discuss speciLc safeguards NRC safeguards staff concluded that, to examples of the kmde of esents that are plannmg or propams used by foreign be prudent. an un=ediate effort was entties Howeser. there is general warranted includmg the development cf under contnumg rev:ew by threat evah,ators at NRC.
speement between the U.S. and its protection requirements. defensh e strateg:es. and uidance on vehicle The NRC ag ees with the comment m nuclear tradmg partners rcFardmg the F
the second sentence: 11at the]
level of physical protection that n barners.This action was beirs taken internatonal terronst threat in the prudent for operstmg power reactors while the U.S. intelbgence agencies were Uruted States today is a possibihty that All parties commit to tne physical Fathenng and assessmg mtelhgence cannot be asceunted" Tne NTsc d:ffers protection entens reco= mended by the mfor=aton on the engm and geog aphic from the peuu:ne-s onh a the detaals International Atomic Energv Agency m extent of th:s new type of threat. as well and level of response. The NRC beheves its pubhcation INTIRC/225 Rev. 2. and as the kmds and quantmts of explouves that u; dant etahiation of terronst many. inclu6ng the U.S. go beyond involved Subsequen*!y. based en activmes. supported by current these r umm = p-ovis: ens.
information received from these protectica levels and conungene)
It Lcem:s Abhogh the Commaston has intelhgente agencies,it cuttkly becar&
planne; for even stronger p otection.
been aware of eas tr. rent itruck bor:.b1 at apparent that the th eat of vehicle bor-b conse:utes an adequate respense.
least since W nonrh it has not attacks m the connnental U.S was not incidentally, the explosne mvolved in rupsced sdicency to date. no 121 immment. and NRC staff resources w crc the c2:ed smdghn;incide::t was As nriy as BM the Comnussa.n staff re6tected away from immeiste
C *** **O"
- *I th' dF" regdato y actions to a broader based contamed tn a hand.carned satchel and was of a s:nall q.:antty.
.'[3
- '.,\\.**f3
.((,,
assessment cf the entre issue The truck bombings m the Middle East occu-ed m 9 Lee p 5 Tra use of t-d bor.bs hes bomb asa:..st a nuclear f ac.dny at a feastbie notions expenenemp a*rned civil unrest.
become a tacbc of choice for te*rons:s The fa m cf artsr.k "tp lit The Co=m:ss:or, a renc:.se to tne a rsituation not prevtlent m ine U S tacuc is a pas e tnreat to cm. nan power recorn:ce t*uci be tb treest han been Subvauently, the truck bomb thrett s' p1 mets * * *. Jp lej Ee th.s Penuon focuses pnmanh on moef 4 deficient. While a Come:ssier.19M the U.S was evaluated m cepth ar.d sunev of the Defense Department the Sec*et al.e nstres !ct dealm; with it w cre truck be=ds it is also essental to pretec, bemce. the Sta*e Deparu ent, and tr.e developed. Noce of the information asamst beat bombs Many nuclear power Depar: cent of fr.ern f ounc trat lapHour des e,ioped was interpreted as mdicctm plants s-e located adiscent to m ater and are agences bel:ese that the ~ truck be'nb" tnrest of a need for irr.me6 ate schon: also.
thus at n.i from att.ci by bost. lp 10i in the t' S n s4cier,t to prompt act:en" and Res;=se. Truck bombs wit!.
had "terlemented measures to counter the permanent rneasu es were considcred explos:se mass suff cient to pose a th-es'." * *
- the Cc=essien only but wc*e deemed inappropnate. Pow er I
challenge to power reactxs base been determ:ned at that time to study tne issue and reactor hcensees were requtted bv used in the M.ddle East, in the U.S. there d'l'Y *C180D-IP 2M Generic Letter BM7 to dcvelop ~
has been only one known incident of a
,j,7,*,"EnIIa 2 rr7ss c nungency plans for providm;;
e n
Protection apainst truck bombs under large truck bomb [ Mat Leb. Wisconsm-Imahy resounded by doir.s no mo, than short nonce, and to conbrm in wntmg (19701).There is no information tnat a s.,utna a tenene tetier (No sa.el which Froup cu rently exists within the U.S.
caHe for heensers to develop
- contingency that they had included the threat of a that has both the capabihty and plans" to dc ol mth the truck bomb threat.
vehicle bomb in their contmeeney
~-,-e
.,,--.n.w-,--,,.,.
-,e m-w-
Federal Register / Vol. 56. No.112 / Tuesday. June 12, 1991 / Proposed Ruleg 26789 plannmc The NRC staff venfied that potent:a! sJsersanes attempting to commit a commercial units in siting. functaan.
conf:::nat;ons w ere received from theft *
- t Such asymmetry is nonsensical.
des:gn. size. nuclear fuel used eafety bcensees inat these con!=ceney plans Lw:aL'y the Conun.ssion cannot systems, and cperations.
had b.en develcred. Temporarv
h"*'edte the r is:ble use of land All power reactors operating in the Instructon 2515!102 (Tl 2515/102).
[
tle,
, pr se s
md d a U.S. use low enriched fuel. There is no
~ Land Vehicle Bomb Contingency potential truck bomb attacker-without high enriched uranium at these sites.
4 Procedures Venfication." was issued on acknowic4mg the possibility of such an Thus, vehicle denial barners are not Nos ember 23.1963. The purpose of T1 attack a heensed reactors. (p.171 required to protect against theft at 2515/102 was to provide pohcy guidance The cur ent standard is somewhat operatmg power reactor sites.
fer NRC regional staff to venfy that ambicuocs be:suse it does not specifica! y 7
The NRC interpretation of the design pow er reactor bcensees have performed include a reference to vetucular support. te.,
~
tne ccnungency plannina required by a:tmess emms 13 eeans other than foot' basis threat for radiological sabotage of
- 'd d" reactors does not preclude adversanes*
Gener:c Letter e9-C.The object:ve cf 71
']3['C use of vehicles, other than truck bombs.
,..gC e n basis
.515;10': vias to ver.fy that the threat mch. des any mode of trahepor*ation-fer t ansportaticn and for breathir.g beerm s ccatir.pncy planning u iy mode cf transponat on-to et to the protected area barners. The consic: red snet1. term at.tions that could sne. or th ot gh the penmeter bemer. Oar interpretation also allows for boats be W cn to pre *e:t agamst attempted des cn Wi s tknt assumes a. moe that (other than boat bombs) for radio! a ~1 smtap involtry a land coWd set throrsh the on nerwr. heat. truck transportation and for breaching the sehicle tomb :f sutn a threat were to er anmher rnethod of transpor'auer * *
- barners.The protection system is matenah:e. Inspect;:ns were ccmpleted plam!y the cwra tas:s treet itse ishou!d at ail operate.g pov.er reac'or sites ror espSce'y retor. ire this pirspect !p 29) destened independent of the tite cf g, gg3 ygg au eacn power reacter site. NRC inspectors 1:erpor:n. The NRC distincmshes its t pe. would be detected by mt usion
/
ver.ned tcat tne I censee a cafeguards between ($) theit cf high enriched alarms when it crosses the barner. No contm enc:;tocedu:es adtessed the uranium from a fuel facility and (21 delay time is credited for the barner. In abaty o tr5pord to an NRC ret.; cst to ndmleg, cal salintve cia pner respame to pcs: tens taken by tne implement n::tq m contng:r.cy reactor. As discussed 1:nder the measares and the ccensee has pettuoner and s.:pported by some response to Excerpt No. 5. the theft commentert one could mc6fy the deterrnmed &st any resources or might support an illicit nuclear explosive design basis threat to express this eqmpment nerded to implement she-t-dev:ce with the potential for higher interpretation. The modification.
ranse contngency measures would be consecuences then those from however, wou!d not affect the high level d in the petition, the NRC radiological sabotage. An ilheit nuclear of protection already provided.
- E "** device would be portable and I
consuhed with the Defense Department.
n M prmecues spinst tra could be s.ected agamst a heanly the Secret Seruce. the State bombs can be schmed at relatively low cost.
Depart:nent. and the Department of Populated area or be directed apinst a The Conunission esnmated in 1985. for seat of cosernment and detonoted at a Enercy. The NRC censidered the extent example. that a vehicle cenial spiem for of th'e protective measures they time selected for maximum explossve roadw av access would cost only about i
1 imp!anented m relation to the prctective effect. An adversary contemplating theft $100 000-s200m0 per facary to mstall and measures that were already in place at would be prepared and eqmpped sto.000-s:0.000 annually to mamtam. whde a power reactors. The consultat: cts were ch.Terently from how he er she wculd be penrreer access demal system woWd ordy cond.:cted as an informalinfcrmat.on if c ntemp atmg radiclogical sabotage.
cost s5ao orxHe1.oco 000 per facity to install Eathenng by, the NRC staff. It was The combmation of th?se facters and and s0.5.000-$50.000 annuaUy to estntam.
reahzed at t*e tan 2 of the consultations other considerations (desenbed below)
- *
- Indeed. the pnce of protect:en seems that tne actncics contacted 6d not,in leads to a design basis threat for theft s r.a!! and well wo-th it. considenng t e h
most cases, have targets analogous t that 6fiers from that for radiological catastrophic consequences that coJd be assoc;sted with successht! sabotage.
those p otected under NRC regulation or sabotaE,;,
i with comparable consequences to a get,, e it could be used in an iHicit I"d"d
- 8 8"'I'C'"' "II" d'"' C'" '
postulated truck bomb attack.Because nuclear explosive device, si mficant n ases and the cnppling of a power pl.mt.
8 of this,it was judged reasonable that quantities of special nuclear material (p.Isl Federal asency response to the truck Isuch as high enriched uranium) must be 1?esponse. Among the issues bomb issse might he agency 4pecific.
protected ngarously agamst theft.This considered by the NRC durhg its Nothms was found that cautd for material ex:sts at certain f ac:htes deliberations on the vehicle bomb were immediate adiucnal measures to ad:ninistered by the Department of the provisions of the Commission's protect asamst truck bcmbs at power En.argy (DOE) and at certain facilities backfit rule. The n.le states in to CTR l
reactors The NRC threat evaluation licensed by the NRC.The two sgencies 50.109(a)(3) that the Commission can c rdmate to carry out a policy of regm e backfittmg whenit determines staff remams ugdant in its continuing search for micat ons of a truck bomb macta:ning fully adequate and that there is a substantialincrease in the threat. The NRC continues to believe essentially eqmvalent safeguards overall protection of the public health that, smcc the hkchhood of such events systems. Durmg 1968. this policy led the and safety or the common defense and is considered to be so low. the actmns E to revise its design basis threat for secunty to be denved from the backfit, taken constitute an appropnate theft of materials from high enriched and that the 6tect and indirect coats of fuel facihties to melude land vehicles implementat:en for that facility are used for t ansporting personnel, and justif'ed in view of this increased
- 12. Lce.ws The Conunission's faccre to their hand-c.anied equipment.
protection. Contrary to the bel;ef of the protect asa.nst truck bombs at power planta A comparabihty review of the pettioner and supported by some p ectar e el I t es os t ice years protection programs for power reactor commenten, the NRC concluded that ago. the Commission deterrruned it was facdities has not been conducted the vehicle deniel system referred to in appropnate to alter the design besia threat because DOE defense-related reactors this excerpt would not provide a for theft "to mclude use ofland vehicles by are fundamentally different from substantial increase in the overall
+
w-w-,-,,
c
,-e--v
+--,-y w
, - -vr e
v-w-v-.pe. wr m g p--*
-i-+e.
ta,--w--re- - -
v--9>g-r P,-f9-9-*g---5:t*
{
26 90 Federal Resrister / Vol. SS. No.112 / Tuescar. June St. S991 / Proposed Rules prottchon cf the pubhc health and by tne Sterdfs Department R dsu t aff:c.
plant operator resardms a praete safe!); Cost WEs not a Ceciding factor.
enme the name of the el{end noe busmess dealms h hen told the oper.te r Inudtritall) the ooliar ulues stated nemsbaMe. Tne caar stated that mNld not be at work untt!lenuary 15 by the peistioner for pert neter access af tne unknown nctim was not retu nr d 1"?t. it.e ilrner stva d r:e would be tack cemal are not represcntative of the
,, g, gg triey wodd irnne" n After he p.t m tne track he s'etet '
nucicar power Nant in Georg.a The if I puhd tne eres to dmb;c tr'e te h c6 costs of provadr.g standoff distances nuciear pnwer plant to be tarreted man and loaded it wah exp;om es I too!d da be)and the ex2st:ry; protected area, as not specif.ed INRC-brensed facihtico in somethmi could be req = red to assure protection Geore:a include Haten 1 and 2 and Acinon itse locallaw enfor:.ement nr. no aratns " esp.osaes for use as tools of Vogt.e 1 and 21 and the FBI were ncthed i
entry or for otne mue dest cytng Acuan No schon tro.nred Resolet:en. On Janunty 1615e41. the d-ite*
reacter, facibt), transportt t. or E*5"k' n. The Sner.ffa department was idennteed. and ha name wme r'ven i
e*
e 08 m
al IH 8) to tr.e Shenf! s ofbcc. He mr.e ar es+d ori j
co,ntsme'inlec.ty or fea!;;tes r,f the refer to socicone marcerated in the unrelated tnch chares ho fi.r:r:ct action 1
sa 4,.,,ards sp. te._a. m t;usntities Stcne Mounts:.n Cc-recnonal Faciht3. a mas pinnned by the hr.tran transportabie Ly ut:cie. (P.gc 12. t,ee me,i,e secanty state penner.uarY
- 7. D2w mitsm i
r Pet: tion.)In st:ne cases. stgsf 4 cent locesed an Stone Mountam. Geo pa. The Sac P lo Verde. Araras IV.hc Smita add:';onal expeniturea w ould be Fift pians no fether acuon CompaWlancora Counm AZ necessary for (in certa.n cases) purchase
- 3. Date.12/77,M se,g.ce: Corpxstaar OfLees. Pnw na. A2 of land. relocaucn of roads and parkmF 5" S*#* ""' T*** ^ V'r'"*"' l ' T ^'r Threet At aha the em W i
loth, aditonallength of bamer Nut; ear hmer Corporaucn. Wndhani operator at be Co.> oration 06r c-structures. and menns to memtor the
(('
male, bebed te $c.W40 s ea s o15 wt.n Pnoenn. Ar zona recened a cell tre e Enteg :'y of the ba9er. These factors
- f, '[p
, or codd r.dd substant..liy to the costa y, nont rece'ved a te.cohone call from a
- " **{
m p ing to bien ttr pMe eh stated fcr the per:me:er system.
mate who stated that tne Iraqr A nl Ne acuan taken VL Staternent of Derdal F ternment mas S inM M w up 6e r
gesa ugmn bcen$te ee,erm n,d th, thrr,,t iermont i erdee nuciear pow er pant.
The Co n.:ss en has considered the Acen TLe laensee un not.fied ttuwft 8 Da e 0 1 t petst;on. the pLthe ccm.ents. and the the state and local pobce and. as a NRC staff evaluaton set forth in th2s Frecauuora F me*sare Increased S:te B unsw:ck Carolma Pom er and Lght nobce.The Co=. ss:on concludes that weea) at trafacunF Ow nuc! car Company Brunswick Coeni>. NC Source Brunswick Mclest himer Visacr*
there has been no change in the EI'** ',n oc iankn sysum wen aim Center
'i domeste tnreat sete tne design basis
~
Threet: At 1008 a.m the Brunswick Re on: Tne beensee and pobre threct was adepted that would just fy a detenrtned the trnet was noncredible.
hudear Power Plam Visitors Center change in the design basis threet.
( page. pg gf n Me'ved a callfrc~ a ede believed to Accord.ng y.19e pettioners' request to site.1rc9an be Southern. who sc d m a raspy voice 2
mod:fy the desirn basis threat for Source.bannet Ue Pomer Authurny IDrA) 1 u had better es ecuate tnc plant rad:clor: cal sabetage as set forth in 10 Threat BPA recened a letter from a because m e are Foir.a to blow up Sunn3 CITd31 is hereby denied.
woman who stated that *In tne new Pt >!nay nca nuclear facany located i
world God wruld destrov dams co.t.
near B unswich today i
Dated at Roca.n e. Man cnd. ths 5:.h day
'I I# I" fired piants oMred p ants. and nudent Achon B unswica ar.d Sunny Pi facihues pomer p!ams PGE :s tr.c dent and wil1 were notified. as well as the FBI Samuel) M be ce*nsed by God m,thm three Resolation. Lceneae determ:ned the thre.o Sec e:c y c'ee ccresux monins ~
e Date. Wim"h
[
" " "DEC Acuen EPA nonfied the portand General Appento-ustnc cf Sabotape and Attac1 Thrects to NRC Lacensces for the Fenod Eicctr:c Compern it.ad dispatcher wno.
Sue Wolf Crael Kams: Go and Flec e in tett notied the 1rc.9r. riart Compac). Ccffer Coung. K5 Auraet 2.19%-1 ebruary 21.1991 S pmmer:ier" Socce. kansan Bureau cf f sesucatan
- 1. Date 0515.90 Reso:ution. Thc hcensee de'ennmed tit Th cat At 2 3D pr.the brenser wes 5.tr Ma.re ia-lee. hne ianice Atoctc ttreat mas renc ed..:e The set:er w ner cafad by the Aansas breau c.
Pcme: Cc=; anb knce.n County. ME was hewn by the O eeon pohce to be 3"$est:ganon that tnes were cautd h a Scr.e. Lcensee s Cc porate OSce unentalivil anc no thrat to socie t.
female w.tr seconc:andinformatan the j
Tt.reat' At 3 4 p.:rL. an unsubstanuated
- 5. Data C1!10*vt someone of Ira:;i cencer.t worked at Wf
{
borb tr. net was recewed at the Site: Trenstramon lme Creek. and af h.s count > is ira aded. Fe cciorate off.re Source Cons =e, Power wil! sabotne the part Ac:.= The Ma.ne 5: ate Pace. t!.e Thnet NCK Eepon In was natif ed b)
Act4on 1r:e G1 was *:rtied A sus:a Pcke, a.d t.te ITM w er !
Consunters Power, that tr.e Canahn Leso!cte-Secu-tv of vits: enr7:ne-, m e..
nctied Pomer Cont ci hed recened a telephau.c heightened Resc!t of l'ceme F.es9enon Lcensee and the pohce bo ::5 threat to dent o> trie nem msest.sanon m ss nepine.
de'e =:ned tu tisat m es none ed:Ste.
transm:suen bne frem Detroit Edzson
- 10. Date in/ItJp:
W furtner att.en cue to the varueress of iommer) to On:ano Hsc c lectnc Tne Sae Deva-besse. Toledo Edman Con;wny a
the treeat.
ber2 was set to ao of; mit, bNrs 0: tam a Coung. OH 2.Date 2002/N Action The FBI was nottled and Detroit Source. Licennec -
5;te Geo c.a Nuclear Nn:s Edaon mas contacted Threat: At W am, the hcen*e reported Sourte Dei.it Goant> Sneriffs Offace Resch.non L bomb mas found that what appeared to oc a bomb Ph ce tntc.f.LDe Tcl
- 6. Date. 01/12/P; sticks of tranown matenal.no pomer Trecat. An at:nyrnous female telephoned Site-Hatcrt Georpa Power Compan3 aource, and no ter.mp device) had t>cen the Duak Co nry Snenfra Off.cc at the App:Ans Coct:4. CA found an a cab. net crawer m a Coethouse m Decatur Geo pa. ar.d Sourte Georg.a Power Co:npany scamtenance build:np which is ph> sically prended a partally uruntelbrtbie Trarest. NkC Repon 11 eccened a call froro removed froro any ntal areas but wnhm meessee repardmg an aliedeed Georgia Power advaams that at 12.20 a.m.
the protected area.
bdnapping that occurred at Stone on January 12.1991. en mdividual drove Actaorr ble secunty responded and Mountam. Geo pa. oo an unspecified up to Hatch's Gate s lowner controlled reported at appeared to t,e a hoait but date.The bnef snessage was
- covered" areal m an 1&wbeeler and asked to see a the respocae contanued as a 1
)
_m.
_,~.._, ___ _,,
..._.,._.....,_._-.._.m.._
_. - ~ _. _..,
Tederal Res:ister / Vol. 56. No.112 / Tuesday, June 11. 1991 / Proposed Rules 26791 clost d au but the south gets. searc.hed Action. The reactor w as shut down. A
- ecauNoan y c' east-e. Iml la w enforcement t/f.t..ts responded and the se unes at the soud sate, and search w
- conducted mth negatne TD w as cen~:ed I c:i;hNne:I remty The ShenfTs results F.- chmen At 1114 a.m.. the object was Uroartvnt c:srctched a pat ol car with Resolutacit The Univermty determmed the identied by the liceasee as a 'securi y bne s95ns c:,gs to the site The 81 threat w as ncncredibles t
tramma deuce" made by one of t5e was not.f e1
- 21. Date' 01/2991 secunr> ef.*;cers Resolut;os The TEI determined the threat
$,,, p.u.Besse. Toledo Edison Company.
was noncreo:ble and nonfied the Ottawa County. OH 11.Dcte C1/16i91 Lte. McGuae. Duke Power Company, hcen-ee.
Source-Ucensee MecMenburst.C a n:: NC 15 Datey!Ml91 Dreat: NEC Resion Ill was not;hed that an ecurce: D.ie Pew er See:..cn. Ccmmonw:a!6 Ed.non indancual wamed mto the Eison Plaza Theat rue rower c.ded id! to deny Camp Lak e County. IL Shopp:ra Center. Tcledo. Ohio. and n:-c s et cat. a t: Sca Carc!ea thet Sou ce elpchce Department McCu;te was uncer attack by Iraqis.
Trare.t Tr e.on Pohce Depan:nent rt cened a dephone cad f:o n an empley+es and destroy To edo Edson Acuen-FEl was nonf.ei mis.ia; wno stated "Re e's a bcmb equ:pment.
R-sciuton. Rumcis w e e f ake
- p. anted at 16 e ircal Mac.DunddsT A Action ITd notfici
- 12. Daw. 01/17/ r1 short t me b?er. a second cc!! state 1 "!
P.eso!ut ow Tne in6vidaal was knewns to Sae: b un. wick. Cet.hna Power and L:gh see y r; re roi da.na any$:r-ebout the the local ochee as Le had :nace p evious Cc ;andn.r.4w:tA Cant >. NC bun.t et bacDonalds or t'e ere at t~e threats Tre hcensee filed a tv.ptnnt. e c
,7c,. L,,.,,.,
Lcc Mar ?ower Plant?
wa ant w es issuei the fran w as Threat At126 a m.. the hcensee tectned Act on. Tte FBI was notified arrested and ja:Ied.
an erv3m us telephone can frem an Rescir:en ne hcensee and the pohce
- 22. Date 01/191 mea si;al rm an ws.de 1.ne who asii i
Tant you peop:e to how Ma boun. it Negne N 1 cat was nennecib c.
Ete kernck Phi!adr phia Cectric 1E D=:e C1.23 31 Ccepe y. Mcntgome y County, PA will to of.f. Two C-4 pianted anc they Ste Tdey Po;nt. I%rida Power and Lght Source: Crense*
d ggg gg..
Ccm;snv. Dade Cetnty. FL Threat At 3 46 pn the switchboard. in a Acuart TLv FEI was nonfied. The hcensee Source. D.de County Me*ropohtan Pohce nonprotected area.reciaised a telcphone conLcted a reash w.th nesatse resJts.
D'P8"!
cail fo : an anonyme.s aniviSal w ho Etsoku:n T'e hcensee dete nmed the hat cee m y Dah Q=4 sa.1 1 put a bomo there that's soms to threat was nont eil.le.
M'II#P'" tan Pchce Urpartment recened blow up?
t3. Date 01 tlM an in vid an!
5.te By on. Commonweal t Esson rawd h wu e' *.had Action. ne Lcal pol.ce were nonfed. A search was conducted with negative w
Co.mer y Of.e County. L Wan nat, and an enplane would Source: Corrsonw enita Eisnn Company bc=5 Turkey Po:nt at a pm Resolution. The caller was behesed to be a nreat-The Roy. Faver Division Action The call was traced to a pay bov. about 8-0 years old The Lcenses IConsonwearth Edson] received sn triepnone at a LMart. but no sus; sect anonymous te:epene cau whath was idennLei The Dade Pohce nonned and pobce determined the threat was nonceiLo th eatened a bomb emplos:en at Byron an the licensee.The FBI was nonned.
seven mmutes Earber.n the rnornmg.
Rese.m ne lanne ed h phe
- n. Date: m /31/91 Peck R:vtr rece:Ved anot;er enonvinous determnei the threat was concreible, Ste: Manhattan College. New York teler*c.e call w r.;ch th estened & bomb 4 Dau-m /24 91 Sourec: Ma:dattan College
.itan epmst a substetien m Rockferi Sne: Consahdated Esson Ccporate Office.
Threat:At 12 naots an anonymous bomb thinois New Y ork threat was recened against a buildmg at Achon A se:ech was conducted witt' Sn-ce. New York City Pohce Derer ment Manhattan College. Riverdale. New necau e resCts Threat. At 1.50 p m.. the New Yora C;ty Yos. housmg a nonpower reactor.
Resoa..;en: The hcensee dettrnnned the Pchce Deparment advised that they Act:on: The local pohce uepartment tr-e.: w es no.crecie.The caber w as recea ed a cal! from an i.dividual wi o respendei A searth was concucted wnh innsned si en urstaQ personaMy who sta'ed 2nt a bomb would p off in ten negam e re suhs.
.i.d made ses en or eynt cMis oser imrees on the 2nd fient of the Resokuos The College and pohce sesera: de o to ren-ene-n factht:es A Ccmohdated Ecsori Corporate Offices determeed the threat w as noncredibie.
wa e-t has been asued fcr ha arrest Act;on: A searth was cund cted with M.Date C2/04/91 14 Ud* WU@Fe y Tennessee VeneY nepta e rerJts-Site: Arianses. Arkansas Power and Light l
Sie Brewns Resotur.on: No mentaen was ensde of an Compant.Pc: County. AR Authonty Orestone Cot.my. AL fiRC.bcensed facdzty-Source F01 O!hce. Uttle Rock. Arkansas Source: Tennessee Wie3 A urentY 19 Date C1/n/51 Threat: The FBI Othee. uttle Rock.
T>at. At 114 ali, th main TVA Sne: Turkey Pomt, Tionda Puwer and Li;ht
^
.d*"'""
ss.:tethaard in Cha tanoora. Tennessee-Cornnam. Dade County, n.
s awd dat g' ansas Meer me wn recea ed e cap. f.mm an nr.iden@ed male Sou.ce. ATaT v.+.: sta'ed. "A b ack Cai"r.c or a niect At1105 a n AT&T recened a enil pg to be.
%ss.n in.ck is on the way to D overs fron. a rna'.e vnth a foreirn accent, who Acn s ne hcensee was not: Led and Ic rv wii a bcn.E" sa:d be er*ded nads and a hammer to increased secur:ty, Attacn The FBI was nonf.ed The bcensee bor-b the Turkey l'omt plant.
Resch. tion: FBI determired the threat w as m.;; rte:ned tc.ghtened awareness.
Actwn: AT &T traced the col! to a local
"'*C N Penob:en: The hc;r-ce determmed the residenc.e an Houywooo. Horida. The 25.Date C2/06/91 ihre.t was rancreible hcensee ccntacted the locallew Ste: San Oncfre. Southern Cahfornia 15.Da r.Ctl3 31 erJercement asency and the l'LL S te ban Orfre.5%thern C hforma Reso6t:ca The local' law enforcement F.d. son Corr:pany. San D,epo County, CA Source Ucensee Einon Company. San Diezo County. CA annes evestiganon detennmed the call Source: Cahforma Stsie H g%ny Patrol was rE.ade by an 18-year old as a prank.
hat Sometama between 4 p m. on Oce.nsate
- 20. Date' m/Wtri February S.1991. and 7.30 a m. on Threat: At e.50 pn. the C.,Lfornia State hae Orezon State University. Oregon Februar) 6.1991, the Lcensee recorded a ilthway Patrol Oceans.oe.recened a Suu-re: The Uruvers.ty messne en an answenng machine which r a.1 from an univdual w ho stated.
Th est At 9 e nu the Uruversity received a said.**The whole place is goms to bluw "There an a bomb at San Ono! e."
acneral bomb threat wtach stated.
up today."
Actiorc The Shen!Ts 01ce and San
- Bon;bs will go off at several places.
Acuan-ne FBI was notif;el A ccpy of the Onofre were notified ne hcensee inch.1ng Oregon State Unhersity."
tape was provided to the FDL
1 Federal Regie.ter / Vol. 56. No.112 / Tuesday. June 22,1991 / Proposed Rules
'26792 Resolat.cn The TB1 detemuned the threat was nrncreible.
2e. De te-C2/14 /J1 Site Ce:rer. Nebraska Pubhc Power Datret. he.a's Counrv. AT Source. Sher.ff. Aubu-n. Nebra ka Threat Tr>e local stenffin Auburru Nebrasia received an encriymous bomb threat as.mst the lo:al hospital and agems: Cooper which said.*'A bomb will pc cff in 09.ciates A:uon A seenh was conducted with eeptne res:.uts Resolution The beensee deterrr.ined the th* eat wIs noncrec.tle.
27.Date C;/19/91 Site. U.S L:: bassy. Cttam a. Car.ada Soune F31 Th:es? Tr.e U.S. An.bassador received an an.:in,.c s Weat letter that a!L ded to sar; s it:el a: mties such as drug draL.; an:: pnstitauen a.d contained tra:ts ep:nst the US. includ:ng a tFaat cf retebata ka n:iare a:: crashes inte U.S nue: car romer plants by exples,e lann pianes. if Iraq mas trnated by U.S fo res Actsen. Tre Reu? Canad.sn Mounted i
Pchte [RC'dP) and the FEl were notified.
I Reselen: Tr.e RCMP and the FBI dete :need tr.rogh the:r invest: ration that the tr.reat af ar.st nuclear fac.shtees was concreible.
- 28. Date:02/01/91 Site: Un:ve sity of Utah. Utah Source. Local Pohce Depa-tment Threat-At 705 a :.. the local pchte def acent not.fied the University of a be='b West apa.nst t!.e Memli Enr.neere,p B din; The threat was not d;te:ted agamst the Tnga reactor which is lccated on the f.rst floor.
Action A scarn wcs conducted with nesnta e reses Reso:uten The bcensee and pohte deter:::.ned tce tr_reat was nonc e&ble.
[FR Doc. 51-13805 Tded 6-1Mn. a 45 am)
- w. ccot wsas s
e n
l l
1 v.
,..,,-,,,.. n
~, - - - -,.,,,
4 Before the UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Washington, D.
C.
20555 IN THE MATTER OF PROPOSED
)
INSTITUTION OF INDIVIDUAL
)
DOCKET NO.
PLANT EXAMINATION PROGRAM
)
TO EVALUATE THE MARGIN OF
)
NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS TO
)
WITHSTAND SAFEGUARDS EVENTS
)
BEYOND THE CURRENT DESIGN
)
BASIS
)
)
TO:
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS REQUEST FOR ACTION Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 5 2.206, the Nuclear Control Institute
("NCI") and the Committee to Bridge the Gap ("CBG")
(collectively, " Petitioners") request the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the " Commission" or the "NRC") to institute an individual plant examination program, under which it would request nuclear power plant licensees (a) to assess the ability of each licensed facility to withstand an attack by explosives-laden surface vehicles
(" truck and boat bombs") and by a larger number of attackers using more sophisticated weapons than contemplated in the current design basis threat, and (b) to report to the Commission any plant-specific vulnerabilities identified in this assessment that imply that the specific facility may be particularly vulnerable, in the sense that its margin to withstand attacks above the current design basis threat 9trz75~OO23&
^
is not large, or perhaps does not exist.
The interests of NCI and CBG in this matter and the rationale for the program they i
propose are set forth below.
I.
The Interests of Petitioners NCI is a non profit corporation, organized and existing under the laws of the District of Columbia, with its principal place of business at 1000 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.,
Suite 704, Washington, D.C.
20036.
NCI is an independent policy research center that was established in 1981 to monitor nuclear programs in the United States and other countries.
It develops strategies for preventing the spread and reversing the growth of nuclear armaments.
In particular, it seeks to increase understanding by policymakers and the public of risks associated with introducing into civilian nuclear programs the materials essential to building nuclear weapons.
Also, NCI explores approaches to reducing the existing nuclear arsenals that are helpful to prevention of nuclear proliferation and terrorism.
In 1985, along with the State University of New York Institute for Studies in International Terrorism, NCI sponsored a multi-disciplinary, internationally-attended Conference on nuclear terrorism and thereafter created an International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, comprised of 26 experts from nine countries.
These initiatives resulted in two books:
Leventhal and Alexander, eds., Nuclear Terrorism:
Defining the Threat. _.
(Pergamon, 1986), and Leventhal and Alexander, eds., Preventing Nuclear Terrorism (Lexington, 1987).
Among other matters, the 150 participants in the Conference and the 26 Task Force members identified deficiencies and urged improvement in protections against sabotage at reactors and other nuclear facilities.
i CBG is a non-profit corporation, organized and existing under the laws of the State of California, with its principal place of business at 1637 Butler Avenue, Suite 203, Los Angeles, California 90025.
CBG engages in public policy advocacy and research, and it is particularly concerned with nuclear safety i
and the threat of nuclear terrorism.
As an intervenor in a i
Commission proceeding (Docket No. 50-142), CBG successfully challenged the relicensing of one reactor based in part on weaknesses in site security.
As one result of CBG's efforts to enhance security, barriers to vehicular access were temporarily installed at the site during a period of particular tension.
CBG has continued to seek improvements in reactor safety and security, including, in particular, the elimination of unnecessary use of weapons g.ade reactor fuel, a
Both NCI and CBG joined in a Petition for Rulemaking to the Commission on January 11, 1991 (PRM-73-9), seeking an upgrade in the design basis threat for radiological sabotage of nuclear reactors as currently set forth in 10 C.F.R.
S 73.1.
The ___
Commission denied this Petition on June 11, 1991 (56 Fed. Reg. 26782).1 l
II.
The Rationale for the Request Even though the Commission has denied the NCI/CBG Petition for Rulemaking, Petitioners believe that action short of a change in the design basis threat for radiological sabotage remains appropriate.
They submit, in particular, that the Commission should institute an individual plant examination program for terrorist-induced events similar to that being carried out for inadvertent accidents beyond the design basis.
(a)
The IPE Program Several years ago, in its Severe Accident Policy Statement, the Commission made two important findings concerning 4
inadvertent accidents:
first, "On the basis of currently available information,... that existing plants pose no undue risk to public health and safety and... [there is] no present basis for immediate action on generic rulemaking or other regulatory changes for these plants because of severe accident risk;" and, i
second, based on NRC and industry experience with plant-specific j
i 1/ Petitioners
- concurrent request for emergency implementation of utility contingency plans was denied by the Director of the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards on January 15, 1991 (DD-91-1).
probabilistic risk assessments ("PRAs"), that it is prudent to implement "a systemic safety evaluation of existing plants to i
determine whether particular accident vulnerabilities are present and what cost-effective changes are desirable to ensure that there is no undue risk to public health and safety."2 In the area of inadvertent accidents, this Commission Policy Statement led to the NRC's " Individual Plant Examination" ("IPE")
Program, embodied in Generic Letter 88-20 (November 23, 1988),
under which plants are evaluating their ability to withstand accident scenarios that could arise but are beyond the design basis under which the plants are currently licensed.
This Program has recently been expanded to include severe accidents generated by external events such as earthquakes, fires, tornadoes, floods and transportation and nearby facility accidents.3 Generic Letter 88-20 is an information request under 10 C.F.R.
S 50.54 (f).
To satisfy this information request, individual licensees will be performing and submitting to the NRC plant-specific analyses that will examine potential accident scenarios beyond the current design basis; identify plant-specific issues that could represent potential vulnerabilities; and indicate any available modifications that could enhance each plant's overall safety.
2/ 50 Fed. Reg. 32138 (August 8, 1985).
3/ Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement #4, 56 Fed. Reg. 33310 (July 19, 1991).
The IPE Program will have four explicit benefits.
- First, plant-specific issues will be identified beyond the design basis; these are issues for which, despite the fact that a plant meets all current regulatory requirements, an upgrade may be desirable.
Second, an overall assessment will be made as to how much
" margin" exists beyond the design basis for each plant.4
- Third, where remedies to increase the plant-specific margin are identified in a given area, an assessment will be feasible as to whether available remedies make sense, with the judgment to be made first by the licensee using its own criteria, and later by the NRC using existing Ccmmission backfit policies.
- Fourth, individual licensees will have achieved a significantly better appreciation for severe accident (beyond-the-design-basis) behavior at their plants.
An unstated but obvious fifth benefit of the IPE Program will be an assessment of the adequacy of the NRC's own safety regulations.
Specifically, if generic trends emerge from the plant-specific findings indicating that the NRC's existing regulations are inadequate, then a basis will exist for modifying these regulations.
~4/ This assessment will in fact be done for each key area of safety protection, such as for loss-of-offsite power transients, medium-sized loss-of-coolant transients, loss-of-chain-reaction-shutdown transients, and so on.
~
(b)
The Need for an IPE-Type Evaluation of Beyond-The-Design-Basis Safeguards Events Like the risk of accidents beyond-the-design-basis, there is a risk from terrorist activities beyond-the-design-basis.
The time is ripe today for an analogous IPE-type evaluation of this risk, emphasizing beyond-the-design-basis threats such as vehicle bombs and attacks by a larger number of attackers using more sophisticated weapons than contemplated in the current design basis threat.
The NRC recently affirmed that it is generally confident as to the existing level of protection from terrorist threats. Thus, it stated, in response to a question from Representative Markey, l
"The possibility that there could be damage recognizes that the j
current configuration at sites varies and does not protect l
against all conceivable vehicle bomb attacks, although the massive structures and redundant safety systems that enable reactors to withstand floods, tornadoes, and earthquakes would provide some inherent protection against the damage from a vehicle bomb....[T]he Commission is confident that existing site and plant characteristics and security systems provide a varying but general capability for successfully thwarting a truck bomb attack".5 This statement, however, reflects an acknowledgment by 5/ Letter from James Curtiss, Acting Chairman, to Congressman Edward J. Markey, dated April 16, 1991 (emphasis added). 3
~
the Commission that the actual level of protection inherent in the structures and safety systems varies from plant-to-plant and that the level of physical protection inherent in security systems is likewise variable. Moreover, the Commission can and must recognize that threats can change with time, perhaps rapidly if a terrorist group with the motivation to do so comes into possession of an advanced technology beyond the current design basis. In such circumstances, it is clear that the the ongoing IPE Program would be a very useful and cost-effective point-of-departure for a similar evaluation of terrorist threats.
- Indeed, it is not only desirable but entirely feasible and inexpensive to carry out such an evaluation.
t The examination Petitioners suggest would analyze the existing plant-specific capability to resist threats beyond the current design basis.
Specifically, using the PRA-type models developed in the IPE for plant systems, their interdapendencies and relationships, and the way the plant equipment and personnel respond when one or another system or function is compromised, and using the spatial-collocation information developed for the flood-IPE and fire-IPE examinations, an analysis can readily be accomplished to demonstrate whether the compromise of certain collocated equipment from a terrorist attack still leaves adequate capability to shut down the plant and maintain it in a secure state.
-B-
To accomplish an IPE-type vulnerability search, it will be necessary for the NRC to specify a few specific beyond-the-design-basis threats, define each one's characteristics, and request that each individual nuclear power plant's licensee analyze the plant's ability to withstand each such threat.
This is directly analogous to the seismic-margin-review method that NRC has endorsed for the seismic part of the IPE, in which the NRC has specified the beyond-the-design-basis threat (the so-called " Review Level Earthquake") that an individual plant must j
use as a tool to evaluate the plant's ability to withstand beyond-the-design-basis earthquakes generally.
An IPE-type examination for safeguards events would accomplish five desirable objectives, analogous to those cited above for the current IPE Program for examining vulnerabilities from inadvertent accidents.
First, plant-specific issues will be identified beyond the design basis; these are issues for which, despite the fact that a plant meets all current regulatory requirements for the design basis threat, an upgrade may pe desirable.
Second, an overall assessment will be feasible as to how much " margin" exists beyond the design basis for each plant.
In the context of terrorist threats, this assessment can help determine whether a given plant does in fact possess adequate features to shut down safely after an act such as a vehicle-bomb
~
I attack.6 Third, where remedies to increase the plant-specific margin are identified in a given area, an assessment will be feasible as to whether available remedies make sense, with the judgment to be made first by the licensee using its own criteria and later by the NRC using existing Commission backfit policies.
Fourth, individual licensees will have achieved a significantly better appreciation for large (beyond-the-design-basis) terrorist threats at their plants.
Fifth, the effort will produce an assessment of the adequacy of the NRC's own safeguards regulations against terrorist threats.
Specifically, if generic trends emerge from plant-specific findings indicating that the NRC's existing regulations are inadequate, then a basis will exist for modifying these regulations.
Today, the capability to perform PRA-type analysis is widespread, and the Commission's staff uses PRA-type methods and l
insights for a very wide variety of purposes.
Most importantly, PRA methods can enable the evaluation of whether specific design features, such as redundancy and diversity of safety-shutdown l
functions and systems, and existing operator procedures and training, are adequate in the face of a terrorist-induced compromise of any given set of systems and functions, including i
l I
6/ This assessment should be done for potential terrorist damage to each key area of safety protection, such as for loss-of-offsite power transients, medium-sized loss-of-coolant transients, loss-of-chain-reaction-shutdown transients, and so on.
i l.
l
not only front-line systems but support systems as well.
If vulnerabilities are identified by a plant-specific analysis, it is likely that most or all of them can be eliminated or their effects reduced by measures that can be implemented at modest cost.
Of cours'e, PRA-type methods can only be used to assess configuration-type vulnerabilities, and not to quantify, in an absolute sense, the likelihood of a terrorist attack (the
" initiating event" in the PRA-type analysis).
Nobody can know what the likelihood of such an attack might be.
Hence it is not possible to analyze for " core damage frequency" in analogy to how PRAs calculate this same frequency for inadvertent accidents.
Rather, the terrorist-threat analysis is best structured to begin with one or more specific beyond-the-design-basis threats, and to analyze each plant's ability to withstand each such threat, in analogy to the structure of the seismic-margin-review methodology now endorsed under the IPE as an appropriate way to search for earthquake-initiated vulnerabilities.
Because PRA-type methods are so powerful, the utilities themselves have almost all adopted PRAs as their chosen method for undertaking their mandated IPE examinations under Generic Letter 88-20.
However, as of today these methods have not been widely used for evaluating the adequacy of plant-specific safeguards features against terrorist threats.
It is now known that configurations vary greatly from plant to plant, and therefore that there is a large variation in the extent to which different plants actually possess significant redundancy and diversity in their safety systems and functions beyond the design basis.
1 While the Commission may believe that in general plants are adequately protected against beyond-the-design-basis terrorist threats such as vehicle-bomb attacks, there can be only an inadequate basis for such a belief for any individual nuclear power plant, until a plant-by plant examination is performed, 1
analogous to the IPE Program that is studying inadvertent beyond-
]
the-design-basis accidents.
The fact is that today, with over two dozen level-1 PRA j
studies in the open literature, it would not be difficult for a determined terrorist group with access to PRA expertise to ascertain on a plant-specific basis exactly which systems and functions, taken in combination, would compromise the plant if they could be damaged.
Indeed, with PRA becoming a widespread and accepted analytical tool, hundreds of engineers ---not all necessarily responsible or loyal U.S. citizens --- have the basic knowledge to understand these issues.
l The further fact is that today, using modern systems-analysis capabilities, it is not difficult for a skilled utility analyst working under IPE-type guidelines suggested here to ascertain whether potential safeguards vulnerabilities might exist.
The task for the analyst is to work out which equipment could be compromised by a given threat and whether enough capability remains operable to shut down the nuclear plant and to maintain it in a safe configuration.
One of the lessons learned from the PRA literature is that such an analysis is highly plant-specific.
The generic insights that could be obtained without plant-specific analysis, if such a generic-type study were done, would probably not have much usefulness, although they might serve as the starting point for plant-specific analyses of all plants.
Petitioners believe that certain possible types of plant-specific vulnerabilities can be identified with a reasonable degree of particularity.
They do not believe, however, that the i
identification of such vulnerabilities necessarily should be a matter of public record.
They hereby advise the Commission that they intend, as soon as this matter is docketed, to submit under seal a list of possible types of vulnerabilities. They submit l
that the identification of possible types of vulnerabilities is both material and relevant to the Commission's actions on this Request and that a review of such possible vulnerabilities will demonstrate to the Commission the wisdom of applying an IPE-type analysis to beyond-the-design-basis safeguards events.
l __ -
CONCLUSION In light of the considerations above, the Commission should adopt a Policy Statement and an information request that asks nuclear power reactor licensees for information analogous to the information request in Generic Letter 88-20 but directed toward beyond-the-design-basis safeguards events rather than beyond-the-design basis inadvertent accidents.
Such action, parallel to the Commission's approach to severt accidents, would properly reflect the recognition that, while the Commission may have determined that nuclear power plants have protections in place which are generally adequate, it is nonetheless necessary to gather the requisite information to be able to affirm, on a plant-specific basis, that no significant safeguards vulnerabilities exist.
Respectfully submitted, C
Eldon V.C. Greenberg GARVEY, SCHUBERT &
ER 1000 Potomac S et, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20007 (202) 965-7880 Attorney for Petitioners Nuclear Control Institute and Committee to Bridge the Gap Dated:
September 4, 1991 Washington, D. C.
i DD-91-08 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
0FFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION Thomas E. Murley, Director l
)
)
ALL NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS
)
)
sp i
\\<'
DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 CFR 2.206 IhTRODUCTION f
On September 4, 1991, the Nuclear Control Institute and the Committee to Bridge the Gap (Petitioners), filed a Petition in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206 with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Comission).
On September 20, 1991, the Petitioners submitted an Annex to the Petition.
l The Petition was referred to the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor i
Regulation, for consideration.
The Petition asked the Comission to institute an individual plant examination (IFE) program requesting licensees to evaluate the margin of nuclear power plants to withstand an attack by explosives-laden surface vehicles and by a larger number of attackers using more sophisticated weapons than specified in the current design basis threat. The Petition asserts as grounds for this request the following:
(1) there is a risk from terrorist activities "beyond-the-design-basis;" (2) the actual level of protection inherent in the structures and safety systems varies from plant to plant and pe 4
ging,
7, a
l l
j y.
4
{
that the level of physical protection in security systems is likewise variable; i
1 (3) the ongoing IPE program would be a very useful and cost-effective point-of-departure for a similar evaluation of terrorist threats, specifically to l
demonstrate whether the compromise of certain collocated safety equipment from I
a terrorist attack still leaves adequate capability to shut down the plant and l
l maintain it in a secure state; and (4) vulnerabilities that are identified can i
j be eliminated or their effects reduced.
i On October 7, 1991, I acknowledged receipt of the Petition. I informed t
]
Petitioners that (1) the petition would be treated pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 l
l j
of the Comission's regulations and (2) appropriate action would be taken in
)
a reasonable time. For reasons discussed below, the Petition is denied.
- 1 BACKGROUND j
The Petition asked the Comission to institute an IPE program requesting licensees to evaluate the margin of nuclear power plants to withstand safe-
]
guards events beyond the current design basis threat. An IPE is a systematic examination of plant design and operation that looks for vulnerabilities to severe accidents and cost-effective safety improvements that' reduce or elimi-3 nate the important vulnerabilities. The ongoing IPE program has been a key 4
part of implementing the Comission's Policy Statement on Severe Reactor Accidents Regarding Future Designs and Existing Plants (50 FR 32138, August 8, 2
1985). This statement describes the policy the Comission has established to resolve safety issues related to reactor accidents more severe than design basis accidents. The Comission considered the issue of sabotage in developing the severe accident policy statement and did not include sabotage as a potential initiating event to be addressed in evaluating existing plants.
1 a
,. -,,. ~
,,--,+.,,,c..
,na m,.----
,e,.,,,
,~w
s
~ ;
i Both the proposed (48 FR 16014, April 13, 1983) and final Policy Statement j
include the following language:
The issues of both insider and outsider sabotage threats will be carefully analyzed and, to the extent practicable, will be l
emphasized as special considerations in the design and in the operating procedures developed for new plants. [En1phasis added]
l The NRC received no public comments regarding this statement.
i To help implement the policy statement, Generic Letter 88-20, " Individual
]
Plant Examination for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities--10 CFR 50.54(f)," dated j
November 23, 1988, requested that each licensee conduct an IPE for internally initiated accidental events only. On June 28, 1991, the NRC issued Supplement 4 to Generic Letter 88-20, to request that each licensee conduct a systematic IPE for severe accidents initiated by accidental external events (IPEEE). The NRC issued the request for an IPEEE after issuing the request for an IPE to allow the staff to perform additional work to (1) identify which external hazards need to be evaluated, (2) identify acceptable examination methods and develop proce-dural guidance, (3) coordinate with other ongoing external event programs, and (4) conduct a workshop to explain the IPEEE process and to obtain coments and questions on the draft generic letter supplement and associated guidance document.
In the workshop, and as later documented in the IPEEE guidance document (NUREG-1407), the staff specifically stated that_ sabotage was not to be addressed as part of the IPEEE.
The general purpose of the IPEEE is similar to that of the internal event IPE--that is, that each licensee (1) develop an appreciation of severe accident behavior, (2) understand the most likely severe accident sequences that could occur at its plant under full power operating conditions, (3) gain a qualita-tive understanding of the overall likelihood of core damage and radioactive material release, and (4) if necessary, reduce the overall likelihood of core
]
damage and radioactive material release by modifying hardware and procedures
]
that would help prevent or mitigate severe accidents. Consistent with the Commission's severe accident policy statement, neither the IPE nor the IPEEE addressed intentional acts of radiological sabotage.
i i
l The Commission's regulations do not require licensees to design safety i
t systems to be resistant to various acts of sabotage, although the diverse and redundant safety systems and structures at nuclear power plants provide j
i some inherent protection against such acts.
Instead, 10 CFR 73.55 requires l
licensees to establish and maintain an onsite physical protection system and security organization designed to protect against the design basis' threat of i
j radiological sabotage as defined in 10 CFR 73.1(a)(1). This is accomplished I
by a combination of detection, interception, and physical protection. The design basis threat is defined in 10 CFR 73.1(a)(1) as:
(i) A determined violent external assault, attack by stealth, or deceptive actions of several persons with the following attributes, assistance and equipment:
(A) Well-trained (including military training and skills) and dedicated individuals, (B) inside assistance l
which may include a knowledgeable individual who attempts to partici-l pate in a passive role (e.g., provide'information),-an active role (e.g., facilitate entrance and exit, disable alarms and communica-tions, participate in violent attack), or both, (C) suitable weapons, up to and including hand held automatic weapons, equipped with silencers and having long range accuracy, (D) hand-carried equipment, 1
including incapacitating agents and explosives for use as tools of entry or otherwise for destroying reactor, facility, transporter, or container integrity or features of the safeguards system, and (ii) An internal threat of an insider, including an employee (in any position).
a j
This design basis threat provides a standard for judging the adequacy of physical
[
protection systems, analogous to using design basis accidents in judging the adequacy of safety systems. This design basis threat of Part 73 is not an additional standard for judging the adequacy of safety systems pursuant to Part 50 requirements. Rather, Part 73 establishes additional independent requirements to protect against the design basis threat.
5-To assure itself that this Part 73 design basis threat remains adequate, prudent and reasonable, the staff continually reviews the threat from terrorist activities in the world environment (the " threat environment"). Staff analysis and recomendations are provided to the Comission semiannually. Following incidents in the Middle East in the mid-1980s in which terrorists used explosive-laden vehicles as bombs, the Comission considered if the design basis threat should be changed to include vehicle bombs. The Comission decided that it would not be necessary to change the design basis threat or to require licensees to provide permanent protection measures against land vehicle bombs. However, as a matter of prudence, the Commission issued Generic Letter 89-07, " Power Reactor Safeguards Contingency Planning for Surface Vehicle Bombs," on April 28, 1989.
In Generic Letter 89-07, the Commission requested licensees to prepare plans and make advance arrangements to irrplement, within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, short-range contingency measures in the event that the threat environment affecting reactors in the U.S. changes in a way that prompts the Commission to determine that protection against a land vehicle bomb threat is appropriate.
The Petitioners previously requested, on January 11, 1991, that the Conrc.ission revise its regulations to increase the design basis threat for nuclear power reactors to include explosive-laden vehicles and a larger number of attackers using more sophisticated weapons. On June 11, 1991, the Comission denied the Petition for Rulemaking based on a determination that there has been no change in the threat environment affecting reactors in the U.S. Since the design basis threat was adopted, that would justify a change in the design basis threat (56 FR 26782).
DISCUSSION The current Petition does not present any information or identify any issues that the Commission has not already considered and addressed in its rulemaking activities concerning Sections 73.55 and 73.1(a); policy decisions on severe accidents and the implementing IPE and IPEEE programs; and the denial of the Petitioners' previous request to increase the design basis threat for radiological sabotage.
In describing their perception of the need for an IPE for safeguards events, the Petitioners state that there is a risk from terrorist activities beyond the design basis. The NRC recognizes that any design basis threat has some related residual risk. One of the l
purposes of establishing a design basis threat is to define a policy positioi-on the level of safeguards that is prudent. This issue was previously l
l addressed in the Petition for Rulemaking to revise the design basis threat.
In denying that Petition, the Commission stated that it continues to believe that there is no credible threat targeting power reactors in this country (56 FR 26782, 26785, June 11, 1991). The current design basis threat is a hypothetical threat used to develop regulatory requirements, provide a standard i
against which changes in the real threat environment can be evaluated, and 3
provide a standard which the Commission considers reasonable for evaluating the implementation of safeguards (Ibid, at pages 26785 and 26788).
The Petitioners further state that although the Comission has denied their previous Petition for Rulemaking, action short of a change in the design basis threat for radiological sabotage remains appropriate. The staff notes that, by issuing Generic Letter 89-07, the Comission has already taken prudent action short of a change in the design basis threat regarding surf ace vehicles laden with explosives.
r--
m---
7, - -
r,-,,,,
s
\\
The Petition states that the actual level of protection inherent in the structures and safety systems varies from plant to plant, that the level of l
physical protection inherent in security systems is likewise variable and that the ongoing IPE Program would be a useful and cost-effective point-of-departure for similar evaluation of terrorist threats.
In describing the proposal for a sabotage IPE, the Petition states the following:
Specifically, using the PRA-type models developed in the IPE for plant systems, their interdependencies and relationships, and the way the plant equipment and personnel respond when one or another system or function is compromised, and using the spatial-collocation information developed for the flood-IPE and fire-IPE examinations, an analysis can readily be accomplished to demon-strate whether the compromise of certain collocated equipment from a terrorist attack still leaves adequate capability to shut down the plant and maintain it in a secure state.
The Petition further states the following:
Of course, PRA-type methods can only be used to assess configuration-type vulnerabilities, and not to quantify in an absolute sense, the likelihood of a terrorist attack (the " initiating event" in the PRA-type analysis). Nobody can know what the likeli-hood of such an attack might be. Hence it is not possible to analyze for " core damage frequency" in analogy to how PRAs calculate this same frequency for inadvertent accidents.
The NRC has already performed or caused to be performed the PRA-type analyses requested in the Petition.
In May 1991, the NRC completed its Regulatory Effectiveness Review (RER) Program which included performing a qualitative fault tree analysis of every operating nuclear power plant.
These f ault tree analyses use PRA-type models for plant systems, their interdependencies and relationships, and the way the plant equipment and personnel respond when one or another system or function is compromised.
These f ault tree analyses also use spatial-collocation information to deter-mine areas which, if successfully protected against adversaries, would provide
l adequate capability to shut down the plant and maintain it in a secure state.
Since it began the RER program in 1981, the NRC has used the results of these analyses in validating each licensee's identification of vital equipment and areas.
Since early 1987, the staff has also used these analyses to identify specific sets of saf ety equipment which, if lost, would create the most signi-ficant challenge to maintaining the plant in a safe condition. The NRC has used the spatial location of these sets of equipment in table-top exercises and licensee contingency response drills to evaluate licensee capability to respond l
to an external threat with characteristics attributed to the design basis threat. The staff will continue to use the f ault tree analyses in new operational safeguards response evaluations of contingency response capabil-ities at sites where contingency drills were not observed by RER teams. The staff will review available IPEs and IPEEEs, as appropriate, to update the results of fault tree analyses from the previous RER program.
Some licensees have also used PRA-type analyses in responding to Generic Letter 89-07. At a sufficient distance, a vehicle bomb would present no safety l
challenge to a nuclear power reactor, regardless of the spatial relationships and interdependencies of the safety systems. Some licensees have chosen to implement their contingency plans at such distances. Other licensees have conducted analyses of spatial relationships and interdependencies of safety equipment to establish closer distances for implementing contingency plans.
NUREG/CR-5246, "A Methodology to Assist in Contingency Planning for Protection of Nuclear Power Plants Against Land Vehicle Bombs," April 1989, describes a PRA-type methodology similar to that proposed by the Petitioners, which could be used by licensees to develop contingency plans.
i i
i i
. i i
The Annex to the Petition submitted on September 20, 1991, describes examples of plant designs and events that the Petitioners consider represent I
"possible types of vulnerabilities to beyond-the-design-basis safeguards events." The Petitioners assumed the success of sabotage on certain equipment before interdiction by the security force. Although the NRC staff does not agree with all of the details and conclusions of the Annex, the examples are similar to those developed by staff using site-specific fault tree analyses (where it is assumed that the saboteurs have successfully damaged some equipment before interdiction) as part of the RER and follow-on programs, which evaluate the effectiveness of licensee safeguards programs to protect against various sabotage scenarios.
These effectiveness evaluations conducted by the staff differ from those proposed in the Petition in one respect. The staff does not address adversary capabilities beyond those specified in the design basis threat. Conducting evaluations using more extensive threat characteristics would not provide useful information on the design of safety systems since one of the purposes of the design basis threat is to provide a standard for evaluating implemented safeguards measures. This design basis threat is well beyond the actual current threat environment. The PRA-type f ault tree analyses are not affected by assumptions regarding adversary characteristics. Rather, assumptions regarding adversary characteristics influence the evaluations of the effectiveness of the physical security systems and measures in picce to protect against external attacks. Although some licensees have chosen to modify safety systems to increase the difficulty of radiological sabotage, weaknesses identified from the results of the effectiveness evaluations are normally corrected by changes in the physical protection measures.
What the Petition intends in requesting an analysis of each plant's ability to withstand marginal increases in the postulated threat is not clear.
The Petition contends that "an overall assessment will be feasible as to how much ' margin' exists beyond the design basis for each plant." The Petition also recognizes that PRA-type methods cannot be used to analyze for " core i
damage frequency" since one cannot quantify the likelihood of a terrorist attack.
On one hand, the Petition could be interpreted as a request for an analysis of the impact of marginal increases in the postulated threat on the effectivene;s of safeguards measures. Having over 15 years of experi-ence in evalur.cing the overall effectiveness of physical security systems, the staff believes that such evaluations do not lend themselves to quanti-tative analysis or qualitative PRA-type analyses. The staff has successfully used other types of qualitative techniques in evaluating the effectiveness of safeguards measures against general adversary capabilities. However, these techniquesareinsensitivetomarginalchangesinthepostulatedthreat.1/
1/ n example of a postulated change in general adversary characteristics A
involved the use of a vehicle for entry into a protected area. The NRC evaluated whether this would significantly impact the effectiveness of site-specific physical security measures. In evaluating this postulated change, the staff identified only one set of circumstances in which a vehicle could have significantly impacted the ability of a power reactor licensee to protect the public health and safety. The licensee subsequently revised its security measures in such a way that the use of a vehicle became insignificant.
However, the effectiveness of safeguards measures as measured by drills and exercises are generally insensitive to marginal increases in the postulated number of attackers.
i
^
11 1
On the other hand, baseo on the Petition's description of the specific type of analysis proposed and the examples in the Annex, the Petition could be interpreted as directly connecting increases in the design basis threat with the compromise of collocated safety equipment. The staff has been conducting the PRA-type analyses proposed in the Petition for about 10 years and has found that such a direct connection cannot be made. PRA-type analyses help identify various combinations of safety equipment which, if at least one combination is protected, would allow a licensee to maintain a plant in a safe condition.
PRAs cannot assess the probability that a saboteur would choose to damage one set of equipment over another.
There is no practical way to directly connect j
threats marginally greater than the design basis threat with sabotage of any amount of safety-related equipment.
The Petition states that " vulnerabilities" that are identified can be eliminated.
It also notes that the proposed program would produce an assessment of the adequacy of the NRC's own safeguards regulations against terrorist threats.
These were essentially the goals of the RER program. Having conducted compre-hensive evaluations for 10 years, the staff concluded that the NRC's safeguards regulations were sound (SECY-91-052, February 26,1991). RER reviews of safe-guards effectiveness at each power reactor site led to more than 500 safeguards improvements. Although the RER program has been completed, the NRC has maintained the unique inspection capabilities developed during the RERs and is continuing to use these capabilities to evaluate the effectiveness of implemented safeguards.
In summary, the Petition is denied for the following reasons:
1.
The Petition does not present any information or identify any issues that the Comission has not already cansidered and addressed in previous policy decisions and rulemaking.
o o 2.
The Part 73 design basis threat for radiological sabotage provides a standard for judging the adequacy of physical protection measures, analogous to using design basis accidents in judging the adequacy of f
safety systems. The design basis threat is not an additional standard for judging the adequacy of safety systems.
3.
The Comission considered the issue of sabotage in developing the severe accident policy statement and did not include sabotage as a potential initiating event to be addressed in evaluating existing plants. Con-sistent with the severe accident policy statement, neither the IPE nor the IPEEE addressed intentional acts of sabotage.
4.
On June 11, 1991, the Comission denied an earlier Petition for Rulemaking l
from the same Petitioners requesting revision of the NRC's regulations to l'
increase the design basis threat for nuclear power reactors to include explosive-laden vehicles and a larger number of attackers using more sophisticated weapons.
5.
The staff has performed a qualitative f ault tree analysis of every operating nuclear power plant to assure that sufficient equipment is protected to provide adequate capability to shut down the plant and 1
maintain it in a secure state. The staff used these analyses in its RER and continuing programs to evaluate the effectiveness of NRC's safeguards regulations and licensee-implemented safeguards to protect this equipment against the Comission's design basis threat.
6.
To implement Generic Letter 89-07, some licensees have chosen to develop their vehicle bomb contingency plans for distances that would present no j
i
, i
+
safety challenge to a nuclear power reactor. Other licensees have con-t ducted PRA-type analyses such as those requested in the Petition as a basis on which to develop their contingency plans.
i 7.
Techniques for evaluating the effectiveness of physical security measures j
l are generally insensitive to marginal increases in postulated threats, and j
there is no practical way to directly connect threats marginally greater than the design basis threat with sabotage of any amount of safety-related i
equipment.
I CONCLUSION The NRC staff has reviewed the Petitioners' request that the Commission institute an IPE program requesting licensees to evaluate the margin of nuclear power plants to withstand an attack by explosive-laden surface vehicles and by a larger number of attackers using more sophisticated weapons than specified in the current design basis threat.
Institution of proceedings in response to a request made pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 is appropriate only when substantial health and safety issues have been raised. See Consolidated Edison Company of New York (Indian Point, Units 1, 2, and 3), CLI-75-8, 2 NRC 173, 176 (1975) and Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2), DD 84-7, 19 NRC 899, 923 (1984). The NRC has applied this standard to determine if the actions requested in the Petition are warranted. For the reasons discussed above, the NRC has no basis for taking the actions requested in the Petition, since no substantial health and safety issues have been raised by the Petition. Accordingly, the Petitioners' request for action pursuant to 10 CFR 52.206 is denied.
- ~
2 A copy of this decision will be filed with the Secretary for the Commission's review in accordance with 10 CFR s2.206(c).
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 31st day of December,1991.
i I
-4t-