ML20035C638
| ML20035C638 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 03/18/1993 |
| From: | Selin I, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | SENATE, ENVIRONMENT & PUBLIC WORKS |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20035C639 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9304080227 | |
| Download: ML20035C638 (8) | |
Text
l ENCLOSURE 1 STATEMENT SUBNITTED BY UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION TO THE i
SUBCO M ITTEE ON CLEAN AIR AND NUCLEAR REGULATION ComITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS UNITED STATES SENATE CONCERNING THE ADEQUACY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SECURITY TO PROTECT AGAINST TERRORISM AND SABOTAGE PRESENTED BY IVAN SELIN CHAIRMAN l
SUBMITTED: MARCH 18, 1993 l
? 0 0 Y O Poc227 y,g
.-~....
MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE SUBComITTEE, WE ARE PLEASED TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU TODAY TO DISCUSS THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0m ISSION'S PROGRAM FOR SAFEGUARDING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AND THE ACTIVITIES WE HAVE UNDERWAY TO REVIEW THE ADEQUACY OF THAT PROTECTION IN LIGHT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS.
WE BELIEVE THAT CUR TESTIMONY ALSO RESPONDS TO YOUR RECENT LETTER TO THE COMMISSION ON THIS SUBJECT.
AT THE OUTSET, WE WANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE BELIEVE THAT CURRENT SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN PLACE AT NRC LICENSED POWER l
REACTORS CONTINUE TO PROVIDE REASONABLE ASSURANCE OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY; THE QUESTION IS WILL THE PLANTS CONTINUE TO BE SAFE WITHOUT FURTHER PROTECTIVE MEASURES.
IT IS IRONIC THAT THE STAFF ALREADY HAD A REVIEW UNDERWAY, STARTING IN LATE 1991.
THE REVIEW, HOWEVER, WAS PRIMARILY FOCUSED ON INTERNAL ACCESS MEASURES, AND NOT ON EXTERNAL ATTACKS SUCH AS TRUCK BOMBS.
AS PART OF THIS REVIEW, THE STAFF WAS ASKED TO CONSIDER A PROPOSAL BY THE NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCES COUNCIL (NUMARC) TO MODIFY THE DESIGN BASIS THREAT AND PLACE GREATER RELIANCE ON INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.
NUMARC ALSO QUESTIONED INTERNAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.
IN A FEW MINUTES I'LL DISCUSS WHAT A DESIGN BASIS, THREAT MEANS.
IN LIGHT OF THE RECENT UNAUTHORIZED YEHICLE ENTRY AT THE THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR POWER STATION AND THE BOMBING AT THE WORLD TRADE CENTER IN NEW YORK CITY, WE AJtE EXPANDING OUR REVIEW TO TAKE A FRESH LOOK AT THE QUESTION OF PROTECTING AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED YEHICLE ENTRY AND A VEHICLE BOMB.
IT IS NOT OUT OF THE QUESTION THAT AT THE CONCLUSION OF OUR REVIEW, WE MIGHT, ON THE ONE HAND, DECIDE TO STRENGTHEN SOME MEASURES. WHILE AT THE SAME TIME, MODIFYING OR DELETING OTHER REQUIREMENTS WHICH HAVE PROVEN TO BE INEFFECTIVE.
I
fr.Q.AL THE FIRST QUESTION TO ADDRESS IS OUR OBJECTIVE.
THE OBJECTIVE OF OUR PHYSICAL PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS AT COP 9tERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS IS TO PROTECT TH GENERAL PUBLIC FROM SABOTAGE-INDUCED RELEASES OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OFF THE SITE.
THE OBJECTIVF IS NOT THE DISCOURAGEMENT OF TERRORISM EEE 1E, NOR IS IT THE PROTECTION OF THE REST OF THE POWER PLANT.
IT IS THE LICENSEES' RESPONSIBILITY TO DECIDE HOW MUCH ADDITIONAL PROTECTION THEY MAY WISH TO PROVIDE FOR THEIR FACILITY, EQUIPMENT, AND EMPLOYEES.
INTELLIGENCE AND ITS CONTRIBUTION
~~
THE SECOND QUESTION IS "HOW MUCH SECURITY IS EN0 UGH *7 THIS IS NOT AN AREA WHERE ONE CAN SAY, "WAT DOES THE INTELLIGENCE INDICATE?" AND THEN DETERMINE THE THREAT AGAINST WICH WE PROTECT.
INTELLIGENCE IN THIS AREA IS ONE PART HARD DATA AND SEVERAL PARTS JUDGMENT. WE DEFEND AGAINST A RATIONAL ADVERSARY-
-WE CANNOT ANTICIPATE THE ACT iAS OF A DERANGED PERSON WO DOESN'T FOLLOW l
LOGIC.
SHOULD WE REQUIRE IMPREGNABLE BARRIERS OR ONES THAT END UP BY REDIRECTING A WOULD-BE ADVERSARY TO A LESS WELL PROTECTED TARGET 7 ALL THESE CONSIDERATIONS ARE REFLECTED IN A DESIGN BASIS THREAT, IN OTHER WORDS, A SET OF POSTULATED THREATS AGAINST WICH PLANT DEFENSES ARE DESIGNED, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ACTUAL EVENTS; THE DETERRENCE PROVIDED BY THE SECURITY SYSTEM FROM A l
POTENTIAL ADVERSARY'S POINT OF VIEW; ?1E DIFFICULTY OF INSTALLING AND MAINTAINING A SECURITY SYSTEM; THE AVAILABILITY OF OTHER, PERHAPS MORE ATTRACTIVE TARGETS; AND INTELLIGENCE WEN IT IS AVAILABLE.
l IT IS THE ABSENCE OF A KNOW, CREDIBLE THREAT THAT FORCES US TO CREATE A DESIGN BASIS THREAT AGAINST WICH TO PROTECT. HOWEVER, I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS 2
THAT THE DESIGN BASIS THREAT IS A JUDGMENTAL SUBJECT ON WHICH PAST C0m ISSIONS HAVE SPENT A GOOD DEAL OF EFFORT.
CONCLUSIONS DRAWN ON THE VEHICLE BOMB THREAT HAVE NOT BEEN UNANIMOUS.
I DON'T KNOW HOW THE CURRENT ComISSION WILL DECIDE THE ISSUES UNDER RECONSIDERATION (WHICH INCLUDE VEHICLE BOMBS), BUT WE WILL DEFINITELY GIVE THEM A FRESH AND OPEN-NINDED LOOK.
PAST ACTIVITIES NRC'S POLICY REGARDING THE VEHICLE B0MB THREAT AND THE NEED FOR VEHICLE BARRICADES AT POWER REACTORS HAS BEEN REVIEWED ON SEVERAL PREVIOUS OCCASIONS.
AFTER THE BOMBING OF THE MARINE BARRACKS IN BEIRUT IN 1983, THE NRC INITIATED EXTENSIVE, CLASSIFIED STUDIES WITH SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES TO EVALUATE THE VULNERABILITY OF A NUCLEAR FACILITY TO A LARGE VEHICLE B0MB, AND TO IDENTIFY BARRIER TECHNOLOGIES THAT COULD BE USED TO PROTECT FACILITIES. THE COMISSION CONCLUDED THAT SUCH PROTECTION WAS NOT NEEDED AT THAT TINE.' THE ComISSION PUT A LOT OF RELIANCE ON THE STURDINESS OF REACTOR BUILDINGS, ON REDUNDANT SAFETY SYSTEMS AND ON DAMAGE NITIGATION FEATURES OF POWER REACTORS, IN OTHER WORDS ON THE TRADITIONAL DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH PHILOSOPHY. THEY ALSO GAVE WEIGHT TO THE POTENTIAL DRASTIC MATURE OF THE CONSEQUENCES AND THE LIKELY POLITICAL BACKLASH THAT WOULD BE DIRECTED AGAINST THE CAUSES OF THE SABOTEUR.
THEY CONSULTED WITH THE INTELLIGENCE COM UNITY AND HEARD THAT THE Co m VNITY BELIEVED THAT THERE WAS ND CREDIBLE THREAT OF TERRORISM AGAINST NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS. TO ENSURE THE BEST THREAT ASSESSMENT, NRC ALSO REQUESTED THE VIEWS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.
IN TURN, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL REQUESTED INPUT FROM THE DEPARTMENTS OF DEFENSE AND ENERGY AS WELL AS THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.
3
REALIZING THE EVANESCENT NATURE OF THE CONCLUSIONS AND THE SPEED WITH WHICH CIRCUMSTANCES MIGHT CHANGE, THE COMISSION DID REQUIRE POWER REACTOR LICENSEES TO DEVELOP CONTINGENCY PLANNING TO PROVIDE SHORT-TERM PROTECTION AGAINST VEHICLE BOMBS; THE AGENCY VERIFIED THESE PLANS VIA INSPECTIONS IN 1989, 1990,
]
AND AGAIN RECENTLY.
CURRENT ACTIVITIES WHAT ARE WE DOING NOW7 AS INDICATED EARLIER, THE Com ISSION BELIEVES THAT IT i
IS AN APPROPRIATE TIME TO REEVALUATE THE DESIGN BASIS THREAT FOR RADIOLOGICAL SABOTAGE. THE PRESENT THREAT STATEMENT DOES NOT ADDRESS'THE USE OF A VEHICLE NOR THE USE OF A VEHICLE BOMB AGAINST A POWER REACTOR.
ONE STEP WE HAVE JUST TAKEN WAS TO HAVE LICENSEES REVIEW THEIR VEHICLE BOMB CONTINGENCY PLANS IN COORDINATION WITH THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTORS.
t GENERALLY, SUCH CONTINGENCY PLANS CALL FOR SUCH ACTIONS AS RETURNING TO SERVICE ANY EQUIPMENT, TEMPORARILY TAKEN OUT OF SERVICE, WHICH WOULD BE USED TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN A SAFE SHUTDOWN CONDITION. A NUMBER OF LICENSEES INSTALLED PERMANENT VEHICULAR BARRIERS SEVERAL YEARS AGO. MANY LICENSEES PLAN TO USE HEAVY EQUIPMENT, VEHICLES, OR CONC #ETE BARRIERS, O!G DITCHES, OR EMPLACE LARGE MOUNDS OF GRAVEL AS TEMPORARY BARRIERS. MANY OF THESE SHORT-TERM MEASURES, HDWEVER, COULD NOT BE REALISTICALLY UNDERTAKEN ON A LONG-TERM OR PERMANENT BASIS. THEY MAY DISRUPT IMPORTANT PLANT MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES, THEY IMPOSE ADDITIONAL BURDENS ON EMPLOYEES SEEKING ACCESS, AND THEY ULTIMATELY DIMINISH OVERALL OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY.
IF PERMANENT MEANS ARE REQUIRED, A DIFFERENT APPROACH MIGHT BE NECESSARY.
4
~
I WHERE D3 WE GO FROM HERE7 THE COM ISSION IS REEVALUATING THE VULNERABILITY OF j
A NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR TO UNAUTHORIZED VEHICLE ENTRY AND VEHICLE BOMBS, REFLECTING CURRENT FACILITY CONFIGURATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY ADVANCEMENTS. SINCE THE ORIGINAL STUDIES WERE COMPLETED BY SANDIA, THE CONCEPT OF STORING j
IRRADIATED SPENT FUEL IN INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITIES HAS MATURED. THE POTENTIAL VULNERABILITY OF THESE FACILITIES AND OTHER EXTERNAL
)
SAFETY SYSTEMS WILL ALSO BE STUDIED.
A RANGE OF PROTECTION OPTIONS AND ASSOCIATED COSTS WILL BE EVALUATED, TO INCLUDE SUCH CONSIDERATIONS AS VEHICLE BARRICADES AT THE-PROTECTED AREA PERIMETER, AND ANALYSIS OF SITE-SPECIFIC STAND-0FF DISTANCES TO COMPENSATE FOR THE EFFECT OF A BLAST.
FOR SOME POWER REACTORS, VEHICLE BARRICADES COULD 3
EASILY BE INPLEMENTED, WHILE OTHER FACILITIES, BECAUSE OF SITING OR SIZE, 1
MIGHT HAVE CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY UNDERTAKING SUCH MEASURES.
1 THE NRC STAFF HAS FORMULATED A WORK PLAN AND HAS MADE IT AVAILABLE TO THE 3
GENERAL PUBLIC. THE ACTION PLAN IS COMPOSED OF TWO PHASES.
PHASE I WILL CONSIST OF A RECONNAISSANCE -- A BRINGING UP-TO-DATE OF EARLIER WORK AND A REVIEW 0F RECENT DEVELOPMENTS. THESE FINDINGS WILL BE PRESENTED TO THE COMISSION NEXT MONTH; WE EXPECT TO BE ABLE To MAKE AN INITIAL DETEMINATION OF DEPTH AE DIRECTION FOR NEXT STEPS. THE SEC0 5 PHASE, LASTING UP TO SIX MONTHS, WOULD ENTAIL A MDRE PROFOUND REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE CHANGES IN THE
)
j NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR I WUSTRY, THE USE OF A VEHICLE, AND THE DESIGN BASIS THREAT FOR RADIOLOGICAL SABOTAGE.
4 WE WANT THIS PROCESS TO INCLUDE PARTICIPATION BY THE PUBLIC TO THE GREATEST 4
5 l
t EXTENT POSSIBLE, REALIZING THAT CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE AND VULNERABILITY INFORMATION MUST REMAIN CLASSIFIED.
THE STAFF WILL CONDUCT A WORKSHOP TO SOLICIT IDEAS, VIEWS AND JUDGMENTS ON VARIOUS APPROACHES AND TECHNIQUES THAT CAN BE FACTORED INTO OUR FORMAL REVIEW. AFTER THE STAFF HAS COMPLETED ITS ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPED PROPOSED OPTIONS, WE PLAN TO PRESENT THEM TO THE PUBLIC DURING A COMISSION MEETING, REPORT TO OUR CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT COM ITTEES, AND THEN PUBLISH OUR CONCLUSIONS IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER.
MR. CHAIRMAN, IN YOUR LETTER OF FEBRUARY 22, 1993, YOU POSED A QUESTION DEALING WITH THE DECISION BY GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION T'0 CONTINUE OPERATION OF THE THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION DURING THE FEBRUARY 7, 1993 EVENT. THAT DECISION IS BEING EVALUATED BY AN NRC INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM (IIT) WHICH IS CONDUCTING A REVIEW OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE EVENT. WILE THERE ARE ARGUMENTS ON BOTH SIDES, EVEN WITH THE BENEFIT OF OVER FIVE WEEKS OF HINDSIGHT, WE HAVE FOUND iiG REASON TO QUESTION THE OPERATORS
- DECISION TO CONTINUE OPERATION OF THE PLANT. THE IIT REPORT WILL BE SUBMITTED TO THE ComISSION NEXT MONTH. WE WILL BE PLEASED TO PROVIDE YOU A COPY OF THE REPORT WHEN IT IS AVAILABLE.
SUmARY IN SUMARY, WE PROMISE AN OPEN-MINDED, FRESH REVIEW 0F THE DESIGN BASIS THREAT FOR RADIOLOGICAL SA30TAGE IN ORDER TO REEVALUATE THE ABILITY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS TO ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVE OF PROTECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY.
WE PLAN TO 00 THIS WITH AS MUCH PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND SCRUTINY AS POSSIBLE, GIVEN SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, AND IN A PRUDENT BUT TIMELY MANNER.
6
s i
i MR. CHAIRMAN, THIS CONCLUDES OUR STATEMENT. WE WOULD BE PLEASED TO ANSWER ANY
]
QUESTIONS THAT YOU AND THE SUBC0pmITTEE MAY HAVE.
i 4
1 l
a e
T 1
i
.r a
J 7
J.S TH 4 ur
- f 4
o,,
UNITED STATES p
g3 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
i l
h WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
,,q d
W GNid l
S f
EDO Principal Correspondence Control FROM:
DUE: 03/08/93 EDO CONTROL: 0008605 DOC DT: 02/19/93 FINAL REPLY:
Paul Leventhal, Nuclear Control Institute Daniel Hirsch, Committee to Brid9e the Gap TO:
Chairman Selin FOR SIGNATURE OF:
- GRN CRC NO: 93-0149 I
Murley DESC:
ROUTING:
URGES NRC TO UPGRADE SECURITY & EVALUATE SAFETY Taylor.
SYSTEMS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS RE INCIDENT AT TMI Sniezek Thompson DATE: 02/23/93 Blaha Knubel ASSIGNED TO:
CONTACT:
TTMartin, RI NRR Muriey Jordan, AEOD SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:
((
fA&'c S
f$
o y,
/smw D W/n y e o
i, m
n/7 g p Jwd'y' -
0%. ;J
~-VAva DUE TO ;-"n, d.,n& ORS 7~ n NS iM -j /u0 W / 7 ga' i l
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL TICKET i PAPER NUMBER: CRC-93-0149 LOGGING DATE: Feb 23 93 ACTION OFFICE: EDO AUTHOR: P. LEVENTHAL D. HIRSCH AFFILIATION: DC (DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA) ADDRESSEE: CHAIRMAN SELIN LETTER DATE: Feb 19 93 FILE CODE: IDR-5 TMI
SUBJECT:
REQ TO REOPEN PETITION FOR RULEMAKING AND REQUEST FOR ACTION --TMI ACTION: Appropriate DISTRIBUTION: CHAIRMANN, COMRS, OGC, DSB, RF SPECIAL HANDLING: NONE CONSTITUENT: NOTES: ENCLS AVAILABLE IN THE EDO DATE DUE: Mar 8 93 l SIGNATURE: DATE SIGNED: AFFILIATION: i EDO - 008605 0 3 t *1 ; J /- fl - m, i}}