ML20035D297
| ML20035D297 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/06/1993 |
| From: | Murley T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Hirsch D, Leventhal P COMMITTEE TO BRIDGE THE GAP, NUCLEAR CONTROL INSTITUTE |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20035C639 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9304130047 | |
| Download: ML20035D297 (4) | |
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e, UNITED STATES s
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n
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,i WASHINGTON, D. C. 205L5 M
g April 6,1993 yp-p29 i
Mr. Paul Leventhal, President Nuclear Control Institute
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1000 Connecticut Avenue, NW.
Suite 704 Washington, DC 20036 Mr. Daniel Hirsch, President Committee to Bridge the Gap i
1637 Butler Avenue i
l Suite 203 l
Los Angeles, California 90025
Dear Messrs. Leventhal and Hirsch:
I am responding to the letter you sent to Chairman Selin on February 19, 1993, regarding the recent security event at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station (TMI) in Pennsylvania.
In that letter you urged the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory i
Commission (NRC/ Commission) to take appropriate action to upgrade security and evaluate safety systems at nuclear power plants in order to avoid or mitigate the radiological consequences of more serious incidents in the future.
Your letter discussed your Petition for Rulemaking on this subject in January 1991 and subsequent denial by the NRC to pursue such rulemaking.
As you may know, the adequacy of nuclear power plant security to protect against
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terrorism or sabotage was the subject of a hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Regulation of the Committee on Environment and Public i
Works on March 19, 1993.
Since the Commission's testimony at that hearing addressed many of the issues you have raised, I have enclosed a copy of our written testimony for your information.
With respect to the TMI security event, the NRC dispatched an incident investigation team (IIT) to review the circumstances surrounding the event and the adequacy of the response taken by GPU Nuclear Corporation. Members of the llT are independent from NRC personnel involved in the day-to-day regulation of the TMl facility. We expect the IIT to issue its report in early April 1993, and we would like to provide you a copy of the final report when it is _available.
Your 1991 Petition for Rulemaking, and subsequent petition under 10 CFR 2.206, requested the NRC to revise the design-basis threat for radiological sabotage at nuclear power plants to include truck and boat bombs and a larger numbcr of attackers using more sophisticated weapons. Of immediate concern at that time l
was the impending military action in and over Iraq by United Nations forces and i
the concomitant increase in terrorist threats by Iraq, particularly against the l
United State.s. A Notice of Receipt of Petition for Rulemaking was published in the Federal Reaister on January 29, 1991, in response to your petition. The NRC carefully considered the 38 letters of comment received in response to the notice.
In its denial of June 11, 1991, published in the Federal Reaister at 6
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Messrs. Leventhal and Hirsch April 6, 1993 56 ER 26782, the NRC stated that it based the denial on a Commission determination that there had been no significant new information that would warrant a change in the design-basis threat.
In my Director's Decision of December 31, 1991, I discussed in detail the action taken by the NRC and by NRC licensees to develop contingency plans for land vehicle bombs.
These measures were implemented in response to NRC Generic Letter 89-07, dated April 28, 1989.
Licensees are required to have these plans in place and to be able to implement them within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after notification from the NRC that the threat environment affecting reactors in the U.S. changes in a way that prompts the Commission to determine that protection against a land vehicle bomb threat is appropriate.
As background, the NRC established a set of hypothetical design-basis threat statements in the mid-1970s based on extensive review and analysis of non-nuclear terrorist attributes and extensive discussions with the intelligence community.
These threats considered the defense-in-depth philosophy that has always been employed in nuclear plant design (e.g., redundant and diverse systems to protect t
and cool the reactor and to provide alternate power supplies and controls).
Furthermore, the design features that enable safety-related equipment to withstand floods and tornados, and structures to withstand earthquakes, would also provide a degree of protection against damage from a vehicle used as a battering ram.
To ensure that these design threat statements remain valid, the NRC has a program to continually review the threat environment.
This program takes into account all available information provided by the intelligence community, including the Executive Branch intelligence agencies, on both foreign i
and domestic terrorist-related activities. Agencies of the Executive Branch met very recently with senior NRC officials to discuss the current situation as it relates to commercial nuclear power plants.
On February 26, 1993, 7 days after the date of your letter, the World Trade Center in New York City was bombed using a van to transport the explosive material. This incident is under investigation by a task force composed of the i
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and the New York Police Department. As discussed above, the design threat specified by the NRC for nuclear power plants does not require protection against vehicle bombs because that scenario was considered an event that has a low likelihood of occurring at a nuclear power plant.
Although the NRC has reviewed this policy on several occasions, the Commission believes now is an appropriate time to reevaluate and, if necessary, update the design-basis threat for vehicle intrusion and the use of vehicular bombs at nuclear power plants in light of these recent events. The Commission has requested the staff to prepare an analysis on the adequacy of current regulatory requirements to protect licensed nuclear facilities against threats by vehicle intrusion, including an assessment of the threat posed by vehicular bombs. The staff has been requested to take into account the findings and recommendations of the llT report on the TMI incident and other intelligence community reports.
The staff will consider your request to reopen rulemaking proceedings in light of the reevaluation being undertaken.
f Messrs. Leventhal and Hirsch In summary, the NRC will continue to monitor very closely the findings of the investigations of these two recent events (TMI and the World Trade Center) and will assess the relevance of their findings to current NRC security requirements.
It is not out of the question that at the conclusion of our review, we may decide to strengthen some measures while at the same time decide to modify or delete others which have been non-restrictive.
Sincerely, Original sind d n:nnae F. Vurlc7 /
Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
Written testimony submitted 3/18/93 Distribution:
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