ML20029B388
| ML20029B388 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 03/04/1991 |
| From: | Stolz J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | GPU Nuclear Corp, Jersey Central Power & Light Co |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20029B389 | List: |
| References | |
| DPR-16-A-149 NUDOCS 9103070187 | |
| Download: ML20029B388 (6) | |
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1 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o,%
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WASHINGTON, D C. 206(4 GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION AND JERSEY CENTRAL POWER tt LIGHT COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-219 OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GEMERATING STATION AMENDMENT TO PROY1SIONAL OPERATING LICENSE Amendrient No.149 License No. DpR 16 The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by GPU Nuclear Corporation et al.
(thelicensee),datedJuly 10.-1990, complieswiththeslandards, and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as-amended (the Act).- and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in i
10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will o>erate in conformity with the application, the provisions of tie Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.
There is-reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; D.
The issua,1ce of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's reEulations and all applifable requirements have i
been satisfied.
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9103070187 910304 DR ADOCK 050 2
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Accordingly. the license is amended by changes to the Technical f.
Specifications as indicated in the attlichment to this license amendment, i'
and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Provisional Operating License No. DPR-16 is hereby amended to read as follows:
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(2)-TechnicalSpecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as l
revised through Amendment No.149. are hereby incorporated in the license.
GPU Nuclear Corporation shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
n-4 3.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance, to be I.
implemented within 30 days of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS$!0N g
O dohnJ. $tolz, Director
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ProfectDirectorateI-4
( pjvision of Reactor Projects - 1/f!
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( ffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulatica O
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Attachment:
Changes to the Technical:
Specifications-I Date of Issuance: March 4.1991 i;
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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMEN 0 MENT NO.149 PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-16 DOCKET NO. 50-219 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages as indicated.
The revised pages aie identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.
Remove Insert Page 3.1-4 Page 3.1-4
-Page 3.1-5 Page 3.1-5 Page 3.1-8 Page 3.1-8 t
4
particular pectcetion instrument is not rOguired; or tho plant is placOd in the protection or safe condition that the instrument initiates.
This is accomplisbed in a normal manner without subjecting the plant to abnormal operations conditions. The action and cut-of-service requirenents apply to all instrumentation within a partiev',ar function, e.g., if the requirements on any one of the ten scram functions cannot be met then control rods shall be inserted.
The trip level settings not specified in Specification 2.3 have been included in this specification.
The basts for these settings are discussed below.
The high drywell pressure trip setting is s 3.5 psig.
This trip will scram the reactor, initiate reactor isolation, initiate containment spray in conjunction with low low reactor water level, initiate core spray, initiate primary containment isolation, initiate automatic depressuritation in conjunction with low-low-low-reactor water level, initiate the stand y gas treatment ; system and isolate the reactor building.
The scram function s.uts the core down during the loss-of-coolant accidents A steam leak of about 15 gpm snd a itquid leak of about 35 gpm from the primary system will cause drywell pressure to reach the scram point; and, therefore, the scram provides prctection for breaks greater than the abovu.
High drywe,'.1 pressure provides a second means of initiating the core spray to mitigate the consequences of loss-of-coolant accident.
Its trip setting of 13.S puig initiates the core spray in time to provide adequate core cooling. The break-size coverage of high drywell pressure was discussed above.
Low-low water level and high drywell pressure in addition to initiating core spray also causes isolation valve closure. These settings are adequate to cause isolation to minimite the of f site doce within required limits.
It is permissible to make the drywell pressure instrument channels inoperable during performance of the integrated primary containment leakage rate test provided the reactor is in the cold shutdown condition.
The reason for this is that the Engineered Safe".y i=ctures, which are effective in case of a LOCA under these conditions, stil still be effective because they will be activated twhen the Engineered safety Features system is required as identified in the technical specification of the system) by low-low reactor water level.*
The scram discharge volume has two separats instrument volumes utilized to detect water accumulation. The high water level is based on the design that the water in the SDIV'a, as detected by either set of level instruments, shall not be *J1 owed to exceed 29.0 gallone; thereby, permitting 137 control rods to scram. To provide further margin, an accumulation of not more than 14.0 gallons of water, as detected by either instrument volume, will result ia a rod block and an' alarm.
The accumulation of not n: ore than 7.0 gallons of water, as detected in either instrument volume will result in an alarm.
Detailed analysis of transients have shown that sufficient protection is provided by other scrams below 45% power to permit bypassing of the turbine trip and generator load rejection scrams. However, for operational convenience, 40% of rated power has buen chosen ao the setpoint below which these trips are bypassed. This setpoint le coincident with bypass valve capacity.
A low condenser vacuum scram trip of 20
- 8. aches h twa,een provided to protect the main condenser in the event that vacuum is lost.
A loss of condenser vacuum would cause the turbine stop valves to close, resulting in a turbine trip Oyater Creek 3.1-4 Amendment No 20, 73, 79, 112,149
- Correction:
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- j transient. Ths low condsnsor vacuum trip providos a rollable backup to the 7
Thus, if there is a failure of the turbine trip on low vacuum, tne reactor would automatically scram at 20 inches Hg.
The condenser is I
capable of receiving bypass steam until 7 inches Hg vacuum thereby mitigating i
the transient and providing a margin.
i Main steamline high radiation is an indication of excessive fuel failure.
Scram and reactor isol.ation are initiated when high activity le detected in the l
main steam lines. These actions prevent further release of fission products to l
the environment.
This is accomplished by setting the trip at 10 times normal rated power backgtound. Although these actions are initiated at this level, at i
lower activities the monitoring system also provides for continuous monitoring of radioactivity in the primary steam lines as discussed in Section VII-G of the FDSAR.
Such capability provides the operator with a prompt indication of any release of fission products from the fuel to the reactor coolant above normal rated power background.
The gross failure of any single' fuel rod could release a sufficient amount of activity to approximately double the background activity at normal rated power.
This would be indicative of the onset of fuel failures and would alert the operator to the need for appropriate action, as defined by Section 6-of these specifications.
i The settings to isolate the ist lation condenser in the event of a break in the steam or condensate lines are based on the predicted maximum flows that these systems would experience durjng operation, thus permitting operation while affording protection in the event of a break.
The settings correspond to a flow rate of less than three times the normal flow rate of 3.2x105 lb / h r.-
Upon initiation of the alternate shutdown panel, this function is bypassed to prevent spurious isolation due to fire induced circuit faults.
The setting of ten times the stack release limit for isoistion of the l
air-ejector of fgas line is to permit the operator to perform normal, immediate j
remedial action if the stack limit is exceeded.
The time necessary for this i
action would be extremely short when conridering the annual averaging which is allowed under 10CFR 20.106, and, therefore, would produce insignificant effects on doses to the public.
i Four radiation monitors are provided which initiate isolation of the reactor building and operation of the standby gas treatment system.
Two monitors are located in the ventilation ducts, one is located in the area of the refueling pool and one is located in the reactor vessel head storage area.
The trip logic is basically a 1 out of 4 system.
Any upscale trip will cause the desired action. Trip settings of 17 mr/hr in the duct and 100 mr/hr on the refueling floor are based upon initiating standby gas treatment system so as not to exceed allowed dose rates of 10 CFR 20 at the nearest site boundary, f.
The SRM upscale of SX10 CPS initiates a rod block so that the chamber can De 5
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-relocatedtoelowerfluxarG3tomaintainSRMgapabilityaspowerisincreased i
to the IRH range.
Full-scale reading is 1-x 10 CPS.
This rod block is 5
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bypassed in IRH Ranges 8 and higher vince a level of 5 x 10 CPS is reac3ed j~
and the SRM chamber is at its fully withdrawn position.
The SRM downscale rod block of 100 CPS prevents the instrument chamber from being withdrawn too far from the core during the period that it is required to-monitor the neutron flux.
This downscale rod block is also bypassed in IRM
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OYSTER CREEK 3.1-5 Amendment No 2,7,112.149 01/5/71, 11/5/71 l
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TABLE 3.1.1 PROTFCTIVE INSTRUMENTATEON REQUIREMENTS Reactor Modes Min. No. of Min. No. of in which Function Operable or Instruuent 3
Must Be Operable Operating Channels Per O
- (tripped}
Ope able 7,ction N
Function Trio Settino Shutdown Refuel Startuo Run Trio Systems Trio Systems Recuired*
n A.
Scram ri s
- 1. Manual Scram X
X X
X 2
1 Insert control rods X(s)
X(ll)
X 2
2-
- 2. High Seactc<
Pressure
- 3. High Drywell 5 3.5 peig X(u)_
X(u)
X 2
2 Pressure
- 4. Low Reactor 2
I X
2 2
Water Level
- 5. a. High Water 5 29 gal.
X(a)
X(z)
X(z) 2 2
e Level in Scram Discharge Volume North Side
- b. High Water 5 29 gal.
X(a)
X(z)
X(t) 2 2
Level in Scram Discharge Volume South Side 53g
- 6. Low Condenser
> 20 inches hg.
X(b)
X 2
2 g
vacuum
?>
- s" 7c High Radiation 5 10 x normal X(s)
X X
2 2
go
.in Main Steam background z
L, Line Tunnel dru o
(b e.e C1 e
G3
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n Wa M
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