ML20024G649

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Proposed Tech Specs Raising Permissible Setpoint of Eight Safety/Relief Valves Installed at Plant to 1,108 Psig
ML20024G649
Person / Time
Site: Monticello Xcel Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/16/1978
From:
NORTHERN STATES POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20024G412 List:
References
NUDOCS 9102140380
Download: ML20024G649 (8)


Text

. - _ . . _ _ . - - _

i

  • I s

TTc Uw 20 10 c

~

>A UO Ou OCD d

t XQ

..a-.

h m

1.0 C AFETY I ritITY ~

LUfITING SAFETY SYSTD1 SETTl?ES T w i Dlu

De e_... __.

U

'..' REACTOP COOf ANT SY$TEtt 2.5 i

REACTOR C00lANT SYSTEM Applicabilitv: Applicability:

Applie- to limi's on reac'"r co o la nt Applies to trip settings of the instrumente evnter pres! a- .

and device- which are provided to prevent the reactor system safety limits from being es. ce ed ed .

Objective: p_hj ec t ive :

To establish .1 limit below wh ich the To define the level of the process variables Integrity of the reactor coolant

' at which automatic protective action is sys tem is ont threatened due to an initiated to prevent the safety limits from overpressure condition. b"ing exce.cded.

t Syecification: Specification:

The reactor vesnel pressure shall A. Reactor Coolant Ifigh Pressure Scram shaii not exceed 1335 psig at any time be 5: 1075 psig.

when ir radiat ed f uel is present in the reactor vessel . B. The self-actuation function of 'at least seven Reactor Coolant System safety relief valves shall be operable.

Valves shall be set as follows:

8 valves at L_ 1108 psig.

23

.2/2.4 PrN

l t '  ;!' b 2 k , ibr r' h [I t P

  • i ' -

... w t o n t i e r b sd e raeh oe t l uet T t ca t ri c

eh ac eni n.h tge iR s -

hiJ e e l T rf esuoe .lu ri s h yf

. u omt a gstl o l g is nct f ei see 3 {V t od s 2:

priV o p J psL b nd 5 nS i en0 2 m a t. evo0 0 er h ec5 1 t t gt se1 s n - s .

yysit y- a l sir al _

e .h u u 4. . n t ytd ec0 o _.

ar r na nnut an inias a o xi r s h h' i or r pr sr ecet t t p i a u pd wr pest e e ar scemt p r eeeh svr rt si e no i e pi s og s dd a pn t n t i mts t

n oasa en isu r

s op ) s d y n gx yr t

en nl i n eniiai o <

t hT mf nh o nt u at r a sh l

s . s g erl ot onnt aih eo hT vr c e ed( ot r sesz or nine1 c i e's .*; on t pasan c er eat e art emcah e r t rml at sn et ns eh ea pi ci e n -

ht yi vi soer t o d

- stl d nye f aanier osrvI h o e a pf ni se gt t i

r poeast n uy i pao sbl l m h n s aeo8 t  :

eemr r4 y rh r/f 2d1 pt oy 1 n:

gf b eio nt s au n oaf o t e u s -

ad .l n -

tarens a edbi r r u meat e el mh sieo reut rnd pi oT s mpc i oar aio ,r f f l s e d

e l

ah ggasr

.m eir n

i ntiisc niri aee t n owt p s r r i

s

l. s un ysvsv : e e s t l n i pu7
o eis0l sl ee h r e2 n oear T t r 1 v ' p p t

s e

s '

S 1

a E 1

S A

1 1

2 I

t , > ] }l,4 j; i i!r !a I la  !!! (iI

d nt t

e an o f h e t o -

se .

h e h t c . e ihMs rf t%

1 r u 8 es l t R t M e reo mf d n r eep ed 0 ia

,bagAmPPiR uot w 1 se nnm st n urh a ot e1 e t m i A sug0 oain l nh gg u -

esiel ssi1 i xen oy l

verh oT yh e esh1 r e t mave i omep roit t asp op ,

i a p

n ans t t prond r so r g n t a e N ves e p P nanf e gt en8 o sy ea .f m h o h yo i eni0 b fb t au ed et cmt l t y e sis ssnt 1 3 _

t nr a n p at1 ld _

ieam l v i ek s.

y sa uear sr

,Od d me 2 ge eal l sc cn e 5 e s e nt srsorsi n 7 t e h n

/

rhl e yh b e a tl eemo f t r gse r

. u r

0 ak pt o ic we ymwt t nipo 1 cii i of e ueis il ret nf t a ersf ra m ao nebh sa td t va k a f caaor l B a o oomd d p e

ana oc as sf c oEt t C ae8 r g i nbi sn _

s t s cM a noaf ie _

eiyn ri4 a n gI i i e S eecf2 i i t i c mr mt oe rA nrh si1 s eb euiiir o eut c e t s t p .i pp ase c t sl rt u t eps ie so gc s ch osor pul eet v e 8 t S vv yl yees at et usoa s51 i1 7 n ea sct t t e e or s b v

.f dh enor p0 ei1 o rf t pgosa i1 g 1 as t efi r p o nva p nl a e r ae s e e t ric eh t eP vsi nc mehe al s ; h I. eod tb t h l as ei l a oveid t .

t I st r ve mt na a h v o rd '

I - coisdd a ovhb wed c pud v t

e acS l n r e c osaogn

,t anb ecM sua cv3 f ue y h o r a eo s o emh t l f rt sl ri e os ecpsi t i t t s ed nl ovws i ea b2i s

no r ps l o t

c e pl o n ec uh e r emt z yvl y a) ' r nean r an es5 a uS ib el uior i re eimul 7 r s s si/e ub rb ef a0 t sh ei st s f s a d es n s pt ybd e

cm r t at e cu usem 1

e at vmeeiea r0 cens on mt yh e ep ili r wl v p1 if as a swal aoe s f acu ot st t vy e v l rei h sis c t n rd cnt f yb s ot ve t sl/ rh . gac t s e l cf se oyut y i emni sanos an aneuvf t: s a hh peid di ec a o vairl esnl cS t o mi e ,l esni il a ,f eie t u sps r mogs ot f l eyvt ar uf uaonaia epre W spe d nmf y n sf sr capt l i m/hf M a ost o su sc r y ao l d l s ei as l oyt e eeb n oast st es r b r s ect i0hh ao o a r oe ei r edl 7 t t r c i n sa pet h e p cesal i i r ct n oe

/ nf ne6 yI aar1 hf p s ee b al av n r ne h ua gs edb ri i n t e

s

/

ytl t oo on b oue ot d oh 4 t aecc iw i

or er el fadh. reet aU me c ch ae t hl euw e ob0 a t r h ar cect om set uf g r h x pa h san .t t

oa et r nnt h oet co ot t ee e mc ,s sis ot i i ct o i

f ,

t s h gt eane t nb h eo a cagt t ns af no i t eor eaa d t h pd e ,t ig cn sri ph r eeei t t erre ei e i nd t r y t T e c' h mw e s r eh nno sri n p t u eu pt v c saef ed g o) st t s sevd e

st uh e e helava erd e~

omar a mn t vei .

n e s eeuaai xt s n sl ct wt a s on i ss t

r pr an5 erl l ( o l uit Hi h p l 6d uif ep l t d e o t i nl r ec c os9 sh ert i c s p r ooer r s os u oi1 f swh r ae was nl . f t s t "e s x t

x c oe gu s rt o gnnsunu t ,

r eis s r eol ee g ri et prh s er ohii ws nn n o el ol otrd n u( evi t t t wo oi i c erf if a t r p t t ioens cl C c got pah rl e a l d i t t e u ni n a ril c r ,i r e t i e n s mod o eyl es cel vt ervort peet oa am l i si e r d r rt e pe r

b at t at r et e ovd a c ol er su es dVi sh v e r gi i u ef s5 I d s go eweeid . ve h uoy e ne h a e0f S. neib h oh ps n8 T t t s nI e h s T sV1 oMi ve a TH t opi1 At e

n 4 a

B 2

. t

i. -

.wmm~

T.0 1 IttI TI COtmlTiLMS l'OR OPERATION 4.0-

!  !.HRVEI hiX'C E ' R EQUIR EMENTS l

j . _ __ . _ _ _

F. . Sa f e ty /Relie f Valve < E.  % fety/ Relief Valves

1. Dur ing pow. r opera ting condi t. ions 1. a. A ninimum of seven safety / relief and whenever reactor coolant pressure is greater than 110 paig and valves shall be bench checked or replaced with.a bench checked t e"ipe ra t ur e is greater than 345"F.

va l ve each ref ueling ou tage.

a. The safety valve function (self-The nominal setpoint'of all opera-tional safety / relief valves shall

' actuation) of se ve.n saf ety/ be 1108 psig.

relief valves shall be operable.

b. The solenoid activated relief
b. At least two of the safety / relief function (Automatic Pressure valves shall be disassembled and Relief) shall be operable as inspected each ref ueling outage. .

requi red by Speci f icat ion 3.5.E. c. The integrity of the safety / relief valv, bellows _shall be continunusly, monitored.

d. The operability of the bellows monitoring system shall be demon- t strated at least once every three months.

3.6/4.6 119 REV

+ + , .

  • l' , ! ! l 3 .  ;

~

y t

i .

- n y k r of % n pkl n ne a i ci mi ad i o1 t p s

eh ab og gsrar r t i

.s a1 t r1 ey m.i ot ms ancbf oaf nn o1 s n.,

k o mo io i a cwai cMr -

aier e et h pb en ac r rnd a cy l at t o dh eoen 0St l eoai t i mi . t7 i aemh t ut r ot qa t i nw t et u d csd ese t

y u i n6 e1 .ca d p 4V 3E h

c r

aF',del i en e eS ad d sf ea 1 R md v e mmam r

u pe not c st pu r l nse l a c .

gh e a . gsse ih us aiec v vx a m

rr ee t el v s et qi dl e r w gl -

nt t5 ad e el yea e eoea r

i a id p nivt h h pnv -

m e gf nv l m af o

. t t ut aoeor l o il n

- sap h ro ec t cl g asf l i e s r o e w pf at r g wc ya aeas e nm i a s pamhd r h p i u i o) l d n k pce d e t sh t t f zrne yf or e o! a gi v b s sii h r! e h e e d l . i/

seiJ 5 wl eiwm n aet y h n r i a nrit i d u ,la . t a usdl ause l

a 'f c st e e s of bhk a c c s og nd n g f osp nnme r yopa t iaeki oi eird u bl s sh r vat it ym ooo s C e ewci ea r a gl g e r t u, e,

c t pf c r s e

d eVl h ve I

a ee g r nI at isdehe h d o .npa p m> t n

s pi s

p r

i S v mM( ,

vt

  • c 4 r e p e e n p e r c i1 r' ur a e v e v t

s ut hf pop ch ed mn .

gl e5 o t eaee ednh aAi c f S

k t n, 'ab7 1 et r vt r et tn e. h 4 l d ac e a u <

e z e 2 a t

e l

n1 e l s r o y i d 0' r t ef v s su s s nt si0 e c d r u ea e s i t t i n ei h n , f ihh e sch o d el k n 0, T e a ah el r ese; t v yoet i eb t pr t i c 9 h t r i i na f

f b a n0 ir a1 .

t mi p e hhst c y yn o c adI r irb

  • cf r t a e t a o at l i c pmn n eh .p r asib

,ni o 0 o n eea npo a aoi.e e u ay 0 r f

e cre) g d s rh ert saAt r f r x 1 f es e w eum it eoT c ui nshF nsl sm v s ' t o gh l a l r .

uet a ai i p aoel i

n lf i nwf e T t

- n o

d .

nd

.h cwb b a s p5 g vf d a on l i

ml r g t eh s f %Ci auuir r . ae0 ed o m2 e1 m o esl h e f n n1 nnr u i l o eki oap pf t t ei( w st cmn o l f en e o. sse d sraf sp o

kayrsar eh al o a new p r e ee- n rl / eeh s vgeal e sct t hbl e

ua yuV t u i al el l

yad s t a sv t l ppnu r r ss ch t e l m o eaen e v pi f f vr a r ot t oaf eeset l e a uh a f tl ce

f nobl et eR s est esueh 6

i l e n w c s s t r ens d o y i mrt ipz aid r .

d ne) e l w i 4 m i c a sd d n ear % v eoadi i e r rP1 l rl n o d nbi e y y i e a /f si n

l h eo s eg e ul d+ v y e a n t et i h at epb mma h t 0 v qon t mmm2 pmt r at n l et a g f eauo 6

3

, mgTf egps a

e r ne a y5 cc i

m f 1 o

0 o

V a

l r

A r s ep i

i l

e f esr3 at sf 8 ssa k I ea o ys .

f l l e ee d a gwk r yo f a e a . i 8 r d nsbb e r nt apr t l n i d o0 / eii r s i ai f eB1 n

u f ri* e aei c a l

e ot . t y r asoo i myt i

- nnbl d mc r

a ,r P cEf e u l t

t ii ae pi a gem t

n n

a oos a prk g f c t a pa a a cs m /y nt S r f

a qeadd eh nee e i r p e t i eA e . s r t amm 1 e

eges s uu d h e e1. 'n t

C c e r t n e ml s egs E o h axif h f

e s C e h ub a esh i a h h nh ss S

- e T wes ot Al T pa S Ti t h c T tit aa A B

s a .

6 B " E 4

/

S

, , < ;; j<  ;; , j

i 30 L1 t'! TI % t .O ND I T I ON S mR OPERATION 4.0 SURVI'1LIANCE RrQUIREMENTS

~_ _ _ _ _ . _

C. MinImue Critica1 Power Ratto (MCPR) C. & inum Critical Power Ratto (MCPR) j Dur ing powe r operat ion, the Operating MCPR MCPR shall be determined daily durinn 1.i m i t , hall he _3 1.33 for 8x8 f ue l and reactor power operation at _3 2 57 ra ted

) 1.31 for 8x8R fuel at rated power ano t he rmal powe r and fo llowing any chany.e flow. If at any time during operat ion it in power level or distribution which i s dete nnined t hat the limi ting va lue for has the potential of bringing the cote MCPR is beier ev.ceeded, action shall be to i t s ope ra ting MCPR limit.

Initiated wi t hin 15 minutes to restore eperation to within t he presc ribed limi t s.

Sur ve il la nce ant corresponding action shall continue until reactor operation it within the prescribed limits. If the steady state MCPR is not returned to within the presc ribed limits within two (2) hours, the react or shal I be brought to the Cold Shutewn condition within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. For core flows other than ra ted t he Operating ?!CPR Limit shall be the above applicable MCPR value times Vr vhere K 7 is as shown in Figure 3.11.3 i

i 189D REV 1.11/4.I1

Bases Continued C.  !!1nimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR)

The ECCS evaluation presented in Reference 4 assumed the steady state MCPR prior to the postulated los s-o f-c oo la nt accident to be 1.18 for all ruel types. In addition, the ECCS analysis presented in Reierence 6 assumed an initial MCPR of 1.24 for reduced flow conditions.- The Operating MCPR Limit of 1.31 for 8x8 fuel and 1.33 for 8x8R fuel in determined from the analysis of transients discussed.in Ba s es Sect ions 2.1 and 2.3. By maintaining an operating MCPR above.these limits, the Safety Limit (T.9 2.1.A) is maintained in the event of t he rios t limiting abnormal operational transient.

For operation with less than rated core flow the Opera t ing !!CPR Limit is adjusted by multiplying the aheve limit by K . Peference 5 discusses how the transient analysis done at rated conditions ,

e nc ompa s ses the beduced flow situation when the proper K factor is applied.

g 4

Those abnormal opera t ional t rans ient s, analyzed in FSAR Section 14.5, which result in an automatic reactor scram a re not considered a violation of the LCo . Exceeding MCPR limits in such cases need not

  • be r epo r t ed .

References

1. " Fuel Dens ification Ef fects in General Elect ric Boiling b'a ter Reactor Fuel," Supplements 6, 7, and 8, N EDM-10 735, August, 1973.

2.

Supplement I to Technical Report on Densificat. ion of General Electric Reactor Fuels, December 14, 1974 (USAEC Regulatory Staff).

3. Communication: VA Moore to T S Mitchell, " Modified CE Model for Fuel Densification," Docket .

50-321, March 27, 19 74. .

4.

" loss-of-coolant Accident Analysis Report for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant," NEDO-24050, September 1977, I. O Mayer (NSP) to V Stello (USNRC), September 15, 1977.

5. " General Elect ric Btm Generic Reload Applicat ion for 8x8 Tuel," NEDO-20360, Revision I, N vember t 1974.

l 6.

" Revision of Inw Core Flow Effects on LOCA Analysis for Operating Bb'R's," R L Gridley (GE).to D G Ei s enh u t (I'SNRC) , Sep tember 28, 1977.

1.1 I m rq _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - = - -

ING

... .-_.. . ._-_ _. _ . . . _ . . _ . , . _ _ . . ._ _ _ _ . _ . _ . . . _ . _ . - _ . _ _ . . - _ __-____.m._ -.._ ._ .._. _ ___. . - . _ _ . . _ _

~

1 .

1 EXHIBIT C LICEt SE AMENDMENT REQUEST DATED MAkcH 16, 1978 This exhibit consists of General Electric Report NEDD-24133-1 entitled,

" Supplement l' Monticello Reload 6 - Simmer Margin Evaluation." Thir report supplements the saiety analysis for reload 6 contained in hED044133 NCO-24133 was e.ubmitted ior 1:ht revi a un Augus.t 10, 1976.

- NEDD-24133-1 providet the ret ult r of additional analyscs which demonstretc the accep tabili ty of increasing the maximum allowable safety / relief valve setpMnt to 1108 peig. ,

)

i

+..

f e

--=eg ww d e**e-e.~www+w,--eew4,w-,=cw.w<,-+,vevw . - .ww -,,- ,..w, -,--% -w v-we-- .e--.e.v..*-ewcw3....=---,,--*=.-we .--,.-,---ev---=mmawv--+-tw---, w -e w-- e w- w v-w-