ML20024D922

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search

NUREG-0612 General Guidelines & Interim Protection Measures for Heavy Load Handling,Ei Hatch Units 1 & 2. App B Will Be Submitted by 831215
ML20024D922
Person / Time
Site: Hatch  
Issue date: 07/29/1983
From:
GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20024D920 List:
References
REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR PROC-830729, TAC-47007, TAC-47008, NUDOCS 8308080437
Download: ML20024D922 (55)
v • d • e


Text

{{#Wiki_filter:" ~4 mb S 4 4 ENCLOSURE 1 NUREG-0612 GENERAL GUIDELINES AND INTERIM PROTECTION MEASURES FOR HEAVY LOAD HANDLING PLANT E. I. HATCH UNITS 1 AND 2 l l 8308080437 830729 ~ PDR ADOCK 05000321 P PDR

TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE I Introduction 1 II General Guidelines for Heavy Load Handling 2 III Interim Protection 19 IV Concluding Summary 21 Appendix A Safe Load Path and Load Exclusion Area Sketches A-1 Appendix B Comparison of Special Lifting Device Design to B-1 ANSI N14.6-1978 Appendix C Comparison of Overhead Crane Design to C-1 CMAA Specification 70

r I. INTRODUCTION The December' 22, 1980 NRC Letter on Control of Heavy Load Handling transmitted to Georgia Power Company (GPC) three enclosures: NUREG-0612 " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" (Enclosure 1) Staff Position-Interim Actions for the Control of Heavy Loads (Enclosure 2) Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads (Enclosure 3) GPC responded to Enclosure 2 and Section 2.1 of Enclosure 3 (which addressed the NUREG-0612 " General Guidelines") with submittals dated June 29, 1981 and May 24, 1982. Franklin Research Center's draft Technical Evaluation Report (TER) C5257-095/446 was transmitted to GPC by an MIC letter dated August 19, 1982 and provided an evaluation of the compliance of Plant-Hatch Units 1 and 2 with the Interim Actions and General Guidelines. This submittal revises GPC's previous responses to address the concerns raised in the TER. i e (1)

II. GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR HEAVY LOAD HAPOLING Section 2.1 of Enclosure 3 to the December 22, 1980 NRC letter requested documentation of how the General Guidelines of NUREG-0612 would be satisfied. GPC's revised response to Section 2.1 is as follows: A. STAFF POSITION 2.1.1 " Report the results of your review of plant arrangements to identify all overhead handling systems from which a load drop may result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal (taking no credit for any interlocks, technical specifications, operating procedures, or detailed structural analysis)."

RESPONSE

A complete, systematic evaluation of all overhead load handling systems in the Reactor Buildings, Diesel Generator Building, Water Intake Structure, and Turbine Buildings in the vicinity of the Control Building was performed at Plant Hatch Units l' and 2. All load handling systems in these areas were identified and their load paths determined. Credit was not taken for interlocks, technical specifications, or procedural controls. Loads considered were those weighing more than a single spent fuel assembly and its associated handling tool (725 lbs), in accordance with the NUREG-0612 " Heavy Load" criteria. Fectors considered in the determination of the load path included a possible load swing of +50 prior to the load drop, existing structural restriction, and the potential for the dropped load to penetrate the floor. In performing the floor penetration analyses it was assumed that the load was dropped from the maximum possible height and that it struck the floor in the orientation which caused the most severe consequences. If the load could not penetrate the floor or cause spalling which could damage safe shutdown or decay heat removal equipment, impact on equipment below the ficar was not considered. The accessible load paths were walked down to determine if a load drop could impact irradiated fuel or equipment required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal. All components, pipes, electrical panels, and cable trays in the load paths were evaluated to determine if they were essential for safe shutdown or decay heat removal. The drywell was not walked down on either unit because lifts of heavy loads in the drywell would only be performed during plant shutdowns, and furthermore, the ECCS systems have sufficient capacity to mitigate the consequences of any damage resulting from a load drop in the drywell. Table 1 provides a list of the overhead handling systems from which the drop of a heavy load could result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal. No credit is taken for interlocks, . technical specifications, operating procedures, or detailed structural analysis other than floor penetration analysis. (2)

r TABLE 1 ITEM NO. DESCRIPTION LOCATION 1. WP-1 Rm Pump "B" Holst HNP-1 Reactor Building, E Corner Room 2. HW-1 RW Pump "D" Holst' HW-1 Reactor Building, NE Corner Room 3. H W -1 Core Spray Fump "B" HP-1 Reactor Building Holst E Corner Room 4. M -1 Rm Heat Exchanger "B" HW-1 Reactor Building, Holst E Corner Room 5. HP -1 Rm Pump "A" Holst HP-1 Reactor Building, SE Corner Room 6. N -1 Rm Pump "C" Holst HW-1 Reactor Building, SE Corner Room 7. HW -1 Core Spray Pump "A" HW-1 Reactor Building, Holst SE Corner Room 8. N -1 R m Heat Exchanger "A" HP-1 Reactor Building, Holst SE Corner Room 9. HP-1 Recirc Pump M-G H W-1 Reactor Building i Set "A" Holst Elevation 158' i 10. N -1 Recirc Pump M-G HP-1 Reactor Building [ Set "B" Holst Elevation 158"' 11. N -2 Core Spray Pump "A" HP-2 Reactor Building, j Holst E Corner Room, El.130' 12.. HNP-2 RW Pump "A" Holst HP-2 Reactor Building, E Corner Room, El.130' 13. W P-2 R m Pump "C" Holst HP-2 Reactor Building, E Corner Room, El.130' 14. HW-2 RW Heat Exchanger "A" HW-2 Reactor' Building, Holst E Corner Room, El.130' i l l 15. HNP-2 Core Spray Pump "B" HNP-2 Reactor Building, j Holst SE Corner Room, El. 130' 16. HNP-2 Rm Pump "D" Holst HNP-2 Reactor Building, l SE Corner Room, El. 130' 17. WP-2 RW Pump "B" Holst HW-2 Reactor Building, r SE Corner Room, El.-130' (3) e

l-TABLE 1 (CONTINUED) ITEM NO. DESCRIPTION LOCATION 18. FNP-2 Rm Heat Exchanger "B" HNP-2 Reactor Building, .Holst SE Corner Room, El. 130' 19. FNP-2 Recirc Pump M-G HNP-2 Reactor Building Set "A" Holst Elevation 158' 20. HNP-2 Recirc Pump M-G HNP-2 Reactor Building Set "B" Holst Elevation 158' 21. FNP-1 Turbine Building HNP-1 Turbine Building, Overhead Crane El. 164' i 22. HNP-2 Turbine Building HNP-2 Turbine Building, Overhead Crane El. 164' 23. WP-1 Reactor Building Reactor Building, Refueling Overhead Crane Floor 24. FNP-2 Reactor Building Reactor Building, Refueling Overhead Crane Floor i [. l l (4)

B. STAFF POSITION 2.1.2 " Justify the exclusion of any overhead handling system from the above category by verifying that there is sufficient physical separation from any load-impact hoint and any safety-related component to permit a determination by inspection that no heavy load drop can result in damage to any system or component required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal."

RESPONSE

Table 2 provides a list of overhead handling systems which are excluded from the category of Paragraph 2.1.1. The majority of the exempted overhead handling systems were accepted in the TER. It has been determined from further evaluation that exclusion of additional handling systems (Items 1, 4, 7, 8, 9,10, and 11) from the category of Paragraph 2.1.1 is justified. Exclusion criteria were: 1. There is sufficient physical separation from any load-impact point and any safety-related component to permit a determination by inspection that no heavy load drop can result in damage to any system or component required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal, or 2. While the capacity of the refueling platforms (1000 lbs.) exceeds the heavy load criteria for Plant Hatch (725 lbs.), the design of these platforms is such that they are limited to the movement of fuel assemblies and lighter loads and thus cculd not be used to lift a " heavy load", or 3. The overhead handling system has a sole-purpose lift function and any system which could be damaged following a load drop will necessarily be out of commission prior to the lift. (This criteria appeared in Paragraph 1.3 of Enclosure 3 to the December 22, 1980 letter and in the TER as an acceptable basis for exclusion). (5)

TABLE 2 JUSTIFICATION OF EXCLUSION ITEM NO. DESCRIPTION FROM PARAGRAPH 2.2.1 1. HNP-1 HPCI Pump & Turbine Criterion 3 Holst 2. HNP-2 CRD Pump & Hatch Holst Criterion 1 (accepted by TER) 3. HNP-2 RCIC Pump, Turbine, and Criterion 3 Hatch Holst (accepted by TER) 4. HNP-2 HPCI Pump & Turbine Criterion 3 Holst 5. HNP-2 Chiller Unit "A" Holst Criterion 1 (accepted by TER) 6. HNP-2 Chiller Unit "B" Holst Criterion 1 (accepted by TER) 7. Diesel Generator "1A" Holst Criterion 3 8. Diesel Generator "1B" Holst Criterion 3 9. Diesel Generator "lC" Holst Criterion 3 10. Diesel Generator."2A" Holst Criterion 3 11. Diesel Generator "2C" Holst Criterion 3 12. HNP-l&2 Water Intake Structure Criterion 1 Mobile Crane (accepted by TER) 13. HNP-1 MSIV "A" Holst Criterion 1 (accepted by TER) 14. HNP-1 MSIV "B" Holst Criterion 1 (accepted by TER) 15. HNP-1 MSIV "C" Holst Criterion 1 (accepted by TER) 16. HNP-1 MSIV "D" Holst Criterion 1 (accepted by TER) 17. HNP-2 RWCU Regenerative Criterion 1 Heat Exchanger Trolley (accepted by TER) (6)

1 TABLE 2 (Continued) JUSTIFICATION OF EXCLUSION -ITEM NO. DESCRIPTION FROM PARAGRAPH 2.2.1 18. FN'-2 RWCU Non-regenerative Criterion'1 Heat Exchanger Trolley (accepted by TER) 19. HNP-2 Spent Fuel Pool-Criterion 1 Cooling Heat Exchanger Holst (accepted by TER) 20.. HNP-2 CRD Repair Area Monorail Criterion 1 (accepted by TER) 21. HNP-1 CRD Repair Area Jib Crane Criterion 1 (accepted by TER) 22. HNP-2 MSIV Bridge Crane Criterion 1 (accepted by TER) 23. HNP-1 Refueling Platform Criterion 2 (accepted by TER) 24. HNP-2 Refueling Platform Criterion 2 (accepted by TER) e 1 (7)

C. STAFF POSITION 2.1.3 "With respect to the design and operation of heavy-load-handling systems in the reactor building and those load-handling systems identified in 2.1-1 above, provide your evaluation concerning compliance with the guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1. The following specific information should be included in your reply:" a. Drawings or sketches sufficient to clearly identify the location of safe load paths, spent fuel, and safety-related equipment. b. A discussion of measures taken to ensure that load-handling operations remain within safe load

paths, including procedures, if any for deviation frcm these paths.

c. A tabulation of heavy loads to be handled by each crane which includes the load identification, load weight, its designated lifting device, and verification that the handling of each load is governed by a written procedure containing, as a minimum, the information identified in NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(2). d. Verification that lifting devices identified in 2.1.3-c, above, comply with the requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978, or ANSI B30.9-1971 as appropriate. For lifting devices where these standards, as supplemented by NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(4) or 5.1.l(5), are not met, describe any proposed alternatives and demonstrate their equivalency in terms of load-handling reliability. e. Verification that ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-2, has been involved with respect to crane inspection,

testing, and maintenance.

Where any exception is taken to this standard, sufficient information should be provided to demonstrate the equivalency of proposed alternatives. f. Verification that crane design complies with the guidelines of CMAA Specification 70 and Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, including the demonstration of equivalency of actual design requirements for instances where specific compliance with these standards is not provided. g. Exceptions, if any taken to ANSI B30.2-1976 with respect to operator training, qualification, and conduct." (8)

RESPONSE

All load handling systems capable of carrying heavy loads over irradhted fuel in the reactor vessel or spent fuel pool (taking no cre k for interlocks, technical specifications, operating procedures, or detailed structural analysis) and those listed in Table 1 (overhead handling systems from which a_ load drop could damage equipment required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal) have been evaluated with respect to Section 5.1.1, General Guidelines, of NUREG-0612. Table 3 provides a list of the crane / load combinations which are within the scope of this evaluation. Compliance with the seven General Guidelines is discussed below: GUIDELINE 1 - SAFE LOAD PATHS [NUREG-0612 SECTION 5.1.l(1)] " Safe load paths should be defined for the movement of heavy loads to minimize the potential for heavy loads, if dropped, to impact irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and in the spent fuel pool, or to impact safe shutdown equipment. The path should follow, to the extent practical, structural floor members, beams, etc., such that if the load is dropped, the structure is more likely to withstand the impact. These load paths should be defined in procedures, shown on equipment layout drawings, and clearly marked on the floor in the area where the load is to be handled. Deviations from defined load paths should require written alternative procedures approved by the plant safety review committee." COMPLIANCE Safe load paths have been established for lifts of heavy loads over the refueling floor and the control building roof. These load paths are shown in the applicable heavy load handling procedures on scale area sketches derived from equipment layout drawings and are clearly marked on the floor. Sketches showing the location of these safe load paths are provided in Appendix A. For heavy lifts over the reactor building corner rooms, definition of safe load paths is impractical due to the high concentration of structures and equipment. Load " exclusion areas" have therefore been established for each lift in lieu of safe load paths. These exclusion areas allow sufficient room for making the lift while minimizing the potential for the load, if dropped, to impact plant shutdown or decay heat removal equipment. Scale area sketches derived from equipment layout drawings showing load exclusion areas are included in the applicable heavy load handling procedures and are also provided in Appendix A. Attempting to mark exclusion areas on corner room floors would not provide a useful visual aid to operators. There are several different exclusion areas in a single corner room, which would necessitate several different markings. Furthermore, the floors consist of a base concrete slab, which is virtually obscured from view by structures and equipment, with several levels of steel grating above, most of which would be removed prior to making the lift. Thus, there is no surface on which any useful markings could be made. The exclusion area drawings are judged to provide sufficiently detailed and unambiguous guidance to crane operators. (9)

We believe that Plant Hatch is in compliance with the intent of Guideline 1, " Safe Load Paths," because (1) the established safe load paths and exclusion areas minimize the potential for a dropped Acad to impact irradiated fuel or plant shutdown or decay heat removal equipment, (2) the safe load paths and exclusion areas guide heavy load movement, to the extent practical, over structural floor members, beams, etc., (3) safe load paths and exclusion areas are shown ca scale area sketches in the applicable heavy load handling procedure, marked on the floor where practical, and clearly posted in the area of the lift, and (4) deviations from safe load paths or into exclusion areas require the approval of the Superintendent of Plant Engineering Services or his designee. GUIDELINE 2 - PROCEDURES [NUREG-0612 SECTION 5.1.l(2)] " Procedures should be developed to cover load handling operations for heavy loads that are or could be handled over or in proximity to irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. At a minimum, procedures should cover handling of those loads listed in Table 3.1-1 of this report. These procedures should include: identification of required equipment; inspections and acceptance criteria required before movement of load; the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the load; defining the safe load path; and other special precautions." COMPLIANCE Table 3 provides a listing of the crane / load combinations which were determined to be within the scope of the General Guidelines. The weight of each load, its designated lifting device, and the number of the plant procedure governing its handling are listed in the table. All of the BWR loads listed in NUREG-0612 Table 3.1-1, " Survey of Heavy Loads," which are currently handled at Plant Hatch are covered by procedures. The load handling procedures designated in Table 3 contain identification of required equipment, special precautions, safe load path or exclusion area sketches, and detailed instructions for rigging and lifting the load. In addition, reference is made in the load handling procedure to separate procedures for crane operator and rigger qualifications, erane inspection and acceptance criteria, and rigging inspection and acceptance criteria. We therefore believe that Plant Hatch is in compliance with Guideline 2. GUIDELINE 3 - CRANE OPERATOR TRAINING [NUREG-0612 SECTION 5.1.1(3)] " Crane operators should be

trained, qualified, and conduct themselves in accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976,

" Overhead and Gantry Cranes." (10)

COMPLIANCE Crane operators for all of the -lifts listed in Table 3 are required by the designated procedure to be trained, qualified, and conduct themselves in accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976. We therefore believe Plant Hatch complies-with Guideline 3. GUIDELINE 4'- SPECIAL LIFTING DEVICES [NUREG-0612 SECTION 5.1.l(4)] "Special lifting devices should satisfy the guidelines of ANSI N14.6-1978, ' Standards for Special Lifting Devices 'for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials'. This standard should apply to all special lifting devices which carry heavy loads in areas as defined above. For operating plants certain inspections and load tests may be accepted in lieu of certain material requirements in the standard. In addition, the stress design factor stated in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 should be based on the combined maximum static and dynamic loads that could be imparted on the handling device based on the characteristics of the crane which will be used.* This is in lieu of the guideline in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 which bases the stress design factor on only the weight (static load) of the load and of the intervening components of the special handling device." "For the purpose of selecting -the proper sling, loads imposed by the SSE need not be included in the dynamic loads imposed on the sling or lifting device." COMPLIANCE Special lifting devices in use at Plant Hatch are identified in Table 3. These devices are currently being evaluated with respect to the guidelines of ANSI N14.6-1978. The results of this evaluation will be documented in Appendix 8 at a later date. GUIDELINE 5 - SLINGS [NUREG-0612 SECTION 5.1.l(5)] f " Lifting devices that are not specially designed should be installed and used in accordance with the guidelines of ANSI B30.9-1971, ' Slings'. However, in selecting the proper sling, the load used should be the sum of the static and maximum dynamic load.* The rating identified on the sling should be in terms of the l " static load" which produces the maximum static and dynamic load. i Where this restricts slings to use on only certain cranes, the slings should be clearly marked as to the cranes with which they may be used." "For the purpose of selecting the proper sling, loads imposed by the SSE need not be included in the dynamic loads imposed on the sling or lifting device." (11) l

COMPLIANCE Lifts of heavy loads requiring the use of slings are listed in Table 3. The plant procedure designated in the table requires that slings be installed and used in accordance with ANSI B30.9-1971. Allowance for dynamic loading of slings is made by the application of conservative safety factors in the sling selection process. In addition to the safety factor of 5 required by ANSI B30.9-1971, an additional safety factor of 2 is used for a resultant rigging safety factor of at least 10. There are no slings at Plant Hatch which are restricted in use to certain cranes. Since the guidelines of ANSI B30.9-1971 are followed for sling installation and use and allowance is made for dynamic loading, we believe Plant Hatch is in compliance with Guideline 5. GUIDELINE 6 - CRANE INSPECTION, TESTING, MAINTENANCE [NUREG-0612 SECTION 5.1.l(6)] "The crane should be inspected,

tested, and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976,

' Overhead and Gantry Cranes', with the exception that tests and inspections should be performed prior to use where it is not practical to meet the f equencies of ANSI B30.2 for periodic inspection and test, or where frequency of crane use is less than the specified inspection and test frequency (e.g., the polar crane inside a PWR containment may only be used every 12 to 18 months during refueling operations, and is generally not accesible during power operation. ANSI B30.2, however, calls for certain inspections to be performed daily or monthly. For such cranes naving limited usage, the inspections, tests, and maintenance should be performed prior to their use.)" COMPLIANCE All cranes and hoists listed in Table 3 are required by the designated procedure to be inspected, tested, and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976. We therefore believe that Plant Hatch is in compliance with Guideline 6. GUIDELINE 7 - CRANE DESIGN [NUREG-0612 SECTION 5.1.1(7)] "The crane should be designed to meet the applicable criteria and guidelines of Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes' and of CMAA-70, ' Specifications for Electric Overhead Travelling Cranes'. An alternative to a specification in ANSI B30.2 or CMAA-70 may be accepted in lieu of specific compliance if the intent of the specification is satisfied." COMPLIANCE The standards to which the cranes and hoists are designed are listed in Table 3. ANSI B30.2-1976 and CMAA-70 (1975) apply to top-running bridge, multiple girder overhead cranes, of which there are four at Plant Hatch: the HNP-1&2 Turbine Building Overhead Cranes and the HNP-l&2 Reactor Building Overhead Cranes (Items 21 through 24 of Table 3). Compliance of these four overhead cranes as well as other types of cranes and hoists with Guideline 7 is discussed below: (12) t

1. If4P-1 Turbine Building Overhead Crane and FNP-l&2 Reactor Building Overhead Cranes (Items 21, 23, and 24) - These cranes were designed in accordance with EOCI-61, with the HNP-1 Reactor Building Overhead Crane meeting the requirements of NUREG-0554, " Single Failure Proof Cranes for MJclear Power Plants" as well. The designs of these cranes have oeen evaluated with respect to the guidelines of CMAA-70 and found to be equivalent in terms of load handling safety. This evaluation is documented in Appendix C. It cannot be verified that the initial design of these cranes was performed to the ANSI B30.2 guidelines; however, an evaluation has determined that their designs comply with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976. These three cranes therefore meet the intent of Guideline 7. 2. FNP-2 Turbine Building Overhead Crane (Item 23) - This crane was designed in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976 and CMAA-70 (1975) and therefore complies with Guideline 7. 3. Other Cranes and Holsts (Items 1 through 20) - The standards to which these cranes and hoists were designed are listed in Table 3. ANSI B30.2 and CMAA-70 have limited applicability to this equipment. In all cases these cranes and hoists were designed to the then current applicable standards. Design in accordance with these standards is considered to meet the intent of Guideline 7 for load handling safety. j (13)

_.. ~ _. _. .~.y-1 TABLE 3 WIDEI,1NE 2 QJIDELIFE 3 CUIDEIINES 4, 5 CUIDELI?E 6 ITD1 CPME OR IOIST WEIGrr LIPTIPC WIDELINE 1 IHD flANDLitC CRME OPERAER SPEEIAL LIFTING CRANES-INSITCTION, GUIIII.INE 7 to. IIDfrIFICATICH IHO (K25) DLV;CE SAFE IfJAD PADIS PRO 2 DUPES TRAINIPC DEVIG S, SLIl0S 1TSTI!C, MhI?tTDWCE CRME DESIGN 1. l@-1 MR IW M R Purp "B" *

  • 3.1 Wire Rcpe Slirg ArpeMix *Aa ItP-6977 NGI B30.2-1976 ANSI B30.9-1971 M EI B30.2-1976 MSI B30.16-1981 "B" luist*

Sketch No. 005 (1D0-6976) (HNP-6975) * * * (IDP-6922) IMI 100-74 (N.E.Corrier Ibom) ORA-70 (Structural) Mm Ptep "B" 3.4 Pbtor 2. 12P-1 RiiR Punp Mm Purp "D" " 3.1 Wire Ikpe Sling Apprnlix 'A" IINP-6977 ANSI B30.2-1976 ANSI B30.9-1971 ANSI B30.2-1976 M 61 B30.16-1981 "D" Iloist* Sketch No. 006 (IDP-6976) DINP-6975)*** (HNP-6922) IMI 100-7, (N.E.Correr Room) O RA-70 (Structural) MR Purp "D" 3.4 Potor 3. TrP-1 Core Spray Core Spray Punp 3.1 Wire Ibpe Sling AppeMix "A" liNP-6977 ANSI B30.2-1976 ANSI B30.9-1971 ANSI B30.2-1976 ANSI B30.16-1981 Purp "B" floist* "B" Sketch No. 007 OlNP-6976) OlNP-6975)*** (llNP-6922) INI 100-74 (N.E. Corner Romi) OmA-70 (Structural) Core Spray Pupp "B" 3.5 Pbtor ** 4 les-1 Mm l>at Mm Heat Excharger 23.5 Wire Rope Sling Appendix 'A' HNP-6977 ANSI B30.2-1976 ANSI B30.9-1971 ANSI B30.2-1976 ANSI B30.16-1981 Exc!wner Holst* "B" ** Sketch No. 008 OlNP-6976) (HNP-6975)*** (HNP-6922) IMI 100-74 (N.E. Corner Roca) ORA-70 (Structural) l 5. In-1 Mm Punp MR Purp *A* ** 3.1 Wire Rqae S11rg N Trndix *A* ID&-6977 ANSI B30.2-1976 ANSI B30.9-1971 ANSI B30.2-1976 ANSI B30.16-1981 "A" Hoist

  • Sketch th. 001 DINP-6976)

(IDP-6975) *** (IDP-6922) IMI 100-74 (S.E.Corrwar Roorn) ORA-70 (Structural) Mm Purp "A" 3.4 Pttor 6 ID-1 P!R Purp M0t Purp "C" *

  • 3.1 Wire ikpe Slirg Arterdix "A*

IM -6977 ANSI B30.2-1976 ANSI B30.9-1971 ANSI B30.2-1976 ANSI B30.16-1981 "C" Holst* Sketch No. 002 DDP-6976) (IDP-6975) *" (ItNP-6922) IMI 100-74 (S.E. Corner Rocal OmA-70 (Structural) Mm Purp "C' 3.4 Potor 7. HNP-1 Core Spray Core Spray Punp 3.1 Wire apse Stirg Apperdix "A" IDP-6977 ANSI B30.2-1976 ANSI B30.9-1971 ANSI B30.2-1976 ANSI B30.16-1981 Purp *A' Iloist* "A* ** Sketch No. 003 OlNP-6976) (HNP-6975)*** (II;P-6922) INI 100-74 (S.E. Corner Rom) 09A-70 (Structural) Cbre Spiay Pupp 'A' 3.5 Potor *

  • 8.

HNP-1 Fim traat MR Heat Excharger 23.5 Wire Rope Slirg Appendix "A' fee-6977 ANSI B30.2-1976 M SI B30.9-1971 ANSI B30.2-1976 ANSI B30.16-1981 ,a Exc!w ger Holst* "A" ** Sketch No. 004 One-6976) (HNP-6975) * * * (HNP-6922) IMI 100-74 (S.E. Corner Room) OSA-70 (Structural) j ) 3 :li b ] s f l 14

TABLE'3 (cont'd.) CUIDr2.Its 2 GJIDE2.ItE 3 GUIDELINE 3 4, 5 CUIDFLIFE 6 1196 CRME OR HDIST WEIGrF LIfTDC QJIDELItE 1 IlmD IIANDLING CPANE OPERATOR SPirIAL LIPTING CRANIS-INSPEITION. GUTIII.IPE 7 ND. IDt2?'IFICATICH IIED (10tE) DIVICE SAIT If%D PA'11tS PIEXII1HES 'I%AINDU DLVIC23, SLitGS TEETItG, WsINIUZ.TE Cl<ANE IESIGN 9. Iw-1 Pectre M-C Cenerator 17 Wire Scre Slirn A[perdix "A* IINP-6977 APEI B30.2-1976 ANSI B30.9-1971 Als! B30.2-1976 APGI B30.16-1981 Set *A" Hoist Sketch No. 019 01NP-6976) (l w -6975)*** (IN-6922) INI 100-74 (Rx Bldj El 153') Petor 15.2 OMA-70 (Structural) i Fluid Drive 16.5 10. HNP-1 Recirc M-G Generator 17 Wire Rape S11rq Agperdix *Aa ilNP-6977 ANSI B33.2-1976 ANSI B30.9-1971 ANSI B30.2-1976 ANSI B30.16-1981 Set "B" Holst Sketch No. 020 (ItNP-6976) OINP-6975)*** OINP-6922) INI 100-74 (Rx Bld3 El 158') Potor 15.2 OTAA-70 (Structural). Finid Drive 16.5 i 11. l e -2 Core Spray Core Spray Pe p 2.8 Wire Rope Slirg Apperdix "A* INP-6977 ANSI B30.2-1976 ANSI B30.9-1971 ANSI B30.2-1976 ANSI B30.ll-1973 Ptry *A* Hoist "A" " Sketch No. 009 OlNP-6976) (HNP-6975) *" OINP-6922) INI 100-74 (N.E.Correr Roan) CWA-70 (Structural) Core Spray Pupp *A" 3.6 Pttor " 13. HNP-2 M S Ibrp PJR Itmp "A" " 3.8 Wire Rape Slirg Apperdix *A" HNP-6977 ANSI B30.2-1976 ANSI B30.9-1971 ANSI B30.2-1976 ANSI B30.ll-1973

  • A* Holst Sketch No. 010 (HNP-6976)

(HNP-6575) **

  • 0!NP-6922)

INI 100-74 (N.E. Corner Raan) CPSA-70 (Structural) Rim Punp "A" 3.4 Potor ** 13. HNP-2 Mm Purp Elm Punp "C" 3.8 Wire Rape Slirg A perdix 'A' !!NP-6977 ANSI B30.2-1976 ANSI B30.9-1971 ANSI B30.2-1976 ANSI B30.ll-1973 l 1

  • C" Hoist Sketch No. 011 O!NP-6976) 0!NP-6975)***

OINP-6922) INI 100-74

  • (N.E. Corner Rorsn) i OIM -70 (Structural)

Mm Ptyp "C" 3.4 Petor ?* { a 14. IINP-2 M R Heat R!m lieat Excharger 23.5 Wire Rape Slirg Arperdix "A* IINP-6977 ANSI B30.2-1976 ANSI B30.9-1971 ANSI B30.2-1976 ANSI B30.16-1973 j Exetarger "A" "A" ** Sketch No. 012 01NP-6976) OlNP-6975) *** (HNP-6922) INI 100-74 ~ Iloist (N.E. Corner Roan) CMM-70 (Structural) 1 15 HNP-2 Core Spray Core Spray Pupp 2.8 Wire Rope Sllrg Apperdix *A* HNP-6977 ANSI B30.2-1976 ANSI B30.9-1971 ANSI B30.2-1976 ANSI B30.11-1973 Ptry *B* Holst "B" " Sketch No. 013 OINP-6976) (liNP-6975) ** * (HNP-6922) INI 100-74 (S.E. Corner Roan 01M-70 (Structural) Core Spray Punp *B" 3.6 Y I Petor ** 4 16. HNP-2 Mm Purp MR Purp "B" 3.8 Wire Roy Sling Apperdix *A" HNP-6977 ANSI B30.2-1976 ANSI B30.9-1971 ANSI B30.2-1976 ANSI B30.11-1973

  • B" liaist sketch No. 014 (S.E. Corner Room) 01NP-6976)

(HNP-6975)*** (HNP-6922) INI 100-74 ORA-70 (Structural) l Petor " i 15

TABLE 3 (cont'd.) CUIDEI.INE: 2 CUIDCLINE 3 _ CUIDELIIES 4, 5 CUIDE2.INE 6 111M CRAPE OR HOIST . WEIGrf LIFFIIG CUIDELIIE 1 ISD IIANILING CRME OPE 3WIOR SPECIAL LIFTIIG CRANES-INSPECTION, CM0ELIE 7 NO. IIENTIFICATIOM IIAD (106) DLVICE SME IMD PA11tS PimfRES TPAINIIG DEVICES, SLINGS 1TSTIPG, PRINIDWCE CRANE DESIQi 17. 1 2 -2 HirR lisnp MR Purp "D" ** 3.8 wire prpe Sling 4perdix "A" leP-6977 MEI B30.2-1976 N EI B30.9-1971 M EI B30.2-1976 N E! B30.ll-1973

  • D" Ibist Sketch No. 015 ODP-6976)

GDP-6975)

  • ODP-6922)

IMI 100-74 (S.E.Correr Room) OmA-70 (Structural) MIR Ptrp "D" 3.4 tt> tor *

  • 4 18.

lW-2 MR Heat RIR Heat Exdanger 23.5 wire Repe Sling Apperdix "A* HNP-6977 ANSI B30.2-1976 MEI B30.9-1971 ANSI B30.2-1976 ANSI B30.16-1973 Excharrier "B" "B" ** Sketch No. 016 ODP-6976) OlNP-6975) **

  • ORP-6922)

IMI 100-74 lbist (S.E.Correr Ran) OM-70 (Structural) i. 19. 12-2 Perire M-G Generator 18.4 Wire Rtpe Stirg AFTendix "A" IRP-6977 MEI B30.2-1976 ANSI B30.9-1971 ANSI B30.2-1976 MEI B30.11-1973 j Set "A" liaist Sketch No. 021 DDP-6976) GDP-6975) *** (10P-6922) MEI B30.16-1973 (Rx Bld} El 158') Motor 15.2 IMI 100-74 f CNA-70 (Structural) Fluid Drive 16.5 30. HNP-2 Recire M-C Cenerator 18.4 Wire Rope Slirg Apperdix "A" IRP-6977 ANSI B30.2-1976 ANSI B30.9-1971 ANSI B30.2-1976 ANSI B30.11-1973 Set *a" Hoist Sketch No. 022 DDP-6976) (IDP-6975) * * * (HNP-6922) MEI B30.16-1973 (Rx Bldj El 158') Motor 15.2 HMI 100-74 OM-70 (Structural) Fluid Drive 16.5 [ 31. 107-1 1trbine Crane load Block 4.5 N.A. Appendix "A" 19P-6977 ANSI B30.2-1976 N.A. ANSI B30.2-1976 EOCI-61 Bld) Overhead Sketch No. 017 One-6976) 02P-6922) Apperdix *C" Crane (Cbntrol B133 Rnof) Air Handlirg Unit 5.3 Wire Rape Slirn ANSI B30.9-1971 (241-B303A B,C) OW-6975) **

  • Filter Unit 2

(Z41-D004A,B) I Exchaust Fan 1 (241-C010) 1 Supply Fan 1 (241-C009) 33. ter-2 Turbine Crane Ioad Block 4.5 N.A. Appendix "A" liNP-6977 MEI B30.2-1976 N.A. AIEI B30.2-1976 N E! B30.2-1976 j Bld3 Overhead Sketch No. 017 ODP-6976) 00P-6922) OM-70 Crane (Contaol Bld3 Roof) Air llandlirg Unit 5.3 Wire Broe Stirg NEI B30.9-1971 (241-D003A,B,C) 02P-6975) **

  • Filter Unit 2

(241-D004A,B) Exhaust Fan 1 (241-C010) ,1 Stpply Fan 1 (241-C009) 16.

TABLE 3 (cont 'd.) CUIDILINE 2 GJIDELINE 3 CUIDELIPES 4, 5 CUIDELIFE 6 11Ut CPN E OR IO!ST WEIQrf LIETItC CU.DELINE 1 IHO liAt:DLI!G CPME OPERA'IOR SP! RIAL LIETDC CRANES-DCPTTION, GJIDP1IFE 7 to. IDDTTIFICATIOri IfAD ('I0es) DEVICE SAFE IND PMHS Ff0CCOURES TRAINIPC DLVICIS, SLIrCS Tf5TI!C, m!!ITI2iA CE CTW.t DESIGN 23. IfP-1 Reactor Crane Irwl Block 9 M.A. Arpendix *A" INP-6929 NEI B30.2-1976 N.A. NEI B30.2-1976 00CI-61 8133 0.erical Sketch No. 018 IN -6977 (IRP-6976) (IDP-6922) IUPIC-0554 Crane (Reft 411rv} Floor) IDP-1 Rx vessel 65 F13-EC09 Aryerv11x "C" lbad 12P-6710,6720 Appenlix *B" 8 INP-6M7 ICP-2 Rx Wssel 65 IfMP-2-6702 fload INP-6977 FC P-1 M)isture 56 F13-EDOS IM -67'O Sepirator INP-6977 teP-1 Steam Dryer 43 1c7-6730 ft.T-6977 Ic.7-1 Drywell 11ead 45 F13-ID09 12P-6705 !NP-6977 th% 2 Drywell liead 45 fee-2-6702 1 INP-6977 127-1 Rx Vessel 6 wire Rope Slirg INP-6715 NEI B30.9-1971 Ikad Insulation 1 N -6977 (!!NP-6975) * *

  • ICP-2 Rx Vessel 6

g INP-2-6702 lbad Insulation 120-6977 IcP-1 spent Ibel 10 INP-6721 Bol Cattle Gute flNP-6977 IOP-2 Sper.t 7 bel 10 INP-2-6702 tbol Cattle 01ute INP-6977 12P-1 Refuelirg 4@l0 INP-6740 Slot Plugs IM -6977 12 P-2 Refuelirn 4@l0 INP-2-6702 Slot Plugs IRP-6977 122-1 D/S Pool 3033 INP-6725 Shield Plugs l@76 IINP-6977 feP-2 D/S rool 3@33 INP-2-6702 Shield Plugs 1876 12P-6977 INP-1 Reactor Well 4@81 INP-6700 Shield Plugs 2980 IRP-6977 INP-2 Peactor Well 4981 I INP-2-6702 Shield Plugs 2@80 107-6977 17

TABLE'3 (cont'd.) GUIDI1!!E 2 CUIDf11tE 3 WIDE 2.INES 4, 5 GUIDE 2,ItE 6 q I'ITM CRATE OR HOIST EIQlT LITTIPC GUIDf11tE 1-I&@ IIANDLIIC CRANE OPERNIOR SP! RIAL LIPTING. CRA!ES-INSPIETION, CUIDFLIFE 7 70. IDf2frIFICATION - t&@ ('!0t3), DIVICE SAFE IIED PKI11S P903!UIES TRAINDG. DEVICE 3, SLINGS TESTDC, MAINT!XNCE CPNE DESIGN leP-1 Reactor leP-1 Rx Vessel 5 Wire Rape Slin} Appendix *A" ItP-6760 M EI B30.2-1976 NE1 B30.9-1971 NE! B30.2-1976 IXCI-61. Bld) Overhead Service Platfor:n Sketch No. 018 leP-6977 (19P-6976) (IDP-6975) * * * (leP-6922) tERDG-0554 Crane Appendix."C" (Refueliry Flcor) teP-2 Rx vessel 5 Ice-2-6702 - 8 Service Platform It4P-6977 lem-1 Spnt fuel 193.75 11NP-6726 . Ibol Cates 195.5 ft4P-6977 lem-2 Spent fbel 193.75 ter-2-670 2 Itcl Cates 195.5 INP-6977 ter-1 Sp nt Fuel 15 ter-1-10153 Packs INP-6977 leP-1 RIV Ikal 1 lee-6710,6720 FAJt & Wacher Pack it4P-6977 IcP-2 RIV lbal 1 12P-2-6702 i Nut & Washer Rack 184P-6977 24. leP-2 Feactor Crane Ioad Block 9 N.A. A mendix *A* IUP-6929 MEI B30.2-1976 N.A. N EI B30.2-1976 EOCI-61 Bld! Overh<*ad Sketch No. 018 IINP-6977 (IDP-6976) (life-6922) Appenjix *C" - Crane (Refueliry Floor) teP-2 Poisture 56 F13-fD08 INP-2-6702 Appendix *B* IDP-6977 Separator leP-2 Steam Dryer 43 122-2 Reactor Well 4981 wire pope Slirn MEI B30.9-1971' + Shield Plugg 2980 tier-6975) *** - (Over Floor only) NOITS

  • Provisions exist for the permnent installation of a hoists towever, none is currently installed. 'the design stan1ards listed are the current applicable stanlards for the type of equipnent which would te uvd here.

It my te nreccsary to use a mobile crane to make this lift. In the event that a mbile crane is used, all guidelines will be net; however, the crane design starmlard would be MEI B30.5-1968, which mtets the intent of Guideline 7.

      • An aalittorul safety factor of 2 is applied to the factor of 5 required by ANSI B30.9-1971 resulting in a total safety factor of 10.

18

III INTERIM PROTECTION Section 5.3 of NUREG-0612 specifies six " Interim Protection Measures" whidi the staff considered necessary until the General Guidelines could be satisfied. Five of these appeared in Enclosure 2 to the December 22, - 1980 letter. GPC's compliance with the six Interim Protection Measures is discussed below: A. INTERIM MEASURE 1 " Licenses for all operating reactors not having a single-failure proof overhead crane in the fuel storage pool area should be revised to include a specification comparable to Standard Technical Specification 3.9.7, ' Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Building' for PWR's and Standard Technical Specification 3.9.6.2, ' Crane Travel' for BWR's, to prohibit handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool until implementation of measures which satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1 (see Table 3.2-1)." COMPLIANCE Plant Hatch Unit 1 Technical Specification 3/4.10.I and Unit 2 Technical Specification 3/4.9.8 prohibit the movement of any load weighing in excess of 1600 lbs. over fuel assemblies in the spent 4 fuel storage racks. B. INTERIM MEASURE 2 " Safe load paths should be defined per the guidelines of Section 5.1. l(1). " COMPLIANCE i Safe Load Paths have been defined in accordance with the intent of Guideline 1 [NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.l(1)]. C. INTERIM MEASURE 3 " Procedures should be developed and implemented per the guidelines 3 of Section 5.1.1(2)." COMPLIANCE Procedures have been developed and implemented in accordance with Guideline 2 [NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.l(2)]. D. INTERIM MEASURE 4 " Crane operators should be

trained, qualified, and conduct i

themselves per the guidelines of Section 5.1.l(3)." COMPLIANCE Crane operators are trained, qualified, and conduct themselves in accordance with Guideline 3 [NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.l(3)]. (19)

E. - INTERIM EASURE 5 " Cranes should be inspected, tested,. and maintained in accordance with the guidelines of Section 5.1.l(6)." COMPLIANCE Cranes are inspected,. tested, and maintained in accordance with Guideline 6 [NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.l(6)]. F. -INTERIM MEASURE 6 "In addition to the above, special attention should be given to procedures,- ' equipment, and personnel for the handling of heavy loads over the core, such as vessel internals or vessel inspection tools. This. special review should include tile following for these loads: (1) review of procedures for installation of rigging or lifting devices and movement of the load -to assure that sufficient detail is provided.and that' instructions are clear and concise; (2) visual inspections of load-bearing ~ components of cranes, slings,- and special lifting devices to identify flaws and deficiencies that could lead to failure of the component; (3) appropriate repair and replacement of defective components; and (4) verify that the crane operators have been properly trained and are familiar with specific procedures used in handling these loads, 'e.g., hand signals, conduct of operations, and content of procedures." COMPLIANCE Procedures for the handling of heavy loads over the reactor core have 'been reviewed and verified to contain' sufficient detail with clear and concise directions for installation of rigging or lifting - devices and load movement. Visual inspections of load bearing components -of the Reactor Building Overhead Cranes and the slings and' lifting devices' used for lifts over the core have been performed to identify flaws or deficiencies which could lead to . failures. No repairs to cranes or special lifting devices have been found necessary; however, some slings have been - replaced. Crane operators have been trained per General Guideline 3 and are familiar with the content of procedures for handling heavy loads over the core. i (20)'

IV CONCLUDING StMMARY i Franklin Research Center (FRC) made several recommendations in draft TER C5257-095/446 regarding the compliance of Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2 with the NUREG-0612 General Guidelines and Interim Protection Measures. GPC has implemented these recommendations as summarized below: A. FRC FIPOING - NUREG-0612 HEAVY LOADS OVERWAD HANDLING SYSTEMS "The licensee's conclusion to exclude all overhead handling systems at Hatch Units 1 and 2 from the safe load handling practices outlined by Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612 is not consistent with the WC goals for improving load handling safety and reliability. The licensee should be requested to review those load handling systems considered to be exempt from NUREG-0612 and provide a revised list of systems requiring compliance based upon the discussion contained in this evaluation." IMPLEMENTATION A revised list of overhead handling systems which were determined to be within the scope of the General Guidelines is provided in Table 3. The criteria used in selecting these handling systems were consistent with the EC goals for improving load handling safety and reliability. B. FRC FINDING - GUIDELINE 1 " Insufficient information has been provided to determine compliance with Guideline 1 of NUREG-0612. The licensee should provide the following information: 1. Equipment layout drawings depicting safe load paths, 2. Details of the type of visual aids provided to crane operators l and load handling supervisors during load handling, 3. Details concerning the handling of deviations from safe load l paths." i l IMPLEMENTATION 1. Scale area sketches depicting safe load paths are provided in Appendix A. 2. Details of the type of visual aids provided to crane operators and loac handling supervisors are described in the preceding l discussion of compliance with Guideline 1. 3. Details concerning the handling of deviations from safe load paths cre provided in the preceding discussion of compliance with Guideline 1. (21)

C. FRC FIPOING - GUIDELINE 2 " Insufficient information has been provided by the licensee to determine-compliance with Guideline 2 of NUREG-0612 at Hatch Units 1 and 2. The licensee should provide additional detail of the composition and scope of load handling procedures at Hatch Units 1 and 2." IMPLEMENTATION Details of the composition and scope of load handling procedures are provided in the preceding discussion of compliance with Guideline 2. D. FRC FINDING - GUIDELINE 3 " Hatch Units 1 and 2 comply with Guideline 3 of NUREG-0612." E. FRC FINDING - GUIDELINE 4 " Hatch Units 1 and 2 do not comply with Guideline 4 of NUREG-0612. The licensee should provide information relative to Sections 3, 4, and 5 of ANSI N14.6-1978 so that a proper review can be performed to ensure - that Hatch special lifting devices meet the intent of Section 5.1.l(4) of NUREG-0612." IMPLEMENTATION Special lifting devices are currently under evaluation with respect to Sections 3, 4, and 5 of ANSI N14.6-1978. The results of this evaluation will be documented at a later date. l F. FRC FINDING - GUIDELINE 5 " Hatch Units 1 and 2 do not comply with Guideline 5 of NUREG-0612. l In order to comply, the licensee should perform the following: 1. Verify that slings are installed and used in accordance with ANSI B30.9-1971, 2. Verify that the load used in selecting and marking the proper sling is based on the sum of the maximum static and dynamic

loads, l

3. Verify that -slings restricted in use to certain cranes are clearly marked to so indicate." IMPLEMENTATION 1. Slings are' installed and used in accordance with ANSI B30.9-1971. 2. Conservative safety factors allow for dynamic loading of slings. [ 3. No slings are restricted in use to certain cranes. l (22)

G. FRC FINDING - GUIDELINE 6 " Hatch Units 1 and 2 comply with Guideline 6 of NUREG-0612." H. FRC FIFOING - GUIDELINE 7 " Hatch Units 1 and 2 partially comply with this guideline. In order to fully comply, the licensee should compare the design criteria for all cranes at Hatch Units 1 and 2 to CMAA-70 (1975) and ANSI B30.2-1976, and evaluate the differences relative to crane reliability and safety." IMPLEMENTATION The design criteria for cranes have been evaluated with respect to the appropriate standards. Details are provided in the preceding discussion of compliance with Guideline 7. I. FRC FINDING - INTERIM PROTECTION MEASURE 1 " Hatch Units 1 and 2 comply with Interim Protection Measure 1." J. FRC FINDING - INTERIM PROTECTION' MEASURES 2, 3, 4, Ato 5 " Evaluations, conclusions, and recommendations are contained in the respective general guidelines in Sections 2.1.2 (Guideline 1), 2.1.3 (Guideline 2)," 2.1.4 (Guideline 3), and 2.1.7 (Guideline 6)." K. FRC FIPOING - INTERIM PROTECTION MEASURE 6 i " Insufficient information has been provided to determine compliance with Interim Protection Measure 6 at Hatch Units 1 and 2. In order to comply, the licensee should: 1. Verify that procedures for installation of rigging or lifting devices and movement of the load contain sufficient detail and that instructions are clear and precise, 2. Verify that visual inspections of load bearing components of cranes, slings, and special lifting devices to identify flaws or deficiencies that could lead to failure of the component have been performed, and the repair / replacement of identified components accomplished, 3. Verify that the crane operators have been properly trained and are - familiar with specific procedures used in handling heavy loads over the core." IMPLEMENTATION 1. The applicable procedures contain sufficient detail with clear and concise instructions. 2. The required inspections and replacements have been performed. 3. Operators are trained and familiar with the applicable procedures. (23) w y --9 w m e -- -- m m i'--,w emi

4 h APPENDIX A SAFE LOAD PATH AND LOAD EXCLUSION AREA SKETCHES ,, ~,-, ,-.e n

I:.

f. qNCLO6UR.E A.- LOAD EXCLU5ich!

AREA A i HmPLO LOAD 2 BW-1, R.HK. PdMPS, EEll C.cc7 A.. -~ l. i_. LO6Alildka w Hse-i. aw t,t w. 4e c.ah1M - r=r s 1 L.o " t t lll LOA,0 DEf tJtaPfidd: PouP 4'do X k' C H 3 he, too L64 Motoit s'or) x ro' LHT A.'ao o. LM lt j Mmucu LA9cld6 BLBVATt0L): I bo'- o 4 i t t r .? 7 o" _ \\ _ it '-o

  • i t

l ]j 2,

l og i

i a

i n

7 N l' e l I j f t s l[ ) S m.e - Y$ = 1'.-O" SEETC N NO. 00/ g A-1 I

" ENCLO6UR.E A - LOAD EXCLUS10hl AR.EA H AWPLEP LOAD

  • BNP-1,12:.HR:. NMPs, tl Ell coo 2.,

'..c _.' LO6ATid4 = Hue-i. av st a. 4e c.,as,E w o n 1 L.o " LOAD Dl!$fRJPTlad: phyp 4 6oX T' C H 3 b.Wo I LM MoToft 3'on X (o' C. H S A.' 8 0 0 L.JbS

j 4

ftY Y b .t ' a e , 7 'm0 ?' '7'-3Sk' g 3 5 llll ( 4 e f s.k j 4 \\ = \\ f I f h sat.n - Y$ = t' o" k . fMf7cH NO. 002 ~ A-2 ,,_.~..-_..-...--__:-

ENGLOSUR.E A - LOAD EX,CiUS10hl AREA gAWPLEp LOAD : H N P-t,' Com.e SPe A9 PdMP s G 2.1 - C.o o I A ~ i .' LO6AT104 = Hwe-i. aw n,t.a. 4e c are ass ~ w m1Lo" LOA,0 DES 42PTidd: po p 4'/o o e 4 -(,# CH3 G,7 oo Las 1 l. _ u at,e,a o o x v c.s, ,,eco Les W tMdu L.M'?ledda kl.RWATeod a 13c' - 0 " i l . ~. 9 \\ l -ino " J'-6 L \\ ^ e.ammesm ///// ( [.- 1 t e t i ~- g I i l l 0 e i l s !) G .. w s_e. if' iL o' f 2 n xH NO.005_ a ~ l A-3 L_ ....~..... z.

' ENCLO6UR.E A - LOAD EXC.LU510h1 AREA l HAMPLED LOAD : H M _ t.g.H e 4 x E li-Boo l A LOCATid64 - RWF-(.O(SupA,6e-(ortaet. st. %' - I h. " t LOAD DESCRJPTidtd: 29% X 5'o p 4 r.coe I a MAxat406A L.AupndG EL.BVATIOd = 15b o'- o " r i i ' 6*3_ _ 7'-o + a p -emme i / / / S i e fl l'l 1 l ./ / ~ l lr t t . [ s ~ i

t hcAta-

'/g / '. o " .k 3Xfre# No. 004 ~ I s A-4

I skicL050R.E-A- Lap Eutu'910kJ AlteA i _ WANDLeo LDApf a HWP-t, R.R R PoM Ps, , te i 1 -cooIF6 ~ LOCAT104 s HNP-I.il!X bLD'.W15 DORMER ~ EL a 1 -o" !g

LpAp ps+cEIFTM z POM P 4' O P X Y-d# CN 3

(.s,1 o C L ib G. i MoToA. s'o o X (o' ( 4 3 4; Boo L a9 ~ ~ ~ .t '( t MAN. MOM L.A,640 t >J en EL.GNATIO Q = 160'-O" e;i i .t 1 l S 4 e e e y t \\ 1 ne fygg. I #/g, f' p # ~ 3 I '. f g =* g,- 'c.' 9WP. _. _ i .THE7tM h/o. 005 l J -5. A

E EklCL0suRE A-LCAP E4GLU910LJ AR.EA _.WA90Ltp LcApf a HWP-l RR R POMPS, . e i 1 - Coo 2.. D I ~ ~ LOCAT104 = H N P-I, Ex BLo. 4 E-cite 4W et AR7 '-o " ~ i i LpAP pr%it FTMs POM P 4.' O D X ~6 - 6" CN ) 6,10C Lb6 t MoTot. S'O o X lo'(I43 '(o. 8 0 0 L.E 6 ~~ ~

l e
l M Ax.oA O M L.A 4 p N ec EL WATidd l b o'- O"
i

, f Y 17'-3W ,}7-o* _ I \\ ,, ne a "(, _ E

  1. ///:

1- .j l = g ^ L y' '/ e ll # 'I j . fesLE u B 0 t o, ..V. t ..op P W 9FE7cH WO.00 &* 3 A-6

EA!CLO90RE A-LMP E4cLU'910kJ AR.EA t' _ WAWDt.to LDApf He-t, c. ore smv PdW. E.2.1-c o o I b LOCAT104 : H NP-. l i iEX BLD. W E-citedeC eLgd-o" ~ -. LpAp PE%EIFriod Paw 4 op x. 4'- (e" (. H 3 /,, 2.00 L.9 6 / i motor. '3 'O P X 6' CH 3 ~7iOOD LB9 ~ MM su e s LAa p hJG BLNA7tod a l g o' a " e g 4 g-r_7'-o.; i \\ l .. no w ? UH//H I i- .s = g Sats b' *= l'0" B e .i. -( l ~-

W A p P..____

I S frarCH No. 00 7 A-7

e euctosure A-Loo nausiou au . W A W ol. t o L o a pf : A WP -1. R H R. HX. E ll-B o olB.' I LOCATt04 : H MP-1 R K Bt oc, bJ E CoRuR. et AE'- t h" f LOAp pre cElFTipd: zW L. x '5 'o o 47,0004 ' i i 'l I 4 I "6 0 - O MAXIMUM L. A+J o WGn E-L,& @ Tio d = 4 O e e eh i ) ,, e y / g ~) (a ? = l'~0# CCALSs / /A {, j / &l l fm e s i dAT-- j ~~ grrrCH No. 008 A-8

EMct.0suRE A-Lap IMcLU910L1 AR.EA WA9pt.ep 1oAp+ 9u9-2, come scieAs pow d; KAoTOR. '2 EZ1 C. col A f Loc 4TIO4 : W P-2.,Rx % oca, W E-t.cstdeat E,01'-o"

}

'LOAp paweinisd : me eteue3r+ ei4zM. no. = s'o o x it/ 4 t--> J+ Bo # MoTom Auevoi. f s 3dD x (s ' L L. 7 7200

  • MAguou
t. AubidG hEVATiod a

.g b o ' - O " b {'- 0 "_ 9 '- 3 * ,, WR m n ou / t / l / ,l D I / e l / _ ___.._.( b .l / $$ i u I i g,- i =., e 3 A,)W8..,.. l! 6 C A 1. B = '/8"== l '- O" i 1 b fretcH Mo.009 A-9 g,., ,,-.-,--y, w

' i, ~ ENGL.09UEL-A- LCAP MCLUWl0M AKth . WAtJULeo LDApf : HWP.2, RHR hjMr / MoTom 2 E- (1-d oo 2 A LOCATioM = 44 P-2.. itx 5 t oGi, 4 t's coR4Et ti:L. 87 '-o " LOAP PMcElPTi#d : POMP stM.+ DISG. Hp :. E' //O.o x 24'L.. ~1(ooo LJL i MoTae. AsseM6. 4 'o. 6. x G ' t._ . (.o8 c o t 2, M Axtudu lidbirJG ELEATIOL l : 130 - o t .l i t f n'- t o* e'- tJ N ,n, WR RL ' ,n e ll / 'l l j, o i m g ..i S t L N ( ) i> LOAP EELUS10M ~ ~~ AgeAs gg-s t 'l c t- ^ l l q P W ll scAte: /s' = l Ld' I i fI fEarCH NO O/O i A-10 +-

EMct.0suf.E A-LMP EACLU910u AUA t j WAWDt.tp L0hpf a MkW 2., E.H R PdMf A MoTo' K .1 G 11 /.' 00 f. G j If L.0C,ATickJ Ruf-2., litx 6Lpaq. k.le-com.de:4, Lt - 67'-o " ! / coAp p <x.ste riod = n ur rt.4 pieca+.it, s'_c,"o..x24't., m,o o t_s. f MOTort M,upt.M 4' #. D X (/ L.. ; (oBOO L 6. ] ~ /38'- 0

  • j d nxa n dkA LAAJV s dtr. EL6 VATieb). =

t 0 i t loso Etclusica AREA ~Q b 20'- o* = = 9L&" . ' 9" 7'-I* _ 7://* G R PGAPZEll. COOK 9- ,, pp [* l 5 IL i r s'z)/ / / / / // r i u s' r,/ l %... i ?? Y e3% uj f -[? / g

uf

/ I, e e e g' 'l O [ ,c -G t l l 'h " WP. 94bl t : '/B = l'- O J t-t j. ..Wtr0H WO Oli t A-ll - ----1 .E-.~.--..'.~.. ---..~-. .. ~, - -. - - - -.,. - ~ _ - - - -

EMCLOSURE A-LOAP E4GLU910U AR.EA i' l . WAWDLeo L.0Ap4 : w w - z.,, C H E R X. . 2 911 - P>oo l A l LOCATiou : B W C 2.. S A P>t 0 4n, d G-Zoedet F L, 9 6'- o " l LOAp pse cElFfi#d : 2 s ' t_. x s' o o - 41 coo t-a.4. i i t l l //ast ArrA CH/NCs PoNT = ISS'- 6 " I NLxwf0M L4ND/WG ELEV4T//U: /3o'- 0 " l i V// l 'o i s t f, l U h 'n' I + 1 Q. } v - 2'1 l. ~ - - i ,i l l j l 8 '-0 ~ ~ ~ 7 '- O ' AgY 3 A STALE-Vi-l'- 0* I d VEdre// AfD. 0/2 A-12

ENCLO6UR.E A - LOAD EXCLUSl0h! AR.EA i HkNVVQ LokD = Nur-z. c.s. Four dame zf2/- cae / B LOGb.Tl04 - Huri,ax sios, Gs ccMER 24. 87'-o " I Loko OeSt.RJPTidd: puup. R o.o. x /4 'l , f490 La / I Motor = 3 ' o.o y 1,' L 't 7260 LB I umucu L60p!Lb ELENMt0L3: 130'- o " ~ 1, e ., a ~~- { l 0, \\ P ~ i E i 1, j s s 3 O O h ~k VMercH Alo. oo la k i is A-13 ?

[ ENCLOSUR.E A - LOAD EXCLUS10h! AR.EA { HM4 PLED LOAD : 9 $JP' 2., EH R WW A WTar ,3 C-11-4007 D l LOCAT104 v HWP 't. 2x PA.ps,4B C02.41!Ht. B L, G'7 -D " LOAD DESCFJPTidd: ppp gl (,6 0 o x 14.1 L, %oo LS Meto A 4'o b x & t , 'G 8co L Eb f O d J t 1 I <@~o f h _ __ - k' '/ f i ,p / J'h / f u ~ ~ [ e o O O G 9 2retcM Mo OM S k ( A-14 - - =

' ENCLO6UR.E A - LOAD EXC.LUSIOh! AREA ~ WANPLEp LOAD : hup-7 R H St. P d M P d i b40 TOR 78 ll-C.OO Z @ LOCATidu v HwR. Z '. g( E,tp& 4e 6sRt4e( E L. 8 7 '- 0 " i LOA D Def t.'R.lPflod : rue s'-s" o.o x r.4' L. % o o a , ' eoo L & MoTot 4.'o.b. v 6 'L ,G er l- / {! b l SCALE: '/$'=l' d 4 zo'- o" l 1o!- 4 ke h I s; og o / / // / / / / / / / / / / ) -/L3' E4M WALL a -E i a _. ( g h I q t; l l t i} \\ ^ fxercN Wo. o/6* G k A-15 _-._c_-__-;_-______--__.__

ENCLOSUR.E k - LOAD EXC.LUS10M AR.EA / 7. H AWDLED LOAD : w,J94, it. Hit HA Z e 11-Pb o o I b LOCATidad v Rui'4 pt A BLec,i, 4 e tezuent et.. W -O LOA,0 DESOE3PTidd

  • 2.6' L-X S'o o 4 f ooo LES' i

hoi +T ATTACRlW6i P'#ldT BLeV4tiod 3 /SS'- fo # umucu L. AuotWG st.tvATisd, 1 :n,o '- 0 " s 8 l SCALE : YB's l'-0,'[ [ t t = J ,i 2 I l i f. n. l I t l s f i 6 ~~ 9%E YCH hio,ofG ~ ' 7C0" " 8LO A-16

1..._ t ~ $8 ~ q s. vI, u s -gg s

  • f a

s x c3 l y e s gf { I l "] 4.g:L .i w 1 a ... l .:a: e.. o s . 4;e .N... ~. t ,,.a 2 v =r.. --.__i._ A .w %. 7. v ;.}3 N. .,' l j 4. d. n h,.,.,. uj! e.. .;nh,.,.. ~ s. \\' n N' 1 ..rc.. 3 r _ gi i, ( i) i l m \\ l s.. < eta ,l k e . i,. 3 i, .V, ErFi + n= . s g .f-

f N R

h.. -.., ii ug d E U'E r., N T l!. uw I!!D.il i i, t '~:' 5.. d} "g y. y' {h i v h9.[..;li.GU ll @ k 3, b,,a'q;- =l 4 s_. _5 3 g,

3

%q40 i "" IE %" a5:e .G{ ~

, c C'qI a.,

1 w,ii I; s nM 'i

i s

.;% y (g %:s i, w w _s. q j:! Mms 1 m :i tv I I, 4y ct"tha i i 3 / hh C I -) t ( c i x,~ ,a g g3 sie 4 .n 0-I. h h> Q h.h !f E ) a 'A f M o n I e~iad4 U '" K a r $.- T i;: . s, s 4., e g' V s M -Rl,y-f y;..e.--------- w,!

  • - (

h,' g g,3 s ,.e i. !,c. s. .u .s ,.,, 5 .g,. 43e - 3.. s s9 = -) t g wJ g e, i M O j* 4 I ('. %g % s ' 4 g .....ML.7 ~

c. n, 4-e,, -l jf fd i. 8 e e I ~ TI T y!j 8 li! .? !l Is ' l.ljj'l l, ...---(i,!['ll l-d,_,, g l 1, I e. ij.n I n m TT 7 l j qi [_I I g' i og -Q j! l7 g yy f---p ,p y .lj! l - ( -t~ - 'i mx e /l !i 1 i e. 9 ) SSr ", Ed!l', l.3;3g_ I l ~l ~,D-. k' i A# so ( a 'UE[..!g $ M W*RRRew i 1 g !,. A I:)I 1 i

  • g jd e___.

l 4 - aA l kgt" l hl d'--- - ) ' f ~ 31 J1j._. i i s Ie ! OI; g io s o R 2 Q d; Ul i ge g e-1 s ) l!! ~ i i g't .t dNgl $,5ll. )),[li!h,. d i s L h ~ ~. .,mm49ey o o na L: 1 40 i j. l -l A-18 ,. L. .=,_:.

m'" 6I-V o e i b1O ON H71 sac,

  1. 4 S.

e .. n.. ,,..,s.. 1 t ,e g. Le-f . 9 % E3 e t ,k E .a a ) \\_ h Jj i, e s .g. p

L y-'

T-a --t __t_ea. Y k h$4Sf ff y l 4 X }. ; \\\\\\$ \\ \\ \\\\\\\\\\\\ I 44 = Q 3 M4 zg 'l ! I I i l [ j Di } lj._ >p l .c- < -v y o. s t ',f. -g ~ .J-~ 'o,I 1 T 1 . -A ; a u! y-i m ) \\L W l n i e e o O C 6 trG. (-f 7,,9',0 X l H'1 s */ X \\ ?eL MWN I w ooo' eE U17i,1stlX ttO 39 7 (N,b -BNw asm.:t b W3 W N0lldra? sed 4401 3 occ.' oE b7,It A (k7,,9,5 x (rw7,,9 i e ,, G, 9 s \\ ' 1 4 W o~vd Y 21,' t -d N M

  • Nol1Y?O'l V i co t -l E.Q 1.49 'ry n swa ggoa-A Tw ' t -dN H ad101 d41dNTH my N0lG019Y-2 dV01 -Y 320501?M3
  1. C 02-V i

i "i 1'

  • m 020 on ums f -$t Q. '- @..

~ ~ 6%. ; ,0;/p- .e ) s1 ...r .i = _. e O y

[

-) -t E \\\\\\N 8% \\ v p g 3w' _s -c ed g' ud i u, d n-e lp gg y i i i xtg ,a )_"j_ L,- J c t a-1

q. q i.

t

.1 b.

'E ) ) 3 8 l / \\ /. / a .3 g 3 ( k [ i. l 1 1, i g ooo'M ema,ttxtw,99(mW ac.mn, y oao'ts (.17,il sil X (M7,9 X (N,G iiW3d dlMd i g oce. og (-O p.1 % (N7,f) f9 ) W7,$ 7% 20U:M & M911 dill 7 sed OTO1 ,,o ,se s % ' inens 72 L-d N H

  • Nol1Y10~1 s

<a t o s s -i 4. 4 m mW <snM. mma yd t -dNH a dT01 da ldNyli .j '/- H1Y N0lGl117YG dV01 -Y -330501?H3

ENCLOStJRE A ~ LOAP EAcLu'p10kl AR.n ff l HAND 12P LOAp HhlP' 2..hcrWL lted.tG, PM9 M.61. 66f.'1b)l-GOO l A LOCATIOM, u c 2. A. fM_o &. e t.-. t 58' Lob.D pascit.iPTidu = Gehea. Tot n'5 3 x s'- ic10 x 7'-3"r 4 a(,'l60 LB* MoTow vz'-6(t3 v 4 '-2" LH) K 9' N 3 3 0. 3 0 0 ' 8 5-N'O DE'Vf 11 '-."1'./t Q X 6'Lt+1 X S/ W ) 3S'ACO LA*S t / .j

  • ...-lc '.

ff.? :.'... C;.: jj t

y.. -, y; *.1 M :

.. c:.t + ,t

s.. -

- 19' y D l..l.,, h},, (I,%:. .r:. M,..' t..;W

I

/ -[2T.4 I

  • 8012..' Y.'

l 3 l s.-* Y-j l <.as.. -., :

  • P

., 9 3.t.. e is e .4.-q SCALE : e Ve ,8 1-0 L

.[~:.. l.... -.\\'c. - s j

,..' i

j '. w. eM~ 7 y

i. t

. 7,' t n. i :. 0 8..-. PVM/ ) 3 l ,,, c u _ ,.dh s f ll tj.' } [. :. @y."4-p ci'3*;s' - s , 's:j f n'.. '.,* i, j. s

===> s,- y G -{jl;[ a 8.' - Y.:,.- e, p,,,,,#""~ 8' l.8 +l l e k.~... . x,y . I,, a_,, 4,, s isp "et -s f#., a. %;,, = , l s g, J. , _ ;.3 .*1; '. mozog ~ 4 s. ,-r-w.... .. : u.e I P <;

  • g,

s a'...,

g

.? ,3W. -:. ~ s i.;- a. - w - s C1 E.%.-@?.c-f .k - -d g '. [' Wy$..,' ' Y 'QM<'.

..i 3.p,
i c -

11"N.i.4 '. Y M .:.. +~'s.-f.u...,... ~.. hd- .t

sxxxx, p;6, -p. 6.s.,

L: _4Rvs.-.v:;e -: " A ; .a ..g.. . m s.. s 3,:: -y. s y .r.e ~ s u ~~. . w. - ,M .o, :- -y ;.; - x. .; a ~. .us a, .1 - -.. s @%dM.- t,....- .c.3 7 .-..c ;; s b Nf.I46;. 3;,.

..
s 0
4. d Q >ia :, M.i q&:+ ~l.

c ' -. '. * ;. ', ' ~ ~.

M s

L :::; ". :q.;q.. s ,v g.. ;- c ;. - .m phg:n v.- y n ist.Q.': A / ?.G~;W:f?W y~'~'f osdf 1 FSt I.,x. e.... ~.10.,-p@m.c ;.J,.~.P .i . r.4 e 9 .y;%?. ' <. --- d + t t .r,:. 4*.. .c. a... 4 g ( g;. ,1 < s s e . D....- s.,'. i ..,. 2' '~ ' s //{C, W s P f. -SET. i .;05_S. 9: I,500tkid-]k'h~LgetE ' ' ~ ", i c. mu u y m u y.s e ~ 3 '7C ge 't bUbThN O l A-21

~ 1L BHC.LOSURE A-LOAP EACLU910M Alt.n &o. i ,l

  • HANDLeP LOAp Hu P-2.. EsAdor itu.ut. PWP h hef.16 N-600 i B ll LOCATIOM R t4 P

'2. R M. bLOG et. g 55'-o " [ LOAD PESLR.lPTidu s Geueo.voit n' LL3 < g._ t" Ca 3 g il s'ILv h % "P50 LBS MoTom. a.'-@LO x B'-2 CRT ';( O' Lv0 30.300 LES

- o w n-w-em x s'c.m x sicw 3@o o 'SS.

l / 't I, s ____. w - y sss s~s,sxes a:t 9 . J.' .;' p. i N 5~.r.. -.t. s s s m s s s s.sm s sm r-s W ~I..I MWi [.. -GN .M N L scALs: y J d $'l9@d d .dif ;,f

'p,y.d
> :1 I y[

6. ,..gc.ku-$ 4 I;'. p, 3 e s i 33pgtm.w 3-7or.oq

m. ps,

+ -.,. i

..... v

'.;u. . / r u :% < f>t +~.ry( V.d,.' J.,-

..a.\\

gl a-I .., r ..t:. ,r'

':, yo,pn :;p>E :

,W..J..,f, v W ,1 q c.i i 3: hQ.','. 6;4.". &'@~t l: Q

.i 0:kT {

E $)W 's ~ ?YY ~

2

.c n <,. h..y:+y . :g,,y 8 r --- w ,. 2 b i %' ' :*-o N, "W. .M l '.if ei : s r. ' 2. Yi:\\ ) .Nh/fD3.N., l ~ k ~f'y?$' $$!5 Nf' y$ - 9. M* $ p ::.i i b M. Q e N ..b.-w/: M"J N a ' C- - y' ? .:.d Y: pdm 1t- ~~~~ d K g/:e 'sg.. 4 f i 9.:.. f's

s. k If.5Y-

~ ... 9;,'R,~ '.; 4' * }.y ~ ~ t ~"c',, yyp:1. .{ s y 4 s -s j g. . - q,,,. i gg s .i i.'. [. s IIL Mc.1, p'.'.'n$N<.'I A..WD4 ~ - ..a [.h3 s 'M..., s .... o.1 p,..f '.i-C G.EL. 4( :7Borl N9 ..,, ' '. '., 'W. t.. l n.-. . w- .. f -.

v..h...., g;%

jI

s...a..

s ..e ' (~ "$.2 ) '. Yd lg 0-$. t ,[. M,, nit:n;;

12345H13, i

Y.Mr, M /.w y,... -Q .. y.,, ..y l 1 r:4.=t 2 i ".?.' h: i.1 1 A,..qnJ.;;Q g,l. q... l l K,?;g -s s :.WA 's : - .. ' ' - -QG " f. * , ~,f274/80/3.$ ^ C,._;,. 3. } ',,d:.}:. 'G,. %: > }:;;7?/ s .g ;r y ?.-77 9 % : - 2[. ~%

  • -1 ~.'i

?7 h-f a L~1: 8

. c ~,.;>,v

= FW ~

t. :.,,

. 2...W. a... i "I s N r.m.. s -f g. A j

.- +=.~

k_ 'v75%K" ... A. s a s ' * ~,. ) IE ; i

  • .p

..a a <- .s b. - u- .. u r;

o.,.,.

W-s* ~ bd* y / 5 R15 1 6x.e-rcu wo, 022.

i 4 1 < i t i t. n i 1 t 4 f i 4 i i t i l APPEM)IX B I COMPARISON F SPECIAL LIFTING DEVICE DESIGN-TO ANSI N14.6-1978 /. l -(LATER)- i. i, e s 6 'Mg-p-M t'.e WM.ge $ wen, q e y$,iy - p ys-y-g 9yq pes e, hypgr gip-pgg wp.-dy go.* g ygqq g-gy weye y ee-yget e p@i-pe ewp, W wgw-'T-NPaus-*N"9-Wr-M**"9WW9ET' FPNT-"WT#99 2F"'T T

APPENDIX C COMPARISON OF OVERHEAD CRANE DESIGN TO CMAA SPECIFICATION 70

I. INTRODUCTION The purpose of the evaluation is to determine the extent of compliance of the HNP-1 Turbine Building Overhead Crane and the HNP-l&2 Reactor Building Overhead Cranes, which were designed to EOCI-61, with the guidelines of CMAA-70. Franklin Research Center (FRC) has compared the recommendations of CMAA-70 against those of EOCI-61 and identified fifteen areas where differences exist. The designs of the above three cranes were evaluated with respect to these fifteen areas as follows: II. HATCH OVEREAD CRANE EVALUATION A. FRC FIM)ING - IMPACT ALLOWANCE "CMAA-70, Article

3. 3. 2.1.1. 3 requires that crane design calculations include an impact allowance of 0.5% nf the load per foot per minute of hoisting speed but not less than 15%.

EOCI-61 specifies only a minimum allowance of 15%. Consequently, for cranes with hoist speeds in excess of 30 feet per minute, it is possible that the impact allowance applied under EOCI-61 will be less than that required by CMAA-70". EVALUATION The subject cranes have hoisting speeds ranging from 4 to 28 feet per minute; therefore, the impact allowance applied under EOCI-61 will not be less than that required by CMAA-70. B. FRC FINDING - TORSIONAL FORCES "CMAA-70, Article 3.3.2.1.3 requires that twisting moments due to overhanging loads and lateral forces acting eccentric to the horizontal neutral axis of a grider be calculated on the basis of the distance between the center of gravity of the load, or force i center line, and the girder shear center measured normal to the force vector. EOCI-61 states that such moments are to be l calculated with reference to girder center of gravity. For girder l sections symmetrical about each principal central axis (e.g., box l section or I-beam girders commonly used in cranes subject to this l review), the shear center coincides with the centroid of the girder section and there is no difference between the two requirements. Such is not the case for nonsymmetrical girder sections (e.g., l channels)." EVALUATION Box girders are used in the bridges of the subject cranes. Since a box girder is symmetrical about each principal central axis, the shear center coincides with the centroid of the girder section and there is no difference between the EOCI-61 and CMAA-70 requirements. (C-1)

C. FRC FINDING - BENDING STRESS "CMAA-70, Article 3.3.2.2 requires that bending stress calculations include a wind load of 5 pounds per square foot in design stress . calculations based on the sum of dead and live loads. EOCl-61 requires that the design of outdoor cranes include a wind load of 10 pounds per square foot of projected area, but is not specific concerning the combination of wind loads with other dead and live loads." EVALUATION The subject cranes are located indoors and are not subject to wind loading. This requirement is therefore not applicable. D. FRC FIFOING - LONGITUDINAL STIFFENERS "CMAA-70, Article 3.3.3.1 specifies (1) the maximum allowable web depth / thickness (h/t) ratio for box girders using longitudinal stiffeners and (2) requirements concerning the location and minimum moment of inertia for such stiffeners. EOCI-61 allows the use of longitudinal stiffeners but provides no similar guidance." EVALUATION 1. The box girder h/t ratios for the subject cranes range from 279 to 288 and are less than the maximum of 564 specified by CMAA-70. 2. The location and minimum moments of inertia of the. longitudinal stiffeners comply with the guidelines of CMAA-70. E. FRC FIlOING - ALLOWABLE COWRESSIVE STRESS "CMAA-70 Article 3.3.3.1.3 identifies allowable compressive i stresses of approximately 50% of yield strength of the recommended I structural material (A-36) for girders, where the ratio of the distance between web plates to the thickenss of the top cover plate (b/c ratio) is less than or equal to 38. Allowable compressive stresses decrease linearly for b/c ratios in excess of 38. EOCI-61 ~provides a similar method. for calculating. allowable compressive l stresses except

1. hat the allowable stress decreases from l

approximately 50% of yield only after the b/c ratio exceeds 41. l Consequently, structural members with b/c ratios in the general range of 38 to 52 designed under EOCI-61 will allow a slightly. I higher compressive stress than those designed under CMAA-70." EVALUATION The b/c ratios for the girder systems of the subject cranes are in the range of 24 to 30. Since no structural members have b/c ratios in the range of 38 to 52, the compressive stress allowed by this oesign will not be higher than that allowed by CMAA-70. (C-2)

F. FRC FINDING - FATIGUE CONSIDERATIONS "CMAA-70, Article 3.3.3.1.3 provides substantial guidance with respect to fatigue failure by indicating allowable stress ranges for various structural members in joints under repeated loads. EOCI-61 does not address fatigue failure." EVALUATION This requirement of CMAA-70 is not considered to be of consequence for the subject cranes because they are not used for frequent lifts at or near design conditions. The subject cranes are categorized as standby since their use is only intermittently required. The number of lifts required over the life of the plant is not expected to exceed 5000 per crane. Furthermore, the majority of the lifts will involve loads which are a small percentage of the crane's rated capacity. The calculated basic stresses for each crane structure are below the allowable values specified in Article 3.3.3.1.3 of CMAA-70 and the cranes are not subject to stress reversal. It is concluded that the lack of fatigue considerations in EOCI-61 does not constitute a significant discrepancy for the cranes being evaluated. G. FRC FINDING - HOIST ROPE REQUIREMENTS "CMAA-70, Article 4.2.1 requires that the capacity load plus the bottom block divided by the number of parts of rope not exceed 20% of the published rope breaking strength. EOCI-61 requires that the rated capacity load divided by the number of parts of rope not exceed 20% of the published rope breaking strength. The effect of this variation on crane safety margins depends on the ratio of the l weights of the load block and the rated Icad." EVALUATION The capacity load plus the weight of the bottom block divided by i the number of parts of rope is 10% of the manufacturer's published l breaking strength for the Reactor Building Cranes' hoist rope and l 19.9% for the Turbine Building Crane hoist rope. Since the maximum of 20% specified by CMAA-70 is not exceeded, the subject cranes comply with the CMAA-70 guidelines. H. FRC FIbOING - DRUM DESIGN "CMAA-70, Article 4.4.1 requires that the drum be designed to withstand combined crushing and bending loads. EOCI-61 requires l only that the drum be designed to withstand maximum load, bending i and crushing loads, with no stipulation that these loads be l combined." EVALUATION l This cannot be verified for the subject crsnes. (C-3)

I. FRC FIPOING - ORlN DESIGN "CMAA-70, Article. 4.3 provides recommended drum groove depth and pitch. EOCI-61 provides no similar guidance." EVALUATION This cannot be verified for the subject cranes. J. FRC FItOIPC - GFAR DESIGN "CMAA-70, Article 4.5 requires that gearing horsepower rating be based on certain American Gear Manufacturers Association Standards and provides a method for determining allowable horsepower. EOCI-61 provides no similar guidance." EVALUATION This cannot be verified for the subject cranes. K. FRC FINDING - BRIDGE BRAKE DESIGN "CMAA-70, Article 4.7.2.2 requires that bridge brakes, for cranes with cab control and the cab on the trolley, be rated at least 75% of bridge motor torque. EOCI-61 requires a brake rating of 50% of bridge motor torque for similar configurations." EVALUATION The subject cranes have the control cab located on the bridge. The bridge brake on each crane is rated at 150% of motor torque. L. FRC FIPOING - HOIST BRAKE DESIGN "CMAA-70, Article 4.7.4.2 requies that hoist holding brakes, when used with a method of a control braking other than mechanical, have torque ratings no less than 125% of the hoist motor torque. l EOCI-61 requires a hoist holding brake torque rating of no less than 100% of the hoist motor torque without regard to the type of t l control brake employed." l EVALUATION The hoist holding brakes on the subject cranes have torque ratings l of at least.150% of the respective hoist motor torque, exceeding the CMAA-70 requirement of 125%.' M. FRC FIPOING - BlNPERS AND STOPS 7 l l "CMAA-70, Article 4.12 provides substantial guidance for the design l and installation of bridge and trolley bumpers and stops for cranes which operate _ near the end of bridge and trolley travel. No similar guidance is provided in EOCI-61." (C-4) 'a w w + e------- e-vs-t v ? w- +v --n&-e v -+ - * - *

  • EVALUATION The subject cranes are equipped with bridge bumpers and runway stops. While existing documentation does not permit a complete evaluation of these devices to the CMAA-70 guidelines, sufficient details exist to determine that their designs meet the intent of CMAA-70. This is not considered a significant discrepancy because the cranes are not operated under load at substantial bridge or trolley speed near the end of travel.

N. FRC FINDING - STATIC CONTROL SYSTEMS "CMAA-70, Article 5.4.6 provides substantial guidance for the use of static control systems. EOCI-61 provides guidance for magnetic control systems only." EVALUATION The Reactor Building Overhead Cranes utilize static, stepless control systems to control the main and auxiliary hoists, bridges, and trolleys. These static control systems meet the requirements of CMAA-70, Article 5.4.6. The HNP-1 Turbine Building Overhead Crane utilizes a full magnetic, 5 step variable speed control system. This control system complies with the requirements of CMAA-70, Article 5.4.5. O. FRC FINDING - RESTART PROTECTION "CMAA-70, Article 5.6.2 requires that cranes not equipped with spring return controllers or momentary contact push buttons be provided with a device that will disconnect all motors upon power failure and will not permit any motor to be restarted until the controller handle is brought to the OFF position. No similar guidance is provided in EOCI-61." l EVALUATION l The Reactor Building Overhead Cranes utilize an induction master in the static control systems to prevent any motor from being restarted after a power failure until the control handle is moved to the "0FF" position. The WP-1 Turbine Building Overhead Crane magnetic control is equipped with a five step " Dead Man" type pushbutton which will spring return to the "0FF" position when it is released. Both of these control arrangements meet the l requirements of CMAA-70. III. CONCLUSION The preceding evaluations demonstrate that the designs of the subject cranes comply with the guidelines of CMAA-70 to a substantial degree. For the limited cases where compliance could not be verified, it is expected that the same good engineering practices applied in other areas I of crane design were used. GPC therefore concludes that the designs of the WP-1 Turbine Building Overhead Crane and the HNP-1&2 Reactor Building Overhead Cranes meet the intent of this aspect of NUREG-0612 Guideline 7. (C-5)}}

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML20024D922&oldid=4625830"