ML20087M832
| ML20087M832 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 03/27/1984 |
| From: | Bomberger C, Sargent I FRANKLIN INSTITUTE |
| To: | NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20084M976 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-NRC-03-81-130, CON-NRC-3-81-130, REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR TAC-47007, TAC-47008, TER-C5506-359-3, TER-C5506-359-360, NUDOCS 8404020043 | |
| Download: ML20087M832 (30) | |
Text
o .
i TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS (C-10)
GEORGIA POWER COMPANY EDWIN I, HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 N RC DOCKET NO. 50-321, 50-366 FRC PROJECT C15C6 NRC TAC NO. 47007, 47008 FRC ASSIGNMENT 13 NRC CCNTRACT NO. N RC-03-81 130 FRC TASKS 359/360 Precared by Franklin Research Center Autnor: C. 3ct:barger 20th and Race Streets Philadelchia. PA 19103 FRC Group Leader: I. Sargen:
Prepared for Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wasnington. 0.C. 20555 Lead NRC Engineer: A. 51::gh March 27, 1984 This reocrt was crecared as an account of worm sconsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neitner tf'e Unttec States GCvernment nct any agency thereCf. 3r any of tnser employees, makes any warranty. excressed or imoliec, or assumes any legal liacility cr resconsicality for any third carty's use, or the results of sucn use. of any information acca-ratus, product or crocess disclosed in th.= recort. or recrosents that its use by sucn tnere carty would not intnnge pnvately owned ngnts.
Prepared by: Reviewed Oy: Approved Oy:
dua .V / ht, .o voc Prtncipal Ador M cup Ladde Department Director )
Date: #W Oate: 3b N Cate: h "T'
& 1 a$ . F ranklin Research Center A Division of The Franklin Insutute l n.e.a mn n.- ns.< % . % ..p. isic)a:9 uaa xo 0] ~
M 34P . _ .
l
1 5 TER-C5506-359/360 CONTENTS Section g Page, 1 INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.1 Purpose of Review . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.2 Generic Background . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.3 Plant-Speecific Background . . . . . . . . . 2 2 EVAI.UATICN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1 General Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2 Interia Protection Measures. . . . . . . . . 21 .
3 CONCI.USION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 3.1 General Provisions for Imad sandling . . . . . . 24 3.2 Interim Protection Measures. . . . . . . . . 24 4 REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 I
a .
?
o ?
TER-C5506-359/360
. {
i FORENQRD
.} This Technical Evaluation Report was prepared by Franklin Research Center under a contract with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Coinnission (Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Operating Reactors) for technical assistance in support of NBC operating reactor licensing actions. The technical evaluation was conducted in accordance with criteria established by the NRC.
l Mr. C. Bomberger and Mr. I. H. Sargent contributed to the technical preparation of this report through a subcontract with WESTEC Services, Inc. ~
Y e
4 6
h N. u n--R en.c.rner
TER-C5506-359/360 f
- 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 PURPOSE OF REVIEW This technical evaluation report documents an independent review of general load handling policy and procedures at the Georgia Power company's (GPC) Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Unita 1 and 2. This evaluation was perfor: sed with the following objectives:
o to assess conformance to the general load handling guidelines of NUREG4612, " Control of Heavy I44ds at Nuclear Power Plants" (11, Section 5.1.1 o to assess conformance to the interim protection measures of NUREG-0612, Section 5.3. ~
e 1.2 GENERIC BACKGROUND
, Generic Technical Activity Task A-36 was established by the U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NBC) staff to systematically examine staff licensing criteria and the adequacy of measures in effect at operating nuclear power plants to ensure the safe handling of heavy loads and to recommend necessary changes in these measures. This activity was initiated by a letter issued by the NRC staff on May 17,1978 [2] to all power reactor licensees,' requesting information concerning the control of heavy loads near spent fuel.
The results of Tast A-36 were reported in NUREO-0612, " Control of Heavy toads at Nuclear Power Plants." The staff's conclusion from this evaluation i
was that existing measures to control the handling of heavy loads at operating plants, although providing protection from certain potential problems, do not adequately cover the major causes of load handling accidents and should be upgraded.
In order to upgrade measures for the control of heavy loads, the staf f developed a series of guidelines designed to achieve a two-part objective using an accepted approach or protection philosophy. The first portion of the ;
objective, achieved through a set of general guidelines identified in i NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1, is to ensure that all load handling systems at l
\
-1
- 4) l'renid 4on neReneerch e
me ==sa Center suunse
- .. .... .. . . . . -....w .
. ~ - - . - \
j to .
l
- i 1 -
d, d Y i u 1 d TEbCS504-359/360
! $ I!
} [ nuclear power plants are designed and operated so that their probability of (
f 1 d. failure is uniformly ===11 and appropriate for the critical taats in which !
I j they are employed. The second portion of the staff's objective, achieved i i l through guidelines identified in letmBG-0412, Sections 5.1.2 through 5.1.5, is 5 to ensure that, for load handling systems in areas where their failure might
$ result in significant consequences, either (1) features are provided, in j , addition to those required for all load-handling systems, to ensure that the .
O potential for a load drop is estremely small .(e.g., a single-failure-proof orane) or (2) conservative evaluations of load-handling sooidents indicate i
that the potential consequences of any load drop are ac9eptably saali. !
l o
Aeooptability of accident consequences is quantified in tsultEG-0412 into four l accident. analysis evaluation criteria. '
l . ..
f ,
A defense-in-depth approach was used to develop the staff guidelines to l.' ensure that all load handling systems are designed and operated so that their i*
, probability of failure is appropriately ses11. The intent of the guideline is to ensure that licensees of all operating nuclear power plants perform the i j followings o define safe load travel paths through procedures and operator training so that, to the estent practical, heavy loads are not carried over or ,
near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment !
, 1 - - .
! f a provide sufficient operator training, handling system design, load
.i handling instructions, and equipment inspection to ensure reliable operation of the handling system.
, staff guidelines resulting from the foregoing are tabulated in Section 5 i
1 of IstmeG-0412. Section 4 of 1stmEG-0412 ressemonded that a program be initiated to ensure that these guidelines are implemented at operating plants.
I
- i. ,
i 1.3 pLAIFF-SPECIFIC BACIG3100llD i
- , f
, on December 22, 1940, the IntC issued a letter (3) to .GPC, the Licensee t
{ for Match Unita 1 and 2, requesting that the- Licensee review provisions for handling and control of heavy loads at Match Units 1 and 2, evaluate these )
l provisions with respect to the guidelines of 110318 0 -0 4 12 , and provide certain .*
! additional information to be used for an independent determination of ,
4 O, -3 by Franhan Rosesren Canur .
, ammame nn eemmame-j l, ,
7 .... . .. ,..<4 4 s -
- - . . .~..-m._-. . . , - _ . _ . _ . . . - . . . . . . _ _ . , . _ _ . . - , _ . . - - , , - . . _ - - . _ . _ ~ - ..-- .- _ m ,.--.-...._ _ . . . _ , . . - _ . . , , . .
t TER-C5506-359/360 i
?.
conformance to these guidelines. On June 29, 1981, GPC provided the initial response [4] to this request; additional information was provided on Mav 24, 1982 (5] , July 29,1983 (6] , January 23, 1984 (7], and March 12, 1984 (8], and a
has been incorporated into this final technical evaluation.
W l
i r
.e eh I
I .
n e
I i
1
~
..re.n.Mn.~Rosee.ren Car.ner
.:._ .. . . _ .. . . . . - 4 !
- t. ,
4
', )j d{ TER-C5506-359/360
% l.
.' 2. EVALUATION q
'i This section presents a point-by-point evaluation of load handling Provisions at Hatch Units 1 and 2 with respect to NN: staff guidelines provided in NUREG-0612. Separate subsections are provided for Mth:the
. general guidelines of NUREG-0412, Section 5.1.1 and the interim measures of j NUREG-0612, Section 5.3. In e.ch case, the guideline or interim measure is presented, Licensee-provided information is susumarized and evaluated, and a conclusion as to the extent of compliance, including recommended additional action where appropriate, is presented. These conclusions are summarized in Table 2.1.
2.1 GENERAL GUIDELINES The NRC has established seven general guidelines which must be met in
, order to provide the defense-in-depth approach for the handling of heavy
- j loads. These guidelines consist of the following criteria from Section 5.1.1 I
of NUREG-0612:
Guideline 1 - Safe Inad Paths ,,
, Guideline 2 - Load Handling Procedures Guideline 3 - Crane operator Training j
Guideline 4 - Special Lifting Devices
- i .. ~ Guideline 5 - Lifting Devices (Not Specially Designed)
- Guideline 6 - Cranes (In.spection, Testing, and Maintenance)
Guideline 7 - Crane Design.
These seven guidelines should be satisfied by all overhead handling j systems and programs used to handle heavy loads in the vicinity of the reactor vessel, near spen
- fuel in the spent fuel pool, or in other areas where a load drop may damage safe shutdown systems.
2.1.1 overhead Heavv toad Handling Systems
- a. Summarv of Licensee Statements and conclusions
)
A detailed evaluation of all overhead handling systems has been performed l by the Licensee at the Hatch plant. All load handling systems and load paths
. M, *, UM Frenidn Reneerch Center
- A Chuan et the Poemen musene e
- _ ~ - . - - , , - - -, y-- y
. TER-C5506-359/360
?
1*:1 o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 3151 2 1 5:
i 2-a]3 o i : : : : : : : : : i : :
1 I~I
- 3 o : : : : : i i : : : : : : :
!I a c:
. . :11 3 4-i m : :
- g ' .
- .
o i : i i i : : : : :
i a ct; .
j -
1 1 i o I o o
- i. .i -}. i o o o o o o o i 4 3 g
.I i
c.
i
- J::st i . i . . . : ; : : : : : i s #
. a : a- ,
j
,j j' ,
2 -s t a si . s 4
- I;:.
o i I I I I I i I i I ! l l ! !
it' .L
.: a ::
.: ~ :4
- :! i; 1 : 11 ,
o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 32 4 m i 4
i E 8
- v.5.:
ils o o o o o o o o o 1
,1 j;
3~4 ! o o o o o 13 1 :!
- r 1
g :-
-A f o*1 a : - s : :
- e- I.
I -
j 1 11 1 i
- 833-c si2 1
a}
8-
}, :
r -z1i-1s a.: : 1-4 -
i
.1 n 8- !*~I 3
1
.224 !: -3 3 3 3.
- 4: ! [: d8 2v I
If !! 21 ! 1 11. 5. :31 14
.. .i , .
4 13 23 c1 iJ s a 3 ac at 2A 8% 2 2 1j 4*
J . iu * :
Dn 'JUUU FranWin 4omasim neeiseenReeseren.Cen.ter ums
b e
- e 6.
5 4* TER-CS506-359/360
..s o
3**.]
- 2; ! ! 1 1 c.i~
c.;
1 j- .
o o o o l ! I I I I
l c, -j .
I .I.s 3*#$
- I I ! I I I I I.I I ! I i g y:j U 4 ,.
.) "
p..
]
- - a ! ! ! a l l I I 1 u I !
i il
- s..
a as l
48 t' '
l J ,. .
- . i ! ! ! I i I i t j]'
3 o I o I e l a c1
- 3) 1 i io I o o o o o ! o .
3.
h
+ p .1
'. t-t
- 33 ! . . I i 1 1 1 1 ! I I I 331
,0 1 31 I
j }js
- '. a l I l e ! I I I I u ,1 I
.- ila e c ,
... n g
a : Je I o u o I w w w u !
4
& 5 t 9 9 v L!
t .
l ja I o . . i . . . . . i . .
(
l
.. s'
' / ., .
l htiI a
~
3 : : " " -
- t s
- ~
N $
l <
I* 2 l a=j1 l a .) E8:h a E
- v. ' "
j '
i I- II sl ai l2, =r:i .= = i i i 11 y a a as ase sa . Il si a a ; On -4" (. Huun Franktn Reneerch Can.cer omen ame mamensues
i . l : ! 1 q . l .j: TER=C$504-359/360 l 9 1 l l 1 shi i i : : : : : : ' 3 lbii I} - -- a i 2~~3 ~t I t j t ! I I I I : I gg] 1 . t i o I v i w : : : l T J c
*1?
1x l . I i o : . . I ;
- 3. ' .) *
.t .J 1 .
I e v : u ! v v v
.} .I
. j!j l t i I I ! t t 33) 1 J W
- -g
;, $}f . I 1 e i o ! 't 1 ialE
. c 3 :.
?f li I w w : w I w w w J h I w w i 9 ;
l w $ s j j l, J I l l
- j , i , ,
!, d d
$11 i :. dd
.. I A $n ,
I 1 .. . t t' 1Ig I. I! ]'g
}t };: 1. I
]i14 8
.' o ,
. s p 31 a.l a.l l lii .:11 1 .' r' ).
bJ J a
-7 4'Juu J Prennen.aCenm aar a e=en e m. ,e 6
R , y Ts [:: ' TE3H:5506-359/360
; 5. ' l were identified, and the potential impact on irradiated fuel or safe shutdown
}
,, equipment was determined. In this evaluation, no credit was taken for
,4 interlocks, technical specifications, or procedural controls. The weight of a i .
heavy load was determined to be any load in emeess of 725 lb. Other factors 1
,; considered in determining loads subject to compliance were load swing arch, structural restrictions, and the potential for floor penetrations. In determining the potential for floor recetrations, the T,1censee's analysis assumed a load drop from the maximum height and in the worst orientation in order to produce the most severe consequences. Based upon the findings, the I.icensee determined that the following handling systems woald be subject to ,
i , compliance with the general guidelines of NintEG-0412:
. o reactor building overhead cranes (2) e o turbine building overhead craneo (2) i o res,idual heat removal (IIRR) pump hoists (4) o cote spray pump hoists (4) o PRR heat exchanger hoists (4) i o recirculation pump motor generator set hoists (4).
9 The t.icensee also identified numerous handling systens which have been excluded from further consideration. .The individual handling systems and bases for exclusion are identified in the following paragraphs.
.3 For the following handling systems, there is sufficient physical s separation from any load-impset point and any safety-related component to 1 permit a determination by inspection that no heavy load drop can result in l
i damage to any of the following systems or component required for plant
, shutdown or decay heat removals o ocntrol rod drive line (CAD) pump / hatch hoist o intaNe structure motile crane o CAD repair area jib crane o reactor water cleanup (leCU) regenerative heat exchanger trolley (2) o spent fuel pool oooling heat enchanger trolley (2) 1 o oniller hoists (2) o main steam isolation valve (Ms!v) hoists (4) o M8IV bridge crane
- o CAD ropair erea menora11.
While the capacity of the refueling platforms (1,000 lb) escoeds the l j heavy load criteria for the Naten plant (725 th), the design of these
. _renen mene_eren._Cen.eet.
l
TER-cS506-359/360 e ,, [
. platforms is such that they are limited to the movement of fuel asseamlies and s
lighter loads and thus could not be used to lift a " heavy load." , Each of the following overhead handling systems has a nole-purpose lif t function; any system that could be damaged following a load drop will necessarily be out of commisalon prior to the lift. H o high pressure coolant hjection (EPCI) pump / turbine hoists (2) o reactor core isolation cooling (acIc) pump / turbine / hatch hoist o diesel generator hoists (5) .
- b. Evaluation and Conclusion GPC's identification of those load handling systems subject to compliance with the guidelines of NtntEG-0412 is consistent with NUREG-0612 guidanJe.
- Similarly, esclusion of those handling systems identified is reasonable based upon the documentation provided by the Licensee.
2.1.2 Safe toad Paths fGuideline 1. NUREG-0412, Section 5.1.1(111
" Safe load paths should be defined for the movement of heavy loads to minimize the poter.tial for heavy loads, if dropped, to impact irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and in the spent fuel pool, or to impact safe shutdown equipment. The path should follow, to the estent practical, structural floor members, beams, etc., such that if the load
- is dropped, the structure is sure likely to withstand the impact. These load paths should be defined in procedures, shown on equipment layout drawings, and clearly marted on the floor in the area where the load is to be handled.
Deviations from defined lead paths should require written alternative procedures approved by the plant safety review committee."
- a. Sunusary of Licensee f tatements and conclusions safe load paths have been established for lif ts over tne refueling floor and the control building roof at the Natch plant. These load paths are included in procedural drawings and are clearly marked on floors. Stecches of these paths have also been provided. Due to the high concentration of equipment and structures in reactor building corner rooms, esclusion areas have been developed to control load movements and have also been identified in
.g. f 4}NJ m .Fme.en ow . me.neeren C.an.aw
< TER-C5504-359/360 f
load handling procedures. It is the Licensee's opinion that the intent of this guideline is satisihd based upon the followings i o established lond paths and exclusion areas minimise the potential that a dropped load will impact irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment o load paths and exclusion areas follow, to the extent, practical, structural floor membera o load paths and esclusion areas are snown in procedural sketches, l marked on floors, and clearly posted in lif t areas o deviations from approved load paths or into exclusion areas require approval of the Superintendent of Engineering Services or his designer.
- b. Evaluation, Information has been provided by the Licensee which demnstrates that load paths developed and implemented at Hatch Units 1 and 2 are consistent with this guideline. Furth'er, these predetermined load paths are incorporated f
- in procedures, marted on floors, follow structural meaners,. and require an appros,riate level of approval prior to deviation. Use of exclusion areas is also acceptable biased upon infor: nation provided which demonstrates.that these areas are a relatively small proportion of the overall area, areas are well ~
defined by structural walls, and adequate procedural controls have been .' implemented to control movements as well as deviations. ,
- c. conclusion Development and implenentation of safe load paths at Hatch Units 1 and 2 f is performed in a manner consistent with Guideline 1.
2.1.3 toad Handlino Procedures, (Guideline 1. 'rUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(211 i
* ' Procedures should be developed to cover load handling operations for i
l heavy loads that are or could be handled over or in proximity to irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. At a minimum, procedures should cover handling of those loads listed in Tsolo 3-1 of NURsG-0412. 4 These procedures should includes identification of required equ pments i inspections and acceptance criteria required before movement of loads the dWJumFrenie.n.e Ree. m.se.a.rc.h C.e.n.ter 4 7.- ,
- , , - - ,,- ,- , , - , - . - - - - --e - - . - - - - ~ - - - - - - , - , - -
TER-C5506-359/360 steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the loads defining ! , the safe path; and other special precautions.'
- a. Summary of Licensee Statgeants and Conchsions
,. A list of all loads determined to be within the scope of the general guidelines and respective load handling procedures has been provided by the Licensee. Por these procedures, the Licensee states that each procedure contains identification of required equipment, special precautions, safe load path /emelusion area sinet.ses, and detailed rigging instructions. Rigging inspection and acceptance criteria are r sferenced and contained in additional procedures.
- b. Evaluation and conclusion Implementation of load handling procedures at Match Unita 1 and 2 is consistent with Guideline 2.
2.1.4 Crano coerator Traininc fcuide .ine 1, NURzc-0612, Sectton 5.1.1(111
" Crane operators should be trained, qualified, and conduct theeselves in accordance with Chapter 2-3.of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' overhead and Gantry ,
Cranes' (ll.'
- a. Susmaarv of Licensee Statements and conclusions The Ligsee has stated that operator training ta currently being implemented *per the guidelines of Section 5.1.1(3) of NUREG-0612.
l .
- 5. Evaluation 4
Crane operator training at Natch Units 1 and 2 meets the intent of NUREC-0612 based on the Licensee's verification that operator training seets the guidance in Section S.I.1(3) with no exceptions for all can-operated, pulpit-operated, floor-operated, and remoto-operated cranes indicated in Reference 5. (m*w r"M
v. 4 4 TER-CS504-359/360
- c. Conclusion .
Training and qualification of crane operators at match Unita 1 and 2 is' consistent with Quideline 3 of NUREG-0612. c 2.1.5 Special Liftine Devices fGuideline 4. NWlEG-0612, Section 5.1.1(4)]
'Special lifting devices should satisfy the guidelines of ANSI N14.4-1978, ' Standard for Special Lif ting Devices for Shipping containers Weighing 10,000 pounds (4500 Ng) or More for Nuclear Materials' (10) .
This standard should apply to all special lifting devices which carry heavy loads in areas as defined above. For operating plants, certain inspections and load tests may be accepted in lieu of certain material requirements in the standard. In addition, the stiess design factor stated in Section 3.2.1.1 of AMs! N14.4 should be based on the concined
- maximum static and dynamic loads that could be imparted on the handling device based on characteristics of the crane which will be used. This 14 .
stress design factor on only the weight (static load) of the load and of the intervening components of the special handling device (NUREG-0612, Guideline 5.1.1(4)l .'
- a. Surenary of Licensee Statements and conclusions The Licensee identified the following special lif ting devices to be subject to compliance with this guidelines ,
o reactor head strongbact o dryer / separator sling asseanly. - Documentation has been obtained from the original manufacturer of these devices (GE), and a detailed cooperison has been made with those sections of ANSI N14.6-1978 directly related to load handling reliability. Regarding design of these devices, the Licensee stated that review of the original stress analysis indicates that all components except the hoot pins satisfy the ANSI design safety margins based upon maximum static and dynamic conditions. The hook pins will be replaced with pins that satisfy ANSI criteria. Although a detailed fancication process was not originally specified, the Licensee stated that adequate doounentation exists to demonstrate that acceptaale fabrication practices were used. Welding was performed in accordance with ASME Section IX, and NDE records are availacle
~12=
' (aum. d E " km ".
- 1 ,
1 . j / l
! TEN:3506-359/360 j l
t
- i. ?
for a11' welds. It is evident from available records that a quality assurance l l{ program was enforced during the design and fabrication of these devices. In addition, boe devices were load tested to 1504 prior to initial use, followed ]',, by les of E11 welds. Te provide assurance of continuing complianee, all j { j devioes are periodiently tested in asserdance with the criteria of ANSI f M14.4-1978, Section 5.3.1. Remaining provisions of Section 5.3 are or will be j
^
incorporated into inspostion procedures for these devices. I l
- b. M j { Although it cannot be determined that the specific requirements of ANSI !
L !* N14.6-1978 for ansponent design and fabriestion have been satisfied for the i
; special lifting devices in use at Natch Units 1 and 2, it is evident that these devices will provide a high degree of load handling reliability. The i Licensee has verified that both devices satisfy the recommended stress design e , masgins oi 3 on ytold atrer.gth and 5 on ultiasto atrength, inclusive of l l
dynamie load considerations. In addition, substantial assurances have been ' l provided-to demonstrate a high degree of confidence in workmanship quality and i t f structural integrity of these devices. ! c negarding continuing compliance, the Licensee indicated that initial 1504 I }
- i q lead tests were performed and periodia tests or inspections of special lifting ;
j devices are performed in a manner consistent with the requirements of ANSI f i } N14.6-1970, Section 5.3.1. ' ! i t
- l. *- mashakut -
. Design, fabrication, and continuing compliance programs for special lifting devices at match Unita 1 and i are consistent with Guideline 4. , ! l 2.1.6 Liftine Deviceg (not seestally desianed) (Guideline 5. nun 8G-0612 i Section S.1.11511
- 'I.ifting devices that are not specially designed should be installed and i used in asserdance with the guidelines of ANSI 230.9-1971, (til j '$1ings.' newever, in selecting tae proper sling, the load used should j be the sus of the statie and
- ssaisum dynamic load. The rating ' identified ,
i , i j gmer, ~.
-u-
l ! T (( ten-C5506-359/360 q on the sling should be in terms of the ' static load' which produces the
., maximum static and dynamic load. Where this restricts slings to use on
*; only certain cranes, the slings should be clearly marted as to the cranes yl ,
with which they may be used." Ji
,}3 a. Suanary of Licensee Statements and conclusions Slings are installed and used at the Match plant Units 1 and 2 in accordance with MSI R30.9-1971. Dynamic loads are compensated for by requiring an additional factor of safety of 2 Deyond the safety margin of 5 j already a part of the sling, with a resultant factor of safety of 10 for each
- f. sling. Ma slings are restricted in use to certain crane,s.
- b. Evaluation and conclusion Selection and use of slings at Eatch Units 1 and 2 is consistent with Guideline 5 on the basis that use is governed by MSI 330.9-1971 and suitable provisions have been made to account for dynamic loads.
2.1.7 Cranes (Insoection, Testing, and Maintenance) fGuideling 6, NUREG-0 612, ! Section S.1.l(6)) i
'The crane should be inspected, tested and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of MSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' with the exception that tests and inspections should be performed prior to use
- when it is not practical to meet the frequencies of MSI 330.2 for periodic inspection and test, or where frequency of crane use is less i
< than the specified inspection and test frequency (e.g., the polar crane
, . inside a PWR containment may only be used every 12 to 18 months during
^
refueling operations and is generally not accessible during power operation. MSI 330.2, however, calls for certain inspections to be performed daily or monthly. For' such cranes having limited usage,- the inspections, tests, and maintenance should be performed prior to their use).*
- a. Susmery of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee stated that crane inspection, testing, and maintenance were
. begun in accordance with the guidelines in Section 5.1.1(6) of NUREG-0612.
o
&'EU l'renMn Reneerch Center A temman et the Pauman cuense g
TEA-CS506-359/360 {
- b. Evaluation and conclusion Crane inspection, testing, and maintenance at Eatch Units 1 and 2 seet the intent of NunsG-4612 based on the Licensee's verification of compliance to
. Section 5.1.5(6) with no exceptions noted for all overhead and gantry cranes.
2.1.4 Crane Desien (Guideline 7, MUREG-4412, Section 5.1.1(711
*3e crane should be designed to meet the applicable criteria and guidelines of Chapter 2-1 of ANSI 330.2 1974, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' and of CMAA-70 (12), ' Specifications for Electric overhead Travelling Cranes.' An alternative to a specification in ANSI 330.2 or
. CMAA-70 say be accepted in lieu of specific compliance if the intent of
*he specification is satisfied.'
- a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions
) The Licensee stated that the Unit 2 turbine building overhead crane was designed in accordance with ANSI 130.2 1974 and CMAA-70, and therefore complies with Guideline 7. For the three remaining reactor and turbine building overhead cranes, design was originally in accordance with ECCI-41, although the Unit 1, reactor building crane satisfies the more restrictive criteria of NUREG-0554, ' Single-Failure-Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power . Plants.* For other cranes and hoists subject to compliance with NUREG-0412, j the Licensee stated that all were designed to then-current applicable standards; this is considered to meet the intent of this guideline.
For those cranes originally build to EOC:-41, the Licensee has performed a detailed comparison of existing design with the more restrictive criteria of CMAA-70. The findings are contained in the following paragraphs.
- 1. Isoect allowance. CMAA-70, Article 3.3.2.1.1.3, requires that crane design calculations include an'Lapact allowance of 0.5% of the load per foot per minute (fpm) of hoisting speed but not less than 154. 20CI-41 specifies only a sinimum allowance of 154. Consequently, for cranes with. hoist speeds in excess of 30 fps, it is possible that the impact allowance applied under 20CI-41 will be less than that required by CMAA-70. The suaject craned at the Hatch plant have hoisting speeds from 4 to 28 fps and therefore satisfy enis requirement.
MDY.!,"D
- ; . ".. . .. c . .. .. ...l_ :
e., . e'
.e l
l i TER-C5506-359/360
- 2. l
\ torsional forces. CMAA-70, Article 3.3.2.1.3, requires that twisting moments due to overhanging loads and lateral forces acting eccentric to the horisontal neutral axis of a girder be calculated on the basis of the distance between the center of gravity of the load, or force center line, and tne , girder shear center measured normal to the force vector. EQCI-41 states that such mesenta are to be calculated with reference to girder center of gravity.
- For girder sections symmetrical about each principal central axis (e.g., box section or I-beam girders), the shear center coincides with the centroid of
{ the girder section and there is no difference between the two requirements. ! , Sc4 girders are used in bridges of the subject cranes and no difference exists between 20CI-41 and CMAA-70 requirements.
- 3. Sendine stress. CMAA-70, Article 3.3.2.2, requires that bending - ,
l stress calculations include a wind load of 5 pounds per square foot in design stress calculations based on the sum of dead and live loads. 30CI-41 requires l that the design of outdoor cranes include a wind load of 10 pounds per square i . foot of projected area but is not specific concerning the combination of wind loads with other dead and live loads. The subject cranes are installed indoors and therefore are not subject to wind loading.
- 4. Loncitudinal stif feners. CMAA-70, Article 3.3.3.1, specifies (1) ,
.l the maximum allowable web depth / thickness th/t) ratio for hon girders using longitudinal stiffeners and (2) requirements concerning the location and minimum moment of inertia for such stiffeners. 30CI-41 allows the use of I j longitudinal stiffeners but provides no similar guidance. The box girder h/t l ,' ratios for the subject cranes range from 279 to 384 and are less than the monimum of 544 specified by CMAA-70. In addition, the location and minimum '
sneents of inertia of the longitudinal stiffeners comply with CMAA-70. , 5. Allowabie comeressive stress. CMAA-70, Article 3.3.3.1.3, identifies allowaale compressive stresses to be approximately 50% of yield strength of the recomeended structural meterial (A-34) for girders, where the ratio of the ! distance between web plates to the thickness of the top oever plate (b/c ! ratio) is less than or equal to 38. Allowable compressive stresses decrease , linearly for b/c ratios in excess of 38. ECCI-41 provides a similar method I 4
% ua Pre. nun Reneeren Ceneer * '
m mmie ne remoisense 1 l
TE3H:3506-359/360
?
for calculating alloweale compressive stresses except that the allowsole stress decreases from approximately 50% of yield only af ter the b/c ratio esseeds 41. Consequently, structural members with b/c ratios in the general range of 36 to 52 designed under ECCI-41 will allow a slightly higher compressive stress than those designed under CMhA-70. He b/c ratios for the girder systems of the subject cranes are in the range of 24 to 30.
- 6. Fatique considerations. CMAA-70, Article 3.3.3.1.3, provides substantial guidance with respect to fatigue failure by indicating allowaale stress ranges for various structural members in joints under repeated loads.
ECCI-41 does not addeesa fatigue failute. The requirenenta of CMAA-70 are not
, oi consequence for the suaject oranos because they are not used !or frequent lif ts at or near design conditions. These cranes are categorized as standby i be:ause their use is only intermittently esquired and the number of lif ts required over life is not expected to escogd 5,000 per crane. Furthermore, j the najority of the litts will involve loads thae ere below the allowaale values specified in CMAA-70 and cranes are not subject to stress reversal. It is concluded that the lack of fatigue considerations in 20C1-41 does not constitute a significant discrepancy for the cranes being evaluated.
- 7. boist rope recuirements. CMAA-70, Article 4.2.1, requires tnat tne capacity load plus the bottom bloct divided by the number of parts' of rope not exceed 20% of the published rope breaking strength. EOCI-61 requires that the
! . rated capacity load divided by the number of parts of rope not exceed 20% of the published rope breasing strength. The capacity load plus the weight of j the botsom block divided by the nunner of parta oi rope is 10t'of the sanufacturer's puolished breaking strength for the reactor building hoist rope and 19.9% for the turbine building crane hoist roper therefore, the suoject cranes comply with CMAA-70.
1
- 8. Drum desion crushinc and bandinc loads. CMAA-70, Ar ticle 4.4.1, requires that the drus' be designed to withstand contined crushing and bending loads. 30CI-41 requires only that the drum be designed to withstand saximum
- load bending and crushing loads with no stipulation that these loads be connined. The combination of crushing and bending loads for the sueject l
/
d% edngeeeerch{erner A W rer i i
. ~ . .- -- - .- . -
7 . .
. . , i l-t l
15>C8804-3S9/344
. f weses 14 set be vuified due e last of insmention. So eva, mis j
't versatian is not espoeted to be of consequence einse the requisements of l CNh&=70 represent the endificaties of good engineering praettee that has been j incorporated in me sentatament building and tubine building oranes built to 3003-41 speciftentions although a specifie requirement wee not sentained in f
. 3D83-41. I 1
- 9. Raum desian ereove desak and sitek. Othh-70, ktiele 4.4.3, povides !
' I resemonded drue groove depth and pitet. seC3-41 provides ne stailes guidanse. !
Me ressmenestiene in 054-70 annatitute a endifiestaan of good engineering f
, practise with regard to reeving statt11ty and redestion.ef rope woes and de j l not differ sestantially free praettees employed in tne design of the seject {
-l eranos.
t l
, 10. M emA-70, Article 4.5, requires that geostag heesepower !
rating be based en oestein American Gear Manufacturers Assestation (Amm) l standasde and provides a mothed for deseemining allowable heroepowee. 30C3-41 ! t provides no etailar guidense. Se. recomendations in omA-79 sometitute a t seditiestion of good engineering praettee fee gear design and de not differ outetanstally free the prsettees employed in the design ei the eentainnent , building and turbine building eranes built to 30C3-41 speetfications. Aetual I l gear design of me ee$eet eranes eennet be vesitied to eseply with mah-70 !
+
orites La. n [' 11. erides beata emaien. Oth4-70, Astiele 4.7.3.3, eequises that beidge wa.., f. eran wie .e annu.t and a. en en a. u.11.y, b. rated .i ;
, least 754 et beidge metes tesque. BBC1-41 requises a beste rating of let of [
bridge ester torque for stallar esafigueantene. 4 emb=en-trolley sentret l arrangement la not used for the sejeet osanes and tne bridge beste en eaan j erane is rated at 1844 et ester toegue. ! i
- 13. noist heata dealen. Om4-70, Mtiele 4.7.4.3, eequises that heist holding branes, when used with a seated of senteel beating other than i somentaal, have tesque ratings no less than List of the heist ester tesque. !
seC3-41 eequises a heist helding beena terque eating ei no lose than 1404 ef the heist ester torque without regned to the type of senteel beste employed. ; i 13 .
. e U suem *
* + ..
--+m -_m--- -_________m -.___-___m._m_.._m _.___m_m.m._a-___.-.-_umm___-__.__ma_mm.______.____.___m_.m
TE3N:SSO4-359/340 l The helst holding beates of the subject oranes have torque ratings of at least 1544 et the roepeative heias motor torque. ,
- 13. Bumeess and stase, CMhA-70, Article 4.12, provides suestantial guidance for the design and installation of bridge and trolley bumpers and scope for oranes waiah operate near the ends of Aridge and trolley travel. les similar guidance is provided in scCI-41. Se suhjeet cranes are equipped with bridge bumpers and railway stope. Although emissing documentation does not provide a esepiste evalvation of these devices to CMhA-70 guidelines, sufficient details exist to determine that the designe meet the intent of CMAA-70. mis is not eensidered a significant discrepeney because the crane is not operated under load at substantial bridge or trolley speed near the end of travel.
- 14. Statie centrol syntana. CMAA-70, Article 5.4.6, provides suhetantial guidance for the use of statie control systene. toCI-41 provideo guidance for angnette control systems only Statis and magnette control eyetoes inetalled on suajeet eranos ate in compliance with CMAA-70 ceiter14.
- 13. Asstart ersteetion. CMAA-70, Attiele S.6.2, roguires that oranos not equipped with spring-return controllers or momentary-eentact puan buttons be provided with a devise that will disconneet all motors upert power failure and will not permit any meter to be restarted until the contro11'er handle is brought to the Ofp positten. Me stallar guidance is provided in 30C1-41.
Control arrangements for sua ect oranes are in oespliance witn CMAA-70. Per these items for which ne design doeumentation eeuld be found (drum design, drum groeve pitch and depth, and gear design), the Licensee provided tne fo11 ewing additional inistmation related to quality of the design of sne sempenents in question. o Se eranes in question, including drums and drum gear benes, were manufsetered by P6N Narnisehfoger which, as a manufacturer, wee elesely involved in tne development of CMAA=70. o compatisen of estating 30CI-41 erano design with CMhA=10 Jeannetrated that all other acepenente evaluated were of an equal or greater quality level taan coquired by CMAA=70. purther, the CMAA=70 requirements for drum and gear ben design were merely a endifiestion
. O%YM _ _ .
y . ... . . . l. t l p'A I; Tsa-CS504-359/340
.: (
of good engineering and industrial practices in place et,the time tae (j satah eranee were manufactured. o named upon the length of service (9-10 years), there is strong assuranee that the eranos were designed and menuiassured ta seet l required servioe conditions. asaed upon the yeevLous evaluations and asgumonts. it is ene Liconsee's opinion that the reactor building oranes and the Unit 1 turbine building orane comply with the intent oi CM4A=70 and pcavide adequeto saiety and relian111ty. ,
- b. k gigdgg Design of the Baton Unit 2 turnine building overhea'd crane is satisfeetary because it was designed to CMAA=70 and ANSI BJ0.2=1974 specifications. similarly, design of the Unit i reactor building orane is ..
satisfactory based upon the previous Mac review that determined that this erano met the criteria of NURBO-0554. Structural and mechanical design eriteria cf Wunse-0954 adequately satisfy the previsions specified in i CMAA=70. For einer handling systems identified by the Licensee for which 20C1-41 or CMAA=70 are not applisaale, design to applisaale standards is an acceptaale alternative. For the Unit 1 turnine building overhead erane and tae Unit 2 reactar building erane, design of these eranes esepties, to a large degree, because their original design was based on soCI-41. The additional comperieen of original design with the more restrictive eriteria of CMhA=70 adequately
, demonstrates, with limited easeptions, that the original design also satisfies these more restrictive design requiremente. For tasse eneoptions noted, j reasonante soeurances have toen provided (i.e., helst manufactured by an major estahtianed erane manufacturer) that demonstrate tne design adequacy and oentinuicy rettamility and safety of these hand 11ag systems.
- e. Canalusian l
.sei,n .f er ee au h. u ung .yste at .atch Unit. 1 and i was
- performed in a manner eeneistent with the setteria of Guideline 7. ,
I e o
TEA-C3506-359/360
?
2.2 DrTERIM pm0TECTICW MA80358 The Nec has estaalished stx interin protoction measures to be 1:splemented at operating nuclear power plants to provide reasonaale assurance that no heavy , loads will be handled over the spent fuel pool and that measures exist to reduce the potential for aseidental load drope to impoet on fuel in the core or spent fuel pool. pour of the six interim seasures of the report consist of Guideline 1, Safe toad Paths: Guideline 2, Load Nandling Procedurest Guideline 3, Crane operator Trainings and Guideline 6, Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance) . The two remaining interim measures cover the following criteria:
- 1. Heavy load technical specifications
- 2. Special review for heavy loads handled over the core. .
Licensee implementation and evaluation of these interim protection l measures are contained in the sucoeeding paragraphs of this section. , 2.2.1 Technical saecificatiens tinterim protection Measure 1. NUREG-0612. l section 1.3 m l
- Licenses for all operating reactors not having a single-failure-proof overhead crane in the fuel storage pool area stould be revised to include a specification comparaste to standard Tecit.ical specification 3.9.7,
' Crane Travel - Spent puel Storage Building. ' for FWR'e and Standard Technical specification 3.9.4.2, ' crane Travel,' for tha's, to prohibit handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool until implementa-tion of measures which satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1 (of tcRed-0812].*
- a. Evahation Altnough the Licensee has not addressed this issue specifically, a review of the Match Technical specifications indicates that section 3/4.9.8 (Crane Travel = spent ruel storage Pool) prohibits the handling of loada in excess of the nominal weight of a fuel assemely over fuel in the storsgo pool.
- b. Canahalon Match Unita 1 and 2 comply with Interim Protection Measure 1.
#m =31=
D k O ".b. "
~
, . . . . .: .~.= . ~ .: . . ....
~
i I s l ?' [ ;. TER-C5506-359/360 l l 1 - 2.2.2 Administrative Controls (Interim Protection Measures 2, 3, 4, and 5, ll NUREG-0612, Sections 5.3 (2)-5.3 ( 5) 1
- l
" Procedural or administrative measures (including safe load paths, load l handling procedures, crane operator training, and crane inspection] ... j can be accomplished in a short time period and need not be delayed for l completion of evaluations and modifications to satisfy the guidelines of
[~ Section 5.1 (of NUREG-0612] ."
- a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions Sumaries of Licensee statements and conclusions are contained in discussions of the respective general guidelines in Sections 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4, and 2.1.7.
~
- b. Evaluatiens, Conclusions, and Recommendations l Evaluations, conclusions, and recommendations are contained in discussions of the respective general guidelines in Sections 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4, and 2.1.7.
, bl
., 2.2.3 'Soecial Review for Heavy Icads Handled Over the Core (Interim Protection Measure 6, NUREG-0612, Section 5.3(6)) _
"...special attention should be given to procedures, equipment, and personnel for the handling of heavy loads over the core, such as vessel
'* internals or vessel inspection tools'. This special review should include
. the following for these loads: (1) review of procedures for installation of rigging or lifting devices and movement of the load to assure that sufficient detail is provided and that instructions are clear and conciser-(2) visual inspections of load bearing components of cranes, slings, and special lifting devices to identify flaws or deficiencies that could lead to failure of the component; (3) appropriate repair and replacement of defective components and (4) verify that the crane I
operators have been properly trained and are familiar with specific procedures used in handling these loads, e.g., hand signals, conduct of l operation, and content of procedures."
- a. Summarv of Licensee Statements and Conclusions Specifically, the applicable procedures contain ' sufficient detail, with !
clear and concise instructions: the required inspections and replacements have l l I M D/J Franidin Research Center - A Dsamen af De Franean humane e
.g.'
- . . . , - . . . . . . , .-,____.,-e. . -- , - . , - - . , - , - . ,,
'l i
M TER-C5506-359/360 been performed; and operators are trained and are familiar with the applicable
', procedures,
- b. Evaluation and Conclusion Information has been provided to indicate that adequate measures have
~
been taken to satisfy the provisions of Interim Protection Measure 6. 6 4 y G f l 1 l l i l l
. renidin
- . - n- _ center rch .
l
L e . . ,i , 1 . 1 TER-C5506-359/360 I l ~
- 3. CONCLUSION l
L This summary is provided to consolidate the results of the evaluation contained in Section 2 concerning individual NBC staff guidelines into an { overall evaluation of heavy load handling at Georgia Power Company's E. I. U Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2. Overall conclusions and recommended Licensee actions, where appropriate, are provided with respect to both general provisions for load handling (NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1) and completion of. the (; staff recommendations for interim protection (NUREG-0612, Section 5.3) . 3.1 GENERAL PROVISIONS FOR ICAD HANDLING The NRC staff has established saven guidelines concerning provisions for handling heavy loads in the area of the reactor vessel, near stored spent fuel, or in other areas where an accidental load drop could damage equipment required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal. The intent of these guidelines is twofold. A plant conforming to these guidelines will have developed and implemented, through procedures and operator training, safe load travel paths such that, to the maximum extent practical, heavy loads are not carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. A plant conforming to
; these guidelines will also have provided sufficient operator training, handling system design, load handling instrue'tions, and equip 7nt inspection to ensure . reliable operation of the handling system. As detailed in Section 2, it has been found that load handling operations at Hatch Units 1 and 2 can be . expected to be conducted in a highly reliable manner consistent with the staff's objectives as expressed in these guidelines. l l l t
l '3 . 2 INTERIM PROTECTION MEASURES The NRC staff has stated in NUREG-0612, Section 5.3 that certain measures should be initiated to provide reasonable assurance that handling of heavy loads will be performed in a safe manner until implementation of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1 is complete. Specified measures include the. implementatio'n of a technical specification to prohibit the handling of . l (' , L- , p dU 4Frenidin m .m n Re. search Center
- m. i=== .,
, -,~--,r-, -
u-- ,, , -.,,e-,- --r-.,- e,-,,--a-n, , - - , , - - - - ,w , - , - , ,,,+,-,m,, n 4,- r ,- -- , - ~ , - ,-,.-en -
l l l
~
1 i N 506-359/360 heavy loads over fuel in the storage pools compliance with Guidelines 1,~ 2, 3, and 6 of NU1EG-0612, Section 5.1.1; a review of load handling procedures and operator training; and a visual inspection program, including component repair or replacement as necessary of cranes, slings, and special lifting devices, to eliminate deficiencies that could lead to component failure. The evaluation of information provided by the Licensee ensures that the staff's measures for
. interim protection at Hatch Units 1 and 2 have been satisfied.
1 4JUOu Freredin Research Center 4 enamen.r The r - -.
-.. - - . , ~ , - - - . .
[ TER-C5506-359/360 .l 4
- 4. REFERENCES
-t
- 1. " Control of Heavy Ioads at Nuclear Power Plants" NBC, July 1980 NUREG-0612
- 2. V. Stallo, Jr. (NBC)
. Letter to all Licensees
Subject:
Request for Additional Infor: nation on Control of Heavy Ioads Near Spent Fuel . May 17, 1978
- 3. NBC Letter to Jersey Central Power and Light Company (JCP&L)
Subject:
Request for Review of Heavy Load Handling at Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Station December 22, 1980
- 4. J. T. Beckham (GPC)
Letter to D. G. Eisenhut (NRC)
~
Subject:
Control of Heavy Ioads June 29, 1981
- 5. J. T. Beckham (GPC)
Letter to D. G. Eisenhut (NRC)
Subject:
Control of Heavy Inads May 24, 1982 e 6. J. T. Beckham (GPC) Letter to D. G. Eisenhut (NRC) - -
Subject:
Control of Heavy Inads July 29, 1983
.. 7. J. T. Beckham (GPC)
, Letter to J. F. Stolz (NRC) subject: Control of Heavy Idads January 23, 1984
- 8. L. T. Gucwa (GPC)
Letter to J. F. Stols (NBC)
Subject:
Control of 3eavy Ioads March 12, 1984 , 9 " Overhead and Gantry Cranes ANSI B30.2-1976 l
- 10. " Standard for Special Lifting Deivces for Shipping Containers Weighing ,
10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials ANSI N14.6-1978 p UUCll Frankhn Reneerch Cerner . A Gamen of The Prussen sumane
- _ _ _ . ._ _ Z.1. . . . _ _ -~ 1 ,~~ " i.___ '~ ~ - , . , _ . . _ , ._- . _ . . _ . .__ _
. s .
TER-C5506-359/360 t
- 11. ANSI B30.9-1971
" Slings"
- 12. " Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes" Crane Manufacturers Association of America,1975 CMhA-70
~
- 13. Auxiliary and Power Conversion Systems Branch Review and Evaluation of the Hatch Unit 1 Modified Spent Fuel Cask overhead Handling System r
l l ! 3 Franklin Research Center 1 4 m w w n - a== mms.
. . _ _ _. _ _ , .__ _.}}