ML20023A781
| ML20023A781 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 10/14/1982 |
| From: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Linder F DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE |
| References | |
| TASK-06-01, TASK-6-1, TASK-RR LSO5-82-10-037, LSO5-82-10-37, NUDOCS 8210200015 | |
| Download: ML20023A781 (6) | |
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October 14, 1982 Docket No. 50-409 LS05-82-10-037 Mr. Frank Linder General Manager Dairyland Power Cooperative 2615 East Avenue South Lacrosse, Wisconsin 54601
Dear Mr. Linder:
SUBJECT:
SEP TOPIC VI-1, ORGANIC MATERIALS AND POST ACCIDENT CHEMISTRY - LACROSSE PLANT Enclosed is our evaluation of SEP Topic VI-1, Organic Materials and Post Accident Chemistry for the Lacrosse Plant. The evaluation for the Organic Materials part of SEP Topic VI-l was based on the staff's safety assessment report dated May 11, 1982 and the Post Accident part of SEP Topic VI-l was based on your safety assessment report dated February 19,1982 with additional infomation provided in May 12 and August 30, 1982 submittals.
The staff has concluded that Lacrosse design does meet current licensing criteria 'for this topic, with consideration for the unique non-circulating ECSS design.
This evaluation will be a basic input to the Integrated Safety Assessment for your facility unless you identify changes needed to reflect the as-built conditions at your facility. This assessment may be revised in the future is your facility design is changed or if NRC criteria relating to this subject are modified before the Integrated Assessment is completed.
Sincerely, Dennis H. Crutchfield, Chief l
Operating Reactors Branch #5 Division of Licensing l
Enclosure:
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NRC FORM 318 (10-80) NRCM 024o OFFICIAL RECORD COPY usom mi m.m
Mr. Frank Linder Cc Fritz Schubert. Esquire U. S. Environmental Protection Staff Attorney Agency Dairyland Power Cooperative Federal Activities Branch.
2615 East Avenue South Region V Office r
La Crosse, Wisconsin 54601 ATTN: Regional Radiation Representative 230 South Dearborn Street O. S. Heistand, Jr., Esquire Chicago, Illinois 60604 Morgan, Lewis & Bockius i
1800 M Street, N. W.
James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III Washington, D. C.
20036 799 Roosevelt Road Mr. John Parkyn Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 l
La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor Dairyland Power Cooperative Mr. Ralph S. Decker P. O. Box 275 Route 4. Box 190D Genoa, Wisconsin 54632 Cambridge, Maryland 21613 i
Mr. George R. Nygaard Charles Bechhoefer, Esq., Chairman Coulee Region Energy Coalition Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 2307 East Avenue U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission La Crosse, Wisconsin 54601 Washington, D. C.
20555 Dr. Lawrence R. Quarles Dr. George C. Anderson Kendal at Longwood, Apt. 51 Department of Oceanography Kenneth Square, Pennsylvania 19348 University of Washington Seattle, Washington 98195 i
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i
Resident Inspectors Office Rural Route #1, Box 276 Genoa, Wisconsin 54632 Town Chairnen Town of Genoa Route 1 Genoa, Wisconsin 54632 Chairman, Public Service Commission of Wisconsin Hill Farns State Office Building Madison, Wisconsin 53702
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ENCLOSURE.,
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SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM, j
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TOPIC VI-1 LACROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR i
TOPIC:
VI-1, Organic Materials and Post-Accident Chemistry I.
-INTRODUCTION l
The design bash for selection of paints and other orgsnic materials
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is not documented for most operating reactors. Topic VI-1 is intended to review the plant design to assure that organic materials.
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such as organic paints and coatings, used inside containment do not behave adversely during accidents when they may be exposed to high radiation fields.
In particular the possibility of coatings clogging sump screens should be minimized.
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- Low 'pH solutions that may.be recirculated within the containment after a Design Basis Accident (DBA) may accelerate chloride stress corrosion cracking and increase the volatility of dissolved fodines.
The objective of Topic VI-1 is to assure that appropriate methods are available to raise or maintain the pH of solutions expected to be recirculated within the containment after a DBA.
Orca nic' Materials : An assessment of the suitability of organic materials in the containment includes the review of paints and other organic materials used inside the containment _ including the possible interactions of the decorposition products of organic r.aterials with Engineered safety Features (ESF), such as filters.
Post Accident Chemistry: An assessment of post accident chemistry l
includes a oetermination of proper water chemistry in the containment spray during the injection phase following a DBA and that appropriate 4
methods are available to raise or maintain the pH of mixed solution in the containment sump.
II.
REVIEW CRITERI A
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Oroanic Materials: The plant design was reviewed with regard to General Design Criterion 1. " Quality Standards and. Records" of f
Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, " General Design Criteria for Nucleap l
Power Plants" which requires that structures and systems important' i
to safety be designed and tested to quality standards commensurate with the importance of the safety function to be parfornied. Also, contained in the, review was Appendix B to 10 CFR 50,." Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel. Reprocessing Pl ants." This guide describes an acceptable tetho'd of complying l
with the Commissions quality assurance requirements with regard to protective coatings.
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f Post Accident Chemistr : The design was reviewed with regard to General J
Design Criterion 14. " Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary" of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 This requiras that the reactor coolant pressure boundary be designed and erected so as to have an extremely low pro-bab'lity of a5 normal leakage and gross rupture.
Also, regarded in the review was General Design Criterion 41, " Containment Atmosphere Cleanup," of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.
This requires that systems to control substances released in reactor containment be provided to reduce the concentration and quality of fission products released to the environment following a postulated accident.
III.
RELATED SAFETY TOPICS The effectiveness of the iodine removal system is evaluated as part of Topic XV-19, for a spectrum of loss-of-coolant accidents.
Topic V,1-7.E reviews the ECCS in the recirculation mode to confirm tfie effectiveness of the ECCS.
, IV.
. REVIEW GUIDELINES Orcanic Materials: Current guidance for the review of organic materia 1s in containment is provided in Sections 6.1.1, " Engineered Safety Features Materials" and 6.1.2, " Organic Materials" of the Standard Review Plan and in Regulatory Guide 1.5t, " Quality Assurance Requirements for Protective Coatings Applied to Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants."
Regulatory Guide 1,54 endorses the requirements and guidelines described in detail in ANSI N101.4-1972, " Quality Assurance for Protective Coatings (Paints) for the Nuclear Industry" and ANSI N5.12-1974, " Protective Coatings (Paints) for the Nuclear' Industry."
_ Post-Accident Chemistry:
Guidance for the review of post-accident chemistry is provided in Sections 6.1.1 and 6.5.2 of the Star.dard Review Plan.
Section 6.1.1 is related to assuring that appropriate methods are available to raise or maintain the pH of the mixture of the containment spray, ECCS water, and chemical additives for reactivity control and iodine fission product removal in the contain-me'nt sump during the recirculation' phase and to preclude long term corrosion problems after the accident.
Section 6.5~ 2 is related to providing proper water chemistry in the containment spray and sump during injection phase following a Design Basis Accident.
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A V.
Evaluation By letter dated February 19, 1982, the licensee provided references to the types and amounts and the environmental testing of organic coating materials used in the plant.
Protective coating systems com-prise the bulk of the organic materials (outside of electrical cable insulation) in the containment. Accident effects on cable insulation are rheiewed under NUREG-0458 (Reference 1).
Some unique features of LACBWR and its engineered safety equipment render it less susceptible than most reactors to adverse effects from paint degradation. The 50 Mwe Lacrosse plant was originally designed and constructed with no provision for long-term emergency core cooling.
However, such systems were installed at a later date to provide for a short-term containment spray (27,000 gallons) and a core spray (15,000 gallons) in the event of a LOCA.
If needed, the core spray
.could be continued with river water until the level o'f water in the containment reached the mid-point of the core. This water will not be recirculated. There is no provision to control the chemical impurities in this water.
Following a design basis accident, the insulation on top of the containment building will be removed.
Residual heat generated from radioactive decay of fission products will be removed by steam condensation on the interior surfaces of the containment dome and by heat transfer through the containnent dome into the atmosphere. No other engineered safety feature equip-ment is required for mitigation of the accident.
Organic Materials:
Because this unique Emergency Core Cooling System operates with no recirculation of the water in the containment and does not require the operation of the shutdown condenser nor of the Decay Heat Removal System, : ore cooling can be accomplished without the operation of any engineered safety features which could be affected by the failure of paints or other organic materials in the containment.
Volatile Organic Compounds Since the,re is no standby gas treattnent system i'n the I ACBWR, there is no concern about the saturation of charcoal. filters by organic vapors from the degradation of paints.
1 The remaining safety-related concern about organic. materials is the possible contribution of organic vapors from paint degradation to the post-accident l
inventory of fhnanable gases in containment.
The generic types of coating systems used are Based on modified phenolic, epoxy and vinyl resins.
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Tests show that the nodified phenclic and epoxy coating systems are resistant 1
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to radiolytic damage, r. ining in serviceable condition efter radiation exposures in excess of 10 rad (References 2, 3 and 4).
Very small amounts of gas are evolved when aromatic organic compounds of the types found in radiation-resistant plastics are i phenolic plastic irradiated to a dose of 10gradiated.
For example, a rads produced 3 ml (STE) of gas per gram of plastic (Reference 4).
For the approximately 60 cubic feet.nf organic coating existing in the containment, approximately 20 cubic feet (STP) of gas would be generated for the conservatively estimated DBA dose of 100 rads.
The gas is mostly hydrogen and less than a tenth of it is volatile organic compounds.
This" amount of gas is not significant.
Vinyl chloride coatings are less resistant to radiation and beging showing signs of degradation after radiatio ~n doses of 2 to 7 x 10 rad.. _
In air, the gaseous radiolytic product is principal-ly CO2 (Reference 4).
The combustible gas contribution from vinyl chloride degradation is therefore negligible.
_ Post Accitfent Water Chemistry:
Because river water may be used in post-accident containment flooding, there is a concern that pipes penetrating the containment walls could be corroded by the river water, thus breaching the integrity of the containment barrier.
The licensee indicated that five pipes penetrating the containment walls can be submerged after an accident.
One of these five pipes is an insulated ~
feedwater line. The other four are part of the Post-Accident Sampling System and are not insulated.
The insulation materials on the feedwater line pipe conform to the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.36, "Non-metallic Thermal Insulation for Austenitic Stainless Steel." None of the piping under consideration is furnace sensitized.
The staff has detemined that the non-metallic thermal insulation material [s on the feedwater line pipe will not contribute significantly to stress-corrosion cracking of the pipe when it is submerged in river water. The combination of (1) relatively low temperature of the water inside contain-ment after an accident, (2) low degree of sensitization of the pipes penetrating the containment walls, and (3) absence of cycling wetting and drying of the pipes, will reduce the proability of stress-corrosion cracking of the uninsulated pipes under river water. General corrosion of the pipes by the river water is expected to take years.
Accordingly, the likelihood of a breach of the integrity of the containment barrier from stress-corrosion cracking and general corrosiori of the penetrating pipe is remote.
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Offsite doses associated with post-accident iodine releases are evaluated under topic XV-19 as part of the Systematic Eval _uation Program.
Hydrogen generation fro'm chemical reactions between metals and water inside containment will be evaluated, independent of the Systematic Evaluation Program, under the TMI Task Action Plan (Task II.B.7 in NUREG-0660) and unresolved safety issue A-48 in NUREG-0705.
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5-VI. CONCLUSION Organic Materials:
Based on the above, we conclude that any degradation of organic materials in containment should not interfere with the operation of engineered safety features and, therefore, the installed organic coating materials are acceptable.
Post Accident Water Chemistry:
On the basis of above evaluation, we conclude that the post-accident water chemistry at the Lacrosse plant is acceptable.
References
- 1.
NUREG-0458, "Short Term Safety Assessment on the Environmental
. Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment bf SEP Operating Reactors," May 1978.
2.
ORNL-3589, Gamma Radiation Damage and Decontamination Evaluation of Protective Coatings and Other Material for Hot Laboratory and Fuel Processing Facilities, G. A. West and C.D. Watson, February,1965.
3.
ORNL-3916, Unit Operaticns Section Quarterly Progress Report, July -
September 1965, M.E. Whatley, et al., March 1966, pp 66-75.
4.
Radiation Effects on Organic Materials, edited by R.O. Bolt and J.G. Carroll, Academic Press, New Ycrk and London,1963, Chapter 6, p. 239.
5.
Letter from F. Linder, Dairyland Power Cooperative to D. Crutchfield, NRC,
Subject:
"SEP Topic VI-1", dated February 19, 1982.
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