ML20011B062

Requests Util Compare Fire Protection Program to 10CFR50 App R.Deviations Should Be Identified & Justified

ML20011B062
Person / Time
Site:	Byron, Braidwood
Issue date:	10/21/1981
From:	Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Delgeorge L COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
References
NUDOCS 8111040130
Download: ML20011B062 (19)

Text

-

..<(

~

t a

m a

f 76 00T I 1 }S$1 Dist.

21 -

fo

-h

@Q iDocket File = <

PCheck LB#1 RDG FRosa

_(

y DEisenhut/RPurple 0Parr

.\\

RLTedesco WJohnston Docket deh STN 50-454, STN 50-455 BJYoungblood NHughes

~'nd STN 50-456, STN 50-457 KK1per a

WKane bcc:

MRushbrook TERA Mr. Lou DelGeorge RFerguson NRC/PDR TWambach L/PDR Director of Nuclear Licensing Comonwealth Edison Company VBenaroya NSIC Post Office Box 767 GHarrison TIC Chicago, Illinois 60690 PSears ACRS (16)

RAnand RHVollmer

Dear Mr. DelGeorge:

RMattson Subj ect: Appendix R of 10 CFR Part 50 - Fire Protection Rule The Comission published a revised Section 10 CFR 50.48 and a new Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 on November 19,1980 (45 FR 76602). This rule becaae effective on February 17, 1931, and it specifies certain fire protection features for operating nuclear power plants licensed before January 1979. The technical requirements stated in Appendix R were adopted after several years experience with the fire protection guidelines of Appendix A to BTP-ASB 9.5-1 in evaluating fire protection programs. A copy of the Federal Register Notice is enclosed (Enclosure 1).

The technical requirements of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 are now being used as guidelines in our evaluation of the fire protection program for plants under review for operating licenses.

It has been our recent practice to perfern the fire protection reviews for OL plants using the provisions of Appendix R.

Accordingly, as part of your overall-fire protection progran submittal, we request that you include a comparison of your fire protection progre to Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.

Specifically identify and justify any deviation from A9pendix R.

Deviations froa Appendix R should be identified as earl" in the review process as possible, so that they may be resolved and all fire protection features be inpleaented by the time the plant is ready for fuel loading.

If you have any questions on this subject, please contact the HRC Project Manager for your facility.

811tJ40130 811021 PDR ADOCK 05000454

-PDR a " '980-32, e2.

NRC FORM 318110,803 NRCM O240 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

E-

..,n.

3

.4 l,.

?

> i L

The reporting / record keeping requirenents associated with Appendix R of

' 10 CFR 50 have been approved by the Office of Managenent and Budget under

-approved number 3150-0011 which expires September 30, 1983. Coments on burden and duplication :aay be directed to the Office of Itanagement and Budget, Reports Manageaent Room 3208, New Executive Office Building, Washington, D. C.

20503 Sincerely, 4

<j Darrell. G. E'i serdut, Di rector Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:

2 Notice of Fire Protection g

Rule cc w/ enclosure:

See next page d

(

1 i

.1 bhi n-

/, n gjIV L:LB, DL:L DL DU

/L f

..d..A.'.'. 1 f

' - omer)..... 2.....

..BA.....

. l a d.R.L..... e.s c e.&....

dei,s,e,n,tju t,,,,,,,

6~-> xx n ri x t.....

b 10/i 10/ /81

....../ /81 our) 10fb/81 10//......k/. 8110 }

.... /. /.. 81.......

.....a....

j NRC FORM 318 tio,803 NRCM O240 OFFICIAL RECOFiD COPY

• " '*a2 4n

.Mr. Louif 0. D31 Giorga Director of Nuclear L1 censing

. Commonwealth Edison Company?

Post Office Box 767 i

Chicago. Illinois 60690

~

ccs:

Mr. William Kortier-

'Mr. Edwar/ R. Crass-Atomic Power Distribution Nuclear Safeguards and Licensing Di. vision-Westinghouse Electric Corporation Sargent & Lundy Engineers P. O. Box 355 55 East Monroe Street

- Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 Chicago, Illinois60603-

' Paul M. Murphy,-Esq.

. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,. Region III Isham, Lincoln & Beale 0ffice of _ Inspection and Enforcement One First National Plaza 799 Roosevelt Road 42nd Floor-Glen Ellyn,' Illinois 60137

-Chicago, Illinois'_60603 l

.Myron Cherry, Esq.

Mrs. Phillip B. Johnson Cherry, Flynn and Kanter i

1907 Stratford_ Lane -

1 IBM Plsza, Suite 4501 Rockford, Illinois 61107 Chicago, Illinois 60611'

' Professor Axel Meyer U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

.-Department ofrPhysics Resident -Inspectors Office Northern Illinois University 4448 German Church' Road DeKalb, Illinois 60115 Byron, IL 61010 C. Allen Bock, Esq.

P. O. Box 342 Urbanan, Illinois 61801 i

f Thomas J. Gordon, Esq.

j Waaler, Evans & Gordon 2503 S. Neil~

Champaign,. Illinois 61820 1

Ms. Bridget Little Rorem j'

. Appleseed Coordinator-117 North Linden Street l

Essex, Illinois 60935 r

i.

Dr. Bruce von Zellin j

Department of Biological Sciences Northern Illinois University

.-DeKal b,- Ill inois 61107 i

i t

?w m.

. ~..

E Wednesday EE-s=_a J.f November 19,1980

-- 3_ m

=d B_

=

_ _ _ = =

~~.,

y

' ' ^.. ~__

_ _... 9 r==- -.

t E=

ji

_w._:

9_-

__=

=_

.- =. m

-=

=

== 4_

nn

=-

-=

Part 11

=

G Nuclear Regu atory z

=

=-

4 COmmlSSIOn w=-

Ei

-L 13.

Fire Protection Program for OPeratin9 E

C3

_:5Ei Nuclear Power Plants h

~~_n 7

[-;

=;

=

=:

=

=

7

=v A~-

-===== =

[., ~.~ ~ 4 4

h, M

L_u

=24 i

,t -

_~

me, m'"

b O

==

~=

' N ans N6

.=.

=

w.I.I"

7eget Fedetal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday Novernber 19,1980 / Rules and Regulations NUCLEAR REGULATORY that the comment penod should have are already set forth in General Design COMeIISSION been extended.

Criterion 3 of Appendix A to 10 CFR The Commission does not agree. The Part 50 and in the NRC guidance 10 CFR Part 50 NRC has been developing fire protection documents. These general provisions requirements since 1975. The NRC gave rise to a number of disputes over Fire Protection Program for Operating

.mblished comprehensive fire protection whether specific methods adequately Nuclear Power Plants guidetmes. Dranch * 'echnical Position accomplished the intended goat The AGENCv: Nuclear Regulatory BTP APCSD 9.51, and its Appendix A in proposed rule is intended to provide Commission.

1976. LI:ensees he.<e compared their fire sufficient specific guidance to ensure ACTION: Final rule' prctecti n pr grams against these satisfactory resolution of these issues.

guidelines and have diseassed their Thus. reverting to generalized guidance suesesAny:The Nuclear Regulatory deviations from these guidelines with would not accomplish the intended Commission is amending its regulations the NRC s:aff for the past four years purpose of the proposed rule.

to require certain provisions for fire durmg the NRC's fire protection reviews The second issue involved some protection in operathg nuclear power of operating reactors. A Safety instances in which the specific wording plants.This action is being taken to Evaluation Report and. in most cases, used resulted in unnecessary and upgrade fire protection at nuclear power supplements to the Safety Evaluation unintended restrictions. For example, plants licensed to operate prior to Report, have been incued for each the proposed rule called for a fresh January 1.1979, by requirmg resolution operating reactor. 'idese reports water

• supply. For firefighting purposes.

of certain contested generic issues in describe fire prctection alternatives that brackish water is satisfactory and a fire protection safety evaluation reports.

have been proposed by the licensee and

" fresh" water supply is unnecessary.

EPPECTrvt DATE: February 19.1981.

found acceptable by the staff as well : a Similarly. the proposed rule called for Note The Nuclear Regulatory unresolved fire protection issues an ' underground' yard fire main loop.

Commission has submitted this rule to remaining between the staff and the Of ten portions of a fire main loop run the Comptroller General for review as licensee. Proposed Appendix R provided above ground in and as they enter structures. The Commission had not may be appropriate under the Federal the Commission's requirements for Reports Act as amended (44 U.S.C.

resolving those issues. Thus, it concerns intended to prohibit runmng portions of 3512).The date on which the reporting only a limited number of issues derived a fire main loop above ground. Other requirement of this rule becomes from the use of the earlier guides. The sir,ilar changes are discussed in Section effective, unless advised to the contrary. Commission believes that a 30-day 111. Specific Requirements.' of this reflects inclusion of the 45-day period comment period was adequate under preamble.

that statute allows for such review (44 these circumstances.

The third issue relates to imposition of requirements on plants with presently U.S.C. 3512(c)(21).

2. Many licensees questioned the need installed or with existing commitments POR FURTHeR INFOAssATION CONTACT:

for backfitting all the re luirements of David P. Notley. Office of Standards Appendi4 R.They commented that they u ! de i

by e staff k Development. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory had previously complied with staff fire satisfy the guidance of Appendix A to Commission. Washington. D.C. 20555.

protection recommendations in

• good BTP APCSD 9.5-1. The Commission pnone 301-443-5921 or Robert L.

faith and have committed to or generally agrees that, except for three Fe rguson. Office of Nuclear Reactor completed certain modifications.They sections that will be back fitted.

Re gulation. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory contend that the staff has properly Appendix R should not be retroactively Commission. Washington. D.C. 20555.

determined that these modifications applied to features that have been phone 301-492-7090, provide at least the level of fire previously approved by the NRC staff as SUPPLassENTARY INFOResATION-On May protection described by the guidance satisfying the provisions of Appendix A 29.1980, the Nuclear Regulatory contamedin Appendix A to Branch to BTP APCSD 9.5-1.

Commission published in the Federal Technical Position DTP APCSD 9.5-1.

The NRC staff had intended, in its Register (45 FR 36082) a notice of They also contend that these original proposal for Appendix R. that proposed rulemaking inviting wr tten modifications provide a level of the requirements be applicable only for suggestions or comments on the protection at least equivalent to ths :

the resolution of unresolved disputed proposed rule by June 30.1980.The contained in the propose 3 rule.They f re protection features.'Ihus, the staff notice concerned proposed amendments express the concern thn the proposed had not intended the provisions of to 10 CFR Part 50. " Domestic Licensing rule was written in such specific Appendix R to require modification of of Production and Utilization Facilities."

language that fire pr,tection issues that previously approved features.This was which would require certain minimum were thought closea would be reopened not clearly described in the proposed Provisions for fire protection in nuclear and new, but not necessarily better-rule as published for comment. In fact, power plants operating prior to january modifications would be required. These the Supplementary Information 1.1979. Fifty-one comment letters were modifications could be accomplished published with the proposed arule received regarding the proposed only by tH 'upenditure of considerable explicitly indicated that "[a]Il licensees amendments. A number of comments engineering, design, and construction will be expected to meet the pertained to specific requirements in the effort and at great undue expense.The requirements of this rule. In its effective proposed Appendix R. and these will be coramenters request that the form, including whatever charges result dealt with below. However, there were requirements in the proposed rule be from public comrnents."

three substantive contentions which rewritten to specify only the general In determining whether the spern.

were raised by many of the commenters. requirements of what needs to be requirements of Appendix R should be These three comments are summarized accomplished.

imposed on licensees with presently as follows:

These comments raise three related installed or existing commitments to

1. Most commenters stated that the 30 issues. The first relates to the need for install fire protection features previously day comment period was too short to specific requirements. The general determined to er sfy Agceda A to perinit adequate detailed response and requirements relating to fire protection Branch Techn: cal Position DTD APCSB

Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 225 / Wednesday Novernber 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 76603 9.5-1,it is important to recognize that arrangements were accepted in some permitted either an oil collection system Appendix R addresses only a portion of early fire protection reviews. As a result or a fire suppression system. The staff the specific items contained in the more of some separate effects tests, the staff

• has also accepted an automatic fire comprehensive document, Branch changed its position on this suppression system as an acceptable Technical Position BTP APCSD 9.5-1 configuration, and subsequent plans method of fire protection for this and its Appendix A. Appendix A to BTP have been required to provide application.The Commission has APCSB 9.5-1 has been the basic fire additional protection in the form of fire concluded that fire suppression systems protection guidance used by the staff in barriers or substantial physical do not give adequate protection for fires their fire protection reviews conducted separation for safe shutdown systems.

that may be induced by seismic events.

for all operating plants during the past No credit for such coatings as fire The Commission therefore believes that several years. For many plants, barriers is allowed by Section Ill.G of previously approved suppression licensees proposed systems and features Appendix R. Appendix A to Branch systems should be replaced with oil

(-

that satisfactorily achieved the fire Technical Position BTP APCSB 9.5.1 and collection systems that can withstand -

protection criteria set forth in Appendix the proposed Appendix R recognized seismic events.

A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 and began to that there were plant-unique The technical basis on which these promptly implement such features and configurations that required fire three sections are based ar-Nther systems.

protection features that are not identical discussed in Section 111. "Sscific Satisfactory features and systems are to those listed in Section III.G of Requirements," of this preamble.

already in place and in operation in Appendix R. For these cases, fire

3. Most commenters stated that the many plants. There is a reasonable protection features were developed by implementation schedule contained in degree of uniformity among most of the licensee and described in a fire the proposed rule is impossible to meet these approved features for all facilities hazards analysis. Some of these for any of the operating plants. The since they were reviewed against the arrangements were accepted by the staff commenters further stated that if the same criteria of Appendix A to BTP as providing equivalent protection to the implementation schedule in the effective APCSB 9.5-1. In general, the features requirements of Section !!!.G to rule is the same, as that in the proposed previously approved by the NRC staff in Appendix R.

rule, the Commission must be prepared

^

its reviews of fire protection using the Requirements that account for all of to either shutdown each operating criteria of Appendix A to BTP APCSD the parameters that are important to fire nuclear power plant, or process 9.5-1 provide an equivalent level of fire protection and consistent with safety

• • {p on re ss e

then concluded that protection safety to that provided under requirements for all plant-unique the specific previsions of Appendix R.

configur4ons have not been developed. the implementation schedule should be Thus, the further benefi hat might be In light of the experience gained in fire

[g'[g'g*r om l$ance.

provided by requiring that previously protection evaluations over the past four p e pro o d rule approved features be modified to years, the Commission believes that the stated that "all fire protection 6.nd conform to the specific language set licensees should reexamine those modifications identified by the staff as forth in Appendix R is outweighed by previously approved configurations of necessary to satisfy Criterion 3 of the everall benefit of the early fire protection that do not meet the Appendix A to this part, whether contained in Appendix R to this part or implementation of such previously regmrements as specified in Sci.tjon in other staff fire protection guidance approved features. which in many cases III.G to Appendia R. Based on this (except for alternate or dedicated are currently being installed.

reexamination the licensee must either Nevertheless, as a result ofits, meet the requirernents of Section III.G of shutdown capability) shall be completed by November 1,1980 unless, for good continuing review of fire protection Appendix R or appi; for an exemption cause shown, the Commission approves matters, the NRC staff has mdicated to that justifies alternatives by a fire the Commission that there are hazard analysis. Ilowever, based on an extension," (proposed paragraph so.481.tc)).The Commission went on to requirements in three sections in which present information, the Commission state its intention in the Statement of the protection afforded by Appendix R does no,t expect to be able to approve Consideration to the rule that "... no over and above tut previously exemptions for fire-retardant coatmgs plant would be allowed to continue to accepted, may be desirable.The used as fire barriers.

operate after November 1,1980, or Ccmmission has decided that these The second relates to emergency beyond an extended date approved by requirements should be retroactively lighting. Section IIy of Appendix R calls the Comission, unless all modifications applied to all facilities. This decision is for 8-hour emergency lighting. whereas (except for alternate or dedicated not meant to reflect adversely on in some cases less than 8-hour shutdown capability) have been previous licensee or staff evaluations; emergency lighting has been accepted as implemented."

e rather its purpose is to take fully into satisfying Appendix A to DTP APCSB The Commission has reconsidered the account the increased knowledge and 9.5-1. While an adequate level of safety implementation schedule and has experience developed on fire protection may be provided by less than an 8-hour determined that it should be modified matters over the last several years.

supply, an 8-hour system would provide for the following reasons:

/

The first of these sections is related to added protection and would generally

. After reviewing the comments and fire protection features for ensuring that involve only a small cost. The the information developed as a result of systems and associated circuits used to Commission therefore believes that completion of fire reviews over the past achieve and maintain safe shutdown are licensees should upgrade the previously e months, the staff has infctmed the free from fire damage. Append:x A to approved facilities to satisfy the 8. hour Commission that the date of November DTP APCSD 9.51 permits a combination lighting requirement of Appendix R.

1,1969, is not possible because the of fire retardant coatings and fire The third relates to protection against effective date of the rule will be after detection and supression systems fires in noninerted containments that date.

without specifying a physical separation involving reactor coolant pump

+ The staff has informed the distance to protection redundant lubrication oil (Section Ill.O of Commission that it would expect systems (Appendix A, D.1(2)). and such Appendix R). The proposed rule virtually all licensees to request 1

76604 Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday November 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations exemptions if the new implementation Section Ill, we provide a summary of the automatic water suppression system dates do not provide an appropriate Technical Basis for each requirement, throughout the plant.

period of time for complying with the followed by a summary of the public An ensured minimum volume of water requirements of Appendix R.The time comments and a statement of the staff's is set aside and dedicated for fire and manpower resources needed by the disposition of those comments.

protection uses to be available at all times regardless of other simultaneous licensees to prepare such requests and Section I. Intmduction ahdScope water uses in the plant.This water by the staff to formulate recommendations on these requests is -

This section has been revised as a volume is dedicated for fire service by not warranted from the star dpoint of result of comments to include a means of separate storage tanks or timely fire protection improvement.

discussion of the importance of safe separate pump suctions from a large

• The revised implementation shutdown capability and the distinction body of water.When common tankage schedule provides a careful balance of between requirements for " safety-is employed for fire service needs and these considerations, calling for the related" equipment and equipment other water services, the fire pump remaining fire protection modifications needed for " safe shutdown."

suctions must be at the bottom of the tank and other water supply suctions g

to be implemented and installed on a Section ll. Genem/ Requimments phased schedule that is as prompt as must be located at a higher level to can be reasonably achieved.

This section has been substantially ensure that the minimum dedicated "Ite revised schedules distinguish rewritten as a result of comments to water volume is set aside for fire between requirements imposed for the provide e concise summary of general protection needs. Administrative first time on the licensee by Appendix R requirements. The specific requirements controls by themselves. such as locked ad those requirements already imposed were consolidated with the appropriate valves to ensure adequate water supply in license conditions or Technical parts of Section III. " Specific for fire fighting needs, are deemed Specifications issued prior to the Requirements." except that the credit unacceptable at nuclear power plants.

effective date of the rule. For given for 50. foot separation has been Comment Resolution requirements imposed by Appendix R.

dropped.

Many commenters stated that we including the items "backfit" to all Section III. Specific Requirements were being too restrictive by stipulating plants, the schedule provides a reasonable time after publication of ti.,

The requirements m. this rule are an underground yard fire main loop and rule for completion of required based upon principles long accepted fresh water supplies. Our intent was modifications. For requirements already within that portion of American industry only that a yard fire main loop be that has been classified by their furnished. We have deleted the Imposed by license conditions providing insurance carriers as 'fmproved Risk,,

specification for an underground loop for implemention after November 1.

1980, the Commission has reviewed or "llighly Protected Risk". In each of since special conditirms may dictate that these cases the Commission has part of the loop be above ground or these schedules and has found that in decided that the overall interest of inside safety-related buildings. Such some instances the allotted time for completion of the required modifications public safety is best served by arrangemente are acceptable.

may be excessive. Thus, for fire establishing some conservative level of With regard to the specification for a protection features other than those fire protection and ensuring that level of fresh water supply, the staff was covered by Appendix R. although th.

compliance exists at all plants. The attempting to avoid potential plant Commission has extended the following is a list of the specific problems that are not essociated with compliance dates beyond the November technical bases and resolution of public fire protection. From a fire protection 1,1980, date in the proposed rule, the comments for each of the specific standpoint. aalt or brackish water is Commission has added a requirement requirements in Appendix R.

acceptable Sr fire suppression provided that limits the compliance schedule in A. Water Supplies for Fire the fire prc/.ection system is designed existing licenses if such schedules Suppirssion Systems Techmca/ Basis, and rr.aintained for salt or brackish extend beyond what we now believe One of the basic fire protection water.The requirement for fresh water should have been a reasonable schedule requirements for a modern industrL.

supplies is therefore dropped. Other initially. Relief from such limitation may site in the United States is a separate operational problems unrelated to fire be granted by the Director of Nuclear water distribution system for fire protection that may result from the use l

Reactor Regulation upon a showing that protection with dual water supplies.

of salt or brackish water for fire I

there is good cause for extending such Duplicate water supplies are required to suppression activ9fes are outside the date and that public health and safety is ensure uninterrupted fire suppression scope of this regulation.

not adversely affected by such capability allowing for single failures Several commenters took issue with extension.

and periodic maintenance and repair of the requirement for two separate It should also be noted that for vital portions of the systems. Duplicate redundant suctions, stating that some licensees whose license conditions water supplies may consist of separate plants use a single large intene structure imposed a schedule with a compliance suctions for fire pumps from a large on a lake or a river for all water

?

date of November 1,1980, or other date body of water such as lake. river, or requirements.The requirement for prior to the effective date of I 50.48, the pond or from two water storage tanks.

separate intake structures was not Commission has suspended such For nuclear power plants, the intended and the rule has been clarified.

\\

t compliance dates by promulgating on distribution system is required to consist Several comments cal!cd for deleting October 29,1980, a temporary rule of a loop around the plant with suitable the requirements for dedicated tanks or i 50.48 (45 FR 71500), which will be valves for isolating portions of the use of vertical standpipe for other water superseded by this rule.

system for maintenance or repair services when storage tanks are used for To better understand the nature of the withct interrupting the water suppiy to combined service-water / fire-water uses, public comments received and the staff's the various fire suppression systems in on the basis that th6 is overly restrictive resolution of these comments. the the plant. Thus, with dual supplies and a and other ways are available to ensure follo nmg section will consider each loop concept, an adequate water supply a dedicated supply such as weirs.

section of Appendix R to this part. In can be ensured to each manual or suction location etc.Two separate but l

l l

l

Federal Register / Vol. 45. Mo. 225 / Wednesday, November 19. 1980 / Rules and Regulations 76605 related issues are involved here. The hour water supply is considered by a visually indicating os hey-operated first is the requirement for dedicated adequate. It should also be noted that (curb) valve." and there was an water storage tanks for fire fighting this minimum dedicated water volume is opportunity to comment on this purposes. The suggestion that the based on maximum flow rates. Since document.

requirement for dedicated tanks be most fires are controlled and D. AfanualFim Suppression Technical deleted was rejected for the reasons extinguished with much small. flow Basis. Considerable reliance is placed stated in the preceding Technical Basis.

rates, this requirement realistically on automatic fire suppression systems The other point deals with ensuring represents a dedicated water volume far throughout a nuclear power plant.

minimum water storage capacity for fire in excess of two hours.

Ilowever, manual fire fighting activities suppression activities when storage B S*c:fonallsolation Valves.

often can control and extinguish slowly

~

tanks are used for combined service.

C.HydmntIsolotion Valves developing fires before an automatic fire water / fire-water uses. ne term TechnicalBasis. These tw suppression system is actuated. In f

" vertical standpipe for other water requirements are similar and can be addition, f4es that are controlled or service' simply means that the suction treated toge,ther. Proper valving is extinguished by automatic systems for other water uses in common storage required to isolate portions of the water require a certain amount of manual tanks will be located sufficiently sligh to distribution system for maintenance or response. Also, some areas of the plant ensure the minimum water volume repair without interrupting the water do not warrant the installation of needs for fire suppression activities. If supply to manual or automatic fire automatic fire suppression systems.

the commenters were assuming that suppression systems mside the plant Manual response is the only fire

" vertical standpipe" referred only to Valves are similarly required to permit suppression available for these areas; pipes inside the tank, this is not the isolation of outside yard hydrants from thus, it is important that manual fire case. In fact a standpipe exterior to the the water distribution system for fighting capability be present in all storage tank is more desirable since any maintenance or reprir without areas of the plant, and that stendpipe leakage would be immediately evident.

interrupting water supply to fire and hose statioits be located throughou*

On an internal standpipe a leak in the suppression systems inside the plant.

the plant.The standpipe and hose pips could actually allow depletion of Visually indicating valves such as post stations are to be located so that at least the water otherwise to be reserved for indicator valves are preferred so that one effective hose stream can be fire uses.The rule has been clarified in tl+ position of the valve can be readily brought to bear at any location in the determmed. Ilowever, key-opera ted plant containing or presenting a hazard allow physical alternatives for water valves (commonly known as cd supply dedication but to preclude to structures, systems, or components exclusive use of administrative controls valves) are acceptable for these important to safety. They are to be purposes where plant-specific supplied from the fire water supply for this purpose.

c a

system except for these inside Some commenters objected to the g,y gt I es omment c ntainment, which may be connected requiren.ent that other water systems Resolution. Many commenters stated t ther reliable water suppher if a used as a backup water supply for fim that the requirement for " approved separate penetration into containment protection should be permanently visually indicating" sectioral control cannot be made for fire water service connected to the fire main system and valves was overly restrictive, needs.

suggested that it would be sufficient t unnecessary, and not specific with provide a water supply capable o' being respect to who should give the approval. Comment Reso!.ition connected to the fire main system within The Commission has accepted this Several c mmenters suggested adding ten minutes of the loss of normal watar suggestion; the rule now requires that

+

supply or pumps. The rule does not

,ectional control valves shall be a sentence reading " Standpipe and hose stations are not required if sufficient address backup water supplies. The provided to isolate portions of the fire requirement means that,if another main for maintenance or repair without justification can be provided that water system is used as one of the shuttmg off the entire system. Post adequate fire protection features have redundant water supplies, it must satisfy ndit 1 tor or key-operated valves are been provided to account for a given fire allof the requirements of the firc mentioned as two examples of area." This suggestion was rejected. The protection water supplies. Additional acceptable valves.

staff has taken the position that the backup supplies need not meet these C.Ilydrant Block Valves-Comment minimum requirements are that at least requirements.

Resolution. A number of commenters one effective hose stream that will t.=

One commenter asked why only a made suggestions for rewording this able to mach any location that contains two-haur water supply is required when section. This section has been clarified or couf ' resent an exposure fire hazard the Erwns Ferry Fire lasted well over to state the requirement for capability to to the safety-related equipment. The two hoars. All of the investigations of isolate hydrants frora the fire main Commission concluded that no analyses the Browns Ferry Fire clearly show that without disrupting the water supply to can identify hazards so carefully that if water 12ad been used immediately, the automatic or manual fire suppression this minimum requirement can be further reduced.

fire would have been extinguished much systems in any area containing or I

earlier. Indeed once the manual fire presenting a fire hazard to safety-related E. IlydrostaticIlose Test Technicol fightmq activities were started with the or safe shutdown equipment.

Basis. Fire hoses should be use of anly one fire hose stream, the fire One commenter suggested that this hydrostatically tested periodically to was extmguished within one-half hour.

requirement be dropped in its entirety ensure that they will not rupture during The etaff would find unacceptable any since it "is a new requirement which has use.The requirement for a minimum test condition in which a postulated fire that not been subjected to the peer review pressure of 300 psi comes from NFPA could threaten safe shutdown capability process." This suggestion was rejected No.196 (National Fire Protection could not be controlled and extinguished on the basis that Appendix A to irrP Association Standard No.196-within two hours with any combination APCSB 9 %1 contains the following Standard for Fire Ilose), a nationally of manual and automatic fire sentence: "The lateral to each hydrant recognized consensus standard. This sappression activities. Therefore, a two-from the yard main should be controlled standard contains other guidance for the

78005 Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday. November 19. 1980 / Rules and Regulations use and care of fire hose that most system in all such areas should be L Are Brigade Tmining Technical industries find useful.

retained.The fire hazards analysis may Basis. Most modern industrial 91 ants can for a separate suppression system.

with replacement cost values Comment Resolution but th,is would be in addition to the fire approaching those of a modern nuclear Many commenters pointed out the detection system, powered electric generating station have erroneous usage of the term

• service G. Protection of Sofe Shutdown a full-time fully equipped fire pressure" rather than " operating Capabihty TechnicalBosis. The department. including motorized fire pressure"in this requirement.The objective for the protection of safe apparatus. Because of the reduced intended meaning for this requirement is shutdown capability is to ensure that at severity of fire hazards in a nuclear that all hoses would be tested at a least one means of achieving and generating station as compared to a pressure greater than the maximum maintaining safe shutdown conditions manufacturing plant ti e Commission pressure found in the fire protection will remain available during and after believes that it is not necessary to water distribution systems. The correct any postulated fire in the plant. Becarse mandate a fully staffedire department.

terminology is " operating pressure." The it is not possible to predict the specinic However, manual fire response rule has been so changed. In addition.

conditmns under which fires may occur capability is required at a nuclear plant t

the staff added a specific mimmum test and propagate, the design basis and a properly equipped and fully pressure requirement of 300 psi to meet protective features are specified rather trained fire b.igade will satisfy this need.The Commission has determined the NFPA standard.

than the desyn basis fire.Three One ccmmenter also pointed out that diffs rent means for protecting the safe that a brigade of five persons constitutes the minimum size sufficient to perform hoses should be inspected for mddew.

shutdown capability outside of the actions that may be required by the rot. cuts or other damage. Although this containrrent are acceptable.The firs; is a valid comment. it is not an means is separation of redundant safe brigade during the fire and to provide unresolved issue with any licensee so it shutJown trains and associated circuits some margin for unanticipated events.:.

Similarly, the training requirements need not tr covered by this rule. In by means of 3-hour fire rated barriers.

listed are considered the minimcm addition, such inspections are already The second means is a combination of needed to ensure that the fire brigade being performed in accordance with the separation of redundant safe shutdown will be able to function effectively plant's Technical Specificaitons.

trains and associated circuits by a 1-F. Automatic Fire Detectwn Technical hour fire rated barrier and automatic fire during a fire emergency.

The proposed rule required emergency Basis. The requirement that automati su pression and detection enability for breathing apparatus without specifying fire detection systems be mstalled in all both redundant trains. The (med means.

the number of such pieces of apparatus.

creas that contain safe shutdown or which may be used only when The rule has been modified to specify safety.related systems or components redundant trains and assoc.iated circuits the personnel for whom such apparatus follows generally accepted fire are separated by 20 feet or more of c1 ear is to be provided and to specify reserve protection practice. Iristallation of such Space, requires automatic fire g

g fire detection capability is independent suppression and detection systems in i1. Fim Brigade-Comment of any requirements for automatic or the area. An alternative or dedicated Resolution. Many commenters suggested manual fire suppression capability in an safe shutdown capability independent of changing this requirement to a simple tres.The purpose of these detection the fire area is required if fire protection statement that a treined and equipped.

systems is to give early warning of fire f r s fe shutdown capability cannot be nominal size site fire brigade of five conditions in an area so that the fire provided as outlined above. For cables persons be provided on each shift unless brigade can initiate prompt actions to and equipment nerded for safe a lesser number is justified.This minimize fire damage within the plant.

shutdown located, side of noninerted recommended change was rejected by m

mmen ion containments, a lesser degree of fire the Commission for the reasons stated Many commenters suggested that the protection is permitted becaust,.

in the Technical Basis.-

words " automatic fire detec3on transient exposure fires ce less ly Some commenters objected to the capability" be substituted for inside containment during plant.

exclusion of the shift supervisor from

" automatic fire detection systems" on oper stion. Section Ill M. " Fire llarriers.

the fire brigade. The commenters felt the basis that, as wordei the discusses the techmcal basis for the 3-that the shif t supervisor should go to the requireiaents are too limiting. They hour barrier. and Section Illt f re and provide the benefit of his stated that an automatic sprinkler

" Alternative and Dedicated Shutdown expertise ar.d authority.The rule would system with appropriate alarm check Capability." discusses the techmcal not prevent this. However, the shift valves and central alarm features basis for safe shutdown capability.

supervisor may have to go elsewhere durmg the course of a fire that adversely provides acceptable detection /alarmmg Comment Resol" tion capability. Several commenters claimed affects plant operation.The fire brigade that a separate detection system is not Many commenters suggested that the leader must stay with the fire brigade needed in areas covered by sprinkler first paragraph be changed slightly and and be assigned no other systems equipped with fusible link the rest of this section deleted.The responsibilities during a fire emergency.

sprinkler heads. A fusible link has a basis for their contention is that the rule therefore, the shift supervisor must be time delay before it actuates. Ilowever.

should state simply the rquiremetit to excluded from membership on the fire more importantly, a smoldering protect cables or equipment of systems brigade.

localized fire that could do damage may necessary for safe shutdown of the plant

g. f sm Brigade Tmining--Comment not generate enough heat to melt the and love specific implementation Resolution. Many commenters have fusible link. While we do not disagree details in some other type of docun ent.

that the slarm from an automatic fire We have modified this section b/

w. di.co..ed at tenaih in the sac.iarr.

suppression system serves as removing the listing of considerations.

"E,aluation of Mmunum bre Brigade Shift Sue'.

d**d luaa 8.1979t topies are avadable from Dand notification that a fire exists, wa deletmg Table 1.and revising the concluded that the nenimum word ng to provide clarification.

O*,$76,$,'

Sd'",'j,*['!l,P*

U h

D c.

requirement for a separate fire detection it Fire Brigade.

msss.

Federal Register / Vol. 45. Nr 225 / Wednesday. November 19. 1980 / Rules and Regulations 76807 stated that NRC used unnecessary detail fire emergency and operators involved modifications to provide alternative in spelling out specific requirements for in safe plant shutdown should not also shutdown systems are extensive. a classroom instruction, fire fighting have to be concerned with lighting in the dedicated system that is essentially a practice, and fire drills. Some area. The small cost differential minimum capability safe shutdown train commenters felt that these requirements between 2-hour supply and the and is independent of those aheady were more detailed than anything the substantial additional protection existing may be provided. This minimum Commission has published with regard afforded by the 8-hour supply does not capability is required to maintain the to operator training. The Commission warrant reducing this requirement.The process variables within those values here points out that most of the Commission has decided to require an a-predicted for a loss of offsite power.The investigations of the TMI accident hour battery power supply in all areas case of loss of offsite power is assumed identified inadequately trained needed for operation of safe shutdown because fires in certain circumstances oreerators as an important factor and equipment and in access and egress (e.g., electrical distribution systems) l that work is now being done in this routes.

could cause ar be related to such a loss.

area.The fact is not that the training K. Administrative Controls Technical Fire damage to cold shutdown capability requirements spelled out here for the fire Basis. The fire protection program uses is limited to damage that can be brigade members are excessive when administrative controls for fire repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to provide a compared to training requirements for prevention and prefire planning.The margin in achieving cold shutdown reactor operators, but that fire brigade items listed in this section are generally conditions. Consideration is given to trainings further along in development, accepted within the fire protection associated circuits because most plants and training parameters that are community as minimum requirements were not designed with this concept in essential to a comprehensive program for un effective administration of the fire mind. Should either the alternative or have been identified.

protection program. Controls are placed dedicated ceability be required to J. Emergency Lighting Technical on the storage and use of combustible function because of a fire,it must not be Basis. Emergency lighting is required in materials to reduce the fire loading in disauled by fire damage tc associated all nuclear power plants. Battery-safety-related areas and on ignition circuits. Also, this capability does not powered lights with capacities of 1% to sources to avoid careless operations.

have to meet the single fadure criterion z i.um. is usually sufficient for Procedures are used to control actions because it is only one of severallevels emergency egress. However, the postfire to be taken by individuals who discover of defense. Seismic Category I criteria is emergency lightmg requirements in a a fire and by the fire brigade for the not imposed because fires inat would nuclear power plant are of a different development of preplanned fire fighting require the installation of alternative or kind.The need is for lighting that aids strategies and actual fire fighting dedicated shutdown capability are not the access to equipment and techniques.

seismically induced.

Comment Resoluuon Comment Resoluuon op ra ed b at erso n I o ffect safeplant shutdown during plant Many commenters stated that this Many of the commenters stated that emergencies. Because such activities requirement was much too detailed for a this requirement exceeded the scope of may extend over a considerable period regulation. Some stated that the Appendix R by defining alternative of time both during and after the fire,it requirements should apply only to those shutdown requirements. They stated is prudent to provide 8-hour battery areas having safe shutdown equipment.

that the tine requirements are excessive emergency Ighting capability to allow Other commenters stated that a simple and should be dropped. They also sufficient time for normallighting to be statement that administrative

• contend that this regulation does not restored with a marg.a for unanticipated procedures should be established to take into account the many plant events.

control the various fire hazards reviews b ring conducted under the througbout the plant was sufficient, and Systemati : Evaluation Program (SEP).

Ccmment Resolution that the details could be spelled out in a It is generally understood that cold Many commenters stated that the regulatory guide or some other simile:

shutdown is the ultimate safe shutdown requirement for emergency lighting is document.

condition and that, for each fire area, overly restrictive in three specifics: first.

Minor changes have been made in the different means may be used and rray that emergency lighting is unnecessary wording of this requirement for be necessary to achieve cold shutdown.

in many ci the designated areas: second, clarification.

Because a fire in cartain areas at some that the requirement for sealed beam or L Alternative andDedicated plants would have the capability of fluorescent umts is overly restrictive:

Shutdown Capability.

disabling systems required to achieve third, that the i, quirement for individual TechnicalBasis. In some locations both hot and cold shutdown,it is 8-hour bawy power supply is (such as the cable spreading room) necessary to specify the minimum excessive. Three commenters within operating nuclear power plants. it capability and time requirement fur each recommended a 2-hour battery power is not always possible or practicable to condition necessary to achieve safe supply, fi.. ammenters recommended a protect redundant safe shutdown shutdown. We agree that evaluations plant specific power supply; and one systems apinst adverse effects of fire or being made under the Systematic commenter recommended that there be fire suppression activities only through Evaluation Program (SEP) may also call no permanent installation.

the use of fire protection features for alternative or dedicated shutdown These smestions have been accepted because the redundant safe shutdown capabihty for reasons other than fire in part. Ughting units with 8-hour systems in a given fire area 6 e too close protection. For example, seismic, battery supplies are to be provided in all to each other. Alternative shudown flooding, or emergency core cooling areas needed for operation of safe capability has usually been required to requirements resulting from the SEP may shutdown equipment and in access and be independent of the control room, require additional modifications. Each egress routes thereto.The reasoning cable spreading room, switchgear rooms licensee should be aware of the status of behind the requirement for an 8-hour and cable riser areas because redundant the SEP so that the requirements battery power supply is that there can systems in these areas are not resulting from SEP can be effectively be a great deal of other activity during a adequately separated. When plant integrated with those relating to fire

F 70ses Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday. November 19.'1980 / Rules and Regulations protection to the extent possible.

required to ensure safe shutdown the national consensus standard used However, the Commission has decided ' capability.The use of a 1. hour barrier in for testing and rating these cable that the modifications required to conjunction witn automatic fire penetration seals. Since the cables complete the fire protection p*ogram suppression and detection capability for conduct the heat through the barrier, should not be deferred until the SEP each redundant train of safe shutdown and since the cable insulation is review is completed.

equipment is based on the fpilowing combustible, the acceptance criteria of M. Fim Barriers.

considerations. Automatic suppression the ASTM Standard E-119 relating to TechnicalBasis. The best fire is required to ensure prompt, effective temperature on the unexposed side must protection for redundant trains of safe application of suppressant to a fire that be appropriately modified.

shutdown systems is separation by could endanger safe shutdown Comment Resolution unpierced fire barn,ers-walls and capabfaty.The actisation of an ceiling floor assemblies. Because these automM.c tire detection or suppression Some commenters suggested that this barrieri are passive fire protection system does not occur uttil sufficient entire section be deleted and replaced features, they are inherently reliable smoke or heat has been developed by with the following two sentences:

provided they are properly installed and the fire. Therefore, the Commission is

" Penetration seals shall provide the maintained. Fire barriers have been requiring a 1-hour barrier to ensure that equivalent protection which is required used successfully for many years to fire damage will be limited to one train of the fire barrier. Evaluation of trie subdn!de large potential fire losses into until the fire is extinguished.

penetration seals based upon a design smaller, more acceptable nsks. Even fire These requirements have now been review and relevant test data or barners with openings have successfully incorporated in Section !!!.C. " Fire qualification tests may be made." The interrupted the progress of many fires Protecticn of Safety Functions."

com.nenters felt that sufficient test data -

6 are available to permit evaluation of provided 1 e openings were properly Comment Resolutusn design requirements without full-scale protected by fire doors or other acceptable means.

Seseral commenters made a number mockup testing and that many of the Fire barriers are "ratea" for fire of suggestions of an editorial nature.

Items spelled out in the regulation. such resistance by being exposed to a One suggestion was to add "or unless as the water hose stream test, were too

" standard test fire".His s!endard test other fire protection features have been detailed and did not belong in the fire is defined by the Americaa Society provided to ensure equivalent regulation. The Commission has for Testing and Materials in ASTN E-protection"in the first paragraph where reconsidered this issue and revised the 113 ' Standard for Fire Resistance of three. hour rated fine barriers were rule to (a) require the use of -

Building Materials." Fire barriers are stipulated unless a lower rating was noncombustible materials only in the commonly rated as having a fire justified by the fire hazards analysis, construction of fire barrier penetration resistance of from 1 to a hours. Mos' The Commission feels that this adds seals. (b) require fire barrier penetration

" Improved Risk" or " Highly Protected nothing in the way of clarification and seals to be qualified by test; and (c)

Risk"(as classified by insurance the suggestion was not adopted.The require such tests to satisfy certain carriers) industrial properties in the second paragraph requires that acceptance criteria.

United States require fire barriers to structural steel forming a part of or O. Fire Doors.

have a resistance rating of 2 to 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

supporting any fire barrier have a fire Technical Basis. Door openings in fire While a nuclear power plant has a resistance equivalent to that required of walls constitute another breach that low fire load. the potential the barrier. An example was given of must be protected. Fire doors that have consequences of fire are serious metal lath and plaster covering ss being been tested and ratad for certain fire nerefore, the Commission has selected one means of providing equivalent exposures are installed to protect these 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> has been as an acceptable protection. Several commenters stated openings. Fire doors frequently fail to minimum fire resistance rating for fire th,_t they thought this was too narrow protect the openings in which they are barriers separating redundant trains fer and would be interpreted by some installed because they are not fully safe shutdown systems.nis will give people as the ordy acceptable method closed. Various methods are available to ample time for automatic and manual permitted. Since the example seemed to licensees to ensure that fire doors are in fire suppression activities to control any be confus%. 9 decision has been made proper operating condition and that they poter4ial fire and for safe shutdown to eliminate it. Other comments to the will be closed during a fire.These activities to properly control the reactor. effect that the requirement was options are listed in Appendix R.

Many operating plants, or plants that excessively resetive with regard to Comment Resolution are already built but that are not yet fire barrier penetrations, including fire operating. have both trains of safe doors and their associated frames and Many commenters stated that this u shutdown equ:pment located in close hardware.and ventilation systems have requirement is too detailed and shou proximity and a single fire could been acted voon by the staff and the be deleted. Minor editorial changes have damage or destroy the functional requirement. as it had affected these been made in order to more clearly state i

capability of both redundant trains. If items was deleted.

the requirements.

specific plant conditions preclude the N. Fire Barrier Cable Pendration Seal P. Reactor Coolant Pump Lubrication instal ation of a 3-hour fire barrier to Quahfication.

System.

separate the redundant train:. a 1. hour TechnicalBasis. Unpierced fire TechnicalBasis. Each reactor coolant 4

fire barrier and automatic fire barriers offer the best protection for pump motor assembly typically contains suppression system for each redundant separating redundant trains of safety.

140 to 220 gallons of lube oil. Oil Icakir'g train will be consi/ red the equivalent related or safe shu'down equipment.

from some portions of the lube oil of 3. hour barrier.

Ilowever, these barriers must be pierced system may come in contact with if the 1. hour fire barrier ano autometic for both control and power cables.

surfaces that are hot enough to ignite the fire suppression for each redundant These penetrations must be sealed to oil. %e resulting fire could be large. and train cannot be provided because of achieve a degree of fire resistance access to the fire would be delayed plant-specific conditions. alternative or equivalent to that required of the barrier because of the time r% ared to enter the dedicated shutdowns capability will be that is pierced. ASTM Standard E-119 is containment.Containent air temperature

Federal Register / Vol. 45 No. 225 / Wednesday, November 19, 1980 / Rulas and Regulations 76609 would increase, severe localized pump oil collection system is covered by Capability.") In the fire hazards analysis environments would develop in the area paragraph C.2 because its function is for a plant, the equipment relied upon to of the fire, and a large amount of smoke required to protect safety-related perform both functions n.ust be would be generated. These conditions systems rather than to perform a safety identified for each fire area. It follows could affect operability of safety-related function. Because the failure of the oil that any associated non-safety circuits equipment inside containment.

collection system for a seismically in the fire area that could adversely Therefore, an oil collection system is induced oil fire should not prevent a affect the identified shutdown necessary to confine any oil discharged safety.related system from performing equipment by feeding back potentially due to leadkage or failure of the its safety function (Regulatory Guide disabling conditions (e.g., hot shorts or lubrication system and to prevent it 1.29, " Seismic Design Classification "

shorts to ground) to the power supplies from becoming a fire hazard by draining paragraph C.2). tha ni collection system or control circuits of that equipment it to a safe location. These occurrences should be designed, engineered, and must also be evaluated. Of course such could be random or could be seismically installed so that its failure will not lead disabling conditions must be prevented g

induced because the existing tube oil to a fire affecting safety-related system piping and oil collection systems equipment as a result of an earthquake.

to provide assurance that the identified may not be designed to withstand a The proposed rule permitted two safe shutdown equipment will function design basis seimic event.

alternatives-an oil collection system or as designed. These requirements have Appendix A to BTP APCSD 9.5-1 an automatic fire suppression system.

n w been incorporated in Saction 1111 We have deleted the alternative of the

" Alternative ano Dedicated Shutdown states that for operating plants, postulated fires or fire protection suppression system because C3pability."

system failures need not be considered unacceptable damage may result to the Comment Resolution concurrent with other plant accidents or safety-related systems from the burning the most severe natural phenomena."

f il before the suppressbn system is Many commenters stated that t'ils actuated and because the fire we.ter requirement should be deleted because The basis for that statement is two fold.

First, nuclear power plants are massive 8upp / system is,not designed to many older plant designs did not,,

withstand seismic events. In addition, consider associated circuits and this is, structures, and essential services are these pumps are located within the therefore, a new design requirement.

designed to withstand earthquakes and biological shield inside contamment, ne commenters felt that the analysis uther natural phenomena. Secod the therefore, timely fire brigade action that will be required to satisfy this history of many fires associateas with w uld be difficult if the suppression requirement will be both long and recent earthquakes have been system malfuncti ns. Further,if the complicated and the requirement should evaluated /niese evaluations showed 8uppression system becomes inoperable therefore be deleted.

that such fires usually are due to failure during operation, a fire watch or patrol The Commission rejected these of piping or tanks of flammable gasses cann t enter the area during operation.

suggestions for the following reasons.

or liquids such as municipal natural gas distribution systems or gasoline storage Comment Resolution

1. Vi:Mally all of the fire protection modifications made to date have been and/or dispensing stations. Where such A number of commenters suggested potential fire hazards exist in nuclear that this section is too detailed and required to correct deficiencies that power planis (e.g., hydrogen fer should be substantially modified.This resulted from lack of consideration of generator cooling, or oil fuel for the requirement was changed to delete the certain specific items during initial emergency diesel generator or station option of protecting the reactor coolant design and construction.

space heating boilers) they are designed pump lubrication system with an

2. The Browns Ferry fire showed the and installed to withstand the damaging automatic fire suppression system Wa necessity of divisional separation of the effects of various natural phenomena.

have modified the rule to indicate that associated circuit of the control cables end other special fire protection features the tequirement that the oil collection to prevent the disabling of safety are provided as necessary. However, system be designed to provide systems by a single fire.%is has been General Design Criterion 2 Design Bases reasonable assurance that it will discussed with licensees during for Protection Against Natumt withstand the Safe Shutdown evaluations of alternative and dedicated Phenomeno requires that structures.

Earthquake can be met by satisfying shutdown capability and is necessary to systems, and components important to paragraph C.2. of Regulatory Guide 1.29, ensure that safe shutdown systems will r afety be designed to withstand the

" Seismic Design Classification." as be able to function properly in the event effects of earthquakes without loss of described above.

of fire capability to perform their safety Q. AssociatedCircuits.

3.Tlie staff considers inccmplete any fungtion. Regulatory Guide 1.29.

TechmcalBasis. When considering fire hazard analysis that does not

" Seismic Design Classification.

the consequences of a fire in a given fire consider the effects of fire damage to describ-s an acceptable method for area during the evaluation of safe circuits that are associated with safe identifying and classifying those shutdown capabilities of a plant, the features oflight-water-cooled nuclear staff must be able to conclude that one shutdown systems.

A power plants that should be designed to train of equipment that can be used As indicated above, as a result of the withstand the effects of the Safe immediately to bring the reactor to a hot comments received on this issue,it is Shutdown Earthquake. In this guide, shutdown condition remains unaffected unclear that associated circuits have in paragraph C.1 applies to systems that by that fire. The staff must also be able fact been adequately considered by are required to remain functional to to conclude that damage to one train of licensees in the'-

-iews using the ensure heat removnt capability; equipment used for achieving cold guidance of Apg x A to BTP APCSB paragraph C.2 applies to systems that do shutdown will be limited so that the 9.5-1.To ensure that the associated not have to remain frunctional for that equipment can be returned to an circuits are e msidered, all operating purpose, but whose failure could reduce operable condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. (See nuclear power plants will be required to the functioning of those systems covered Technical Basis for Section Ill.G.

meet the requirements of Section III.G of by paragraph C.1. The reactor coolant

" Protection of Safe Shutdown Appendix R.

a

1 78810 Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 225 / Wednesday, Novernber 19, 1980 / Rules end Regulations Ceneral Comments Resolution.

shutdown capability.The Commission comments received on the proposed d es not agree. We believe that the regulations, other commenters Several commenters contended that Commission a overall fire protection demonstrated a thorough understanding Commission regulations mandate that program involving extensive plant-of the proposed requirements.

en adjudicatory hearing be conducted specific fire 7tection modifications Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of prior to a final decision. One commenter that are based on guidance set fodh m, 1954. as amended, the Energy labeled the regulation an

• order" within BranchTechnical Position BTP APCSB Reorganization Act of1974, as amended.

the meaning of the Administrative 351 and its Appendix A and the and Sections 552 and 553 of Title 5 of the Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 551(6))( APA) specific requirements of Appendix R to United States Code, notice is hereby and asserted that to CFR 2.204 of the usolve disputed issues provide given that the following amendments to Commission's regulations, " Order for adequate fire protection.

Title 10 Chapter 1 Code of Federal Modification of 1.icense," applies to this One commenter stated that the Regulations, Part 50, are published as a rulemaking proceeding.

ambiguity of the proposed regulation document subject to codification.

The Commission disagrees with these with regard to criticalitems te antes

1. A new i 50.48 is added to read as comments. A " rule" is defined in the that it be renaticed. The commenter follows:

APA to mean "the whole or a part of an so e e ency statement of general or

'[rh Nix g

so.se e Protecnon.

s particular applicability and, future effect such ambiguity. They were Section Ill.G.

(a) Each operating nuclear power Section Ill.N and Section III.Q. We have plant shall have a fire protection plan designed to implement prescribe law or policy,,,,7l5 U.S.C.

reviewed thesa examples.

that satisfies Criterion 3 of Appendix A 551(4)). The agency action questioned in reference to the first example, the to this part.This fire protection plan Sete is clearly one that treats sumlarly commenter stated that the first shall describe the overall fire protection situated licensees equally and that paragraph of Section III.G identifies program for the facility, identify the alternative shutdown capability "s an wrious positions within the licensee's ents For those licensees who pti nal protective feature and that organization that are responsibile for the r u heb not a!resdy provided an eqaivalent paragraph III.G.2.c then identifies program. state the authorities that are level of fire protection. certain specific al,emative shutdown capability as a oelegated to each of these positions to t

fire protection features are required.

mimmum fire pmtection feature. We do implement those responsibilities, and Various of these requirements would not agree with Jus statement.The first outline the 71ans for fire protection, fire paragraph of Section !!I.G identifies detection aad suppression capability, Th o

nte a acte z tion f th rule alternative shutdown capability as one and limitation of fire damage.The plan as an order, along with the assertion W n in a c nahon u m daH abo hc6 gecMeakres that 10 CFR 2.204 mandates a hearing protection features for a spacific fire necessary to implement the program before the rule becomes final is area. Paragraph Ili.G.3 indicates when described above, such as administrative incorrect. On its face, that regulation this option should be used.

controls and personnel requirements for (which does grant a hearing right)

In reference to the second example, fire prevention and manual fire applies only to Commission orders that the commenter stated that section III.N suppression activiiies, automatic and modify a license.8It does not apply t requires a pressure differential across manually operated fire detection and requirements promulgated through a the test specimen during the testing of suppression systems, and the means to rulemaking action conducted in f re barrier penetration seals but fails to limit fire damage to structures, systems, accordance with the rc luirements of define the pressure differential.This or components important to safety so applicable law.

comment is incorrect. The pressure that the capability to safely shut down Several commenters contended that differential called for by the proposed the plant is ensured.*

the environmental impact had not been provision was the maximum pressure (b) Appendix R to this part establishes adequately addressed. One commenter, dif ferential that the barrier would fire protection features required to citing the requirements in Section III.A experience in the specific plant satisfy criterion 3 of A1 ndix A to this of Appendix R for two water supplies installation. In any event, the part with respect to certain generic sad two separate redundant sections as requirement for pressure Jifferential issues for nuclear power plants licensed examples of requirements mvolving during such testing has been deleted to operate prior to January 1,1979.

environmental issues, contended that since only noncombustible mateilalis Except for the requirements of Sections the Commission relied upon its staff's now being used for such seals.

III.G IU.), and 111.0, the provisions of unsupported determination that, In reference to the third example, the Appendix R to this part shall not be pursuant to 10 CFR l $1.5(d), an commenter stated that Section I!!.Q is applicable to nuclear power plants environmental impact statement-totally lacking in cefinit'on. We do not licensed to operate prior to January 1, appraisal;or negative, declaration is not antee. Footnote 6 references Regulatory 1979 to the extent that fire protection required. The Commission has G de 1.75 and IEEE Std 384-1974.The features proposed or implemented by considered Section Ill.A and has further le tter document is a commonly used considered the remaining requirements ir dustry standard that defines i s. w fire protection suid.nce for nuclear powee of Appendix R and remains convinced a <sociated circuits and provides pienis to contained in two NRC documents:

e Branch Techmcal Posinon Aumliary Power that the regulations are not substantive g tida.'ce for ensuring that such circuits Cawrmon System Branch BTP APCSB 9 bl.

and are insignificant from the standpoint d i not compromisa the independence of

""'d'.hnn fu Mm Protectmn for Nuclear Pown of environmentalimpact.

the shutdown circuits they are

"'" Ny'1W ""

One conmenter suggested that all associated with.

da plants be required to install dedicated Based on the above examples and our

• Appendia A to BW APCSB e F1. "CeNhnes review of the other provisions of the for Rre Protechon for Nuclear Pown Ptants Docketed PHw to luly 1.1976 " for pfants that wer.

'It should aleo be noted that i 2.204 la codified in proposed t' ale, we do not believe thut

' *"" # d"'8" "

"""8 " ""d" '*" "".176 d.. - J August 23.

Subpert B of to CF14 Part 1The scope of Subpart B h6 mIe as proposed was ambiguous so constructmn before July 1 le specmcally limlted to " cases initiated by the sf a'f as to require renoticing. Moreover, it is7s.

• *

• to tanpon reprements by wder on a hamnenF' tts cFR 1200ts)k tEmphas4a supphed) should be noted that. based on other Also see Note 4.

Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday. Noveraber 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 76611 the licensee have been accepted by the after the effective date of this section determines, upon a showing by the NRC staff as satirfying the provisions of and Appendix R to this part; licensee, that there is good cause for Appendix A to Branch Technical (i) the first refueling outage:

extending such dve and that the public Position DTP APCSB 9.5-1* reflected in (iil another planned outage that lasts health and safety is not adversely staff fire protection safety evaluation for at least 60 days; or affected by such extension. Extensions reports issued prior to the e ffective date (iii) an unplanned out, age that lasts for of such date shall not exceed the dates of this rule, or to the extent that fire at least 120 days.

determined by paragraphs (c)(1) through protection features were ac cepted by (4) Those fire protection features that (c)(4)of this section.

the staff in comprehensive fire require prior NRC aporoval by (1)Those fire protection features that protection safety evaluation reports paragraph (c)(5) of this section. shall be involve revisions of administrative issued before Appendix A to Branch implemented within the following controls, manpower changes, and schedule: Dedicated shutdown training shall be implemented within 4 Technical Position IrrP APCSD 95-1 was published in August 1976. With systems-30 months after NRC months after the date of the NRC s'aff

(

respect to all other fire ; otection approval; modifications requiring plant Fire Protection Evaluation Report features covered by Appendix R. all shutdown--before startup after the accepting or requiring such features.

nuclear power plants licensed to operate earliest of the events given in paragraph (2) Those fire protection features prior to January 1.1979 shall satisfy the (c)(3) commencing 180 days after NRC involving installation of modifications applicable requirements of Appendix R approval; modifications not requiring not requiring prior approva.1 or plant to this part. including specifically the plant shutdown-e months after NRC shutdown shall be implemented within requirements of Sections Ill.G. Ill L and approval.

12 months af ter the date of the NRC (5) Licensees shall make any staff Fire Protection Safety Evaluation gjm m

cadons nxess y to comply with Report accepting or requiring such (c) All fire protection modifications these requirements in rdance with features.

require to satisfy the provisions of the above schedule -

si prior review

, (3) Those fire protection features, Appendix R to this part or directly and approval by NF.xcept for including alternative shutdown affected by such requirements shall be m dif. cations required by Section III.G.3 capability involving installation of compfeted on the following schedule:

of Appendix R to this part. Licensees modifications requiring plant shutdown

, [1) Those f. ire protection features that shall submit plans and schedules for shall be implemented before the startup mvolve revisiors of administrative meeting the provisions of paragraphs after the earliest of the following events controls, mar.pewer changes, and (c][2), (c)(3). and (c)(4) within 30 days commencing 9 months or more af ter the training, sh ii be implemented within 30 af ter the effective date of this section date of the NRC staff fire Protection days after the rffective date of this and Appendix R to this part. Licensees Safety Evaluation Report accepting or section and Appendix R to this part.

shall sthmit design descriptions of requiring such features:

(2) Thost fire protection features that modifications needed to satisfy Section (i) The first refueling outage; mvolve installMion of modifications that Ill.G.3 of Appendix R to this part within (ii) Another planned outage that lasts do not requae or'or NRC approval or 30 days after the the effective date of for at least 60 days: or plant shutdiwn shall be implemented this section and Appendix R to this part.

(iii) An unplanned outage that lasts within 9 months after the effective date (6)in the event that a request for for at least 120 days.

of this section ar.d Appendix R to this exemption from a requirement to comply (4) Those fire protection features part.

with one or more of the provisions of involving dedicated shutdown capability (3)Those fire protection features.

Appendix R filed within 30 days of the requiring new buildings and systems except for thow :rquiring prior NRC effective date of this rule is based on an shall be implemented within 30 months approval by prapraph (c)(5) of this assertion by the licensee that such of NRC approval. Other modifications section, that inWve installation of required modifications would not requiring NRC approval prior to modifications thaa do require plant enhance fire protection safety in the installation shall be implemented within shutdown, the ru ed for which is justified facility or that such modifications may 6 months after NRC approval.

in the plant and schedules required by be detrimental to overalt facility safety.

(e) Nuclear power plants licensed to the provisions of paragraph (c)(5) of this the schedule requirements of paragraph operate after january 1,1979, shall section, shall be impftmented before (c) shall be tolled untd final Commission complete all fire protection startup after the earliest of the following action on the exemption request upon a modifications needed to satisfy events commencing 180 da)s or more determination by the Director o Nuclear Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part in r

paactor Regulation that the licensee has accordance with the provisions of their

• ciaritication and suidance with respect to provided a sound technical basis for licenses.

permissihte alternetwes to satisfy Appenda A to such assertion that warrants further

2. A new Appendix R is added to BTP APOR 9 S-1 has been provided in tout other staff review of the request.

10 CFR Part 50 to read as follows:

(d) Fire protection features accepted

,, p p

7 niary cuidance on information by the NRC staff in Fire Protection

%,, p

, g3g,, op,,,;q p,g, g e

N*rded f nrire Proteuion Evaluation? dated Safety Evaluation Reports referred to ir-January 1.1979 October 21. ws.

a ' Sample Technical SpeciferatioC dated May paragraph (b) of this section and it WL supplements to such reports. other than

/ Introduction ondscope j

• "Nuctent Plant Fire Protection hnetional features covered by paragraph (cl. shall This Appenda apphes to hcensed nuclea.

be completed as soon as practicable but power electnc generahng stations that were no later than the completion date operating pnor to January 1.1979. except to a y ra c date ne 1 of

. *Menpower Requirments for Operatins

[' ','['*"('.

" D," jap Reactors / dated May 11. tes.

currently specified in license conditions g

p A Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report that or technical specificati3ns for such asues for such facihties it sets forth fire k7,(,"[,'[,',YppC"M*g"]j, 'h" facility, or the date determined by protection features required to satisfy paragrap. [d)(1) through (d)(4) of th,s Cnterion 3 of Appendm A to thb part.*

i 6dentifice open fire protection oues th.t will be section, whichever is sooner, unless the resolved when the fwitity satisfies the approprial, requirements of Appenda R io this part Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

= see footnote 4

\\

L

76612 Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday. Nowmber 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations Criterci 3 of Appendic A to this part prostram shall establish the hre protection D. Afrernative or DedicatedShufdown specifies that "Stn;ctures. systems. and policy for the protectio i of structures.

Capabihty components important to safety sh-ll be systems. and componen's important to safety in areas where the fire protection features destaned and locate 1 to mmimize. onsistent at each plant and the procedures equip nent.

cannot ensure safe shutdown capability in with other safety requirements. the end personnel required to amplement the the event of a fire in that area. alternative or probabshty and effect of hres and program at the s.lant site dedicated safe shutdown capabihty shall be The hre protection program shall be ender presided.

-caplosions

the d:rection of an individualivh'a has been Ill Spe ific Requirements When considenng the effects of ire. those systems associated with achieving md delegated authonty commensurate with the maintaining safe shutdown conditu ns responsibihties of the position and who has A Water Supplies for Fire Suppression assume major importance to safety because available staff personnel knowledgeabic m Systems damage to them can lead to core d.4 mage both fire protection and nudear safety.

Two separate water supplies shall be resulting from loss sf coolant throuah boiioff.

The hre protection program shall ei!end provided to furnish necessary water volume De phrases "important to safety " or the concept of defense-m.debth to hre and pressure to the fire main loop.

" safety-related." will be used throu thout this protection in hre areas important to safety.

Each supply shall consist of a storage tank.

Appendix R as applying to all safet '

with the fobowmg objectrves:

pump, piping, and appropriate isolation and to prevent fires from startmg:

control valves. Two separate redundant g

functions De phrase ' safe shutdoun* will a

be used throughout this Appenda F as e to detect rapidly, control and extmguish sucL.sns in one or more intake structures applying to both hot and cold shutd swn promptly those hres that do occur:

from a large body of water (river. lake. etc.) -

• to provide protection for structures, will satisfy the requirement for two separated functions.

because fire n sy affect safe shut:fown systems. and components important to safety water storage tanks. These supphes shall be systems and because the loss of function of so that a fire that is not promptly separated so that a failure of one supply will systems used to mitigate the conselutnces of extinguished by the fire suppression activities not result in a failure of the other supply.

design beeis accidents under postfire wd! not prevent the safe shutdown of she Each supply of the fire water distribution system shall be capable of providing for a conditions does not per se impact pubbe plant.

B. Are Razon/s Ano/pis penod of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> the maximum expected safety, the need to limit fire damage to A fire hazards analysis shall be performed water demands as determined by the fire systems required to achieve and maintam safe shutdown conditions is greater than the by quahfied hrs protection and reactor hazards r.nalysis for safety related areas or need to limit fire damage to those systems systems engineers to (1) consider potential in other creas that present a fire exposure required to mitigate the consequences of situ and transient fire hazards. (2) determine hazard to safey-related areas.

' design basis accid nts. Three fevels of hre the consequences of hre in any location in When storage tanks are used for combined damage hmits are estabbshed according to the plant on the abrhty to safely shut down service-water /hre water usea the minimum the safety functions of the structure, system.

the reactor or on the abihty to minimize and volume for fire uses shall be ensured by control the release of radioactivity to the means of dedicated tanks or by some

_ environment; and (3) speafy measures for physicai means such as a vertical standpipe or component:

hre prevention, hre detection fire for other water service. Admmistrative amis, sown r.,

wms suppression. and hre containment and controls. includmg locks for tank outlet alternative shutdown capabihty as required valves, are unacceptable as the only means He asesem.. _. 4. e.m et.womwe aw w, e

• • • • * *umaa *o* *** for each hre area containing structures.

to ensure mimmum water vclume.

Other water systems used as one of the

'* QZZZ systems, and compor ents important to safety two hre water supphes shat! be permanently m accordance with NRC guidelines and

, w. n.m.g. d, a s,ng. w.

connected to the fire main system and shall

=cimo n ewwe w

• regulations.

com sp.am_.

ace une e m m nec****' "

C Fire Prevention Frotures be capable of automatic abgnment to the fire

7. 7.*M*

Fire protection features shall meet the main system. Pumps. controls..nd power followmg general requirements for all f re supphes in these systems shall satisfy the

.a.w.r. m. inaa.m g. mum

• • **** so w * *** c'= *=a areas that contam or present a fire hazard to requirements for the main fire pump. The

• ',1**7l",,'**,,, ",,,"y*** 'j structures, systems, or components important use of other water systems for fire protection shall not be incompatible with their functions to safety.

1. In situ fire hazards shall be identified required for safe plant shutdown. Failure of n,

Deur===

so* ee<= os ow mas a**eaary a

the other system shall not degrade the fire

""**g* 8,yg and suitable protection provided.

^

2. Transient fire hazards associated with mam system.

normal operation. maintenance. repair, or B.SectionalIsolat/ n Volves

,,,i,,.,,,

m.

modification activitiea shall be identihed amt Sectionalisolation valves such as r9st eliminated where possible. Those trar.sient inoicator valves or key operated vahes sh.J1 ta===

a fire hazards that can not be ehminated shall be mstalled in the fire main loop to permit

(* gg".,er "ce*ason,ns suca *; be controlled and suitable protection isolation of portions of the fire main loop for

.n w =.,,,w w,,,

,compor.o:,ex r

s ga provided.

mamtenance or repair without interrupting wu,..,,,,

3. Fire detection systems. portable the entire water supply.

wn, gQyg3a,s y extmguishers and standpipe and hose C Hydrant Isohtion ro/ves stations shall be installed.

Valves shall be installed to permit isolation

. e.

,e a n.,,,,,,ing ca s

Q*,j'y*'y'gcQ *ay,po***

4. Fire barriers or automatic suppression of outside hydrants from the fire main for

%e 'mo.t strinsent fire damage limit shall systems or both shall be installed as maintenance or repair without interrupting necessary to protect redundant systems or the water supply to automatic or manual fire apply for those systems that fallinto more components necessary for safe shutdown, suppression systems in any area containing than one category. Redundant systems used

5. A site hre brigade shall be estabhshed, or presenting a fire hazard to safety-related to mitigate the consequences of, t er design

' basis accidents but not necessary :or safe trained, and equipped and shall be on site ai or safe shutdown equipment.

4 all times.

D. Afunualfire Suppression shutdown may be lost to a single esposure

6. Fire detection and suppression systems Standpipe and hose systems shall be fire. However, protection shall be g rovided so shall be designed. Installed. maintained, andmstalled so that at least one effective hme that a fire within only one such syrem will tested by personnel properly qualified by stream will be able to reach any lootion that not damage the redundant system.

experience end trainmg in fire protection contains or presents an exposure fire Fazard to structures, systems, or compnents l

ll. Genero/ Requirements systems.

A. Fire Protection Program

7. Surveillance procedures shall be important to safety A fire protection program shall b -

established to ensure that hre barriers are in Access to permit effective functionmg of established at each nuclear power $lant.The place and that fire suppression systems and the I re brigade shafi be p rsvided to all areas compenents are operable.

that contain or present an exposure Sre

Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 76613 hazard to structures, systems. or components hour rating. In addition. fire detectors and an Institute for Occupational Safety and important to safety, automatic fire suppression system shall be llealth-approval formerly given by the U.S.

Standpipe and hose stations shall be inside installed in the fire area; Bureau of Mines) shall be provided for fire PWR containments and BWR containments Inside noninerted containments one of the brigade, damage control, and control room that are not inerted. Standpipe and hose fire protection means specified above or one personnel At least to masks shall be stations inside containment may be of the following fire protection means shall available for fire brigade personnel. Control connected ta a high quahty water supply of be provided; room personnel may be furnished breathing sufficient quantity and pressure other than

d. Separation of cables and equipment and air by a manifold system piped from a the fire main loop if plant-specific features associated non-safety circuits of redundant storage reservoir if practical Service or rated prevent extending the fire main supply inside trains by a horizontal distance of more than operating life shall be a minimum of one-half containment. For DWR drywells, standpipe 20 feet with no intervening combustibles or hour for the self<ontained units.

and hose s'ations shall be placed outside the fire hazarda:

At least two extra air bottles shall be dry well with adequate lengths of hose to

e. Installation of fire detectors and aa located on site for each self-contained I

reach any location inside the dry well with automatic fire suppression system in the fire breathing unit. In addition, an onsite e hour an effective hose stream.

area; or supply of rescrve air shall be provided and E. Hydmstatic Hose Tests

f. Separation of cables and equipment and arranged to permit quick and complete Fire hose shall be hydrostatically tested at associated non-safety circuits of redundant replenishment of exhausted supply air bottles a pressure of 300 psi or 50 psi above trains by a noncombustible radiant energy as they are returned. If compressors are used maximum fire main operating pressure, shield.

as a cource of breathing air, only units whichever is greater. Ilose stored in outside

3. Alternative or dedicated shutdown approved for breathing air shall be used; hose houses shall be tested annually. Interior capability and its associated circuits.'

compressors shall be operable assuming a standpipe hose shall be tested every three independent of cables, systems or loss of offsite power Special car must be years.

components in the area, room or zone under taken to locate the compressor in areas free F. Automatic fire Detection consideration, shall be provided:

of dust and contaminants.

Automatic fire detection systems sha l be

a. Where the protection of systems whose L Fire Brigade Tmining l

tr. italled in all areas of the plant that conta'u function is required for hot shutdown does ne fire brigade training program shall or present an exposure fire hazard to safe not satisfy the requirement of paragraph G 2 ensure that the capability to fight potential shutdown or safety-related systems or of this section: or fires is established end maintained. ne components. nese fire detection systems

b. Where redundant trains of systems program shall consist of an initial classroom shall be capable of operating with or without required for hot shu'cown located in the instruction program followed by periodic offsite power.

same fire area may be subject to damage classruom instruction, fire fighting practice.

G. Fire Protect on o/Sofe Shutdown from fire suppression activities or from the and fire drills:

Capability rupture or inadvertent operation of fire t Instruction

1. Fire protection features shall be provued suppression systems.

a. He initici classroom instruction shall for structures, systems, and components In addition, fire detection and a fixed fire include:

important to safe shutdown. These features suppression system shall be installed in the (1)ladoctrination of the plant fire fighting shall be capeble of limiting fire damage so area room, or zone under consideration, plan with specific identification of each Il Fim Brigade individual's responsibilities.

that[.

a One tram of systems necessary to A site fire brigade trained and equipped for (2) Identification of the type and location of achieve and maintain hot shutdown fire fighting s'all be established to ensure fire hazards and associated types of fires that conditions from either the control room or adequate manual fire fighting capability for could occur in the plant.

emergency control station (s)is free of fire all areas of the plant containing structures, (3) ne toxic and corrosive characteristics damage; and systems, or components important to safety.

of expected products of combustion.

b. Systems necessary to achieve and The fire brigade sh yll be at least five (41 Identification of the location of fire maintain cold shutdown from either the members on each smit. De brigade leader fighting equipment for each fire area and control room or emergency control station (s) and at least two brigade members shall have familiarization with the layout of the plant, can be repaired withm 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

sufficient training m or knowledge of plant including access and egress routes to each

2. Except as provided for paragraph G.3 of safety-related systems to understand the area.

this section, where cables or equipment, effects of fire and fire suppressants on safe (5) ne proper use of available fire fighting including associated non-safety circuits that shutdown capability. He qualification of fire equipment and the correct method of fighting could prevent operation or cause brigade members shall include an annual each t;pe of fire. ne types of fires covered maloperation due to hot shorts, open circuits.

physical examinatior, to determine their should include fires in energized electrical or shorts to ground, or redundant trains of ability to per'orm stenuous fire fightins equipment, fires in cables and reble trays, systems necessary to achieve and maintain activities. The shift supervisor shall not be a hydrogen fires. fires involving flammable and hot shutoown conditions are located within member of the fire brigade. The brigade combustible hquids or hazardous process leader shall be competent to assess the chemicals, fires resulting from construction or the sa nma a s e nma potential safety consequences of a fire and modifications (weldine. end record file fires.

g g

advise contml morn personnel Such (6) He proper use ci..mnmunication, ensuring that one of the redundant trains is free of fire damage shall be provided:

c mpe ence brigade leade* may be lighting, ventilation, an/.. mergency breathing evidenced by possession of an operator o equipment.

[{*}',"," g', ables and e ui me t and I cense or equivalent knowledge of plant (7) ne proper method for fighting fires aafety-related systems.

maide buildings and confined spaces.

trains by a fire bamer having a 3-our rating.

Structural steel forming a part of or He minimum equipment provided for the (8)De direction and coordination of the brigade shall consist of personal protective fire fighting activities (fire brigade leaders g

supportmg such fire barriers shall be equipment such as turnout coats, boots.

only)' Detailed review of fire fighting protected to provide fire resistance equivalent to that required of the bam,er; gloves. hard hats. emergency communications (9) equipment. portable lights, portable strategies and procedures.

b. Separation of cables and equipment and ventdation equipment. and portable (1C) Review of the latest plant associated non-safety circuits of redundant extinguishers. Self<ontained breathin2 modifications and corresponding changes in trains by a horizontal distance of more than apparatus using full-face positive-pressure fire fighting plans.

20 feet with no intervening combustible or masks approved by NIOSli(N.tional fire hazards. In addition. fire detectors and an Nota-Items (9) and (10) may be deleted automatic fire suppression system shall be fmm the training of no more than two of the 6Alternet e shuidown capabdity is provided by installed in the fire area: or reroutmg. relocatmg or modificatmg of esisting non-operations personnel who may be

c. Enclosure of cable and equipment and systems. dedicated shutdown capabihty is provided asMgned to the fire bdgade.

associated non-safety circuits of one by installms new structures and systems for tne

b. ne instruction shall be provided by redundant tram in a fire barrier having a 1 function of post fire shutdown.

quahfied individuals who are knowledgeable.

76614 Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday. November 19. 1980 / Rules and Regulafions espenenced. and suitably tramed in fightmg brigade and selet tion. plarement and use of required additional fire protection m the the t> pes of fires that could occur m the piant equipment, and fire fightmg strateg:es.

work attnit) procedure and m usmg the types of equipment asaildle (2) Assessment of a och bngade member's

5. Govern the me of ignitton sources by use m the nudear power plant knowledge of h s or her role m the fire of a ilame permit system to control welding.

c. :nstruction shall be pros ided to au fire fightmg strategy for the area assumed to Hame cuttirig. brazing. or soldering bnsade members and fire bngade leaders.

contam the fire Assessment of the bngade operatens. A separate permit shaU be issued

d. Reuutar planned meetmgs shall be held member's conformance witif estabbshed for each area where work is to be done. lf at lent escry 3 months for all bngade plant f:re fahtmg procedures and use of fire work contmues oser more than one shift. the members to review charges in the fce fuht.ng equipment. meludmg self-contamed pernut shall be vabd for not more than 24 proferhun program and other sub;ct.ts as eme rgency breathmg apparatus.

hours when the plant is operatmg or for the eommumcation eqwpment. and sentilation duration of a particidar joo dunng plant neceu ar).

e Pernhc refresher frammg sessmns shall eqwr ment. to the extent practicable.

shutdown.

be neld to repeat the classroom instruction i H The simulated use of fue fghtma

6. Control the remcval from the area of all piogram for all bngade members oser a two-equipment required to cope with the situation waste, debns. sc"p. oil spdis, or other 3 ear penod. These sess;ons may be an j type of fire seier ted for the dnll. The combust 6?es resultmg from the work actiuty c,oncurrent with the regular planned are. and ty pe of fire thosen for the dnll immediately followmg completion of the should differ from ' hose used m the previous actisity. or at the end of each work shift.

g

meetmg, dnli so that bngade members are tramed in w hxheser comes first.

I Prochce Pracrae sessioris shil be held fr.r each f>ghtma fires in vanous plant area, U -

7. Maintain the penodic housekeepmg shift fire hnxade on the proper method of situation selected should simulaic the size inspections to ensure contmued comphance hghtmg the s arious types of fires that could ar d arrarwemerit of ;i fire that could with these admimstrativa controls.

occur m a nuclear power plant. These remmably occur m the area selected.

8 Control the use of specific combustibles sessions shall prmide bngade members with a!!awmg for f;re development due to the time m safety-related areas. AI! wood used in espenence m actual fire estmgu:shment and required to respond. to obtam equipment. nnd safety-related areas dunng mamtenance, the use of emergency breathmg apparatus org mze for the fire. assumme loss of modification, or refuchng operations (such as

,nder strenuous con 1tions encountered m automatic soppression capabibts.

lay-down blocks or scaffoldmg) shall be hre huhtmg These practice sessions shall be (4) Assessment of bngade leader's treated with a flame retardant. Equipment or prouded at least once per y ear for ear h fire direchun of the fire fight ng effort as to supphes (such as new fuel) shipped m bngade men.ber.

thoroughness. accuracy. and effectiveness untreated combustible parkmg untamers 1 Ded/s 4 Ih ords may be unpacked in safety-related areas if

a. Fire bngade dnlis shall be performed m Indmdual records of traimng prosided to required for vahd operstmg reasons.

the plant no thal the f.re bngade can practice can h fire bngade member moludmg dnll llowever, all combustible matenals shall be rntiques shall be mamtained for at lent 3 removed from the area immediately followmg as a team b Dnlis shall be performed at regular years to ensure that each member receives the unpackmg. Such transient combustible mtervals net to eurred 3 months for each traming m all parts of the trammg program.

materiai unless stored m approved shift fire bngade Each bre bngade member These records of trammg shall be asadable contamers, shall not be left unattended should partmgate m each dnit but must for NRC euew Retrainmg nr broadened dunng lunch breaks. shift changes. or other participate m at least two dnlis per year.

trammg Ior bre fightmg withm Luddmas shall simdar penods. Loose combustible packing A sufficient number of these dntle. but not be scheduled for all those brigade members matenal such as wood or paper excelsior, or less than one for each shift fire bngade per whose performance records show polyethylene sheetmg shall be placed in year, shall be unannounced to determme the defeaencies metal contamers with tight-fittma self-closmg fire fightma readmess of the plant fire l Emergency I.ig6tmg metal cos ers bngade, bngade leader, and f re protection Errerger.cy bghtmg unt!s with at least an 8-

9. Control actions to be taken by an sy stems and eqmpment. persons plannmg hour bat ery power supply shall be prouded mdividual discovenng a fire. for example, and authonzme an mannounced dnll shall m all asc as ne eded for operatinn of safe notification of control room. attempt to ensure that the respondmg r.hift hre bngade shutdo-n eqwpment and m access and estmguish fire, and actuation of local fire members are not aware that a dnllis bemg egress roues thereto suppression systems.

planned unblit is begun. Unannounced dnils K. Admmisfrutae Contro!s

10. Control actions to be taken by the shall not he schedided doser than four Admmistratne controls shall be control room operator to determine the need week t estabhnhed to m.mmize fire hazards m areas for bngade assistance upon report of a fire o.

At least one dnll per year shall be contammg structures, systems and receipt nf alarm on ci ntrol room annunciator performed on a "back shift" for each shift fire components important to safety These panet, f< r example, announcing location of brerade.

controls shall estabbsh procedures to.

fire over pA system, sour;dmg fire alarmt

c. The dn!!s shall be preplanned to

1. Govern the handhng and hmitation of the and noti >ymg the shift supervisor and the fire establ sh the trammg oNectives of the dnll use of ordmary combustible materials.

bngade icader of the type. size, and location and shall be entiqued to determme how well combushble and fiammable gues and of the fire.

the trammg objectnes have been met.

bquids, high efficiency particulate air and

11. Control actions to be taken by the fire Unannounced dnlls shall be planned and charroal filiers. dry son exchange resms, or bngade after notification by the control room cnhqued by members of the management r..

• combushble supphes in safety.related operat. e of a fire. for exarrple, assembhny in a desig iated location, receiving directions staff responsible for plant esfety and fire are n protection. performance deficiencies of a fire 2 Prob.%t the storage of t.umbustibles in fiom Il fire bngade leader. and dischargmg brigade or of individual fire bngade rnembers safety related areas or estabhsh designated specifn fire fightmg responsibilities mcludmg shall be remedied by scheduhng additwnal storage areas with appropnate fire selectis 1 and transportation of fire fighhng trammg for the bngade nr members protection equiprr nt to fire location, selectum of Unsatisfactory dnli performance shall be 3 Gosern the hvidimg of and hmit protect,e equipment. operatmg mstructioris followed by a repeat dnll withm 30 day s.

transient f:re loads such as combustible and for une if fire suppression systems. and use

d. At 3-year intervals. a randomly selected flammable hqwds wood and plastic of preplanned strategies for fight ng fires m t

unannounced dnll shall be entiqued by products. or other comountable meterials m specifw areas.

quahfied individuals mdependent of the buddmgs contammg safety-related systems

12. Define the strategies for fightmg facs in hcensee s staff. A copy of the wntfen report or equipment dunna all phases of operatmg all safety-related areas and areas presentmg from such individuals shall be avadable for and especial'y dunna mamtenance.

a hazard to safety.related equipment These NRC renew.

med!hcation. or refuehi.g operations.

strateg.es shaU designate:

e. D.11s sha!! as a mammum mclude the t Designate the onsite staff member

a. bre hazards m euh area con red by the followmg.

respons6ble for the mplant fire protection speufic prefire plans (1) Assessment of hre alarm effettiveness.

renew of proposed work actairies to identify b Fire extinguishar s t est suited for o

time requ; red to notify and assemble hre potential transient fire hazards and specify controlhna the fires u ouated w th the firi

Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 79815 hazards in that srea and the nearest location coolant level above the top of the core for separation and barriers between trays and of these extinguishants.

BWRs and be within the levelindication in conduits containing associated circuits of one

c. Most favorable direction from which to the pressurizer for PWRs.

safe shutdown division and trays and attack a fire in each area in view of the

c. The reactor heat removal function shall conduits containing associated circuits or ventdat on direction. access hallways, stairs.

be capable of achieving and maintaining safe shutdown cables from the redundant and dot rs that are most hkely to be free of decay heat removal.

division, or the isolation of these associated hre. and the best station or elevation for

d. The process monitoring function shall be circuts from the safe shutdown equipment.

fightmg the fire. All access and egress routes capable of providing direct readings of the shall be such that a postulated fire involving that inv Ive locked doors should be process variables necessary to perform and associated circuits will not prevent safe g

specifice!!y identihed in the procedure with control the above functions.

shutdown."

the appropria'e precautions and methods for

e. The supporting functions shall be M. Fim Borrer Coble IVnetration Scol access specified.

capable of providing the process cooling.

Qualification

d. Plant systems that should lie managed to lubrication. etc necessary to pernut the Penetration sei designs shall utilize only

{

reduce the damage potential during a local operation of the equipment used for safe noncombustible n terials and shall be fire and the location of local and remote shutdown functions.

quahfied by tests test are comparable to tests controls for such management (e g., any

3. De shutdown opability for specific fire used to rate fire baniers.%e acceptance hydraulic or electriW r,.tems in the zone areas may be c.ique for each such area, or it criteria for the te.! shall include:

covered by the specific fire fighting procedure may bone unique combination of systems 1.h cable fire barrier penetration seal that could increase the hazards in the area for all such areas. In either case, the has withstood the fire endurance test without because of overp.essurization or electrical alternative shutdown capability shall be passage of flame or ignition of cables on the hazards).

independent of the specific fire area (s) and unexposed side for a period of time

e. Vital heat-sensitive system components shall accommodate postfire conditions where equivalent to the fire resistance ratmg -

that need to be kept cool while fightmg a offsite power is available and where offsite required of the barrier; local hre. Particularly hazardous power is not avadable for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

2.ne temperature levels recorded for the combustibles that need cooling should be Procedures shall be in effect to implement unexposed side are analyzed and designated.

this capability.

demonstrate that the maximum temperature

f. Organization of fire fighting bngades and

4. lf the capabihty to achieve and maintain is sufficiently below the cable insulation the assignment of special duties according to cold shutdown will not be available because ignition temperature: and job title so that all fire fighting functions are of fire damage, the equipment and systems 3.ne fire barner penetration seal remains covered by any complete shift personnel comprising the means to achieve and intact and does not allow projection of water complement. These duties include command maintain the hot standby or hot shutdown beyond the unexposed surface during the controlof the bngade transporting fire condition shall be capable of maintaining hose stream test.

suppression and support equipment to the fire such conditions until cold shutdown can be N. Fin Doors scenes, applymg the extinguishant to the fire, achieved. lf such equipment and systems will Fire doors shall be self< losing or provided communication with the control room, and not be capable of being powered by both with closing mechanisms and shall be coordination with outside fire departments.

onsite and offsite electric power systems inspected semiannually to verify that

g. Potential radiological and toxic hazards because of fire damaee, an independent automatic hold-open, release, and closing in fire zones onsite power system shall be provided. The mechanisms and latches are operable.

h. Ventilation system operation that number of operating shift personnel.

One of the following measures shall be ensures desired plant air distribution when lasive of fire brigade members, required Provided to ensura they will protect the s

the ventilation flow is modified for fire w operate such equipment and systems shall opening as required in case of fire:

containment or smoke clearir.g operations.

be on site at all times.

1. Fire doors shall be kept closed and

i. Operations requiring control room and

5. Equipment and systems comprising the electrically supervised at a contmuously shift engineer coordination or authorization.

means to achieve and maintain cold manned location; f Instructions for plant operators and shutdown conditions shall not be damaged

2. Fire doors shall be locked closed and general plant personnel during fire.

by fire; or the fire damage to such equipment inspecte I weekly to venfy that the doors are L Alternative andDedicatedShutdown and systems shall be limited so that the in the closed position; Capability systems can be made operable and cold

3. Fire doors shall be provided with

1. Alternative or dedicated shutdown shutdown achieved within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

automatic holdepen and release mechanisms capability provided for a specific fire area Materials for such repairs shall be readily and inspected dady to verify that doorways am free of obstructionsw shall be able to achieve and maintain available on site and procedures shall be in subentical reactivity conditions in the effect to implement such repairs. lf such

4. Fire doors shall be kept closed and res(tor, mamtain reactor coolant inventory equipment and systems used prior to 72 hoi.rs in5Pected daily to verify that they are in the achieve and maintain hot standb> '

after the fire will not be capable of being closed position.

conditions for a PWR (hot shutdown ' for a powered by both onsite and offsite electric ne fi e brigade leader shall have ready BWR) and achieve cold shutdown '

power systems because of fire damage, an access la keys for any locked fire doors.

conditions within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and maintain cold independnet onsite power system shall be Areas Protected by automatic total flooding shutdown conditions thereafter. During the provided. Equipment and systems used after gas suppression systems shall have postfire shutdown, the reactor coolant system 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> may be powered by offsite power electrically supervised self-closing fire doors or shall satisfy option 1 above.

e process variables shall be maintained within only.

those predicted for a loss of normal a.c.

6. Shutdown systems installed to ensure O. Od Co//ecuan System for ReMor power. and the fission product boundary postfire shutdown capabihty need not be Cm/ont PWnp E'"'ct r coolant pump shall be integnty shall not be affected; i.e.. there shall designed to meet seismic Category I criteria.

equippel wHn an il c llection system if the I

be no fuel clad damage, rupture or any single failure cnteria. or other design basis C"" 5""' "*' I"'d*d d"'I"8 " '"'I pnmary coolant boundary, or rupture of the accident criteria, except where required for operatic n. The oil collection system shall be containment boundary.

other reasons. e g. because of interface with

2. The rarformance goals for the shutdown or impact on existing safety systems, or y.iesigned engineered, and installed that

.a m mil not lead to fire during normal or functiom shall be:

because of adverse valve actions due to fire En Ws acMent conMons and eat

a. The reactivity control function shall be damage.

capable of achieving and maintaining cold

7. The safe shutdown equipment and shutdown reactivity conditions.

systems for each fire area shall be known to a An e. eptable method of complyins with this

b. The reactor coolan' makeup function be isolated from associated non-safety

• I','"jQ","

d shall be capable of maintaining the reactor circuits m the fire area sa that hot shorts, sed ensecuan where trays from open circuits, or shorts to ground in the redundans safety dwisions are so protected that

' As defmed in the Standard Technical associated circuits will not prevent operation postulated fires affect trays from only one safety Specihcations.

of the safe shutdown equipment.The dmsion

s 7eska Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday, November 19, 1900 / Rules end Regulations there is reasonable assurance that the system

-will wtthstand the Safe Shutdown Earthquake

• Such collecnon systems shallbe capable of -

collecting lul+ oil from all potential pressurized and unpressurized leakage sites in the reactor coolant pump lube oil systems.

.Lankage shall be collected and drained to a

-vented closed contamer that can hold the entire tube oil system mventory. A flame arrester is required in the vent if the flash pomt charactenstics of the oil present the 9

hazard of fire flashback. Leakage points to be I

protected shallinclude lift pump and piping.

overflow Imes lube oil cooler oil fill and drain hnen and plugs, flanged connections on g

od hnes, and lube oil reservoirs where such features exist c n the reactor coolant pumps.

.The drain hne shall be large enough to accommodate the largest potential oilleak.

(Sec.181b. Pub. L 83-703. 68 Stat. 948 sec. .201. Pub. L 93-438. Sa Stat.1242 (42 U.S.C.

2201(b).5841])

' Dated at Washington. D C this 17th day of

-November 1980.

' For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Samuel I. Chilk, Secretary of the Commission.

pn onc. awers nled 1i-ioe a es mal '

-.esLums cost ree-et-as e

4

- I

l

'See Regulatory Gu6de L2% "Seannuc Desgn

Classification" Paragraph C1 t

a

- -,