ML20010H195

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Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law on Contention A-2 (Applicant Financial Capability),Contention A-9 (Quality of Workmanship) & Contention A-10 (Health Effects).Certificate of Svc Encl
ML20010H195
Person / Time
Site: Summer South Carolina Electric & Gas Company icon.png
Issue date: 09/08/1981
From: Bursey B
AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:
References
ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8109240120
Download: ML20010H195 (7)


Text

,. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA l NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 9 pga s ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD usH@ -

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SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS ) Cy /

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R Q't d j' iNTERVENOR'S FINDING 0F FACTS AND CONCLtSI0ffS 3 N/

tg g C Ifh.4 Three contentions are to be addressed in this preliminary filing of facts and conclusions: Applicant's Financial Capability (A-2), Qualtiy of Workmanship (A-9), and , Health Effects (A-10).

Intervenor's Contention A-2 -

A-2(a). The Applicant lacks the financial qualifications necessary to safely operate and decommission the Sumer station in compliance with NRC Rules (42.050,2232) and regulations.

A-2(b). The sum allocated by the Applicant for decommissioning of the Summer plant is grossly inadequate and does not conform to the requirements of 10CFR50.33(f).

It is the Intervenor's position that the adequacy of funding for decommission-ing is necessarily tied to the proposed mode of decommissioning. Accepting the Applicant's 70 million dollar (1978 dollars) estimate for complete dismantle-ment, the 30 year life span of the plant ould require between $733.7 million 3 and $4.9 billion for decommissioning (given 7-14% inflation). Tr. 2746. Staff S witness Peterson asserts, and Applicant agrees, that projecting inflation /

rates for the life of the facility is "so speculative that it is not very meaning .

ful," Tr. 2738, This off+ handed treatment of the Applicant's responsiblitty to responsibly project adequate funding for decommissioning is underscored by (0109240120 810908 PDR 0 ADOCK 05000395 (prq

their plan for a "non funded" reserve. (Ford testimony pp.1-2, Wooten testi-monty p. 4) This proposed plan will have the rate payers assessed an indefinite amount that the Applicant will use to invest in their own corporation. When decommissioning becomes necessary, the Applicant will sell bonds to raise decomissioning capital. These bonds will be paid by future generations of rate payers. The admittedly speculative economic and technological aspects of decomissioning compel this licensing board to require the establishment of a " funded reserve' of $70 million (1978 dollars). This reserve should be held in an interest bearing trust by a third party. This method provides the only reasonable assurance of adequate funding for decomissioning under all contingen-cies.

Staff financial witness Peterson stated that the funded reserve provides greater financial assurance of safe.. adequate decomissioning than the unfunded approach, Tr. 2740.

The Applicant's argument tha't the NRC has no authority over ratemaking (in regard to decomissioning costs) does not preempt the Licensing Board's responsibility to insure the Applicant has adequate funding for decomissioning.

It is within this Board's authority to n.;- on external, funded reserve a con.

I dition of the operating license.

The Applicant's assertion that the term "pemanent shutdown" means decomis-sioning at the end of the facility's nomal life is a self-serving interpre-tation, Common sense dictates that decommissioning of a facility occurs at the end of its useful life - whether that is 3 months or 30 years after operation CorirDences.

The Applicant alludes to a variety of possible options to raise funds for premature decomissioning.

The TMI accident happened with approximately 450 commercial reactor years of pperating experience. With 80 reactors operating, we can expect another TMI type accident within the next 6 years, Prudence dictates that this licensing

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i board not rely on previous financial requirements that will leave a utility vague options to fund decomissioning under all contingencies.

The only way this licensing board can assure the Applicant's financial l capability to deal promptly and safely with decommissioning under all contingen-cies is to mandate an external, funded reserve of $70 million,1978 dollars, as a condition of the operating license.

Intervenor's Contention A-9.

The quality control of the Sumer plant is substantially below NRC stan-dards as evidenced by substandard workmanship in several aspects, during the construction of the plant.

e The Applicant's position on welding quality control can be likened to a great deal of smoke, many sparks, but absolutely no possibility of fire. Clarence Crider, the welder who brought many deficiences to light, is characterized by the Applicant as self serving. Mr. Crider's motives aside, none of the 15 particularized allegations contained in Report No. 79-35 were dismissed as frivolous, and in fact, were all confirmed at least in part.

l The Applicant admits having serious difficulties adhering to code and, in part, dismisses the problem as a generic shortcoming not peculiar to the Summer site. Tr. 1414.3525' .

The failure to meet ASME Code Section 111, 71 & 73 that requires pipe with drawal 1/16th of an inch prior to welding (Allegation H - Crider) was substantiated by the I & E Report. The Applicant's position is to take issue with the code itself by arguing:

(a) even if they did not follow the code, there is no safety problem; (b) the welding process itself defeats the prupose of the code.

These two welding problems exemplified by items A and H of Report 79-35 affect over 15,000 welds, These were brought to the Board's attention by one l

worker. The consistent testimony before this board about faulty welding and

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4 haphazard quality control raises a reasonable doubt as to the ul'timate integrity of thousands of safety related welds. Under these circumstances the Board should refuse to issue an operating license to the Applicant. Should a license be ultimately granted, the Applicant should be restricted to operating at 5% of the reactor's thennal capacity for 6 months to insure the integrity of safety related welds.

Intervenor's Contention A-10.

"I feel at the present time with the data on record that I could not support the claim that they have been overly conservative. I feel in some res-pects just the inverse of that, that is, they have chosen values that would tend to depreciate the risk rather than to perhaps exaggerate the risks." (Dr. Morgan, Tr. 2489)

Dr. Morgan's observation that the Applitant and Staff are not forthcoming in their estimation of health eff,ects is borno out by the obscuring of

" bottom line" figures in both the Applicant's and Staff's documents.

Although the Staff and Applicant go to lengths to discredit Dr. Morgan's testimony, Dr. Brannagan admits (Tr. 3823) and the Applicant concurs there is no major disagreement in the " total range of health effects."

It is interesting to note that nowhen in Staff or Applicant documents do we see Dr. Morgan's unrefuted projection of 35 fatalities, 70 cancers (Tr. 2494) and 1700 genetic disorders. The Staff and Applicant relied on a jumble of numbers unintelligible to the average person to obscure the actual health risks of operating the V.C. Sunner plant.

The Applicant has asserted that the FES figures combined with the results of BEIR III leads tothe conclusion that "there will be no measurable health impact on man" from the operation of the V.C. Summer plant (Barker, prefiled testimony, p. 6).

. _ _ __ _ . _ .__ _ __ ~ _ . . _ _ . _ _ . . . _ _ _. _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . , _ . _ . _ . _

The Applicant states on the one hand that there is no (najor disagreement in the total range of health effects as postulated by Dr, Morgan versus the FES. (this range being up to 35 fatalities, 70 cancers and.1700 genetic disorders), while presenting sworn testimony on the other hand that concludes no measurable health impact on man. This glaring contradiction indicates that l t'a Applicant has a wholly different assessment of "t.easurable health j impact (.s)" than rational thought processes can follow. Certainly a different i

view than the 70 people who may contract cancer as a result of the operation of this plant may have, The Applicant seems to hope that the Intervenor and the Board will get lost in the scientific quagmire of how certain figures are reached, rather than the bottom line costs of cancer deaths and genetic abnonnalities so carefully hidden from public view over the 8 years of licensing hearings for this faci-lity.

This Board surely has the common sense to know that the industry figures for the cost-benefit of health effects have been historically as understated as in the instant case. Dr, K.Z, Morgan, a nuclear scientist of the highest integrity since the splitting of the first atom, provides this Board with as I

broad and frank an insight into their task as can be found: "(I)tisincumbent l

1 on us to try to develop an understanding with members of the public as to what the true risks are, what the spread of uncertainties are...the public should be made aware of these uncertainties and what the possible consequences to them and their children are." Tr, 2498.

The nuclear industry and this Applicant have a long history of denigrating the negative effects of nuclear power - a high-priced, high-powered misrepre-sentation of the facts of this proceeding.

This Board has the historic opportunity to concern itself with the demo-cratic representation of the informed will of the people, rather than perpetuating

the myths the nuclear industry has been built upon. If the facts of the health effects expected from the operation of this nuclear plant had been honestly repre-sented to the public eight years ago, the plant in all probability would never have been built. The momentum of a billion dollar investment is a ponderous force to reckon with, but the lives that will be lost and genetically impacted without their informed consent represents a chilling turn from democracy that cannot in good conscience be countenanced.

This Board's responsibility to democratic principles far outweights any homage to profit-making corporations. Were the impacted citizenry informed of their risks, the lack of need for power alone would dictate a denial of this operating license. Given the fact that the costs are incurred against the lives of a misled public, this Board has no option other than to deny the benefit of excess power to the Applicant's stockholders.

If in the final assessment, this Board _ decides not to represent the interest of the people, and opts to cast more lives to a bankrupt future - to allow technoiogy to take the path of maximum profit - you must not continue to h1de the costs l you have determined are just.fiable. The ill-advised gran. .ig of an operating license must clearly state how many cancers, how many deaths and how many genetic disorders we can expect to suffer - should nothing go wrong at the V.C. Summer l plant, w

Brett Bursey, Intervenor j l

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4 con UNITED STATES OF AMERICA .2 ce

- NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCM.LSSION C

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? !ne:$dg y BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSINO 30AR3 d, s p o, .,

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a-SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC &

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I h SOUTH CAROLINA PUBLIC )- Decket No.59-395 CL SERVICE AUTHORITY )

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.., CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE g

> I hereky certify that copies of "Intervenor's Finding of Facts and Con- -

, d clusions" were served upon the following persons by depesit in the United

=. States mail, first class postage, this 8th day of September,1981:

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i; ll Herbert Grossman, Esq. Chairman, Atomic S..fetf and

  1. Chairman, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Fanel f Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulator-f
U. S. Nu-lear Regulatory

'j Commission Commission Washington, D. C. 205U

Washington, D. C. 20555 George Fischer, Tsc .

. Dr. Frank F. Hooper Vice President & Grou; j School of Natural Resceurces Executive - Legal Affa'.rs 4 University of '41chigan S. C. Electric & Gas Cc?pany Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109 . Post Office Box 764 4 s

  • Columbia, S. C. 29202 j Mr. Gustave A. Linenberger Member, Atomic Safety and Steven C. Goldberg, Es:.

Licensing Board Panel Office of the Execctive i

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Legal Director

, Commission U. S. Nuclear Ragulatory Washington, D. C. 20555 Commission

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Washington, D. C. 2055; 9 Chairman, 7tomic Safety and j Licensing Appeal Board Panel g U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Mr. Chase .~t. Stephens

_; Comission Docketing and Service Secticr.

Washington, D. C. 20555 Office of the Secretary

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  • U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D.C. 20555

! Richard P. Wilson Esq.

l Assistant Attorney General j South Carolina Attorney General's J.B. Knotts, Jr. , Esq.

Office Debevoise & Liberman P.O. Box 11549 1200 17th Street. N.W.

. Columbia S.C. 29211 Washington. D.C. 20036 Larry Mahan.

South Carolina Electric & Gas Company P.O. Box 764 Columbia. S.C. 29218 .

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