ML20038A702
| ML20038A702 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 11/03/1981 |
| From: | Bursey B BURSEY, B. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8111160190 | |
| Download: ML20038A702 (17) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CDCKETEC ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD UMC In the Matter of:
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G -6 P1 $4
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SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC AND
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Q GAS COMPANY, et. al.
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DOCKET NUMBER:
50-395-OL.
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Virgil C. Summer Nuclear
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Station, Unit 1
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~ [Y " /ggI:% -b OPj INTERVENOR'S FINDING OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS -
l-RQ!y9 y 4 q
. 8 State and County Understanding and Capability
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is The original phrasing of my contention regarding Emergency / Accident con-siderations, as rewritten by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, raised a concern that:
"The Applicant has made inadequate preparations for the implementation of emer-gency plans in those areas where the assistance and cooperation of state and local agencies are required."
The testimony solicited during the course of this hearing has proven this con-cern to be valid and the resulting shortcomings are a critical flaw in the imple-mentation of an effective emergency plan.
My_ concerns about the emergency plan should not be limited to the pro forma w
exchange of a specified documents or even the existence of an " adequate" paper plan, but rather, the assurance of an adequate, workable plan for all contingencies.
/
It is the Applicant's responsibility to appraise state and country emergency officials of the necessary measures they must be prepared to take to mitigate the consequences of a serious accident.
The record reflects that county and state emergency preparedness personnt 1 350f have a total lack of understanding of the potential seriousness of a major S
nuclear accident.
The ignorance and misunderstanding amongst state and local officials as to the potential impacts of accidents they may be called upon to respond to, threatens 8111160190 811103
{DRADOCK 05000395 PDR
7 the ultimate adequacy of the plan.
For example, George Douglass, Di rector of the Fairfield County Office of Emergency Preparedness, (the host ccunty of the reactor) agreed with me that the public should be educated as to the possibility and impacts of a major nuclear accident (tr 2163-3).
Yet Mr. Douglass states he believes the chances of a serious accident are "almost approaching nil" (tr 2164-1) and he doesn't '.hink there would be the type of release that would be the cause of any deaths." (tr 2167-25) fiUREG 0654 recognizes the potential severity of core melt sequences.
0654 anticipates consequences from the worst core' melt sequence as possibly exceeding Protective Action Guidelines and posing life threatening doses outside the EPZ (D.
Planning Basis.
2.
Emergency Planning Zone B & C) 0654 anticipates thorough emergency plans for the 10 mile EPZ will allow for adequate emergency mea-sures outside the zone in the event of life threatening consequences beyond ten miles.
State and local officials' admissions of ignorance as to consecuences of a core melt accident raise serious doubts of the efficacy of their plans within the If Mr. Douglass doubts there can be any accidents that cou[d 10 mile zone.
cause fatalities, he doesn't understand the planning basis for 0654.
If Mr.
Douglass imparts his underestimation of the impacts of serious accidents to his planning and to the local citizens, the adequacy of the plan to adequately miti-gate serious consequences is doubtful.
The TMI accident that gave rise to 0654 was beyond design basis.
The premise of 0654 is to enable the realistic mitigation of accidents - including core melts beyond design basis.
The Staff and Applicant's position is that if the mechanical steps of Part 11 are committed to paper memorandums, emergency plans are adequate.
I contend that without understanding the seriousness of accidents beyond design basis - as reflected in Part I of 0654 - it is unrealistic to believe that Part 11 of 0654 can be abstractly implemented to adequately cope with all emergency.cntin-1 gencies.
Nowhere in 0654 is Mr. Goldberg's assertion that Part I of the document is to be ignored in the Board's assessment of adequate planning.
Nor is there anything in 0654 that states Part I should not be.taken into consideration and understood by state and local agencies.
The transcript reflects that none of the local or state officials (with one exception) had any notion of whether they would be dealing with 4, 40, 400 or 4,000 potential fatalities in the event of a core melt and radioactive release.
General George Wise, Director of the State Office of Emergency Preparedness, illustrated a critical ignorance of the magnitude of a core melt by claiming the radiation of a " reactor meltdown is quite insignificant compared to" a 20 KT nuclear weapon. (tr 2213-14) The fact is, a 20% release of the radioactive inven-tory could amount to two billion curies, as opposed to 20,000 curies in a 20 KT nuclear device.
This comparison is drawn slmply to illustrate that the state and local officials are unaware of post-TMI core melt considerations, required by 0654.
Bringing state and local officials' understanding of accident impacts up to an adequate level to comprehend and prepare for major accidents is not a lengthy or complicated endeavor.
The basic problem lies in the Applicant (and nuclear industry) downplaying accident probabilities and impacts.
This prablem is compounded by the NRC position reflected by Mr. Goldberg - that if the paperwork is right, i
you don't have to look any further into the adequacy of emergency planning.
Medical Provisioils There is an obvious lack of preparedness in regard to the efficent hanJ1ing of internal radiation dose cases and radiation / trauma victims.
There is continual reference by county officials (ilcluding the Oct. 5,1981, Richland County Civil Defense Disaster Operations racedure for the V.C. Summer Nulcear Station.
See attached, section H, page 4) to Richland Memorial Hospital " handling radiation
-4 accident cases" that fly in the face of the record.
Mr. Dale Campbell, Radiation Safety Officer for Richland Memorial Hospital, stated in prefiled testimony attached to the record of this proceeding that, "the hospital doesn't assume the role of a decontamination facility." Campbell went on to note that "we don't have the facilities here to handle a really bad everexposure case." When asked how many radiation patients Richland Memorial could handle, Campbell responded, "right now we are set up to handle about four.
I think it is realistic to think that we would never have more than three or four people."
Campbell, as well as local and state emergency officials so seriously misunder-stood the medical consequences of a serious accident as to render their emergency medical plans inadequate.
Applicant's Emergency Managenent The Applicant asserted during the hearings in response to Dr. Kaku's postu-lated accident acenario, that t5ey would determine a state of General Emergency six minutes after the initiating event, notify state, Iccal and federal agencies and call for an evacuation eleven minutes after the initiating event.
D r. Kaku postulated the LOCA could have been ititiated by a transient, human failure, double ended guillotine break, or common mode failure.
Dr. Kaku then
~2 2 made the Appi
.nt's response easy by having hundreds of thousands of gallons of primary cooling water spill immediately onto the control room floor, alerting
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the reactor operator to a possible problem.
Had Kaku not included this large, immediate loss of water, the Applicant could not have simply responded to the easily detectable double ended guillotine break intiator.
Mr. Storz, a reactor operator for the Applicant, testified (tr 4554-21) "and without a doubt, the accident described in their scenario is probably the most spectacular and probably the easist one for the operator to immediately identify."
It is highly unlikely that the Applicant could have responded to any of the other hypothesized initiators within the six minute time frame given by the
. Applicant.
There are serious " command decisions" in the event of a general emergency that the testimony gives reasonable cause for concern regarding prompt emergency actions.
Mr. Storz testified that in a ~ rapidly developing accident scenario the shift supervisor acts as emergency director.
Storz further noted (tr 4580) that during the May 1 Emergency Drill he arrived at the plant and "could have, if I had chosen to, assumed the responsibility as emergency director."
Mr. Storz's testimony indicated (tr 4530) that, given time, during an acci-o dent the plant manager would arrive on the scene in the control room, and becore involved in decision-making.
The options of the assumption of command (reactor operator, shift supervisor, management duty supervisor, plant manager) in the event of an emergency lend doubt to the Applicant's assertions that an on-duty reactoo opecetor Will indeed be the one to declare a., state of general emergency.
In a less spectacular initiating event than a large break LOCA, there will obviously be more decision makers in the control room - contributing to uncer-tainty ac to a course of action.
The probability of a general emergency being de-clared in six minutes and an evacuation call being issued in eleven minutes is an unlikely prospect.
Dr. Budnitz, testifying for the Applicant (tr 4182-9) stated that Dr. Kaku's accident scenario is "not only the most likely excercise of these plans, but one l
l which perhaps these plans maybe aren't capable of coping with."
I concur with the Applican't witness that, in spite of flUREG 0654, the Appli-cant is incapable of coping with greater than design basis accidents - an uncon-l troverted fact on the face of the record.
In contesting Dr. Kaku's accident scenario, the Applicant taook the most " spec-tacular" initiator, and the most favorable - and unlikely - responses, in order l
to af fect a successful evacuation of a limited area, i
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. Agricultural Considerations NUREG 0654 mandates that emergency plans include procedures for the protection, care and feeding and possible evacuation of farm animals within the 10 mile EoZ.
The possible seizure and destruction of crops is also a necessary emergency planning consideration. The Clemson Extension Service is the state agency delegated responsibility for these tasks.
Mr. William Funchess, the Clemson representative, subpoenaed for the hearings, was unfamiliar with the term " ingestion zone" (tr 1808), although his agency is responsible for educating farmers in that 50 mile radius to procedures to mitigate accident impacts (tr 1811).
The Extension Service has, to date, made no contact with farmers in the area concerning adequate emergency procedures (tr 1811).
While Funchess maintained that evacuation of livestock would utilize the owners' vehicles (tr 1810), that "all farms have certain facilities for storing feed (tr 1812)" and that "the costs would be borne by the farmer" (tr 1812), a dairy farmer with several hundred head of cattle. wi_ thin the 10 mile zone (Mr. C.H. Coleman) testi-fied to the contrary.
Coleman indicated that he could not transport more than five of his 300 cows at_ a time (tr 1824), that he die not have ade we'e covered storage for feed and did not have enclosures for his her. (tr 1823)
Co.eman further testified that a serious' release at the plant requiring stored feed or th' destruction of milk would financially " clean us out."
(tr 1823)
The record makes it clear that state and local emergency plans in regard to agricultural considerations are woefully inadequate.
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Public Notification l
There are two main aspects of public notification in regard to acciaents at the Summer station:
(1) public education prior to an accident, and (2) public and governmental notification in the event of an accident.
The Applicant has a responsibility to adequately educate the public as to how, when, and why to respond in the event of an accident at the Summer station.
The Applicant's primary means of public education consists of a brochure that has not beer distributed to the public in the EPZ.
The existing brochure has been criticized by the NRC (Report No. 50-395/81-09, Page 7) for not addressing the FEMA criticized the subjects of respiratory protection and radioprotective drugs.
bmchure as overstating the cleanliness of the nuclear fission process and the inclu -
~
sionaof obscure statirtics.
It is my position that in the Applicant's efforts not to alarm the public, their Emergency informat in Brochure lulls the public into thinking nuclear accidents are not only extremely improbable, but inconsequential.
In order for the public to respond adequately in the event of a serious accident at the Summer station, they must know very clearly what to do, when to do it and why.
The what and when are not contested by the Applicant.
The why they should respond is a critical component of an adequate and timely response e,a the part of the public.
Radioactive hazards are a relatively new and unknown Without understanding the consequences of failing to respor d to an l
occurence.
evacuation or sheltering notiee, the public cannot be expected to respond promptly and adequately. They must be told that in the event of an accident serious enough to necessitate evacuation, their failure to respond could result in death.
~ ~The Applicart's emergency brochure informs the.public that the most radiation anyone
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could have received from the most serious comnercial nuclear accident (TMI) was 70 mr.
less than they receive annually from background radiation.
The potential x
fatalities, latent cancers and genetic abnormalities that would result in the event of an ignored or untimely evacuation necessitated by a PWR class event are not
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mentioned in the Applicant's brochure.
How is the public to learn that their
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failura to rea'd between the lines of the brochure could result in thcir death?
They kOw what will happen if they fail to evacuate a burning building, or to remove themselves from the path of a tornado.
This Board has a responsibility to in;ure that the applicant's Emergency Brochure be mroe than industry propaganda.
The Applicant has a mandated responsibility to notify the public within 15 The minutes af ter a general emergency necessitating mitigating action occurs.
primary means for this notification are electronically activated sirens and the Emer-gency Broadcast System (EBS).
The siren system has yet to be tested for effectiveness.
I assume licensing considerations will be held in abeyance until the successful testing of these sirens under facorable conditions.
I would urge the Board to consider, however, that the unlikely event the sirens are intended to alert the public of an emergency may well be accompanied by electrical power outage.
In the event of power outages the siren's wculd fail to operate.
In this event, the recourse, according to tie Applicant's emergency coordinator, Mr. Beale, would be for sheriff's deputies and volunteers to ride around the 100+ square miles affected, blowing their sirens.
People would in turn somehow know to turn on their car radios - as their electricity is off -
and receive emergency instructions.
During the hearings Mr. Beale was asked how long this means of notification would take; he responded (tr 4511-15) "I gave you yesterday my off the top of my head assumption that it wco; d take approximately 60 minutes for local sheriffs, locat emergency vehicles to get out into location and sound their sirens.
That number may be better, it may be greater."
Knewing we are supposed to evacuate our homes is a significant concern that is potentially a matter of life and death to those of us listening for those sirens to go off.
The possibility of a power outage being associated with a serious acci-dent at thW Summer station is not a far fetched notion.
Richland County Sheriff Frank Powell told me that "it would take a minimum of 6 to 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> to notify people living in affected areas of Richland County", and that he did not feel com-fortable that everyone could be reached in that amount of time - far beyond the Applicant's emerg'ency specialist conjectured time of one hour.
Sheriff Powell responded to the Richland County Disaster Operation Procedure Number 4 (see attachment), recommending ' state personnel be primarily responsible" for evacuation assistance in the EPZ.
His suggestions are " based on the fact that there is not sufficient personnel available to provide these services" given his department's other responsibilities.
_g_
The actual evacuation f citizens from the affected areas within the EPZ remains a matter of conjecture.
The actual number and locatica of residents needing assistance remains no more than a computerized guesstimate upon which county and state emergency personnel - and certainly this licensing board - cannot rely.
There has yet to be done a house to house survey of those requiring evacuation assistance.
In the May 1 Emergency Drill - when everyone was pre-alerted and standing at ready - the Emergency Broadcast System was activated 35 minutes after "significant offsite radiation levels existed" (FEMA May 8, Deficiencies in the V.C. Summer REP Exercise).
This response under staged conditions is in obvious excess to the 15 minute NUREG 0654 criteria.
Given the six hour minimum notification time for power outage postulated by Sheriff Powell for the EPZ under consideration in Dr. Kaku's accident scenario, we would be facing 200 to 500 fatal ties in the resident population of nearly 1,000.
Should the wind shift on the av rage of a zone every two hours, as Mr. Grimes suggested (tr 4662-21), the consequences would be compounded.
Suma ry In conclusion, I find that the Applicant's emergency preparedness as it interfaces with responsible state and local agencies is so inadequate as to warrant the denial of an operating license.
The record reflects that state and local of ficials were oblivious to the nature and consequences of accidents they are res-ponsible for being adequately prepared to mitigate.
Prior to even considering granting an, operating license for the Summer plant this Board must order:
(1) A clearer chain of management responsibility in the event of a serious l
accident; (2) The Applicant undertake a serious eauca:.1: nai ef fort for state, local r
and hospital officials to bring them up to date with post TMI, PWR considerations
__- and adequate mitigating measures; (3) Require the Applicant to undertake a door to door public notification and education campaign to inform all citizens in the EPZ what, how and why they should take action in the event of an accident requiring protective action.
(4) Require back up battery power for the siren system that serves as the primary means of public notification; (5) Require the placement of radio activated " black boxes" in the homes of those living in the EPZ as a " fail safe" notification system.
These boxes should at least be installed in the homes of area residents who would cooperate as volunteers to facilitate prompt evacuation of their neighbors; (6) Ensure the NUREG 0654 agricultural considerations be met.
All farmers in the EPZ must be appraised and adequate emergency measures instituted prior to license considerations.
On the face of the record established during the course of this proceeding, reasonable minds wo.1d conclude 4 hat the state and local ott icials responsible for the health and safety of the public in the event of a serious accident at the V.C. Summer plant are so inadequately educated and ill prepared as to necessitate
-a-denial ~of the Applicant's operating license.
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_g Submitted by the Intervenor, Brett Bursey November 3, 1981
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMTMlldW BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of:
)
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SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC &
)
GAS COMPANY and
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SOUTH CAROLINA PUBLIC
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Docket No.59-395 OL SERVICE AUTHORITY l
)
(Virgil C.
Summer Nuclear
)
Station)
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CERTIFICXTE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of "Intervenor's Finding of Facts and Conclusions on Emergency Preparedness" were served upon the following persons by deposit in the United States mail, 'jrst class postage, this 3rd day of November,1981.
Chairman, Atomic Safety and Herbert Grossman, Esq.
Licensing Board Panel Chairman, Atomic Safety and U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Licensing Board Commission U.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D. C.
20555 Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555 George Fischer, Esq.
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Vice President & Group Dr. Frank F.
Hooper Executive - Legal Affairs School of Natural Resources S. C. Electric & Gas Company University of Michigan Post Office Box 764 Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109
- Columbia, S.
C.
29202 Mr. Gustave A.
Linenberger Steven C.
Goldberg, Esq.
Member, Atomic Safety and Office of the Executive Licensing Board Panel U.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory Legal Director U.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555 Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555 Chairman, Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel Mr. Chase R. Stephens U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Docketing and Service Section Cornission Office of the Secretary Washington, D.
C.
20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mh Richard P. Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General J.B. Knotts, Jr., Esq. 4
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South Carolina Attorriey General's Debevoise & Libeman f GN 1200 17th Street, N. 77
" O !:rc g Washington, D.C. 20Cp3D
.,U' Office P.O. Box 11549 I
j G jog Columbia, S.C. 29211 Dr. John Ruoff 5D*
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Larry Mahan
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South Carolina Electric & Gas Company h
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29218 ds weg A m tLAursev s Intervennr_
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'/.r liur.h K hovG, Jr.
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Civil Defense i
1 a, 01 llanpton F,t reet
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Dear Gi r:
I an in receipt of the bicaster Operation Procedure Nat.ber U dated October 5, 19S1.
In studying the plan, I would ofrer t he foJ 1oving c.?mtc and reco c.endationc for your consideration 1
Pir,e :', Paragral h L, I would recor.rx.pd that ctate nerconnel t:e pri.urily esponmible for the evactrition of recidents radiun wit h the counties of fliohlard. Lexington, withir the D r:i o
F jrriels! and '.sberry usine their available reco4rcen to.incist i.; 4erecenry.
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i would reco cond that the South Cs roli n'i lii ghway I' epa: t ent pir e Barricadas at the check points upon
- otificatien of an emo gene" ovruation.
l would il n r. urgent that portons livine. within the ovacuation area be 'innued pures or parnits upon the opening of the V.
U. Summer unt rather trnin after :in cm rency han been declared.
In th. cvent or an em rgenc,v, I would nugr,est that the Federal Aviation 1, r,(.cy be contacted to prohibit crn li ttircraft fro"- enttrir.g into the disaster cene.
Fi n:t1;y, ! would rec e oni that the state provide perrannel, National iar.1 or otherr, to prevent 'anauthoriced pericnr fra entering into m ll'-P. i l e rndius.
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.1 rf 0 0 t i o n . 3 rr' *Me brod on the TRCt that there IC not su f fi c ient cr.onnei avaliab'e t> provido thene servi cec an:t -till Lerfort the u;.3
.u, e n . m: r ~c u '. la t t <-
throughout t he ceunt-
Eichlanh Gotmfg - Eifg of Golumbia (Einil I3cfense FHOND8031254-9296 vat t a=o casou eLeo.
5 October 1981 1*u'$E'."s"."E.
29201 RICHLAND COUNTY-CITY OF COLUMBIA DISASTER OPERATION PROCEDURE #4 (00P #4)
RADIATION RELEASE ACCIDENT V. C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION An accident occurs at the V. C. Summer Nuclear Station which can I.
Problem:
result in the release of radiation.
II.
Assumption:
That the Bureau of Radiological Health, State Emergency Preparedness A.
Division, and the South Carolina Electric and Gas Company will keep the Richland
. County-City of Columbia Emergency Operation Center apprised of accidents which ray involve release of radiation along with appropriate recommendations concern-
.ing protective action.
' ~"
That accident which can result in release of radiation can be due to the B.
venting of radioactive gases or an explosion resulting release of radioactive par-ti cles_.
That release of radioactive gases is most likely the type of accident C.
that -wil(take place.
That sensors placed in the area by the Bureau of Radiological Health D.
and SCE&G plus information from the station are the only means of monitoring
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amounts of radiation in escaping gases.
That monitoring of personnel and decontamination will not be necessary E.
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for accident involving venting of gases.
That an accident in which an explosion results in release of radioactive F.
particles will require monitoring of personnel in effected area and decontami-nation of personnel falling within the zone of reading on a CDV700 or other monitor as specified by the Bureau of Radiological Health.
Disaster Operation Procedure #4 - page 2 G.
That due to the undetermined result of an explosion, several sites should be selected as decontamination points.
H.
That a mobile decontamination unit is best suited for such a mission and request for unit will be made to U. S. Army, Fort Jackson under these conditions.
I.
That Bureau of Radiological Health, State Emergency Preparedness Division, and SCESG will furnish alert and warning for evacuation to County in sufficient time for evacuation of effected area, i.e., Emergency Preparedness Zone prior to personnel in the area becoming exposed to contamination.
J.
That upon receipt of appropriate recommendations from organizations listed above, County will authorize sounding of sirens in its zone to aler t personnel.
K.
That simultaneous with recommendations to sound sirens the organizations listed in "I" will cause the emergency broadcasting stations to warn the public as to dangers involved and aphropriate action to be taken by them.
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L.
That Cocnty will take back-up neasures to alert and warn people in zone by use of Sheriff's Patrols, volunteers, Sheriff's aircraft, and helicopters.
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That when radioactivity is released due to an explosion, County will M.
monitor for radiation under technical assistance of Bureau of Radiological Health.
-~.:.
This includes monitoring of personnel when required.
N.
That County will select decontamination sites and decontaminate personnel with technical advice of the Bureau of Radiological Health.
O.
That personnel requiring to re-enter zone will be issued passes and dosimeter
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s prior to re-entry. Upon exit a record of the reading on the dosimeter will be made and kept for protection of the individual.
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Disaster Operation Procedure #4 - page 3 That issue of Potassium Iodine (KI) as an antidote for Thyroid blocking P.
action will be by County Health Officer.
That re-entry to the area will be made upon notification that danger is Q.
This notification will be based on information from Bureau no longer presant.
of Radiological Health.
III.
Mission:
A.
To alert, warn, and evacuate personnel from zone upon notification by proper authori ty.
To register evacuated personnel and provide them with temporary housing B.
and feeding.
To provide transportation for personnel in zone requiring same.
C.
D.
To monitor and decontaminate when required.
IV. Task:
Emergency Communicat[on Operation Center upon receipt of information A.
from Bureau of Radiological Health, State Emergency Preparedness Division, and/
or SCE&G immediately notify Civil Defense Coordinator who will ascertain pro-cedures outlined in Richland County-City of Columbia Emergency Plan particularly Annex E-1 are put into effect.
B.
Richland County Sheriff's Department upon notification from Emergency Operation Center will:
i Establish a Forsard Operation Center at Ballentine Volunteer Fire 1.
I S ta ti on.
Dispatch Sheriff's Patrol vehicles, volunteers, and Sheriff's air-2.
t l
craft'over zone as back-up alert and warning.
Vehicles will be equipped with CDV700's.
t i
1
Disaster Operation Procedure 14 - page 4 3.
Est,ablish six check points as indicated in Richland County Emergency Plan, Annex E-1.
4.
Request Columbia Police Deoartment to establish three check points to assist evacuees at junction of I-26 and I-20, at junction 1-20 and 215, at 215 and turn off to Columbia Bible College.
5.
Provide security at Registration Point as requested by Richland County Department of Social Services.
C.
Columbia Police Department will provide assistance to Sheriff's Depart-ment as requested.
D.
Columbia Fire Department will:
1.
Provide monitoring service and decontamination assistance when requested by Emergency Operation Center.
2.
Dispatch Mobile Emergency Operation Center on direction of Emergency Operation Center.
E.
South Carolina Electric and Gas Company Transportation will dispatch two buses to Ballentine Volunteer Fire Department upon notification by Emergency l
--Operation Center.
F.
Richland County Emergency Medical Services dispatch ground and air trans-l port th'fone when requested.
G.
Richland County Department of Social Services establish a registration point at Student Union Building, Columbia Bible College.
Register evacuated personnel and assign them to designated motels.
Request securi ty f rom Sherif f's Department i f requi red.
1 H.
Richland County Health Department establish First Aid Station at Regis-tration Point and assist with monitoring and decontamination if required.
Admin-ister "KI" if required.
Richland Memorial Hospital handle radiation accident-Cases.
Disaster Operation Procedure 64 - page 5 1.
School District Superintendent will determine need to cancel and release schools on information provided by Lexington County Emergency Operation Center.
Richland County will assist a.s required.
J.
Citizens Information Office and Columbia Public Information Office establish liaison with State Public Information Office at Central Media Control.
Information to media will be released through these offices only.
K.
Clemson Extension Agent develop procedure to protect feed and care for farm animals in zone.
Evacuation if feasible.
V.
Logistics:
A.
Transportati on:
Personal vehicles, SCE&G buses, and/cr Sheriff's or volunteer vehicles.
B.
Routes of evacuation U. S. 176,1-26, I-20, and 215 to Columbia Bible College. Maps to assigned motels provided upon registration.
C.
Richland County-City of Columbia Emergency Plan as applicable.
VI.
Command and Control:
A.
Emergency Operation Center,1401 Hampton Street, Columbia, S. C. or Mobile Emergency Operation Center as sited.
B.. {ommunicationnormalradionetsandtelephoneplusColumbiaAmateur Radio Club.
FOR RICHLAND COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR AND CITY OF COLUMBI A MANAGER:
I, *
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^ Hugh k. Boyd, Jr.
Coordinator 4
I