ML20010E981

Forwards LER 81-128/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20010E981
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire
Issue date:	08/31/1981
From:	Parker W DUKE POWER CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20010E982	List: ML20010E981 ML20010E985
References
NUDOCS 8109090224
Download: ML20010E981 (3)

Text

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DUKE POWEIf COMPANY .P- f /

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August 31, 1981 ' ' ' ' ' '

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director 10 g

U . 'e . Nuclear Regulatory Commission [ '" '

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.a.insma essmasse Re. McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1 anomm . ry Dj Docket No. 50-369 V

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

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Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report R0-369/81-128. This report concerns T.S. 4.3.1.1, "Each reactor trip system instrumentation channel and interlock shall be demonstrate <* operable by the performance of the channel check, channel calibration and channel functional test operations for the modes and at the frequencies shown in T2ble 4.3-1."

This incident was considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

Very truly youre, l

f )lJ'/.)7f $ l W l O &

William O. Parker, Jr.

PBN/php Attachment cc: Director Mr. Bill Lavallee Office of Management and Program Analysis tiuclear Safety Analysis Center U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 10412 Wachington, D. C. 20555 Palo Alto, California 94303 Ms. M. J. Graham Resident Inspector-NRC McGuire Nuclear Station 5, I

?0109070224 010831 PDR ADOCK C5000369

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McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT !aRIBER: 81-128 REPORT DAT3: August 31, 1981 OCCURRENCE DATE: August 14, 1981, and August 16, 1981 FACILITY : McGuire Unit 1, Cornelius, NC IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: The channel functional tests of the reactor trip instrumentation were not performed prior to start-up, as required by Technical Sprecification 4.3.1.1.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE: Mode 2, Startup DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: The Unit #1 reactor was started up (escalated from mode 3 to mode 2) on August 14, 1981 and again on August 16, 1981 without per-forming the Manual Reactor Trip, Intermediate Range, Neutron Flux, or the Source Range, Neutron Flux Channel functional tests as required by Technical Specification 4.3.1.1. During Zero Power Physics Testing on August 14, 1981, some leaks developed on the Pressurizer icvel instrument tubing. After the repairs were completed, the reactor was brought up to criticality. The pro-ceture used in the startup was the Controlling Procedure for Unit Startup.

Although this prceedure includes all of the necessary checklists to cover the required surveillance items, the operators on duty started the procedure in the section that was consistant with Reactor Coolant System operating conditions at that time. In bypassing the first part of the procedure, they missed several surveillance items that were required by Technical Specifica-tions.

On August 16, 1981, the reactor was restarted following a trip that was part of the Zero Power Physics Test Program. This time the Reactor Trip Recovery procedure was used for the startup. The Reactor Trip Recovery Procedure did not include the channel functional tests of the reactor trir instrumentation as prerequisites, and thus the required channel functional testa were miseed on both startups.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: The channel functional tests of the reactor trip instrumentation are required to be performed before every startup unless they have been done within the previous seven days. The Intermediate Range, Neutron Flux Channel Check was the only test that met the surveillance re-quirement for either of the startups. Operators using the controlling Pro-cedure for Unit Startup were required to verify as complete all prerequisites before entering the procedure at an advanced point. The operators involved in the startup on August 14, 1981 failed to do an adequate verification of the prerequisite sections of the procedure. The Reactor Trip Recovery pro-cedure used for the startup on August 16, 1981 was deficient in its prerequisitea.

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Report Number 81-178 Page 2 SA_FETY ANALYSIS: All of the rear.to* trip instrumentation functional channer checks were performed satisfactorily on August 17, 1981. Since the instru-mentation was in good working order at that time and hence throughout the time since the previous tests, the safe. operation of the plant and the health and safety of the public were not affected.

C,0RRECTIVE ACTION: Operations will begin every startup that uses the Con-trolling Procedure for Unit Startup at the beginning of the procedure. Every checklist and prerequisite will be verified individually. The Reactor Trip Recovery Procedure has been modified to incluae the missing surveillance items.