05000369/LER-1981-002, Forwards LER 81-002/01T-0

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Forwards LER 81-002/01T-0
ML19351F915
Person / Time
Site: McGuire Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 02/13/1981
From: Parker W
DUKE POWER CO.
To: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML19351F916 List:
References
NUDOCS 8102200479
Download: ML19351F915 (3)


LER-1981-002, Forwards LER 81-002/01T-0
Event date:
Report date:
3691981002R00 - NRC Website

text

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33 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia Re: McGuire Nuclear Station Cocket No. 50-369

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RC-369/81-02.

This report is submi::ed pursuant to McGuire Nuclear Station Technical Specification 4.9.4.1 which concerns containment penetrations providing direct access from the con-tai =ent atmosphere to the outside atmosphere and the asscciated isolation valres.

Tais incident was considered to be of no significance with respect to its ef fect en the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours, h cM L'

c2 2 71./

William 0. Parker, Jr.

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RWO:ses Attachment cc:

Director Mr. Bill Lavallee Office of Management & Program Analysis Nuclear Safety Analysis Center U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 10412 Washington, D. C.

20535 Palo Alto, California 94303 00) s

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DUKE POWER COMPANY MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION Report Number: RC-369/81-02 Report Date: February 5, 1981 Occurrence Date: January 30, 1981 Facility: McGuire Unit 1, Cornelius, North Carolina Identification of Occurrence: Vent 7alve VX-41 and Containment Isolation Valve Vv-40 Open Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Initial Fuel Loading Mode 6 Description of Cccurrence:

At 0200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br /> on January 30, 1981, vent valve VX-41 and containment isolation valve VX-40 were discovered open to atmosphere.

This was in violation of Techni a1 Specif restions 4.9.4.1 since it must be assumed that containment integrity was not established when fuel loading began on January 28, 1981. Vent valve VX-41 was closed and containment isolation valve VX-40 was locked closed by an Cperator.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The initial fuel loading test precedure did not contain a valve checklist and no pericdic test existed to insure containment isolation valves necessary for Mode 6 be verified closed.

Analysis of Occurrence:

The initial fuel loading test procedure required that containment integrity be established prior to fuel loading. These steps were signed off as complete by Operations and Reactor personnel since Operations personnel determined that the periodic tests (PT's) for systems required for fuel loading had been completed.

The VX (Containnent Air Return Exchange and Hydrogen Skimmer) system was not required for fuel loading; however, its containment isolation valve (VX-40) was required by Technical Specifications to be closed. There was no PT whian verified that containment isolation valves required for Mode 5 be closed. When this oversight was discovered by Operations personnel a periodic test (PT) procedure was written to verify that containment integrity was established.

While performing this PT, a nuclear equipment cperator discovered that VX-40 anc VX-41 were open. The Operator closed VX-41 and locked closed VX-40.

Only two fuel assemblies had been loaded into the core prior to the discovery of the open valves. Since no safety problems were encountered while loading the two fuel assemblies at 2345 hours0.0271 days <br />0.651 hours <br />0.00388 weeks <br />8.922725e-4 months <br /> on January 28, 1931, and the fact that there was nc irradiated fuel involved, the health and safety Of the public were not affected.

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Corrective Action

A periodic test procedure was written to verify containment integrity. This periodic test was performed at 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> intervals by Operations personnel and verified complete at each shif t change by the Reac tor Engineer in charge of fuel loading for that shift.

PT's to verify containment integrity for Modes 1 through 5 had already been prepared prior to the incident.

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