ML20010E250

LER 80-091/01X-11:on 801223,analysis Per IE Bulletin 80-11 Determined That 17 Walls Would Be Overstressed During Seismic Event & 11 by Compartment Pressurization.Caused by Change in Analytical Methodology.Mods Made

ML20010E250
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	08/25/1981
From:	Mekbel C TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML20010E246	List: ML20010E245 ML20010E250
References
IEB-80-11, LER-80-091-01X, LER-80-91-1X, NUDOCS 8109030238
Download: ML20010E250 (11)

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I 3167, 3187, 2337, 4806, 4817, 4826, 4837, 4347, 4857, 4657, 4016, 3407, 5207, and a j 11gg g por tion of 311D would be overst rewed. Unlis 3167, 3177, 3187, 4107, 4117, 4127, l 1

3447, 3457, 3467, 3237, and 3287 uould be overntrenced by comparttacut. prennuri..atfon. l g

l g:q The conditions are reportable per Technical Specificalion 6.9.1.8.1. _j

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. t TOLEPO r.DISDN C0!!PANY DA\'IS-BLSSE NUCLEAR PCAF.E STATION UNIT ONE SlTPl.EETAL INrch:LiTIM, FOR LER NP-32-80-17 l l

f I DATE Or EVENT: Deceeber 23, 1960, February 17, March 10, March 27, ,

April 21, May 7. : lay 13, June 11, June 12, Jtum 29, l July 29, August 5, and August 11, 1981 5 11

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FA':! L l'; + Divis-Besse Unit 1  ;

IDEWIriu,T!GN OF OCCrt:R:?;CE. Iloor beon at the top of concrete block  ;

wali 5107, ti.e '11ooi1 Man at the top of concrete blech wall 23d7, the

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connection between concrete block wall 2047 and the floor, t.h e connec- r t icn between wa11 2337 and the floor, and floor beans at the top of l walls 3167 and 1187 t ould b" overstressed during a desir.n basis seismic event.. Walls 31t7, 3177 and 3167, and walls 4107, 4117 and ',127 would (

be overst ressed duriN, a compartr cut pressuriration. Unlis 3447, 3457 L and 346l' could faii durin;; a seismic event. or experience masonry over-l stress following pim,sure l o nd i n;; , r es u l t i n,, from compartment pressuri-  ;

r.a t i on . Walls 4 h06, 4 817, 4c26, 4837, 4847 and 4857 could fail and wall  !

4647 could experience localized wall overstress during a seismic event.  ;

The stresse in the moury and in the top and bottom connections in wall 4016 r.ould exceed de.ign allowable stresses during a seismic event.

Conucciions of walls 3237 and 3?67 could become overst ressed whmt subjecte.'  ;

to pre: aure loading resulting frem a main feedwater line break  ;

The fleor brum conn"ct ed to the top of wall 3407 would be ove rr.t r e s s ed ,

durin:, a seismic event. l l

j The floor beam connecterl to the top of wall 5207 and the masonary and t I 11 expans. inn anchors on a portica of the east edge of wall 311D could [

become overstressed during a seismic evcnt.  !

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COND1'rIfpS__PP TOR _TO JpCURRE'jrE : The unit. was in Mode I with Power j

(MWT) = 1525 and Load (Gross MWE) = 269. .

I DESCRIPfl0N OF OCCGENCE Wh;1r performing t he nr.alys is of coecret e l block walls required by NRC IL Bulletin 80-11, it wa.s det. ermined t hat. j during a sciamic eve o thn block wall betueen the cont.rol room and stair AB-1 wrld cause tho floor be m above to be overstressed. This floor beam in attached to the wall and supports a portion of the floar above the conttol room. j l

l It was det ermined that this condit. icn was less conservative than assumed  ;

in the Final Safety Ana'yais Eerort (FSAR) and is being reported under [

Techoical Specification o . 9 .1. 6 . .i . The NRC On-Site inspector was not if J ed  ;

at 093 bours on Decruber 23, 1980.  !

c l Addit icnal ,malysis per NRC IL 1:ulletin 80-11 determined t hat during a i sei:,mi c event the bicch wall Imtwece to:rponent cooling uat.cr heat exchanger f l and purrp toen (/!326) and elevator nu.: r 2 woulti cause the floor beam i

( above to be overstressed. This floor bean is att. ached to the wall and ,

support s a portion 'r the floor above the corponent cooling water exchanger i dnd fuCf rCQd ,

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l t war, also determined that this condition was los. conservative than

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assuwd in the ITAR and is being reported under Technical Specification l 6.9.1.8.i. The NRC On-Site Inspector was not ified at 0935 hours0.0108 days <br />0.26 hours <br />0.00155 weeks <br />3.557675e-4 months <br /> on i

l Febr ua r*, 18, 1931. b

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l, Additienal analysi: per NRC IE Bullet in 80-11 det er mined that during a sei oic event, tha loads on block wall 2047 (betwee n t he two naheup [

{ purps) from the atteched piping systems would cause the stresses in the  !

connection between th, wall and the ficor to he greater than code allow-

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l It was determined that this condit ion was ler, conservative than assnmed in the i MR and is be ing report ed unde r Techn ica1 Speci fic.it ion 6.9.1.6.1. l

{ The Nhc On-S it e Inspector was not ified at 1221 hours0.0141 days <br />0.339 hours <br />0.00202 weeks <br />4.645905e-4 months <br /> on March 11, 1961. i t

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1 Analysis of addit.ionni walls per NRC IE Bulletin 80-11 determined that l during a seisnic event, walls 3167 and 318/ would cause the floor beams  !

I attached to the t cps of these walls to become overstressed. It was also

) determined thc.t the concrete mar.onry in block walls 3167, 3177 and 3187 ,

) would be overr tressed when subject < d to comparttrent preosurizatica f l

originatina frem a pipe break. These walls form a cable chase in Mechan- ,

ical Penetration Room v4 (Rocm 314) on the 585 foot elevation.

This condition was lors conservati.ve than assumed in the PSAR and is l

l being reported under Technical Specification 6.9.8.1.i. The NRC On-Site Inspector was notified at 1325 hours0.0153 days <br />0.368 hours <br />0.00219 weeks <br />5.041625e-4 months <br /> on March 30, 1981.

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Additional analysis per NRC IE bulletin 80-11 determined that during a '

l design basis seirmic event, the connect ion between wall 2337 and the ,

l floor could become overstressed. This wall is located in Mechanical Penetration P.com #2 on the 565 foot elevation. .

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l It was determined that this condition was less conservative than assuned  !

in the PSAR and is being reported under Technical Specification 6.9.1.8.1. l

! The NRC On-Sit e Inspector .zas notified at 1204 hours0.0139 days <br />0.334 hours <br />0.00199 weeks <br />4.58122e-4 months <br /> on April 22, 1981.

Additional analysis per NRC 1E hulletin 80-11 determined that after a nain feedwat er pipe break, the increase in pressure created could develop  ;

an overntaessed masonry conditica in block walis 4107, 4117 and 4127.

These walls located on elevation 603'-0" form a pipe chase in corridor l 404.

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11. was determined th n this ccndit ion was less conservative than assumed in the PSAM and is being reported under Technical Specificatian 6.9.1.8.3.

The NRC On-S it e inspect or was not if ied at 1530 hours0.0177 days <br />0.425 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.82165e-4 months <br /> on May 7, 1981. i L

i Additional analysis per NRC Eullet in 80-11 deter. tined t hat during a seismic event, loadin;. are impond on walb. 3447, 3457 and 3467 which could cause localized wall failui e It was clso determined that these valls, which separate corridor 304 from corridor 310 cud room 313 on floor elev.aion 585'-G" could also become overstressed when subjected to compart munt pressurir,ation originating from a main feedwater line break.

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{, It was determined that this condition was less conservative than assumed 4

in t he FFAR ..nd is being reparted under Technical Specification 6.9.1.6.i.

j The ShC he ; ion 1I1 of fice was not ified at 1040 hours0.012 days <br />0.289 hours <br />0.00172 weeks <br />3.9572e-4 months <br /> on "ay 14, 1981. [

l

Additional analysis received June 11, 1951 per NRC Bulletin 80-11 deter-

] mined :t during a scismic event, loadings are imposed on walls 4806, j 4817, % 26, 4h37, 4847 and 4S57 which cculd cause the walls to fail j (fa)) over). These walls scave as fireproofing for building columns

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located in Electrical Potmtrat ion Rocm No. 2 (roc'. 427, elevation 003').

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j It was d"termined that this ccadition was less conservative than assumed j in the FSn an ! is boing ri ported undet Technical Fpncificatien 6.9.1.8.1.

j The Nhc On-Site inspector was notified at 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br /> on June 12, 1981.

1 i Additional analvsis received June 12, 1981 per NRC 1E Bulletin 80-11 I determitmd that during a seismic event, loadings are inposr d on wall

} 4647 which could creat.e a localined masonry overstressed condition.

l This nail is a firewall and part. of the negat ive pressure boundary i septrating the cable sprec. ling reon at elevation 613'-6" from corridor i 404 at elevation 603'-0" i

It was deter. mined that this ccaditica was Icss con v rvative than assumed

in the D 4!: and is bein;; report.ed under Technical Specif icat ion 6.9.1.6. i .

l The ':8C Un-Sito Inspector was notified at 1530 hours0.0177 days <br />0.425 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.82165e-4 months <br /> on June 15, 1981.

i Additienal annlysis per NRC Pulletin S0-11 determined that during a seismic event, the casonry and wall connections in wall 4016 could I b" core overst rr sed. This wall separates the low voltage switchgear romr (No. 428) itcc Battery Room B (No. 428A) on Elevation 603 in the

, Au>:i!iary luild.ng. It was determinod that this condition was less f conservative tha'i assumed in the FSA!! and is being reported under Technical Spec i fic at ica 6.9.1.8. i . The NRC Da-Site Inspector was notified at 1500 hours0.0174 days <br />0.417 hours <br />0.00248 weeks <br />5.7075e-4 months <br /> on June 30, 1981.

) Additional .nalysis per NRC 1.E.Bulletin 80-11 determined that after a .

1 crack in the main feedwater line located in Room 313, the increase in i j pr" oure crcated could develop cverstressed conditions in the expansion

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hors in the connect ions at the south end of wall 3287 and the nort.h l ewl of wall 237. Additionally, the floor beam at elevat. ion 603 '-0" to wFich t.he top of wall 3237 is connect ed could be overstressed in torsion l when the wall is subjected to such a loading. k'all 3237 separates elevator No. 3 from Passage 310 and wall 3287 separates stairway AB-2 I f ro:: Pa s s te,e llo , on elevat ion 585 '- 0".

i 1t was det ermined that this condition was less conservative than assumed j in tFe U.S.A.1; and is being reported under Technical Specification

! 6.9.1.8.i. The NRC On-Sit.c Inspector was notified at 1330 hours0.0154 days <br />0.369 hours <br />0.0022 weeks <br />5.06065e-4 months <br /> on l July 30, 1981.

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l Re-analysis of masonry block walk, required by NRC IE Bulletin 80-11 ,

l det erc.ined that during a seis:ric event., wall 3407 could cause the flocr l bear attached to the top of this wall to become overstressed. This wall l l

located on floor clovat inn 585' separat es the component cooling water l heat exchanger and pump roca (#328) f rom stair way AB-1. i l

LG #80-09l 3 i

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l l It. was also deteimined that t hi.' condit ion was less conservative thnn  !

1 assumed in the FSAR and is being reported under Technical Speci fication r

! 6.9.1.8.1. The ShC on-site inspector was notified at 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br /> on -

i' August 6, 1981.

i I ke-analp is of masonry block walls required by NRC lE Bulletin 80-11 .

determined that during a seismic event, wall 5207, separating the computer l room (uS10) from control cabinet room ((;502), elevation 623, could cause f the ileor beam att ached to the top of this wall to becomo overstressed. '

It was also detorcined that wall 311D, en elevation 585 in the Diesel 1

I I, Generater Rec, (e318), could experience a localized everstressing of '

masonry and c.v.pansion anchors under a seismic loading.

t It wem found that these conditions were less conservative than assumed  !

in th<. FSAR and is being reported under Technica! Specification 6.9.1.8 4 l The SRC on-site inspector was notified at 1447 hours0.0167 days <br />0.402 hours <br />0.00239 weeks <br />5.505835e-4 months <br /> on August 12, 1981.

• DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: This finding is due to a  ;

j change in the analytical authodology used by the architect /engincur (

since the walls were design-d in the early 1970's. Using the nethods  !

applicable at that time, the floor beam would be acceptable as built. j lloue ve r , the change in the method treats wall section properties and r i seismic f]cor response inputs differently and is a dynamic instead of i static analysis. Under the new methods, the floor beam design and the

) wall to floor connection is deficient.

1

! For the seventh finding, the cause of the occurrence resulte.d from

architect /eng aer design error. Wall to lintel (support beam over door l j 309) connection associated with walls 3447, 3457 and 3467 was originally  ;

deficient in design when subjected to seismic loading Compartment preasurm generated by postulated pipe breaks were not originally considered when the architect / engineer designed the walls.

Re-analysis of these walls with the additional loading has resulted in 1 the overstressed masonry condition.

1 I For t.he eighth and ninth findings, the cause was en architect / engineer desic.n error which resulted in the construction of valis 4606, 4626 and -

j 4647 across a coismic joint leading t o wall strength deficiencies when  ;

i subjected to scismic loadings. Additionally, when valls 4C06 and 4826 ,

were originally de igned, the loads from wall attachments were not considered. Subsequent analysis usint; dynamic instead of static methods and including wall at tachoent. loadings resulted in an overstressed wall j cond it. ion during a seismic eeent .

The finding on wall 40;6 ir the result of a change in the analytical

. methodology used by the architect / engineer sinen the wall was crit ;inally i designed. Additionally the loads from wall attachments were not origi-

) nolly considered. Subsequent analysis using dynamic instead of r.t atic l

methods and wall attachnent loadings result ed in an overstressed wall condit.icn during a . seismic event.

for walls 3237 nnd 3287 compartment pressures generated by a main feed-i water line break were not originally considered when Architect / Engineer

! designed the walls.

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.I I 'I b e finding for wall 3407 is due to a change in the inialyt ica l met hml-olon. n m! hy the ar chitect/ engineer since the walin were desigami in I the early 1970's Using the methods applicabic at that t. i m e , the floor [

beam wrm ld be aco ptable as built Ho.sver, the change in the rcthod [

! t. r e a t s w111 .ection proporties ..ad seislic floor respenne input a di f fer-  !

ently am. i :, a dyn-r.ic i: ,t ea 1 of stat ic analynin I!a le t the no.e nethoda,

the f leur ben des i;m it deficient.

4, The f i nd i n;; for 5207 and 311b is due t o a chance in the analytical '

v t hwh l t m, used by the a rch i t ect /en;;ineer since the walls were de:. i gned in the e:rly 1% D's tJsinn the tr e* hods applicchle at that time, the fIvat h< m nd wa 1I connect ions vnuld be a c cept .2h I e as hni1t. However, II in th- un LI:od t r cats wa1I section prcpertles and seinnic i the c h a n ".e

! floor re: p ase input. di f f eree ly ar.d is a dyncmic inst ead of a stat.ic f a n a l ', i i :- Undm the new methn.., the floor beam above wall 5207 and the

! neon:-', rai wal I connect ions .ociated with wall 31]D are deficient.

1 i W.bvSIs tu F L_CC " rf.7" There was no dan;;er to the health and afety of i th- public or ,t et it s personnel . The floor ter'., anI wall to flocr

] connection in question are only overntrm sed during a naximum prob.ible l eart. g ke Durinn all other postulated unit ope rs t i ng condi t ior.r, , the st re: w :, are 'athin a l l owab l e:

A pr"linir nry revi"w of the port ion of the floor above the control room The resulte. are not conclusive suppm ted 1,y th i be.a has been mcdc.

i but imii ste there is a potential that a portion of the floor above may

. undm aa smo t.rnctur.,1 distr" r A more detailed analysis could take th r"

• c :n: hs to perform. The rudi f ic at ion to correct this condition con 3n,ts of two call st rut 4 which could be installed in about two j weeps. Therefore, in the ;aterest of taking the ro s t. enpuditions approach, Toledo Edison has decided to r7ke the moditication at thir, t irsc without.

proceeding with fu;ther analytical effort.

Similarly, a preliminary review of the portion of the floor above the ca ;.c.mn t c coling water heat exchanger and pump room sug ported by the i bean has been cade The results are not conclusive but indicate there '

i r. . I:ot ent i a l t h a t. a pcrtion of the floor above rc.ny undergo c one struc-tural distress A more det ailul analyr.is would take three ronths to perfoiu. The rad i f icat ion t o correct this conditica consist of the i

installat ion of three plat e stif feners b" tween the web of the floor beam I

and the floor above This L.a li fication can be nade in a short.er time l tlu n it would icke to complote the detailed analysis of the floar.

l' Tlie re f o re , in the interest of t.aking the most expeditious approach, Toledo Edi<on ha decided to nake the nodification at this time without pi oc. ceding w ith t he deta il ed f l oor nnalysis.

pipe ,opportr 31 -H CC -5!!5, 31-!iCC- Siin , 31-11CC-5117 and 31-HCC-5H9 are .

I at Lached to all 2047 lh, ing a maxirata probable earthquake these pipe nupports ir par u loads t o ts all 2047 which cause thu stresses in portion of the connection between wall 2047 and the floor to be greater thaa

! nilowd by t he Uniforn Building Code (lTC) and Aucrican Concrete Institute (ACl) Code, 'the wall was analyned as five call strips. The st resses in l

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' the connection between the wall and the floor in only two of the wall st. rips were greater thaa allowable. Ifowever, even in these t.wo s t. rips ,

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the factors of safet.y are greater than one, demonstrating that these

strips are st ill stah'c.

j There is also an ii.nerent conservatism in our analysis since the it:ter-

' 2ction between wall st rips is not considered.

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The piping systems attached to the wall have been reanalyzed assuming  !

that there will be deflection in wall PO47. The resulting piping and support stress are all wit.hin the interim allowable stresses developed 4

j for IE Bullet.in 79-14.

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Overstress of the masonry comprising block walls 3167, 3177 and 3187 is due to the post ulat ed corrp,rtment pressure resulting f rom a break in the main feedwater line in room 314. During all ot her operating conditions ,

l the stresses are within allowables. lloweve r , such a break in this room j

has a low probability of occurring The portion of the pipe acets most of the criteria established by SRC Eranch Technical Posit. ion ' fell 3-1 to qualify as a "no break zone", the exception being that the pipias was designed to ANSI B31.1 instead of ASME Section III, Class 2. However, the Toledo Edison procurement and inst.allation specifications required j

the same material and installation documentation as is required under  ;

/sSME Section III, Class 2.

I The effects of the wall deflection caused by the seismic loads on nuclear safety relz ad conduit attached to these walls have been invest igated Addit ional analyn 's to and failure of the coaduit will not occur.

determine if yieldint; of th. floor beans would cause structural distress in a portion of the floor above would take approximately six a.onths to i

! perform, while a modification to ermure the condition is conservat ive can be made in a shorter time.

4 In the case of wall 2337, the strerses creat ed in the wall to the floor connection are greater t'. m criteria allowables per the Uniform Building l llowever, the

! Code (UDC) and the American Concrete Institute (ACT) Code i

f act or of saf ety on the connection was still great.cr than 1, thus de:m-l strating wall stabilit.y during a sei: nic event .

The stresses in the pipirig and cenduit systems attached to this wall j

have been reviewed assuming the wall would deflect during a seismic event, and f rund to be within allewable limits When a break in the main feedwater 1ine in corridor 404, including the port ion wi t.hin the pipe chase is postuinted, the masonry in walls 4107, 4117 and 4127, and all wall connectionu, could become overstressed due ,

to the pre: sure loading. Dur ing all other post ulated unit operat. int; conditions. the strerses are withla allowabic limits.

The above p,ct nlated event (a nain feedwater r im i reak in corridor 404) has a low probability of occurrence 'lhe af' t. d ortion of the main feedwater line has been reviewed against n - c. sign criteria. Our j

review indicates t.h a t. this pi l-ing meet - < .e t. irementn of Branch Technical Position "EB 3-1 (sect ion U . ' , n.td System Piping in i

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t con t a i r. men t penetration areas where break need not be postulated, wit h the following exceptions: 1) the piping system was designed to ANSI i B31.1 instead of AS":' Section 111, Class 2. However, the Toledo Edison I procurment and inst a l lat ion speci f icat. inns required the same material I and installation docum:ntation as in required under AS.'S Section III, Class 2; and, '.) this port ion nf the piping does not comply wit.h Set iou Bl .1 b (/. ) wh i ch r erpi: , ea that the length of the section of pipe for which bre ' . are not postulated be kept to a minimum.

1 During a ;eisnic event, walls 3447, 3457 and 3467 could experience l localized w.il failure Sections of these walls, if allowed to fail, l could pom ibly inpact the safety related conduits penctrating the walls, although f urther analysis would be required to analyze how the conduits l would be affected. A part. ial modi f icat ion t o correct t.h i s condition has be' designed and tan be implemented more expedit.ously than the time

' i l required for further analysis Additionally, t.b e Nsonry comprising block walls 3447, 3457 and 3467 ,

could b"come overst.reaurd following t.he post ulated compartment prcosure

! resulting from a break in the min feedwater lino in cither 100.u 313 or j corridor '104. During all other operating conditions, the stre-ses are w ithin a llos: ables . Howeve , such a breth in this room has a les proba-bilit.y of occurring The port. ion of th" pipe unet.s most of the criteria 1 est:2blishod by Nhc Eranch Technical Position !!EB 3-1 to qualify as a "no

, break zone" with the except ics bein;;,: 1) the piping was designed to ANSI E31.1 instead of ASME Section III, Class 2. lioweve r , the Toledo Edison precurcrent and installation specifications required the same i material and isntallation document ation as is required under AE'C Section llI, Class 2; 3) the piping ir room 313 or corridor 30a does not comply ,

i with Section Bl.1B(4) which requires that the length of the section of pipo for which breaks are not postulated be kept to a minimun.

i Following a naximum probable carthquake walls 4806, 4817, 4826, 4837, 4847 ana 4657 could experience los- of structural strength due to wall attachment leadings and pot ential di f f erential movenent between seirmic zones #6 ond /7. Failure to construct. a .,cismic joint in walls 4806, 4826, 4837 and 4857 hetween these nonca contributes to their failure and that of w;lis 4817 and 4847.

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A potential consequence of wall f ailure could be damage to the s a f e t.y related condait: attached to these walls and possible dan:c.c to safety i related itena in the roer adjacent to these walls. The degree of damage l to these conduits has not conclusively been determined. However, if the circuits contained within the dataged conduits are affected such that they cannot perform the i r des i gned function , safe shutdown of the plant 1

could sti11 be provided by a1ternute systems not affected.

l'n ! 1 u re to provide a seisnic joint at the south end of masonry wall 4647

could create e localized overstressed masonry condition in th is s;all .

The masonry is oterstrewed in ecmpression due t.o in plane seismic loads

< generat ed by t he absence of this joint- Localized crushing of the na,onry in the vi<inity where the joint should have been construct.ed, could occur as a result. This localized masonry crushing should not i

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t result in the loss of function of the safety related circuits con t.a ined

{ within the conduits penetrating this wall for the following reasons:

i 1) the loadings on the steel conduits are reduced due to energy dinsipa-tion when localined masonry cr ushing occurs; 2) radial compressive

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j etrength of the steel conduits is great er t han the compressive strength I of the masonry; and, 3) su; port for safety related conduits which pene-j trate the .esli will not. be a f fect ed .

! When wall '.016 is subjected to a seismic loading, the masonry stresses in the wall and the stresses in the tcp and bottom wall connectionn er.ceed det17 allcwabl~ Addit ionally deflection during a seismic event of the wall would cause attached conduits, some of which contain nuclear saiety related circuitn, to exceed the acceptance criteria for l

the acnduit deflection. Failure of the entire wall or circuitn contained

!' within the affected conduits has not been confirmed even though the

! allowable stress has been exceeded. The present analysis uses average ,

I material strengths and does not tcke any credit for load reductions t attributable to localined failure (crushing) of masonry. If, however, l in the unlikely event t h a t. the nuclear safety related cli cuit s contained  !

I j within the ..ffetted conduita cannot perform their intemled safety function,  ;

i ,a f e plant. shutdown could still be provided by alternate syntems not t l affected.  !

c, During a postulated break in the main feedwater line in Room 313 the e xpan r. i on anchors in the connections in walls 3237 and 3.%7 and t he floor beam at t ached to t he top of wall 3237 could become overntressed. j i

A potent ial consc<pmnce could be structural distress in a part ion of the floor above Ll e ben at elevation 603'-0" Further analysir would be [

t l rmluired to determinn i f thin part ion of the floor would bewme over-

r. tressed if yielding of ti , beam did occur. A mdificat ion to corre i this conditien can be designed and ir:plement ed e are expedit ionsly than th~ 2 to 3 renths required for a detailed analysis of the floor synteu.

Also, failure of the wall conunctions is not likely even though the factors of in f et.y for t he expa:..,ica enchorn in the ccm.nctions are l e s .,

than the acceptance cr it e r ia . However, this factor of safety is ;reater thra 2, spurified as ac ceptab hs for short t<rm operabi1i_y by I.E Bullet.in 79-02.

Additionally, a pipe break of this nature in Room 313 han a low probability [

of occurring The pa t ion of t he p i j.. meets most of the criteria estab- [

lished by %'C Branc0 Technical Position MEB 3-1 to quality as a "no-break none" with the exce;>t ions be i: ,, 1) the piping was designed to ANSI B31.1 inst ead o f AN!E Sect ion 111, Clas, 2. However, the Toledo >

Edison procarenec+ and instal l at ion .,pecifications requi:ed the snme mat erial and installt.t;ou docuw u ution as is required undu AS.fC Section Ill, Ciaas 2; 2) the piping in Room "'3 does not co.tply with 7 Section B . I .h (4 ), which reaui re: that the length of the section of pipe e for which breds are not postulated be kept to a minimum.  ;

i When wall % 07 is subject ed to seismic l oad i r.gs f rom a maxirr.um probable ,

earthquahn, the floor bm , attached to the top of the wall could beccne j ove r:,t. rer se? A prelininary r eview of t.he por t icin o f the floor above a

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4 l the cemp wn t cooling water heat exchanger and pump room indicates that i there is a pas,ibility taat a portion of the floor above may undergo

! none st ruct ural dist res s. A more detailed analysis to verify this pos,ibility would require two to three months to perform. The modifi-i cat ion tt> correct. this condit ion consists of struct urally bracing the beam which could be accomplished in a shorter time than it would take t.o coc..pl e t e a det ailed a:alysis of the floor system. Therefore, in the interont of t aking the ca ; t expeditions ap;> roach, Tolede Edison han decided to mal e t he modification at this time w i t hou t. proceeding with the deta i l ed f icor anal;,4 in i I When wall 3207 is bjected to seismic loodings from a maxiuum probable I

earthquske, the beam attached to the top of t he wall could become overu re sed. A liminary review of the portion of the floor above indiutos that t; is a possibility that a portion of the floor may undergo some st rur.t u ral d istress. A more detailed analysis to verify i this possibility would require three months to perforn whereas a modifi-cation to correct this condition could be accomplished in a shorter

' time Therefore, in the interest of taking the most expeditious approach, 13 Toledo Ldison has decided to make the modification at this time without f urt her analytical effort.

I Also, during a seismic event, wall 311D could experience localized failure The area affected would be limited to a four foot long strip

! along the eastern wall edge. At one location the masonry is overstressed j in shear and the expansion anchors have f actors of safety less than one.

i because the indicated failure is local, gross wall failure is not expected to occur. Additionally, because of inherent strengths in the wall not considered, conservative assumptions in the analysis, and that the wall is reinforced, damage to safety related items in the immediate vicinity of the wal1 resulting from spalled masonry is considered rerrote.

CORRECTIVE /.CTION'. Under Facility Change Request 80-277, two struts were added to the floor beam above the wall between the control room and stairway AB-1. This work was completed March 6, 1981.

For the second finding, three plate stiffencrs will be installed between the beam an.1 floor above, under Facilit.y Change Request L1-015.

For the third finding, the condition will be corrected by removing the pipe supports from wall 20',7 and attaching them to the nakeup pump rocra ceiling. This relocat ion work will be done under Facility Change Request El-016 when s.tation operating conditions pe rm i t. .

Por t he fourt h finding, the condit inn will be corrected by the addition l

of a ta. o - l a y e r e d internal bracing systen to the cabic chase formed by walls 3167, 3177 and 31FJ. The top layer of bracing will lower the floor bem stre: ses to allowable limits by reducing the vall deflec-t Lions The lower level internal bracing will reduce the masonry wall i sicasses (those caused by compart ment pressuri2ntion) to within allow-ables. These modificat ions will be madu under Facilit.y Change Request 81-018 when station operating condit.ons peruit..

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For the 1 i . th f ind i tu;, the cc:ulit ion vi11 1m corrected by reinforcing the to: n ,* inn of tbc base of wall 2337 b, adding steel angles connect ed j to the 'a11 and f1<or vith thru-bolts aml e xpan:, ion anchors This modi-f i c:n i ca ;i11 be ' de undor FCR 81-017 when station operating conditions f.

pe r: it {

For the .i:th findin m, the condition ,cill be corr.:ted by the removal of l walls 4 i 17 ..no 4 1 '. 7 , and rep 1m emen. of wtil 'i l17 wit h a steel jet i imp in t;" en: shie!" Wall 4107 will be telufo ned w t h a ., t. e e l pn s t ,

ant ho .d to the fleer Thi, uudi'icat ion s ilI he m.nle ender Facilit.y j Chan.," ae. .t 61-020 whon stat ion ope rat ing condit io: - p c ra i t. . I t

Foi the sr vent b ' i n ' M c , ":ic i 1 i t y Ch.4 s Request d1-019 has been issued L. pl t o,i..<.a. T',i i s 1CR wi11 reduce t. h e siress in the for ic .

wal! c "! b' a Jc evint .nd corpm tuent pressur;/ aion to eithin a l b :, A ' r l ha 2 The initial portion of thit FCR xor' will redare the stre,,o .  :.ed by a ic i:. n i c cven t. . A supplement will be issued to also reet the stre<- >, caused b, compartment p essurinat ion and further refino th" aiwiir pm t. i on o f th" nadific.nion.

For the eic.hth !inding, the condit ion w ill be correct ed by l emov ing wa!): ', s, al7, ', 5 2 o , 4837, %!. 7 and ',8 5 7 , fireprc;fing the building co l n: enith e re sur rot n~ e.i ny the c a l l:- and relt ;a t iu;, t he e.:isting un]1  : to h , u t ; to satinfautory 1npports This modifitat inn wi ll be made under Fa c l l i t.3 Chan;p Keone:,t 81-621 wht n s t .: Lion operating condi-tions per iL.

The condition of we]1 4647 wilI he corrected by constrncting ae required seismic joint 2n th i: wall per Fr.cility Change heqntz 61 -u2.' when st m ion operat io;; condit ions permit.

The condit jon of wall 4016 will be corrected by reroving 16" wide block sect ions at <1 locations for the full height of ti e unll and replacing them w i t.h , teel box sections fastened to the floor holoc and floor beams above this w:ll. This . 2di f ication will be made under i .cilit.y Change Lequest U 1 -02 ,

The condition of wal!: 3237 and 3267 will be corrected by brc :ing t.hc ficor beam to renist the leadin;,from wall 3237 and reinforcing the sout h end connect ion of t' ill 3287 an1 the north end connection of wall ill be oude 31Ti 4 ith anc,lu and e:. pans ion anchors . This modif ication uudet facility Chang I:e q u e 7. t 31-024.

Bracing will ! r.N e d 't f o't r locations to 1.he beam above wall 3407.

Th: modification will be performed under Facilit3 Change 1:< o u e ., t. GI-0 2 ', .

' Tho c el:'ico of wall 5:207 will b" corrected by bracing th" floor beam nhove to : e:. it the 10 .11 n , fran wa11 5207.

Tnis wilI be done under Faci 1ity Change kcquest 61-027.

I The eastern < r b .e of wall 311D w:11 he strengthened by the addition of a pilast er to tie wall at this location This modification will be made under racilit, Chango Request.81-026.

lailure Thta:

There have been no previously sin.ilar report ed occurrences 10 1C ISA .

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