05000311/LER-1981-043, Forwards LER 81-043/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 81-043/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20009G133
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	07/10/1981
From:	Uderitz R Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20009G134	List: 05000311/LER-1981-043, Forwards LER 81-043/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
References
NUDOCS 8108030359
Download: ML20009G133 (3)

LER-1981-043, Forwards LER 81-043/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
3111981043R00 - NRC Website

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O PSIEG Public Sevice Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, N.J. 07101 Phone 201/430-7000 July 10, 1981 Mr. Boyce H.

Grier Director of USNRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 81-43/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 2 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 81-43/03L.

This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours, U

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~ IJ R.

A.

Ud General Manager -

Nuclear Production g qp CC:

Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (30 copies)

Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control

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(3 copies) 8108030359 910710 PDR ADOCK 05000311 S

PDR The Energy Peopk) 95 2001 (400M) 181

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Report Number:

81-43/03L Report Date:

July 10, 1981 Occurrence Date:

6-12 and 6-18-81 Facility:

Salem Generating Station, Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Overpressure Protection System Inoperable.

This report was initated by Incident Reports81-190 and 81-199.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

June 12 - Mode 4 - Rx Power 0% - Unit Load 0 MWe June 18 - Mode 5 - Rx Power 0% - Unit Load 0 MWe DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

During the cooldown of the unit for maintenance on June 12, 1981, the Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System (POPS) was not armed when Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature decreased to 312*F.

Previously the POPS valves (2PR47 and 2PR48) and pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORV'S) (2PR1 and 2PR2) were isolated by closing 2PR6 and 2PR7 due to excessive leakage to the pressurizer relief tank (PRT).

Action statement 3.4.10.3.b was entered at 0437 hours0.00506 days <br />0.121 hours <br />7.225529e-4 weeks <br />1.662785e-4 months <br /> due to both POPS channels being isolated and inoperable.

The RCS was depressurized and a vent flow path to the PRT from the RCS was established within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> in accordance with the requirements of action statement 3.4.10.3.b.

The POPS and PORV'S were inspected, restroked, and functionally checked during the mainte-nance outage.

Action statement 3.4.10.3.b was terminated at 1500 hours0.0174 days <br />0.417 hours <br />0.00248 weeks <br />5.7075e-4 months <br />, June 14, 1981, when POPS channels 1 and 2 were returned to screice.

After pressurizer steam bubble formation, in preparation for returning the unit to service, PORV 2PRl and/or POPS valve 2PR47 were again identified as leaking through to the PRT.

At 1830 hours0.0212 days <br />0.508 hours <br />0.00303 weeks <br />6.96315e-4 months <br />, June 18, 1981, 2PR6 was closed to isolate the leakage to the PRT and POI'S channel 1 was declared inoperable and action statement 3.4.10.3.a was entered.

At 1035 hours0.012 days <br />0.288 hours <br />0.00171 weeks <br />3.938175e-4 months <br />, June 21, 1961, RCS temperature was increased to greater than 312 F and action statement 3.4.10.3.a was terminated.

As the RCS heatup continued, a leakage problem to the PRT developed on PORV 2PR2 and 2PR7 was closed to isolate the leakage.

When the unit entered mode 3 action state-ment 3.4.5.a was entered at 1235 hours0.0143 days <br />0.343 hours <br />0.00204 weeks <br />4.699175e-4 months <br /> due to the isolation of both PORV'S (2PR1 and 2PR2).

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LER 81-43/03L 7/10/81 DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

PORV 2PR2 and POPS valve 2PR47 were previously identified to be l'Tking through and they were isolated by closing 2PR6 and 2PR7.

When RCs temperature decreased to 312*F both POPS channels 1 and 2 were declared inoperable since they were isolated.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Technical Specification 3.4.10.3.b requires that with both POPS inoperable, depressurize and vent the RCS through a 3.14 square inch vent within the next 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Valves 2PR47 and 2PR2 will be repaired and tested at the next refueling outage.

A supplemental report will be submitted when the valves are repaired.

Work Orders 948112 and 935175 were issued for valve repair.

FAILURE DATA:

Valve 2PR2 Copes - Vulcan Valve 2PR47 Marotta Prepared By J.

J.

Espey

+Wd Manager - Salem Generating Station SORC Meeting No.

81-60 i

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