ML20006F153

Proposed Tech Specs Revising Tables 3.3-10 & 4.3-10 Re post- Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements

ML20006F153
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	02/02/1990
From:	TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20006F148	List: ML20006F147 ML20006F151 ML20006F153
References
NUDOCS 9002270216
Download: ML20006F153 (12)

Text

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3 LINSTRUMENTATION POST-ACCIDENT INSTRUMENTATION 1

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.3.6 The post-accident monitoring. instrumentation channels shown in

Table 3.3-10 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.-

ACTION:

a. With the number of OPERABLE post-accident monitoring channels less than required by Table 3.3-10, either restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days, or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. .

b, The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.3.6 Each post-accident monitoring instrumentation channel shall be

. demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHECK and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations at the frequencies shown in' Table 4.3-10.

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. INSTRUMENT c- 1/Steas.1 Generator 25 1. SG Outlet Steam Pressure

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4. Pressurizer Level Y%

2/ Steam Generator OZ

5. SG Startup Range Level , R ClI =

1/AFW System- -== M w 6. Auxiliary Feedwater Status 2 2 2 "V"I T w 7. Containment Vessel Hydrogen QD A 2 7Q e

8. Containment Vessel Post-Accident Radiation - @ P"P'I 1/ Valve

9. Containment Vessel Isolation Status h ""C3

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12. RPS Status D p F"7"!

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H CEROC CALIBRATION INSTRUNENT N R l

1. SG Outlet Steam Pressure N R

2. RC Loop Outlet Temperature M R

3. RC Loop Pressure N R

4. Pressurizer Level Y N R

• 5. SG Startup Range Level N IIA

6. Auxiliary Feedwater Status

7. Containment vessel Rydrogen N R  ::= M M

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8. Containment Vessel Post-Accident Radiation

9. Containment Vessel Isolation Status N NA yg mm Nh N NA

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y 11. Safety Features Equipment Status N NA -

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[ Dqc.ket Number 50-346

- 1.icense Number WPF-3 i

Serial Number 1733 Attachment 1 Page 12 ,

REFUELING OPERATIONS INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

____ _ _ _ - - - . - _ ~

ont bm eu.h Sibe d % reador com, 3.9.2 As a minimum, two source range neutron flux monitorkshall be operating, each with continuous visual indication in the control room and one with audible indication in the containment and control room.

^- - ~ . - - - - ~ - _ '~'-

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6.

ACTION: ,

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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f'4.9.2 As c' minimum, +wo M source range neutron flux monitog\ hall be demonstrated 3

pRABLE by performance of:

a. A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 7 days, and

b. A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> prior to the initial start of CORE ALTERATIONS, and

c. A CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> during CORE ALTERATIONS.

~ ~ . . - . . _ _ . . _

d. A CAmRt4GL CALIBRRTloA/ grior to c.dej mio #\0DE 6 if not perbme2 tsbn b \o.sh 13 modhs.

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DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 9-2

T iDochetNumber50-346

' Licence Number NPF-3 Serial Number 1733 h INhh BU TIM L h ONIO(O I - UT ULU .

l e1 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION I

f BASES l

l REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRLMENTATION (Continued)

HOT STAND 8Y of the facility from locations outside of the control room.

This capability is required in the event control room habitability is lost, l

3/4.3.3.6 POST-ACCIDENT INSTRLMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the post-accident instrumentation ensures that suffi-cient infomation is available on selected plant parameters to monitor -

1 and assess these variables following an accident.

i 3/4.3.0.7 CHLORINE DETECTION SYSTEMS - Deleted l

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3/4.3.3.8 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION 0perability of the fire detection instrumentation ensures that adequate I

warning capability is available for the prompt detection of fires. i This capability is required in order to detect and locate fires in ,

their early stages. Prompt detection of fires will reduce the potential for damage to safety related equipment and is an integral element in the overall facility fire protection program.

l In the event that a portion of the fire detection instrumentation is inoperable, the establishment of frequent fire patrols in the affected areas is required to provide detection capability until the inoperable instrumentation is restored to OPERABILITY,

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ADDill0NAL CHANGES PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED BY LETTER t SerialNo._ /M / Date 6'/M/6 l

l DAVIS-BESSE. UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-3 Amendment No. 9.58.58.134

J Doedst Number 50-346 L

• Lic:nse Number NPF-3 m q l 3 L S2 rial Number 1733 -

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-Attachment'l I 6 I- I I *

"" 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS f BASES 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION The limitations on reactivity conditions during REFUELING ensure that:

1) the reactor will remain subcritical' during CORE ALTERATIONS and 2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volumes having direct access to the reactor vessel. These limita-tions are consistent with the initial conditions assumed for the boron dilution incident in the accident analysis.

3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of source range neutron flux monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core.

3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME

{' The minimum requirement for reactor subcritic'lity a prior to movement i of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor pressure vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

l 3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS The requirements on containment penetration closure and OPERABILITY ensure that a release of radioactive material within containment will be restricted from leakage to the environment. The OPERABILITY and closure

, requirements are sufficient to restrict radioactive material release from a fuel element rupture based upon the lack of containment pressuriza-tion potential while in the REFUELING MODE.

l 3/4.9.5 COMUN! CATIONS The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity condition during CORE ALTERATIONS.

4 DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 B 3/4 9-1

o -

Dock;t Number 50-346 >

Lic;ns] Nu ber NPF-3 '

Serial Number 1733 Attachment 2 Page 1 .

1 SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION l

)

Description of Proposed Technical Specification Changes The purpose of thia Significant Hazards Consideration is to review proposed +

changes to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS), Unit Number 1 Operating License, Appendix A, Technical Specifications. The proposed changes involve Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.3.3.6, Post-Accident Instrumentation, '

Table 3.3-10, Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation. Table 4.3-10, Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements, and TS 3/4.9.2, Refueling Operations - Inctrumentation. The DBNPS has been using the excore neutron flux monitors supplied with the Babcock and Vilcox (B&V)  !

nuclear instrumentation system to meet both TS 3/4.9.2 and TS 3/4.3.1.1, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation, Table 3.3-1 and 4.3-1. Item 11 (Source Range, Neutron Flux and Rate - Startup and Shutdown). However, the B&V-supplied nuclear instrumentation system is not environmentally qualified.

Two excore neutron flux monitors qualified to meet the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.97, " Instrumentation for Light-Vater-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident", were installed during the fifth refueling outage at the DBNPS and vill be available to be used to comply with TS 3/4.3.3.6 following the sixth refueling outage and also with TS 3/4.9.2 during the sixth refueling outage.

This request proposes the addition of " neutron flux (vide range)" and " neutron flux (source range)" to Tables 3.3-10 and 4.3-10 to reflect the appropriate surveillance requirements for the new monitors for demonstrating operability.

Additionally this request proposes TS 3/4.9.2 be changed to require calibration of the neutron flux monitors prior to entry into Mode 6 in order to allow either the new monitors or the existing monitors to be used to comply with this specification. The Technical 'Jescription (Attachment 1) discusses these changes.

Significant llazards Consideration l The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has provided standards in 10CFR50.92(c) for determining whether a significant hazard exists. A proposed amendment to an Operating License for a facility involves no significant hazards if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed changes would not: 1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident l previously evaluated; 2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of I accident from any accident previously evaluated; or 3) Involve a significant

! reduction in a margin of safety.

l l The proposed Technical Specification changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration because the operation of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit Number 1, in accordance with these changes vouldt

1. Not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of l an accident previously evaluated because additional operability and l surveillance requirements for the qualified excore neutron flux monitoring system are being added to the Technical Specifications. These additional requirements have no increased impact on the probability of any accident.

C.

O Dock;t Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3

Serial Number 1733 i' ' Attachment 2 Page 2 .

In' addition, no radiological consequences are increased due to these additional requirements [10CFR50.92(c)(1)].

2. Not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because failure mechanisms previously unanticipated or events not bounded by previous evaluations are not introduced by these changes [10CTR50.92(c)(2)].

l

3. Not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety because these Technical Specification changes, namely adding the new equipment to TS 3.3.3.6 and a new surveillance requirement to TS 3.9.2, will ensure that adequate license requirements exist for testing the new excore monitoring system at the assigned frequency [10CFR50.92(c)(3)].

Conclusion Based on the discussion above, it is concluded that the proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration.

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