ML20005G738

Proposed Tech Specs Re Second Level Undervoltage Relay Setpoint

ML20005G738
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	01/12/1990
From:	POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
To:
Shared Package
ML20005G720	List: ML20005G719 ML20005G721 ML20005G738
References
NUDOCS 9001230007
Download: ML20005G738 (10)

Text

<, --)

-: s .

-c j

, 1 1

i ATTACHMENT I I PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION  ;

i (JPTS-89-0M) i I

h, i

?

L Y

l.  !

l 9

1, l t l

i New York Power Authority JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Docket No. 50-333 900I930002 7000,,2 DPR59 rp nu ocopg333 ,

4  :-

JAFNPP 32 BASES (cont'd)

The recirculation pump trip has been added at ta vytion The Ewegv.cy Bus L.nids.v4igs Trip System transfers the 4 of ACRS as a means of limiting the consequecce G the kv emergency e;ecMca! buses to the Emergency Diesel Generators in the event an undervoltage condition is detected.

unlikely occurrence of a failure to scram during an *Aicipaico transient. The response of the plant to this postulated event The system has two levels of protection- (1) degraded voltage falls within the envelope of study events given in General protection, and (2) loss-of-voltage protection. Degraded Electric Company Topical Report, NEDO-10349, dated voltage protection prevents a sustamed low voltage condeon March,1971.

from dargigiig safety-related equipment The degraded

_ , _ _ _ , voltage protection has two time delays. A short time delay Acc.i dent uivinavinig instrumentation provides avviuvn. with a W-coolant acesdent A and a W l information which ,s a helpful to the operator in assessmg piant b h m al MN h conditions follovnng an accident by (1) providing ununiouvii needed to pemwt the operators to take preplanned manual hWMhhh

~N P'" " = a e m W %

actions to accurip;ini safe plant shutdown; (2) determinmg from causmg a long term interruption of power. Time delays are M in h W 2 W N W W h

)

th at ~

enable therf to spunous W h . h , M N & &

to determme the potential for a breach of the bamer to ' "7

1. 0E "

radioactivity release and if a bamer has been breached; ~

(4) ftanssiiig data for deciding on the need to take unplanned action if an automatic or manually initiated safety system is not functioning properly or the plant is not responding properly to the safety systems in operation; and (5) allowing for eafy l indication of the need to initiate action necessary to protect the public and for an estimate of the magnitude of any problem.

This instrumentation has been upgraded to conform with the acceptance criteria of NUREG-0737 and NRC Generic Letter 83-36.

Amendment No. If,if,1[ m

_ _ _ _ _ - - 16

JAFNPP -

TABLE 32-2(Cont'd) ,

3 INSTRUMENTATION THAT INITIATES OR CONTROLS THE CORE AND CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEMS Minimum No. of Total Number of Operable Instrument instrument Channels item Channels Per Provided by Design No. Trip System (1) Trip FunctKm Trip Level Settog for BothTrip Systems Remarks 37 (1 per 4kV bus) 4kV Ensgency Bus 110.611.2 2 inst. Channels 1. Irvtiates both 4kV l Undervoltage Relay micunday volts Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage) . Trners. (Degraded Voltage LOCA and non-LOCA)

2. Notes 4 and 6.

38a (1 per 4kV bus) 4kV Emergercy Bus 9.0 1.0 sec. 2 Inst. Cieiies -

1. Note 5.' l Undervoltage Timer (Degraded Voltage LOCA) l[,

386 (1 per 4kV bus) 4kV Erregercy Bus 45 5.0 sec. 2 Inst.Chaves 1. Note 5.

Undervoltage Timer (Degraded Voltage non-LOCA) 39 (1 per 4kV bus) 4kV Erregercy Bus 85 4.25 2 inst. Channels 1. Irvtiates 4kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage Relay secondary volts Undervoltage Loss of -  !

(Loss of Voltage) Voltage Trner.

2. Notes 4 and 7.

40 (1 per 4kV bus) 4kV Emeigency Bus 2.50 0.05 sec. 1. Note 5.

2 Inst.Cteies Undervoltage Timer l (Loss of Voltage) i 41 2 Reactor Low Pressure 285 to 335 psig 4 Inst. Channels ibnMve for closmg recirculation pump discharge valve.

Amendment No. , ,If,if m

JAFNPP TABLE 32-2 (Cont'd)

INSTRUMENTATION THAT INITIATES OR CONTROLS THE CORE AND CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEMS NOTES FOR TABLE 3.2-2 l 1. Whenever any ECCS subsystem is required by specification 3.5 to be operable, there shall be two operable trip systems. From and j after the time it is found that the first column cannot be met for one of the trip systems, that trip system shall be placed in the tripped l- condition or the reactor shall be placed in the cold condition withm 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

2. " Deleted

• i' 3. Refer to Techmcs! Specrficahon 3.5.A for lirmtmg condihons for operation, faslure of one (1) instrument channel disables one (1) pump.

4. Tripping of 2 out of 2 sensors is required for an undervoltage trip. With one operable sensor, operation may conhnue with the

inoperable sensor in the tripped condition.

5. The 4kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage Timers (degraded voltage LOCA, degraded voltage non-LOCA,and loss-of-voltage) inshate the .l l following: starts the Emergency Diesel-Generators; trips the normal / reserve tie breakers and trips all 4kV motor breakers (in conjunction with 75 percent Emergency Diesel-Generator voltages); initiates dieselgmerator breaker close permissive [m conjunction with 90 percent Emergency Diesel-Generator voltages) and; initiates sequential starting of vital loads in conjunchon with low-low-low reactor water level or high drywell pressure.

6. A secondary voltage of 110.6 volts corresponds to approximately 93% of 4160 volts on the bus.

l

7. A secondary voltage of 85 volts corresponds to approximately 71.5% of 4160 volts on the bus.

I Amendment No. ,1 ,1 71

_ __ _ . . , - _ . . . _ . _ , . . . _ . . . _ _ . ~ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ .

JAFNPP ,

TABLE 42-2 ,

MINIMUM TEST AND CAUBRATION FREQUENCY FOR CORE AND CONTAINMENT COOUNG SYSTEMS t

l Instrument Channel (8) Instrument Functional Test - Calibration Frequency Instrument Check (4).

1) Reactor Water Level (1)(5)- (15) Once/ day -

2a) Drywell Pressure (non-ATTS) (1) Once/3 months None 2b) Drywell Pressure (ATTS) (1)(5) (15) Once/ day 3a) Reactor Pressure (non-ATTS) (1) Once/3 morfhs None 3b) Reactor Pressure (ATTS) (1)(5) (15) Once/ day

4) Auto Sequencing Timers None Once/ operating cycle None

5) ADS- LPCI or CS Pump Disch. (1) Once/3 rreiti6 None

6) Trip System Bus Powcr Monitors (1) None None

8) Core Spray Sparger d/p (1) Once/3 ire 4t6 Once/ day

9) Steam Une High Flow (HPCI & RCIC) (1)(5) (15) Once/ day

10) Steam Une/ Area High Temp. (HPCI & RCIC) (1)(5) (15) Once/ day

12) HPCI & RCIC Steam Une Low Pressure (1)(5) (15) Once/ day

13) HPCI & RCIC Suction Source Levels (1) Once/3 rredi6 None

14) 4kV Emergency Bus Under-Voltage Once/ operating cycle Once/ operating cycle None (Loss-of-Voltage, Degraded Voltage l

LOCA and non-LOCA) Relays and Timers.

15) HPCI & RCIC Exhaust Diaphragm (1) Once/3.Teitts None Pressure High

17) LPCi/ Cross Connect Valve Position Once/ operating cycle -None None NOTE- See listing of notes following Table 42-6 for the notes referred to herein.

Amendment No.1[,f,%,f, if,1%

79

i l

l ATTACHMENT 11 l SAFETY EVALUATION FOR i

~ PROP 06A110N f (JPTS-89 034)  ;

-i f

i i

1 i

r t

?

7 L

l i-l 1 ,

New York Power Authority JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Docket No. 50-333 DPR 59 .

l .-

i L

Attachment il L SAFETY EVALUATION Page 1 of 4

f. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES The proposed amendment to the James A. FitzPatrick Technical Specifications incorporates changes to Bat,es 3.2 and Tables 3.2 2 and 4.2 2 on pages 80,70c,71 and 78. The changes are as follows:

1 A. Setpoint Changes

1. Table 3.2 2 on page 700 Item 37: replace the present trip setting of "106

• 1.5' with *110.6 ! 1.2."

2. Table 3.2 2 on page 71 Note 6: replace

'A secondary voltage of 108 volts corresponds to approximately 90.8 % of 4160 volts on the bus."

with "A secondary voltage of 110.6 volts corresponds to approximately 93 % of 4160 volts on the bus."

B. Deletion of Cycle 9 Operating Restrictions Delete the *** and the associated footnote, ** Modification approved for Cycle 9 only,"

from the following pages.

1. Bases 3.2 on page 60

2. Table 3.2 2 on page 70c Items 38a and 38b

3. Table 3.2 2 on page 71 Note 5

4. Table 4.2 2 on page 79 ltem 14

11. PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES A. Setpoint Changes Amendment 120 (Reference 3) to the FitzPatrick Technical Specifications approved a second level emergency bus degraded voltage system which utilizes two separate time delays: one coincident with a LOCA signal and a second for normal operation. The supporting safety analyses were based on a Reserve Station Secondary Transformer (RSST) tap setting of 119 kV and demonstrated that the Class IE loads connected to the emergency buses would not be damaged during sustained degraded voltage conditions.

During the 1990 refueling outage, the Authority plans to implement Improvements to the FitzPatrick plant AC distribution systems to reduce voltage transients produced during manual bus transfers. I The RSST tap setting of 119 kV and the 4160 V/600 V load center transformer (LCT) tap setting of 3950 V are being changed to 116 kV and 4050 V, respectively.

l

, Attachment 11 SAFETY EVALUATON Page 2 of 4 t

The new transformer tap combination increases the setpoint for the undervoltage relay (degraded voltage) to 110.6 secondary volts. No changes are required to the degraded voltage timers or to theloss of voltage system.

B. Deletion of Cycle 9 Operating Restrictions NRC concerns on technical issues associated with the undervoltage protective system resulted in operating restrictions imposed by Amendment 120 for Cycle 9. These issues have been resolved (See References 4,5, and 6). This amendment will delete the footnote on pages 60,70c,71 and 79 of the Technical Specifications which restricted plant operation to one cycle.

Ill. IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES A. Setpoint Changes  :

Raising the degraded grid undervoltage relay setting from 108 V to 110.6 V has no impact on plant safety. The new transformer tap settings (RSST setting of 116 V and LCT setting of 4050 V) increase the 4.16 kV emergency bus operating voltage by 100 V which offsets the effect of raising ,

the relay setpoint (90 V increase on the 4.16 kV side). Analyses demonstrate that safety related l equipment fed from the emergency buses will not be adversely affected by a degraded voltage condition for up to 60 seconds. This change is associated with improvements to the AC distribution  :

systems, g

B. Deletion of Cycle 9 Operating Restrictions Deleting the ' Operating Cycle 9" restrictions allows plant operation with a degraded grid undervoltage protection, This change is purely administrative in nature.

These changes do not impact the capability of the AC electrical distribution systems in performing their safety related functions during normal or post accident operations. The FSAR and station operating procedures will be revised to reflect the setting change.

IV. EVALUATION OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION Operation of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant in accordance with this proposed amendment would not involve a significant hazards consideration, as defined in 10 CFR 50.92, since the proposed changes would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously

!. evaluated. The proposed setpoint change does not alter the AC electrical distribution system's ability to meet normal or post accident requirements. The Class IE equipment connected to the emergency bus are protected against sustained degraded voltage conditions. FSAR analyses described in Section 8.6.3 are unaffected by this change.

The proposed change to remove ' Cycle 9' limitations is purely administrative in nature and can not increase the probability or consequences of the plant's accident analyses as documented in the FSAR or the NRC staff's SER.

i  ;

Attachment 11 SAFETY EVALUATION -

Page 3 of 4 l

2. create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from those previously evaluated.

The proposed revision to the degraded grid (second level) undervoltage relay setpoint does not introduce any new failure modes, nor does it allow plant operation in an unanalyzed configuration.

{

The administrative changes which extend the provisions of the degraded grid (second love!)

undervoltage technical specification beyond Cycle 9 are purely administrative, and, as such,

. can not create new or different kinds of accidents.

3. involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. The margin between anticipated bus voltage and the degraded grid (second level) undervoltage protection relay setpoint is increased by 10 V with this proposed setpoint change. This provides an increase in the safety margin by reducing the potential for voltage transients during manual bus trans'ers. l The purely administrative change which removes the Cycle 9 restrictions on plant operations L during degraded grid (second level) undervoltage conditions can not impact or affect the margin of safety.

V, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES Implementation of the proposed changes will not impact the Al ARA Program at the FitzPatrick plant, nor will the changes impact the environment.

VI. CONCLUSION These changes, as proposed, do not constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59. That is, they;

a. will not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report;

b. will not increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a type different from any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report;

c. will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification; and ,

d. Involve no significant hazards consideration, as defined in 10 CFR 50.92.

I Vll. REFERENCES

1. James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 8.6.

1

2. James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Safety Evaluation Report (SER), dated November 20, 1972 and Supplements.

','t. -.

Attachment 11 SAFETY EVALUATION i Page 4 of 4 ,

c

3. NRC letter ([[::JAF-88-358|JAF-88-358]]), D.E. LaBarge to J.C. Brons, dated November 18,1988, transmits Amendment 120.

4. NRC letter (JAF 89-192), D.E. LaBarge to J.C. Brons, dated June 1,1989, transmits Amendment 131.

5. NYPA letter (JPN 86-016), J.C. Brons to D.R. Muller, dated April 10,1986, regarding Reserve  !

Power to Emergency Buses.

L 6. NYPA letter (JPN 86 037), J.C. Brons to D.R. Muller, dated August 5,1986, regarding Reserve Power to Emergency Buses. ,

7. James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Second Level Undervoltage Relay Set Point Change for Emergency Buses Safety Evaluation, JAF SE 89 097, November 21,1989.

E a

k

_ . . . _ ,.y _ , .,._ .