ML20005A889
| ML20005A889 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 06/12/1981 |
| From: | Tedesco R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Davidson D CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8107020105 | |
| Download: ML20005A889 (3) | |
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- r. Calwyn:R. Oavids:n-C (p. v,,,g,,d][f:::::: O)j*
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flice president -_ Engineering -
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erry licensing review, the staf nas ;rt:1ced a c
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- caf. 21f2ty I.11sati:n Rep:rt (SER) ce sections 3.I, 3:5,- 3.7 s-c 2.9 o f
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i pst :ns is also enclosed'as.the 2;p.3ndix to the SER 2nd tq252 sirve d
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The staff riquests 1 eetirg with your technical staff trM :cni/ ints feca 3AI and II at a -utually agreaable site in 2 r:xiestaly 50 C1ys to discuss tne opsn items in the Oraft SIR.
They ray:-- and '." a t W s m2e ti ng ce *.2id in 131:ing, Pennsyhania during the. seek of *t gust 3 and Ply Inticipate 3 seting of 3 to 5 days. At the c0nclusion of this eating, they ee.pect to have all the cpen issuas resolved and to be able to arite their final SIR for these secticns.
~ ~n preparation for this meeting, your technical staff will undcuttscly
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- e form of written response to either the open issues in the SER or the questions. The staff would appreciate re:eiving a drift c:o/
of tha written response at least a.;esk hafore the meeting. Also, since
?2:s;aff has in outside censultant for this review, they r3qu3st that a cc:y of jour.caspense te mailed direct 1/ to:
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.s 2-After you have reviewed this request, please pmvide a schedule and place for the :neeting. If you require any clarification of this request, please contact M. D. Houston, Project Manager, (301) 492-8S93.
Sincerely, edge,st signed @
Robert L. Tedesco Assistant Director for Licensing i
Division of Licensing
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/encicsure:
See next page Ciscribucion:
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MService CHouston RLiedesco l
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-a Mr.-Jaiwyn R. Davidsen Vice Pracident, Engineering The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company P. O. Sex 5000 C16,.l..d Chio 44101 cc: Gerald Charnoff, Esq.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 1500.'4 Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
20036 Donald H. Hauser, Esq._
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company P. O. Scx 5000 Cleveland, 0hio 44101 U. S. Nuclear Regula: cry Ccmmission P.esicent :nsrector's Office Parmly at Center Road Perry, Ohio 44C81 I
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j, MCHANICAL ENGINEERING 3 RANCH ORAFT SAFETf EVALUAT*CN RE?CRT.
PERRY. C:. EAR PGER Pt.AhT UNIT I W
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MECFANICAL ENGINEERING 3 RANCH l RAFT SAFETI EVALUAT:CN RE.CRT PERRY NUCLIAR PCWER FLANT UNIT I 3.2 CLASSIFICAT CN CF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND CCM.CNENT3 C
3.2.1 Seismic Classification General Cesign Criterien 2,
- Design 3ases f:r Protec:1cn Against Natural Fhencmena,* of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A, in ; art, escuires : hat nuclear
- cwer plan
- structures, systems, and ccmcenents imccriant to safety be designed : wi nstand the effsets of earthcuakes ni;heu: Icss :f ca: ability to ;erf:rm tneir safety function. These :lant features are these necessary to assure (1) the integrity :f the react:r :: clan: :ressure beundary, (2)
Me :acability Oc shutdewn the reac:ce and maintain it in a safe snutcewn c:ndition, or (3) :he cacability Oc preven: Or nitigate the ::nsequences of accidents wnien c:uld result in octantial offsite ex csures ccm: arable :o 10 CFR Par 100 ;uideline ex:csures. The ear:ncuake for wnich tnese :lant features are cesigned is defined as one safe snutdcwn earthquake (!!E) in 10 CFR ?ar: ICO, Accendix A.
The SSE is based ;;cn an evalua:f en cf :he maximum earthcuake ;ctential and is tha; eartaquake wnich procuces :he maximum vibrat:ry ground ration f:r wnica structures, systams, and ::=cenents imccriant Oc safety are designed. o rt=ain functional. These. plan: fea:ures tna are cesigned :: remain functional if an 3SE :c:urs are designated seismic Categcry I in Regulatory Guide 1.29. Regula: ry 3uide 1.29, Seismic Casign Classificatien,' is One princi:al document used in cur review f:r identifying these plant features imcortant to safety wnich, as a minimum, snculd :e designed to seismic C4:escry I requirements. Cur review Of the seismic :11ssi#icati:n Of structures, systems, anc c:meccents (excluding electri:al features' Of Ferry <as :er#:rted in ac::rcance di:n :ne ;uidance in I:ancarc Review ?lan 2.2-1, ' Seismic Classi#f ca:f on. '
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- The structures, syst2ms, and comocnents im:cr ant to safety of Perry that are required to be designed to withstand the effects of :. SSE anc remain functional have been identified in an acceptabte manner in Table 3.2-1 of tne Final Safety Analysis Report. Tante 3.2-1, in part, identifies major components in fluid systems, meenanical systams, and asscciatad structures designated as seismic C.ategory I.
In addi:1cn, piping and instrumentation diagrams in the ~inal Safety Analysis Report identify -he intere:nnecting o
piping and valves and the boundary limits of each system classified as seismic Categcry I.
'de have reviewed Taoie 3.2-1 and the fluid system picing and instr. mentation diagrams and have seme quertien ::ncerning ; art cf :nis taole.
It states in the FIAR': hat structures, ::=cenents and systems designated as Safety Class 1, 2, Or 3 are classified as seismic Cates:ry I exce:: f:r some portions of :ne radicactive waste trea: men: handling and disposa!
systems. There are several 1: ems in Table 3.2-1 :na: c:nflict with this statement.
- The saismic classifica:icn incicated in Tacle 3.2-1.ee:S.ne requi re-ment of Regulat:ry 3 aide 1.29."
It is als: s:stad in faction 1.3 :na: the
?trry ;1 ant c:mplies witn all of :he requirements Of Regula:Ory 3 cide 1.29.
Oces nis mean that saismic Category I :: cling water is previded :: the l
recirculation ;umes during normal oceration and folicwing a LCCA?
'4 hat design requirements were used in ne design of the reac:Or cressure vessel skirt and the ccre support structures?
Quality assurance requirements should te addressed in Table 3.2-1.
l The ncn-seismic classification of the ::ntrol rods shculd be justified.
.1cta 7 dces ict accly to the :entr:1 -Ods.
l FMvide an ex: lana:i:n f:r :ne ':, v' seismic :iassi#icati:n #:r f
relief valve discnarse piping.
I Mcw much Of the main staam ci ing, :e-neen ne '4.0. 3::o valve and the
- ur ine 3 :o valve, is loca:ad in :ne Auxiiiary suiiding?
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3-Thers appears Oc te a diserspancy in :ne seismic classificati:n of the discharge :unnel. The discharge tunnel anc the ciffusor no::le art seismic Catescry I.
The tunnel entrance structure and dcwnshaft are not.
Provide clarification for this apparent c:ntradiction.
What is tne seismic classification of the Containment */essel Cociing Units?
Note 19 is an exceotion to Regula: cry Guice 1.29 and shculd te included in Section 1.3.
Based upon Our review Of FIAR Section 3.2.1 and subject Oc the satisfact:ry resolution of :ne cpen itams, our findings =111 te as f:11cus.
We have reviewed Table 3.2-1 and :ne fluid system pioing and instrument diagrams and we c:nclude tha :ne structures, systems, and 00m:enents important to safety of Perry have been properly classified as seismic Catagery ! itams in c:nfermance with Regulat:ry Guide 1.29, Revisi n 1.
Ali other structures, systams, and c:mcenents that may be required for Oceration of the facility are not recuired to be designed : saismic Category I requirements, including these portiens Of Catagery I systems sucn as vent lines, fill lines, drain lines, and :as lines en the downs:rtam side of isclatien valves and ;crtions Of these systems whien are no recuired ts perform a safety function.
We ::ncluce that the struc urts, systems, and ::mpenents im:cr: ant Oc safety of Perry that art within the sc pe 5f the.4echanical Engineering 3 ranch and are designed to withstand the effects of an SSE and remain functional art precerly classified as seismic Categcry I items in ac:cetance witn Regulat:ry Guide 1.29 and c:nstitutas an acceptable basis for satisfying, in part ne requirements Of 3eneral Oesign Cri:arica 2, and is, theref:rt, accecisole.
0
-4 3.3.3 System Cuality Greue Classifica:icn General Cesign Criterien 1,
- Quality Standarcs and Records," of 10 CFR Part 50, Acpendix A requires tnat uclear ;cwer plant systems and c:mpenents imocrtant to safety be designed, facticatad, erte:ed, and tested to quality standards comensurste with the importance of the safety function to be perforned. These fluid system, pressurt-ettaining ::mconents art : art of the reac or c:clant pressure boundary and other fluid systems imcortant to safety, where reliance is placed en :nesa systams:
(1)to prevent or sitigata the c:nsequences of accidents and malfuncticns originating vi: Min :ne rea :Or c:oian: ;ressure beundary, (2) :s ;crmi shu dcwn of :ne react:r and maintain it in a safe snutdcwn : nditicn, and (3) to rt:ain radicactive material. Regulatory Guide 1.25, *0uali y Gr up Classification and Stancards for Watar, 5 team, and Radicactive-Wasta-Containing C:mcenents of Nuclear Fewer Plants,* is the principal deezent used in our review for identifying :n a functional basis the c:mocnents f tacse systems i=criant t: saft y that art Quality Groups 3, C, and D.
Secticn 50.55a of 10 CFR Par 50 identifies these 1.merican Society of Meenanical Engineers (ASME) 3ciler and Pressurt Yessai Cece,Section III, Cla,ss ! excenents -hat art l
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- of the reac:Or c:ciant pressure bcundary (RC?S). Conf:r anca :f -hesa RCPS cxcenents wi:h secticn 50.55a of 10 CFR Par: 50 is discussed in Secticn 5.2.1.1 of this Safety Evaluation Repert. These RC?S ::mpenents 7
are designated in Regulatory Guide 1.25 as Quality Greuc A.
Certain ::nce RC?S ccmcenents wnich meet the exclusion requirements of footncta 2 of ne l
rule are classified Quality Group 3 in acecedance with Regulatory Guide 1.25.
l "ur review Of the quality group classifica:icn Or art:surt-retaining c:meclents of fluid systems imccriant to safety f:r Ferry was :erf;cf.ed in ac::rdance with tne guidance in Standard Review Plan 3.2.2, System I
Ouality Grou: Classift:2:*. :n. "
E e systems and := ccen:s 4t:cr an: :: safety of Ferry have been identified in an ac:ec.able manner in Table 3.2-i of the Ff nal Safe y analysis l
Recert. Table 3.?-1, in part, identifies -te ma'cr :scenen s in fiuic sys ams sucr as :ressure vessels, nea; excnangers, s:Or, age tanks, :u=s,
- i:ing, and valves anc recnanical systams, sucn as :ranes, esfueling o
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5-platf:rms, and cther miscellaneous handling acui: ment.
In adcition, the piping and instrumentation diagrams in the Final Safety Analysis Report identify the classificatien beundaries of the intere:nnecting piping and valves.
'4e have reviewed the applicant's use of the NRC Cuality Group system in Table 3.2-1 and on the system piping and instrumentation diagrams and we cer.clude the pressure-retaining ccmcenenta of fluid systems important :s safety have been properly classified and meet the guicance in Regulat:ry Guice 1.25, Revision 2.
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'We concluce tha: :r.e acclicant's classification Of flui: system ;ressurs ra:aining ccmpenents imccriant to safety c:mplies with Standard Review Flan Secticn 3.2.2, Regulatory Guice 1.25 and satisfies the a:piicable acetiens of General Design Critarion 1.
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6 3.5 ;ROTECTICN AGAINST OYNAMIC E.::ECTS AS3CCIATED WITH ~HE 2CS*JLATED AUPTURE OF ?IPING The review performed under this section pertains to -he acclicant's program for protecting safety-related ccmcenents and structures against the effects of pcstulated pipe breaks both inside and cutside c:ntainment.
The effect that breaks or cracks in high cr acderate energy fluid systems wculd have en adjacent safety-related ccmconents or structures has been analy:ad with respect to jet impingement, pipe wnto, and environmental effects. Seversi means are used o assure the protecticn of nese safety-raiatad items. They include pnysical sacara:icn, enclosure within suitably design structurts, tne use of pipe ani? restraints, and :ne use of equipment shields.
a scciatad with 3.5.2 Ce arminatten of 3reak L:ca-icns and Oynamic E"ects s
- ne ?cs uia:ec Recturs of ; 1nc Cur review under Standard Raview ?lan 3.5.2 was c:ncer9ed with the loca:icns chosen by the applican: fer :.cstulating piping failurts. We also reviewed the si:e and orientation of Onese postulatac failures and hcw the acclicant :siculated the resultant cipe whi: andTetimoingementleadswnfen signt aff9c nearby safety reia:ac c:mpenents.
5:andard Review plan 3.5.2 also sets forth certain critaria for the i
l analysis and subsequent in-service inspection of high energy piping in the l
break exclusien area of c:ntainment ;enetration. 3rtaks need not be
- cstulated in these ;crtiens of picing that mee
- the requirements of the i
ASME Coce, Secticn III, Subarticle NE-li20 and the additional design recuirements cutlined in 3 ranch Technical position ME3 3-1.
Acci-icnal in-service ins:ecticn is also recuired f:r these ;crtiens of piping.
l The ?:llcwing discussas :cen issues f:und in ur review :f 25AR Iecticn 3.5.2.
I: c:ncluces vi:n :ur #incings ;:ntingen: a:cn resciuti:n l
of all ccen issues.
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7 In Section 3.5.1 references are mace to ' elastic / plastic pipe ania restraints er pi;e suc;cris wnica eliminate ;i;e wnip damage. ' Oetails of how pipe succorts are designed for pipe whip protecticn and an examole of such an analysis are needed.
Pipe wnip need only be censidered in these hign energy piping systems having sufficient capacity to develop a jet stream. The means for determining hign and r.cderata energy lines is f:una in Regulatory Guide 1.46, *Cretection Against Pi;e '4 hip Inside Containment". This criteria has been used correctly by the a;olicant. Scme additi:nal information is recuired :o clarify this secti:n. Mcw is it deternined tha: :he internal energy levet ass:ciated wi:n wnipoing is insufficien: to imcair :ne safety func:f en of any system or ::mconent to an unacceptable level'? Ce:sils shculd be provided of any f1:w restric 0rs used. Metnods used Oc ce:armine fluic reservcir! 41:n sufficien capacity :: develop a jet stream shculd also be ;rovided.
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Fcr determining stresses Or fatigue usage fact rs tha recuire a pipe break :: be ;cstulatec, plant leacings are to te these resulting from ncrmal anc u:se: ::ndittens plus an CSE.
assurances must be srevided that leacs due :: SRV actuation and discharge are incluced in :ne ucse ::nditiens.
For ASME, Secticn III, Class 1 piping designed to seismic Categcry I standards, breaks due to stress are to be ;cstula:ec a: :ne folicwing iccatiens :
(1)
If Eq. (10), as calculated by ?aragracn 18-3653, ASME Occe Section I!!,
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exceeds 2.a 5,, Onen Eqs. (12) and (13 must be evalua =d Ec. (12) :r (13) exceeds 2.a 5,, a break mus te :cstulatec.
In ::ner words, a break is ;cstul ated i' Ec. (10) > 2.4 3, and E:. (12) > 2.4 3, or I:. 00) > 2.3 3, anc E. 32) > 2.a 5, e--~
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! (2) 3rtaks must aise be ;cstulatad at any icca icn wnert :ne cumulative usage factor exceeds 0.1.
The above critaria is evaluated under loadings resulting frem normal and up-set plant c:nditiens including the CEE.
Any deviations frem the above critaria must be Justified.
Art there any high energy Class 2, Class 3 cr 331.1 ifnes? If so, wnat critaria is used for postulating breaks in these lines?
Any instances with limittd treak c;enings Or break ::ening times exceeding cne millisac:nc mur, te ider.:ified.
2ny analytical te:hecs, recresenting test results Or based On a rec. anistic accreacn, used to 1
justify the above must be ;rovided and exclained in detaf f. This apolies to centainment and annulus petssuri:sti:n as well as generai ;f;e treas.
For these ;crtiens cf ASPE, Secticn III, Class 1 pi:ing designed to saismic Category I standards and included in :ne break exclusten area breaks need not be ;cstulated ;raviding the fol': wing stress cri:eria are met.
(1) If Eq. (10) as calculated by paragra;n NB-2653, ASME Ccde, Sectica !I cces not excaed 2.4 5, a ertas need not be';cstula:ad.
7 (2)
If Eq. (10) does exceed 2.a 5,, then Eqs. (12) and (13) mus be evaluatac.
If neitner Ec. (12) or (13) exceeds 2.a 5, a break need 3
not be postulated. In other words, a break need not :e ;ostulated f.f:
S Eq. (10) < 2.1 5s or Eq. (10) > 2.4 5, and Ic. (12) < 2.a 5, and Eq. (13) < 2.a 3 n (3) 3rtaxs P.eec not te ;cs uis:ec as icng as :ne :uru ative 'a:1;ue. age
'ac :e is less : nan 3.1.
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(4) For plants witn isolati:n salves inside ::ntainment, the maximum s rtss, as calculatad by Eq. (9) in ASME Ccce Section III, Paragracn NB.3652 under the leadings of internal pressure, deadweight and a pastulatad piping failurt of fluid systems upstream or dcwnstream of the c:ntain-ment pene:ra:icn area mus not exceed 2.25 5.
3 The above criteria is evaluated under 1cadings resulting fr m normal and ucset piant conditfens inclucing :he CBE.
In addition, augmented insarvice inspection is required :n all piping in the break exclusien area.
The acclicant must provice assurancas tha: :nef e :ritaria for pf;f ng in the break exclusien areas c:mplies with :he requirements cutlined accve and those :f Stancarc Review Plan 3.6.2.
Art there any Class 2, Class' 3, or 331.i ;fpfng in the break exclusien eu.
arear.
If se, wna: critaria tr used in their desf;n?
A lis: of all systems included in the break exclusien areas mus: be incluced in the FSAR.
- n addition, break exclusf:n areas shculd te shcwn
- n the apprcerinte ;fping crawings.
Provide an examole Of the detailed stress analysis dcne en a welded attacnment to a peccess ?fpe.
In addition, provide de:afis Of :he stress analysis done f:r ne nead fitting for the main steam line.
'4 hen prcviding ;rctacticn frem pipe wni;,assurancas must be providad that all potential targets art examined. Provide a definition for ifmits of strain wnich are similar to strain leveis allowed in restrain: :lastic mee:ers.
"oi:ing systems art cesigned so that ;1astic instacility cces no
=ccur in :ne Oi;e a: the design dynamic anc static I:acs 'nless damage studies are
- er#:rmec wni:n secw :ne ::nsecuences c nc: resuit in : free: facage :: any assential system :r ::::cnent. ' Frevide a ifs: cf I:ca:icns where :nis tecnni:ue nas been usec anc an exam:le Of :ne stacies :er# rmec.
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When evaluating the effects of jet impingement loads i: is the staff's position t 4 all potential targets aiust be evaluated. Assurances must be provided that your analysis has considered all potential targets. What service limits are used for piping anen evalua*.ing jet imoingement leads?
Reference is made to the use of a suitable dynamic load factor (OLF).
Provide an examcle of its use. How is it determined that it is suitacie?
In :ne discussion accut snuccers, reference is made :o ::ner simul:2necus l eads .
I furtner states tha: these loads are c:mbined by SRSS. Wha; are
-hese 1:acs?
"Picing integrity usually dces not depend upon -he pipe anip restraints f r any leading ::mcinaticn.* Lis all -hose locations and Icading c:mcinations wnere it dces. What service limi s are usec in :ne cesign of :ne pi:e wnto restraints?
l Ouring hc: functional tasting wna: critical 40ca:icns inside ::ntainment are monitorec?
Standarc Review Plan 3.5.2 allcws a 10t increase in yield strength to acc:un for strain rate effects. Any loca:icns wners an increase n -he i
l yield or ultimate strength greater nan 10% has been usec must be identified.
Justificat ~ for any increase greater : nan ICt mus: also be providec.
d Cur review of Section 3.5.2 includes all tables and figures. We have seversi questions pertainint to tables and figures.
Prov de a schedule for -he ::=:letien of any tacle that is incemoista.
d Are 31*. ;cstula ad treak 1:ca:icns in ne recircula-i:n sys:ca sacwn (Figure 2.5-65) ? Where are :rear--
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.Tacle 3.2-i, ? age 3.2-10 Mcw mucn of the main staam piping, between the :4.0. s:cp valve and one turcine step valve, is located in the Auxillary Building?
Taoie 3.2-1, Page 3.2-24 There appears to be a discrecancy in the seismic classification of the disenarge tunnel. The discharge tunnel and the diffusar no::le are seismic Category I.
The tunnel entrance structure and dcwnshaft are not. Provide clarifica ico for this apparent contradic:fcn.
Tacle 3.2-1, Page 3.2-25 Wha: is the seismic classification of the C:ntainment 'lessel C:o11ng Units?
Taoie 3.2-1, Page 3.2-34 Note 19 is an exception to Regulat:ry Guide 1.29 anc shcuid be included l
in Section I.3.
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3-3.5 PROTECTICM.aGAINST DYNAMIC EF EC 5 ASSOCIATED WITH HE ?CSTJLATED l
RUPTURE OF ?!?!NG
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3.5.2 Ceternination of 3reak Locations and Cynamic Effects Assceiated with
- ae ?cstulatec Ruoture of ?131nc
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3.5.2, Paga 3.5-7 1
In Section 3.5.1 references are made to " elastic /piastic pipe whic restraints or pipe sucocr:s wnich eliminate pipe whip damage. Cetails of how pipe supper:s are designed for pipe wnis protectics anc an examole of such an analysis are needed.
3.5.2.T.4, Page 3.5-10 Mcw is it deternined that "The 'nternal enercy asscciatec with wni: ping is insufficient to imcair :he safety func:ica Of any structure, system or ccmcenent to an unacceptable level"?
3.5.2.1.5, Page 3.5-11
?lant icading c:ncitions for evaluating pi:e :reak are : inciuce ner-al and uoset c:nditions plus an CBE. Assurance must be provided that SRV discharge leads are included in the upset c:noitions.
3.5.2.1.5, Page 3.5-11 Fcr ASME,Section III, Class 1 cioing designed to seismic Categcry I stancarts, :reaks due :: stress are to be :cstula:ac a: :ne 'Olicwing l
l icca:icns:
I l
l l
1 0
-__an,--n.-,,,-n,--.,_-,
,..n-----,_-.---,--_-.
---,n.,
-,,, -. ~, _. _ -, ~,,., - - -.. -. -
4 (i)
If Eq. (10), as calculated by Pa.ragracn NB-2553, ASME Ccde Section !!!,
excesos 2.4 5, then Eqs. (12) and (13) must be evaluated.
Il eitner 3
Eq. (12) or (13) exceeds 2.4 $, a break must be postulated. In other 3
words, a break is postulated if Eq. (TO) > 2.4 S, and Eq. (12) > 2.4 5, or Eq. (10) > 2.4 5, and Eq. (13) > 2.1 S, (2) 3reaks must also e :ostulated at any iccati:n wnere One cumulative usage factor exceeds 0.1.
The above criteria is evaluated under leadings resulting fr:m normal and uc-se: plant c:nciti:ns including the CSE.
Any deviations fr m the acove criteria must be justified.
3.5.2.1.5, Page 3.5-11 Are :nere any hign energy Class 2, Class 3, or 331.1 lines? If so, what criteria is used for ;ostulating breaks in :Eese lines?
3.5.2.1.5, Page 3.5-13 Any instances ahere icngitucinal break areas are less than ene circumfer-ential pipe area must be icentified. The analytical methods recresenting test results and based on a mechanistic acarcach must be explained er justified. Previde axamoies of a typical analysis.
3.5.2.1.5, Page 3.5-14 Mcw are energy reservoirs Of sufficient :a:acity :: deveic: a je f*.cw :eter?.inec?
~.ih a: are justifiasia line -estricticns? 2revide One justification. Any instances where flew limiters are used shcul: te identifiec anc justi#ied.
9
_ _ 3.5.2.1.7.1, Page 3.5-15 For ASME,Section III, Class 1 pioing designec to seismic Category I standards, breaks need not be postulated providing the follcwing stress criteria is met.
(1)
If Eq. (10) as calculated by Paragrach N8-2653, ASME Code,Section III does not escaed 2.4 S,, a break need not be postulated.
(2)
If-Eq. (10) sees exceed 2.2 S, Then Eqs. (12) and (13) must be 3
evaluated.
If neither Eq. (12) or (13) exceeds 2.1 S,, a break need not be postulated.
In other worcs, a break need not be postulated if Eq. (10) < 2.2 Sm or Eq. (10) > 2.4 S, and Eq. (12) < 2.4 3, and Eq. (13) < 2.1 5m (3) 3reaks need not be ;cstulatad as long as the cumulative fatique usage fac:Or is less than 0.1.
(4) For olants with isola-icn valves inside :OntYinment, the maximum stress, as :alculated 5; Eq. (9) in ASME Code Section III, paragra:h NS-26E2 under the leadings of internal pressure, cead weign and a :ostulated piping failure of 'luid systems upstream or dcwnstream of the c:ntainment penetration area must not exceed 2.25 S,.
The above criteria is evaluated under loadings resul-ing from ner::a1 and uoset plant cenditions including the CSE.
In addition, augmented inser/ ice inspecticn is recuired :n all piping in the break exclusien area.
The a:clican us: Orovide assurances that their Or teria for :i:i,g d
in ne break ex:lusi:n areas ::moifes
- th ne ecuirements :u linec 1:cve and Oncsa :f Stancarc Review Plan 3.6.2.
.m
,..v.,.-m.,--g.
,mm.,---,----r--,y.,___.,.__,_
- 3.5,2.1.7.1, Page 3.5-15 Are there any Class 2, Class 3 cr 331.1 piping in :ne break exclusien areas? If so, what criteria is used f:r their design?
3.5.2.1.7.1, Page 3.5-15 A lis: Of all systems in the break exclusien area is needed. 3reak exclusien area shcuid be shewn en the appreoriata pi ing drawings.
3.5.2.1.7.2, Page 3.5-15 Frevide an axa.::le Of :ne :e tiled stress analysis d ne :n a welded attacr. ment :: tne process pipe.
In seditien, previce details :f tne stress analysis 4:ne On he head ft: ting f:r :ne main steam line.
3.5.2.2.1, Page 3.5-17 Provide a lis: Of all loca:icns nere limi:ad break :;ening areas have been usec. 'Frtvide 3;stification f:r each Iccation and de a'Is :f any inelas-1: analysis usec.
3.5.2.2.1, : age 3.5-17 Provide a lis: Of all 1 cati:ns ahere tr'zak cening times grea:ar than l
- ne millisec:nd have been usec. Provide anc justi#y any ex:eri ental data anc analy fcal inecry.
3.5.2.2.2, age 3.5-20 revi:e assurance :na: all ;c:antia! targe:s are avalua ac =cen ::nsicering
':e wni:.
3.5.2.I.3, Oaje 3.5-20 2" v' e a :sf#*iti:r. #*r l'5i*s
- s**1*
- ani ' a. e s'ti' ar 70 strai7 eve's a Iinec * * *estrai"; ' as!' * *er:f r *.
O
~,,,. - - -.... - -, -, - - -
.n.--
.. 3.5.2.2.2, Page 3.5-20 Piping systems are designed so that plastic instability dces ne: Oc:ur in t.% pipe at the design dynamic and static loads unless damage studies are per# creed which shcw the consequences do not result in direct damage to any essential system or c:meenent. Provide a list of wnere this technique has been used and an examole of the studies perforned.
3.5.2.3.1, Page 3.5-23 It is the staff's ;csition that wnen evaluating je: impingement 1: ads all :otentiai targets must be evaluated. Provice assurances nat ycur analysis f:r je imoingement effects have included all :ossible targe 3.
l 3.5.2.3.1, Dage 3.5-29 What servica limits are used f:r ;i;ing wnen e/aluating jet imoingement leads?
3.5.2.3.1, Page 3.5-30 l
Mcw is it determined that the dynamic lead fac:ce (':LF) is suitacle?
Provide an examole of its use.
3.5.2.3.1, Page 3.5-30 For snubcers, wna: are the *other simultanecus leads" ::a tre ::mcined by the 3RSS methed?
.---.,.._.----.,-...n a-
--.,~.-,,,...,,_._.,,-,,,~,-,,.---,,-,.-<--,,._--,-,-_n_
n.n,,,,,,
_g,_---,,,,-.-.,.--
~
-a -
3.5.2.3.3, Page 3.5-33
- Piping integrity usually dcas not depend upon ne pipe wnip restraints for any leading ccmcination. List all those locations where integrity of the piping depends upon the pipe wnip restraints.
3.5.2.3.3, Page 3.5-33 What service limits are used in the design of the of pe ahis restraints?
3.5.2.3.3.1, Page 3.5-33 What critical lcca:icns inside centainment art enitored curing hc:
functional tes:ing?
3.5.2.3.3.1, Page 3.5 40 Any locations where the increase in the yield or ultimate strengths, of the matarial used fcr pipe whi; restraints, exceeds 10% must be identified.
Justiff caticn for any increasa greater than 10% must aisc be pr0vided.
3.5.2, Tables Pr: vide a schedule for the c:meletten of any table tha i s inccmclete.
i l
3.5.2, Figure 3.5-55 Art all ;c'stulated break Iccations in the recirculation system snewn?
3.5.2,.:igures 3.5-71, 3.5-73, 7.3-71, 3.5-77, 3.5-78, 3.5-79, 3.5-60 Where are breaks postulatad in these figures?
l 3.5.2, :igure 3.5-75 Indicate the location of valves in this line.
.- -,.----.,.---.. --.._,-,,,.,.,,.,. ---,,-. -..,..,,.----..,,-,,,- --,,-, n, - - - - -, -,.,,
l l
.g.
l 3.7.3 Seismic subsystem analysis 1
3.7.2.1.2.5, Page 3.7-11 l'he discussien on *Different Seismic Movement of Interconnectad l
I Comcenents requires scme clarification.
- The stresses thus obtained fcr
~
d each natural mode are then superimposed for all medal displacements of the structure by the SRSS (square rect sum of the scuares) method." Provide an example of wnat was done here.
3.7.2.1.2.5, Page 3.7-11 What criteria was used to determine ahether :r not a twe eas significan ?
I 3.7.2.1.2.5, Page 3.7-11 1
'"When a ::mcenent is covered by ne ASME Sciler and Pressure Vessel Ccde, the s:nsses due to relative displacement as catained above are treated as secencary stresses. ' Cces nis statement :ertain Oc pising or succor:s ?
l i
3.7.3.1.1, 3 age 3.7-20
Seismic analyses were :erf rmed for those sui:, systems that ::uld be
- cdeled o correctly precict :ne seismic res:ense. ' What precedure was used for the other systems? Provide in example of scme Of -hese systems.
3.7.3.1.1, Page 3.7-21
'What is meant by Cicsely s: aced in ;hase medesd?
l 3.7.3.2.i, Page 3.7-21 Mew many stress tycles are Jsec in -".e 3CE !asign?
'T
- ~m3
.a, p
e.e-~m -
- p. y, w,pe
- + _ -
.-,-.-.--,,,,,e--.
,,,--n-----
O
... 3.7.2.3.2.1, Page 3.7-23 Par: (a) discussing dec:upling of main steam and branch lines is not a criteria.
3.7.3.3.2.2, Page 3.7-24 Mentien is made of using 33 hert: as a frequency cut:ff for seismic At some point in the.3AR the acoifcant.ust address the n
analysis.
frecuencies of 50 t: 50 her : and greater than c:me from ne suporession
- col hydr: dynamics.
3.7.3.5, Page 3.7-25
'Fer flexicle ecui:=ent, tne ecuivaien static icad is taken as the
- r
- cuct Of 1.5 times the ecui; cent mass and the ;eak flect res:ense s:ectrum value.* Regulat:ry Guide 1.100 alicws -he use of the 1.5 fac: r f:r verifying the integrity Of frame type structures.
For ecui: ment having c:nfigura:icns ::ner ::an a frame type structure, justifica:fcn is recuired f:r use Of :ne 1.5 factor.
l 3.7.3.7.1, Fage 3.7-25 Wha: rececure is used f:r ::::ining :losely s acec meces :f systems in :ne 3CP sc::e?
I l
i i
3.7.3.7.2, Page 3.7-25 The c.ferenced ecuati:n shcuid te as fol' ws
~N N
'1/2 T T. ' R< 4 t=
3
<3,
l
..<= 1
- =1 2
I o
r
. ~
l
-11 3.7.3.3.1, Page 3.7-23 1
Justification mst be provided that the adeling of valves with off-set motor operstars is detailed enough to provide acceleration values to be used for valve qualificatien.
3.7.3.3.1, Page 3.7-23
- !n addition, tne effects of the medes not included sre adced to -he SRSS rescense as one term, using the accelerstien at the hignest frequency from the SRSS rescense under 33 her*: to cetain the :ctal rescense."
P nvide an exa:cle of na.vas dcne here.
Tacle 3.7-11, Page 3.7-54 Provide a detailed explanatien of the informaticn in thf s table.
I l
1 i
I
-~.,-,,,re.,,-.. - - - - - --..,--.,-- --
av,--
,-wg
,-w--,--
i l 1 1
l i
3.9 MECHANICAL SYSTEMS AND COMFCNE.173 l
3.9, Page 3.9-1 Any references to the ASME Soiler and Pressure '/essel Cece should
. indicate wna ; art is being referenced.
(
3.9.1.2, Page 3.9-1 Methods of verification are required for all NSSS : meuter :: des l
used in the 1 alysis.
t i
3.9.1.2.5, Page 3.9-16 All ::meutar programs used in the design and analysis of systems and ccmcenants witnin the 3CP sc:pe must be lis sd. Me:neds :f verifica-tien are recuired for all SCP programs.
l l
3.9.1.4.72, ? age 3.9-25 It is stated that alastic-plas:ic re:necs of analysis may te used i
for scme ::mcenents. We.:uld lika to review Md analysis ;r::acures t
l l
that would be used if an elastic-plastic analysis was cone.
1 3.9.2, Page 3.9-27 i
More detail is needed fer tne NSSS anc 3CP precceraticnal vibratien testing
- rogram. What locations will be mcnitored. What tyces of instruments:'on will be used. What are the actual values that will be used for deflec: don and stress if mits.
The staff's :osition is tha accac ance limits for vibr's-i:n should be based :n half Of One encuranca limit as define: by -he 35ME C:ce a-j 105 :ycles. We will require a :: y :f / cur results '-tm y ur :reecers-icnal i
i vibratien :estf nq r: gram.
1 I
i
,c
-r-,-w-,
i
_ 3.9.2.1.2, Page 3.9-29 "The piping system dcas 'snakedcwn' after a few thermal expansion cycle <." Provide an explanation of tais statement.
3.9.2.4, Page 3.9-65
- In additien to the above components, vibration measurements of the core spray sparger will be measured during preccerational testing of that system at the designated oratotype 251 SWR /S plant (Grand Gulf)."
Show new this is acclicacle to Ferry.
3.9.2.4.1, Page 3.9-66 Provide a ::mmi ment that ?arry will be in ::mcliance with ?.egulat:ry Guide 1.20 for prototype reactors.
3.9.2.5, Page 3.9-67
'These ;ericcs will'be determined fr m a ::mcrehensive dynamic medel of the RPV and internals with 12 degrees of freedgm.* It is not clear what is actually dcne here. - Few can a model be ::merehensive and have caly 12 degrees of freedem?
3.9.2.5, Page 3.9-68 It accears that some results frem Grand Gulf will be used in the evaluation and qualification of :he reactor internals at Perry. Shcw that the similarity between the two sets of internals is sufficient to allcw direct ccmcarisons.
3.3.3, Page 3.9-68 Several references are mace :nreugneu: :nis sacticn :: ai::wa:le stresses for bel:ing. Scecifically,,na: alicwacie stress limits are ussd inr bol-ing for (a) ecui: ment ancncrage, (b) :: :enen succcc:3, and (c) flanged :ennec: tens? Where are :nese lini s cefinec?
r w
14-3.3.3.1.2, Fage 3.3-73 Are there any Class 1 systems in the 3CP sc:pe of res;cnsibility?
3.9.3.4.1, Fage 3.9-107 "For the NSSS scope of supply, all valve Ocerators wnich are mcuntad on Class 1 aiping will not be used as attachment points for ccmcenent succor:s.* -What about Class 2 and 3 piping? This ;uestien also acclies to the 3CP se:pe of res;cnsibility.
3.3.3.4.1, Page 3.3-109 Provide more detail en the testing dcne en snubters.
3.3.3.4.4, Page 3.9-112 What elastic-olastic analysis has been dcne en supccr s? Provide an exaxcle :f this analysis.
3.9.4.3, ? age 3.9-114 Reference is made to allowable deforma:1cn in the tit!e of this secticn but there is no discussion of alicwaole defarma: Tons in the text.
3.9.5.1.1.3, Page 3.9-120 l
Recently, crackinc has been coserved in SWR je: pu=c hoiddown :eams.
The resolution of this preolem may affect' the design er testing of :ne Per y fet pumcs (see :1E 3u11etin 80-07).
3.9.5.1.1.10, Page 3.9-121
,3; =.,
Whatfeeeva:ers;argerdesi9njisusaca:?erry? Frevide a ::=ni en:
- o NUREG-0619.
1 l
l l
,n,-
-,,--.m---
,,,,,_,..,,,.n. _..,, - - -,,,,.
-,..._..,._-...,n
_ 3.9.5.3.3, ? age 3.9-129 Have the reactor internals placed in tne Other interna 13 category been seismically analyzed to show that they will not compromise the integrity of seismically qualified reactor internals?
3.9.5, Fage 3.5-131 Thers are several safety systems c nnected to the react:r c:clant pressure boundary that have design pressure :elew tha rated reac:Or c:olant system (RCS) ;rtssure. There are also scme systems wnich are ra:ad at fv11 reac:ce Ortssure On the discharge sice of Oumes but have ;ume suction belcw RCS pressure.
In order to pretac: these systams fr:m RCS Ortssure, two or mers isola:icn valves are placed in series :: f:rm the interface be: Ween the hign pressure RCS and :ne icw :ressure systems. The leak-:ign: intagrity of these vaives must be ensured by :eriedi: leak testing :: prevent exceeding the tesign petssure of the icw :ressure systems
- nus causing an intarsystem LCCA.
?rtssdre isolation valves are recuired to be category A or AC :er IWV-2CCO and to mee: :ne accrocriate recuirementy of IWV-2220 of Secticn XI of :ne ASME C0de except as discussed beicw.
Limiting Cencitiens for C; era:icn (LCG) are required to be acced to
- ne tecnnical s ecificaticn wnich will require corrective action; f.e..,
snu:cewn or system isolation wnen the final approved leakage limits are not met. Also, surveillance requirements, wnich will stata :ne acce table leak rate :asting frequency, shall be provided in the :achnical specifica:icns.
Periedic leak tasting Of each pressure isoistien valve is recuired be ;erformed at least once car each refueling cutage, after vaive maintenance Orier to return Oc service, and for syste.9s rated at less nan 50% of RCS design :rt<sure eacn time :ne valve nas Icvec ' rem i s fuiIy closed :osition unless justifica:f cn is given. The :asting interval sncuic average accroxima:eiy One year. Laak :as:ing sacuid also be :er':rmec after all :f sturcances to :ne valves are c oie:a, :rior to -sacntng :cwer
- ceration f:11cwing a refueling :utage, maintenance, e' :.
l c
I i
~
.. ~. - _. -,
l The staff's present ;csitten en leak rati limiting c:ncitiens for cceration must be ecual o or less : nan 1 gallon :er minute for each valve (GPM) to ensure the integrity of the valve, demenstrate tne adequacy of the redundant pressure iscia:icn function anc give an indication Of valve degradatien over a finite period of ;fme.
Significant increases
^
over this limiting valve would be an indi;stien of valie degradatien from cae test to another.
Leak rates hignc.- Onan 1 GPM dill be ::nsiderec if the jeak rate
- nanges are belcw 1 GPM above the prevf eu: test teak rate or system cesign
- recludes easuring 1 3FM with sufficient accuracy. These 1
- ems will :e
.eviewee en a :sse by :sse basis.
The Class 1 to Class 2 beuadary will be censicered the isolation point nich must be Or:tected by recuncant isola:fcn valves.
a In cases nhere :ressure isolaticn is provided by two valves, bc:n will be inde:endent'y leak tested. When three r :cre valves ;revice isolatien, Only two of :ne val <es neec to be leak :estec.
?revice a lis of all pressure isola:icn valves included in ycur testing program alcng with f:ur Ie s Of Piping ah' :nstrumen: Diagrams d
wnica bescribe your reactor c:alant system pressure isola:icn valves.
Also discuss in detaii hcw your leak testing Or: gram wili ::nf:rm to One acove staff positien.
Tacle 3.9-1, Page 3.9-134 Oces this table acply to Perry?
Taole 3.9-1, ? age 3.9-135 What does *l "d refer 0?
Tacie 3.3-1, ? age 3.9-135
?cw many A05 cycles are included in the design :f :erry?
,n
~--
+ - -
.- Ta:le 3.9-1, ?nge 3.9-126 Standarc Review Plan 3.9 requires i CSEs Of 10 cycles each.
If fewer cycles are used, ju: ification must be provided.
Tacle 3.9-3, ?nge 3.9-141 The accactance critaria shculd reference the AS.ME Ccde Service Limits.
A similar table is needed fer the 3CP.
e Table 3.9-3a, Page 3.9-143
- The results f stress anc fatigue usage analysis are given in detail in the vessel manufacturer's stress recer; and in new 1: ads evaluatien by SE within the c:de limits.* Provide ciarificati:n :f :nis sta: ament.
Tacle 3.9.3m, 3.9.30, 3.9.34 and 3.9.3h Scme values in :nese tacles are missing. Pr;vice a schedule f:r their ccmcie: ion.
Table 3.9-3s, ?nge 3.9-225 Provice an explanaticn f:r the resul s in :nis table.
Table 3.9-23, Page 3.9-232
'Where are the 1 cads used in this table befinec?
tre these leads ::moined?
I Table 3.9-32, Page 3.9-297 Has Ec. :) :een used? :f so, :r;vi:e the sa:ccrting :a a.
no, deista ne ecua icn frem :ne :a:1e.
Tacle 3.9-33, 3 age 3.9-298 Have I:s. e), f), Or ;) :een usac?
f sc, Or; vide ne succerting
- a:a.
- f net, delete nesa acua-icns # rem ne a:le.
i e
i
,e..
.a4 y
v.
9 9
g
-r,.-9
,y,.y
_m,.
-,--.m..---.-,_-m
-r--,,w y -- -,.
9y
1 l
-l a-l Tacle 3.9.24, Page 3.9-301 Has Eq. c) been used. If so, provide the sucperting data.
If not, delete :.ie ecuation from the table.
ACOIT'CNAL CUEITICNS Table 3.2-1, Page 3.2-9
'4 hat design requirenents were used in the design of :ne core succor:
structures?
3.5.2.1.5, ?tge 3.5-13 Regardless of the ratic of longitudinal to hoop stress, bc:n a icngi:udinal soli and a circumferential treak shculd be :cstulated at any 1:ca icn wnere the :umuistive usage facter is greater : nan 0.1.
- 3. 9.1.1.1, inge 3.9-1 Mcw many cycles due s SRY disenarge are included in :ne anaiysis?
3.9.2.5, ?nge 3.9-67 Previous analyses for other nuclear plants have shewn tha: ar:ain reactor system ccepenents and their supports may be subjected :: previcusly under-resui: from :he astimated asymmetric 1 cads under the c:ndi icns tha f
postulation of ruptures of the reactor c:clant piping at varicus Icestions.
The applicant has described be design of the'reactar internais for I
bicwcewn 1 cads enly. The a:plicant shculd also provide inferna:fcn en
- is, therefore, necessary Oc reassess the ca: ability of asymmetric icads.
tresa reac :r sys am ::m:enents :: assure Ona: the calcula:ad dynamic asymme ric 1: ads resui:ing fr:m :hese :cs uistac pipe ruptures will be witnin the reac::e :an :e brougn:
the tcunds necassary Oc previce hign assuranca tha:
The react:r system ::m:enents :na:
safely Oc a cold shu:dewn c:ndition.
l recuire reassessmen; scall include:
l 9
s
_. 1.
Reac ce pressure vessel b.
Core sucports and other reac:cr internals c.
Centrol red drives d.
ECCS piping that is attached to the primary :: clan: picing e.
Primary c:clant piping f.
Reacter vessel supports The fcilowing informatica shculd be included in the FSAR accu the effects of postulated asynee:ric LCCA leads en the above mentioned reacecr system ::mcenents and the varicus cavity structures.
1.
Provide arrangement drawings of the reac::r vassal supper sys ams in sufficient detail to show the gecmetry of all principal elements and materiais of cens:ructien.
2.
If a plant-specific analysis will not be submitted for your plant, provide supacrting informati:n to demcnstrate that -he generic plan:
analysis under ::nsideratien acequataly bouncs the postuia:ac accidents at your facility.
Include a ccm: arisen of the gecee:ric, structural mecnanical, and thermal-hydraulic similarities.between ycur facility and the casa analy:ed. Discuss the effects Of any differencas.
3.
Consider all postulated breaks in the reac ce c:ciant ;iping system, including the fcilowing 1cca icns:
1.
Steam line noz:les to piping terminal ends.
b.
Feecwater noz:la to piping :arminal ends, c.
Recircula:icn inlet and outlet ncz:les to recirculation piping tarminal ends.
Provide an assessment of the effects of 1 symmetric pressure differentials
- cn the systams and : mpenents listad abcve in ::=bina:icn aith 111 external 10acings inclucing safe snuticwn earthcuaka icads and ::her
, 31cwecwn je: forces 1: the loca:icn Of the ructure (reacticn ?:r:ss),
ransien: cifferential pressures in :ne annular e:gien :e: ween :ne ::m:ccen-and ne 4ali, anc transien: differen-tal ;ressures acr ss :ne : re :arrel within :ne reac r vessel.
,.--,,,.-,.,n-..
__ faulted ::ndition leads for tne postulated breaks described acove. This assessment may utili:e the follcwing mechanistic effects as appifcabie:
a.
Limited displacement -- break areas b.
Muid-stmcture intaraction c.
Actual time-depencent forcing function d.
Reac:Or support stiffness e.
Break opening times.
~
4.
If the results of the assessment en item 3 above indicata Icacs leacing to inelastic acticn of these systems or displacemen exceeding ;revicus design limits, provide an evalua:fcn of ne ineinstic behavi:r (inciucing strain harcening) of the material used in ne system design and the effect of the lead transmit:ad to the backu: structures :: which :hesa systams are attacned.
5.
cr all analyses cerfemed, include the me:hed of analysis, the structursi and hycraulic c:=putar c: des am:1cyed, drawings Of the cdeis em:!c.<ed and ::m arisens of the calculatad to allcwable stressas and strains Or deflections with a basis f:r the allewable values.
Cemenstrate that safety-reia ad ::m;cnen s wiU1 retain their structursi 5.
integrity when subjected to the c:mbined 1: ads resulting from the less-
.s of-c:clant accident and the safe shu:dewn -artnquake.
7.
Cemenstrata the 'unt:icnal capability of any essential piping wren subjected :o the c:mbined leads resulting frem the I:ss-of-c clan:
acciden and :ne safe shutdown eartacuake.
The apolicant has cu lined his approach for detamining -he forcing func 1:ns c:nsidered in.ne system and ccmcenent dynamic analyses of mac:cr structures for nomal Ocers-icn and anticicatad transients. Thesa me:heds are a :mcinati:n :f analyticai methods and :redicticns tased en :ata fmm
- revi:usly tastad reac :r internais cf a similar design. The f:rcing func:fon inf:matien is ::mcined with dynami =ccal analysis to form a basis for in ar re:ati:n Of :ne prs, erstienal anc initial star uc tast resu! 2.
. decal stressas are calcu!atac anc relati:nships are :::aine be%een senscr res:enses anc :eak ::=cenent stresses f e each Of :ne I:wer cces.
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3.9.3.3-2. cace 3.9-106 w atz s.s Prohide justification for using a.T.cdified static **&emoos on the safety relief valve cioing in the suceressicn : col and explain wnat is used for the
- conservative dynamic load factor" in the analysis.
Provide the time-nistory transient forces resulting frem the SRV actuaticn used in the SRV piping and sucocrt desten including the loads develooed frem tne discharging water slug.
Discuss the types of sucocrts used on the SRV piping in both the drywell
_ad suceressien pool and Oravide drawings of the sucoce:s.
Dravide the type of safety relief valhes used in the plant, the Yalhe ocening time, and the secuences of valve actuation used in the analysis.
3.9.3.A.6, cage 3.9-113 Are the stress due to differential ancncr 7.ovements considered as crimary Or sec:ncary stresses for 3CP succerts?
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n-TO ALL APot.! CANTS:
Due to a long history of problems dealing with inoperable and incorrectly installed snubbers, and due to the potenttal safety significance of failed snuacers in safety related systems anc components, it is re:;uested that maintenance records for snubbers be documented as follows:
Pre-service Examination A pre-service examination should be made on all snubbers listed in tables 3.7 44 and 3.7 45 of Standard Technical Scecifications 3/4.7.9 This exami-nation should be made after snubcer installdtica but not more taan six months prior to initial system pre-operational testing,.nd should as a simimum verify the following:
(1) There are no visible signs of damage or imcaired operability as a result of storage, handling, or installation.
(2) The snubber location, orientation, positicn setting, and configuratien (attacntnents, extensions, etc.) are ac: ceding to design drawings and specifictions.
(3) Snubbers are not sei:ed, fro:en er jansned.
(4) Adecuate swing clearance is previced to allow snubber movement.
(5) If aoplicable, fluid is to the ree:nnended level and is no leaking from the snu ber system.
(6) Structural connections such as sins, fastaners and c ner conne::ing hardware such as lock nuts, tabs, wire, ::tter pins are installed r
c:rrectly.
l If the ;eriod between the initial pre-service examination and initial system pre-ocerational test exceeds six months due :: unex:ected situations, re-examination of items 1,2, and 5 shall be performed. Snuboers which are installed inecerectly or otherwise fail :: meet the above requirements mus be re; aired or replaced and re-examined in ac:Ordance with the above criteria.
Dre-Ocerational Testine During pre-coerational testing, snuober thermal movements for systems whose coerating tamperature exceeds 250* F should be verified as foli:ws:
(a) During initial system heatup and :coldown, at specified temperature intervais for any system which attains operating temperature, verify l
tne snutter ex:ected thermal movement.
f ~w) Fcr these systems nni:n do nct attain ::erati i 25:3P1 af8 Vi?' Y7 via observation anc/cr calculation that the snubber 4111 ac::rxneca:e One ;r0fec:ac :nermal movement.
(:) Verify :ne sna::er swing clearance at 3:ect'iec neatu: and ::ci:cwn intervals. Any discre:encies or inconsistencies snail be evaluatec # r
- ause and :Orrectec price to ;r::eecing 2 -he next 5:ecifisc in*erval.
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The above described operability program for snubbers should be included and documented by the pre-service inspection and pre-operational test t
programs.
The pre-service inspection must be a prerequisite for the pre-operational testing of snu:ber thermal nation. This test program should be specified in Chapter 14 of the FSAR.
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110.0 MECHANICAL ENGINEERING BRANCH It is the staff's position that all essential safety-related instrumentation lines should be included in tne vibration monit: ring program during pre-operational or start-up testing. We require that cither a visual or instrumented inspection (as appropriate) be c:n-ducted to identify any excessive vibration that will risult in fatigue f&ilure.
Provide a list of all safety-related small bore piping and instrumentation lines that will be included in the initial test vibration monitoring progrun.
The essential instrumentation lines to be inspected shculd include (but are not limited to) the follcwing:
.a) Reactor pressure vessel level indicat:r instrumentation lines (used for monitoring both steam and water levels).
b) Main steam instrumentation lines for monitoring main.
steam flow (used to actuate main steam isolation valves during high steam flow).
c) Reactor c re isolaticn cooling (RCIC) instrumentation lines on the RCIC steam line cutside containment (used to monitor high steam flew and actuate isolation),
d) Control red drive lines inside c:ntainment (not ncrmally pressuri:ed but required for scram).
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- M MECHANICAL ENGINEERING RRANCH There are several safety systems connected to the reactor coolant pressure boundary that have design pressure below the rated reactor coolant system (RCS) pr:ssure. There are also some systems which are rated at full reactor pressure en the discharge side of pumps but have pump suction below RCS pressure. In order to protect these systems from RCS pressure, two or more isolation valves i
are placed in series to form the interface between the hign pressure RCS and the low pressure systems. The leak tight integrity of these valves must be ensured I
by periodic leak *.asting to prevent exceeding the design pressure of the low l
pressure systems thus causing an inter-system LOCA.
Pressure isolation valves are required to be category A or AC per IW-2C00 and to meet the appropriate requirements of IW-3420 of Section XI of the ASME Code except as discussed below.
Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) are required to be added to the technical specifications which will require corrective action f.e., shutdown or system isolation when the final approved leakage limits are not met. Also surveillance recuirements, which will state the acceptable leak rate testing frequency, shall be provided in the technical specifications,.
Periodic leak testing of each pressure isolation valve is required to be perfomed at least once per each refueling outage, after valve maintenance prior to return to service, and for sys' ems rated at less than 50% of RCS design ;ressure each time the valve has moved kom its fully closed position unless justification is given. The testing interni should average to be approximately one year. Leak testing should also be performed after all disturbances to the valves are complete, prior to reaching p::wer operation follcwing a refueling outage, maintenance and etc.
The staff's present position on leak rate limiting conditions for aceration must be equal to er less than 1 gallon per minute for each valve (GpM) to ensure the integrity of the valve, demonstrate the adequacy of the redundant pressure isolation function and give an indication of valve dagradation over a finite period of time. Significant increases over this limiting valve would be an indication of valve degradation from one test to another.
Leak rates higher than 1 GPM will be considered'if the leak rate changes are below 1 GPM above the previous test leak rate or system design precludes measuring 1 GPM with sufficient accuracy. These items will be reviewed on a case by case basis.
The Class I to Class 2 boundary will be considered the isolation point which must be protected by redundant isolation valves.
In cases where pressure isolation is provided by two valves, both will be inde-pendently leak tested. When three or more valves provide isolation, only two of the valves need to be leak tested.
l Provide a list of all pressure isolation valves included in year testing program along with four sets of Piping and Instrument Diagrams which describe ycur reactor coolant system pressure isolation valves. Also discuss in detail how your leak testing program vill confom to the above staff position.
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