ML20004D428
| ML20004D428 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 06/05/1981 |
| From: | Colbert W DETROIT EDISON CO. |
| To: | Kintner L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| EF2-53473, NUDOCS 8106090388 | |
| Download: ML20004D428 (41) | |
Text
_ - -
c'.
%/ f
~
r r~
f D
lls a Deholt a
Cd r d'((
!g 2000 Secona Avenue
=
0 Jggf f._
's. Q;v" ! i (313) 29-a000
.an /* * '
R Cetroit. M.cncqan 48226 y' 3 w
June 5, 1981 5
foer f g EF2 - 53473
. w, x,
Mr. L. L. Kintner
/N Division of Project Managemant Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Conunission Washington, D. C.
20555
Dear Mr. Kintner:
Re ference: Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341
Subject:
Responses to Outstanding Open Issues on Fermi 2 Docket Please find enclosed several items responding to NRC questions. This information will be included in a forthcoming FSAR amendment.
Item 1 PSB Q222.55 through 222.62 Diesel Generators Detroit Edison's responses to these questions are enclosed as.
Item 2 EQB Haughey Question II.E.4.2 - Purge and Vent Valve The response to Mary Haughey's question en purge and vent valve operability is enclosed as Attachment 2.
Item 3 CSB Lane Question Debris Screens and Recombiners The respot.se to John Lane's questions are enclosed as Attachment 3.
Mr. Lane should also be provided a copy of Attachment 2 - Purge Question.
I l
Ite-4 Verbal 6/2/81 Q042.25 - Nitrogen Inertin; Line
(
The response to this verbal question is enclosed as Attachment 4 00(
hlI 8106090js?
[
l
Page 2 Letter to:
L. L. Kinter June 5, 1981 EF2-53473 Item 5 Verbal Question 6/3/81 Q042.49 - Debris Screens The response to this verbal question is enclosed as Attachment 5.
Please refer also to Attachment 2 above.
Item 6 RSB 15.5.2.2 ODYN Remnalyssis Detrait Edison's response to this open item is enclosed as Attachment 6.
Item 7-MIEB 5.2.8.7 Pre-Service Inspection Program Detroit Edison has prepared a new FSAR Section 5.2.8.7 covering the Preservice Inspection Program. A draft copy has been enclosed as.
Item 8 PSB Q222.48 Diesel Generator - Colt Test Results Commitment Detroit Edison will supply documentation on the piping modification and test run as detailed on Attachment 8.
Item 9 CEB Q281.5, 281.7 Chemical Technolog",
Detroit Edison has made two minor revisions to these responses as 1
detailed on Attachment 9.
- Sinceriy,
'b f
,r /
William F. Colbert Technical Director Enrico Fermi 2 RMB Attachments
Letter to:
L. L. Kintner June 5, 1981 Page 3 bec:
L. W.
Schuerman F. E. Gregor J. Honkala E. Lusis A. E. Wegele R. M. Berg Document Control GED/16/4.5
krr&Wm6sr-I EDG QUESTIONS 6/cg (J4'7p QUESTION The FSAR text and Table 3.2-1 states that the components and piping systems 222.55 (3.2) for the diesel generstor auxiliaries (fuel oil system, cooling water, lubri-(9.5.4)
(9.5.3) cation, air starting, and intake and combustion system) that are mounted on (9. 5. 6)
(9.5.7) the auxiliary skids are designed seismic Category I and are ASME Section III (9.5.8)
Cbss 3 quality. The engine mounted components and piping are designed and manufactured to DEMA s tandards, and are seismic Category I.
This is not in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.26 which requires the entire diesel gener-ator auxiliary systems be designed to ASME Section III Class 3 or Quality Group C.
Provide the industry standards that were used in the design, manu-
- f. eture, and inspection of the engine mounted piping and components. Also show cn the appropriate P&ID's where the Quality Group Classification changes from Quality Group C.
TsF.9PONSE The engine mounted piping and components, other than those designated as 222.55' (9.5.5)
ASME Section III, Class 3 are designed, manufactured, and inspected in ac-cordance with DEMA Standards (Diesel Engine Manufacturer's Association).
af' <aYe.d The FSAR figures 9.5-2 and 3 are being-w to show the w piping classes.
JRG/nkk June 4, 1981 QUESTION You state in Section 9.5.5.2 each diesel engine cooling water system is 222.56 provided with an expansion tank to provide for system expansion and for (9.5.5) venting air from the system.
In addition to the items mentioned, the ex-pansion tank is to provide for minor system leaks at pump shaf t seals, valve stems and other components, and to maintain required NPSH on the system circulating pump.
Provide the size of the expansion tank and loca-tion.
Demonstrate by analysis that the expansion tank size will be adequate to maintain required pump NPSH and make up water for seven days continuous
~
. 222.56 operation of the diesel engine at full rated load without makaup, or (9.5.5) provide a seismic Category I, safety class 3 make up water supply to the expansion tank.
RESPONSE
The cooling water expansion tank for each diesel angine has a capacity f 57 gallons. The manufacturer considers this tank size to be adequate 9
5) for seven (7) days of continuous full load operation under normal condi-tions.
The expansion tank must be located above the highest point of the engine cooling system (elev. 601 ft.) to provide NPSH. The bottom of the ex-pansion tank is located at an elevatior. of 603 feet and thereby provides adequate NPSH.
JRG/nkk June 4, 1981 QUESTION For the diesel engine lubrication system in Section 9.5.7 describe the 222.57 pr tective features (such as blowout panels) provided to prevent unac-(9.5.7)-
ceptable crankcase explosion, and to mitigate the consequences of such an event.
RESPONSE
The Fairbanks Morse 3STDS-1/8 0P engines, used at Fermi 2, are designed 222.57 (9.5.7) to contain a crankcase explosion. Explosion relief covers are not re-quired. The manufacturer conducted actual crankcase explosion tests (20 lbs. per sq. inch) and then designed the crenkcase inspection cover and fasteners to contain such explosions (100 lbs, per sq. inch). These tests showed that the explosion was not harmful to the engine and posed no danger to the operators.
JRG/nkk June 4, 1981 QUESTION Describe the instrumentation, controls, sensors and alarms provided in 222.58 (9.5.8).
the design of the diesel engine combustion air intake and exhaust system which alert the operator when par ameters exceed ranges recommended by
. the engine manufacturer and describe any operator action required during alarm conditions to prevent harmful offects to the diesel engine.
Discuss systems interlocks provided.
Revise your FSAR accordingly.
(SRP 9.5.8.,
Part III, item 1 & 4).
RESPONSE
The diesel generator air intake and exhaust systems do not require alarm-222.58 (9,5.8) ing of any parameter except for the differential pressure across the in-take filter. An indicator and switch are installed to locally monitor the air intake. filter and alarm in the main control room.
The combustion air intake and exhaust systems have no interlocks.
JRG/nkk June 4, 1981 QUESTION Provide the results of an analysis that demonstrates that the function 222.59 (9.5.8) of your diesel engine air intake and exhaus: system design will not be degraded to an extent which prevents developing full engine rated power or cause engine shutdown as a consequence of any meteorological or ac-cident condition.
Incl
- te in your discussion the potential and effect of fire extinguishing (gaseous) medium, recirculation of diesel ceabustion products, or other gases that may intentionally or accidentally be released on site, on the performance of the diesel generator.
(SRP 9.5.8., Part III, item 3).
Si w EESPCNSE This question is answered in the FSAR.
Monummmmmer* FSAR Sections 8.3.1.1.8.
222.59 (9.5.8) 2.K., 9.5.1.3.4. and 9.5.1.3.7.1.
JRG/nkk June 4, 1981 QUESTION Discuss the provisions made in your design of the diesel engine combustion 222.60 (9.5.8) air intake and exhaust system to prevent possible clogging, during standby and in operation, from abnormal climatic conditions (heavy rain, freezing rain, dus t s torms, ice and snow) that could prevent operation of the diesel generator on demand.
(SRP 9.5.8., ' art III, item 5).
L SPONSE The diesel engine combustion air inlet filter is located inside the RHR 222.60 c mplex structure.
Combustion air is 14,000 CFM of the 8),000 CFM total (9.5.8)
(combustion plus ventilation) admitted through a lovered wall opening and a missle shield. Abno 'al climatir, conditions will not affect the diesel combustion air intake.
The diesel engine exhaust silencer is located on the roof of the RHR com-plex and is surrounded by a missile shield enclosure.
The exhaust silencer is provided with an open drain te relieve any cendensate which may collect chrough the exhaust pipe.
JRG/nkk June 4, 1981 QUESTION Show by analysis that a potential fire in the diesel generater building 222.61 (9.5.8) together with a single failure of the fire protection system will not de-grade the quality of the diesel combustion air so that the remaining diesel will be able to provide full rated power.
T e e.
h" ques tion 20.8 of Ap-
. RESPONSE This question is answered in the FSAR.
222.61 (9.5.8) pendix E and FSAR Section 9.5.1.3. 5.
JRG/nkk June 4, 1981 QUESTION The FSAR text and Table 3.2-1 states that the components and piping systems 222.62 (3.2) f r the diesel generator auxiliaries (fuel oil system, cooling water, lu-(9.5.4) brication, air starting, and intake and combustion sys tem) that are mounted (9.5.5)
( 9. 5. 6)
(9.5.7) on the auxiliary skids are designed seismic Category I and are ASME Section (9.5.8)
III, Class 3 quality. Figures 9.5.2. and 9.5.3. show certain lines for these systems as being designed nonseismic and Quality Group D.
Text, table and drawings seem to be in conflict, clarify this discrepancy, and in particular for the following items pro"ide the requested information and/or comply with the stated positions:
a.
In Figure 9.5-2 the diesel oil storage tank fill and vent lines are
a.
t
- 1.. - ~ '
shown as non-seismic, Quality Group D piping. This is unacceptable.
222.62
)
These lines are necessary for continued emergency diesel engine oper-ation and should be designed seismic. Category I, Quality Group C.
Comply with this position, or justify your present design.
RESPONSE
. FSAR; figure 9.5-2 has been upgraded. The fill and vent lines 'on the 222.62 fuel oil storage tank are Group D, seismicly supported. These lines -
are not required for the initial seven (7) days of emergency diesel operation.
QUESTION b.
In Figure 9.5-2 Sheets 1 and 3 show the clean fuel drain lines from 222.62
~
the injector nozzles and dirty fuel drain lines as being designed non-seismic Quality Group D.
It is unclear from the figure end the FS AR t ext the purpose of these lines. Provide a discussion on the purpose of the if as and to where they are routed. If they are used during engine operation they should be designed seismic Category I, Quality Group C.
Comply with this position, or justify your present design.
RESPONSE
The clean and dirty fuel drain lines are Greap D, sef snicly supported 222.62 up1d./
and FSAR figure 9.5-2 has been agesaded. These lines are not needed for emergency diesel operation. Openended drain lines are routed to the nearest floor drain. All RHR complex drains are routed to the oil settling pond. The lines are used to handle small amounts of engine leakage.
QUESTION c.
Figure 9.5-2 shows a lube oil tank and connecting lines to the diesel 222.62 generator as non-seismic, Quality Group D.
The FSAR text states that a
the tank is used to replenish lube oil to the enigne sump during eng'ine operation. A seismi event would result in the spillage of lube oil in all diesel generator rooms causing a fire hazard. The tank and associated lines seem to be used during engine operation. Therefore, the lines should be designed seismic Category I, Quality Group C.
. Comply with this position, and provide lube oil tank capacity and location, or justify your present desig%
RESPONSE
This line is Group D, seismicly supported and the FSAR figure 9.5-2 222.62 ap 4 v-d has been W. The engine lube oil sump provides three (3) days of lube oil supply at full rated engine power. Additionally, low level in either the tank or sump is alarmed. The lube oil tank capacity is 275 gallors and the tank is located in the diesel oil storage room.
QUESTION d.
Figure 9.5-3 shows the jacket coolant water system vent lines (two) 222.62 and the equalizing line to the expansion tank as non-seismic, Quality Group D.
This is unacceptable. A seismic event would result in the loss of water to all diesel generators. These lines are necessary for continued emergency diesel engine operation and should be designed seismic Category I, Quality Group C.
Comply with this position, or justify your present design.
RESPONSE
These lines are Group D, seismicly supported and the FSAR figure 9.5-3 222.62 ter</d d has been t M. The expansion tank is seismically supported and was hydrostatically tested.
QUESTION e.
Figure 9.5-3 shows the diesel engine exhaust lines as non-seismic 222.62 Quality Group D.
This is unacceptable. The exha,/ust system should be designed seismic Category I, Quality Group C.
Comply with this position or provide justification for non-compliance.
RESPONSE
The exhaust lines are Group D, seismicly supported and FSAR figure 9+s-3 222.62 upff-/
has been ugemaded. The exhaust lines operate at very high temperatures and this piping can not be qualified as Group C.
TTACi+MG&r ;1.
tSf3-S3M*75 Pgm i
-NHMM> QUESTIONS - MARY HAUGHIY QUESTION:
I require formal confirmation of the following for the II.E.4.2 purge and vent vale operability:
- The valves are qualified to close against the buildur of cou-tainment pressure for the LOCA break spectrum and will meet the requirements of the " Guidelines for Demonstration of
~
Operability of Purge and Vent Valves.
9 Valve actuators are qualified to close the valves under the conditions outlined in item 1.
e Valve closure time does not exceed 5 seconds.
e Methods are being used to insure the isolation valve closure I
will not be prevented by debris which could become entrained in the escaping air and stream.
RESPONSE
The purge and vent valves are qualified to close against 62 pSIG and meet the requirements of the " Guidelines for Demonstration of Operabilicy of Purge and Vent Valves". The operators trill' close the valves against the LOCA pressure in five (5) seconds.
The p$ge and vent valves are manufactured by Jamesbury and the opera'. ors are manufactured by Bettis, Limitorque and Jamesbury.
Debris screens are provided inside the drywell for the large purge and vent valves. These screens will preven". -debris from blocking isolation valve closure.
t JRG/dje
- h..
6 /4/81'-
4 kWGNr~ }
GF3 -S3.y9 S.-
_ ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS - JOHN LANE QUESTION:
Whether or not debris screens would be provided on the containment I
purge lines.
RESPONSE
See response to purge questions for debris screens.
QUESTION:
' John Lane (301-492-9420) of Containment Systems Branch indicated that FSAR Reference No. 8 on page 6.2-67 should really be Reference 11.and requests clarification.
Ia addition, he questioned if our recombiners are the same as those provided at Hatch 2 and whether Atomics Inter-national report AI-77-55 was still acceptable.
RESPONSE
Reference 8 on page 6.2-67 should be referr. ace 11.
The Atomics International Report, AI-77-55, is applicable to Fermi 2.
b JRG/dj e 6/4/81
N
' ? A tNv
+gw,.
P' a.
wi,N, l MAGE EVALUATION
~ TEST TARGET (MT-3)
\\
c I.0 lllEnBE
> g t u tt u o na l-l S 5
- b b
~ e.=
/
.8 1.25 1.4 1.6
/
6-
=
=
pflN
//
^
h /%
4 klf,,y 4)h,${flA p'W
-(
i j
i :
1~
C
-~ ~
\\
///
- )
o//
~
S4 IMAGE EVA!.UATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) i e
1.0 582 E4 g m gag m
m l.l $ 5 * $ N 7
1.25 J.4 1.6
/
4_
gu y
///
ll/
- ft ')//
4 % g \\'\\N
/
Ik,,,D/
$Mks;'f f
I i:.
- C.
.,..c__
M.. '
~% ~ ';
~
n...
, o sa.
a no V'^
IMAGE EVALUATION N'
TEST TARGET (MT-3) l.0 5EnIE EEE I.l\\{"IM
__/
1.8 l.25lO!.4 1.6 a,-
5
./
s"
=
l h//
////f h f4%NN
///
4
/
b' 4>
u
-.,. c
...g,.
.,.,.a
AWWWV Sh*}-S149f--
JUNE 3.-1981 ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS QUESTION NO. 7 Edison's response to Question 042.25 (Page E.5.042-31) must i
be revis-d to account for an inerted containment.
The revision should also include appropriate modifications to other FSAR sections such as Table 6.2-2 to indicate this line is a potential bypass leakage pathway.
RESPONSE
The nitrogen inerting supply line is not a bypass leak-age path.
This line is discussed in FSAR Section re spu> e 6.2.1.2.2.3.
Question 042.25 has been revised to reference this section.
The FSAR has been updated to reflect the inerted con-tainment.
These changes are made in Amendment 36.
U.
R. Green
/dk 6-5-81 4
i k&W $
M.P - fJ'/7%
i I
JUNE 3, 1981 ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS QUESTION NO. 8 NRC will require debris screens on the containment purge valves as required by BTP-CSB 6.4 page 6.2-11 in the SRP.
Refer to FSAR Question 42.49.
In addition, Edison will be required to demonstrate the large contain-ment purge valves will be operable during a postulated LOCA.
Finally, a commitment must be made that the Tech Specs will be written to limit valve operation to 90 hours0.00104 days <br />0.025 hours <br />1.488095e-4 weeks <br />3.4245e-5 months <br /> per year.
RESPONSE
This question is. answered as Item II.E.4.2.3.f of Appendix H.
The debris screen and valve operability are covered in a response to Mary Haughtf.
The FSAR r.sf 2c.
Question 42.49 will be revised.
3 J.
R. Green
/dk 6-5-81 t
$ M C M GvT' G EJ'f 71 ODYN REANALYSIS TURBINE / GENERATOR TRIP WITH FAILURE OF THE BYPASS At the request of NRC, Detroit Edison hac performed a sensitivity analysis of Turbine / Generator trip with postulated failure of the bypass flow to the condenser (26% of rated steam flow) using ODYN.
Analysis was performed with input parameters and initial conditions as specified in Table 15-0-1 and systems opegations same as Subsection 15B.2.2.2.2 except that failure of the main turbindi$$Ytem is assumed for the entire transient time period analyzed. Steam flow through the reheater line as depicted in Figure 15B.0.3 of the Fsa?. is included in the anlysis.
The results are summarized in Table 1, which provides the maximum vessel pressure, peak neutron flux, heat flux and operating limit CPR valwes. Figure 1 provides the curves of neutron fluW, flow rates, pressure, etc., typically provided for transients in Chapter 15 of the FSAR.
In addition, Figure 2 provides minimum operating CPR limit versus scram speed.
POST TURBINE TRIP REHEATER STEAM FLOW In response to a request from NRC, the attached (Attachment 2) write up is provided for the purpose of explaining the basis for the reheater steam flow curves previously used in a presentation to the NRC (November 28, 1978 meeting).
GED/16/4.10 l
TABLE 1
SUMMARY
OF RESULTS Maximum Vessel Pressure (Psig) 1212 Peak Neutron Fit $x (% of initial value) 411 Peak Fuel Surface Heat Flux (% of initial value) 114 Operating CPR 1.25* (Option A) & l.15 (Optic B)
Current operating limit on CPR is 1.24.
This is based on Red Withdrawal error as being the most limiting transient.
i e
h 3
\\.
e t
i 6
S e
- Ir((
]
E N
E 3
l N
\\
2 ft QVG FUEt. ROO)'
2 N
E R5 Il C
150.
Ci l'k 'UII' $E '"DUX 3 IIV W.
3 *.AFITY gr,Nf3(%4_t. I tLM1fft FLOH i
- . VE%EL Sf Uut FLOW 4 Id LitF ve vt tList f el 5 DIN 6S vi ivt flow I.
6 Tuftf'It( : IipH f LOW f.)
' g im.hd I-m.
Q a
g,
.I f
/
MM
)A N
50.
5--
100.
f s
U L
I
%g
/
u 0.
'a-6 35 8
$5 O.
2.
4.
6.
U.
- 0. : ' " rb -
)
O.
2.
4.
6.
8.
Titt (SEC1 TIME ISEC8
,/
\\
l o'
I LEVELIIMH-REF-SEF-SMIRT f
I h10RENilvfff*
7 2 W R SEN5rg (ty[g,( gegt)($1
/
2 00tPLER fFACT!vlTT I
200.
3 ti R TFil9 0 t FVfLfINCIESI t/
3 Sr(Nn arm gVITY l
TEtWMtTTLT4T~. I 1.
4 Td1 -
UCTIVI C
.O 5 ORIVE FLtwIi.1 CD E
- 28 100 M 0
^
i' #
Y\\ u Q
0.
O
.t.
4 2
5 1
N
$'.2,....n....
N
- 300,
..i..
4 P
0.
2.
4.
6.
D.
0.
0.8 1.6 2.4 3.2 Titt 15CCI Titat (*ic)
FIC0FE MefT*tIPUPT10&
TUR81NE TRIP WO BP W PDtERTER FLD-e,
..fio..uve 0
.s*
I i
c
[
l i
,i.3s l
us f
I 8.34 1.30 i
6 o-5 115
/....'
RWE t
,/
' 5 120
~~~~~~~~~~~"$~~
~
7s 120
~~
a
/
't N
uof /
/
/.
y/
/
1' 1,S )s,s %#s#
o 6
2
/ g t{
/
$'n need
/
r
=>
E FWCF WITH 26% BP
~
E 1 35,
- jviriinTI s ~'
1 18
~
2 T
14 y/p O
n
'h
'6 TT (Li'.) WITH 13% BP O
'b N
WITH RH
/
y g%
1.10
~~
3.10 h
D MINIMUM OPERATING CPR LIMIT t,
M
$ 7-
~ === EVENT MINIMUM OPERATING CPR LIMIT 8
flA5 I
fM 1.05 i
- ^
=
. _,. s,-Te cr.g-ra c:rs Q,
.m 3
4:<Ts g
r--
M,,
?
?
I g
A _aeLL e e1A2ftL ST-7 q 4 s hi.N
,...,,,g.,
N aa.
/W ~7 CNIN T <Q}
l
\\
FEBMI 2 - POST TJF3DZ TRIP RDEATER SITAM FIIM RESPQ:SE INTPOOLUTIO3 Daring steady-state full pcwer conditions in Fermi 2, ten per cent of the steam flow passes through the reheater. Since this path is upstream of the turbine stop valves, it provides additicnal bypass flow for turbine trip transients.
Since the peak power during such transients depends on the artcunt of bypass avail-able and since the peak power occurs at about one second, a conservative prediction has been made of reheater steam flow during the very early stages of a turbine trip transient described belcw. The study showed that the reheater flow frce the main line heade,r to the reheater tube side will be raintained at its initial full pcwer value or greater until about tw seconds following a turbine trip.
DESCRIPTIO; OF SYSTD1 he Drico Fermi No. 2 reheater and drains syr u.c:t is shcun in Figure 1. A line carries a portion of the : rain steam frcra the main steam manifold to the tube side of two reheaters where condensation occurs. n e heat given up superheats the shell side fluid which is the steam source for the low pressure turbine.
The condensed fluid passes through the reheater seal tank, heater 6, heater 5, the flash tanks, drain purps, and then directly injected into the train feedwater line.
Outlet valves on the seal tank and her.or 6 are centrolled by their respective levels.
High water level in these vessels also opens bypass valves to the ccndenser.
Other fluid paths and volumes are s.%m in Figure 1.
DESCRIPTIO! OF MCCEL l
A mathematical :mdel was developed to si::ulate the Enrico Fermi No. 2 drain system from the steam line manifold to the flash tank. Se rodel is described in the order of fluid flow and is diagra.rned in Fig 2re 1.
System conditicns were taken frcm the heat balance diagram shown in Figure 1.2 - 34 of the Enrico Fermi FSAR (see Figure 2).
l 6
m m
l
?.f-j Steam Line - We steam line pressure response for a turbine trip e
}
with full bypass was used as a ccnservative (on the low side) esti-
{
mate of the reheater flow driving pressure for transients with IMM iypass (see Figure 3).
B rottle and HP Stop Valve - Closes linearity in 0.2 seconds.
e High Pressure Turbine - First order lig with time ocnstant of 0.54 e
seconds.
(English Electric doct..nent package)
Extracticn Flows - Ccnstant fractions of rain steam flow taken frcm e
heat rate conditions.'
f Separator-Reheater Shell Side - Nonlinear transfer function has a e
time constant of three seccnds at full load.
(English Electric
~
j h ent package)
Reheater Heat Transfer - I.u:ged ::cdel (both reheaters in cne it :p) e R
having the following characteristics:
Mtal rass of tube metal = 290,402 lbs.
2 tal CD surface area = 88,712 ft2 l
% tal ID surface area = 54,905 ft2 2tal rass of steam (esturated) = 5,000 lbs.
2 value of 700 to 1000 Btu /ft HR F has been predicted in the literature (1). Based on this, the nodel was executed, using values of 500, 1000, and 2000.
Se reheater-separator shell side steam was considered cne It=p of rass and the tube raterial assur:ed another lurp of rass, each with capacity for storing heat.
Intercept Valves - Close linearly in one seccnd.
e s.
Iow Pressure Turbine - Linear pressure-flow relationship based on heat e
- haiance, i
s a
e O
m.
-I t
Separator termal Ccoditicns - Back calculated, based on LP turbine e
inlet pressure are saturated conditions.
Reheater Seal Tank (RST) - 2e RST was redeled, using the TME sub e
rout
~ihed later). n e liquid portion of fluid in the tank was -
o: Je 50% by volume. % e tank's size is 11.5 feet Icag and 4 feet in dia:aeter. W e level centroller has liquid mass as input (% of initial value) and its cutput redulates the conductance term in the outlet line. We valve was assu: red linear, the centroller was given a gain of 2.0 and the effect of transducers was acccunted for by a first order lag with a time constant of 0.25 seccrds. Valve position followed the controller output. We hi-lirc.'.t emergency line to the ocodenser and its respective control are not modeled because of the short time involved.
Beater 6 - Heater 6 was also redeled, using the tank subroutine. Outlet e
flow was controlled exactly as in the PST. Heat transfer is an algebraic relationship and is a function of respective input ficws, input te.per-A atures and lump terperatures. Flows are used in the heat transfer cal-clulation because the heater tubes are in the vapor portion of the volume
-and very sensitive to input conditiens. The te::perature of the fluid on
.the tube side is ccnsidered ccustant. Each of the two No. 6 heaters is 1542 ft3 and each initially has 91.6 ft3 of water.
Beater 5 - Heater 5 is ro:!eled, using the tank subrcutine. Heat transfer e
is algebraic and is only a functicn of bulk shell side temperature. Each of the two No. 5 heaters is 1732 ft3 and has 274 ft3 of water.
Flash Tank - 2 e flash tank is represented as a constant pressure reser-e voir and a check valve operates between Heater 5 and the flash tank. We check valve sets flow equal to zero when the pressure in the flash tank is greater than the Heater 5 pressure.
Tank Subrcotine - A tank containing fluiii in two phases was mathe a:ically e
modeled, using the conservation of mass, the conservation of energy, and 9
3-
the state relationships. Wis results in two differential equations and eight algebraic equations. W e steam tables were curve-ficted, using the four segments for each variable needed over the range of operation. Wese equatiens were mathematically manipulated so that valves could be directly calculated without internal iteraticus.
Pipe Head loss - Pressure drop, due to friction and valve restrictions, e
was taken into accxnm by considering pressure drops proportional to the square of the ficw rate. Initial conductances were calculated, based on the heat halance data for the reheater steam line and con-necting pipes frcm RST to Heater 6, Heater 6 to Heater 5, and Heater 5 to the flash tanks.
He rodel is written in PL1 and executed through CPS. h e model blcck diagram and basic equations are s.b n in Appendix A.
ASSLS7rICt_:S he cost irgertant assurpticns are:
he tank redule ccnsiders ther::odynamic equilibrium and all liquid and vapor are at saturation.
,%e turbine flow decays as a first order function.
he separator pressure remains constant after the trip. How ver, the rain influence of the reheater after a trip is due to its tube metal rass.
Pit.uvi3PE ne nodel was initialized according to the heat balance informatico s.bn in Figure 2.
A turbine trip conditicn was sirulated by ramping the flow into the high l
pressure turbine to 0 in 0.2 secord and closing the intercept valves in cne secord.
r Once the valves start closing, the pressure in the separator is held cx:nstant.
Also, following a turbine trip, the valve in the line frcm the main steam to the reheater tubes is ra:: ped snut in 30 seccods.
An additional study was made to exarine the effect of control Icep gain settings.
%e reheater seal tank centrol valve was held fixed for one case a.d in a second j
1 M
M l
..-- y wn,em..r w r q m -
.y
~ - > -.
.. - ~
~
~
-,-~m
o O
case, the ocntroller gain was increased fram 2 to 20. In both cases, the re-sultiag effective time constant was about 5.5 seconds, thereby shcwing the response relatively insensitive to level control hetion in this time frame.
RESULTS
'Ihe studf showed that the reheater ficw frce the' main steam line header to the reheater tube side will be maintained at its full power value,or greater,until about two seconds following turbine trip (see Figure 4). 'Ihis is past the time of peak flux for turbine tr'ip transients (see section 153.2 FSAR). ftreover, the reheater flow used in the Chapter 15 pressure transient studies (Figure 15B.0.3 of the Enrico Fermi ESAR) takes no credit for the early increase abcne its initial value as a result of the steam line pressure rise following turbine step valve closure.
NKD:s.
5-6-81 References (1) Heat transfer references:
- Heat Transfer Data Book General Electric by R.H. Norris, etc.
- Handbook of Heat Transfer W.M. Ibbsenow, J.P. Hartnett McGraw-Hill (2) Balance of plant system s"udy to be reported under ERD Project 75D69.
N t
o 4
o
. l
1 i
e l \\
i
. 1
. ' _. _..__.i-3
.l..,
.a i
l l
I.
g t
I I
e I
a i
i i.
i 8
,8 i
D s
.I a
I 1
i.
1 l
i i
i.
.....____.g...
__. 3 y
I
_l
- 1...l.
. g. _..'
n j
i i
i i
e i
1 t
t t
I i
i
,I_..i i
l'_
l'_..
f l
I 42 3 4.,
9 t.
m; E
.s = c.
e e
l l'
l
-6
=
3 i
3 j
i I.
j t
- f j'J jg l
l l'
g.
e f
t......
e 8
t, j
l i
g
- 8
.. =
l j
i j
8 l - !.... :..,
g.
.~,
i I
i.
l s
i i
}
f t
e l__.
3 r
I I
l l
fs I
l
. r -. - -
,=
l I
i I
l
.r t
4 I
l 1r t-g
=
g l
.l
=g
.t
.t.
,...l.
. j....
,s 2
f
'l 3
n t
I g
go g
f-I w.
1 a
=
t 3
2
.l g.
g d
,1 I.
. i...,I :};
E I.
4.
i ww l
g.
e s
k l
2 a
s J
.=* 4 3
2
?
i
. l:
2 g
l
=>
g t
- t 4
=
t 4
g l
s s
i
.l
.I.
I.l i
=g.
o l
f" P00R ORIGINAL
~
.~.
I 6
~ *
.e.=
4 9
+
-e..,_..e-...e._ss..-4.-
g _g
% [
]
50 I
=
n 51 5
]
" 4n o.
s l 2 e
- l
- 1 C
1 e
ym I
g l 42 o,"
3 L
2e 9.E f ! ;.
a" I
e i
- e. g w
-1 A.
I 9 3 *= ;: o x
r
<a 8*
u.
l:;ll.l :li.
1, I
i 3
t 3
In 3:
'.o s us i
i; I i-O t
.i *
[
l3 i..
- e ei o
a
- " I*i"-4 * $,,~ ~ I' il - ~ -
7 ! b ',',
! I'!
U5 o
. r r.
- ti! ' =
. l l
r ilt z -
a 1 -- % {i ' :)% *n 1:
l I
r
-isr
'9, IL a
' lI j;-
"N
!:lt!
cc',.
n:
i, i,2,i d!
-..:=.
1
[II
,,., :;. I
- M ~. =~ i i
f l
q i,j ' t ;-
i 4 2 llI l
i
!_'lj
- *i I
i l
.lt. ; ji j L
.==-d.
-t i
if !:
.;I
[I i ti e
- - ~
. = =. _
. l
.1 1
l i
\\'l(/
l ij'i T
i
/
I I
W:
ill
_r-.-W-e=
t I
i p
lN
/.i\\
I
[..
!$i di
[.. _t. 4=-;l
.==j 1
~
i t i
l1
.i, i a,,
.- --r j l'd;il75n ll[!.=.:.. f. @~
l.
1"3
- i. l'!..;.;.. -u. _ -~ ~=
~ '1
[
]
i:;
(
b_
1],.. q; J
37 -
r I. p.S u
'rr I,
1,
._i. J -
j
.u L..#p. g r.__.
L:.
L]-
s Ci-il
._m: -:
e l-I
.-#..i
.; c:,
y i
i
.,,e 11
~. 7-6 :..r_ : =. =..- ;.
._. ) --
.:--l a.l
...i r,
l
! J,
- ii
.4i=h dl 4
I 'l q;
j%.
Il j'
', ij' L
.=r+-
, 'il
!D F
j ryj.
gj,g
==
_:.m 1 g,
ii
,3
!j in
.;1 3-
- y.. - ';
t';
UI :::::.- = ~.
~7
-lr.-
1,..*f*... -
n.
=.:
-. h
~
- g h.3
- _m...;;
= = =
1.
,l i,
I
~.:. --
n.
'I
- "**}_.
b f
fTl
.g
.~
.Ih..i i, I.I l{
I
,a I;[dg A_.m y, l
i i
ni idyi I. -
12.-t
--=m-
.r
,,,_ h ijUl_
7_
\\w=-. -., ;
._ f ~[a
'~~ ~4 ~
f t--- !8 i
tr i g
i.,
i a
lli n >-,!;
a d
j!
i
.itil t.- : lib; e
1 L
- - -i. '
11iil!i!
= - Q !n st!
.=r-j
- 5..
- .==-.:r' l
P00R ORIGiRAL d
,e
.1
--- y
_4-.,
f
_ 9.t. _ y....
J...
..[.
[e l
.j.4 e
I g4
. -.. g Qu e 2000
/
s 9
..g.y
\\
e e
q e
...g g
B-
--8
..... - g. t
\\
-_.e.....
9 3
.t 6
.g.
g.0 t
i N
g g
g v ' 500.
!... g. -
i-O N
,5 s
i e
x e
!- _..,4 u,= 2 e c o.
O
< - u.. seco.
=
'h
.o O
I 1
3 4
r 4
7 f
9 10 Tikt JCC0005 L
. FIGURE 4 g.-......
l
""2 REHEATER TUBE SIDE FLOW RESPONSE VS TD2 FOR
,i
~~ VAR'.cuS NOMINAL HEAT TRANSFER COEFFICIENTS INSIDE TUBES i
(U
- 'E 'E
~
IN e
...--. Flow 1 per Unit - 1.4 E6 # /hr
~
l
-(1) U I
IN. 500 (2) UIN - 1000 (3) UIN - 2000
=
r....:_...
i g
..v q
_. *.. g oo t ---
el Il r.
't-gg w
i.
A j
i I,-O l
l
\\
1 O
I t
3 4
C s
~1 10
't
?
Tit < t recovor a
.....t I
. Etc'UxF. 3 3
s' t
t -
eEF2 STEAstI.INE MAM!FCLD PRESSURE VS TDIE
\\
w 7 pw.
'r N '-.
=M T.
.u I
j l
APPENDIX A
/
e I
e o
e e-as 9
e l
\\
i m
?DDR ORIGINAL
~
.. ~....
l Ii;j z STPAsr FLco l'
f eer LP TT TuR8:wg ttntAtta Tunst#E a
ll Pm cmt runmt
/.
eTet M.Hn:
[
naid ad.2 :rc Mr..
Mr.or j 3.nd 0 *'t A
(T(4%
l
\\,
gh). "
^
b\\b\\Y z-c v.m t ---
- o,.,
7WLI * !f'-
r Tavm_
_1 TRTE)
Y j
g Meir i
a I
Yg b
- i
=X)O
)
X ---
e 1
x.
u,a
- Mgras, 1
,a u
Se 3fc HTR 6 04 s
s.p l
%s-s I
c g
-l I
I
.Y eee og
- ff o
Rt m
v L
HTR5 q,
h
.. 4 4
f httutti Csettsin T f l
FQ412 To FLASW TMKI RhtATEA Ft.o.f Ddc4Y M8cEl.
/
r A
,1 tr. Pme. 7_
+4rr p
Mk b hyttwott A I
p g
,2
i t
\\,
FERN 12 Ruteris : Tant - Govitut e Gaanon J
%,,, ' L (Am m u)
+tN m:1 ft w l
84a"bbPr6-Farf'Ane[
3
't,r Mrwr= ;sn.g $w 5= LArrut u t.'ns H,w t He,r,'t - FM H(M BAL. (y tL O Gu :*w,'
ft'Euri:, ivy 4
- rw
.our
$EsT1'.sn, g Wris er, + (p TWJ +tgre
$ss *.CM t tira fhte TFri r-
=
A, = Aw 0; 1. cuor Varx,
=
aa -n...-c m1s.su.
be fwcu.
- ce [H,.or-H
- Hec li-X,,)) - Q: -
l.
Ms,.
83 TRs
- C N R: 9 Ce
( (WFEA.af +7c6 [taan (see!.. -
l t
Rma km g_
t% c e s.t
= Q. ~ Q w-kiw
- A Alc Mt " her -T Q.n= puw. A e (T -%)
Ng1A4 Nwt45, NFr W
!4L'E N'ff4')
3 t
Ren PA LE.1 Footsorcs -
I IF 2-P445r Vo44 Hrs wiTH It Cwrrus (EPI I k - I Magi PR'J P td T: J s% 4 y 2
90 = si %
t
& O C <the e
p t En.eu lu - ff.re,v ost TMc cust,.w- *.2 r trc.
VALK$ - L. tat;.1at
@ $TG4MI4 2'.t (J4M rev.4 W4TM MU As CawrJ44 a h ase or r o.<.,c t o.iu,m vw nr l
SP.*En/0/Yb I
l P00R ORIGINAL
~"
F A c E 2 se 3.
i
.. _-~-~
- g.a~.
x.
- M i yog_-_ _ _- _ - _
--A&
i
+
4TT)fc e 6v7 W.L- $3 Lfg New Section for FSAR 5.2.8.7 Preservice Inspection Pragram A preservice inspection program (PSI) will be performed on all Class 1 and 2 components to the extent that is prac-tical in accordance with the 1974 Edition of ASME Section XI " Rules for Inservice Inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Component" with Addenda through Sununer of 1975 (74/S75).
(The Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) was examined to the 1971 Edition of Section XI as explained in Section 5.4.2.)
Table 5.2-11 outlines the examination requirements for Class I components in accordance with Tables IWB-2500 and IWB-2600 of Section XI (IS-251 - IS-261 for the RPV).
Included in this table are:
1)
Examination Category 2)
Components and Parts to be Examined 3)
Required Examination Method 4)
Remarks Table 5.2-12 contains a list of all Class I components that are exempt from volumetric and surface examination.
The only Class I components in Fermi 2 that are exempt from volumetric and surface examination are exempt under IWB-1200 (b)(3) " Component Connections, Piping, and Associated Valves'(And Their Supports) One-Inch Nominal Pipe Size and Smaller." These exempt components will be examined in accordance with IWA-5000 during the system hydrostatic pressure tests required by IWB-5000.
GED/16/4.8
Class 2 systems within the scope of the Section XI inspection program are:
o Residual Heal Removal, Division 1 and Division 2; ECC function in LPCI mode,
- RHR function in RHR mode, CHR function in Containment Spray mode.
o Core Spray - ECC function.
o High Pressure Coolant Injection - ECC function.
i The portion of the RHR system which performs the head spray o
function, up to the Class 1 boundary **alve.
Standby Liquid Control system, up to the Class 1 boundary valve, o
o _ Main Steam system between the second and third isolation valves.
I Detroit Edison will perform the number of examinations for each system as listed below, Minimum Number of Exams Number of Exams to be Required Per System Performed Per System System During 10 Year Interval During 10 Year Interval Branch Circum. Total Branch Circum. Total Core Spray 1
10 11 1
10 11 HPCI O
23 23 0
23 23 Main Steam 1
3 4
1 4
5 RHR 2
52 54 2
52 54 The determination of the number of examinations resuired per system during a 10 year interval for this Class 2 Weld Prtigram is in full conformance with 10CFR50 and section XI (Summer 1975 Addenda) requirements with no deviations.
l i
i cED/16/4.9 I
l The selection of the individual velds to be examined is based on the current inspection philosophy identified in the Summer 1979 and later Addenda of Section XI.
The selection philosophy contained in the Summer 1975 Addenda is one based on a random selection of welds and results in examining a particular weld only once in the plant's 40 year life. No trending of data is possible under the Summer 1975 rules. The Summer 1979 Addenda embraces a selection philosophy that concentrates the examinatzens en those welds which history has shown to have a greater probability of failure namely, high stress welds, welds at terminal ends, and dissimilar metal welds. In addition, the Summer 1979 Addenda re: quires examinations of the same welds each 10 year interval so that meaningful data trending can be l
accomplished. There is general agreement in the industry that the Summer 1979-philosophy is superior to the random selection approach identified in the Summer 1975 Addenda.
In developing the Fermi 2 Class 2 Weld Program the following categories of welds were identified for each system:
e Terminal Ends - Defined as points where there is constraint in at least two degrees of freedom.
I e High Stress Welds - Defined as follows:
Design Stress Value > 0.8 (1.2 Sh+SA l as per the
}
Summer 1979 Addenda.
e Moderate Stress Welds - Welds that have lower stresses than the y
High Stress Welds defined in Summer 1979 Addenda, but were considered in selecting welds for the Fermi 2 Class 2 Weld Program.
~
These welds are defined as follows:
~ Design Stress Value > 0.7 (1.2 S + S ] but is 1 0.8(1.2 S h
A*
I Examination of these Moderate Stress Welds is an added conservatism
^
that exceeds the current Section XI philosophy.
e Dissimilar Metal Welds - No' Dissimilar Metal Welds were identified in f8 Class 2 systems requiring nondestructive examination.
e I
~. ',
e S
I
....~. +. y..-
The criteria for selecting the specific welds to be examined for each 10 year interval are as follows:
A portion of the terminal ends were selected such that each type of e
terminal end contained in the system would be sampled. For exa ple, the Core Spray system has four (4) pu=ps, each with a *.er=inal end at the suction and discharge attachment welds,.
To examine all eight (8) terminal end welds would be redundant and would skew the examination sample to those particular welds. Therefore, to enable
{
a more representative sample to be taken only one (1) pump suction and one (1) pump discharge terminal end weld were selected for examination.
j e All High Stress Welds are examined.
j e All Moderate Stress Welds are examined.
e All Dissimilar Metal Welds are examined.
(None have been identified).
I e Additional welds are randemly selected to bring the total number of welds to be examined up to the number identified in Tables 1.1, 2.1, 3.1, 4.1 and 5.1.
Based on the discussion above, Detroit Edison requests relief from two (2) of the Summer 1975 requirements for all the Class 2 system welds included in their program. The first request for relief is to allow Detroit Edison to select those types of welds that history has shown to have a higher probability of failure in lieu of the random selection approach required by the Summer 1975 Addenda. The second request for relief is to allow repeated examination of the same welds in subsequent 10 year intervals in lieu of the requirements that different welds be inspected in each 10 year interval.
S 44. W it>
b t.m gd bs3 Z sktm N mg
%a w,% ~ me w A m.c..~ tbm w t;
1 g I t*
i 1
e 4
e e
- - h,,m-e
. Oe a e Me
.enem
6 0
abm I
L L Icnb oa e.cA h "' '**'
6 e
9
~
O
\\
t I
O f
=
t
~
s a=il TABl.E dl:
~
CLASS 1 PRESERVICE EXAMINATION REQUIRl71ENTS ENRICO FElutt - IINIT 2 Examination Category Component Or Parts To Required Exam (IWB-2500)
He Examined He t tu,d Remarks
~
PUMP PRESSURE BOUNDARY B-G-1 Pressure Retaining Recirculation pumps UT/HT Recirculation pump drawin Bolting 2 Inches and to be evaluated for exam-i.arger in Diameter ination requirements B-K-1 i. m, rally Welded UT Sup,, orts B-L-1 Pump Casing )lelds UT B-L-1 Pump Casings Visual VALVE PRESSURE BOUNDARY
~ B-C-1 Pressure Retain'.ng Class 1 Valves UT/HT Class 1 valve drawings to Boltina 2 Inches be evaluated to determine and Larger examination requirements B-G-2 Pressure Retaining Visual Bolting Smaller than 2 Inches in Diameter B-K-1 Integrally Welded UT Supports B-H-X Valve Body Welde UT B-H-2 Valve Bodies Visual B-P Exempt Components Visual
i' _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - -
i (f
' I, 5.z -11 NY TAHl.E $
.f CIASS L PRESERVICE EXAtllNATION REQlllHEllENTS 1
EthilCO FERtil - IINIT 2 d
(
i Examination Category
___(IWB-2500)
Component or Parts To i
Required Exam f
lie Examined 11et hod Remarks PIPING PRESSURE BOUtIDARY
]
B-F Safe-End to Piping Welds Safe-end welds and Safe-End in Branch UT/PT To be examined Piping i
)
B-C-2 Pressure Retaining Bolting less than 2" diameter Polting Smaller than Visual To be examined 2" in Diameter B-J Circurrferential and Piping welds Longitudinal Pipe Welds UT To be examlned Branch Pipe Connections piping welds Welds Exceeding 6 Inches ITT To be examined in Diameter Branch Pipe Welds 6 piping welds Inches in Diameter and HT To be examined Smaller Socket Welds Socket welds Mr To be examined B-K-1 Integrally Welded Piping lugs Supports UT To be examined B-P Exempted Components Exempted Components Visual To be examined
q.t-Il{c&
TAlli.E %
+
Cf. ASS 1 PRESERVICE EXAMINATION REQUIRl71EffrS ENRICO FERHI - UNIT 2 i
Examination Category Component or Parts To Rerpsired Exam 1S-251 lie Examined Method Remarks I
i D Primary Nozzle-to-Vessel Nozzle-to-shell welds and inner UT Nozzle-to-r' ell welds wei Welds and Nozzle Inside radius section on the following examined manually in the Radius Section nozzles:
fabrication shosl. Inner Recirculation Inlet radius examinations to be Recirculation Outlet performed Hain Steam Feedwater Jet Pump Instrumentation Core Spray llead Spray
/
CRD liydraulic System Return E-1, Pressure Containing Welds CRD Penetrations UT To be examined. Ifr not in Vessel Penetration possible. Alternatives being explored.
C-1 Pressure Retaining Bolting RPV closure studs ar.d nuts, washers,
'UT/MT Flange 11 ament complete.
R 2-Inches A Larger in Diam-bushings Remainder to be examined.
eter 11 Vessel External Skirts RPV support skirt-to. vessel weld UT Examination completed.
1-1 Interior Clad Surfaces of RPV cladding and RPV closure head Visual To be examined Reactor Vessels cladding N
Interior Surfaces and RPV Internals Visual To be examined Internal Components of Reactor Vessels
i q,gQ Tant.E o Cf. ASS 1 PRESERVICE EXAMINATION REQUIREHEttrS
~
ENRICO FEllHI - IINIT 2 Examination Category Component Or Parts To Recguired Exam IS-251 He Examined Method Remarks A Pressure Retaining Welds RPV longittadinal & circumfer-UT A~ manual UT examination in Reactor Beltline Region ential welds in core region was perforined on the RPV longitudAnal and_ circum-ferenttal welds in the Combuntton Engineerfng fabricatloa' shop except for a small portion of the upper intermediate to lower intermediate
/
shell course.
This will be examined manually at a later date.
B Pressure Retaining Welds RPV closure head and meridional UT See Category A in Vessels welds and bottom head meridional and circumferential welds RPV longitudinal and circum-UT See Category A ferential welds above and below core region C Pressure Retaining Welds RPV closure head-to-flange weld.
UT Vessel-to-flange to be
~
Vessel-to-Flange and llead-RPV shell-to-flange weld.
to-Flange examined manually from the seal surface.
e
l tabla s 5, z -/ L COMPONE.NTS EXEHl'T FROM VOLUMETRIC AND SURFACE EXMtINATION ENRICO FEltHI - UNIT 2 i
l
=
{
i' System Line ID No.
I.ine Size Exemption Banla Nuclear Boller 2187 1"
IWit-1220 (b) (3) 2187 1/2" Iwa-1220(b)(3) c 4037 1"
IWB-1220(b)(3)
Instrumentation Linea 1" and Less IWB-1220(b)(3)
Reactor Water Cleanup 3096 1"
IWu-1220(b)(3)
Iligh Pressure Coolant Injection./
3526 1"
IWB-1220(b)(3) 3526 3/4" Itin-1220(b)(3)
Recctor Core Isolation Cooling 3526 1"
IWB-1220(b)(3) 3526 3/4" IWB-1220(b)(3)
Core Spray 3052 3/4" IWB-1220(b)(3) 3053 3/4" IWB-1220(b)(3)
Standby Liquid Control 2340 3/4" IWB-1220(b)(3)
Hesidual I! cat Removal 2229 3/4" IWB-1220(b)(3) 3519 3/4" IWB-1220(b)(3)
L.
h ATT%HM6vi~ h i
SF.) -53 t{95 222.48 The prelubrication of the Fermi 2 emergency diesel generator has been reviewed with the EDG engine manufacturer.
The manufacturer indicates that a piping modification to the existing keep-warm system will reduce the problem of dry starts.
The design change will reroute the present keep-warm system so that it discharges into the upstream side of the lube oil strainer.
This will provide continuous lube oil to the ~_ower-ing bearings and greatly reduce voids in the lube oil system.
The solid lube oil system will provide faster lubrication of 1
the upper bearings on starting of the diesel and the engine bMN M MW
- 84. [ fin) driven pump. DocumO8cw en hSt tw @ll be S a s ~;fk A ~{o N NdC YY,okke IWI.
The design for this change will ba done by September of 1981 and the system installed by August of 1982.
h The manufacturer does not consider the emergency startup of
}
f the prelubrication pump as a meaningful means of improving l
~
the prelubrication operation.
To assure maximum standby readiness, the Fermi 2 lube oil system is maintained in a pre-warmed condition by heaters and a circulating pump.
The engine. start logic is designed to i
automatically prelubricate the engine on all non-emergency 1
1 a
starts to achieve maximut prelubrication.
l h.
~.
[
I
~
ki l
?
o A77AcwMW 'f 6/.;l 4'JV 73 281.0 CEMICAL CGI!;EERItc.BPxot - OctICAL 'IIncotfGY 281.7 Indicate the control roca alarm set points of the con-(5.4.8) ductivity meters at the inlet and outlet demineralizers (10.4.6) in the condensate and reactor water clean up systems when either (Regulatory Position C.5 of Regulatory Guide 1.56, Revision 1):
a.
'Ihe conductivity indicates marginal performance of the demineralizer systems; b.
'Ibe conductivity indicates noticeable breakthrough of one or nore demineralizers.
RESPONSE
The control room alarm set points for conducti-vity meters at the inlet and outlet of deminera-lizers in the condensate and reactor water clean up systems during normal operation are as follows:
CONDENSATE SYSTEM Inlet
- 0. 2 pS/cm Outlet Individual,0.k ps/cm Overall
-0.09 pS/cm REACTOR WATER CLEAN UP SYSTEM Inlet ( 1.0 ds/cm ]
h Outlet - 0.09 pS/cm N
As previously htated in 281.6 c.d.,
conductivity end point is used to remove a demineraliter from service rather than demineralizer break-i through.
O o
G 9
9 9
9
,c s'
/ '
281.0 CletICE CGINEERDE DPRO{ - ODtICE TECDOEDGY 281.5 Indicate that the initial total capacity of new deminera-(5.4.8) lize: resins will be measured and describe the method (10.4.6) to be used for this measurement (Regulatory Position C.3' of Regulatory Guide 1.56, Revision 1).
RESPONSE
The initial total capacity of all resins will be measured at least once per year and prior to demineralizer vessel loading.
Capacity determinatices will be performed by either or all of the following:
1.
Rad Chem Section - EFIl 2.
Engineering Research Department - Detroit Edison 3.
Resin vendor / supplier The method used for determination of total resin
.)
capacitv is outlined by AST:g' If the type or
' supplier on wo uva ano dnivu tesin is changed, D-2N7
- = ^="r*= "' of taitia
'*t ca9act'v "i i
be performed prior to vessel loading.
\\
i, J
1 e
4 m
. -r
.