ML20002E135

Proposed Tech Specs Sections 3,4 & 6 to Support Deautomation of Incident Level 5 of Safety Features Actuation Sys. Description of Electrical Mods,Safety Evaluation & Draft Proposed Emergency & Sys Operating Procedures Encl

ML20002E135
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	01/15/1981
From:	TOLEDO EDISON CO.
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ML20002E131	List: ML20002E130 ML20002E135
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Download: ML20002E135 (20)

Text

i Dock t No. 50-346 1

.(*s)- _ License No. NPF-3 Serial No. 678 January 15, 1981 I

Attachment A APPLICATION FOR AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3 FOR DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT I Enclosed are forty (40) copies of the requested changes to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 1 Facility Operating License No.

NPF-3, together with the supporting Safety Evaluation and Analysis for the requested change. This requested change deals with the proposal to de-automate the valve shifts caused by Incident Level 5 of the Safety Features Actuation System.

The proposed Technical Specifications changes include pages:

3/4 1-17, 3/4 3-13, 3/4 3-48, 3/4 3-50, 3/4 5-3, 3/4 5-6

- 3/4 5-7, 3/4 6-11 and B3/4-12.

By ec:/ W. C. Rowles Director, Nuclear Servicea For R. P. Crouse Vice President, Nuclear Sworn and subscribed before me this 15th day of January, 1981.

. A Notary Public

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Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Attachment A Serial No. 678 .

January 15, 1981 I, Changes to Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 1 Technical Specifications Appendix A, changes pages:

3/4 1/17 3/4 5-6 3/4 3-13 3/4 5-7 .

3/4 3-48 3/4 6-11 3/4 3-50 B 3/4 1-2 3/4 5-3 See proposed changes attached .

A. Time Required to Implement This change will be implemented during the first outage after NRC approval for which the plant will be in Operational Mode 4 for greater than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. .

B. Reason for Change (Facility Change Request 80-278 Rev A) these changes have been proposed during discussion with NRC to address potential problems resulting from inadvertent or premature actuation of SEAS Level 5.

C. Safety Evaluation - attached.

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, ATTACHMEhT A Safety Evaluation and Analysis for FCR 80-278 Rev. A Safety Evaluation At present, the suctions to the. decay heat (DH) and containment spray (CS) pumps are automatically transferred from the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) to the Containment Emergency Sump on a Safecy Features Actuation System (SFAS) trip of incident level 5. This occurs at a BWST level between 49.5 and 55 inches. This change proposes the above described automatic transfer of these pumps be changed to manual. Because this modification removes an automated safety feature that would now be manual, the possibility of an accident of a different type not previously in the Safety Analysis Report may be increased. This therefore, identifies a unreviewed safety question. The following analysis is provided to justify this modification.

Analysis The safety function of this transfer is to protect these pumps from cavitation for lack of proper net positive suction heads and to transfer these pump suctions to the containmeat emergency sump during the recircu-lation mode of operation. The SFAS incident leyel 5 trip will be used as an interlock to prevent a premature manual transfer. The following table shows the BWST levels required by this analysis for this suction transfer to be successfully performed as a manual transfer.

Table 1 BWST Level BWST Volume Description (Inches) (Callons),_

Develop Minimum Level to Transfer Suction to Containment Emergency Sump

1. Accident Analysis minimum level to start 36 the transfer per the original analysis

2. Instrument string inaccuracy and drift 13.5 .

3. Lcwesc aula indicated reading Lo schJL 49.5 control room operator action to transfer Develop Minimum Contained Volume

1. SFAS Incident Level 5 Interlock ,

96 1 TriprSetpoint l l

2. Interlock Trip Tolerance + 4.5 l l

l

3. Highest (lowest) indicated level that 100.5 (91.5) 1 interlock trip can occur

4. Instrumen't string inaccuracy and drift + 13.5 l

5. Highest (lowest) actual level that 114 (78) 122,778 l interlock trip can occur (this volume

1

'BWST level BWST Volume Description (Inches) (Callons) may not be available for the decay heat or containment spray pump) l

. 6. Instrument String drift + 1.2 7._ Highest (lowest) allowable 101.7 (90.3) interlock trip

8. 360,000 gallons required to be c3ded 334.3 360,000 for Emergency Core Cooling System I (ECCS) analysis

9. Lowest safe indicated level for ECCS 448.2 482,778 Analysis in Modes 1, 2, 3, & 4 As shown in the above table, a control room operator will manually perform this transfer when the safety grade level indicators in the control room

- indicate between 49.5 and 96 inches (4.125 and 8 feet) of BWST level.

This will give a control room operator about 4 minutes to make the transfer safely. Since the plant under the conditions existing at this point will be in an emergency situation for a mininum of 23 minutes, the station procedures will instruct a control room operator to be looking at the BWST level indicators to initiate the manual transfer. As observed from the above calculation table, the minimum level requirements of BWST will be i met if the transfer is initiated within 4 minutes after the indicated BWST level drops to 8 feet.

A control room operator will manually perform this transfer about 23 minutes af ter the initial SEAS trip that started all high pressure injection, low pressure injection and containment spray pumps assuming at their maximum flow. The accident analysis requires 360,000 gallons to be adied for ECCS analysis when in modes 1, 2, 3 & 4. As shown in the above table, this condition will still be met and the attached Technical Specifications are changed accordingly.

This change to manual transfer will provide the same safety function as is performed by the present automatic cransfer ... discussed above. -

Hence, no adverse environment will be created by the change and the safety function of the DH and CS pumps will not be affected. This analysis is considered justifiable to support this proposed modification.

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS E0 RATED WATER Sol!"*ES - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.9 Each of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. The boric acid addition system and a ociated heat tracing wi th:

1. A minimum contained borated water volume in accordance with Figure 3.1-1,

2. Between 7875 and 13,125 ppm of boron, and

3. A minimum solution temperature of 105*F.

b. The borated water storage tank (BWST) with: g y 97gg ,

f

1. A contained borated water volume of between 22",C:0 and 550.000 gallons, d 2, Between 1800 and 2200 ppm of boron, and

3. A minimum solution temperature of 35'F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

a. With the boric acid addition system inoperable, restare thi storage system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to 1% ak/k at 200*F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore the boric acid addition system to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

b. With the borated water storage tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 1-17

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g TABLE 3.3-4_

" SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS m .

v, FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWA8LE VALUES

.m C

5

-4 INSTRUMENT STRINGS

a. Containmer.t Hadiation < 2 x 8ackground at RATED < J x Background at TilERMAL POWER STED THERMAL POWER,

b. Containment Pressure - High 1 18.4 psia 1 18.52 psla#

c. Containment Pressure - High-liigh - < 38.4 psia 1 38.52 psia #

d. RCS Pressure - Low > 1620.75 psig

> 1615.75 psig#

> 420.75 psig > 415.75 psig#

$ e. RCS Pressure - Low-Low _

03

f. BWST Level > WW and < W:0 in,11 0 > and 2

$ H 1n. H go'

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" ~Ql'S 100 5" lo/ ry SEQUENCE LOGIC CHANNELS

a. Essential Bus Feeder Breaker Trip (901) > 3744 volts for > 3558 volts

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~ 7.11.5 sec for 711.5 sec#

k b. Diesel Generator Start, Load Shed on

> 2071 and < 2450 volts > 2071 and < 2450 i

E. Essential Bus (591) - ~

2 for 0.5 i 0.1 sec volts for a .

0.5 1 0.1 sec, n

P INTERLOCK CilANNELS

\w a. Decay lleat Isolation Valve < 438 psig < 443 psig;*

and Pressurizer Heater -

I Allowable Value for CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

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TABLE 3.3-10 (Continued) y P,0ST-ACC! DENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION co D. MINIMUM M

• , CHANNELS INSTRUMENT OPERABLE z

Q 15. Low Pressure Injection (DilR) Flow 1/ Channel

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16. HPI System Pump and Valve Status 1/5ystem

17. LPI System Pump and Valve ".tatus 1/ System

18. Containment Spray Pump and Valve Status 1/ System

19. Core Flood Valve Status 1/ System j 20. BWST Valve Status 1/ System

?' 21. Containment Emergency Sump Valve Status 1/ Valve 8 ,

22. Containment Air Recirculation Fan Status 1/ Fan

23. Containment Air Cooling Fan Status 1/ Fan

24. EVS Fan and Damper Status 1/ System ar. B WST La vel. 3

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' EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ECCS SU! SYSTEMS T;V,3 > 250*F s

LIMITING CON 0! TION FOR 03ERATION 3.5.2 Two indecender.: ECCS subsystems shall be OFIRAILE wita each subsystem cocarisec cf:

a. One OPERA 5LE high pressure injecticn (HPI) pump,

b. One OPERA 3LE Icw pressure inf ection (L?!) pu=;,

c. One OPERAILE decay heat c:oler, and

, .s , ... ._ , ,

d. An OPERA 3LE flow pa:n capable of taking suction femm the

-bera ed water s:crage tank (SWST) en a safety injection signal I$criuoll, %y_ _-- : '..::7 transf erring suction to the containment su=;

^ ' ' : ; . . .

. . . . . . . . , . '.. . . , . .  ; . . ' . , .-zi d u ri n g th e-recir:ulation phase of operation.

A::LI C.15 :'.!TY : MCOE5 1, 2 and 3.

AC ION: .

a. With one ECC5 subsystem ine:erable, res:cre tne inocerable subsystem :: OPERA 3LE status witnin 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> er be ia HOT SHU 3 N within the nex: 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

b. . In :ne event the ECCS is actuated and injects wa er into the Rea::ce Coolan- System, a Scecial Recort snall be prepared and submi::ed to the Csur.issicn pursuant to Specifica-icn 6.9.2 l witnin 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation i and the total accenulated actuation cycles to date.

SURVIILLANCE RICUIREMENT3 l

1 4.5.2 Each ECCS subsystem shall be' demonstrated CPERABLE:  !

l

a. A least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, !

pcwer operated or auteert,ic) in the flew path that is not j

locked, sealec or c herwiia secured in position, is in 1 s correct pcsition.

CAYIS-BEISE, UNIT 1 3/4 5-3 l

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Teksto Edhon C.a S4milted to (Ka.,

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS N M'NbkO

• Re..'tvis h .5 4v11'tIIA! CT D %

ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T:vs < 280*F pe,p, 7 7 3 cy; ig4y . A J ,7, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.3 As a minimum, one ECCS subsystem comprised of the following shall be OPERABLE: ,

a. One OPERABLE high pressure injection (HPI) pump,

b. One CPERABLE low pressure injection (LPI) pump,

c. One OPERABLE decay heat cooler, and

d. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the j

- borated water storage tank-(BWST) andgransferring suction to.

the containment emergency sump.duyiny 4he vec.irculah'cr1 p)sse C{ cfyrab. ' ' ~

APPLICABILITY:~ MODE'4.' - -

, ACTION: ..

a. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of the inoperability of either the HPI pump or the flow path fri:m the barated water storage tank, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />. . ,

. b. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of the inoperability of either the decay heat cooler or LPI pump, restore at least one T ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status or maintain the Reactor ..

Coolant System T less than 280*F by use of alternate heat -

removal methods. avg t C

c. In the event the ECCS f r a'ctuated and injects water into the T reactor coolant system, a Special Report shall be prepared and f.!

submitted to the Comission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2

- within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation :l and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.

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SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS #

f a

E 4.5.3 The ECCS subsystems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the 5" applicable Surveillance Requirements of 4.5.2.

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. DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 . 3/4 5-6 .

t I

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BORATED WATER STORAGE TANK LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.4 The barated water storage tank (BWST) shall be OPERABLE with:

482 s'IT 8

a. A contained borated water volume of between 1:1,0:0 and 550,000 gallons,

b. Between 1800 and 2200 ppm of boron, and

c. A minimum water temperature of 35'F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With the borated water storage tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.4 The BWST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by:

1. Verifying the contained borated water volume in the tank,

2. Verifying the boron concentration of the water.

b. At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the water temperature when outside air temperature <35'F.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 5-7 .

_ -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ +

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l CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM I

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.1 Two independent containment spray systems shall be OP'.RABLE alth each spray system capable of taking suction from the BWST on a ,

entainment spray actuation signal and rutr:ti::F7 transrer/ W I N 'l.Jj i suction to the containment emergency sump er ; "-" n'a- "my duy(OJ fht teClyculafiori pha.se % of*7QflCA j APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION: '

" ' ~

~

dith one containment spray system inoperable, restore the inoperable

.s. . spray s'ystem.to' 0PERABLE status, within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at lea'st . HOT ,

STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore the in' operable' spray sjstem to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within'the'next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.*

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.2.1 Each containment spray system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

b. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:

1. Verifying that each automatic valve '.a the flow path actuates to its correct position on a containment spray test signal.

2. Verifying that each spray pump starts automatically 'on a SFAS-test signal.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 . 3/4 6-11 l i l

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.1.4 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY

! This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made critical with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less than 525'F.

This limitation is required to ensure 1) the moderator tempersture coeffi-cient is within its analyzed temperature range, 2) the protective instrumentation is within its normal operating range, 3) the pressurizer is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and 4) the reactor pressure vessel is above its minimum RTNOT temperature.

2/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS The boron injection system ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operatien. The cc 'nents required to perform this function include 1) borated water sw. Jes,2) makeup or DHR pumps, 3) separate flow paths, 4) boric acid pumps, 5) associated heat tracing systems, and 6) an emergency power supply from -

OPERABLE emergency busses.

With the RCS average temperature above 200*F a minimum of two separate and redundant baron injection systems are provided to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure readers one of the systems inoperable. Allowable out-of-service periods ersure that minor component repair or corrective action may be completed without undue risk to overall facility safety from injection system failures during the repair period.

- The boration capability of either system is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN fran all operating conditions of 1.05 Ak/k after . .

xenon decay and cooldown to 200'F. The maximum boration capability requirement occurs from full power equilibrium xenon conditions and l requires the equivalent of either 7373 gallons of 8742 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 52,726 gallons of 180) ppm borated water from the borated water storage tank.

H82,778 The requireu.nts for a minimum contained volume of 0;t,000 gallons ,

of borated water in the borated water storage tank ensures the capa-bility for borating the RCS to the desired level. The specified quantity of borated water is consistent with the ECCS requirements of Specification 3.5.4. Therefore, the larger volume of borated water is specified. -

With.the RCS temperature below 200*F. one injection system is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the l

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 8 3/4 1-2 Amendment No.,41', 3 3 -

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ATTACHMENT B AP 3005.56,2 1 i BWST LOLO LVL, IFER TO EMER SUMP

1. STMPTOM 1.1 This alarm is generated when any one of the four SFAS BWST level histables trips.

1.2 Setpoint

8 feet water 1.3 Source Designation: LSL 1525A, LSL 1525B, LSL 1525C, and/or LSL 1525D

2. IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION 2.1 verify that the BWST level is at 8 feet per LI 1525 A, B, C, and D.

2.2 Verify a LOCA condition exists. '

2.3 Transfer pump suction to the emergency sump by blocking SFAS incident level 2 for DH9A and DH93 and then opening DH9A and DH9B using HISDH9A and HISDH9B. Verify that the. BUST outlet valves DH7A and DH7B start to close as DH9A and DH9B start to open. Verify the transfer is complete by checking the indicating lights on DH7A and B and DH9A and B and by checking that low pressure injection flow has not sub-stantially changed.

3. SUPPLEMENTARY ACTIONS 3.1 Refer to EP 1202.06, Loss of Reactor Coolant, Reactor Coolant Pressure 1

a l

SP 1104.04.15 31 ,

DH 831 (DH 830) when IMI Pump 1-1 (1-2) line flow is higher. .Then balance the flow to 1500 gpm per line-

~

'by adjusting the flow control valves DH14A and DH14B.

If no air is available to DH14A and DH14B, the DH injec-tion valve DHlB (DHLA) can be throttled under emergency conditions. This motor operated valve only moves while control switch is held.

~

9.2.3 Deleted

10. RECIRCULATION FROM THE CONTAINMENT VESSEL -EMERGENCY SUMP

/ Following a LOCA, the BWST level will decrease until at the 8 feet level the operator must manually transfer the suction of the DH and CS Pumps to the emer-gency sump. The operator will open the emergency sump outlet valves DH9A and DH9B and close the BWST outlet valves DH7A and B. This operation must be com-i pleted before the level falls below 5 feet.

No operator signoff is required for Section 10.-

10.1 Prerequisites 10.1.1 Low Pressure Injection in progress.

10.1.2 Borated Water Storage Tank water level has reached the low level transfer setpoint '(8 feet) as read on LIl525A, B, C, or D ,

10.1.3 The annunciator "BWST LOLO LVL, XFER TO EMER SUMP" may or may not have been received.

~

10.2 Procedure 10.2.1 Block SEAS incident level 2 on DH9A and DH9B.

10.2.2 Open DH9A and DH9B using HISDH9A and HISDH9B.

s

/ 10.2.3 Verify that DH'/A and DH7B start to close as DH9A and DH9B start to open. ,

10.2.4 Verify that the transfer is complete by checking the indicating lights on DH9A and B and DH7A and B and by checking that the

{[\ _

Low Pressure Irjection flow was not significantly changed.

10.2.5 Continue low pressure injection as needed. _

e 9

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. l 33 SP 1104.04.15

- NOTE: The preceding three steps establish the

" piggyback" mode of operation. If this operation is being formed to provide RCS makeup at high pressure, no further action is required until makeup is no longer needed at which time the pumps may be stopped and DH 63 and DH 64 closed.

If this operation is the result of an RCS gg leak and the BWST level is approaching

• = 8 feet, continue with the remaining steps.

jr 15 11.2.4 Clase the high pressure injection pump minimum recirculation valves to the BWST. This is to minimize the contamination of the BWST and

' maintain off site radiation, levels as low as possible.

15

, NOTE: If, DH 64 (DH 63) and HP 32 (HP 31) are both open, computer alarm Q488 (Q489) will occur.

Close HP 32 (HP 31).,

CAUIION: If the high pressure injection 15 ~

flowrate drops to f$ 35 GPM per pump due to an increase in RCS pressure, stop the high pressure injection pumps 1-1 and 1-2 so as not to damage them.

11.2.5 *SEE' ATTACHED SHEET FOR STEP 11.2.5*

11.2.6- When Reactor Coolant Pressure is low enough for 15 l the Decay Heat Pumps to discharge directly to the Reactor Conlant System at a flow of 2000 gpm, begin Decay Heat System recirculation of the Containment Vessel Emergency Sump as follows:

11.2.6.1 Stop the High Pressure Injec-15 tion Pumps 1-1 and 1-2 if ,

their flow is not needed.

11,2.6.2 Shut the Decay Heat Pump discharge valves to the High Pressure Injection Pump Suction Dh 63 and DH 64.

Section 11 Completed Date

11.2.5 When BWST level reaches 8 feet, transfer pump suction to the emergency' sump by blocking SFAS. incident level 2 for DH9A and DH9B and then opening DH9A and DH9B using HISDH9A and HISDH9B. Verify that the BWST outlet valves DH7A and DH7B start to close as DH9A and DH9B start to open. -Verify the transfer is complete by checking the indicating lights on DH7A and B and DH9A and B and by checking that low pressure injection flow has not substantially changed.

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. _ . - . -.: s EP 1202.0614 6 .

u e METERS,* the hot leg teltperaturea

[ h bE If either the RCS T S4T indic'a t ? on s , or the incore thermocouple temperatures

!4 e" indicate super-heated conditions for the existing

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! pressure, refer to A3 1203.06, Inadequate Core Cooling i "[ "

'j; tj u . .  : Cuidelines. An increase in the source or intermediate range nuclear instrumentation may also indicate an,

co d d $ inadequate core cooling situation.

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> ue uu 4If both main and auxiliary feedwater f s lost, refer to

" 3 $ " o- 2.4.1.3 AB 1203.05, Complete Loss of Main and Auxiliary Feed-3 " > .! 3 water, to aid in restoring auxiliary feedwater ip the 3.s,"d event both OTSGs are dry.

E c.$ D %

"$555 2.4.1.5 Determine the availability of reactor coolant pumps E' " $ $ ea If all kD* d (RCPs). 'If any RCPs are running, go to 2.4.2.

u E 3 e i> RCPs are off, go to 2.4.3. -

0ma< 0 " oo8. E . ..

ggg,, 2.4.2 Actions with at least one RCP running Ue5"# 2. 4. 2.1 Maintain one RCP running per loop (stop other pumps).

35 guy o c4 b Continced operation of at least one RCP is desirable.

g"c*A The only conditions requiring RCPs be stopped would be E8"$7 I if RCS pressure falls below 1650 psig such that SFAS SOm5* incideht level 2 is actuated or if the RCP vibration I*" 'E -o # as measured by the Bentley-Nevada equipment exceeds 30 mills. Note that the X2 (times-two) switch on the

• $" I < -o Bentley-Nevada equipment must be used for the expanded I S. " E 5 range.

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2.4.2.2 Allow RCS pressure to stabilize. If RCS pressure con-U y "o g tinues to decrease past secondary side pressure, the g g, o g NJo3e, leak is large and section 3 should be consult.ed.

-ae oo 2.4.2.3 Establish and maintain OTSG cooling by adjusting steas U d .E if S . pressure via the turbine bypass valves and/or atmos-

= co '" 3 .M $ phetic vmit valves.

0 Occidown at 100 F per hour to . gig e i " .*f 5 schiav.' : n RCS cre":sure of 250 psig. Track the cool-Ti**"x e 5 5 5 EC 1

s-down on Figures 2 and 3. Isolate core flood tanks k when 50 F subcooling (using RCS TSAT METERS) is

]85 g{d . attained and RC pressure is less than 700 psig.

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.3.lo)k SFAS level Q .deq 3ess than 600 psig.

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• $gg*g yd 2.4.2.4 .Co into LPI cooling described in 2.5.'1 _

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t g g 2.4.3 Actions with no RCPs r .nning 35uoA eau 4 e0 C 3 C se eC 2.4.3.1 Verify that the OiSG 1evel is maintained at 96" on the Ejm{]} startup range by auxiliary feedwater.

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NOTE: If desired, the OTSC Icvel may be raised as hIgh

(* a o p s. as 95% on the operate range to impt ve RCS coeling but the transition must be . slow enough to prevent excessive changes in RCS pressure and temperature.

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EP 1202.06.13 '

16 .

- 2.7 Discussion For the purposes of this procedure, a medium sized leak is one for which the HPI pump capacity is suf ficient to maintain pressurizer level or RCS pressure. If the HPI pumps cannot keep up with the leak, then RC pres-sure will fall until the LPI system can provide additional makeup; this is defined as a large leak and is discussed in the next section.

Depending on the size of the leak, the RCS pressure will slowly or quickly fall to the 1600 psig pressure setpoint of the SFAS for level 1 and 2

• actuation. Note thatfall for s=all breaks with a co=plete loss of feedwater,;

low enough- to actuate SFAS levels 1 and 2.

RCS pressure may not '

Manual actuation of SFAS could be accomplished by actuating ,

each component in level 1 or.2 or by actuating levels 1, 2, 3, andManual4 except C.S. pumps, by means of the manual actuation pushbutton.

o actuation will result in natural circulation of the RCS and an SFRCS uj actuation. Operator action shall be taken to re-establish the seal oud* injection and CCW to the MU Pumps to allow continuous operation of the

.SEEO RCPs. Manual actuation should NOT be used Once unless the SFAS setpoints are HPI is initiated and 0"E3 reached and the actuation does not occur.

8 $ "= level is restored to enable pressure control, a cooldown can be started.

"E* The cooldown should proceed normally with the exception that one of the 9U"g5 .

ECCS pumps must remain in operation in the injection mode to makeup the 3 E' 3 " water lost out of the leak. HPI can be shutdown within the limits of 9e"d item 6 of 2.6.1. ,

5" i3 " E If possible the depressurization/cooldown will be complete before the Og 8*o BWST low level is reached and the "piggybacking" of the HPI and Decay

'5 0 E E Heat Pumps will not be necessary. If the depressurization/cooldown cannot

o. E e A be completed in time, the pressurizer level may be maintained by aligning the Decay Heat Pu=ps to tate a suction from the emergency sump and discharge

! 5 l3 "d. to the suction of the HPI pumps.

D E 3, ' u' EOO33 A flow path from the RCS hot leg to the DH System must be established within seven days to prevent boron concentration buildup as described in Section 3.4.8. If this flow path cannot be established, an alternate 0 0 en g 0 UE3 E.

path through the auxiliary spray line must be used.

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"n0 " l If an operator blocks an SFAS signal and changes the status of the actua-ted equipment, he is responsible for assuring proper equipment operation 3 % 3g*3 and re-initiation if required until the SFAS is reset.

For guidance on ed3eI resetting the SFAS af ter a real or erroneous trip, see Section 4.0.

3.n 4 a 8 Uc3eo # " For additional details on possible consequences of a medium sized leak, E .E see The Evaluation of Transient Behavior and Small Reactor Coolant j o. " $ . $

$$3T4 System Breaks in the 177 Fuel Assembly Plant - Section 5 (B&W) .

"Ye$m Notes on Step 2.4.3.5 j %8y"u""

! u"A ,

When this step is reached, auxiliary feedwater has established a 96" level d $ .E d i in the OTSGs and no RCS flow exists (forced or natural). Depending on the

, E6"e3 size of the break, the RCS may repressurize enough to reach the code safety e

u$e8 valves setpoint. If the electromatic relief is available, the RCS pressure

$"$* l may be reduced manually. If not,' the RCS pressure will be relieved by the l

.E '" C

"* 0uo"# break and the safeties if the pressure goes that high. At some pressure, the energy escaping from the break (and the electromatic or 1 safeties if used:

• EP 1202.0&l4 18 ,

e 1.4 Supplementary Actions ac Implement Site Emegency Procedure, EI .1300.04, -

x$2$

U U SQ oU

'2. eu3 \

" 5 m " *, CAUIION: DO NOT BLOCK AND OVERRIDE ANY SAFETY EQUIPMENT EXCEPT AS S Om505 FIED IN SECTION 2.4.3.'

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• • S0$ 3.4.1 If the flow rate between the two HPI lines for an HPI Pump n ea u am

.= c c= becomes unbalanced, throttle the HPI valves and split the flow awx=m Do NOT throttle the line with the

, j g 3 g, between the injection lines.

uyg,3 high flow below the flow rate shown on Figure 4.0. Assure g .o > g o, proper HPI operation per Section 5.0 of SP 1104.07, "HPI I t,p,u, . Operating Procedure". l E o. E D .E .

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30*8.5 n n < ow - -

hb oN 3.4.2 Verify the LPI pumps are injecting into the RCS when RCS pres-g,yu, sure decreases to approximately 200 psig by reading FI DH2B and ggug FI DH2A on C5716. No throttling of the LPI valves is required g , ,, 3 ,

gaj a, if both LPI pumps are in operation since mechanical stops are 5gggg installed on the, cooler outlet valves. Assure proper LPI opera-j,y< tion per Section 9 of SP 1104.04, "LPI Operating Procedure".

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• "A 3.4.3 If a DH Pump has failed and a break does not exist outside of 5C containment, close the suction on the disabled pump, open DH831 A f( 3 c 'E or DH830, and balance flows using DH14A and DH14B if available 3 S. " $ "

"u$"* or DHlA and DHlB if DH14A and DH14B cannot be throttled.

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. E eo a " 3.4.4 -Stop any non essential equipment such as reactor coolant pumps,

• {j$$ makeup pumps, etc. Although the 'RCPs- will prol ably trip on a

< m oiS loss of CCW an'd seal injection, DO NOT STOP MORE .THAN ONE RCP N.Ioe PER LOOP UNLESS A MININUM OF 3000 gpm TOTAL DECAY HFAT FLOW HAS OEc" 5 BEEN ESTABLISHED.

U d .E " O fo -

= m " 3 fo E h 3.4.5 If LPI flow is greater than 1000 gpm per pump for 20 minutes, the operator may stop the HP1 pumps. Unless the HPI pumps are piggy-

, e}[Zi backed, the HPI pumps must be stopped before the suction is manual-g .c , g p g ly transferred to the emergency sump on low BWST level (8 feet),

3ggagg If LPI flow is less than 1000 gpm per pump, open HPI to LPI cross-g waggg connes-r as per_Section.11 of the DH and.LPI Operating Procedure, gyy *q g - -

SP 1104.04 before the suction is transferred to the emergency sump.

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VEm5' -( See Section 4.0 of this procedure for guidance before overriding .

3 E u $ eo 8 3.4.7

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• any other safety equipment.

3 E ce # "U E t

, U .E " 3.4.8 Monitor RB pressure and temperature and if CS Pumps are in opera-l To @ $ U " $ tion, assure CS 1530 and CS 1531 throttle when recirculating

$8MSAd f rom the ecergency sump.

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Dockst No. 50-346 Lic nsa No. NPF-3 Serial No. 678 ATTACHMENT C January 15, 1981 Description of Operation -

During no mal p1 ant operati on the BWST Outlet Valve is open and the corresponding Containment Emergency Sump Valve is closed. An inter-lock exists betveen the two valves that would prevent the sump valve from being opened until the BWST Outlet Valve is fully closed.

On a Level 2 SFAS actuation, the valves will remain in their normal position. At this point, the blocking of Level 2 SFAS signals will still not allow the Containment Emergency Sump Valve from being opened until the BWST outlet Valve is closed. When Level 5 of SFAS is ac-tuated neither valve will move. At this point, if the Level 2 SEAS signal is blocked, the Level 5 signal will block the interlock allowing the operator to manually open the Containment Emergency Sump Valve.

When the Containment Emergency Sump Valve begins to open, another inter-lock between the two valves will start closing the BWST Outlet Valve.

The transfer to the sump will be totally manual and no automatic opera-tion will be involved.

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