ML20002B180
| ML20002B180 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 10/29/1980 |
| From: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Hoffman D CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| References | |
| TASK-07-03, TASK-7-3, TASK-RR NUDOCS 8012110027 | |
| Download: ML20002B180 (16) | |
Text
a a8eoq'o IJNITEd STATES g
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- ,,o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
~g-E WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 i
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October 29. 1980 0:cket No. 50-155 M
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Mr. David P. Hoffman di.~
Nuclear Licensing Administrator 1
i'FA Consumers Power Comparty
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212 West Michigan Avenue s
- 'd Jackson, Michigan 49201 1,1 H.
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Dear Mr. Hoffman:
RE:
SEP TOPIC VII SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN (Big Rock Point)
Enclosed is a copy of our evaluation of Systematic Evaluation Program Topic VII-3, Electrical, Instrumentation, and Control Features of Systems Required for Safe Shutdown. This assessment compares your facility, as described in Docket No. 50-155, with the criteria currently used by the regulatory staff for licensing new facilities.
Please inform us if your as-built facility differs from the licensing basis assumed in our assessment within 60 days of receipt of this letter.
This evaluation will be a basic input to the integrated safety assessment for your facility unless you identify changes needed to reflect the as-built conditions at your facility. This topic assessment may be revised in the future if your facility design is changed or if NRC criteria relating to this topic is modified before the integrated assessment is completed.
Sincerely, De/4&0b4 k
- k nnis M. Crutchfield, C ef Operating Reactors Branc #5 Division of Licensing
Enclosure:
Completed SEP Topic VII-3 cc w/ enclosure:
See next page 8012110 o27
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2-October 29, 1980 Mr. David P. Hoffman i
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Mr. Paul' A. Perry, Secretary U. S. Environmental Protection 4
Consumers Power Conpany Agency 212 West Michigan Avenue Federal Activities Branch Jackson, Michigan 49201 Region V Office ATTN: EIS COORDINATOR-
'Judd L. Bacon, Esquire 230. South Dearborn Street Consumers Power Company Chicago, Illinois 60604 212 West Michigan Avenue
' Jackson, Michigan 49201 Herbert Grossman, Esq., Chairman
- Atanic Safety and Licensing Board Joseph Gallo, Esquire U.~ S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i
~Isham, Lincoln & Beale Washington, D. C.
20555 L
1120 Connecticut Avenue Room 325 Dr. Oscar H. Paris Washington, D. C.
20036
. Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Peter W. Steketee, Esquire,
Washington, D. C.
20555 505 Peoples Building.
Grand Rapids,' Michigan 49503 Mr; Frederick J. Shon Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Alan S. Rosenthal, Esq., Chairman U. S. Nuclear "egulatory Comission Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board Washington, 0. C.
20555
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U. S. Nuclesr Regulatory Comission Washington, D. C.
20555 Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant ATTN: Mr. C. J. Hartman Plant Superintendent Mr. ' John O'Neill, II
.Ctarlevoix, Michigan 49720 Route 2, Box 44 Maple City, Michigan 49664 Ct rista-Maria Charlevoix Public Library Rcute 2, Box 108C 107 Clinton Street Ctarlevoix, Michigan 49720 Charlevoix, Michigan William J. Scanlon, Esquire Chairman 2034 Pauline Boulevard County Board of Supervisors Ann Arbor, Michigan 48103 Charlevoix County Charlevoix, Michigan 49720 Resident Inspector Big Rock Point Plant Office of the Governor (2)-
c/o U.S. NRC Room 1 - Capitol Building RR #3, Box 600 l
Lansing, Michigan 48913 Charlevoix, Michigan 49720-Director, Technical Assessment.
Mr. Jim E. Mills Division Route 2, Box 108C
' Office of Radiation Programs Charlevoix, Michigan 49720 (AW-459)
U. S. Environmental Protection Thomas S. Moore
-Agency Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal: Board Crystal Mall #2 '
O. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Arlington, Virginia 20460 Washington, D. C.
20555 4-
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Mr. David P. Hoffman October 29, 1980
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Dr. John H. Buck
. Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D. C.
20555 Ms, JoAnn Bier 204 Clinton Street -
Charlevoix, Michigan 49720 Richard E. Schaffstall KMC, Inc.
1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. !!.
Washington, D. C.
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SEP TECHNICAL EVALUATION TOPIC VII-3 ELECTRICAL, INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL FEATURES -0F SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN BIG ROCK POINT NUCLEAR STATION Consumers Power Company i
S. E. Mays RELIABILITY AND STATISTICS BRANCH ENSINEERING ANALYSIS DIVISION, EG&G IDAHO, INC.,
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CONTENTS l
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
2 2.0 REVIEW CRITERIA.
2 3.0 RELATED SAFETY TOPICS AND INTERFACES.............
4 4.0 REVIEW GUIDELINES 4
5.0 DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION 4'
5.1 Instrumentation.
6 5.1.1 Evaluation.....*........
6 52 Safe Shutdown Systems..................
8 5.2.1 Onsite Power Unavailable...-..........
8 5.2.1.1 Evaluation 8
5.2.2 Offsite Power Unavailable 9
5.2.2.1 Evaluation 5.3 Shutdown and Cooldown Capability Outside the 9
Control Room 9
5.3.1 Evaluation....................
9 6.0
SUMMARY
SAFE SHUTDOWN EIIC FEATURES FOR CONSIDERATION BY 7.0 10 SEP TOPIC 111-1 11
8.0 REFERENCES
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SEP TECENICAL EVALUATION TOPIC VII-3 ELECTRICAL, INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL FEATURES OF SYSTEMS REQUIRED POR SAPI SHUTDOWh EIG ROCK POINT NUCLEAR STATION 1.0 INTRODUCTICN This report is part of the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) review of Topic VII-3, " Systems Required for Safe Shutdown."
The objective of this review is to determine whether the electrical, insert
- mentation, and control (EI&C) features of the systems required for safe shutdown, including support systems, meet current licensing requirements.
The systems required for safe shutdown have been identified by the NRC SEP staff. The systems were reviewed to ensure the following safety objectives are met:
1.
Assure the design adequacy of the safe shutdown system to automatically initiate operation of appropriate systems, including reactivity control systems, such that fuel design limits are not exceeded as a result of operational occurrences tnd postulated accidents, and to automatically initiate 1
systems required to bring the plant to a safe shut-down 2.
Assure that required systems, equipment, and control to maintain the unit in a safe condition during hot shutdown are appropriately located outside the control room, and have the capability for subse-quent cold shutdown of the reactor using suitable procedures 3.
Assure only safety grade equipment is required to bring primary coolant systems from a high pressure to low pressure cooling condition.
The ' scope of this review specifically includes an evaluation of the electrical, instrumentation, and control features necessary for operation of the identified safe shutdown systems.
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j The review evaluates the systems for operability with and without The offsite power and the ability.co operate with any slugle failure.
EI&C review of safe shutdown systems only includes chose features not covered under other SEP Topics. Specific items which will.be covered under other SEP reports are identified in Section 4.0,. Review Guide-lines.
2.0 REVIEW CRITERIA Current licensing criteria for safe shutdown is contained in the following:
1.
IEEE Standard 279-1971, " Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations"
- 2. -
GDC-5, " Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Com-ponents" 3.
GDC-13, " Instrumentation and Control" 4.
GDC-17, " Electric Power Systems"
.5.
GDC-19, " Control Room" 6.
CDC-26, " Reactivity Control System Redundancy and Capability" 7.
GDC-34, " Residual Heat Removal" 8.
CDC-35, " Emergency Core Cooling" 9.
GDC-44, " Cooling Water."-
3.0 RELATED SAFEU TOPICS AND' INTERFACES The following list of SEP topics are related to the safe shutdown topic with respect to EI&C features, but are not being specifically reviewed under this topic:
i 1.
SEP III-10. A, " Thermal Overload Protection for Motors of Motor-Operated Valves" 2.
SEP VI-7A3,'"ECCS Actuation System" 2
3.
SEP VI-7Cl, " Independence of"Onsite Power" 4.
SEP VI-10A, " Testing of RTS and ESP Including Response Time Testing" 5.
SEP VI-105, " Shared ESF, Onsite Emergency Power, mad Service Systems for Multiple Unic Facilities" 6.
SEP VII-1, " Reactor Trip System" 7.
SEP VII-2, "ESF Control Logic and Design" 8.
SEP VIII-2, "Onsite Emergency Power Systens--Diesel Generators" 9.
SEP VIII-3, " Emergency DC Power Systems" 10.
SEP II-3, " Station Service and cooling Water Systems" 11.
SEP IX-6, " Fire Protection."
Where safe shutdown system EI&C response is affected by the above-mentioned topics, that particular SEP review has been consulted for determination of overall safe shutdown system performance. Where the SEP topic review is not available, the affect on safe shutdown system performance has been identified as being based on an assumed operating condition of the affecting system. The safe shutdown review will be considered preliminary until resolution of the affecting topic is com-pleted and found to be in accordance with assumptions made in this review.
The completion of this review impacts upon the following SEP topics, since capabilities relating to safe shutdown is required in the topic:
1.
SEP VIII-LA, " Potential Equipment Failures Asso-ciated with a Degraded Grid Voltage" 2.
SEP VIII-2, "Onsite Emergency Power Systems--Diesel Generators."
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e 4.0' REVIEW GUIDELINES The capability to attain a safe shutdown has been reviewed by evaluating the systems used for normal ehutdown (onsite power not avail-able) and emergency shutdown (offsite power not available).
SRP 7.4 vaa applied to each system to ensure the following guidelines were met:
1.
They have the required redundancy (SRP 7) 2.
They meet the single failure criterion (RG 1.53, ICSB BTP 18) 3.
They'have the required capacity and reliability to perform intended safety functions on demand.(SRP 7).
Additionally, SRP 5.4 requirements contained in BTP RSB 5-1 were reviewed to determine if the systems required for residual heat removal met the following' guidelines:
1.
The systems are capable of being operated from th's control room with only offsite or only onsite power available 2.
The systems are capable of bringing the reactor to cold shutdown with only offsite or only onsite power available within a reasonable period, assuming the most limiting single failure.
The electrical equipment environmental qualification and physical sep-aration are being reviewed under other topics, as is the seismic equip-ment qualification, and are not reviewed in this report. Section 7.0 consists of a list of safety related EI&C equipment necessary for safe shutdown to be used in resolving SEP Topic III-1, "Classificati'on of Structures, Components, and Sys tems."
5.0 DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION l
5.1 Ins Tusent.ttion. The NRC SEP Staff Review of Safe Shutdown Systems identified the instrumentation available in the control room necessary to bring the reactor from the hot shutdown to cold shutdown condition. This review evaluates the nuclear' instrumentation, since 4
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s this parameter must be monitored to ensure the reactor achieves and maintains shutdown conditions. Various system pa ' meters, such as pump running or valve position indications, are not ine Jed in the list of safe shutdown instruments. This is due to the fact that indication is provided by the control / operate circuitry. Availability of control /
operate circuitry to run the system also means availability of the required indication. Similarly, if the control / operate circuitry is unavailable such that system operation is not possible, the system indication is not mandatory.
The nuclear instrumentation consists of three independent reactor protection buses providing redundant indication of each range of power level. Two buses are powered by their own motor generator set or a transformer. The third bus is powered by either a transformer or a static inverter (DC powered). Thus, there are no single failures which would disable all nuclear instrumentation.
The reactor parameter indicators (level, pressure / temperature) available in the control room are powered from the Sphere Instrument and Control Power Panels or the Turbine Building Instrument and Control Power Panels. Both systems are supplied by an automatic transfer device fed from Instrument and Control Transformers 1A and 25.
These panels also provide process indications such as flow, temperature, pressure, etc. for the other safe shutdown systems. Any failure or fault of the transfer device would result i,n a loss of power to the power panels.
Therefore, a single failure could result in a loss of vital instrumen-tation of the reactor and safe shutdown systems in,the control room.
The indications for power to the various AC and DC buses is sup-plied by lights, meters, or alarms powered from the bus being monitored.
Loss of power to the bus would be indicated in the control room, and no single failures of indications would effect the ability to monitor any other bus.
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5 1.1 Evaluation. Tha' instrumentation necessary for reaching and maintaining cold shutdown at Big Rock Point does not meet current licensing requirements since potential single failures could render vitst indications necessary for maintaining plant control ino perable.
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5.2 Safe Shutdown Systems. The SEP ' Staff review of Safe Shutdown Systems identifie'd the systems required for short-term cooling (immedi-
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ately after reactor shutdown) and long-term cooling (when the reactor
'is cooled to the Shutdown Cooling. system (SDCS) pressure limit) with only offsite and'only onsite. power available.
Normal short-tera cooling is provided by sumping steam:from the reactor to the main condenser via.the turbine bypass valves. Circula-ting water removes heat by condensing the steam. The feedwater system then returns the water to the reactor. This cooling method is only
.avellable whsn uffsite power is available. Failure of the feedwater control system, turbine control system, or loss of cooling flow to the condenser can render this ;aethod of cooling inoperative. The systene in this method are not class 1E but' are being considered as an avail-able means to remove decay heat.
Emergency or alternate short-term cooling involves operation of the emergency condenser (EC) or operation of the Reactor Depressuriza-tion System (RDS) in conjunction with the Core Spray (CS) system.
The EC consists of two steam lines from the steam drum immersed in f.
a large tank of water which is vented to the atmosphsra. The-lines
. return from the tank to the reactor. Flow through the system is initi-aced by opening a single MOV in each !!ne which allows the reactor _ to be cooled by boiling the water in the' tank and returning condensed steam to the reactor by natural circulation. Failure of the DC power to the MOVs would disable the system although the valves may be manu--
ally operated provided the sphere atmosphere will support manned. entry.
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Failure of the' control circuits for other normally-open MOVs could also cause. system isolation. The EC is not a class 1E system, but is being l
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considered as an available means to remove decay heat and can provide long-tera as well as short-term cooling.
The RDS operates to dspressurize the reactor by dumping steam directly.to the sphere atmosphere through four separate lines. Valves in each line.are controlled by a Class IE 120V'AC vital bus supplied by a static inverter from a battery / charger combination. Each line has a separate vital supply for its valves. There are no II&C single fail-ures which could prevent the RDS system from operating.
The CS system is used in conjunction with the RDS to remove decay heat. An electric pump powered from the emergency generator or a com-plately independent d.eset-driven pump can supply water to the CS header from the fire water.ystem. Two spray lines provide water to the reac-toe. One spray line requires that two AC MOVs open to provide cooling The other line uses two DC MOVs powered from the stacien bat-water.
tery. The CS system can cool the reactor by continuing to inject cold 4
water to the reactor and removing water via the RDS lines or by using the recirculation mode to pump water from the sphere sumps back to the reactor via a heat exchanger cooled by the fire water system. The pumps fo; this mode are electric pumps and must be manually loaded onto the diesel generator since the buses powering them are isolated on loss of effsite power.
The SDCS is the system normally used for long-term cooling. It consists of two parallel loops with a suction line, pump, heat exchan-ger, and a discharge line. There are multiple single failures which I
can render SDCS inoperable, including failure of any of the suction and discharge line normally-closed MOVs. Also, the SDCS pumps are powered from buses which are isolated on a loss of offsite power.
After approximately 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br />, the Reactor Water Cleanup System j
(RWCS) can provide enough cooling - to remove decay heat using the non-regenerative' heat exhanger which is cooled by the Reactor Cooling Water
. System (RCWS). This method can be used at any reactor pressure but the
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pumps necessary are powered from. buses' isolated on a loss of offsite.
power.
The teatrol' Rod Drive '(CRD). system can be used to 'nject water to
' the reactor at a rate of 50 gym. In conjunction.with relief valves, this system can maintain the reactor. at hot shutdown until the decay heat rate is within the capacity of the RWCS. However, the CRD pumps 1
- and the air compressors necessary to operate the CRD valves are powered from buses isolated on a loss of offsite power.
t 5.2.1 Onsite Power Unavailable (offsite power only).. Big Rock Point normally operates with all of its buses supplied by the main generator through an auxiliary transforme;. Loss of the main generator powe. during operation will result in a reactor scram and turbine trip.
The buses normally powered by the generator will automatically transfer to the reserve auxiliary transformer.
the most limiting EI&C single failure when only offsite power is availablo. is loss of the station 125V DC system. This would disable 4-the EC MOVs motite and control power. Under these conditions, the RDS and CS system would still be available to provide cooling necessary to reach and maintain cold shutdown conditions.
5.2.1.1 Evaluation. The systems required to reach and maintain cold shutdown conditions at Big Rock Point are capable of l
.providing the required cooling assuming no onsite power is available and a single EI&C failure.
l 5.2.2 Offsite Power Unavailable (Onsite Power Only). Shut-i down and cooldown without offsite power. requires the use of the emer-gency diesel generator..Under this condition, the normal cooldown method (dumping steam to the main condenser) is unavailable.
The most limiting single failure in this case is loss of the DC.
This would result in the loss of the SDCS, RWCS, RCWS, SWS, and CFD l
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o system. The EC would be available to cool the reactor to cold shutdown as would be the RDS/CS system method of cooling.
5.2.2.1 Evaluation. The systems required for reaching
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and maintaining cold shutdown conditions at Big Rock Point are capable l
of providing the required cooling assuming only onsite power is avail-able and a single EI&C failure.
5.3 Shutdown and Cooldown capability Outside the Control Room.
l The capability to shut down and cool down the plant from outside the
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control room exists at Big Rock Point. Communications between opera-cora is by radio units. There are inadequate means to determine reac-tor parameters such as level, pressure, and the temperature outside the control room. Local control stations exist for the pumps and valves of the systems required for safe shutdown described in Section 5.2.
Prt-cedures for taking the plant from hot to cold shutdown from outside the
~ control room exist.
l 5.3.1 Evaluation. The capability exists to shut down and l
cool down the reactc; from outside the control room at Big Rock Point.
'dovever, reactor and safe shutdown systems instrumentation outside the control room is inadequate.
6.0
SUMMARY
The systems required to take the reactor from hot shutdown to cold l
shutdown, assuming only offsite power is available or only onsite power is available and a single EI&C f ailure are in compliance with current I
licensing guidelines and the safety objectivas of SEP Topic VII-3.
Single failures of EI&C equipment cannot render all. short and long-term L
cooling systems inoperable.
The instrumentation available to control room operators to reach and maintain the reactor in cold shutdown conditions does not meet current licensing criteria since a single failure can cause a loss of 9
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i vital indication such as reactor temperature, pressure and level, as well as process instrumentation for safe shutdown systems.
The capability to shut down and cool down the reactor from outside the control room exists and is in compliance with the safety objectives of SEP Topic VII-3, except that instrumentation to verify shutdown and cooldown conditions from outside the control room is inadequate. Pro-cedures exist to take the plant to cold shutdown from outside the con-trol room to satisfy the safety objectives of SEP Topic VII-3.
7.0 SAFE SEUTDOWN EI&C FEATURES FOR CONSIDERATION BY SEP TOPIC III-1 ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION (including support structure, but not individual loads) 1.
AC BUSES (2400V Bus,1, lA, 1E, 1C, 2, 2A, 23, 2C, 2P) -including all feeders, incoming or outgoing, control circuits, indicating circuits, bus work. an,d support struetures 2..
ALL DC BUSES-including batteries, chargers, breakers, bus work, and support structures 3.
DIESEL GENERATOR-including control and indicating circuitry, and control and ind* cation of vital DG auxiliaries such as lube oil, fuel, and cooling.
INSTRUMENTATION (including support structures) 1.
REACTOR LEVEL 2.
REACTOR PRESSURt 3.
REACTOR TEMPERATURE 4.
NEUTRON MONITORING (including in-core monitoring) 6.
AREA AND SYSTEM RADIATION MONITORING.
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_ SYSTEMS (includes pumps, valves, control, indication, and support structures) 1.
SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM 2.
SERVICE WATER SYSTEM 3.-
REACTOR DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM 4.
RELIEF VALVES 5.
EMERGENCY CONDENSER 6.
ColfrROL ROD DRIVE SYSTEM 7.
REACTOR WATER CLEANUP SYSTLM 8.
REACTOR COOLING WATER SYSTEM 9.
FIRE WATER SYSTEM' 10.
CORE SPRAY SYSTEM.
8.0 REFERENCES
1.
Final Hazards Sununary Report, Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Station.
2.
Code of Federal Regulations, 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, " General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants."
3.
IEEE Standard 279-1971, " Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuc-lear Power Generating Stations."
4.
NUREG 75/087, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Standard Review Plan 7.4, " Systems Required for Safe Shutdown" and 5.4, " Residual Heat Removal."
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