ML19354D371

Proposed Tech Specs Section 3.6/4.6,modifying Requirements for Jet Pump Flow Indication

ML19354D371
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	10/11/1989
From:	COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML19325C905	List: ML19325C904 ML19325C913 ML19354D371
References
NUDOCS 8910180084
Download: ML19354D371 (22)

Text

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&U&CWEHL1 c-EROP_01ED_ CHANGES TO APPENDIX A }

IECa lCAL SPrf1F1 CATION  !

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DER-29 DPR-30 3.6/4.6-9 11-3.6/4.6-10 3.6/4.6-5 3.6/4.6-23 3.6/4.6-5a l 3.6/4.6-5b 3.6/4.6-5c t 3.6/4.6-13 L

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-OPR-29 i G.

l Jet Pumps _ G. Jet Paps '

-1. Whenever the reactor is in the 1. Whenever there is recirculation Startup/ Hot Standby or Run flow with the reactor in the.

modes, all jet pumps shall be Startup/ Hot Standby or Run intact, a9d all operating jet modes, jet pump integrity and pumps shall be operable. .If it operability shall be checked .,

is detersined that'a jet pump is daC v by verifyina thatathe j inoperable, an orderly shutdown '

, , ** *, j fo:'owing two conditions do'not -l shall be initiated and the- occur simultaneously: i reactor shall be in a cold i shetdown condition within 24 a. The recirculation pump- flow 1 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, differs by more than 10% i from the established i speed-flew characteristics.  !

c. IndWJad jet raat Ow f*' wh .

-l l p f.mp d... .w d.W by we b. The' indicated total core

w. ie*i, f, ed4tisked % 4, flow is more than 105  ;

greater than the core flow m,9 t g jet p.ar N A ca M oots. \ value derived from

• i established core plate DP

~

$ core flow relationships. *

' 4 -

2. Flow indication from e of the 2. Additionally' when operating '

'20 jet pumps shall be verified withonert.Irculationpumpwith.

prior to initiation of reactor the equalizer valves closed, the i startup from a cold shutdown diffuser to lower plenum  !

condition. differential pressure shall be ,

39 checked daily, and the t i differential pressure of any jet .i pump in the idle loop shall not l  !

! vary by more the 105 fra  :

established pa'. terns. -

L i t

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L i I

l' 3.4/4.6-9 AmendmentNo.q4

Y' QUAO-CITIES  :

DPR-29 3.

l h e indicated core flow is th V 3 The baseline data required to  !

g suis the flow indication (om evaluate the conditions in l L mach the 20 jet pumps. If- Specifications 4.6.G.1 and flow i (cation failur ccurs 4.6.G.2 will be acquired each for two ohnore jet s. operating cycle. _j immediatechecti action 7g,,g,g g gg c ,,,,pg,,,,,, 4(e 33 ,of.fAc shall be taken. f flow  !

indication fo a but one jet flod '4dk*h*^ #'** 6"'#2f M ##N i pump cannot obt ed within ope'able flow indicahon , .Tn cd4epo/or 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> orderly utdown **3 'l'* Famp u% Inope abic flow shali initiated nad Id # " * *' YAt how 14dic4*0n from 44>

reac r shall be in a col M*/?adio^ Otf Famp on T c same,jef sh own condition within 2 8""/o riser sAoll be summeda second

n. hme 40 compensaIs for % Row  ;

• 'Y " #

i

4. If flow indte.<hn fu%s ocow's b" bok icI &lom)Y pap os the some. Jet pamp et>ce immeos}e ind:ce. hors . If flow indieck:en corretMt. adten shslo be furen. G / lea indtsshon fa:lart. oc. car for' h1ree ot- en ors. \

{oe ar leut one e & % ' pef pmps cannot he )t+ pumps,7mmed;afe coeree,sse chir. ned &&n i2. hosts,, en ord l s4.J40an ac+'.eu shaiI bs lakes: . If F/e,a shal bc inh *ak4 and %e rene&ea-l stwil se. sn  ;

\

m g ,t e p. o n g , ,, a tt s u t. 4 9 o ye f p a m p ,

a. cord sh+ Mown consthan "!!k:n 24 hasars. -

5. If flow indreaken f,:I n oe a <s f.e 6o k Connot G^ ordest beskwkfown oblained W;%:n shojl se gg t*2t; ho g and Se. beh.n sMt be rn a wy i cal *hrokd (do. Ate- fap)jef pps on the ^

same reeircuIs+:en toop immediah 'shukom cong%n 4'" y b*"'s -

correct:sc achon shattb,e fukm. .cf floa ,

ind:cchon {v. af lesss' one oi +heyt-  :

pmps cannehloc obhrned Wh%sn i2 k rb j an ordkly Shaldown shall be iniNshd ar*d %L '

rfactw. <hatt he wir>iin 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.in a cad sha Mean condH:en  ;

H. Recirculation Pump Flow Limitations H'. Recirculation Pump Flow Limitations i

1. Whenever both recirculation Recirculation pumps speet shall be l

.. .. nunps'are in operation, pump checked daily for mismaten, speeds shall be maintained 3 within 15 sf each other when '

power level is greater than 805 end within 155 of each other -

whan power level is less than 805. .

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QUAD-CITIES Sg,pa 4. g p.ung

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Con- CM b ttheocu rc vn-wth G. Jet Puups b""

1. cekw f.de

. ' ^*[on Irne 6)at ' b'9t (ogs. oNoq! i Failure ofs a' jet pump nozzle assembly holdewn mec, anism, nozzle assembly, and/or riser increases the cross sectional flow area for blowdown following the postulated de11gn-basis double-ercled recirculatisn line break.

Therefore, if a f ailure oraurs, repairs must be made to assure the validity of the calculated consequences. <

.The following factors form the basis for the surveillance requirements:

L A break in a jet pump decreases the flow resistance characteristic of the external piping loop causing the recirculation pump to operate at a higher flow condition when compared to previous operation.

- 2nert m

1. 2 37 Th; change in flow rate of the failed jet pump produces a change in I the indicated flow rate of that pump relative to the other pumps in i that loop. Comparison of tas data with a normal relationship ar pattern provides the indication necessary to detect a failed jet i pump.

3N4 j:t == flow deviation pattern derived from the Me*;;;, w- '

lower plenum ilYfen,,d;' --=mura cdi..  ;

i evalusta jet ~~ :;;. iiny ' n th.... wiD~bei tr.1 used to further 1 .

l- e tr.; iv.ss in Sectiens_O6.G.1 and 2. '

Waement of indicated core flow with established core plate-coce flow relat o s provides the most assurance.that recirculation flow t bypassing the through inacthe or broken ist pumps. ypass flow is l

reverse with respec 1rmal jet flow. The Indic otal core flow is a summation of the flow indhdeon for the 20 dualjetpumps. The total 3 core flow measurin erse jet pump flow as though it were fonvard flow.g instrumentat' Thus the ind higher than actual core flow i by at least twice the no ow through any

'sedM f el ji inveatory is known occur gh degree of confidence so ing pump. Reactivity von if a jet pump MF1 uring a shutdown period, subsequent power a ion would pr ti nstrate abnormal control rod withdrswal for any power-

m. na noint __.,

A nozzle-riser system failure could a'so generate the coincident failure of a i jet pump bo @; however, the converse is not true. The 16ck of any

, substantial stress in the jet pump body makes failure impossible without an '

l:

u initial nozzle riser system failure.

l r

3.6/4.6-23 Amendment No. 4

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INSERT NO. 1 'i N :j' l

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'c  ; Comparison of: individual jet pump flows to average loop jet pump flow is the most sens1tive indichtor of significant jet pump performance -

4 degradation. The individual jot pt'.ap flow deviation from established i patterns will clearly indicate jet pump displacement since the indicated ,

-a flow of the jet pumps on the affected riser changes by 45% and 07%.  ;

Failure of a jet pump with lost flow indication would be indicated by a  !

n change in the flow to average loop. jet pump flow ratio of the companion  ;

jet pump on~the same jet pump riser.

Plant operation with loss of flow indt:ation for both jet pumps on the  ;

same riser is not permitted. If this should occur, there is no method for  !

ensuring jet pump integrity is being maintained for the affected jet pumps.

Plant cperation with loss of flow indication for both calibrated f (double-tap) jet pumps on a recirculation loop is not permitted. If this '

should occer, uncertaintles introduced into core flow calibration axceed  !

the value assumed in the. derivation of the Safety Limit Minimum Critical  !

Power Ratio.

INSERT NO. 2

2. Agreement of indicated core plate dp/ core flow relationships provides assurance that recirculation flow is not bypassing the core through inactive or broken jet pumps.

1631B/0600Z

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L'. ' QUAD CJTIES-DPR-30 '

h TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

)

4 . . .

Page l

. 3.5/4.5 CORE CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEMS 3.5/4.5-1 j

[

A. Core Spray Subsystems and the LPCI Mode of the RHR System 3.5/4.5-i i

B. Containment Cooling Mode of the RHR System 3.5/4.5-3 C. HPCI Subsystem 3.5/4.5-4 D. Automatic Pressure Relief Subsystems 3.5/4.5-3 1 E. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System . 3.5/4.5-6 '

F. Min _imum Core and Containment ~ Cooling System Availability 3.5/4.5-6 G. Maintenance of filled Discharge Pipe 3.5/4.5-7 .

H. Condensate Pump Room Flooo Protection .

3.5/4.5-8 I. Averagt feAnar i.inear Heat Generation Rate (APLHGR) 3.5/4.5-9 -

J. Local LNGR -3.5/4.5-9 K. ~ Minimum CrtM al : Power Ratio (MCPR) 3.5/4.5-10 l 3.5 Limiting Conditions for Operation Bases 3.5/4.5-11  :

4.5 durveillance Requiroments Bases '3.5/4.5-16 1 3.6/4.6 PRIMARY SYSTEM BOUNDARY- 3.6/4.6-1

.A.' Thermal Limitations 3.6/4.6-1~

Pressurization Temperature 3.6/4.6-1 r 8.

C. Coolant Chemistry 3.6/4.6-2 if , D. - Coolant Leakage 3.6/4.6-3 L E. Safety and Relief Valves 3.6/4.6-4 L F. Structural Integrity 3.6/4.6-4 G. Jet Pumps 3,6/4.6-5 H. Recirculation Pump Flow Limitations 3.6/4.6-5a e I. Shock Suppressors (Snubbers) 3.6/4.6-5c 1

0 3.6 Limiting Conditions. for Operation Bases 3.6/4.6-8

'. 3. 7 / 4. 7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS ,

3.7/4.7-1 A. Primary Containment 3.7/4.7-1 B .- . Standby Gas Treatment Systtm 3.7/4.7-7 C; Secondary Containment 3.7/4.7-8 D. Primary Containment Isolation Valvas 3.7/4.7-9 3.7. Limiting Conditions for Operation Bases 3.7/4.7-11 4.7 Surveillance Requirements Bases 3.7/4.7-15 3.8/4.8 RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS 3.8/4.8-1

' A .~ Gaseous Effluents 3.8/4 8-1 B. Liquid Effluents 3.8/4.8-6a C. Mechanical Vacuum Pump 3.8/4.8-9 D. . Environmental Monitoring Program 3.8/4.8-10 E. Solid' Radioactive Haste 3.8/a 8-13 F. Miscellanects Radioactive Materials Sources 3.8/4.8-14 H. Control Room Emergency Filtration tem 3.8/4.8-14a 3.8/4.8- Limiting Conditions for Operation and Surveillance Req. Bases 3.8/4.8-15 16318/0600Z 11 Amendment No.

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WlDg, n- i f s QU'.D-C111ES

' DPR-30 a

' .il;7 3.6/4.6 PRIMARY SYSTEM BOUNDARY If ' LIM 111NG CONDIT10NP FOR OPERA 110H SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS-Applicability:

Applicability:

Applies to the operat;ng status of the reactor coolant system. AppIles to the periodic examination and A testing requirements for the re ctor Objective: coolant system.

, .+- -To assure the integrity and safe opera- Objective:

F . tion of the reactor coolant system.

[- To determine the condition of the reactor h coolant system and the operation of the safety devices related to it.

V

$pECIFICA110N$

A. Thermal Limitations A. Thereal Limitations

1. Except as indicated in

$pecification 3.6.A.2 below, the 1. During heatups and cooldowns the following temperatures shall be

~

average rate of reactor coolant

1. temperature change during normal permanently recorded at Y heatup or cooldown shall not 15-minute intervals:

exceed 100'r/hr when averaged over a 1-hour period. a. reactor vessel shell.

b. reactor vessel shell flange, and

/ -

4 c. recirculation loops A and B.

1 2. - A step reduction in reactor coolant temperature of 240'r is 2. The temperatures listed in permissible so long as the limit Specification 4.6.A.I shall be

-In Specification 3.6.A.3 below permanently recorded snbsequent

.is met.~ to a heatop or cooldown at 15-minute intervals untti three consecutive readings at each given location are within 5 degrees of each other.

[

3.. At all times, the shell flange

'to shell temperature l differential shs11 not exceed 140'F.

d. The recirculation pump in an

" l

. idle recirculation loop shall .

not be started unless the  ;

coolant in that loop is within l 50*I of the operating loop coolant temperature.

-1558t 3.6/4.6-1 Amendment No, i

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QUAD-CITIES _

DPR-30 l

. B.- Pr'essurization Temperature B. Pressurization Temperature j

. 1. Operation for hydrostintic or i 1. Reactor vessel shell temperature and leakage tests (Curve A), during reactor coolant pressure shall be ,

heatup or cooldot.1 scurve B), perr.anently recorded at 15-minute  !

or with the core sritical intervals whenever the shell ,

(Curve C) shall be conducted temperature is below 220'F and tne  !

only wnen the reactor vessel reactor vessel is not vented, temperature is equal to or above that shown in the- 2. Neutron flux monitors and samples i appropriate curve of Figure shall be installed in ':he reactor

~

3.6-1. Figure 3.t.1 is vessel adjacent to the vessel wall effective through 16 EFPY. At at the core midplane' level. The least six months prior to 16 monitor and sample program shall- 1 EFPY new curves will b9 conform to ASTM E 185-60. The  !

submitted. monitors and samples shall be  ;

removed and tested in accordance .

2. The reactor vessel head bolting with the-guidelinas set forth in stuos shall not ta under 10CFR50 Appendix H to experimentally tension unless the temperature verify the calculated values of of thc vessel shell immediately integrated neutron flux that are below the vessel flange is 1 used to determlnc the NDTT for i 100'F. Figure 3.6-1. l

3. When the reactor vessel head bolting ]

studs are tightened or loosened, the l reactor vessel sheli tcmperature l immediately below the head flange  ;

shall be permanently recorded.

C. Coolant Chemistry l C. Coolant Chemistry  :

1. a. A sample of reactor coolant  :

1. The steady-state radiotodine shall be taken at least every concentration in the reactor 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> and analyzed for coolant shall not exceed 5 radioactive iodines of I-131 pCl of I-131 dose equivalent through I-135 during power per gram of wr.ter. operation. In addition, when chimney monitors indicate an increase in radioactive gaseous '

effluents of 25% or 5000 pC1/sec. whichever is greater, during sttady-state reactor operation, a reactor coolant sample shall be taken and analyzed for radioactive lodines.

b. An isotopic analysis of a reactor coolant sample shall be made at least ono per month.

Whenever the steady state radioiodine concentration of prior operation is greater than 1% but less 1797B/0650Z 3.6/4.6-2

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~ QUAD-CI!!ES 8 .v DPR-30 -

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i

. r G. Jet Pumps G. Jet Pumps

~

J 1. - Whentver the reactor 1s in the 1. Whenever there is recirculation i Startup/ Hot-Standby or Run flo's with the reactor in the j modes, all jet pumps shall'be Startup/ Hot Standby or Sun modes, intact, and all operating jet jet pump integrity and .

i pumps shall be operable. If it operability shall be checked  ;

is determined that a jet pump daily by. verifying that two of "l 1s leoperable, an orderly the following conditions do not 1' shutdown shall be inttinted and occur. simultaneously:

the reactor shall be in a cold shutdown condition within 24 a. The recirculation pump flow hours. differs by more than 10% '

from the established

" speed-flow characteristics.  ;

b. The' indicated total core flow is more than 10%

greater than the ore flow  ;

value derived from -

established' core plate DP/ core flow relationships.

c. Individual jet inp flow for i each jet pump does not differ by more than 10% from established flow to average loop jet pump flow

' characteristics. ,

i 2.- Flow indication from 19 of the l 2. Additionally, when operating with 20 jet pumps shall be verifled one recirculation pump with the  :

prior.to initiation of reactor equalizer valves closed, the startup from a cold shutdown diffuser to lower plenum condition.

differential pressure shall be  ;

checked daily, and the.

differential pressure of any jet pump in the idle loop shall not ,

~

vary by more then 10% from established patterns. ,

3. The indicated core flow is che 3. The baseline data required to sum of the flow indication from evaluate the condttions in e each jet pump with operable Specifications 4.6 G.1 and

1. 1ow indication. In addition, 4.6.G.2 will be acquired each -

f~or any jet pump with operating cycle, inoperable flow indication, the flow indication from the companion jet pump on the same jet pump riser shall be summed a second time to compensate for the flow through the jet pump with inoperable flow indication. If f 4w indication fallare occurs for three or 1631B/0600Z 3.6/4.6-5 Amendment No.

o n .

QUAD-CITIES -

L'._

DPR-30 l' more jet pumps, immediate corrective action shall be'  !

taken. If flow ludication for I b all but two> jet pumps cannot be  ;

obtained within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, an  ;

orderly shutdown'shall be )

initiate? snd the reactor shall h be in t cc 1 shutdown condition i

( within ra sours.

4. If flow indication failure 1 occurs for both jet pumps on l the same jet pump riser, i immediate corrtctive action,  ;

shall be taken. If flow ,

i indication for at least one of r the jet pumps cannot be '

obtained within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, an orderly shutdown shall be . ,

initiated and the reactor shall be in a cold shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

5. If flow indication failure occurs for both calibrated -

(double-tap) jet pumps on the t same recirculation loop, i immediate corrective action i shall be taken. If flow  ;

indication for at least one of i the jet pumps cannot be obtained within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, an orderly' shutdown shall be. j initiated and the reactor shall.

be in a cold shutdown condition L -

within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

H. Recirculation Pump Flow Limitations H. Recirculation Pump Flow limitations

1. Whene'/er both recircu!ation Recirculation pumps speed shall be cumps are in operation, pump chicked daily for misratch, speeds shall be maintained within 10% of each other when

_ power level is greater than 80%

and within 15% of each other when power level is less than

+

80%.

1 2.- If Specificatic,n 3.6.H,1 cannot '

g be met, one recirculation pump thall be tripped l

l 1631B/0600Z 3.6/4.6-Sa Amendment No.

L 1

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c. QUAD CITIES. i

-'~

h. p.l ' +

s: , DPR-30

, l

[ 3. Prior to Single Loop' Operation for cmore than 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />s-the following l i

restrictions'are required: i r,-

-- a . The MCPR Safety Listt shall be. +

,{ increased by 0.01.- (T.S. 1.iA);-

- s :b; The MCPR' Operating Limit shall  ;

s be-Increased by 0.01 (T.S.  !

- 3.5.K); , y j

'c. The flow biased APRM Scram and  !

< Rod Block Setpoints.shall be  !

reduced by 3.5% to read as  :

follows:

T.S. 2.'l.A.1;- ,

g S 1 58HD +-58.5  ;

I T.S. 2.1.A._l;*

5 1 (.58HC.+ 56.4) FRP/MFLPD 3 1

.T.S. 2.1.E

. S 1. 58HD + 46.5- .

t

. T.S. 2.1,B;* i.

S i (.58HD + 46.5).FRP/MFLPD

> -i' T.S. 3.2.C (Table 2.1-3);*-

APRM upscale < (.58HD + 46.5)

FRP/MFLPD .

a

.* In the' event-that NFLPD exceeds FRP.

E ( d .1 The flow biased ~RBM RHi Block .

l setpoints shall be reduced by ,

- 4.0% to read as follows:

T.S. 3.2.C (Table 3.2-3); RBM l Upscale 1 .65ND + 39 j

e. The suction valve in the idle loop shall-be closed and- t electrically isolated except when the idle loop is being i

l-- prepared for return to service.

'16319/0600Z 3. 6 / 4. 6-5ts Amendment No.

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_- c QUAD-CITIES

'k DPR-30

,# u

- I. Shock Suppressors (Snubbers) I. Shock Suppressors (Snubbers) p 3 a , The following surveillance requirements apply to all snubbers on safety related piping systems.

l.- During all modes of aperation 1. Visual inspections shall be except Shutdown and Refuel, all performed in.accordance with the ,

snubbers on safety 1 elated 'ollowing schedule utilizing the i piping systems shan be operable acceptance criteria given by i except as noted ir. 3.6.I.2 Specification 4.6.I.2. l following. r

2. From and after the time that a Number of Snubbers snubber is determined'to be Found inoperable Next inoperable, continued reactor During Inspection Roquired operation 1; permissible during or During Inspec- Inspection  !

the succeeding 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> only if tion Interval Interval l the snubber is sooner made >

operable. 0 18 months  :

+25%

3.- If the requirements of 3.6.I.1 and 3.6.I.2 cannot be met, an 1 12 months orderly shutdown shall be  !

125%

initiated and the reactor shall be in a cold shutdowa condition  : 6 months '

within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. 125%

4. If a snubber 10 determined to be 3.4 124 days inoperable while the reactor is 125%

l in the Shutdown or Refuel mode, c the snubber shall be made 5,6,7 62 days operable prior to reactor 125%

i

.- startup.- -

^

28 31 days

+25% ,

i l; The required inspection interval. <

l shall not be lengthened more than one step at a time.

l.

Snubbers may be categorized in two groups, ' accessible' or

' inaccessible' based on their accessibility for inspection during reactor operation. These two groups may be inspected independently according to the above schedule.  ;

16318/0600Z 3.6/4.6-5c t.mendment No.

~

QUAD-CITIES ,

. DPR .

{

G. Jet Pum;s .

Failure of a jet pump nozzle assembly holddown mechanism, nozzle assembly. l and/or riser increases the cross-sectional flow area for blowdown i following the postulated design-basis double-ended recirculation line i break. Therefore, if a failure occurs, repairs must be made to assure the  !

validity of the calculated consequences. Maintenance of jet pump l integrity is requirad to demonstrate that the. core can be reflooded to l two-thirds core height following a large recirculation line break loss-of-coolant accident. j The following factors form the basis for the surveillance requirements: l

1. A break in a jet pump decreases the flow resistance  ;

characteristic of the external piping loop causing the .

recirculation pump to operate at a higher flow condition when  !

compared to previous operation. l t  !

i 2. Agreement of indicated core plate dp/ core flow relationships -?

L provides assurance that recirculation flow is not bypassino the core through inactive or broken jet pumps.

3. The change in flow rate of the failed jet pump produces a change 1 in the< indicated flow rate of that pump relative to the other pumps in that loop. Comparison of the data with a normal .

relationship or pattern provides the indication necessary to.

detect a failed jet pump.

-Comparison of individuni jet pump flows to average loop jet pump flow is the most sensitive indicator of significant jet pump performance  :

i degradation. The individual jet pump flow deviation from established l

patterns will-clearly indicate jet pump displacement since the indicated i flow of the jet pump on the affected riser changes by 45% and 67%.

l- Failure of a jet pump with lost-flow indi~ cation would be indtrated by a change in the flow to average loop jet pump flow ratto of the companion jet pump on the same jet pump riser.

Plant operation with' loss of flow indication for both jet pumps on the '

l same riser is not permitted. If this should occur, there is no method for ,

i ensuring tr.t pump integrity is being maintained for the affected jet pumps.

Plant operation with loss of flow indication for both calibrated ~

-(double-tap) jet pumps on a recirculation loop is not permitted. If this should occur, uncertainties introduced into core flow calibration exceed '

the value assumed in the derivation of the Safety Limit Minimum Critical Power Ratto.

A nozzle-riser system failure could also generate the coincident fhilure of a jet pump body; however, the converse is not true. The lack of any substantial strest in the jet pump body makes failure impossible without an initial nozzle riser system failure.

16318/0600Z 3.6/4.6-13 Amendment No.

t,.

AUACWENt 2 St)MMARY OF Cl[MiGES y- .

1. Page 11 (DPR-30)

L a. Change. reflects renumbered pages l

2. Page 3.6/4.6-9, 3.6/4.6-10 (DPR-29)

Page 3.6/4.6-5, 3.6/4.5-Sa (DPR-30)

a. Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.G.2

• Replace each" with "19"

! b. LCO 3.6.G.3 .

-

• Replace existing text with."The indicated core flow is the sum of

.the flow indication from each jet pump with operable flow indication. In addition, for any jet pump with inoperable flow indication, the flow indication from the companion jet pump on the same jet pump riser shall be summed a second time to compensate for u

the flow through the jet pump with the inoperable flow indication.

If flow indication failure occurs for three or more jet pumps, immediate corrective action shall be taken. If flow indication for all but two jet pumps cannot be obtained within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor thall be in cold shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />."

c. LC0 3.6.G.4 (new)

• "If flow indication failure occurs for both jet pumps on the same jet pump riser, immediate corrective action shall be taken. If flow indication for at least one of the jet pumps cannot be obtained within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in cold shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />."

d. LCO 3.6.G.5 (new)

• "If flow indication failure occurs for both calibrated (double-tap) jet pumps on the same recirculation loop, immediate corrective action shall be taken. If flow indication for at least one of the jet pumps cannot be obtained within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in a cold shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />."

e. Surveillance Requirement 4.6.G.1  ;

• Add "two of" and delete "two"

• Add "c. Individual jet pump flow for each jet pump does not differ by more than 107. from estab11shed flow to average loop jet pump flow characteristics."

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l 3. Page 3.6/4.6-23'(DPR-29)

Page 3.6/4.6-13 (DPR-30) t

a. Paragraph 1 l e' Add " Maintenance of jet pump. integrity is required to demonstrate that the core can be reflooded to two-thirds core height following a i c.

large recirculation line break loss-of-coolant accident."  !

b. Paragraph 2 s

• Renumber item #2 to #3

• Add "2. Agreement of indicated core plate dp/ core flow relationships provides assurance that recirculation flow is.not -

bypassing the core through inactive or broken jet pumps."

c. Paragraph 3

• Repicce current text with: j

" Comparison of individual jet pump flows to average loop jet pump  !

flow is the most sensitive indicator of significant jet pump performance degradation. The individual jet pump flow deviation l from established patterns will clearly indicate jet pump displacement since the indicated flow of the jet pumps on the  :

affected riser changes by 45% and 67%. Failure of a jet pump with e lost flow indication would be indicated by a change in the flow to average loop jet pump flow ratio of the companion jet pump on the same jet pump riser.

Plant operat hn with loss of flow indication for both jet pumps on '

the same riser is not permitted. If this should occur, there is no i method for ensuring jet pump integrity is being maintained for the affected jet pumps.

Plant operation with loss of flow indication for both calibrated  !

(double-tap) jet pumps on the recirculation loop is not permitted.

If this should occur, uncertaintles introduced into core flow ca?ibration exceed the value assumed in the derivation of the Safety Lin,1t for Minimum Critical Power Ratto."

4. Page 3.6/4.6-5b and Sc (DPR-30) *

• Page number change only. l 0315T:5 .

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, i ADACMIML3 DESCRIPTION AND BASES OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT Quad Cities Station Units I and 2 contain twenty (20) jet pumps per unit. Each jet pump is provided with a single tap, diffuser to plenum, differ-ential pressure transmitter. The total core flow passing through the jet pump  !

diffusers is determined by the single tap differential pressure transmitter on '

each jet pump. The differential pressure signal from each indiviuual jet pump is electronically square rooted to obtain a signal proportional to flow and ,

then summed with other jet pump flows to obtain the jet pump loop flows and ,

the total core flow. ,

In addition, four jet pumps are provided with a double tap, diffuser to diffuser, differential pressure transmitter. These four jet pumps (Numbers .

1, 6, 11, and 16) are laboratory calibrated prior to installation. During  ;

initial plant startup, the flow through these four calibrated jet pumps is  ;

calculated from the. double tap measurement system and two calibration constants per loop are developed. The average of these two calibration constants for a loop is then used to calibrate the 10 single tap instruments in the loop so that the loop flow indicators and core flow recorders are accurate. This  :

calibration process is conducted throughout the life of the plant to compensate for instrument drift and other changes in the recirculation system operating ,

characteristics.

Unit I has been operated with one jet pump instrument line inoperable since October 31, 1972, when the Jet Pump Number 7 differential pressure instrument line failed. Operation in this manner has been satisfactory and '

the ability to accurately rionitor total core flow as well as the ability to demonstrate jet pump integrity has been adequately maintained.

Operation with the sensing line on Jet Pump Number 7 has not been detrimental to the core measurement accuracy. The sensing line on Jet Pump Number 7 is inoperable; however, the jet pump remains operable. Jet Pump Number 7 receives drive flow from the same riser as Jet Pump Number 8; therefore, both jet pu,nps should have equivalent flows. Base data obtained prior to the sensing line failure demonstrates the ratio of Jet Pump Number 7 to 8 flows to be 1.0057. This ratio indicates that the pumps have flows which are equal and within the accuracy of the instrumntation. The milliamp flow signal of Jet Pump Number 8 has been supplied to the core flow summer to represent Jet Pump Number 7 flow, thereby the total core flow is based on 20 inputs.

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In addition to the surveillance on individual jet pump flows, there  ;

are a number of acceptable means for verifying jet pump integrity. The methods available include:

1. Recirculation pump speed to recirculation loop flow.

2. Core flow to core power and flow control line.

3. Core flow to core plate differential pressure, t

4. Core flow to recirculation drive flow.  ;

5. Recirculation pump speed to jet pump loop flow. {

The ability of these methods to detect jet pump failure has not been 1 l:

jeopardized by the loss of Jet Pump number 7 flow indication since the

j. capability of core measurement system has been maintained. -

As discussed in-Attachment 6. Commonwealth Edison has investigated various methods to repair the inoperable jet flow instrument, however, repair  :

is not feasible due to the limited work space available. As a result, the proposed Technical Specification was developed to reflect the current plant configuration.  ;

The proposed Technical Specification amendment:

a) reduces the number of jet pumps, from which flow indication is verified and prior to startup from cold conditions, from twenty (20) to nineteen 5 (19).

b) _ changes the description of the inputs to the total core flow calculations,  ;

" ircludes the verification of individual jet pump flows to c.verage loop jet L pump flow relationship as a Technical Specification surveillance to determine jet pump integrity, t d)- increases the number of allowable inoperable flow indication to two, and

.e) prohibits continued operation if both jet pumps on the same jet pump riser or both calibrated (double tap) jet pumps on the same recirculation loop have failed flow indication, k The proposed Technical Specification change does not represent a significant change in acceptance criteria or safety margin. The addition of the proposed Individual jet pump flow to average loop jet pump flow survelliance provides further assurance, via increased monitoring, that jet pump integrity is maintained. The proposed surveillance requirement ensures that adequate jet pump integrity monitoring, as specified in SIL 330 " Jet Pump

! Beam Cracks" dated June 9, 1980, is provided. '

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l The failure of the jet pump instrument line introduces three (3) basic concerns to continued operation:

1. the ability to accurately measure total core flow, f

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2. the ability to ensure jet pump integrity is maintained to ensure that l the core can be reflooded following the design basis loss-of-coolant l

-accident (LOCA), and,  ;

3. the creation of a leakage path from the jet pump to the annulus region.

i

, The ability to accurately measure total core flow is necesscry to '

ensure that accurate calculation of the reactor power distribution is obtained and Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) remains within Technical Specification  ;

requirements. The GE evaluation (Attachment 5) demonstrates that core flow m::asurement uncertainty is maintained within the limits assumed in the GE Thermal Analysis Basis (GETAB) provided that flow indication is maintained for  ;

both jet pumps on the same riser as well as both calibrated jet pumps on the same recirculation loop. The measurement uncertainty analysis included an ^

assumption that jet pump flow with inoperable flow indication is simulated by the companion jet pump on the same jet pump riser. GETAB is the method for deriving the MCPR Safety Limit for both single loop and double loop  ;

operation. The proposed Technical Specification includes the restriction of continued. operation in the event these condttions are not met.

1- The GE evaluation demonstrates that the failure of jet pump flow L indication does not prevent adequate monitoring of jet pump integrity provided l that both jet pumps on the same riser do not have failed flow indication. The  ;

restriction for failed flow instruments on both jet pumps on the same riser has been incorporated into the proposed Technical Specification. The current Technical Specification surveillance for monitoring jet pum) integrity is -

adequate provided the flow indication has not failed. In t1e event of a failure of the jet pump with inoperable flow indication, the current surveil-lance would not be adequate. The resultant change in the indicated core flow, for this case, would be significant, but may not be sufficient to cause the core plate differential pressure (dp) to core flow romparison to be out of the limit. To ensure adequate monitoring of jet pump integrity with inoperable L jet pump flow indication, an additional surveillance is proposed. The ,

proposed surveillance requires that a comparison of the individual jet pump flow to the average jet pump loop be performed. In the event of a jet pump failure with a failed flow instrument, the resultant change in flow through the companion jet pump on the riser would be sufficient to detect the

, failure. The conduct of the two surveillance would effectively monitor the L _ integrity of the jet pump, thereby assuring that the core can be reflooded '

following the design basis LOCA.

f 0315T:8 1

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a.

.u Finally, while the failure of the instrument line provides an additional leakage path from the jet pump to the annulus region, the leakage from the 0.25 line has no effects on the LOCA safety limits or calculation.

The amount of leakage from the instrument line during the design basis LOCA is considered to be insignificant when compared to the capacity of the available core cooling systems. The leakage is also insignificant with respect to the design leakage assumed for the jet pumps during normal operations and during LPCI operation. As a result, the additional leakage path is not a substantial consideration. -

031ST:9

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AIIActMMLA MSISl0fLN0_SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS DEllfMIELLQB l i

As discussed in the Description of. the Proposed Amendment Request, the proposed. change revises the current Technical Specification for jet pump instrument operability requirements, due to the failed jet pump .

Instrumentation on Unit 1 Jet Pump number 7.

The changes have been reviewed by Commonwealth Edison. Based on this review, Commonwealth Edison does not believe the changes'present a Significant Hazards Consideration. The basis for the determination is document below.

l Basis for No Significant Hazards Consideration Commonwealth Edison has evaluated this proposed amendment and determined that the change does not involve a significant hazards '

consideration. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.92 (c):

1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence or an accident previously evaluated.

A loss of coolant accident is the only evaluated accident which entails a broken instrument line. With respect to the loss of coolant accident, two concerns have been identified.

First, the jet pump integrity must be maintained to ensure that the core can be reflooded following a design basis LOCA. -The GE safety evaluation has demonstrated that the failure of the jet pump flow Indication does not prevent adequate monitoring of jet pump Integrity provided that both jet pumps on the same riser do not have failed flow indication. The safety evaluation concluded that for the failure of any jet pump, except one having failed flow indication, the current Technical Specification surveillance requirements were adequate for detection of the failure. In the event of a jet pump failure on a jet pump with inoperable flow Indication, the resultant change in indicated core flow would be significant, but it may not be sufficient to cause the core plate dp-core flow comparison to be out of limits. If this type of failure occurred ,

while utilizing the proposed surveillance requirements, the resultant change in the flow through the companion jet pump on the riser would be 0315T:10

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, r, ff sufficient to ensure the detectic,n of the failure. Since the core plate dp-core flow comparison surveillance would be adequate for detection of the failure of at least 19 of the 20 jet pumps (those with operable flow indications), the surveillance.is being retained as a Technical Specification requirement. The individual jet pump flow to average loop jet pump flow comparison is being. led to ensure that two surveillance methods are available and effective to detect the failure of a jet pump regardless of the condition of the flow indication. The proposed Technical Specification surveillance methods will, therefore, ensure that jet pump integrity monitoring capability will be maintained.

Second, the failure of the instrument line provides an additional leakage path from the jet pump to the annulus region. The' instrument line is a 0.25 inch line and would allow insignificant leakage during the

' design basis LOCA compared to the capacity of the available core cooling system. The leakage from the instrument line is also insignificant with respect to the design leakage assumed for the jet pumps during the normal operation and during'LPCI operation. LOCA sensitivity studies have indicated that an increase in leakage, on the order of that associated with the failed jet pump instrument line, has no effect on the LOCA safety limits or their calculations.

The proposed change, therefore, does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated.

2. The proposed changed will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

.The purpose for the jet pump flow instruments is to provide a means to monitor jet pump integrity as well as measuring core flow.

Jet pump integrity must be maintained to ensure that the core can be reflooded following a design basis LOCA. The GE safety evaluation has demonstrated that the failure of the jet pump flow indication does not prevent adequate monitoring of the jet pump integrity provided that both jet pumps on the same riser do not have failed flow indication. The safety evaluation concluded that the current Technical Specification

!. surveillance is adequate provided that the flow instruments on the failed L jet pump is operable. The amendment request, therefore, proposes an additional surveillance requirement. The proposed surveillance requirement would detect a failure of a jet pump irrespective of the condition of the flow instruments provided that both jet pumps on the same riser do not have failed flow instruments. The proposed amendment restricts operation under these conditions. The current Technical Specification, augmented by the proposed Technical Specification surveillance will ensure jet pump integrity is properly monitored.

-0315T:11 1 ,

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~ The-ability'to accurately measure total core flow will be maintained. .

to ensure;that accurate calculations of.the reactor power distribution and j

Minimal Critical Power Ratio (MCIR) is provided. The GE safety evaluation _ j demonstrates that-core flow measurement _ uncertainty is matntained wtthin.

the limits assumed in the General Electric Thermal Analysis' Basis (GETAB) orovided.that both jet pumps on the same_rlser do not have failed flow ,

ndication and both calibrated jet pumps on the same recirculation loop- 1 e have operable flow' indication. The proposed ameridment restricts operation ,

under these conditions. The derivation of the MCPR safety limits for'both q single and dual: loop op ration ls achieved through.the use of GETAB. <

In. addition, the proposed Technical Specification does not introduce' i any new or O fferent modes of operation, thereby, no new accident scenarios is treated as a result of any new modes of operation.

H

3. The propp ed changes does not involve a significant reduction in the

. margin of safety.

The ability to accurately measure total core flow will be maintained to ensure that accurate calculation of the reactor power distribution and .

MCPR is achieved, thereby, no significant @'ction in the margin of safety is: involved. The GE safety evalu+ - n N'nonstrates that core flow  ;

measurement uncertainty is maintained witW to ) alts assumed in the-General, Electric Thermal. Analysis Basis ( C AB) provided that both jet.

pumps on the s me riser do not have failed flow indication and both

- calibrated jet pumps on the same rectrculation have operable flow indication. The proposed amendment restricts operation under these conditions. The derivation of-the MCPR safety limits for both single and dual loop operation is achieved through the use of GETAB.

In addition, the LOCA analysis assumptions foi intact jet pumps will

. be eet throagh the proposed surveillance' requirement. ' The surveillances

?

provide methods to assure' jet pump integrity is maintained.

[' , The proposed Technical Specification, therefore, do not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

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