ML19350F010
| ML19350F010 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 06/17/1981 |
| From: | Tedesco R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Robert E. Uhrig FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8106240044 | |
| Download: ML19350F010 (20) | |
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NUCLE AR Ht-UULA1 UMY COMMlb31mv m.:m:.=. :. c. :::::
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Docket No. : 50-389 O
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Dr. Robert E. Uhrig, Vice President Advanced Systems & T(chnclogy
" OY 2 2 19g g Florida Power & Light Company f; "8?ge,D7#"
"3 P. O. Pox 529100 N<
Miami, Florida 33152 Q
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Dear Dr. Uhrig:
SUBJECT:
ST. LUCIE PLANT, UNIT 2 FSAR - REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION From the review of your application for an operating license by the Instrumen-
-tation & Control Systems Branch, we find that we need additional infonnation regarding the St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2 FSAR. The specific information required is listed in the Enclosure.
Responses to the enclosed, which was provided to your staff on June 11, 1981, should be submitted by June 29, 1981.
If you cannot meet this date, please inform us within seven days after receipt of this letter of the date you plan to submit your responses.
Please contact Mr. Nerses (301-492-7468), St. Lucie 2 Project Manager, if you desire any discussion or clarification of the. enclosed report.
Sincerely, l.i F c5.2t.w.,.
Robert L. Tedesco, Assistant Director for Licensing Division of Licensing
Enclosure:
As stated cc: See next page.
2.
4*3W 8106240 0
-Dr. Robert E. unrig,-' ice President-v Advanced Systemsfand Technology Florida Power:& Light Company P. O. Box 529100 Miami,. Florica 33152 ccs:
' Harold F. ' Reis, Esq.
Lowenstein, Newman, Reis, Axelrad & Toll 4
1025 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
' Washington, D. C.
20036 Norman A. Coll, Esq.
McCarthy, Steel, Hectory & Davis 14th Floor, First National Bank Building Miami,-Florida -33131 Mr. Martin H. Hodder 1131 N. E. 86th Street I
Miami. Florida 33138 Resident Inspector St. Lucie Nuclear Power Station c/o U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7900 South A1A Jensen Beach, Florida 33457 O
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~ty!tW Qutbi t04f -647AINiWG IG CHAPTER 7 (i!.;!!: "; Cl.!;.
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InE F3AR TGR ST. LUCIE-U:;IT.:
Following is a list of items for discussion at meetings witn ene applicant to provide the fiRC staff with information required to understand the design bases and design implementation for the instr _. :ntation and control systens for St. Lucie 2.
The applicant should be prepared to use detailed instrument, control, and fluid system schematics at the meetings in explaining system designs and to provide verification that design bases and regulatory criteria are met.
420.05 The iristrumentation and control system comparison information of FSAR Table (7.1) 1.3-1 and FSAR Subsection 7.1.1.6 is insufficient.
The informati'on supplied does not completely show that each instrumentation, control and supporting system is:
a.
Identical to that of a nuclear power plant of similar design which has recently received an operati.ng license, or b.
Different from previous /recent designs with a discussion of the differences and their effects on safety related systens.
The above information is required by Regulatory Guide 1.70, Revision 3,
" Standard format and content of safety reports for nuclear power plants",
Section 7.1.1.
Therefore, in conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.70, Section 7.1.1, provide a comparative discussion for each St. Lucie 2 instrumentation and control system.
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' 420.06 The Safety Evaluation Peport (and suopienents) for the St. Lucie 2 ccnstructice
( 7.1) permit describes instrumentation and control system items which require resolution at the ' operating license stage. ' Also, several commitments were made by the applicant to modify the St. Lucie 2 design.
Please give the status for each item where such resolution /commitgents were made.
420.07 Various instrumentation and control system circuits in the plant (including (7.1) the reactor protection system, engineered safety features actuation system, instrument power supply distribution system) rely on certain devices to provide electrical isolation capability in order to maintain the independence between redundant safety circuits and between safety circuits and non-safety ci rcui ts.
Therefore, please provide the following information:
(1) List all parameters and systems that interface / interconnect between redundant safety circuits and between the safety circuits and non-safety circuits (control systems, associated circuits, etc.).
1 (2) Identify the type of transmission (i.e., analog, digital, electric, optic, etc.) which is involved with each interface that is identified in response to Part I above.
(3) Identify the type of isolation device which defines the Class IE boundary for each interface which was identified in response to Part 1 above.
(4) Provide the acceptance criteria for each isolation device which is identified in response to Part 3 above.
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( 5) Describe the test program for the isolation devices to insure adequate protection against EMI.
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420.08-FSAR Subsection 7.1.1.6 states that there has been minor changes in the core (7.1)
- protection calculator (CPC) software.
Describe the changes in " software" used for the " analog" CPC.
Identify all instrumentation, control circuits, and components (both safety 420.09 For all and non-safety) that may become submerged as a result of a LOCA.
such components and circuits that are not qualified for service in such an environment, provide the results of an analysis to determine the following:
(1) the safety significance of the failure of the components and ci-:uits (e.g., spurious operation, loss of function, loss of accident / post accident monitoring, etc.) as a result of flooding and (2) the proposed design changes, if any, resulting from your analysis.
Idcatify where instrument sensors or transmitters supplying information to 420.10 (7.2) more than one protection channel are located in a common instrument line (7.3) or connected to a common instrument tap.
The intent of this item is to verify that a single failure in a concon instrument line or t,ap (such as break or blockage) cannot defeat required protection system redundancy.
Identify where instrument sensors or transmitters supplying information to 420.11 (7.2) both a protection channel and control channel or to more than one control (7.3) channel are located in a common instrument line or connected to a common The intent of this item is to verify that a single failure instrument tap.
in a common instrument line or tap can ne;ther defeat required separation between control and protection nor cause multiple control system actions not bounded by analyses contained in Chapter 15 of the FSAR.
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920.12-Recent review of a plant (Waterford) revealed a situation where heatars (7.2) are to be used to control temperature and humidity within insulated cabinets housing electrical transmitters that provide input signals to the reactor protection system.
These cabinet heaters were found to be unqualified and a concern was raised since possible failure of the heaters could potentially degrade the transmitters, etc.
Please address the above design as it pertains to St. Lucie 2.
If cabinet heaters are used then describe as a minimum the design criteria used for the heaters.
420.13 In the FSAR it is stated that four measurement channels are provided for each ff,'l parameter monitored in the protection systens. The applicant proposes to operate various protection systens with one of the four channels in bypass.
The system involved would then function as a 2 of 3 channel protective system.
(With one channel tripped, the system would function as a 1 of 3 channel protectivesystem).
The proposal is based on asserted four channel independence To demonstrate independence the applicant must demonstrate separation of power supplies, logic and sensors.
St. Lucie 2 has been designed as a two battery system, that is, the four protective channels obtain power from four separate vital AC instrument buses, which inturn obtain power from two AC/DC
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power divisions.
Hence, the demonstration of 4 channel independence is, a priori, incomplete.
On previously reviewed plants (Waterfor?.) we have required (by plant Technical Specification) that the protec,tive system be used as a four channel system l
with oypass of a known defective channel for no more than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> and require trip of a known defective channel af ter 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. Please be prepared to discuss this design concept.
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5-C 14 Ti.: rcsctor protection system (RPS) includes two trip inputs (turoir.e trip (7.2) ar.d loss of component cooling water trip) which are classified as not being required for reactor protection.
It is the staff's position (BTP ICS5 26) that all reactor trip inputs to the RPS are required to meet the design requirements of IEEE 279 without exception.
This includes the entire trip function from the sensor to the final actuated devices.
FSAR Chapter 15 snows that the accident analysis takes credit for reactor trip on turbine trip.
FSAR Subsection 7.2.2.2.11 states that.the turbine trip is taken from non-Class 1E hydraulic oil pmssure switches. The use of non-Class IE switches is not acceptable. Also, it is not clear that the component cooling water trip meets the requirements of IEEE 279.
Therefore, provide a descriptior, of these and other such RPS inputs with respect to their conforrance to BTP ICSB 26.
This design description should be supported with electrical schematic,s,, logic diagrams, piping and instrument drawings, test procedures and technical specifications.
420. 16 FSAR Subsection 15.2.1.1.2 states that the operator manually trips the (7.2)
(15.0) reactor after receiving the turbine trip alarm. This is not consistant with the other accident analysis events which trip the reactor automatically on turbine trip. Please clarify this inconsistency.
420.16 The reactor protection system brings the four Class 1E independent and (7.2) redundant instrument power supply circuits into common logic ratrices.
This results in the potential for compromising the physical and electrical independence of these circuits. Therefore, describe the degree of physical separation and e'.ctrical isolation provided for the redundant instrument power supplies at these logic matrices and also at any other points of 1
con fluence.
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420.17 Flease describe how your test procedures for tne protection systens confor:::
(7.2)
(7.3) to Regulatory Guide 1.118 (Revision 0) Position C.13 guidelines which states that test procedures for periodic tests'shall not require jury rig test Identify setups, the use of temporary jumper wires, or the removal of fuses.
and justify any exceptions.
420.18 State whether open-column reference legs are used in the level measurement systems (7.2) for the steam generators and the pressurizer.
If so, discuss the effect on the measurenent accuracy caused by the heatup of the reference leg due to a high energy line break inside the containment.
420.19 The St. Lucie 2 design consists of interconnections for AB shared system (7.3) equipment.
For example, FSAR Table 7.3-2 shows that the intake cooling water pump 2c and component cooling water pump 2c each receive both SA and SB actuation signals from the redundant trains. This results in the potential for compromising the physical and electrical i,ndependence of the redundant ESFAS circuits.
Therefore, describe all situations where interconnections (third channel (SAB)
Pquipment actoated by redundant actuation trains SA and SB) for SAB shared system equipment exist.
Discuss how this design concept meets the requirements of IEEE Standard 279-1971 and IEEE Standard 384. We are particular_ly concerned with physical and electrical independence of redundant safety circuits.
- Also, describe the physical location of the third channel actuated equierent in relation i the Channel A and B actuated equipment.
420.20 Discuss design feateres which insure that the blocking of the operation of (7.3) selected protection function actuator circuits is returned to normal operation after testing.
Is reliance placed upon the operator doing this and then observing test lights in the safeguards test racks, or are there core positive,f means to insure that systems are returned to normal operation?
420 21 With regard to tne recirculation actuation system (RAS), provide a response (7.3) to the following items:
c (1) For all modes of plant operation, evaluate the consequences of an inadvertent switchover signal which could cause the PAS to operate and realign the pumps and valves when not required.
If any of the consequences are found to be unacceptable, describe the design features which are provided to help insure against such an occurrence.
(2) Discuss the safety related display instrumentation associated with this actuation which is available to the operator.
(3) Can the reset of safety injection actuation prior to automatic switchover from injection to recirculation defeat the automatic switchover?
420.22 FSAR Subsection 7.3.1.1.3 states tnat, "The SIAS and high-high containment (7.3) pressure signals are combined in four AND circuits within the ESFAS initiating logic." However, FSAR Figure 7.3-3 s,h.ows two XND circuits. Please correct this discrepency.
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420.23 The information supplied in FSAR Subsection 7.3.2.1.1 for GDC 24 is insufficient.
>3.2.1.1)
Therefore, provide additional information on separation of protection and control systems and clarify the statement that, "The ESFAS is not a protection sys tem. "
420.24 Section 2.3.2.1.3 refers to certain actuated devices which are not tested P.3.2.1.3)
P. 2. 2. 3. 3) during reactor operation but are to be tested during reactor shutdown.
Such devices arenot sufficiently discussed in the appropriate portions of Sections 7.2.2.3.3 and 7.3.2.1.3.
Therefore, identify the specific equipment and provide the justification for not including this equipment in the tests during reactor operation in line with the recommendations contair.ed'in
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Regulatory Guide 1.22 and BTP ICSB #22 in Appendix 7A of Standard Review i.;
Plan.
.A 4FO. 25 In the discussf or of the Mair. Steam Isolatica Signal (MSIS), in Section 7.3.1.1.5 (7.3) of the FSAR, it is stated that a MSIS on either channel (steam generator A
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or steam gene' ator B) closes the maia' steam isolation valve, the main feedwater isolation valve,'and the batkup.feedwater isolation valve.in that channel, and
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sends a signal through an isolation device to close the same cocponents of the other channel. Upoa review o.f the associated logic, schematic, and wiring diagrams, the following, discrepancies were noted:
a) _ The F315 logic diagram Eigure 7.3-5, does not include the logic in which the signal from one channel actuates the components in the other channel.
Modify this figure accordingly.
b) On the schematic diagrams for the main steam isolation valves (2998-8-326 sheets 312 and 315, Revision 1) the two MSIS contacts are both shown in the normally closed position. However, in the control wiring diagrams (2998-B-327 sheets 312 and 315, Revision 6) the two MSIS contacts are shown as one normally open and one normally closed. Resolve this i nconsistency.
c) Also, in the schematics and wiring diagrams identified in b), it was noted that the 4YA coil is connected directly to the positive bus through the SA/SB contact while the 4YB coil is connected to the positive bus through several contacts. Please clarify this difference.
420.26 The second and third paragraphs of Section 7.3.1.1.5 state that the MSIS signal (7.3) is initiated by low steam generator pressure or high containment pressure.
However, in parts a and h of this section, it is stated that only one parameter.
4 steam generator pressure, initiates that signal. Resolve this inconsistency.
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420. 27 Tne discussion concerning the loss of tne instrument air system in Section (7.3) 7.3.2.1.5 states that none of the essential control or monitoring instrumentation is pneumatic. However, Table 6.2-53, which lists the containment isolation valves, shows that many of the ESF actuated valves are pneumatically operated.
Revise your discussion of the consequences of loss of instrument air accordingly.
This discussion should include the following:
(a) A list of all pneumatically operated valves and controls which are sa fety-rela ted.
(b) The normal operating position for each pneumatically operated valve and control and the safety function position.
(c)
Identification of all pneumatically operated valves and controls that do not move to the safety function position upon loss of air.
420. 28 SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM (SDCS) :
FSAR Subsection 5.4.7.2.6 states that (7.4 )
(5.4.7) manual actions for alignment of the SDCS require that the LPSI pump suction valves from the refueling water tank and the containment sump be closed with a handwheel located in the safeguards pump room (outside the control room).
This design is not suitably justified as required by Position A.3 of BTP RSB S-1.
Therefore, describe all areas where system operation is required outside the control room to align the SDCS and provide sufficient information to justify such a design as required by the above position.
420.29 FSAR Subsection 7.4.2.3 states that the safe shutdown systems are periodically (7.4) tested to verify proper functioning during normal plant operation.
Describe how the safe shutdown systems conform to the requirerrents of IEEE 338 ard the recorrendations of Regulatory Guide 1.22 since the existing FSAR information is insufficient.
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....; 'i. 3. :.:.: rec tha :t.::pr.:ci: L...p c:! :: :--.: ::- r:' ' ' *'" ?S (7.4) on the hot :hutd:::n control panel which are not listed in FSAo Table 7.4-2.
Please clarify and amend the FSAR where necessary.
420. 31 According to Subsection 7.4.1, monitoring of the reactor coolant boron (7.4.1) concentration is required for shutdown. Please describe the instrumentation /
systems to be used to measure the boron concentration. Be sure to include a description of the power source (s). and design criteria. Electrical schematics and one-line wiring diagrams should be included as support documentation. Al so,
explain why this instrurentation is not included in Tables 7.4-1 and 7.5-1.
420.32 Section B.1.(a) of BTP RSB 5-1, " Design requirements of the residual heat
( 7.4.1. 3) removal system," requires that valve positions be indicated in the control Please p ' ovide a description of how (limit switches, indicators, etc.).
room.
the shutdown cooling system meets this requirement. Also, provide the acceptance design criteria used for valve position indication.
420.33 With regard to the Shutdown Cooling System Interlocks (Section 7.6.1.1), the (7.4.1.3)
(7.6.1.1) description of the measurement channels does not establish that there is any diversity among the channels. The staff's position in this area (see Standard Review Plan Appendix 7A - ICSB BTP 3 Item 2) requires diversity in the interlocks.'
Provide a discussion of your conformance to this portion of the position.
In addition, identify all other points of interface between the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) and other systems whose design pressure is less than the design pressure of the RCS. For each such interface, discuss the degree of conformance to the above cited Branch Technical Position 3.
420.34 Branch Technical Position (BTP)
ICSB 18, " Application of the single failure (7.3)
(7.4) criterion to manually-controlled, electrically operated valves," gives the (7.6) 4 staff's position on disconnection of power to electrical components of fluid 1
systems.
Please identify such areas of design and state your conformance to the BTP ICSB 18.
- (7.4.c..w,j In the description of.systaira required for' safe shutdcun in S;;ti
- r. 7.4.1, 93 no discussion of the pressurizer heaters and spray system is presented.
However, controls for these systems are_ included on the hot shutdown panel.
Please provide a description of the pressurizer controls as required for shutdown.
420.36 The FSAR states that manual transfer switches are provided at appropriate locations (7.4) outside the control room so that the required circu-lts for hot shutdown are
' isolated from circuits in the control room.
Please provide the following infor-mation:
(a) Design basis for selection of instrumentation and control equipment on the hot shutdown panel.
(b) Location of transfer switches and remote control station (include layout drawings,etc.).
(c)
Design criteria for the remote control station equipment including transfer switches.
(d) Description of control of access to the displays and controls located outside the control room.
(e)
Discuss the testing.to be perforced'during plant operation to verify the capability of maintaining the plant in a safe shutdown condition from outside the control room.
(f) Description of isolation, separation and transfer / override provisions.
This should include the design basis for preventing electrical interaction between the control room and remote shutdown equipment.
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Description of any comunication systems required to coordinate operator.
actions, including redundancy, separation, and environmental qualification',j,.
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1 (h) 0 ascription of control room annunciation of remote control or overridden status of devices under local control.
420.37 FSAR Table 7.5-1, " Safety related display instrumentation," does not describe (7.5) the display instrumentation on the plant auxiliary control board.
Therefore,
please cescribe the function, design criteria and location of this control board and amend Table 7.5-1 appropriately.
420.38 The FSAR states that sufficient instrumentation and controls are provided (7.4.1.5) outside the control room to achieve cold shutdown through the use of suitable procedures. Please provide a summary of the procedures used to achieve cold shutdown from outside the control room. These procedures and associated equip-ment should ensure that cold shutdown can be accomplished before Technical Specification limits on hot shutdown are exceeded.
Be sure to include a list of the systems required for cold shutdown from outside the control room and the location of the panels where these system controls are housed.
Discuss the design criteria applied to these systems,and controls. Also, if coordination of control at the hot shutdown panel and the local panels is needed to achieve and maintain cold shutdown, discuss what communication facilities are available.
420.39 Please provide the following information on bypass and inoperable status (7.5)
(7.5.1.1) indication (Regulatory Guide 1.47):
a) Regulatory Guide 1.47 recommends automatic indication at the system level of bypassed or deliberately induced inoperability of the protection system and systems actuated or controlled by the protection system. The second paragraph of Section 7.5.1.6 implies that some protection systems do not have automatic initiation of bypassed or inoperable status, but require manual initiation.
Identify all protection systeas not provided with automatic initiation of bypass and inoperable status od' the system level and provide justification for this manual initiation.
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b) State how the bypass and inoperable status indication system conforms to Regulatory Position C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.47.
Discuss the design criteria (bases) used in the selection of equipment /syscems to be monitored, and provide the criteria to be employed in the display of inter-relationships and dependencie!
on equipment / systems This is to insure that bypassing or deliberately induced inoperability of any auxiliary or support system will automatically indicate all safety systems affected.
c) The title of Table 7.3-10 suggests that the table includes the RPS/ESF bypasses or inoperable status indication. However, no RPS equipment is included in the table. Also, the combustible gas control system and the diesel fuel oil storage and transfer sysam are not included. Revise the table to include all RPS/ESF systems for which bypass or inoperable status indication is provided.
d) Inforration supplied is insufficient to determine complete confermance to the design criteria of branch technical position'(BTP).ICSB 21. Therefore, please i
provide additional frifortration on how the bypass and inoperable status indication system complies to Positions B.3, 8.4, and 8.5 of BTP ICSB 21.
420.40 The FSAR states that available information for the engineered safety features (7.5.1.1) systems consists of valve position indication.
Please describe the design features used to provide direct indication of ESF system valves.
420.4I
" Instrumentation for light-water-cooled nuclear power plants, to assess plant (7.5) and environs conditions during and following an accident," Regulatory Guide 1.97 (Rev. 2), Section D, Implementation, stat-that " Plants scheduled to be licensed to operate before June 1,1983, should meet the requirements of NUREG-0737 and the Cor;;ission Memorandum and Order (CL!.-80-21) and the schedules of these documents or prior to the issuance of a license to operate, whichover The balance of the provisions of this guide should be completed, date is later.
Provide a cocnitment to comply with this schedule.
by June 1983."
. 37 420.42 Botn Tables 7.4-1 and 7.5-1 list instr =r.taticn required for shutdown.
1(7.5)
However, the lists are not consistent. Audit both tables and modify them so that the shutdown instrumentation is consistent.
420.43 Safety Injection Tank (SIT) Isolation Val.o Interlocks:
'.6.2.2.2) a.
Describe how valve position indication (i.e., limit switches, visual indicators, etc.), is accomplished for the safety injection tank isolation valves as required by Position 2 of branch technical position (BTP)
ICSB 4.
b.
Describe the cesign criteria applied to this position indication system.
c.
Discuss how the SIT isolation valve system conforms to Position 3. of BTP ICSB 4. As a minimum, describe the independence of power supplies for the visual indication system and alarms and provide electrical schematics, one line wiring diagrams, etc., as support information.
d.
The FSAR information. suppl:ed for Item 4.22 of IEEE 279-1971 states that, "The instrumentation and cables associated with SIT isolation valve interlocks is not uniquely identified."
It is the staff's position that a method t,e used for identifying safety related instrumentation and control circuits and equipment which is in conformance with the recomendations of Regulatory Guide 1.75 and the requirements of IEEE 384.
Therefore,
please describe how the instrumentation and cables associated with the. SIT isolation valve interlocks conform to the above recommendations and require-ments.
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1 420.44 a)
The FSAR Subsection 7.7.1.1.1 discusses the aute:: tic ::ithdrawal prohibit (7.7) signal.
Describe the logic used to implenent this signal.
Include logic df agrams and electrical schematics.
b) FSAR Subsection 7.7.1.2.1 states that the withdrawal prohibit signal can be bypassed at the operator's module.
Discuss the operational procedures to be used to actuate this bypass and discuss the possible implications resulting from actuation of this bypass.
Be sure to include as a minimum, such items as administrative control, control room indication, effects upon the reactor protective system, effects upon fuel design limits, etc.
420.45 The last statement in Section 7.7.2 states that the safety analyses of Chapter (7.7) 15 do not require the systens discussed in Section 7.7 to remain functional.
However, the first paragraph of Section 15.0.2.3 states that several normally operating control systems (including sone discussed in Section 7.7) are assumed to function during certain accidents. Resolve this inconsistency.
420.46 In the discussion of the Digital Data Processing Eystem in Section 7.7.1.2.10, (7.7) the statement is made that the system is functionally identical to the system supplied for St. Lucie Unit 1.
State whether the system provided for Unit 1 provided group sequencing for the control elenent assemblies.
List all other functions provided by the Digital Data Processing System for Unit 2 that were not provided for Unit 1, and vice versa.
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..G-420.47 Gur Letter (R. L. Tedc :: t: Dr..R. E. Uhrig) dated May 5, 1991 requests additional information pertaining to four (4) instrumentation and control system concerns. These concerns are entitled:
Loss of non-class 1E instrumentation and control power system bus a.
during power operation (IE Bulletin 79-27);
Engineered safety features (ESF) reset controls (IE Bulletin 80-06);
b.
Qualification of control systens (IE Information Notice 79-22), and c.
d.
Control system failures.
Please provide the requested information.
FSAR Subsection 1.9.1 states that the FSAR will be amended as appropriate.
420. 48 To date to address the TMI Action Plan Items as desc-ibed in NUREG-0737.
no responses to NUREG-0737 TMI Items II.B.1, II'.D.3, II.E.1.2, II.F.2, or II.K.3.1 have been received. Therefore, please provide information on the above TMI items as required by NUREG-0737.
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DPAWING REVIEW ITEMS FOR ST. LUCIE UiiiT lC. I r+
Electrical scher.atics and physical layout drawings should be used by tne applicant to " walk through" all equipment from initiating signals to actuated devices.
The applicant should be prepared to follow energy sources for this equipment back to electrical buses discussed in Chapter 8 of the FSAR and instrurent air supplies discussed in Chapter 9 of the FSAR.
Conformance with IEEE Standard 279 Regulatory ~ Guide 1.53, Regulatory Guide 1.75, Regulatory Guide 1.47, and Regulatory Guide 1.32 should be demonstrated.
420.49 Discuss the routing of the instrumentation wiring for the four pressurizer pressurt> transmitters (PT1102A, PT1102B, PT1102C, and PT11020) used in _ the reactor protection system. The discussion should (a) identify the physical location of the transmitters, (b) trace the wiring from the transmitters through conduit to the penetrations, (c) describe the pen,etrations, (d) trace the wiring from the penetrations through conduit and/or cable trays to the reactor protection system cabinets, and (e) continue tracing the wiring through the trip logic within the RPS cabinets to and including the RPS trip breakers.
420.50 Identify the physical location of the equipment that actuates the reactor trip on turbine trip. Trace the wiring from this equipment to the reactor protection system cabinets.
420.51 Discuss the routing of the control wiring for the three component cooling water The discussion should (a) identify the physical location of the controls pumps.
(on main control panel as well as local panels), (b) trace the wiring from the manual controls and from the automatic actuation (SIAS) logic cabinets to the final actuated equiprent, and (c) trace the wiring which annunciates improper alignment of pump 2c motor power in relation to any of its motor operated discharge valve posi tions.
420.52 Discuss the routing of instrumentation and control circuitries cetween tne hot shutdown panel and the main control room control boards.
Id2ntify the location of the manual transfer switches. e 420.53. Table 7.3-10 of the FSAR lists several components in the Charging and Baron System that automatically provide annunciation when they are bypassed or become inoperable. These components include the charging pumps, boric acid make-up pumps, boric acid trake-up tanks, and return valves. Describe the bypass or, inoperable circuitry for each of these components. The description should include (a) how the bypass or inoperable signal is generated, (b) the location of the circuitry generating the signal, (c) the routing of the signal wiring to the annunciator panels, and (d) the location and layout of the various annunciator panels.
If the plant computer system is used to monitor the status of these signals, the routing of the signal wiring to the computer system should be traced.
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