ML19350E368
| ML19350E368 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 04/28/1981 |
| From: | Briggs L, Greenman E, Mcbrearty R, John Thomas NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19350E366 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-219-81-03, 50-219-81-3, NUDOCS 8106170389 | |
| Download: ML19350E368 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000219/1981003
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DCS Nos. 50219-810210
50219-810217
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION I
Report No.
50-219/81-b3
Docket No.
50-219
License No.
OPR-16
Priority
Category
C
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Licensee:
Jersey Central Power and Light Company
Madison Avenue at Punchbowl Road
Morristown, New Jersey 07960
Facility Name:
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Inspection At:
Forked River, New Jersey
Inspection Conducted:
February 2-28, 1981
Inspectors:
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J. A. Thomas, Resident Reac(of Inspector
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E. E. driggsg Reactor Inspector
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R. McBrearty, Reactqf Inspector
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Approved by:
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E. G. Greerman- Chief, Pseactor Projects Section 2A
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Division of Resident and Project In:,pectors
Inspection Sumary:
Inspection on February 2-28,1981 (Report No. 50-219/81-03)
Areas InE 'ted: Routine inspection by the resident inspector, two region
based inspectors and one Region I Section Chief (98 hours0.00113 days <br />0.0272 hours <br />1.62037e-4 weeks <br />3.7289e-5 months <br />) of:
tours of the
facility; log and record review; followup of onsite events; review of licensee
action on IE Bulletin 80-17 supplement 4; and, inspection cf an irradiated fuel
shipment.
Results: One item of noncompliance was identified in one area. (Dosimetry not
issued to visitors and Dosimetry Exception Log not signed, Paragraph 2.b.(5))
81061603 N
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
J. Carroll, Director, Oyster Creek Operations
- K. Fickeissen, Manager, Plant Engineering
- D. Jones, Engineer, Senior I-Elec./ Inst.
R. McKeon, Rad Waste Operations Manager
A. Rone, Engineering Manager
W. Stewart, Plant Operations Manager
- J. Schofield, Engineer III
- J. Sullivan, Manager, Operations
D. Turner, Radiological Controls Manager
The inspectors alsc interviewed other licensee personnel during the
course of the inspection including management, clerical, maintenance, and
operations personnel.
- Present at exit interview conducted February 27, 1981.
2.
Plant Tours
a.
During the course of the inspection, frequent tours were made in the
following areas:
Turbine Building;
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Augmenteo Off-Gas Building;
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New Rad-Waste Building;
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Old Rad-Waste Building;
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Cooling Water Intake Structure;
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Monitoring Change Areas;
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Maintenance work areas; and
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Yard areas.
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In addition, tours of the Control Room were conducted at least once
per day when the inspector was on site including a weekend tour on
February 15, 1981.
"ours of the reactor building were conducted
once per day at least four days out of five during the inspection
period.
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b.
The foliowing determinations were made:
(1) Monitoring instrumentation: All control room panels were examined
to verify that required instrumentation was functional, that proper
correlation between instrument channels existed, and that indicated
parameters were within Technical Specification limits. Control room
indications were examined to verify that system alignments and avail-
ability complied with Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for
Operation. Local plant instrumentation was selectively examined to
verify instrument operability and correlation between channels.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
(2) Control room annunciators and alarms:
Lit control room annunciators
were reviewed with operators and shift supervisors to verify that the
reasons for the alarmed conditions were understood and that corrective
action, if required, was being taken.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
(3)
Plant housekeeping conditions:
General cleanliness, material storage,
and control of materials to prevent fire hazards were examined for con-
formance to licensee administrative procedure 119, "Househeeping", Revi-
sion 3, dated December 2, 1980, and procedure 120, " Fire Eazards", Revi-
sion 9, dated October 16, 1980.
On February 23, the inspector met with licensee management and expressed
concern for the large quantity of contaminated tools, equipment, and
waste stored on the 95 foot and 119 foot elevations of the reactor
building. This could have an adverse impact on the outage scheduled
for April 1981 because working conditions could become degraded due to
the additional amounts of contaminated tools and equipment generated
by outage maintenance. The licensee vchnowledged the NRC's concern
and stated that dedicated crews were to be established to remove the
material to a more suitable storage location and to commence decontam-
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ination and recovery of the tools and equipment. This cleanup and
recovery effort is to be completed before the April outage and con-
taminated equipment resulting from the outage maintenance will be
cleaned on an ongoing basis to prevent future accumulations in unde-
sirable areas. The licensee stated that progress in removing contam-
Inated waste has been slow due to the availability of trucks and allo-
cation of burial space at the authorized disposal sites.
During a tour of the facility on February 25, 1981, the inspector
found a single cigarette butt on the floor of the station battery
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room and another one behind a work table in the Cable Spreading
a
Room. These were considered to be isolated cases.
Housekeeping
was being procerly maintained in these areas. The inspector dis-
cussed the licensee's controls over smoking in areas containing
safety related equipment with facility management. The licensee
acknowledged the inspectors concern and stated that increased atten-
tion would be given to the control of smoking in designated and
posted "no smoking" areas.
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(4)
Fluid leaks and system integrity:
Systems and equipment in the
areas toured were examined for evidence of fluid leaks and abnor-
mal piping vibrations. On February 11, 1981, hydraulic snubber
,
number 23/3 (serial number F93501#7), located on Containment
Spray System II piping on the 23 foot elevation of the reactor
building, was found with its tell-tale indicstor out of view,
and oil was found on the floor beneath the snubber. Licensee
management was notified and the snubber was immediately replaced
with an operable spare. During subsequent testing the replaced
snubber failed to lockup in the compression mode due to failure
of the inner shaft seal. The licensee stated that a Licensee
Event Report would be submitted. The LER will be reviewed during
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a subsequent inspection.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
(5) Radiation Controls: The inspector made observations to verify
that control point procedures and posting requirements were being
followed. Work in radiation controlled areas was observed for
adherence to licensee procedures and for compliance with the
requirements of applicable radiation work permits.
Personnel
were observed to verify that dosimetry was worn.
On February 27, 1981, the inspector reviewed the records of dosi-
metry issued to visitors. Names of visitors to the facility were
selected from the security records for February 24 and 25, 1981,
and compared to the dosimetry issue records. Thirty six names
were selected from the security visitor log for February 24, and
47 names were selected for February 25, 1981. Of these 83 visitors,
there were records of issuance of a self reading dosimeter to two
individuals on February 24, and to eight individuals on February
25, 1981.
None of the visitors to whom dosimetry was not issued
had signed the Dosimetry Exception Log as required by Procedure
903.2, " Personnel Monitoring", revision 13 dated April 30, 1980.
Failure to either complete the Dosimetry Exception Log or to issue
a self reading dosimeter for visitors constitutes noncompliance
with Procedure 903.2 (50-219/81-03-01).
(6) During tours of the facility, valves and components in safety
related systems were checked to verify proper system alignment.
Selected valve positions were checked in the core spray system,
containment spray system, and standby liquid control system.
Selected breaker positions were verified in the 4160 volt and
460 volt electrical distribution systems.
(7)
Security: The inspector verified that security posts were manned
and that personnel and vehicle searches were conducted as required.
All vital areas were periodically checked to insure that they were
locked or guarded and that positive control of access was exercised.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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3.
Shift Logs and Operating Records
a.
The inspector reviewed the following plant procedures to determine
the licensee established requirements in this area in preparation
for review of selected logs and records:
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Procedure 106, Conduct of Operations;
Procedure 108, Equipment Control; and
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Procedure 115, Standing Order Control.
The inspector had no questions in this area.
b.
Shift logs and operating records wer? reviewed to verify that:
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Control Room logs were filled out and signed;
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Equipment logs were filled out and signed;
Log entiies involving ab9ormal conditions provided sufficient
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detail to communicate equipment status;
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Shift turnover sheets were filled out, signed, and reviewed;
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Operating orders did net conflict with Technical Specification
regitirements; and,
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Logs and records were maintained in accordance with the procedures
in a. above,
c.
The review included the following plant shift logs and operating
records as indicated and discussions with licensee personnel.
Reviews were conducted on an intermittent selective basis:
Control Room Log, all entries;
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Control Room Alarm Sheets;
Control Rod Status Sheets;
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Technical Specification Log;
Reactor Auxiliary Log;
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Reactor Log;
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Control Room Turnover Check List;
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Equipment Tagging Log;
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Lifted Lead and Jumper Log;
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Standing Orders, all active; and,
Operational Memos and Directives, all active.
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No items of noncompliance wera identified.
4.
Follow-up of On-Site Events
a.
At approximately 2:45 a.m. on February 10, 1981, an operator discovered
water leaking through a pipe penetration in a concrete wall which
forms a vault around the Chemical Waste Collecting tanks in the new
Rad-Waste Facility.
This was indicative of the vault being flooded
to a depth of about four feet as a result of an overficw of the
tanks.
The operator notified the Group Shift Supervisor who began a
search of the plant in an attempt to locate the source of the unusual
amount of water flowing into the Chemical Waste Collecticn system.
The three Chemical Waste Collection Tanks in the New Rad-Waste
Facility receive waste water from the floor drain sumps throughout
the plant. Waste water is subsequently processed from the
"C" tank
through a concentrator. A review of operating records revealed the
following sequence of events leading to the overflow of the Chemical
Waste Collection Tanks:
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At 4:25 p.m. on February 9, 1981, the plant floor drain sump
system was aligned to the "B" Chemical Waste Collection Tank
(WCT).
The indicated levels in the A, B, and C WCT's were 100
percent, 96 percent, and 100 percent, respectively. At approx-
imately 6:00 p.m., all three tanks were at levels of 100 percent
and the "A" concentrator was started to process water from the
"C" WCT. At 6:35 p.m. after processing about 600 gallons of
waste water the evaporator was placed in a recycle mode dua to
a low pH in the "C" WCT. At that time, no decrease in the "C"
VCT level was indicated and the operators began a check af
system valve lineups to determine if there was an abnormal
source of water flow into the
"C" WCT. At 7:20 p.m.,
processing
from the "C" WCT was restarted while operators continued to
search for the unknown water source.
No off normal valve
lineups were found which could account for an abnormal flow of
water to the WCT's. At 11:45 p.m.,
no decrease in the "C" WCT
level was indicated and it was assumed that the tank level
gauge was in error.
By 2:00 a.m. on February 10, 1981, an
instrument technician hcd completed trouble shooting of the "C"
WCT le.el gauga and determined that it was functioning properly.
At 2:45 a.m., the water was seen leaking through a pipe penetration
in the vault wall confirming that the tanks had overflowed and
flooded the vault.
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Upon discovery of the overflow of the WCT's, efforts continued to
locate and isolate the source of laakage into the Chemical Waste
Collection system. At 8:00 a.m. on February 10, 1981, the Manager
of Plant Operations took charge of coordinating the recovery efforts
in the New Rad-Waste Control Room.
The volume of water in the WCT
vault was calculated to be approximately 30,000 gallons.
Because of
its low conductivity (5 micrombos per centimeter), the water was
believed to be from the condensate transfer system. At about 10:00
a.m., the indicated water level in "C" WCT had begun to decrease,
indicating that the source of the abnormal leakage had been isolated.
Once control of the WCT levels was regained, provisions were made to
pump the water from the flooded vault to the waste surge tank for
subsequent processing.
Drainage of the flooded vault was completed
at approximately 10:00 p.m. on February 11, 1981.
Subsequent investi-
gation of this event was unable to determine the cause of the
overflow of the Chemical Waste Collection Tanks into the vault. A
plant water balance revealed a loss of approximately 50,000 gallons
of water from the condensate ~ransfer system which correlates closely
with the estimated 30,000 gallons of water spilled in the vault plus
an estimated 20,000 gallons of excess water processed through the
radwaste system during this event.
It was concluded that the source
of the water was the condensate transfer system.
However the flow
path into the Chemical Waste Collection System is undetermined.
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This item will remain unresolved pending further investigation by
the licensee and the NRC.
(50-219/81-03-02)
The early recognition of this event could have minimized the amount
of radioactivity contaminated water spilled into the tank vaults.
Early recognition was hindered by the fact that there is no means to
easily inspect the WCT vaults for water accumulation.
A shield
block must be removed from the top of the vault and a visual inspection
performed.
This was not done during the event until 9:00 a.m. on
February 10, 1981.
The licensee will study the feasibility of
installing a water level monitoring system in the Chemical Waste
Collection Tank vault.
This is unresolved pending licensee evalu-
ation and implementation of corrective action.
(50-219/81-03-03)
At about 7:45 a.m. on February 10, 1981 during this event, water
from the WCT vault was discovered seeping through the west wall of
the New Rad-Waste Building.
Samples of the water were collected and
found to have gross gamma activity levels of 3.2 E-3 microcuries per
milliliter. A direct frisk of the wetted areas of the wall showed
contamination levels of 15,000 to 120,000 disintegrations per minute.
Detectable ground contamination was found only within about six
inches of the wall.
The area was immediately barricaded and posted
as a contamination controlled area.
The total amount of water that
leaked through the wall is estimated to be about 15 gallons.
The
floor and lower five feet of the wall of the New Rad-Waste Building
is a seismic Category I structure designed as a " bathtub" capable of
preventing the release of the total inventory of water in all tanks
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in the event of a common mode failure.
The leakage of this structure
which consists of concrete walls approximately three feet thick is
under investigation by the licensee. This item is unresolved pending
further review by the licensee.
(50-219/81-03-04)
b.
At approximately 3:00 p.m. on February 17, 1981, the Emergency
Notification System (ENS) telephone and commercial telephone lines
were found to be out of order at the facility. A temporary line of
communication between the control room and the NRC Headquarters
Operations Center was established using radio communication between
the control room and the load dispatcher and commerical telephone
between the load dispatcher and the operations center.
The normal
ENS was restored at about 11:00 p.m. on February 17.
The loss of
communication was attributed to the accidental breaking of telephone
lines by a telephone company maintenance crew working off site.
The
problem was discovered by a routine daily check of the ENS system.
The telephone company was aware of the interruption of the telephone
circuits but apparently has no mechanism for notifying the licensee
on the NRC of such an event.
This item will be reviewed further by
the NRC as a potentially generic issue.
5.
Licensee Actions on IE Bulletin 80-17, Supplement 4
Bulletin 80-17 requires the licensee to submit to the NRC detailed
information concerning the installation, testing, and operation
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of the scram discharge volume water level continuous monitoring system
(CMS).
The inspector reviewed records, interviewed licensee representatives and
examined the monitoring equipment and alarms associated with the licensee's
ac'tions relative to supplement 4 of the bulletin.
This was done to
detenr.ine licensee compliance with the bulletin requirements and licensee
commitments to the NRC.
The scram discharge volume (SDV) system in the reactor building includes
four 4 inch diameter headers and two 6 inch diameter headers connected to
a "U" tube scram discharge instrument volume by 2 inch diameter piping.
The SDV is comprised of two sections, North and South, each containing
two 4 inch diameter headers, one 6 inch diameter header and 2 inch diameter
piping connecting the headers to the instrument volume.
The CMS incorporates the NDT " Water Sleuth" Model 280 Level Detection
System which was installed to continuously monitor water level in each of
the six scram discharge headers and to alarm at a predetermined level
(1.25 inch).
The system includes the following components:
Two ultrasonic transducers (NDT Model WST-1) which are attached to
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each discharge header (one per header is presently operational, the
second will be used as a backup system when it becomes operational).
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Six electronic monitors located in the vicinity of the transducers
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in the reactor building and attached to the transducers by a length
of triaxial cable.
Local and remote (red) alarm lights at the monitor and in the control
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room which will illuminate on high water level in the discharge
header (s).
Local (red at monitor) and remote (yellow at control room) lights
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which will illuminate on loss of power, transducer malfunction or
abnormal amplifier gain.
Two annunciators on Alarm Panel "F" in the control room which will
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alarm when any of their respective (North or South) monitors detect
either high water level or become inoperative.
The inspector observed a portion of an in progress training class devoted
to instructing personnel in the calibration and operation of the CMS
equipment.
Instruction was provided by the site Supervisor-Maintenance
Training and followed the lesson plan referenced below.
The inspector's review included the following:
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Scram discharge Manual Surveillance NDE Log for the period from
November 28, 1980 to February 20, 1981.
Manual surveillance calibration sheets for February 20, 1981.
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Procedure No. UTL-JCPL-UT-13B, "UT Procedure for Detection of Water
in Horizontal or Vertical Piping Runs on All BWR's Scram Discharge
Header Piping", Revision 0, the governing procedure for manual
ultrasonic surveillance of the SDV.
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Procedure No. 501, " Annunciating Alarms", delineating action required
of control room personnel if the control room CMS alarms are actuated.
Procedure No. Special 80-165, " Scram Dump Volume Monitor In-Service
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Operational Test", Revision 0.
Procedure No. 617.3.008, " Scram Discharge Header Water Level Monitoring
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System Test and Calibration", Revision 0.
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Lesson plan for training personnel in the operation and use of the
CMS equipment.
Section 4 of the bulletin supplement requires that a full test of the CMS
be performed using the SDV headers.
The test must be done during a
planned outage within six months of the supplement date.
The licensee
stated that the test will be performed during an outage planned for the
Spring of 1981.
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The operability test of the CMS during reactor operation as required by
Section 5 of the supplement will be done on a quarterly basis.
The inspector found that the equipment is capable of performing its
intended function and that the requirements of IE Bulletin No. 80-17,
Supplement 4 are being met as delineated in the licensee's response to
the bulletin dated February 2, 1981.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
6.
Irradiated Fecl Shipment
On February 2, 1981, spent fuel shipping cask number NAC-10 was received
from Babcock and Wilcox, Lynchburg, Virginia, via Tri State Motor Transit
Service.
Upon survey, removable radioactive contamination levels of
30,000 disintegrations per minute (dpm) were found on areas of the trailer
bed.
The NRC was notified and the cask was moved into the radiation
controlled area in preparation for decontamination.
The cause of the
surface contamination was believed to be leaking of contaminants from the
metal after exposure to the weather.
The cask and trailer were subsequently
decontaminated to a-level of less than 1000 dpm. An amendment to Certificate
of Compliance Number 6698 was granted by the NRC permitting the use of
NFS-4 cask number NAC-10 with a layer of strippable paint to preclude
repeated leaking of contaminants to the metal surface. On February 19,
1981, t,he cask was used to transport a shipment consisting of irradiated
fuel rods to Battelle Memorial Laboratories, Columbus, Ohio.
Prior to
departure of the shipment, the inspector reviewed the licensee's survey
of the trailer and its contents and verified that general area radiation
levels and removable contamination levels met the requirements of 49 CFR
173.
In addition, the inspector conducted an independent radiation
survey of the trailer and its contents.
No disparities existed between
the licensee's and the inspector's surveys.
Immediately prior to departure
of the shipment, the inspector witnessed a final radiation survey of the
truck cab, observed final safety checks of the truck and trailer, observed
communications check between the truck and the New Jersey State Police
escort vehicles, verified proper placarding of the vehicle, and verified
sufficient number of personnel were in the transport and escort vehicles
to assure adequate security.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
7.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in
order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance,
or deviations.
The unresolved items identified during this inspection
are discussed in paragraph 4.a.
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8.
Exit Interview
At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were
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held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and
findings. An exit meeting to discuss the results of the inspection of IE
Bulletin 80-17 was held on February 27, 1981.
Discussions with station
management relative to the status of Resident Inspection efforts were
held on February 3, 5, 10, 17, 19, 23, and 27, 1981.
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